

DE GRUYTER

Suaad Alghafal
**A BRIDGEHEAD
TO AFRICA**

**GERMAN INTEREST IN THE OTTOMAN PROVINCE
OF TRIPOLI (LIBYA) 1884-1918**



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ORIENT

Suaad Alghafal

A Bridgehead to Africa

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Ulrike Freitag

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Suaad Alghafal

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To my mother Warda and my father Mohamed: You are the reason for what I am today and what I want to be tomorrow

To my brothers: I am really grateful for your continuous help and support; without you I could not have reached this stage in my life

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Introduction

Turkish authority has never done anything to introduce modern progress, nor has it been concerned with organizing this country. 'One must wonder,' said a writer, 'how Europe has tolerated for so long at its doors the stigma of a savage Africa ...' while Algeria and Tunisia have become in civilization the equals of the countries of Europe. While France made so many sacrifices to bring to Morocco the lights of progress, this unfortunate Tripolitania, under the indifferent yoke of Turkey, remained with her defects and barbarism of former days.¹

This short text by Ernest Laut, a journalist and writer between 1910 and 1940 at *L'Illustration* and *Le Petit Journal*, explained in the first page of the French newspaper entitled "Explication de nos Gravures, Les Italiens en Tripolitaine", that Ottoman Tripolitania should be colonized by Europeans. He wrote this on October 15, 1911 before the declaration of the so called "Italo-Turkish War" on September 29, 1911. Laut stated that provinces from North Africa were ready to be colonized, civilized and modernized by Europe. He used the term Europe. The Tripolitanian province was to be civilized like the other provinces of North Africa. These words show how the relationship between Europe and Africa is seen just in terms of colonization and modernization with a very ambiguous conception of modernity and civilization. If we already know the stakes and goals of France with regards to Africa and specifically North Africa, we do not know very well about the other European countries, specifically Germans and Germany and how they conceived these relationships with North Africa and the Ottoman North African provinces. What were their goals, their interests in this context? This book is conceived as a reflection upon the relationships between Germany and the Ottoman province of Tripoli, Libya today, and an attempt to know more about this context of growing European colonialism and interests. This book is conceived as a close study of published and unpublished archival documents found in the Political Archive and the Federal Archives in Berlin (*Politisches Archiv* and *Bundesarchiv*)

¹ Our translation in English from the original in French: "L'autorité turque n'a jamais rien fait pour y introduire les progrès modernes, pas plus qu'elle ne s'est préoccupée d'organiser ce pays. 'Il faut se demander', disait un écrivain, 'comment l'Europe a toléré si longtemps à ses portes l'opprobre d'une Afrique sauvage...' Alors que l'Algérie, la Tunisie sont devenues en civilisation les égales des pays d'Europe, alors que la France fait tant de sacrifices pour porter au Maroc les lumières du progrès, cette malheureuse Tripolitaine, sous le joug indifférent de la Turquie demeurait avec ses tares et sa barbarie d'autrefois", Laut Ernest, *Le Petit Journal*, Supplément du Dimanche, "Explication de nos Gravures, Les Italiens en Tripolitaine", October 15, 1911, Gallica BNF, 10-12-2015, p. 1.

and the National Center for Documentation and Archives in Libya and the National archives of Tunisia. These documents were written in a variety of languages including German, English, Italian, and French. The archival documents found in the Libyan National Center for Documentation and Archives were also in different languages (Arabic, English, German, and Ottoman) while the archival documents found in Tunis were mainly in Arabic. These archival sources include government reports and correspondents as well as reports by travelers and witnesses who experienced the events as they were taking place. Some German, English and French consuls' reports found in the archives also contain important information about the province of Tripoli, such as reports written by the British consul in the province of Tripoli. These reports include very valuable information on the trade exchange and volume of trade between Germany and the province of Tripoli in the years 1884, 1885 and 1886. For instance, the reports included statistics in terms of total exports of the province of Tripoli to Germany and compared the volumes of trade in different years, and also compared the volume of trade of other European powers. Reports on Ottoman trade, such as a letter² released by the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs with regard to the German consulate in the province of Tripoli in 1910. Or the letter sent to confirm the approval by the Ottoman Empire of the new consul in 1910 could be found in these files. An example of the Arabic archival documents was about the slave trade.³ A number of boxes were at the National Center of Historical Archives in Tripoli, Libya. One of these files contained documents regarding the continuation of the slave trade in the province of Tripoli and specifically in the port of Benghazi in the eastern part of the province despite the universal decision to prevent it. In this book, many Arabic books written about the time period under study are used for understanding how German politics was perceived by the authors, mainly historians from the western and eastern part of Libya. For example, Ḥasan, al-Faqīh Ḥasan's chronicle⁴ with his major account of the history of the Ottoman province of Tripoli in the first half of the 19th century is one of them. Ḥasan, al-Faqīh Ḥasan wrote

2 Wathīqā 4288, *Ṣādīra 'an wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-'ūthmāniyyā ilā wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb, Wathīqā 'ūthmāniyyā 1327H/1910*, Dār al-māhafūḍāt al-tārikhiyya, al-Sarāya al-Ḥamrā', Ṭarābulis.

3 Wathīqā 12, *Milaf al-wathā'iq al-ijtimā'iyya, 1/6/1902*, shu' bat al-wathā'iq wa al-makhtūṭāt, al-markaz al-waṭānī li-l-māhafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis.

4 Ḥasan, al-Faqīh Ḥasan, *al-Yawmiyyāt al-libiyyā, vol. 1, 958h–1248h (1551–1832)*, taḥqīq Moḥammad al-'Uṣṭā wa 'Ammār Jihīdar, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1984, collection of textes and archives, 7); *al-Yawmiyyāt al-libiyyā, vol 2, al-harb al-'ahliya wa nihāya al-'ahd al-Kāramanli, 1248–1251h (1832–1835)*, ed. by Jihīdar, 'Ammār, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, collection textes and archives, 2-7), Ṭarābulis, 2001.

about daily life in the province of Tripoli and the events he experienced.⁵ There was also another interesting Arab author originally from Egypt, who witnessed many events during the war of 1915, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Azzām.⁶ He witnessed the war between Libya and Britain in Egypt during 1915–1916 and wrote a book about the battles there between the British and the Libyan *mujāhidīn* (The resisters). The Ottomans and the Germans supported these *mujāhidīn*. In his book, ‘Azzām provides details about the difficulties that faced the *mujāhidīn* and their leader Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf during the battles, their withdrawal toward Libya and the period after their defeat. It is worth mentioning that ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Azzām accompanied the army that started from the province of Tripoli and headed to Egypt to fight the British there. Another contemporary Arabic writer was al-Ṭāhir al-Zāwī⁷, who wrote a book *Jihād al-abṭāl* (Jihad of the Heroes) addressing the struggle of the Libyans against the Italians. It focused on the most important events that al-Zāwī personally experienced. He also wrote about the last period of the Ottomans in Libya and described the battles of the Libyans against the Italian occupation up to the point of time when the local Libyan leaders were negotiating with the Italians. He also wrote about the Republic of Tripoli that was declared after the end of World War One. Books written by travelers, particularly from Germany, containing a wealth of information about the economic, cultural and social life and the importance of the province of Tripoli for Germany were used as sources as well. These travelers began to reach the province of Tripoli during the 1840s. Moreover, the German travelers, in particular, provided a lot of scattered information about various aspects of life in the province of Tripoli. To give an example, one of the most influential German travelers was Gerhard Rohlfs, who wrote extensively about his trips to the province of Tripoli and North Africa and provided a lot of information about the province and its significance to Germany. One of his notable titles was *Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā*.⁸ Another significant

5 This chronicle was edited and published by the famous Libyan historian ‘Ammār Jihīdar and provides valuable information on travellers in this region.

6 ‘Azzām, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, “kifāḥ al-sha‘b al-lībī fi sabīl al-ḥurriyya”, translated by ‘Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, *Majallat al-wathā‘iq wa al-makhtūṭāt* 2, 2, markaz jihād al-libiyyin ḥid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1987.

7 See Kraiss, Jakob, *Geschichte als Widerstand, Geschichtsschreibung und „nation-building“ in Qaḍāfīs Libyen*, Ergon, Würzburg, 2016.

8 Rohlfs, Gerhard, *Reise durch Marokko*, Bremen, Kühtmann’s, 1868. Arabic translation: *Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā: taqārīr al-raḥāla al-‘almānī Ghīrhārd Rulfīs ilā Ṭarābulis ‘abr Bani-Walid wa Sūknā wa Hūn wa Waddān wa Zallā wa Awjilah wa Jālū wa Binghāzi*, translated by ‘Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2006.

book was written by Gustav Nachtigal under the title of *Sahara und Sudan*.⁹ He passed through the province of Tripoli in 1870. Italian literature on the history of Libya including the seminal works of Salvatore Bono¹⁰ was used as well. Bono collected western sources on the history of Libya (1510–1911). Orhan Koloğlu wrote about the history of Turkish-Libyan relations.¹¹ In addition, the works of ‘Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, who wrote many articles and books about the German travelers who visited Tripoli or other places in North Africa, is considered here as a major work on the analysis of German consuls who worked in Tripoli.¹² He also translated some of their books. Amongst the German researchers whose work on colonialism has been of relevance to this study is Sebastian Conrad; a prominent historian who has written extensively about German imperialism and colonialism. In his book *German Colonialism: A Short History*¹³, he discusses German colonial expansion and its most important causes and consequences. Another German historian of particular relevance for this work is Jürgen Osterhammel.¹⁴ He is the co-author of *Globalization: A Short History*.¹⁵ He wrote about the concept of imperialism and colonialism and provided a comprehensive definition of the two concepts discussing their many dimensions and attributes.¹⁶ Conrad and Osterhammel wrote an important book together about the position of the German transnational Empire in the World, 1871–1914.¹⁷

This book comprises five chapters which are arranged in chronological order.

9 Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan: Ergebnisse sechsjähriger Reisen in Afrika*, Erster Band, Graz, Austria, 1967.

10 Bono, Salvatore, *Storiografia e fonti occidentali sulla storia della Libia (1510–1911)*, Rome, 1982; See also Wright, John, *Libya: A Modern History*, Croom Helm, London and Canberra, 1981.

11 Koloğlu, Orhan, *500 Years in Turkish-Libyan Relations*, Ankara, 2007, pp. 10–11; see also Koloğlu, Orhan, “Libya from the Ottoman perspective (1835–1918)”, *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente*, 63-2, 2008, pp. 275–282.

12 Ghānim, ‘Imād al-Dīn, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-‘almāniyya fi Lībiyā khilāl al-‘aḳd al-‘awal min al-qarn al-‘aishrīn kamā tuṣawiruhā wathā’iq al-‘arshif al-siyāsī al-‘almānī”, *Majallat al-buḥūth al-tārikhiyya*, 5, 1, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn ḳid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1983.

13 Conrad, Sebastian, *German Colonialism: A Short History*, translated by Sorcha O’Hagan, Cambridge University Press, 2012.

14 Osterhammel, Jürgen, *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen*, C.H.Beck, Munich, 1995.

15 Osterhammel, Jürgen, *Globalization: A Short History* (with Niels P. Petersson, Princeton 2005) *Max Weber and His Contemporaries*, ed. with Wolfgang J. Mommsen, London 1987.

16 Osterhammel, Jürgen, “The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century”, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014; Osterhammel, Jürgen, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, 2nd ed., Princeton 2005.

17 Conrad, Sebastian and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2004.

The first chapter consists of discussions and discourses on European and German colonialism and imperialism and their definitions as used in this book and found suitable for the case of the province of Tripoli.

The second chapter examines the geopolitical importance of the province of Tripoli and how this lent the province a geographic, strategic and economic significance that attracted the attention of the countries seeking control over areas in North Africa. The next part of this chapter presents the general situation in the province of Tripoli between 1870 and 1884 and includes the political situation when the province was under Ottoman rule. Tripoli's administrative divisions were set by the Ottomans to facilitate their control. Examples of some Ottomans governors are given, particularly those who had a prominent role at that time. The economic situation between 1870 and 1884 is also discussed, with reference to key indicators such as taxes, industry and commerce. The society of the province of Tripoli is discussed in the context of different social conditions and characteristics presented relating to the origin of the province's residents and an analysis of their origin. Other social aspects, such as culture and education, from the beginning of establishing schools to the era of publishing newspapers and magazines in the province of Tripoli, are also included in the analysis of the social circumstances of the region.

The third chapter begins by discussing the relations between the province of Tripoli and Germany following the Berlin Conference in 1884. It ends with the year 1909, and includes several aspects concerning the German interest in the province of Tripoli and when the topic began to be clearly and officially discussed. The second subchapter discusses the second Berlin Conference in 1884 and its impact on the Maghreb region. This conference was held because of the intersection of European interests in Africa. The question here is about the consequences for the African continent? What were the regulations and laws at the European level that were adopted to prevent conflicts and wars, including those relating to political and economic interests in the future? This chapter also explores the role of the German travelers in Tripoli and Fezzan at the end of the 19th century and how it granted them access to Central Africa with the consent of the Ottomans in Tripoli. Moreover, what was their role in supporting the country's policy toward the province via the reports that they sent to Germany? The question that arises in this context is whether the activities of the travelers impacted the development of the relations between the province of Tripoli and Germany through 1895, especially with a focus on economic and trade exchanges? This chapter concludes by discussing the opening of the German consulate in Tripoli in 1909, and raises the question of why Germany was relatively late, in comparison to the other European countries, in establishing diplomatic representation in the province of Tripoli. It also tries to find an answer to the question of why

Germany decided to open a consular agency in 1884, and why it was only in 1909 that the consulate was developed into an embassy?

The fourth chapter focuses on investigating economic developments and German policy toward the province of Tripoli during the period between 1909 and 1914. It also takes the major events that occurred during this phase into account. The chapter tries to answer the question of whether and to what extent the establishment of the German diplomatic representation impacted relations between the two countries. The chapter goes on to discuss the international conventions and the occupation of the province of Tripoli by Italy in 1911. The main conventions between the European countries are presented and the chapter considers the extent to which these conventions shaped and reshaped the interests of European countries outside Europe. Within the same political context, the subject of Ottoman-German relations and the alliance between these powers before the First World War, and the evolution of this relationship, are discussed. It concludes with the declaration of German neutrality toward the province of Tripoli after Italian occupation, a move that entailed open hostilities with the Ottoman Empire, given that the province of Tripoli was administratively and politically managed by the Ottomans. The next subchapter discusses how the German presence in Libya continued after the Italian occupation in the form of sending health missions to the province of Tripoli, which was providing assistance to Libyans wounded in their war against Italy.

The fifth chapter discusses the relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire and its impact on the situation in the province of Tripoli during the First World War. It reveals the German position toward the Libyan *jihād* movement, discussing the motives, goals and gains. Then it refers to the German support to the Ottoman state through the German presence in Libya, where German politicians decided to provide military and financial aid to the Ottomans and the Libyan *mujāhidīn*. The last part focuses on how the Germans and Ottomans managed to convince the leadership of the *mujāhidīn* in Libya to develop their war from a war against the Italians in Libya into a war against the British in Egypt in 1915. Finally, the chapter presents the German policy toward the province of Tripoli at the end of the First World War in 1918, the negative impacts on the German presence in Libya and how the defeat of Germany at the end of the First World War resulted in the end of German influence in Libya during this phase.

1 European Colonial Ambitions and Economic Expansion of the Reich (1884–1914)

1.1 Behind Colonialism and Imperialism

This book investigates a rare topic in German imperial history: German engagement in the Ottoman province of Tripoli. It thus fills the important gap in the extensive literature on German imperialism with a specific focus: relations between Germany and the Ottoman provinces of Tripoli (*Wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-Ghārb*) from 1884 to 1918. It also considers the political, economic, and institutional factors that influenced the relationships between Germany and Tripoli. This province was one of the North African provinces under the rule of the Ottoman Empire from 1551 to 1911. This book will also analyze as well the relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the light of events of more international significance that were taking place around the same time and influencing this relationship.

The time period focused on in this book is from 1884 to 1918. This period has been selected for its essential relevance to the history of the relationship between the East and the West. The 18th and 19th centuries were characterized by an extension of European control outside the European continent;¹ an enterprise that included what came to be known as the “scramble for Africa”.² This period was also marked by the Industrial Revolution in Europe. The mechanization of the industrial sector that it brought about, as well as mass production of different products, led to enormous economic developments.³ Following these developments European powers began to search for markets for their products and for regions that would supply the raw materials required for the growing industries.⁴ In order to secure their access to these markets and raw materials, it was necessary to have the routes and the political control over these areas, either by entering into treaties with the original landowners or by the imposition of direct political and military control. The expansion outside Europe was rooted in these specific needs, which took on both a political and economic char-

1 Conrad, *German Colonialism*.

2 Pakenham, Thomas, *The Scramble for Africa: The White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912*, Harper Perennial, 1992.

