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Atomic Assurance : The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation / Alexander Lanoszka.

By: Material type: TextTextLanguage: English Series: Cornell Studies in Security AffairsPublisher: Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2018]Copyright date: ©2018Description: 1 online resource (216 p.)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781501729195
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 327.1747 23
LOC classification:
  • JZ5675
  • JZ5675 .L36 2019
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation -- 1. How Alliances (Mis)Manage Nuclear Proliferation -- 2. American Security Guarantees during the Cold War, 1949-1980 -- 3. West Germany, 1954-1970 -- 4. Japan, 1952-1980 -- 5. South Korea, 1968-1980 -- 6. Nuclear Proliferation and Other American Alliances -- Conclusion: Understanding and Managing Alliances in the 21st Century -- Notes -- Index
Summary: Do alliances curb efforts by states to develop nuclear weapons? Atomic Assurance looks at what makes alliances sufficiently credible to prevent nuclear proliferation; how alliances can break down and so encourage nuclear proliferation; and whether security guarantors like the United States can use alliance ties to end the nuclear efforts of their allies.Alexander Lanoszka finds that military alliances are less useful in preventing allies from acquiring nuclear weapons than conventional wisdom suggests. Through intensive case studies of West Germany, Japan, and South Korea, as well as a series of smaller cases on Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and Taiwan, Atomic Assurance shows that it is easier to prevent an ally from initiating a nuclear program than to stop an ally that has already started one; in-theater conventional forces are crucial in making American nuclear guarantees credible; the American coercion of allies who started, or were tempted to start, a nuclear weapons program has played less of a role in forestalling nuclear proliferation than analysts have assumed; and the economic or technological reliance of a security-dependent ally on the United States works better to reverse or to halt that ally's nuclear bid than anything else.Crossing diplomatic history, international relations, foreign policy, grand strategy, and nuclear strategy, Lanoszka's book reworks our understanding of the power and importance of alliances in stopping nuclear proliferation.
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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation -- 1. How Alliances (Mis)Manage Nuclear Proliferation -- 2. American Security Guarantees during the Cold War, 1949-1980 -- 3. West Germany, 1954-1970 -- 4. Japan, 1952-1980 -- 5. South Korea, 1968-1980 -- 6. Nuclear Proliferation and Other American Alliances -- Conclusion: Understanding and Managing Alliances in the 21st Century -- Notes -- Index

Open Access unrestricted online access star

https://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2

Do alliances curb efforts by states to develop nuclear weapons? Atomic Assurance looks at what makes alliances sufficiently credible to prevent nuclear proliferation; how alliances can break down and so encourage nuclear proliferation; and whether security guarantors like the United States can use alliance ties to end the nuclear efforts of their allies.Alexander Lanoszka finds that military alliances are less useful in preventing allies from acquiring nuclear weapons than conventional wisdom suggests. Through intensive case studies of West Germany, Japan, and South Korea, as well as a series of smaller cases on Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and Taiwan, Atomic Assurance shows that it is easier to prevent an ally from initiating a nuclear program than to stop an ally that has already started one; in-theater conventional forces are crucial in making American nuclear guarantees credible; the American coercion of allies who started, or were tempted to start, a nuclear weapons program has played less of a role in forestalling nuclear proliferation than analysts have assumed; and the economic or technological reliance of a security-dependent ally on the United States works better to reverse or to halt that ally's nuclear bid than anything else.Crossing diplomatic history, international relations, foreign policy, grand strategy, and nuclear strategy, Lanoszka's book reworks our understanding of the power and importance of alliances in stopping nuclear proliferation.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

This eBook is made available Open Access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license:

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

https://www.degruyter.com/dg/page/open-access-policy

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2022)

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