3 Giordani, Paolo, *The German Colonial Empire – Its Beginning and Ending*, translated by Mrs. Gustavus W. Hamilton, G. Bell and Sons, London, 1916. <https://archive.org/stream/germancolonialeem00gioruoft/djvu.txt> (05.05.2016), p. vi

4 Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 27.

acter. Many European countries sought to obtain control over territories outside their borders. Alongside more internationally powerful countries such as Britain, France, Spain and Portugal, Germany also had ambitions of this nature. Britain had succeeded in extending its influence into many areas including India in Asia, Egypt and Sudan in North Africa as well as some other areas in Central and West Africa. France had control of some areas in North Africa like the Ottoman province of Algeria since 1830 and Tunis from 1881, while Spain and Portugal had managed to control some of the areas bordering the Indian Ocean. Germany did not participate in the earlier colonial competition of the European countries in these regions. Only after the political and administrative unification in 1871 did Germany start to develop a policy of expansion toward territories outside Europe, and Africa more specifically. Thus, Germany had acquired some areas in Central and Western Africa, albeit later than other European countries such as Britain and France. The German expansion started in practice with Otto von Bismarck (1815–1895),⁵ the German Chancellor of the Reich (1871–1890). He decided to have colonies outside Germany in 1884, a move which he viewed as crucial to protect his country from other powers. The German minister Bernhard von Bülow (1849–1929) who was the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1897–1900) and later the Chancellor of the German Empire (1900–1909) expressed the necessity for expansion explicitly in his speech before the house of the Imperial Diet of the German Empire (Reichstag) on December 11, 1899:

In our nineteenth century, England has continually expanded its colonial empire – the largest the world has seen since the days of the Romans. The French have gained a firmer and firmer foothold in North Africa and Africa and created for themselves a new empire in the Far East. In Asia, Russia has embarked on a series of victories that has taken it to the Pamir Plateau and the coasts of the Pacific Ocean....⁶

In these words, he stressed the position of England as the first colonial empire in the world, as well as the gains of the other major powers, mainly France and Russia. In a speech comparing these powers, he mentioned the main interest of each and the German interest specifically, as well as the main reasons behind the expansion, in the following words:

⁵ For more information on the Prussian statesman and the German Chancellor (1815–1898) see Pflanze, Otto, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, vol. 3: “The Period of Fortification, 1880–1898”, 2nd ed., 1990.

⁶ Bernhard von Bülow, speech given: “Dynamic Foreign Policy” (December 11, 1899), German History in Documents and Images (GHDI): http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=779 (05.03.2016).

It is out of the question for the simple reason that we now have interests in all parts of the world. [...] The rapid growth of our population, the Unprecedented expansion of our industry, the industriousness of our merchants, in short, the phenomenal vitality of the German people have integrated us into the world economy and drawn us into international politics. If the British speak of Greater Britain, if the French speak of Nouvelle France, if the Russians move into Asia, we too have the right to a Greater Germany.⁷

Another important event which took place during the period in question was the Second Berlin Conference, also known as Congo Conference, in 1884. This conference was a very influential political event that shaped the relationship between the major European powers as well as their respective expansions in Africa. The conference was held in response to the emerging conflict among the European powers about their colonies in Africa, especially in the Congo Basin. It discussed questions such as how to colonize, what to colonize and how to implement free trade and freedom of navigation in the Congo Basin, and came out with new regulations with regard to their colonies in the area.⁸ The main regulations included the supervision of colonies to prevent any single country abusing the rights of another. These were stated in articles 34 and 35 of the conference agreement.⁹ The countries participating also agreed to prevent the slave trade in article 9. Article 6 specified the regulations to deal with the local populations in the colonies.¹⁰ The year 1918 has been selected as the cut-off point of this book because it represents the end of World War I and the decline of German influence over the province of Tripoli, which was named “Libya” in 1911 after the Italian occupation.¹¹ However, this period will also be examined in this book in order to see if and how German interest in Libya changed during this time and whether or not it was affected by Italian occupation of this region. In 1918, the Tripolitanian Republic was established under Italian rule (*al-Jumhūriyya al-Ṭarābulisiyya* – Republic of Tripolitania).¹² The political and economic conditions in which the declaration took place were

7 Bernhard von Bülow, speech given: “Dynamic Foreign Policy” (December 11, 1899).

8 On the topic see for example Craven, Matthew, “Between Law and History: The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 and the Logic of Free Trade”, *London Review of International Law*, 3-1, 2015, pp. 31–59.

9 Stoecker, Helmuth, *German Imperialism in Africa from the Beginning until the Second World*, Translated from German by Bernd Zöllner Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1986, p. 37.

10 Ibid.

11 Nagy, Lászlo J., “Le guerre italo-turque en Tripolitaine (1911–1912) et la Hongrie”, *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente*, 63-2, 2008, pp. 325–331.

12 This “Tripolitanian Republic” started on November 16, 1918 and ended on July 1, 1919; see al-Zāwī, al-Ṭāhir Aḥmed, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, Dār al-madār al-islāmī, Bayrūt, 2004, pp. 322–323, 353.

difficult, owing to the recent defeat of the Ottoman forces (supported by Germany) and their withdrawal from the region, including Libya. Even at the beginning of 1919 the Ottoman forces were asked to leave the country, the representative of the Ottoman Empire and the German commander Paul Freiherr Wolff von Todenwarth stayed to help build the new republic that expected to rule the country.¹³ The geographical scope of this book is limited to the area belonging to the last North African Ottoman province of Tripoli at the end of the 19th century and within its boundaries defined in that period by Britain and France. The province of Tripoli shared its eastern borders with the former Ottoman province of Egypt. The British army had occupied Egypt since 1882 but it was not declared a British colony, making its status unclear. The western border of the province was shared with the former Ottoman province of Tunisia and the former Ottoman province of Algeria that had been colonized by France since 1830. The northern borders of Tripoli were constituted by the Mediterranean Sea, and to the south lay the middle, eastern and western regions of Sudan, which are now divided into Chad (colonized by France 1900-1960),¹⁴ Niger (colonized by France 1922–1960) and Sudan (colonized by Britain 1899–1956). These geographical borders had been defined differently under the administration of the Ottoman Empire, and they were changed when the European countries colonized the area and redefined the borders according to their interests and influence. The province of Tripoli was considered important for different European powers. Historical literature showed that in 1899 the province of Tripoli was an issue of dispute between England and France, since it was viewed as the easiest intermediary passage between the basin of Chad, English Nigeria and French Senegal and the Mediterranean. In Giordani's words "Tripoli, for evident geographical reasons has always been the shortest way to the sea".¹⁵ The importance of the province of Tripoli also resulted from the coastline stretching north to the Mediterranean with a distance exceeding 1.900 km. Tripoli was an important commercial center with many 'Libyan' cities established since the period of the Phoenicians, and then under Carthage and the Roman Empire. It was also the meeting point of the African trade routes that gathered both Eastern and European trade.¹⁶ With regard to Germany, this importance was stressed in the German media at the time supported by businessmen,

¹³ al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, pp. 310–311

¹⁴ See Zeltner, Jean-Claude, *Tripoli, carrefour de l'Europe et des pays du Tchad (1500–1795)*, Paris, 1992.

¹⁵ Giordani, *The German Colonial Empire – Its Beginning and Ending*, p. 131.

¹⁶ See "Les annales Tripolitaines de Charles Féraud", with an introduction by Nora Lafi, Bouchène, Paris, 2005, 437p; see also Dewièrè, Rémi and Işıkşel, Güneş, "Tripoli, port de mer, port de desert", *Hypothèses*. Revue de l'école doctorale d'histoire de Paris 1.

travelers and investors to prompt the German politicians and decision makers to seek a space in North Africa building on the good relations they had with the Ottoman Empire. In addition to that, they tried to find an entrance to reach their colonies in East and West Africa easily.¹⁷ This province was the best place to realize this objective and it is argued clearly in different documents from the The Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts) that the German presence in this Tripolitanian region was subjected to the international policies, but the intention was different from the colonial intentions of Italy.¹⁸ Germany's interests in the province were more specifically economic and strategic in contrast to Italy, which wanted to fully occupy the province. The Italian interest was based on the concern to have a colony in the province of Tripoli, the coast of which it regarded as its fourth border (*Quarta sponda*).¹⁹ The province of Tripoli also attracted many travelers who played a major role in highlighting its strategic importance. A large number of travelers of differing European nationalities visited this place. They came also with different intentions. Most of them came under the aegis of the Association for Promoting the Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa, also known as the African Association, which was established in London in 1788.²⁰ This association was used by Britain to collect as much information as possible on the areas that were not yet under the control of any European countries. The association financed scouting trips and other activities that helped in collecting the needed information. Many European travelers were financed through this association, such as the German traveler Heinrich Barth (born 1821) who wrote extensively on Tripolitania and on Africa more generally.²¹ However, other travelers who visited the province of Tripoli came individually, driven by their desire to explore the area. They subsequently developed their interests and were supported by some associations that had specific missions. In addition to Heinrich Barth, Gerhard Rohlfs (born 1831),²² Gustav Nachtigal (born

17 Giordani, *The German Colonial Empire – Its Beginning and Ending*, p. 131.

18 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 1, vom Juli 1869 bis Oktober 1888, R901/52506, 19. Juni, 1899, Nr. A.z.14524/99/1899.

19 <https://chronicle.fanack.com/libya/history-past-to-present/italys-fourth-coast/>.

20 On the African Association, see Rutherford, Robert Vincent, *Sir Joseph Banks and the Exploration of Africa (1788–1820)*, Berkeley, University of California, 1952, 704p; see also: Mūri, 'Atilyū, *al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-juḥrāfi fī Libiyā mundhu maṭala' al-qarn al-tāsi' 'ashar ḥata al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī*, Ta'rib Khalifa al-Tilisi, Dār al-Furjāni, Ṭarābulis, 1971, p. 8.

21 Barth's journey to the province of Tripoli will be presented in chapter 3, Barth, Heinrich, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa*, London, 1857.

22 Friedrich Gerhard Rohlfs (1831–1896), a former consul in Zanzibar appointed by Otto von Bis-

1834),²³ Gottlob Adolf Krause (born 1834),²⁴ and Ewald Banse (born 1883)²⁵ amongst others. Obviously, they all benefited from the experience of the Libyans in understanding the desert as well as their knowledge about the routes and pathways leading to the interior of Africa. The European travelers who visited the province of Tripoli could be divided into two categories: The first, like Baron von Maltzan and Gottlob Adolf Krause, came to the province to explore and research historical and geographical aspects, in addition to the monuments. The second group tried to study the province focusing on the political, economic and social aspects, and they intended to collect as much information as possible. Members of this, group, such as Gerhard Rohlfs and Gustav Nachtigal, were serving the colonial objectives first. Those travelers, especially the Germans, realized economic goals. Tripoli offered them a good entry into West and East Africa. This is why the German consular agency (*al-Wikāla al-Qunṣuliyya*) opened in Tripoli in 1884 and was later upgraded in 1909 to a consulate (*Qunṣuliyya*). The opening of the consulate is generally viewed by Libyan historians as representing the highpoint of German interest in the province of Tripoli.²⁶ But it should be stressed that this revealed the interests of Germany, despite the reserve with which German diplomacy worked with the province through other channels, such as those of Constantinople, the capital of the Ottoman Empire. In shaping German policies in the North Africa region, the German consul does not represent as such the German approach to the whole region. German decision makers acting through this consular agency is sometimes different from those pertaining to the consulate. The

marck, who was before a doctor in the French colonial Legion in the Ottoman province of Algiers where he took part in the violent colonization of the Kabylia region. In 1878 he was commissioned by the German African Society to travel to the region of Wadai in the south of the Province of Tripoli. As a geographer, as well, he explored Africa and dedicated very interesting pages to the province of Ottoman Tripoli, See Rohlfs, Gerhard, *Reise durch Marokko, Uebersteigung des grossen Atlas, Exploration der Oasen von Tafilet, Tuat, Tidikelt und Reise durch die grosse Wüste über Rhadames nach Tripoli*, Kühtman's Buchhandlung, Bremen, 1868.

23 Nachtigal, Gustav, *Sahara und Sudan*, 3 vols., Weltgeist-Bücher Verlags-Gesellschaft m.b.h, Berlin – Leipzig, 1879–1889.

24 Krawzā, Ghūtlūb Adūlf, *Taqārīr Ghūtlūb Adūlf Krawzā al-ṣaḥāfiyya ḥawl al-ghazū al-iṭālī li-Libiyā*, translated by 'Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1993.

25 Banzā, Ifāld, *Ṭarābulis maṭla' al-qarn al-'aishrīn fī waṣf al-jughrafi al-'almānī Ifāld Banzā*, translated and studied by 'Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1998.

26 See for example Ghānim, 'Imād al-Dīn wa Hānis Shlūtīr, "al-Qunṣuliyya al-'ālāmiyyā fī Ṭarābulis wa makanātuha fī al-'ālāqāt al-libiyyā al-'almāniyya ḥattā nihāyat al-ḥarab al-'ālāmiyyā al-'ūlā", unpublished, p. 3.

consulate served the Germans who resided in the province, including the travelers and investors.²⁷ The international context in the 19th century was just about control over the territories of the Ottoman by the European countries. In 1882 an agreement between France and Britain and then in 1899 made possible the sharing of Sudan between them. An 1887 German-Italian agreement was secretly signed by the Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. By signing this agreement Germany stated the eligibility of Italy to occupy the province of Tripoli.²⁸ There was also an Entente cordiale signed between France and Britain in 1904.²⁹ It is to be noted here that the signing of this agreement resulted in the first Morocco crisis, which was solved via the Algeciras conference.³⁰ This highlights the argument that Italy had entered into many agreements and used other agreements to pave its way to occupy the province of Tripoli. An analysis of Germany's relationship with the Ottoman Empire is needed, particularly a study of German influence and support provided to the leadership of the Libyan *mujāhidīn*³¹ (those who fought against the invasion in 1914 in moving their troops to fight in a war outside their province, specifically against the British in Egypt instead of supporting them in the internal war against the Italians).

This book argues that Germany was trying to emulate the major European countries, particularly Britain and France, in the process of extending its control beyond Europe. Germany had political, strategic and economic interests in North Africa, particularly the province of Tripoli, but never had colonial intentions like the other European countries although the terms and concepts “colonialism” and “imperialism” are differentiated by historians in other contexts. To realize these goals, Germany started to strengthen its relations with the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 19th century. They also developed the military forces of the Otto-

27 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. 16857, 19. Juni 1899.

28 On the agreement of 1887: Medlicott, W.N., “The Mediterranean Agreement of 1887”, *The Slavonic Review*, 5-13, 1926, pp. 66-88; Ismā‘īl, Ḥilmi Maḥrūs, *Tārīkh al-‘Arab al-ḥadīth min al-ghazā’ al-‘ūthmānī ilā nihāyat al-ḥarab al-‘ālāmiyyā al-‘ulā*, vol. 1, mu’ssasat shabāb al-jamī’a, al-Iskandariyya, 1977, p. 263.

29 On the Entente cordiale see Bell, P.M.H., *France and Britain 1900–1940*, Routledge, London, 2014, 288p; see also Mikhā‘īl, Hinrī ‘Anīs, *al-‘Ālāqāt al-Injilīziyya al-libiyyā ma’a taḥlīl li-lmu’āhadā al-Injilīziyya al-libiyyā*, al-hai’a al-maṣriyya al-‘āmmā li-l-ta’līf wa al-nashir, al-Qāhira, 1973, p. 13.

30 Jones, Heather, “Algeciras Revisited: European Crisis and Conference Diplomacy 1906”, *EUI Working Papers*, European University Institute, Max Weber Program MWP 2009/01; see also Anderson, Eugene, *The First Moroccan Crisis (1904–1906)*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Press, 1930.

31 People who are involved in *jihad* (Islamic war against the enemies of Islam).

mans and established economic projects like building the Baghdad railway. This book also argues that Germany already had a political and military presence in other parts of central Africa; the province of Tripoli was thus viewed by Germany as the gate to the German colonies in Africa. This study considers an episode of what has been called the “scramble for Africa”. The events are analyzed as part of the wider context of colonialism and imperialism. It is relatively common that the terms “colonialism” and “imperialism” are used interchangeably in literature discussing the subject, although they refer to different phenomena. Colonization as a phenomenon had spread drastically in the period following the geographical discoveries at the beginning of the 15th and 16th centuries, and became stronger in the 18th and 19th centuries. Jürgen Osterhammel’s definition of colonialism explains the process. Osterhammel defines colonialism as a relationship of domination between two culturally different powers, in the context of which one party controls the decisions of the other, who is forced to deal with these external pressures and serve the interests of the dominant party.³² The interests of the colonized countries were not considered subordinated to those of the colonizers. Moreover, colonialism is the ideological orientation of the colonizer.³³ Timo Särkkä supported the argument and definition provided by Osterhammel that colonialism is an unequal economic, political and cultural relationship between the colonial powers and the colonized countries.³⁴ It is noted that imperialism as a concept emerged later than the concept of colonialism. According to the same writer, the term imperialism means the collection of all the actors and all forces that contribute to the establishment and maintenance of colonial empires. Imperialism was not only a colonial policy of one power but it was shaped and reshaped by the influence of the international polices and powers of countries who seek to take part of the process and actions.³⁵ The main factors behind the development of colonialism tend to be divided into four groups in the literature on the subject.³⁶ The first of these is the economic factor, including the rise of the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution was also taking place in the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe and was accompanied by the mechanization of the industrial sector as well as mass production of different products that led to enor-

³² Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen*, p. 21.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Särkkä, Timo, *Hobson’s Imperialism A Study in Late-Victorian Political Thought*, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, 2009, p. 13.

³⁵ Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen*, p. 21.

³⁶ Aybar, Juan Carlos Ocaña, *Colonialism and Imperialism, Geography and History*, Bilingual Studies – IES Parque de Lisboa, Alcorcón, Madrid.

mous economic developments.³⁷ These developments were the reason behind the attempts of the European powers to search for markets to sell their products, as well as to find new regions to get the required raw materials for the growing industries.³⁸ In order to secure their access to these markets and raw materials, it was necessary to have political control over these new regions, either by entering into treaty relations with the original rulers or by imposing direct political and military control. The expansion outside Europe came from these specific needs, which took on both political and economic characters. It is also important to note that imperialism was not limited to the actual establishment of colonies but could also included penetration by economic and financial means. This corresponds to Germany's relations with the Ottoman Empire. The idea of examining the economic motives of imperialism was originally developed by J.A. Hobson (1858–1940),³⁹ who argued that imperialism was driven by economic motives during the Industrial Revolution when the European powers tried to find new markets and sources of raw materials. Hobson's main argument is that after the industrial and capitalist countries achieved production surplus they began to search for new markets to sell their products, invest their capital and acquire raw material for the growing industries and found their target in the developing countries. As part of this process, the pressure that businessmen and venture capitalists put on their governments to protect their money and projects led to political intervention in the internal affairs of colonized countries.⁴⁰ Jules Ferry (1832–1893) justified the French motivations behind colonial expansion in his speech before the French National Assembly that:

... which justify a policy of colonial expansion from the point of view of that need, felt more and more strongly by the industrial populations of Europe and particularly those of our own rich and hard working country: the need for export markets. Is this some kind of chimera? Is this a view of the future or is it not rather a pressing need and, we could say, the cry of our industrial population? I will formulate only in a general way what each of you, in the different parts of France, is in a position to confirm. Yes, what is lacking for our great industry, drawn irrevocably on to the path of exportation by the (free trade) treaties of 1860, what it lacks more and more is export markets. Why? Because next door to us Germany is surrounded by barriers, because beyond the ocean, the United States of America has become protectionist,

37 Giordani, *The German Colonial Empire – Its Beginning and Ending*, https://archive.org/stream/germancolonialem00gioruoft/germancolonialem00gioruoft_djvu.txt (05.05.2016), p. vi

38 Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 27.

39 Särkkä provided a comprehensive analysis of Hobson's theory from his own perspective as well as the perspectives of other writers.

40 Evans, Richard J., "Empire: The Scramble for Africa", Gresham College, London, 2001, (<http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/the-scramble-for-africa>).

protectionist in the most extreme sense, because not only have these great markets ... there is a second point, a second order of ideas to which I have to give equal attention, but as quickly as possible, believe me; it is the humanitarian and civilizing side of the question.⁴¹

The second factor was political, including the expansion of political power and influence that was supported by specific lobby groups and political prestige. The third includes geostrategic factors such as the acquisition of geographically privileged provinces and their transformation into colonies of the European powers. The larger the colonial empire, the more powerful were the colonizers. This can also be seen as linked to the first two factors. The fourth factor can be related to cultural and scientific goals, including the expansion of European cultures and civilizations in the new colonies. This included using colonies to locate the growing European population to ease population pressures in Europe. It is argued also in literature that⁴² political rivalries, anticipated economic gains, nationalism, and humanitarianism all contributed to the psychological atmosphere that led to this final chapter of Western expansion.⁴³

Consequently, many European countries sought to obtain new territories or intensified their control over territories outside their borders, especially powerful countries like Britain, France, Spain and Portugal, in addition to Germany. Britain had succeeded in extending its influence into many areas including India, Egypt and Sudan as well as some other areas in Central and West Africa. France controlled some areas in North Africa like Algeria and Tunis. Spain and Portugal had also managed to control some of the areas bordering the Indian Ocean. Considering all these issues, it can be argued that both economic and political factors played a significant role in prompting the Europeans to look for new areas outside the European continent. However, since this book focuses on Germany, the question that arises here is whether the German colonial empire was different from the other European colonial empires?

41 Jules Ferry (1832–1893) was a French politician who twice served as premier during the Third Republic from 1871 until 1940.

42 Jules Ferry, Speech before the French National assembly, see Power, Thomas, *Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism*, Whitefish, Literary Licensing, 2013, Pakenham, Thomas, *The Scramble for Africa, 1876–1912*, Random House, New York, 1991.

43 Wesseling, Hendrik L., *Imperialism and Colonialism: Essays on the History of European Expansion*, Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press, 1997.

1.2 German Colonial Ambitions

Germany did not participate in the earlier colonial competition of the European powers outside Europe because the German states were not united at that time. It was only after German unity in 1871 that the policy of expansion toward territories outside Europe and specifically in Africa developed. Germany had succeeded in achieving its political unity – modelled on Italy which had preceded it in 1860 – as a result of the great efforts of the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who decided to engage in war with Austria, France and Denmark to prove his country's military strength and power and for Germany to take a remarkable position among the major powers represented by Britain and France at that time. The German expansion began when the German Chancellor of the Reich Otto von Bismarck decided to have colonies outside Europe in 1884. These were viewed as crucial to protecting his country from other powers. Germany had acquired some areas in Central and Western Africa, albeit later than the European countries like Britain and France. Germany's unity, which took place during the period of industrial revolution in Europe, reinforced its economic activities and led to significant growth in the chemical industry, heavy industry, construction of the fleet and the army and so on, factors which formed the basis for its expansionary interests in the 1890s and after. Sebastian Conrad argued that there were pressure groups and agents behind the German colonial expansion,⁴⁴ referred to by Dirk Göttsche⁴⁵ as the colonialist movement in Germany. These included the geographical societies and projects that helped to provide academic insight into Africa by exploring uncharted territories. Sebastian Conrad mentions Heinrich Barth, Gerhard Rohlfs and Gustave Nachtigal as the main travelers whose trips to different parts of Africa were influential in German colonial expansion. As mentioned before, these three German travelers visited the province of Tripoli, which led to the province becoming part of their ambitions. Sebastian Conrad also refers to a second group, the colonial immigrants and missionaries including the Catholic missionaries sent by the French and Belgian churches. A third group included merchant networks, such as the Hanseatic merchant families, who set up trade linkages throughout the world. They fought for the principles of free trade and played an important role in preparing the ground for colonial activities. A fourth pressure group mentioned by Sebastian Conrad was the educated, liberal and nationalist members of the bourgeoisie who were backed by some

⁴⁴ Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 23–27.

⁴⁵ Göttsche, Dirk, *Remembering Africa: The Discovery of Colonialism in Contemporary German Literature*, Camden House, USA, 2013, p. 44.

nobility, missionaries and merchants and played a crucial role in setting policy. Sebastian Conrad mentions Friedrich Farbi (1824–1891), an adviser to Bismarck and Adolph Woermann, a merchant and national liberal member of the Reichstag as a pioneer of the German expansion⁴⁶. He wrote a book on colonialism and how Germany should build a colonial empire like the other European countries. In addition to the pressure groups, Sebastian Conrad also discusses the factors and motivations behind German colonial expansion and argues that trade interest was the first motive. As he shows, colonies played an important role in solving the problem of over-production. A second motive was related to migration. This had been ongoing since 1880, when politicians became motivated to find a place for new German settlements abroad, beyond those that had hitherto represented the focus for German migration. There was a fear that Germany would be the “fertilizer of people” and North America was considered as a “melting pot”. Colonies were to play the role of the “New Germany”, meaning that Germans would remain German even when settling overseas.⁴⁷ A third motive were the internal conflicts and tension prompting unrest within Germany. In Sebastian Conrad’s words:

Historians have termed this the strategy of social imperialism: it meant declaring colonial expansion to be a task for the nation as a whole, thus pushing material needs and social tensions into the background.⁴⁸

A fourth motive was the idea of colonizing that was found in German culture and ideology. Sebastian Conrad portrays a German concept of a ‘civilizing mission’ as an idea that brought different people together.⁴⁹ Götttsche⁵⁰ supports this with a quotation from Osterhammel.⁵¹ He agrees with Sebastian Conrad to a great extent that these factors and actors influenced German colonial expansion and mentions the main factors as “the interplay of colonial expansion, Eurocentric capitalist trade, industrialization, the development of a world-wide modern infrastructure, and the increasing global movement of individuals, goods and ideas.”⁵²

The German Empire also continued after Otto von Bismarck, as Bernhard von Bülow, who was the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1897–1900) and

⁴⁶ Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 25.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁵⁰ Götttsche, *Remembering Africa*, p. 45.

⁵¹ Osterhammel, Jürgen, *Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, C.H. Beck, Munich, 2009.

⁵² Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt*, p. 44.

later the Chancellor of the German Empire (1900–1909), explicitly expressed the necessity of expansion in his speech before the Reichstag on December 11, 1899:

In our nineteenth century, England has continually expanded its colonial empire – the largest the world has seen since the days of the Romans. The French have gained a firmer and firmer foothold in North Africa and Africa and created for themselves a new empire in the Far East. In Asia, Russia has embarked on a series of victories that has taken it to the Pamir Plateau and the coasts of the Pacific Ocean....⁵³

His speech viewed the position of England as the first colonial empire in the world, as well the other gains of the other major powers, particularly France and Russia. In a comparison between these powers, he mentioned the main interest of each and the German interest specifically, as well as the main reasons behind the expansion, in his words:

It is out of the question for the simple reason that we now have interests in all parts of the world. [...] The rapid growth of our population, the unprecedented expansion of our industry, the industriousness of our merchants, in short, the phenomenal vitality of the German people have integrated us into the world economy and drawn us into international politics. If the British speak of Greater Britain, if the French speak of Nouvelle France, if the Russians move into Asia, we too have the right to a Greater Germany.⁵⁴

Coming to the question of the period under research (1884–1918) and the reasons for its importance, it can be argued that many events took place during this period of time that contributed to its significance in the development of colonialism in Africa and in German colonial expansion. The most important event of the period was the Second Berlin Conference in 1884, which has therefore been chosen as a starting year in this book because of the significance of this conference to the relationships between the East and the West. This conference was organized by Germany, which sought to develop a role for itself in mediating between the European powers, which were beginning to have conflicting interests in Africa. The conference was a significant political event that shaped the relationship between the major European powers as well as their expansion in Africa. It was held to deal with the emerging conflict among the European powers about their colonies in Africa, especially in the Congo Basin. It discussed very crucial points including how to colonize, what to colonize and how to implement free trade and freedom of navigation in the Congo Basin. Its results also included new regulations regard-

⁵³ Bernhard von Bülow, *Dynamic Foreign Policy* (speech given December 11, 1899).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

ing their colonies in the area.⁵⁵ The main regulations included strong supervision of colonies to prevent any abuse by any country against the others. These were stated in Article 34 and 35 of the conference agreements.⁵⁶ The countries participating in the conference also agreed to prevent the slave trade in Article 9. Article 6 specified the regulations to deal with the local populations in the colonies.⁵⁷ World War I was a turning point because the major powers, mainly Russia, Germany, France, and Britain joined the hostilities that transformed it into a world war.⁵⁸ In 1918, the Tripolitanian Republic was established in very difficult political and economic conditions. The Republic was declared after the defeat of the Ottoman forces (which had been supported by Germany) and their withdrawal from the entire region, including Libya. However, even after the official departure of the Ottoman forces, the representative of the Ottoman Empire and the German commander von Todenwarth stayed to help build the new republican government that was expected to rule the country.⁵⁹ A consideration of the factors that distinguished the German colonial expansion would point to the argument, well-known in the relevant literature,⁶⁰ that the German colonial empire was one of the shortest-lived colonial empires in modern history, particularly when compared with the British and French empires. However, it is also argued that even if it was short, it was still a significant and integral part of the period in which it took place and that it played a major role in the political events of that time, such as the First World War. Germany only started acquiring colonies after its unification in 1871 and in 1884–1885 acquired large territories in Africa in what is now Togo, Cameroon, Namibia and Tanzania, in addition to small territories in East Asia and the Pacific.⁶¹ That made the German empire the fourth largest in the world after Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. The characteristic features of German colonialism included the concept of transporting the German civilization to their colonies. It is argued in the literature that Germany aimed at a more thorough penetration of the colonized territories and population than other colonial powers and that this ambition was linked to the idea of modernism and efficient forms of rule that were developed and invested into infrastructure and human capital. Sebastian Conrad questions whether these ideas were carried out

55 On the topic see e.g. Craven, “Between Law and History”, pp. 31–59

56 Stoecker, *German Imperialism in Africa*, p. 37.

57 Ibid.

58 Hamilton, Richard, F. and Herwig, Holger H. (eds.), *The Origins of World War I*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 10.

59 See al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, pp. 310–311.

60 Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 1.

61 Ibid., p. 3.

in reality.⁶² He emphasizes that the German empire tried to apply the same European state system in its colonies but, in reality, this could not take place, thus “the colonial state was not simply an extension of the western European model, but as Jürgen Osterhammel suggests, ‘a political form in itself’”.⁶³

Different writers describe German imperialism in different ways. Pro-German imperialism argued that Germany penetrated the Ottoman Empire specifically inspired by the idea of the “Orient”.⁶⁴ Malte Fuhrmann⁶⁵ argued that this is how the German Orient was constructed. They did not use heavy weapons, or ride high with waving banners, but instead came carrying all kinds of tools and machines. An army of industrious workers followed in their wake, constructing new buildings and transforming caravan trade paths into railways lines. The Germans wanted to liberate the Orient and spread the German version of civilization through railway construction, German schools and trade. The main theoretical argument about German colonial expansion supported by Sebastian Conrad⁶⁶ and Jürgen Osterhammel⁶⁷ is that the dynamic of German colonialism extended not only to its protectorates and overseas possessions, which he called the formally acquired territorial colonial empire, but also included places that were informally penetrated. Sebastian Conrad calls this “informal colonialism”,⁶⁸ and Jürgen Osterhammel called it the “informal empire” or quasi-colonial control (*quasi-koloniale Kontrolle*).⁶⁹ He uses this term to refer to the spheres of influence of German colonialism outside its formal territories, arguing that the German empire, like other colonial empires, built a colonial policy that operated not only in the colonies but also in other parts of the world like in China, Latin America and the Ottoman Empire. For Osterhammel, the role of the informal colonies was to support the center and particularly to enhance the German trade and investments. One example provided by Sebastian Conrad is the German economic

62 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

63 Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen*, p. 62, quoted in Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 66.

64 Means the East in comparison to the West including Europe and America, see Said, Edward, *Orientalism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978.

65 Fuhrmann, Malte, “Visions of Germany in Turkey: Legitimizing German Imperialist Penetration of the Ottoman Empire”; in *The Contours of Legitimacy in Central Europe: New Approaches in Graduate Studies*, European Studies Centre, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Great Britain, 2002, quoting from Paul Lindenbergh in Fuhrmann, p. 9.

66 Conrad, *German Colonialism*, pp. 169–170.

67 Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen*, pp. 23–26

68 Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 170.

69 Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen*, p. 25.

projects in the Ottoman Empire such as the Baghdad railway. Others include the German travelers, health missions, the German consulate, the German export to the province and the military help provided from German to the Ottomans in their war against Italy in 1911 and to the Libyan *mujāhidin*; all are conducted within the friendship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Quoting from Grüner, Sebastian Conrad refers to the German belief.

We help the Turks to build railways and ports. We seek to awaken their industry. We support them with our credit. We supply ships and cannons....⁷⁰

1.3 *Jihad* in Libya as a Resistance Movement against Colonialism

As mentioned above, during the time in which Germany was searching for economic and political influence outside Europe, its attention was directed toward the Ottoman Empire, which had extended its influence into large areas in the Balkans and the Arab world. The Ottomans also succeeded in obtaining economic concessions, which helped them to establish colonies in the center and east of the region. The African continent attracted the Europeans, particularly during the time of the European colonial competition, to invest and settle in new locations outside Europe. Not surprisingly, imperialism and colonialism faced strong local opposition. In the Muslim world this opposition became known as *jihad*. The Libyan *jihad* and its historical foundations give the term a different meaning to that found in theology. *Jihad* meant anticolonial resistance. But not all anticolonial resistance meant *jihad*, as many journalists wrote. *Jihad* as a general term includes many aspects, including the individual's struggle to live according to his or her interpretation of the commandments of Islam, to contribute to a society that accords with the requirements of the religion, and to bring others to the religion of Islam.⁷¹ In its political sense the term refers to the armed struggle to defend Islam, whether in a territorial or ideological sense.⁷² This last usage

⁷⁰ Die Welt am Montag, November 21, 1989, quoted from Grüner (ed.), *Rassismus, Kolonien und kolonialer Gedanke*, p. 210, in Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 170.

⁷¹ Lüdke, Tilman, "(Not), Using Political Islam: The German Empire and its failed propaganda campaign in the Near and Middle East 1914–1918 and beyond", in *Jihad and Islam in World War I: Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck Hurgronje's "Holy War Made in Germany"*, ed. by Erik-Jan Zürcher, Leiden University Press, 2016, p. 83.

⁷² McAuliffe, Jane D. (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of the Quran*, vol. 3, 2003, pp. 35–42.

tends to be known as defensive *jihad*.⁷³ It is probably this term that is the most accurate description of the form of *jihad* developed in reaction to the Italian occupation and colonization of Libya and other parts of the Muslim world. According to Imam Qurtubi (1214–1273)⁷⁴ this type of *jihad* is obligatory upon all Muslims:

If the situation becomes such that the enemy has occupied the Islamic state [...], it becomes an individual obligation according to all those belonging to that city to go out in the way of Jihad, lightly and heavily, young and old, all upon their individual capability and vigor; those with fathers even without their permission and those without; no one who is able and has the capability to fight, whether they are fighters or non-fighters can remain behind.⁷⁵

Imam al-Qurtubi also explained that the concept of *jihad* also includes helping neighboring localities or states in their fight against the enemies' invasion:

If despite all this that locality is unable to repel the enemies' invasion, the duty falls upon those closest in geographical locality [...]. They must send whatever is necessary to help the occupied locality so that the enemy can see that the Muslims have sufficient energy and resources to drive them back. Any Muslim who comes to learn that the Muslims in that area are weak and need help against their enemy, and also knows that he has the ability to help and assist them is obliged to go out to them. The Muslims are one hand against their enemy.⁷⁶

When does the duty of *jihad* end? According to Imam al-Qurtubi, it is only over when the occupying enemies are repelled:

If the Muslims in the area of occupation were successful in repelling their enemy, only then would the obligation of Jihad fall from the necks of the Muslims elsewhere. Even if the enemies of Islam were to come close to the borders of the Islamic state, but not enter, it is still obligatory to come out in Jihad to establish Islam and protect the honour and to humiliate the enemy and there is no disagreement about this.⁷⁷

⁷³ al-Uyari, Shaykh Yusuf, "The Ruling on Jihad and Its Divisions", translated by Abu Osama, Series of researches and studies in Shari'ah 2, 2014, p. 9.

⁷⁴ Imam Qurtubi was a famous *mufassir*, *muhaddith* and *faqih* scholar from Cordoba of Maliki origin, the Maliki legal school. He is most famous for his commentary of the Quran, Tafsir al-Qurtubi. Bosworth, C.E.; van Donzel, E.; Lewis, B.; Pellat, Ch., *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (New Edition), vol. V (Khe-Mahi), Leiden, Brill, 1986, p. 512.

⁷⁵ Tafsir al-Qurtubi vol. 8/151.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

The Libyan Islamic *jihād* began with the announcement of Italy's war on the Ottoman Empire in Tripoli in September 1911. Most Libyans registered themselves in groups under the guidance of the Libyan tribal leaders and used whatever weapons available to attack the Italian soldiers and their army centers in the cities and regions. These Libyans were referred to as *mujāhidīn*. Most of them did not have military training and did not participate in the struggle as professionals; rather, they were motivated by the concern to defend their land against Italian colonization. As such, the *mujāhidīn* included all social classes.⁷⁸

78 al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, pp. 66–91.

2 The Province of Tripoli and its Significance for German Interests (1870–1884)

This chapter highlights the geographical, strategic and economic significance of the province of Tripoli to Germany from 1870 to 1884. Like many other parts of the Arab world the province of Tripoli was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire during this period. Tripoli integrated Ottoman Empire when Suleiman I (1494–1566) was the sultan and Sinan Pasha (1506–1596) ruled this new region of the Empire in 1551,¹ expelling the Spanish from Tripoli.² The period from 1551 to 1711 is known as a ‘direct Ottoman rule’³ and was followed by a dynasty called *al-Kāramanlī* between 1711 and 1835.⁴ This time is seen as independent or more autonomous from the central power in Istanbul.⁵ The Ottomans eliminated this dynasty and restored their direct control over the province in 1835. The following period, known as “the second Ottoman period”⁶ lasted until 1911, when the province was occupied by Italy. As the 19th century approached its final quarter, rule in Libya was increasingly determined by world powers such as Britain, France and after 1871, Germany, meaning it was probably determined

1 Pasha is a Turkish title given to honor some governors with military ranks in the Ottoman Empire and it was given to the governors of the Ottoman provinces, Şabān, Suhail, *al-Mu’jam al-mausu’i li-l-mṣṭalahat al-’ūthmāniyyā al-tārikhiyya*, al-Riyad, 2000, p. 52.

2 Ibn Ghalbūn al-Ṭarābulī, Abū ‘Abd al-lāh Moḥammad bin Khalīl, *al-Tadhkār fī man malak Ṭarābulis wa mā kān bihā min Akhbār*, ṣaḥḥaḥahu al-Ṭāhir Aḥmed al-Zāwī, Dār al-madār al-islāmī, Bayrūt, 2004, p. 160; see also Brogini, Anne and Maria Ghazali, “Un enjeu espagnol en Méditerranée: les présides de Tripoli et de La Goulette au XVI^{ème} siècle”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 70-1, 2005, pp. 9–43 and for a larger discussion on the debate see also Özbaran, Salih, *The Ottoman Response to European Expansion*, Isis, Istanbul, 1994; Inalcik, Halil, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, CUP, Cambridge, 1994.

3 See for example the work of Mütevelli, el-Feth, Aḥmed Fuad, *al-Osmāni li el-Ṣam ve Mısır ve mukaddimat min vaka el-vasaik, dar el-nahda el-misriyya*, Cairo, 1976, For the debate on the autonomy of Ottoman provinces see Lafī, Nora, Rattachement et autonomie locale: réflexions sur la ville Ottomane, in *Villes rattachées*, ed. by Denise Turrel et al., Presses universitaires Françaises Rabelais, Tours, 2003, pp. 99–112.

4 The name comes from the Karman region in southern Anatolia. This was the origin of their grandfather and they belong to the class called *al-Kuarglah*. Ibn Ghalbūn, *al-Tadhkār fī man malak Ṭarābulis*, p. 275; see also Micacchi, Rodolfo, *La Tripolitania sotto il dominio dei Caramanli*, A. Airoldi, Intra, 1936.

5 al-Kīb, Najm al-Dīn Ghālib, *Madīnat Ṭarābulis ‘abr al-tārikh*, al-Dār al-‘arabiyya li-alkitāb, Ṭarābulis – Tūnis, 1978, p. 74.

6 Bruce St. John, Ronald, *Libya: Continuity and Change*, Routledge, 2011, p. 11; Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama’ al-‘arabi al-libī fī al-‘ahd al-’ūthmānī*, al-Dār al-‘arabiyya li-l-kitāb, Ṭarābulis, 1988, p. 26.

by changing relationships between the Ottoman administration in Istanbul and the African provinces like the province of Tripoli.⁷

It is noteworthy that the significance of the province of Tripoli to the Europeans, including Germany, did not begin in the period under study (1870–1884), but can be seen going back to the Middle Ages, when North Africa was under the continuous threats of Islamic-Christian disputes and wars started in or ended by Spain.⁸ Other authors state that the importance of the province was linked to the establishment of the three cities on the coast, which are Oya (Tripoli), Sabratha and Leptis, in the late 6th century BC, and which thus go back even further in time.⁹ However, I argue that it was specifically the Industrial Revolution in Europe and the spread of colonialism and imperialism in North Africa that caused Tripoli to acquire a key relevance for the access that it offered to different parts of Africa. The ideal location and its ports played a major role in the history of the province in enhancing trade both internally and externally, as it represented a secure and practical port for trade. Tripoli also played a significant role in the wars and conflicts in the Mediterranean. The province of Tripoli was active in most of the political events that took place in the Mediterranean since the 16th century.¹⁰ This is mainly because Tripoli and its ports were located in the middle of the Mediterranean and any power seeking to dominate the eastern, western, or internal parts of Africa would take Tripoli as its starting point. Thus, Tripoli's strategic importance based on the access to different parts of Africa and the connection of these regions to the European continent and to North America. The province of Tripoli was therefore important for the Ottoman administration and was a crucial place to defend.¹¹ In addition, caravan trade routes existed in the province. Increasingly it attracted the attention of many European powers as they competed with the Ottomans at the time of the Ottoman reforms called *Tanzīmāt*, starting in 1839.¹² The Europeans viewed the whole region as important for enhancing their trade with Africa.

7 Deringil, Selim, “‘They live in a State of nomadism and savagery’: The late Ottoman Empire and the post-colonial debate”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 45-2, 2003, pp. 311–342; and his book *The Well-Protected Domains. Ideology and the Limitation of the Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909*, London and Oxford, 1998.

8 See for example: Koloğlu, *500 Years in Turkish-Libyan Relations*, pp. 11–15.

9 al-Kib, *Madīnat Ṭarābulis ‘abr al-tārīkh*, p. 14.

10 Alghafal, Suaad, *al-‘Ālāqāt al-libīyyā al-tūnisīyya khilāl al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī (1835–1911)*, markaz jihād al-libīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2006, p. 10.

11 Lafi, Nora, “L’empire Ottoman en Afrique, perspectives d’histoire critique”, *Cahiers d’Histoire. Revue d’Histoire Critique*, 2015, 128, pp. 59–70.

12 On this previous trade, see numerous studies like Wright, John, “Sequins, slaves and Senna: Tripoli’s international trade in 1767”, *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione*

2.1 The Province of Tripoli: A Colonial Bridgehead to Africa?

Tripoli was referred to by a number of names over the centuries.¹³ The Greeks had dubbed it “Libyas”, a name which referred to the area on the western border of Egypt.¹⁴ This name appears to be derived from the word Lippo, which was the name of the tribes living in the region. The Romans referred to it as Africa, and this term was used for the region of North Africa as a whole.¹⁵ It began to be called Tripoli in the third century.¹⁶ Then it came to be known as Tripolitania, which then was changed to Tribols. Under Ottoman rule, this province was first called *Eyālet Ṭarābulis al-Ghārb* in 1835, and then changed to *Wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-Ghārb*, which means province of Tripoli, in 1865.¹⁷ The city of Tripoli became the capital of the province.¹⁸ It is worth mentioning that in the German documents it is referring to as Tripolitania. The name Libya was first used after the Italian occupation in 1911.¹⁹ Herodotus mentioned the names of some tribes who lived in Tripoli during the 15th century BC, including the Nasamoin, Garamanti, Macae and Paylli.²⁰ Most of them were concentrated in coastal areas, which provided them with different livelihood options. They were also concentrated around internal

Dell'Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente, 63-2, 2008, pp. 249–260; J.C. Zeltner, *Tripoli, carrefour de l'Europe et des pays du Tchad, 1500–1795*, L'Hamattan, Paris, 1992; Fisher, Allan G. B. and Humphrey J. Fisher, *Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa: The Institution in Saharan and Sudanic Africa and the Trans-Saharan Trade*, C. Hurstand Co., London, 1970; and Panzac, Daniel, “Le commerce maritime de Tripoli de Barbarie dans la seconde moitié du XVIII^{ème} siècle”, *Revue d'Histoire Maghrebine*, 69-70, 1993, pp. 141–167; and Panzac, Daniel, “Une activité en trompe-l'oeil: la guerre de course à Tripoli de Barbarie dans la seconde moitié du XVIII^{ème} siècle”, *R.E.M.M.*, 47-1 1988, pp. 126–141; Gemery, Henry A., Jan S. Hogendorn, *The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade*, Academic Press, New York, 1979.

13 See Riemer, Michael J., *Colonial Bridgehead 1807–1882*, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1997, p. 251.

14 See Zimmermann, Klaus, *Libyen: das Land südlich des Mittelmeers im Weltbild der Griechen*, C.H. Beck, Munich, 1999.

15 For a discussion on the Roman period, see Jerary, M. Tahar, “Septimius Severus the Roman emperor, 193-211 AD”, *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell'Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente*, 63-2, 2008, pp. 173–185.

16 See for this point the studies of Salvatore Bono, op.cit. and Cresti, Federico, *La Libya tra Mediterraneo e mondo islamico*, Giuffrè, Milano, 2006.

17 For this point see Günes, Isiksel, *La diplomatie Ottomane sous le règne de Selim II: paramètres et périmètres de l'Empire Ottoman dans le troisième quart du XVI^{ème} siècle*, Peeters, Paris, 2016.

18 Rūsi, Itūri (E. Rossi), *Libiyā mundhu al-faṭḥ al-'arabī ḥatā sanat 1911*, translated with an introduction by Khalifa Moḥammad al-Tilisi, Dār al-thaqāfā, Bayrūt, 1974, pp. 23–25.

19 “Libya” will be used when discussing the period starting with the Italian occupation in 1911.

20 Fage, John D., “The Libyans”, *The Cambridge History of Africa: From c. 500 BC to AD 1050*, vol. II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978.

oases with wells and springs. The most important of these oases were Jalu and al-Kufra, Ghat and Awjilah that connected the northern part of Libya and the African greatest Sahara. A third center of population concentration were the cities in the south of the province, which represented a north-south axis. These cities were marked as centers of trade and represented meeting points for the groups of traders en route to Africa, or coming from Africa toward the city of Tripoli, the province of Tunisia or elsewhere. Tripoli shared an eastern border with Egypt and a western border with Tunisia and Algeria²¹ (see Appendix 3). The southern border, with sub-Saharan Africa (the region now known as Sudan-Chad-Niger) also made the province a good entry point into the rest of the continent.²² In addition to its land borders, the coastal borders of Tripoli were also of strategic relevance. Its coastline, which stretches north along the Mediterranean for over 1.900 km, attracted the attention of both the Ottomans and Europeans.²³ It was considered the starting point to different directions. In the south of the province, the border with Africa is almost 2.000 km.²⁴ The province of Tripoli can thus be seen to occupy a large geographical area, containing varied geographical and climatic differences within it.²⁵ However, the province of Tripoli is dominated by a Mediterranean climate, with cool winters and hot summers.²⁶ Moreover, the province of Tripoli is divided into plain areas, mountainous areas and coastal areas, and other desert and semi-desert areas.²⁷ There are no natural rivers but there are many valleys including Wadi al-Shati and al-Sayal and a large number of oases. Its geographical location led the province of Tripoli to play a major regional role in a number of different historical periods. The importance of Tripoli is

21 al-Jawhari, Yusri 'Abd al-Razzāq, *Shamāl Afriqiya dirāsā fī al-jughrāfiyya al-Tārikhiyya*, Dār al-Ma'ārif, al-Qāhira, 1978, p.15.

22 al-Sāqizli, 'Abd al-Laṭif Sulaymān, *Libiyā al-thawrā*, vol. 1, Dār Mimfis li-l-ṭibā'a wa al-nashr, al-Qāhira, 1398 H, p. 9.

23 Tüllü, Ritshārd (Richard Tully), *'Ashar sanawāt fī bilādī Ṭarābulis*, translated by 'Umar al-Dīrāwī Abūhijla, maktabat al-Furjānī, Ṭarābulis, n.d., p. 8.

24 See for example Zimmermann, *Libyen: das Land südlich des Mittelmeers im Weltbild der Griechen*, Munich, 1999. See as well Abū Shārib, Moḥammad 'Alī, "Tijārat al-qawāfil wa 'alāqatuhā bi-wāḥat Awjilah", *Awjilah baina al-māḍī wa al-ḥāḍir (1950–1951)*, a'māl al-nadwā al-'ilmiyya al-sābi'a allatī 'uqidat bi-madinat Awjilah (17-20/9/2009), ed. by Moḥammad Bashir Suwisī, markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2007, p. 131.

25 Nāji, Maḥmūd, *Tārikh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, translated by 'Abd al-Salām Adham wa Moḥammad al-'Ustā, al-jāmi'a al-libiyyā, kuliyāt al-'ādāb, Ṭarābulis, n.d., p. 13.

26 Dardano, Achille and Riccardo Riccardi, *Atlante D'Africa*, Ulrico Hoepli Editore, Milano 1936, xiv.

27 Brūshin, N.A., *Tārikh Libiyā min nihāyat al-qam al-tāsi' 'ashar, ḥata 'am 1969*, translated by 'Imād Ḥātim, revised by Milād al-Magraḥi, markaz jihād al-libiyyin ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1988, pp. 25–26.

evident since the establishment of the three cities of Oea (Tripoli), Sabratha and Leptis along the coast in the late 6th century BC.²⁸ The focus was initially on the city of Tripoli, which later became the capital of the province. However, other cities were also significant, including Benghazi, located in the eastern coastal region, and Murzuq, located in the south of the province,²⁹ while Sawkanh and Ghadames were centrally located, so the different directions were connected to each other (see map 1). Over a long period, the province of Tripoli had attracted the attention of the Phoenicians and Romans, Spanish, Greek, Arab and Islamic cultures and the Ottoman Turks specifically, who selected Tripoli as their military base in North Africa when they ruled the region. Its location also attracted the attention of the European powers for the access that it offered to many important areas. The province of Tripoli was thus incorporated into their strategic plans and actions.³⁰ Tripoli thus clearly functioned as a bridge between the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan countries such as western and central Sudan and the rest of the African kingdoms, which increased the geographical significance of the province. This is due to its open frontiers with the desert. There were no natural obstacles that impeded contact between these countries. Ottoman Tripoli was one of the most important naval bases in the Mediterranean.³¹ It was used by the Ottoman naval service to attack Malta in 1565,³² 1703, 1705 and 1709³³ and to control the Mediterranean Sea. Tripoli also contributed to the restoration of the Tunisian territory that was under Spanish rule. The war with the Spanish began in 1559³⁴ and continued until the end of their colonial rule. In 1581, the Spanish signed an agreement³⁵ acknowledging Ottoman sovereignty over Tunisia. Moreover, it is not possible to ignore the role played by the Tripolitanian marines, especially in the aftermath of the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, when the Ottomans reasserted their

²⁸ al-Kīb, *Madīnat Ṭarābulis ‘abr al-tārikh*, p. 14.

²⁹ Sharaf al-Dīn, In’ām Moḥammad, *Madkhal ilā tārikh Ṭarābulis al-ijtimā’i wa al-iqtisādī: dirāsa fī mu’assāt al-mādīna al-tijāriyya*, markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1998, p. 23.

³⁰ On this point see Orhan Koloğlu, op.cit.

³¹ Panzac, Daniel, *La marine Ottomane, de l’apogée à la chute de l’Empire (1572–1923)*, CNRS Editions, Paris, 2009.

³² Nāji, *Tārikh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 167.

³³ Rūsi, *Libiyā mundhu al-faṭḥ al-‘arabī ḥatā sanat 1911*; see also Panzac, Daniel, *Commerce et navigation dans l’Empire ottoman au XVIIIe siècle*, Isis: Istanbul, 1996.

³⁴ al-Zāwī, al-Ṭāhir Aḥmed, *Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb min al-faṭḥ al-‘arabī ilā nihāyat al-‘ahd al-turkī*, Dār al-faṭḥ li-l-ṭibā’a wa al-nashr, Bayrūt, wa al-Sayyid Moḥammad al-Ramāḥ Bashīna, Ṭarābulis, 1970, p. 265.

³⁵ Rāfiq, ‘Abd al-Karīm, *al-‘Arab wa al-‘ūthmāniyyūn, 1516–1916*, Dimashq, 1974, p. 79.

sovereignty – after their defeat at Lepanto – in the Eastern Mediterranean.³⁶ In 1667, the Tripolitanian naval forces were under the direct authority of the Ottoman Pasha as they were part of the Ottoman military forces in Tripoli. It is noteworthy that the Europeans in general possessed relatively little information about the importance and size of interior and central Africa in the first half of the 18th century compared with the extent of their information about the African coasts. They were therefore eager to get information about these areas. Tripoli, in their view, was the appropriate port for exploring the internal parts of Africa. It also seems that the ease of communication between the ports of the south and the northern Mediterranean, especially Sicily and the Italian ports, with the ports of the province of Tripoli, such as the city of Tripoli, Zuwarah, Misurata and Benghazi, boosted the province's strategic importance.³⁷ Moreover, it is obvious that the strategic importance of the province of Tripoli was one of the main reasons that prompted the Italians to seek control of the province, a goal that they attained in 1911. However, the realization of this goal took place after thorough political, economic and cultural preparation of the ground during of Ottoman rule.³⁸ France also focused on the city of Tripoli and began to work in the south of the province, specifically in the city of Ghadames on the border with the Ottoman province of Algeria in 1826.³⁹ France convinced the Ottoman authority to establish a consular agency in Ghadames, after they had already obtained a consular agency in the city of Tripoli. The French had essentially begun to negotiate with tribal leaders to convince them to sign an agreement. The main terms of the agreement were about trade and taxes to be paid by the caravan convoys that passed through Ghadames. The agreement was signed in the city of Ghadames in 1860.⁴⁰ This struggle of the French to find a foothold in the province of Tripoli was due to its geo-political and

36 al-Tilisi, Khalifa Moḥammad, *Ḥikāyāt madīnat Ṭarābulis ladā al-raḥḥāla al-‘arab wa al-‘ajānib*, al-Dār al-‘arabiyya li-l-ikṭāb, Libiyā-Tūnis, n.d., p. 70.

37 See for example Hoefler, Ferdinand, “Etats Tripolitains: régence de Tripoli”, in *L’Univers Pittoresques*, 1856; see as well F. Coro translated in Arabic: Kūrū, Frānshiskū, *Libiyā athnā’ al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī*, translated by Khalifa al-Tilisi, al-munsha’a al-‘ammā li-l- nashir wa al-tawzi’ wa al-i’lān, Ṭarābulis, 1984, pp. 59, 139.

38 Ruḥūmā, Muṣṭafa Ḥāmid, *al-Muqāwama al-libiyyā al-turkiyya qīd al-ghazū al-iṭālī Uktūbar 1911-Uktūbar 1912*, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn qīd al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1988, p. 24.

39 Lafi, Nora, “Ghadames cite-oasis entre empire ottoman et colonialisme”, in *Libia tra Mediterraneo e mondo islamico*, ed. by Federico Cresti et al., 2006, pp. 55–70.

40 al-Ḥindīrī, Sa’īd ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, “Taṭawwur tijārat al-qawāfil fi wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb(1835–1911)”, *al-Mujtama’ al-libī (1835–1950)*, a’ māl al-nadwa al-‘ilmiyya al-thāmina allatī ‘uqīdat bi-l-markaz fi al-fatra min 6-27/9/2002, ed. by Moḥammad al-Ṭāhir al-Jarāri, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2005, p. 969.

military importance and to the economic benefits that arose from this.⁴¹ The French recognized the great services that could be provided by the city of Ghadames if it was under their authority. They saw Ghadames as a connection to their colonies in Tunisia and Algeria, using the trade routes on which the city was situated. They also realized its considerable economic significance, which will be explained later in this chapter when discussing the role of cities in boosting trade in the province. France obtained official permission from the Ottoman Government in 1842 and 1843 to open the consulates in Murzuq and Ghadames.⁴² These consulates were used to directly supervise trade heading to or coming from sub-Saharan Africa.⁴³ The candidate for the position of consul was Eugene Ricard, the French consul in Malta. What distinguished him from the other candidates was that he knew the customs and traditions of the place, since he had previously lived in Benghazi, as well as the fact that he was fluent in Arabic.⁴⁴ Through this, the French had significantly strengthened their position by 1894. France was not the only country to establish a consulate in Ghadames; other European countries such as Britain also maintained a representative office in this region. Furthermore, Tobruk represented an important city for the Germans because it could be used as a port to inner Africa and to reach the southern Nile bank. From there, they could move freely between their colonies in West and East Africa, at the same time avoiding direct contact with Britain, which was already in Egypt, Sudan, and controlled the main ports, land and sea lanes there. Britain also had the strongest European fleet. The British felt the increasing presence of German influence in the region as the Germans were persistently strengthening their relations with the Sultan of the Arab Maghreb, as well as augmenting their trade activities and projects. The German efforts resulted in gaining the privilege of building the port of Tangier in Morocco, and their economic activities extended to both Algeria and Tunisia despite the fact that these regions were under the

41 For an overview of the economy and Ottoman empire see e.g. İslamoğlu-İnan, Huri (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, and see also the seminal work of Halil İncalcik and particularly İncalcik, Halil and Donald Quataert (eds.) *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1914*, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

42 The British consul had also been represented in Tripoli since the 17th century. See Baker, Thomas and C.R. Pennell, *Piracy and Diplomacy in Seventeenth Century North Africa, The Journal of Thomas Baker, English Consul in Tripoli, 1677–1685*, Golden Cockerel Press, London, 1989.

43 al-Ḥindirī, “Taṭawwur tijārat al-qawāfil fi wilāyat Ṭarābulis”, p. 969.

44 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli Bd. 1, 1895 bis 1899, R16111.

control of France.⁴⁵ A report compiled by Friedrich Gerhard Rohlfs (April 14, 1831 – June 2, 1896) highlighted the strategic importance of Tripoli.⁴⁶ The study provided evidence that whoever controlled Tripoli could also rule Sudan.⁴⁷ The same sentiments can be found in the discourse of European political actors around the same time, in addition to the reports of individual travelers.

Before being mentioned in reports, texts and studies conducted by the Germans, Tripoli was mentioned in different European accounts, such as the studies conducted by the French and the British. Separately, and in the context of international competition (given that the *Tanzīmāt* reforms of the Ottoman Empire were largely introduced to respond to the challenges of European imperialism),⁴⁸ they all emphasized the strategic importance of the province of Tripoli for their economic and colonial goals first of all.⁴⁹ There were also projects planned by some Europeans which reveal their interests in the region. For instance, the British envisaged integrating all the valleys in Tripoli and supplying them with water from the Mediterranean.⁵⁰ They hoped that this would create a new maritime route toward sub-Saharan Africa. The project was not implemented because it was very expensive and believed to be unrealistic. France had also offered to build a canal to link the city of Gabès in Tunisia with Tripoli, but they retreated from this proposal as well.⁵¹ Nevertheless, France did not abandon its economic relations with Tripoli and continued to take advantage of the vital trade routes in Tripoli in the hope of connecting the south of

⁴⁵ Muḥāfaẓa, ‘Alī, *Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-‘arabiyya (1): mauqaf Faransā wa ‘Almāniya wa Iṭaliya min al-waḥdā al-‘arabiyya 1919–1945*, markaz dirāsāt al-waḥdā al-‘arabiyya, Bayrūt, n.d., pp. 23–24.

⁴⁶ On Rohlfs’ occupation and work see the introduction to this study.

⁴⁷ Nāji, *Tāriḫ Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 78.

⁴⁸ For this *Tanzīmāt* (reforms) there is a very important historiography, for an overview on the Ottoman empire see for example Findley, Carter Vaughn, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989; and Davison, Roderic H., *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1905; for an very interesting view on this period see also Fuhrmann, Malte, *Der Traum vom deutschen Orient: Zwei Deutsche Kolonien im Osmanischen Reich 1851–1918*, Campus, Frankfurt-New York, 2006 and Fuhrmann, Malte, *Den Orient deutsch machen: Imperiale Diskurse des Kaiserreiches über das Osmanische Reich*, 2002, For Tripoli see for example the study of Lafi, Nora, “Entre ottomanité, colonialisme et orientalisme: les racines ambiguës de la modernité urbaine dans les villes du Maghreb (1830–1960)”, in *Frankreich und Frankophonie: Kultur – Sprache – Medien*, ed. by Sabine Bastian and Franck Trouilloud, Meidenbauer, Munich, 2009, pp. 143–162.

⁴⁹ Nāji, *Tāriḫ Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 78.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

the former Ottoman Algiers, colonized by France, and the region between present-day Mali and Chad, competing with the British in the south of the former Ottoman provinces of today's Sudan.

The natural climate of the province of Tripoli had a decisive effect on its economic options and opportunities. Harsh natural conditions like severe droughts, for example, limited agricultural potential. In addition, the province mainly depended on rainfall for the production of crops such as wheat and barley, as well as the cultivation of olive trees.⁵² This played a major role in guiding the population toward internal and foreign trade as an alternative to agriculture. Moreover, local people were taking advantage of the cities that represented trading focal points. The local people and the Ottoman governors were fully aware of the importance of trade for developing the economy of the province, as well as of the fact that its importance was increasing over time. This was apparent through the establishment of many trade centers and road networks used by convoys with significant economic uses; the result was a boom in internal trade.⁵³ Cities like Tripoli, Benghazi, Sawkanh and Ghadames constituted the center of the economic activities. Routes like Tripoli-Kano (Nigeria), Tripoli-Borno, Tripoli-Benghazi, the middle route to Sudan and others played a significant role in enhancing trade between Tripoli, east, west and central Africa. Consequently, these routes enhanced the importance of the province to many internal and external powers including the Ottomans and the Europeans.⁵⁴

2.2 Political Situation and Administrative Structures between Natural Resources and Slave Trade

From the restoration of direct Ottoman rule in 1835, prior to the period under study, the Ottoman Empire undertook a new approach in dealing with people of the province of Tripoli within the context of the administrative reforms referred to as *Tanzimât*. This was manifested in stricter control over Tripoli and more careful selection of its governors. The province came under the direct control of Istanbul, capital of the Ottoman Empire, and power was increasingly centralized, despite

52 Ĥamida, 'Ali 'Abd al-Laṭif, *al-Mujtama' wa al-dawlā wa al-isti'mār fī Libiyā dirāsa fī al-uṣūl al-ijtimā'iyya wa al-iqtisādiyyā wa al-thaqāfiyya li-ḥarakāt wa siyāsāt al-tawāṭu' wa muqāwamat al-isti'mār 1830–1932*, markaz dirāsāt al-waḥda al-'arabiyya, Bayrūt, 1998, p. 78.

53 Ibid.

54 See Baker, Thomas and C.R. Pennell, *Piracy and Diplomacy in Seventeenth Century North Africa*.

the attempts of local notables from cities and the hinterland to maintain control over their regions. In addition, some local leaders chose to work with France or Great Britain to strengthen their own influence, thereby also supporting the interests of these European powers through unrests or rebellions against the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁵ This could, from a local perspective, have been seen as the rallying of external (European) support against imperial Ottoman rule. It was often the case at the time, at the cost of increased European influence, when more emphasis on local perspectives would have been useful. This context also helps to explain why the city of Tripoli remained the latest Ottoman provincial capital in North Africa, the residence of the Ottoman governor and the center of its administration.

The administrative structure was changed by the Ottomans repeatedly during this time under the frame of the *Tanzīmāt*, or reform period. In 1835, Tripoli was an *Eyālet* (meaning large province)⁵⁶ and the governor received the title of pasha. This *Eyālet* was later divided into administrative units called *qā'im maqāmiyya* or *sanjaks*, with each of which governed by *qā'im maqām* (a governor). In 1865, this system was changed and the divisions of the Ottoman Empire were called provinces (*wilāyāt*). The internal administration in the province of Tripoli was structured as follows:

The province was divided into four *sanjaks* (sometimes called *liwā'*), each of which contained a number of *aqḍīya* (singular *qaḍā'*) with their own administrative center. A governor was selected for each *sanjak*.⁵⁷ The *qaḍā'* of Tripoli included the city of Tripoli and all the areas surrounding it, particularly in the west. The regions that it included were Tajura, Zanzur, and Jifarah. Other examples of *aqḍīya* are Ujaylat, Zuwarah, Tarhuna, Warfalla, Gharyan, al-Aziziyah and al-Gosh.⁵⁸ *Qaḍā'* al-Khums included Sahel al-'Ahaamed, Taworgha, Meslata, Zlitan, Misurata and Sirte.⁵⁹ *Qaḍā'* al-Jabal included Nawāhī like al-Haoud, Mizdah, al-Zintan, Kikla, and *qaḍā'* like Ghadames, Nalut and Fassato.⁶⁰ *Qaḍā'* Fezzan, which was in the south of the province, included Murzuq, which was the capital of *liwā'* Sebha, and also included al-Wady al-Shargee, Jufrah, al-Shargya, al-Gatrun, Houn, Zillah, Sawkanh, al-Shati, Ghat, Taborshadh, and al-Ghayra.⁶¹ The status of the area of Barqa was unstable. It remained a *qā'im maqāmiyya* under the control of the Ottoman government in the province of Tripoli from

55 Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama' al-'arabī al-libī*, p. 18.

56 Rūsi, *Lībiyā mundhu al-faṭḥ al-'arabī*, p. 384.

57 Kūrū, *Lībiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 26.

58 Rūsi, *Lībiyā mundhu al-faṭḥ al-'arabī*, p. 385; Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 85.

59 Rūsi, *Lībiyā mundhu al-faṭḥ al-'arabī*, p. 385.

60 See Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 85.

61 Rūsi, *Lībiyā mundhu al-faṭḥ al-'arabī*, p. 385.

the beginning of Ottoman rule mainly because it was far from the center and lay in the region bordering Egypt.⁶² In 1836, Barqa was then transformed into a *mutaşarrıfıyya* under direct control of Istanbul; this lasted until 1871, when it was returned to the control of the province of Tripoli.⁶³ This only lasted for one year, when it again became a *mutaşarrıfıyya* under the control of the Ottoman capital until 1888. Barqa was then divided into three *qā'im maqāmiyya*: Derna, Jalu and al-Marj and every *sanjak* was divided into *Nawaḥī* like the city of Tripoli.⁶⁴

The structure of the society in the province of Tripoli was predominantly tribal. Each tribe was headed by a person called *shaykh al-maḥallah* in small villages or in cities with a chief of the city (*shaykh al-balad*).⁶⁵ This position was initiated at the time of the reforms in the province of Tripoli after the establishment of the new type of Ottoman municipality, *al-baladiyya*, in 1868 (the municipality of Tripoli).⁶⁶ This position of *shaykh al-maḥallah* or *mukhtar* with a chief of the municipality (*ra'īs al-baladiyya*) and a council of the municipality (*majlis al-baladiyya*) was initiated in 1871. It was conceived as a new and modern municipality following the administrative system of the Ottomans.⁶⁷ It represented an

62 Kürü, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmāni al-thāni*, pp. 29–30; see also Lafi, Nora, *L'Empire Ottoman en Afrique: perspectives d'histoire critique*, 2015, 128, pp. 59–70.

63 *Osmanlı Belgelerinde: Trablusgarb* (Ṭarābulis al-ghārb fi al-wathā'iq al-'ūthmāniyyā), Kemal Gurulkan, et.al, ed. by Salih Sadawi, Istanbul, 2013, p. 253

64 Kürü, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmāni al-thāni*, pp. 29–30.

65 For the question of *shaykh al-balad* in Ottoman cities and specifically Tripoli see the publications of Nora Lafi, op.cit., and those of Kürü, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmāni al-thāni*, p. 48–53. In other context and specifically tribe societies the *cheikha* existed as well and even with a very interesting gender aspect: “Si une femme est offensée par un homme qui lui aurait dit, par exemple qu'elle est laide, malpropre ou dévergondée, celle-ci se rend auprès de la *cheikha* du clan dont elle dépend, et porte une plainte contre qui a proféré ces offenses. La *cheikha*, après avoir consulté d'autres *cheikhas* de la tribu, détermine la peine à infliger à l'insultateur... Après la prononciation du verdict la *cheikha* accompagnée de 30 à 40 femmes se rendent devant le portail de l'accusé et au cours de toute la journée, parfois même la nuit, tapent du tambour pour l'obliger à s'exécuter...”, see the account of Pavel Chatev (1882–1953), a Bulgarian exiled in the region as a prisoner after his participation in the bombardment of the building of the Ottoman bank, symbol of European capitalism and the bombardment of the railway line of Salonika-Istanbul. This account was studied and published in Peev, Yordan, “Un exilé bulgare en Libye au début du XXème siècle”, *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell'Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente*, 63-2, 2008, pp. 283–295.

66 On the institutionalization of the new municipality in Tripoli see the work of Lafi, Nora, *Une ville du Maghreb entre ancien régime et réformes ottomanes: genèse des institutions municipales à Tripoli (1795–1911)*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2002.

67 See *Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī mā'at 'ām 1286/1391H-1870/1970M*, Dār al-ṭiba'a al-ḥadīthā, al-maṭba'a al-libiyyā Ṭarābulis, 1972, pp. 164–165 and Lafi, Nora, *Municipalités méditerranéennes*.

institution between the population and the government in Tripoli and between the population and the central government in Istanbul. In villages, the person appointed had to have suitable qualifications and his authority was limited to the specific area (*maḥallah*). A *shaykh al-maḥallah* can be elected when the settlement had no fewer than 50 houses. The main responsibilities of the *shaykh al-maḥallah* were mainly informing the population about orders (*awamir*), laws issued by the government. He also informed the government about events that took place in *al-maḥallah*.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, the Ottoman reform did not end the role of the *shaykh al-maḥallah*, who continued to exercise local control after several conflicts.⁶⁹ This was also the case in the central and southern parts of the province. Obviously, not all the governors who were sent to the province of Tripoli were of the same caliber. In addition to the varying levels of efficiency and political competence, some governors were also motivated by personal interests conflicting with those of the Empire.⁷⁰ This was aggravated by the fact that governors were aware of the limited time for which they would hold their position, owing to the Ottoman policy of circumscribing the time that any individual governor spent in a single place. In addition, governors could also be removed or transferred at any point throughout their term in power.⁷¹ Transfers could result from complaints about the governor made by residents or cases of civil unrest. This became particularly clear in the latter half of the 19th century.⁷² Local revolts challenged the new order and the Ottomans governors such as Moḥammad Halit Pasha (1870–1871) or the *shaykh al-balad*⁷³ of Tripoli, ‘Alī al-Qarqānī.⁷⁴ ‘Alī al-Qarqānī was assisted by two soldiers viewed as violators of the local traditions.⁷⁵ The resi-

Les réformes urbaines Ottomanes au miroir d'une histoire comparée (Moyen-Orient, Maghreb, Europe méridionale), Klaus Schwarz, Berlin, 2005.

68 On this point see Lafi, Nora (ed.), *Municipalités méditerranéennes*.

69 Lafi, Nora, “L’affaire Ali al-Qarqānī, Tripoli 1872”, in *Etre notable au Maghreb: Dynamique des configurations notablistes*, ed. by Abdelhamid Hénia and Maḥad al-Buhuth al-Maghribiyah al-Mu’asirah, Maisonneuve et Larose, Paris, 2006, pp. 201–214.

70 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā’ al-’ahd al-’ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 26.

71 Lafi, “L’affaire ‘Alī al-Qarqānī, Tripoli 1872”, pp. 201–214.

72 See Lafi, Nora, “Petitions and accomodating urban change in the Ottoman Empire”, in *Istanbul as Seen from a Distance: Centre and Provinces in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Elisabeth Özdalga, Sait Özervarli and Feryal Tansug, Istanbul, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 2011, pp. 73–82.

73 *Shaykh al-balad* was a position given by the Ottomans to some of the original residents of Tripoli and had the tasks of communicating directly with the local people. See Lafi, “L’affaire Ali al-Qarqani, Tripoli 1872”.

74 Lafi, Nora, *Une ville du Maghreb entre ancien régime et réformes ottomanes*, op. cit., 2002, p. 146;

75 *Baladiyyat Ṭarābulūs fī mā’at ‘ām 1286/1391H – 1870/1970M*, p. 161; Lafi, “L’affaire Ali al-Qarqani, Tripoli 1872”, op. cit.

dents of Tripoli made many complaints to the governor against al-Qarqānī⁷⁶ and the negative effects of his policies on them, especially because he controlled everything in Tripoli including the industry. A revolt also broke out in the eastern part of the province,⁷⁷ which prompted civil unrest throughout the province. The administrator equipped a military campaign to put the unrest down, although this was disbanded shortly afterwards as the unrest decreased. Moḥammad Halit Pasha did not stay in power long. He was dismissed and replaced by Moḥammad Rashid Pasha in 1871 in the context of growing European pressure in the region to control all Ottoman provinces. Moḥammad Rashid Pasha implemented a moderate policy in Tripoli, balancing the demands of the Ottoman central government and a local Ottoman society in the face of European pressure. Therefore, they worked together to build good relations with many foreign consuls, including those of Britain, France, the United States, Tuscany (until 1866), Spain and others, which were competing for control over the Ottoman regions. Moḥammad Rashid Pasha also introduced new reforms to different sectors in the province. However, this did not prevent the inhabitants of Fezzan in the south of the province from revolting and rejecting the authority of the Ottoman Empire. Laurent Charles Féraud (1829–1888), consul, spy and erudite who conducted research on this, indicated that the unrest was instigated by the Tuareg population in the far south of the province in 1871. At the same time, the tribes of Awlād Sulaymān in the central region also rejected Ottoman rule and their participation in the Tuareg revolution.⁷⁸ The governor Moḥammad Rashid Pasha tried to put this revolution down,⁷⁹ particularly because it started to adversely affect trade convoys destined for the south of the province. It is noticeable that these disorders abated gradually with the outbreak of internal conflict between two Tuareg tribes, namely the al-Hāqar and ‘Azqār tribes, on who had the authority over the southern part of the province. The conflict ended with the defeat of the ‘Azqār tribe. This prompted Moḥammad ‘Akhnūkhan, one leader of the ‘Azqār tribe in the southern part of

⁷⁶ Lafi, Nora, *Une ville du Maghreb entre ancien régime et réformes ottomane*, op.cit, pp. 283–291.

⁷⁷ *Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī mā‘at ‘ām 1286/1391H - 1870/1970M*, p. 163.

⁷⁸ Fīru, Shāril (Féraud Charles), *al-Ḥawliyyāt al-lībiyyā mundhu al-faṭḥ al-‘arabi ḥattā al-ghazū al-iṭāli*, translated by Moḥammad ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Wāfi, jāmi‘āt Qāryūnis, Bīnghāzī, 1994, p. 504–507. See also the introduction and the biography of this personnage by Lafi, Nora, *Les annales tripolitaines de Charles Féraud*, Paris, 2005, 437p; and Lafi, Nora, “Biographie: Laurent Charles Féraud, une passion coloniale”, in *Laurent Charles Féraud: Peintre et témoin de la conquête de l’Algérie*, ed. by Bernard Merlin, Editions Monelle Hayot, Saint-Remy-en-l’Eau, 2010; 112p., pp. 103–106.

⁷⁹ Governor or in Arabic *Wālī* is an administrative title that was used during the Caliphate and Ottoman Empire to designate governors of administrative divisions.

Tripoli⁸⁰ to contact the Ottoman Government in Tripoli to seek protection in return for his submission to it. He later asked the Ottoman government to train and recruit new soldiers from among the local people to strengthen his power there. In the city of Ghat, also located in the south of the province of Tripoli, the situation was unstable until Muṣṭafa Asim Pasha was appointed governor for nine months before leaving for the Yemenit Ottoman province in 1875. He decided that Ghat should be given the administrative status of a *sanjak*. He was able to regain control as part of his efforts to extend Ottoman authority of the province across the entire desert. He sent soldiers armed with cannons to strengthen the Ottoman presence and make it a district under the control of Fezzan. As part of these efforts Taborshada, which was located on the border with Chad, was also made a district of the province in 1881.⁸¹ Muṣṭafa Asim Pasha gained an advantage over the other Ottoman governors in the province of Tripoli through his practice of travelling to see the conditions of the people in person, trying to address their problems before they become uncontrollable.⁸² Such outbreaks of civil unrest were frequently instrumentalized by British and French consuls and military interventions. The Berlin Conference in 1878 discussed and negotiated the distribution of political influence among European countries in the Ottoman world, whether in the Balkans or lands belonging to the Ottoman Empire in other regions.⁸³ It should be noted that the Ottoman Empire was aware of European ambitions in Tripoli, especially when France colonized Algeria and declared Tunisia a protectorate. The Ottoman Empire then considered the need to preserve its remaining Arab provinces. This was mainly done by preventing Tripoli from coming under the control of any European country. As a result, Aḥmed Ezzat Pasha (1879–1881) was sent to Tripoli in 1879, where he attempted to introduce reforms to protect the province. His main work was to repair the forts and walls.⁸⁴ This work was completed after him by Moḥammad Nazif Pasha (1880–1881) who also focused on the defensive aspect by building many fortifications in the major centers around the city. They were equipped with cannons that were brought especially from the central government in Istanbul

⁸⁰ Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 212.

⁸¹ Sāmiḥ, 'Aziz, *al-'Atrāk al-'ūthmāniyyūn, fī Afrīqiya al-shamāliyya*, translated by 'Abd al-Sālām Adham, Dār al-Furjāni, al-Qāhira, 1991, pp. 211–212.

⁸² al-Zāwī, *Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, pp. 508, 523.

⁸³ al-Jamal, Shawqī 'Aṭallāh, 'Abd al-llāh Ibrāhīm and Rabāb Salām, *Tārīkh 'Aūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-mu'āṣir min mu'tamar Fiyinna ḥatā al'ān*, vol. 2, Dār al-thaqāfā li-l-nashr wa al-tawzī', al-Qāhira, n.d., p. 38; see also Porter, Andrew, *European Imperialism, 1860–1914*, Macmillan, Houndmills, 1994.

⁸⁴ al-Zāwī, *Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 270.

(Astana) to defend the city in case of any attack.⁸⁵ These efforts were accompanied by the appointment of Aḥmed Rasim Pasha as a governor of the province in 1881. This was a critical period because it coincided with France's declaration of Tunisia as a French protectorate and with British preparations to occupy Egypt.⁸⁶ Aḥmed Rasim Pasha lived up to the expectations entrusted to him by the Ottoman Empire in this regard, as his political stance was defiantly anti-colonialist. Aḥmed Rasim Pasha (1881–1898) attended first to the political stability of the province. He lifted the European protection from some Arab nationals and brought them back under the authority of the Ottoman Empire. During his rule the province was affected by a number of conflicts, particularly between tribes inhabiting the border region between Tripoli and Tunisia. Although Rasim Pasha succeeded in reducing the frequency of these disputes, he was not able to end them entirely.⁸⁷ He was then faced by a new problem, namely Italian ambitions over Tripoli, which led to some direct conflicts with the Italian consul, particularly after the Italian government began focusing its activities and economic interests in the province by encouraging immigration and other efforts to control Tripoli.⁸⁸ As a result of these developments and the desire of Italy to control Tripoli, the local people began to feel the gravity of the situation and feared the advent of European colonization. This changed the whole situation in the province as it motivated the local people to support the governors; for instance, Moḥammad Nazif Pasha's ruled in 1880.⁸⁹ He succeeded in strengthening the fortifications of the center of Tripoli, specifically in the northwest of the city, such as the towers of al-Hamedia, al-Frarh, Sidi Mansour, and Gargarsh. He also set up canons on the left and the right side of the city.⁹⁰ He was assisted by the local inhabitants in all of this. Their fear of European occupation led them to support him, despite their opposition in other instances, and even to offer financial assistance for the construction of material defences. Moḥammad Nazif Pasha also focused on the central and eastern regions and established a new political administration under the control of Sirte. His successor, Aḥmed Rasim Pasha, remained in office for a long period that lasted until 1898, when he was replaced by Namik Pasha.⁹¹ To highlight the economic situation in the pro-

85 al-Tilisi, *Ḥikāyat madīnat*, p. 170.

86 See Ganiage, Jean, *Les origines du protectorat français en Tunisie (1861–1881)*, Maison Tunisienne de l'Édition, 1961.

87 al-Zāwī, *Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, pp. 273–274.

88 al-Tilisi, *Ḥikāyat madīnat*, p. 174.

89 Rūsi, *Libiyā mundhu al-fatḥ al-'arabī ḥatā sanat 1911*, p. 384.

90 al-Zāwī, *Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 274.

91 *Ibid.*, p. 276.

vince of Tripoli in the context of revolt and European imperialism between 1870 and 1884, the following tables offer detailed information on natural resources such as the different types of agricultural products and the quantity of produce with regard to most aspects of the economy in Tripoli. This is to understand how this economy was so important for local and external actors competing for control over the region. The figures have mainly been drawn from documents found in a report in the Political Archive (*Politisches Archiv*) in Berlin, Germany.

Table 1: The number of fruit trees in the province of Tripoli in 1869

Fruit	Number of trees
Olive	3.447.040
Palm	2.687.740
Orange	450.000
Lemon	220.000
Pomegranate	12.580
Apricot	11.300
Apple	1.400
Other	15.245

The information in this table⁹² dates to the period between July 1869 and October 1888, and included the number of trees in the province of Tripoli. The table shows that the number of olive and palm trees was higher than that of other trees, a point which reveals their significance to the economy of the province. Given the large numbers of olive trees in Tripoli, olive oil was also produced in large quantities, as stated in the report.

In the same report, the quantities of crops and cereal in the same period are presented in table 2 below.⁹³

⁹² Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 1, vom Juli 1869 bis Oktober 1888, R901/52506.

⁹³ Ibid.

Table 2: Quantities of crops and cereal produced in 1869

Crop	Quantity in Kilogram
Barley	50.000.000
Wheat	22.500.000
Sorghum	300.000
White Sorghum	15.000

The following table⁹⁴ presents the production of fruits and vegetables in the province of Tripoli in the same period (1870–1884).

Table 3: Production of fruits and vegetables (1870–1884)

Quality	Quantity in Kilogram
Orange and Lemon	40.000.000
Date	28.500.000
Pumpkin and Watermelon	1.000.000
Dried Fig	672.000
Hinnah	275.000
Onion	240.000
Yam	135.000
Truffle	105.000
Carob	60.000
Pomegranate	28.200
Raisin	27.000
Apple	13.800
Pear	10.500
Quince	5.000
Tobacco flower	3.300
Rubber	1.200

It was not only statistics on agricultural products that were presented in the report, the species and numbers of animals and livestock in the province of Tripoli were as well, and are illustrated in table 4 below.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

Table 4: Species and numbers of animals and livestock in Tripoli

Species	Number
Lamb	700.0000
Camel	150.0000
Young sheep	120.0000
Ram	587.000
Capricorn	400.000
Goat	350.000
Bird (chicken and rooster)	110.000
Ox	110.000
Cow	38.000
Mule	15.000
Pony	14.000
Horse	12.000

As land constituted a significant issue in the economic life of Tripoli, the same report indicated the different types of soil and their uses, including agricultural land and gardens, the land used by pastures for animals, uncultivated land in the desert, and residential areas.⁹⁶ The main industries in Tripoli were metal and leather industries, textiles, and straw mats. The metal and leather industries had received the special encouragement of Samih Pasha⁹⁷ who ruled the province in 1874 and 1875.⁹⁸ These industries were represented in certain markets in various parts of the province. Each craft had its special market. The markets were not limited to the industries of silk, gold, silver, jewelry, and copper, which were known as *Sūq al-qāṣdarha*. There was also some manufacturing of iron and other metals. The inhabitants of Tripoli were interested in the textile industry. It represented one of the most important and largest industries in the province. Wool was produced by men and women equally. Production varied between silk gowns, robes made of wool, and carpets mainly produced in Misurata.⁹⁹ These products were sold in the local markets and locally consumed as traditional dresses. Some-

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ al-Zāwī, *Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 264.

⁹⁸ Ibrāhīm, ‘Abd al-llāh ‘Alī, “Anmāṭ al-tijārā al-dakhīliyya fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb wa Barqa fī al-niṣf al-thānī min al-qarn al-tāsi ‘ashr”, *Majallat al-buḥūth al-tārīkhiyya*, 6-2, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, jāmi‘at al-Fātiḥ, Ṭarābulis, 1984, p. 402.

⁹⁹ Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama‘ al-‘arabi al-libi*, p. 65; Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā‘ al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 148.

times, they were exported to Tunis. Straw mats called *ḥaṣīr* (or *kalīm*) were concentrated in two main areas: Taworgha and Tajura.¹⁰⁰ They were produced and used locally in huge quantities. Like the other Ottoman provinces, the Arabic provinces ruled by the Ottoman Empire were organized under a very complex system of taxation. The Ottoman taxation system in Tripoli included taxes called *werko*,¹⁰¹ the oppressive property tax implemented by an 1858 Ottoman law. Other taxes included the tithe, taxes on inheritances and on commercial transactions, in addition to the real estate tax and taxes on precious metals. The *werko* was a tribute annual tax known as *mīrī*, which was imposed on the population of Tripoli. It was considered one of the most important taxes in the province. It was taken from every adult male and was used by the Ottomans to cover administrative expenses.¹⁰² In addition, there were taxes on livestock that varied depending on type. For a camel, for example, the owner should pay 35 Ottoman Qirsh,¹⁰³ whilst the sum for each cow was 17.5 Ottoman Qirsh. Taxes were also imposed on trees and wells.¹⁰⁴ A new tax was introduced in 1897 to pay for the exemption from military service. The tax was known as *al-jihādiyya* and the main goal behind was to cover the expenses of the Greek-Turkish war. It is noteworthy that the government in Istanbul imposed this tax for only one year, but the governors in Tripoli made it permanent, and included it within the *werko* tax.¹⁰⁵ The tithe was paid on agricultural products. Farmers had to pay one tenth of their agriculture production such as wheat, barley and olives to the government. Because this tax was linked mainly with the quantity and quality of production it differed from one year to another.¹⁰⁶ In addition, other taxes and revenues included the property tax, stamps tax, and taxes paid in ports, which were imposed in 1886.¹⁰⁷ It should be noted that the families of the aristocracy were exempted from these

100 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, pp. 65–67.

101 Brūshīn, *Tārīkh Libiyā min nihāyāt al-qarn al-tāsi' 'ashar*, pp. 64–65.

102 Ibid.

103 There is different currencies mentioned in this book as it was mentioned in the literature, I could not find any document that helps me to unify the different currencies.

104 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, pp. 37, 38, 46.

105 Kākiyā, Antūnī, *Libiyā fī al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī 1835–1911*, translated by Yūsuf Afandī al-'Asalī, Ṭarābulis, 1946, p. 91, an Arabic translation of Cachia, A.J., *Libya under the Second Ottoman Occupation (1835–1911)*, Tripoli, 1945.

106 al-Wibā, Kāmil 'Alī, *al-Idāra al-'ūthmāniyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, revised by Ṭāhir Khalf al-Baka', markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2005, p. 135.

107 al-Sūrī, Ṣālāḥ al-Dīn Ḥasan, “al-ḍarā'ib al-'ūthmāniyyā fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb wa Mutaṣarrifiyya Binghāzī fī al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī mashākil al-ḍagḥṭ wa al-tawattur”, *Majallat al-buḥūth al-tārīkhiyya*, 6-2, markaz jihād al-libiyyin ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, jāmi'at al-Fātiḥ, Ṭarābulis, 1984, p. 394.

taxes.¹⁰⁸ Exempted groups included the *al-Kuwāriqliyya*,¹⁰⁹ the Ashrāf, and the *shyūkh* (singular: *shaykh*). Despite these exemptions they could still be harassed to pay taxes. For example, the sons of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Sālām al-‘Asmār in Zlitan were harassed for years by the tax collectors and the judiciary, who asked them to provide supplies, including food, for free. For this reason, they wrote to the Ottoman sultan in Istanbul to inform him of these harassments. They asked the sultan to provide them with protection and to send an order to inform the local authorities that they were exempted from paying taxes. The sultan then reacted positively and strengthened their situation.¹¹⁰ All the non-Muslims and particularly the Jews who lived in the province of Tripoli were exempted from military service. For this exemption, they had to pay 30 penny/piaster.¹¹¹ Customs were also paid in ports. These were equivalent to 1% on exported goods and 8% on imported goods, in addition to the taxes required at ports. In the case of taxes paid at ports, the Ottomans only imposed taxes on Arab ships; ships of other countries were exempted. Furthermore, there were also taxes on post and telegraph. The revenues from the taxes were sent to Istanbul.¹¹²

108 al-Wibā, *al-Idāra al-‘ūthmāniyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 150; Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama‘ al-‘arabī al-libī*, p. 232.


109 This is a Turkish name given to a group of people in the province of Tripoli. It is said that they were born to the Turkish soldiers who were married to women from the local population. The families tended to concentrate in the cities of Tripoli, al-Zawiya, Misurata and Zeltin and other cities in the coast, see also Kamālī, Ismā‘īl, *Sukkān Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, translated by Ḥasan al-Hādī bin Yūnis, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1997, p. 60.

110 Wathiqā 40/30, al-markaz al-waṭānī li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.

111 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā‘ al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 39; Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama‘ al-‘arabī al-libī*, p. 246.

112 Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama‘ al-‘arabī al-libī*, p. 246.

2.3 Cities as Centers of Trade Networks



Map 1: Cities of the province of Tripoli

Tripoli and Benghazi

The natural consequence of the development of trade at various levels was the success and reputation the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi gained in North Africa. They became the most important commercial centers of the coastal region and formed a link between north and south, and east and west. The city of Tripoli was considered the departure and arrival point for commercial convoys between north

and south of the Sahara.¹¹³ The port played a very important role in the revitalization of commercial maritime traffic. This increased markedly at the end of the 19th century, both in terms of the value of exports and imports, and in the steady increase in the number of ships that frequently passed by Tripoli. There was a particularly marked increase in the number of Italian private vessels as a result of the increasing interest of the Italian government, which resulted in intensifying their economic activities in Tripoli and in turn boosted maritime commercial traffic.¹¹⁴ This maritime activity reached a highpoint in the period 1872–1881.¹¹⁵ The reason behind the development and recovery of the caravan trade was the progressing political situation in Tripoli and the keenness and commitment of some governors to develop this trade. The elimination of the rebels who worked against the Ottoman authority was the first task that increased the sense of security and ensured the safety of the trade caravans. Moreover, the authorities reinforced their influence in the interior areas, especially in the province (*liwāʾ*) of Fezzan and in the city of Ghadamès, which were considered the main centers along the caravan trade route with the kingdoms of Sudan.¹¹⁶ In addition, the Ottoman authorities rebuilt their relations with the kingdoms of Sudan, especially the kingdom of Kanem and Borno in the south in the second half of the 19th century. These relations had deteriorated during the rule of the *al-Kāramanlī* dynasty. Furthermore, the Ottomans tried to restore their relations with the Kingdom of Wadai (in Chad) and maintain this region within their empire.¹¹⁷ The Ottoman authorities had also taken other measures, including allowing the British government to open

113 For more information see the work of Martel, André, *Les confins Saharo-Tripolitains de la Tunisie, 1881–1911*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1965 and Lafi, Nora, “Tripoli de Barbarie, port de mer, port du désert (1795–1835)”, in *Méditerranée, mer ouverte: actes du colloque de Marseille (21–23 Septembre 1995)/Tome 2, XIXe et XXe siècles*, ed. by Christiane Villain-Gandossi, Louis Durteste and Salvino Bussutil, International Foundation, Malta, 1997, pp. 657–666.

114 Hüwidi, Muṣṭafaʿ Ali, “al-Ṣurūf al-iqtisādiyyā, fi wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb qubail al-ghazū al-iṭālī”, *al-dawr al-iqtisādi li-madinat Ṭarābulis ka-ḥalaqat wasl baina ʿAūrūbbā wa Afrīqiyā (1835–1950)*, ed. by Khalifa Moḥammad al-Duwaybi, aʿmāl al-nadwā al-ʿilmiyya al-thālitha allatī ʿuqidat bi-l-markaz fi 3/10/1998, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2008, p. 204.

115 Anderson, Lisa, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987.

116 Lafi, Nora, Ghadamès, cité oasis entre empire Ottoman et colonialisme, in *Libya tra Mediterraneo e mondo islamico*, ed. by Federico Cresti, A. Giuffrè, Milano, 2006, pp. 55–70.

117 Concerning the Ottoman Empire and Sahara, see Minawī, Mostafa, “A New Start? Libyan History and Historiography at a Time of Historical Transition” a post-workshop report on the international workshop “Libyan History and Historiography at a Time of Historical Transition”, held at Zentrum Moderner Orient in Berlin (2012), report consulted on September 3, 2020, https://www.eume-berlin.de/fileadmin/eume/pdf/arbeitsgespraeche/Minawi-Libyan_History-Report.pdf.

two branches of their consulate in Tripoli in Murzuq and Ghadames and permitting the French to open a branch of their consulate. All of these efforts contributed to stimulating the caravan trade with the Sudanese kingdoms and this finally had a significant positive impact. The number of caravans from the province of Tripoli increased.¹¹⁸ At the time, Benghazi was as important as Tripoli with the number of trades conveys which were passing through. The port of Benghazi received goods from Wadai, and Timbuktu (in Mali). To give just one example, in the second half of the 19th century, large quantities of ostrich feathers were imported from Wadai by caravan to Benghazi, where they were exchanged for cotton textiles from Europe. The historical literature indicates that the number of convoys from Benghazi to sub-Saharan Africa was relatively large in 1893, employing a total of 1.111 camels to transport the goods. The number of camels carrying the goods also increased to 1.232 and reached 2.238 by 1899.¹¹⁹ This clearly demonstrates active trade between the north and the south. It also demonstrates how the authorities of Sudan's sub-Saharan kingdoms were keen to continue this trade that enriched the local markets, while at the same time representing a connection with the north. The sultans of the Sudanese kingdoms were collecting the tithe (or *ōṣūr*, meaning “tenth” in English) imposed on goods transported to and from Tripoli, as well as different amounts of money to facilitate the slave trade that was conducted across the land.¹²⁰ This played an important role in enriching the market in these kingdoms.¹²¹

Sawkanh

This city is located in the southeast of the province of Tripoli and was considered a center of trade toward the interior cities and regions of south-central Africa. The

118 See for example: the thesis of al-Ḥindīrī, Sa'īd, Université de Provence, Aix, Marseille, 1992, and other publications such as al-Ḥindīrī, “Taṭawwur tijārat al-qawāfil fi Wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb”, p. 696.

119 al-Ma'lūl, Sālim Moḥammad, “Daūr Awjilah fi tawthiq al-'ālāqāt ma' mamālik bilād al-Sūdān mindhu al-qarn al-'āshir ḥatā maṭla' al-qarn al-'aishrīn”, *Awjilah baina al-māqī wa al-ḥāqīr (1950–1951)*, a'māl al-nadwā al-'ilmiyya al-sābi'ā allatī 'uqidat bi- madīnat Awjilah (17-20/9/2009), ed. by Moḥammad Bashir Suwīsī, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyyā, Ṭarābulis, 2009, pp. 103–104.

120 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 121.

121 See the work of Panzac, Daniel, *Les corsaires barbaresques. La fin d'une épopée, 1800–1820*, CNRS Editions, Paris, 1999 and the English translation, Corsairs, Barbary, *The End of a Legend 1800–1820*, Brill, London, Boston, 2005, p. 353.

city gained its significance from its strategic geographical location on the route that runs between Tripoli and Borno in (Nigeria) and on the pilgrimage route between east and west.¹²² It is on a plane extending toward the east. Sawkanh was also considered the south gate to the oases in the Jofra region in the province (*liwāʿ*) of Fezzan. Its climate is famous for hot summers and cold winters. It was mentioned by the German traveller Gustav Nachtigal,¹²³ who estimated the population to be about 3.000 in 1869.¹²⁴ The city had been active in transit trade. The merchants of the city were able to amass considerable wealth, seen as business agents (*wukalāʿ*) in the north and south because they had established linkages with the sultans of Borno, the Hijaz, and the city of Istanbul. Sawkanh was also a resting station for trade convoys headed toward both north and south. The city provided the trade convoys with food such as dates, meat, bread and so forth. Another factor that boosted the importance of the city was that the local people rented their camels for trade and some inhabitants volunteered to serve as escorts to the convoys.¹²⁵

Ghadames

Ghadames had a special significance. First, it is an ancient city with a privileged geographic location. It is located to the northwest of the city of Tripoli in a mountainous area known as al-Ḥamada al-Ḥamraʿ (640 km from the center of the province of Tripoli), on the borders with Tunisia and Algeria. These borders were important because Algeria was under French occupation in 1880, at the same time as the French were trying to extend their influence to Tunisia. Ghadames was an important trade center between Algeria and Tunis. France then tried to take control of parts of Ghadames and to change the trade routes to pass through Tunisia. The city center is also only 9 km from the Algerian border, whilst the

122 al-ʿAfif, Mukhtār ʿŪthmān, “Namādhij min al-ṣilāt al-tijāriyya bain Sawkanh wa Ṭarābulis khilāl al-ʿahd al-ʿūthmānī al-thānī 1835–1911”, *Majallat al-buḥūth al-tārikhiyya*, 21-2, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1999, pp. 123, 125.

123 See Nachtigal, Gustav, *Sahara und Sudan*; on his biography see also Priesner, Claus, “Nachtigal, Gustav” in *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 18, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1997, pp. 682–684.

124 Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan*, p. 148; Ghānim, ʿImād al-Dīn, “al-Mujtamaʿ al-libī ladā al-raḥḥāla al-ʿaūrūbbiyyīn”, *al-Mujtamʿ al-libī 1835–1950*, aʿmāl al-nadwā al-ʿilmiyya al-thāmina allatī ʿuqidat bi-l-markaz fī al-fatra min 26-27/9/2000, ed. by Moḥammad al-Ṭāhir al-Jarārī, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2005, p. 330; see also Panzac, Daniel, *La population de l’Empire Ottoman, Cinquante ans (1941–1990) de publications et de recherches*, CNRS-IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence, 1993.

125 al-ʿAfif, “Namādhij min al-ṣilāt al-tijāriyya bain Sawkanh wa Ṭarābulis”, p. 125.

city of Ghat is about 800 km away.¹²⁶ Another feature that increased Ghadames' importance is the existence of many water sources or springs called *'auyūn* (singular: *'ayn*); the most famous being *'Ayn al-Faras*.¹²⁷ Most of the residents of the area drew water for their animals and irrigated their farms from *'Ayn al-Faras*.¹²⁸ The city was of great importance for the trade convoys. It represented the main place where they exchanged their tired camels for rested animals to continue their journey to Ghat, where the camels were replaced again. This was the established pattern of all convoys from Tripoli to Kanem in 1897.¹²⁹ Economically, the city was a center of trade and a meeting place for convoys (see Picture 1), which contributed to its status as an important commercial city. It was also a large oasis in the desert in its own right, rich in palm trees, gardens, and wells.

Ghadames' traders assumed a privileged position both within the province and beyond. They had permanent trade agents in different places, like Tunis,¹³⁰ Timbuktu and many other cities of the region of Sudan, Sokoto (in Nigeria), Kanem and Wadai. It is noted that these agents were from the same city and often the sons of the merchants themselves.¹³¹ Ghadames also represented an important point of cultural interchange between the Islamic culture and society that dominated in the north and the less Islamically oriented culture of the sub-Saharan regions.¹³² The trade that was taking place between north and south of the Sahara reveals how the two parts of Africa were complementing each other economically.¹³³

126 al-Ma'lūl, Fātima Moḥammad, *madīnat Ghadāmis dirāsa fi jughrāfiyat al-mudun*, al-Qāhira, 2006, p. 12.

127 al-'Aḥwal, Khalifa Moḥammad, "al-Jāliyāt al-ajnabiyya fi Libiyā (1835–1950)", *al-Mujtama' al-libī (1835–1950)*, a'māl al-nadwā al-'ilmiyya al-thāmina allatī 'uqīdat bi-l-markaz fi al-fatra min 26-27/9/2000, ed. by Moḥammad al-Ṭāhir al-Jarārī, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2005, p. 456.

128 Abū Shārib, "Tijārat al-qawāfil", p. 135.


129 Nāji, *Tārikh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 63.

130 Yūsha', Bashir Qāsim, Wathiqa 142, 1884, *Wathā'iq Ghadāmis wathā'iq tijāriyya tārikhiyya ijtimā'iyya 949H/1542M-1343H/1924M*, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1995.

131 Martel, *Les Confins Saharaos Tripoltains de la Tunisie (1881–1911)*, p. 93; see also al-Ṭawīl, Imḥammad Sa'īd, "al-Ṣirā' al-duwalī 'alā madīnat Ghadāmis khilāl al-niṣf al-thānī min al-qarn al-tāsi'a 'ashar wa in 'ikāsātuh 'alā tijāratihā", *a'māl al-nadwā al-'ilamiyya al-tārikhiyya ḥawla tārikh Ghadāmis min khilāl kitābāt al-rahḥāla wa al-mū'arrikhīn*, introduced by Nūr al-Dīn al-Thīnī, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2003, p. 199.

132 See Marmol y Carvajal, Louis, *L'Afrique de Marmol*, ed. by Richelet Pierre, 3 vols., Paris, 1667, p. 58.

133 al-Sāqizlī, 'Abd al-Laṭīf Sulaymān, *Libiyā al-thawrā*, vol. 1, Dār mimfis li-l-ṭibā'a wa al-nashr, al-Qāhira, 1398H; Sālim al-Ma'lūl, "Daūr Awjilah fi tawthīq al-'ālāqāt ma' mamālik bilād al-Sūdān", p. 93.



Picture 1: Example of a convoy in Ghadames in 1884

Network of Caravan Trade Routes

The other factor contributing to the economic importance of the province of Tripoli was the network of routes used by convoys to travel back and forth. These routes had two characteristics (see Map 4). Firstly, they had been in use for a long time and were therefore well known to all who were involved in trade in Africa. Secondly, they constituted a network that extended outward to connect different parts of Africa to the rest of the Ottoman provinces. There were several important routes.

The route of Tripoli to Kano passed through a series of small towns and villages and some tribal groupings until it reached south to Chad, and went through the southwest passing areas like al-Aair and Zander to Kano.¹³⁴ This route passed through Ghadames.

134 Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, pp. 161–162.

The Tripoli-Borno (Nigeria)¹³⁵ route ended at Coca on the shores of Lake Chad. It was the most direct route toward the Central of Africa. The duration of a round-trip was six months.¹³⁶

The Tripoli-Benghazi route was used by convoys from Tripoli traveling to Benghazi and became a rallying point for many convoys. In Benghazi there were representatives responsible for monitoring the convoys, which belonged to Tripoli until they left. On the way to Tripoli they passed through such places as Wadai, al-Kufra, Tebsti, Anwaja and Enski.



Map 2: Ottoman African provinces

The middle route to Sudan was a longer but safer, starting from the city of Tripoli, passing through Ghadames and reaching Kano. It is notable that most of the users and the supervisors of this route were traders from Ghadames. The advantage of this route was that it generated large profits for the province.¹³⁷ In addition, the

¹³⁵ ‘Āmir, Maḥmūd ‘Alī, *Tārīkh al-maghrib al-‘arabī al-ḥadīth, Libiyā, Jāmi‘at Dimashq, Dimashq*, 1987, p. 157.

¹³⁶ Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā’ al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī*, pp. 86–87.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 84–85.

traders from Ghadames were known for their intelligence and were very active. This was because they had grown up in trading families and were always surrounded by traders coming to their city, besides their good knowledge of several African languages and dialects in addition to Arabic. This helped them in turn to extend their trade outside their city, with some of them were very famous in Kano, Nubi and Zander in Africa and some cities in Tunis. The estimated total number of merchants from Ghadames during the second half of the 19th century was estimated to be 129.¹³⁸

The desert route linked Tripoli with the oases through Sawkanh, Zawilah, Awjilah, al-Jaghub to Siwa, and Kradash in the west of Cairo. This route also linked Tripoli to the Tunisian and Algerian commercial centers.¹³⁹ There was more trade with Tunisia than with the other two provinces. These exchanges were supervised by the Tunisian agents in Tripoli, and the same in Tunisia. The exchange of goods included both domestic goods and those coming from Europe and Africa.¹⁴⁰ Trade with Algeria was limited to Tar (*al-tronh*) and Hina (*ḥinnah*) also known as *Lawsonia inermis*.


The coastal route: This route was divided into two main legs, one heading toward the east, starting from Tripoli and passing through the major coastal cities and continuing through the border with Egypt until reaching both Alexandria and Cairo. Trade with Egypt included trade in rice and sugar and imported livestock, *ḥinnah*, mats, and other manufactured goods. These were transported by convoys or ships of the Italian and Maltese companies.¹⁴¹ The second route headed west toward the Tunisian cities such as Sfax, Kairouan and Tunis, which were involved in trade and economic exchange. The main difference between these routes in trading terms is that the transport of goods was more expensive on the coastal route than the land routes.

138 al-Ṭawīl, “al-Ṣirā‘ al-duwalī ‘alā madīnat Ghadāmis”, p. 64.

139 Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama‘ al-‘arabī al-libī*, p. 64.

140 Alghafal, *al-‘Ālāqāt al-libīyyā al-tūnisīyya*, p. 144.

141 Kürü, *Libiyā athnā‘ al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 77–78



Map 3: Caravan trade routes in the province of Tripoli in the 19th century

These routes facilitated trade between the regions and were used to transport different goods such as grains (barley, wheat, corn), gold and silver jewelry, glass, dates, spices, horse saddles, livestock and carpets,¹⁴² in addition to goods coming from Europe, including silk imported from Lyon in France, cotton fabrics from Britain, and handicraft tissues that were made in India, perfumes of various kinds, weapons and other goods.¹⁴³ These routes also helped transport African products and goods such as ostriches, gold, ivory and slaves. Some convoys also carried goat skins and leather goods.¹⁴⁴ To sum up, the preceding overview has presented the geographic, strategic and economic importance of Tripoli and has indicated why the province was so important to control. The situation in the province of Tripoli played a major role in shaping the relationship between Tripoli and the other Ottoman provinces as well as with the European powers.

¹⁴² ‘Āmir, *Tārīkh al-maghrib al‘arabī*, p. 158.

¹⁴³ al-Ḥindirī, “Taṭawwur tijārat al-qawāfil fi wilāyāt Ṭarābulis”, p. 703.

¹⁴⁴ Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā’ al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī*, pp. 88-89; al-Ḥindirī, “Taṭawwur tijārat al-qawāfil fi wilāyāt Ṭarābulis”, p. 703.

Internal and Foreign Trade

Trade in the province of Tripoli was directly supervised by the Ottoman governors and main families of the region. Some of the Ottoman governors of Tripoli were known for their work in developing the economic sector in general and trade, in particular. They focused their efforts on developing the trade sector that they viewed as important for developing the province's economy. Examples of such governors were Ali Rida Pasha¹⁴⁵ (first term 1867–1870, second term 1872–1873), Muṣṭafa Asim (acting as governor 1870, second term 1874–1875), and Aḥmed Rasim Pasha (1881–1896). However, trade was sometimes disturbed when conflicts arose or groups rebelled against the ruling political authority. This includes the slave trade, which was taking place at that time both internally and externally. The region enjoyed great economic importance during the dynasty of *al-Kāramanlī* (1711–1835). Tripoli's economic importance at that time was mainly due to the large activity of trade convoys, which enjoyed the support of the ruling power, which in turn provided full protection to convoys coming to or departing the state. At the end of the rule of the *al-Kāramanlī* dynasty, trade declined due to the political situation. During this time, the province was politically unstable and witnessed a series of revolts by the local population. Internal conflicts broke out among *al-Kāramanlī* dynasty members about who was eligible to rule. The family was divided into two groups: a group led by Moḥammad Pasha, and the other led by Ali Pasha, the legitimate heir of the family.¹⁴⁶ The Ottoman Empire resolved this conflict by sending a naval fleet to Tripoli. It consisted of 32 ships and was led by Najib Pasha who announced that he was coming to calm the situation and restore security in the province. Within a few days of his arrival, he managed to restore direct Ottoman rule and ended the rule of the *al-Kāramanlī* dynasty,¹⁴⁷ and everything reverted to its previous state, including trade.¹⁴⁸ Najib Pasha was then appointed as governor in 1835. Another period of decrease in trade was that after 1881. This time, the deterioration of trade was due to the decrease in demand for some material goods brought from Africa. For instance, Britain had been able to raise ostriches to produce feathers, which lowered the demand for feathers imported from Africa and directly contributed to the marked decline in prices.¹⁴⁹

145 Concerning the implementation of the reforms with this governor see the study of Lafi, Nora, *Une ville du Maghreb entre ancien régime et réformes ottomanes*, op.cit.

146 Rūsi, *Libiyā mundhu al-faṭḥ al-'arabī*, p. 570.

147 Ziyāda, Niqūlā, *Libiyā fi al-'uṣūr al-ḥadīthā*, ma'had al-buḥūth wa al-dirāsāt al-'arabiyya, Jami'at al-duwal al-'arabiyya, al-Qāhira, 1966, p. 52.

148 Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 189.

149 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 84; Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 68.

This mode of trade focused on local products as well as imported products at other times. The province's wealth of livestock and agricultural production were the main source of livelihood for the locals; the transactions took place in markets held daily or weekly. There were permanent markets in the city of Tripoli, such as the al-Rubaa old market established by Osman Pasha al-Saqzle, who ruled between 1649 and 1672. It was distinctive in that it was completely covered by a ceiling.¹⁵⁰ There were also weekly markets in most regions, such as the Friday market¹⁵¹ (see Picture 2),¹⁵² and the Sunday market for selling the sparto and *ħalfa* plants (*Cortaderia selloana*).¹⁵³ These markets also existed in other coastal cities such as Zuwarah, Misurata and Benghazi, as well as southern cities including Murzuq, Ghadames and Ghat.



Picture 2: Friday market in Tripoli city in 1900

150 Jūbran, Mofidā, *al-'Aswāq bi-al-madīna al-qaḍīmah Iṭrābulis dirāsā tārikhiyya iqtisādiyya, mashrū' tanzīm wa idārat al-madīna al-qaḍīmah Iṭrābulis*, Ṭarābulis, 2001, p. 53.

151 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 78.

152 Wathā'iq Dār al-māḥafūḍāt al-tārikhiyya al-Sarāya al-Ḥamrā', Ṭarābulis.

153 Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama' al-'arabī al-libī*, p. 193.

The goods sold were mainly food and the daily necessities, as well as agricultural products such as cereals like wheat, as well as the sparto or *ḥalfa* plant, dates, olive oil, fruits and other products. There was also a trade in livestock such as sheep, cattle, goats, camels and horses.¹⁵⁴ The most important livestock markets in the city of Tripoli were al-Ḥalfa and al-Khubuz. Both were weekly markets held on Mondays. The most important livestock markets not in the city of Tripoli were in the western part of the province, which were dedicated to the buying and selling of cattle. For instance, the market in the city of Gradates was located in the city center in an open area. There were 33 shops for selling different types of goods as well as other service shops. In the 19th century, this market had developed and become a big market that included smaller specialized markets such as the livestock market, the artisan market and the market of the goldsmiths and other goods.¹⁵⁵ In addition, famous markets were also held in al-Zawiya and Zuwarah in the western part of the province. In the central area of the province of Tripoli, markets were held in Ghadames, Ghat, Nalut and Murzuq in the south. Specifically, there was a larger market in Murzuq.¹⁵⁶ In the eastern part of the province, Benghazi was able to take a privileged position after it became the capital of Cyrenaica *mutaṣarrifiyya*, and it became the center of trade. In Benghazi, markets were divided into two types. In the first, shops had ceilings and traded in goods like grain, food, silk and cotton clothes, along with weapons and several other minor commodities. The second type was open and consisted of standing stalls. The livestock trade took place daily, and was described as the most important trade in the state.¹⁵⁷ The best-known livestock markets were found in Ajdabiyah, Suluq, and al-Marj.¹⁵⁸ Foreign trade was significant for the economy of the province. This trade derived its wealth from two main sources: Caravan trade with sub-Saharan Africa and Arab and Ottoman provinces on one hand, and trade with European countries on the other. The Ottoman Empire had a high share in these exchanges as it imported tobacco, household tools, alcohol, rice, flour, textiles, mats, *ḥinnah*, ghee, oil, dates, and sponges.¹⁵⁹

154 Ibrāhīm, “Anmāt al-tijārā al-dakhīliyya fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb”, pp. 401–402.

155 Fātima al-Ma’lūl, *madīnat Ghadāmis*, pp. 41, 60.

156 al-Ḥashā’ishī, Moḥammad bin ‘Uthmān, *Riḥlat al-Ḥashā’ishī ilā Libiyā 1895 (Jalā’ al-Karab ‘an Ṭarābulis al-ghārb)*, ed. by ‘Alī Muṣṭafa al-Miṣrātī, Dār Lubnān li-l-ṭibā’a wa al-nashr, Bayrūt, 1965, pp. 85, 112.

157 Kākiyā, *Libiyā fī al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 125.

158 Kūrū, *Libiyā fī al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī*, pp. 79–80; Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama’ al-‘arabī al-libī*, p. 171.

159 Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 59; Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā’ al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 77; Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama’ al-‘arabī al-libī*, p. 12.


Many governors of the province of Tripoli focused on trading with countries located on the Mediterranean Sea according to the diversity of goods and financial return generated. The exchanges or transactions, especially with European countries, took place in Tripoli; they had to be approved by the Ottoman government. To facilitate these exchanges, the Ottoman government in the province of Tripoli opened transportation lines subjected to specific laws and regulations benefiting Ottoman trade and the economy. There was maritime commercial activity between Tripolia and some European countries. The German line (*Deutsche Levante-Linie*), for example, was one of the most important shipping companies transporting materials and products from and to both Germany and Belgium.¹⁶⁰ Goods were transferred from the ports of Tripoli to others, such as Beirut and ports in Egypt. This was in addition to the Italian public navigation lines that were supervised by the Bank of Rome, which had taken the port of Genoa as its center of operations. This choice was mainly because Genoa was one of the main Italian ports and the one with the best connections to Tripoli and Benghazi. Its importance is also reflected by the fact that Genoa was the main port used for transit trade, specifically for those goods coming from Spain and Switzerland and sometimes from Germany. Maltese ships also contributed to this trade; the main operations took place between Marseille and the ports of Tripoli. Trade links with the ports of Tunisia were also established.¹⁶¹

As for Britain, the state benefited from the services of the Italian ships, in addition to using its own ships. At the same time, Great Britain sought concessions from state authorities to facilitate its trade with Tripoli, and succeeded in doing so in the 18th century. As a result, they signed an agreement to ensure their export against in exchange for a few paid annually to the government in Tripoli. They were followed in this by Venice, while Russia failed to achieve the same end.¹⁶²

160 See for example the archive of the *Chambre de Commerce Marseille* and see also the seminal work of Martel, André, *Les confins Saharo-Tripolitains de la Tunisie*, op.cit; see also Kürü, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 76.

161 Kürü, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, pp. 74–75, 78.

162 Qaddūrā, Zāhiyyā, *Tārikh al-'arab al-ḥadīth*, Dār al-nāḥaḍa al-'arabiyya, Bayrūt, 1985, p. 417.



Map 4: Port city of Tripoli

France had sought to take advantage of this important convoy trade, actively working to extend its control over the most vital routes, especially in the border region between Tripoli and Tunisia¹⁶³ and used these routes to serve their interests. They tried to change the routes to pass through Tunisia and Algeria instead of the province of Tripoli. They offered some privileges to traders to attract their attention and entice them to take these new trade lines. Their actions affected business in Tripoli, and resulted in the clear decline in operations at the end of the 19th century.¹⁶⁴ The attempt by France in 1880 to control the border area between Tripoli and Tunisia is also relevant to this discussion.¹⁶⁵ The French ambitions were based on the strategic importance of this area and their own desire to take advantage of the caravan routes there. Some French officers and experts were thus sent to this region secretly.¹⁶⁶ The Tuareg tribes in the southern part of the province of Tripoli, and in the context of conflict with other tribes such as the Hagar in 1898, were suspicious of all these movements in the border area. Their suspicion led them to oppose the judge (the document does not mention

163 Martel, *Les confins Saharo-Tripolitains de la Tunisie*, p. 180.

164 Ḥamīda, *al-Mujtama' wa al-dawlā wa al-isti'mār fī Libiyā*, p. 93.

165 See for example Pervinquière, Léon, *Tripolitaine interdite Ghadamès*, Nabu Press, 2011, p. 336.

166 Martel, *Les confins Saharo-Tripolitains de la Tunisie*, p. 180.

his name) of Tataouine city (in the province of Tunis), which was located near the western border with Tripoli. The judge was almost killed by the Tuareg when he arrived in Ghadames in 1898, as part of a publicity campaign to support the French at the expense of the Ottomans.¹⁶⁷ But the mayor of Ghadames was able to stop them and informed them of the serious consequences of such an act on the relationship between Tripoli and France. When this news reached the governor of Tripoli, Namik Pasha ordered the release of the judge and sent ten guards to protect him until he arrived in Tataouine.¹⁶⁸ In 1898, a small group of French soldiers crossed the provisional Libyan-Tunisian border that had been established by the colonial powers and traveled 20 miles into Libyan territory. The unit established a military camp within the French colonial borders of the province.¹⁶⁹ The Ottoman state did not accept this and demanded the appointment of a committee to determine the zones of influence and to mark the borders accurately.¹⁷⁰

The province of Tripoli had benefited greatly from the sparto (*ħalfa*) trade, as one of the main sources of revenue, especially in the 19th century. It boomed in 1896¹⁷¹ and the largest importer was Britain. The price per quintal amounted to seven pounds. The sparto was cultivated in different areas such as Jifarah, Tarhuna, the mountain area, al-Aeaiat, Warshefana, Meslata, al-Amamra and others.¹⁷² The province's authorities were concerned with this production; in the mid-19th century, machines were used to compress the sparto into bundles or bales ready for storage or transportation in the center of the province and in cities like al-Khums¹⁷³ and Benghazi. Later, the cities producing this product were increasingly located between al-Aziziyah and al-Khums.¹⁷⁴ The supervisors of the machines were under the direct control of the government who seriously controlled for any manipulation in the production process. For instance, a manuscript referred to an act of embezzlement in al-Khums. It mentions that a director was involved. This

167 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten, Bd. 6-7, vom 1. Mai 1895 bis 31. Januar 1899, R16111, .

168 Ibid.

169 On this issue see the colonial borders of the region (see map in the annex).

170 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten, Bd. 1, 1895 bis 1899, Nr. A12804, R16111.

171 'Ughli, Khalil Saħli, "al-Mašādir al-muta'aliqa bi-libiyā fi maktabat jāmi'at Ištānbül", *Majallat al-buħūth al-tāriħhiyya*, 2-2, markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tāriħhiyya, Ārābulis, 1980, p. 250.

172 Mangano, G., *L'Alfa in Tripolitania*, Firenze, Milano, pp. 5–6.

173 Nāji, *Tāriħ Ārābulis al-ghārb*, p. 32.

174 Ibid., p. 73; Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmāni al-thāni*, p. 70.

forced the administrator to write to the governor immediately.¹⁷⁵ Even the process of collecting the plant from the fields and transporting it to the city of Tripoli was controlled and supervised by the Tripolitan authorities. Nevertheless, the accumulation of the crop in front of stores resulted in an obstruction of traffic in some streets, prompting the city council to address the ruling authorities about three crucial issues: the blocking of the traffic, the threat of fire that might lead to serious consequences, and the camels used to bring the crop and which stayed there for some time, which had its own disadvantages. The main request of the city council was to locate the market for the crop outside of Tripoli.¹⁷⁶ There were many companies involved in exporting the sparto, for example Arbeeb, the Bank of Rome, Perry Puri, H.B. Nahum, and M.J. Hassan. Each of these companies had compressing laboratories and storage facilities, especially, Arbeeb and Nahum in the cities of Tripoli and al-Khums, al-Tabya and Zlitan. Puri and Hassan only stored the plant in Tripoli and al-Khums. The main crop markets were in the cities of Tripoli, al-Khums and Zlitan.¹⁷⁷ The revenues from exporting the sparto varied from year to year. For instance, it was 4.000 Francs in 1870, but it increased in the subsequent years to reach 3.750.000 Francs.¹⁷⁸ The Ottoman documents show that the amounts exported in 1895 were equivalent to 53.855 Ottoman qirsh and in the next year the value was only 49.318 Ottoman Qirsh.¹⁷⁹ The authorities in Tripoli started to focus their efforts on increasing production and they decided to form a committee composed of the mayor of Tripoli, engineers, the head of the port, the head of the sailors and some traders. The main mission of this committee was to select a suitable place for establishing a new port dedicated specifically to the export of this plant.¹⁸⁰ This was an important step taken by the Ottoman government and indicated the economic significance of this plant for the province of Tripoli. Sponge was the second main export of the province of Tripoli due to the demand for this product in European countries. Greek sailors were the main traders of this product. There were some Greeks living in Tripoli, and some of them were traders. The sponge that was found along the coast of Cyrenaica

175 Wathiqā 4/2/1052, 1896, *Milaf buḥūth wa maqālāt (nabāt al-ḥalfa)*, al-markaz al-waṭani li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.

176 Wathiqā 105/2/4 Māyū 1871, *Milaf buḥūth wa maqālāt (nabāt al-ḥalfa)*, al-markaz al-waṭani li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.

177 Mangano, *L'Alfa in Tripolitania*, 1913, p. 38.

178 Nāji, *Tārikh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 33.

179 Wathiqā 1051/2/4, 1318, *Milaf buḥūth wa maqālāt (nabāt al-ḥalfa)*, al-markaz al-waṭani li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.

180 Wathiqā 2011, 1875, *Milaf buḥūth wa maqālāt (nabāt al-ḥalfa)*, al-markaz al-waṭani li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.

was of the highest quality.¹⁸¹ Ostrich feathers and ivory were imported from sub-Saharan Africa and were also very significant exports that played an important role in the economy of the province of Tripoli. These products also attracted the attention of the European traders, which led them to travel to the province to bring goods in high local demand, which they would then exchange for the domestic goods and other goods coming from Africa.¹⁸² The province used several ports to export and import ostrich including the port of Tripoli, which was where most of the trade with Europe took place. This was in addition to the other five ports of al-Khums, Zlitan, and Misurata, Derna and Tobruk and other smaller anchors. Trade with Germany was carried out by the German shipping line (Deutsche Levante-Line). Various categories of goods were imported from Germany including haberdashery, blankets, tea, sugar, iron, glass, perfumes, chemicals and medical materials, textile yarns, ropes, cotton, wool textiles, porcelain, gold and silver ornaments, and alcohol.¹⁸³ Exports to Germany focused on leather, ivory, ostrich feathers, barley, salt and dates. Goods imported from Germany tended to be transported to Malta first and then to Tripoli and Benghazi by the Italian shipping lines.¹⁸⁴ The reports of the English consul contain important information about the volume of trade exchange between the province of Tripoli and different European countries focusing on Germany. For instance, one report states that the year 1884 could be considered the actual beginning of commercial traffic from Germany. In terms of trade, Germany was ranked 6th on the list of countries for both import and export to and from the province of Tripoli. This rank increased or decreased depending on the quantity and quality of the products. In 1888 and 1889, for example, Germany was ranked in the seventh place and in 1893 in the eighth place, when the German imports from Tripoli were estimated to constitute a value of £7.000. In 1894, German imports were valued more modestly at £4.000. German exports from Tripoli amounted to £16.000 in 1893 and increased to £27.500 in 1894.¹⁸⁵ The amount was the same in 1895 despite the decrease in the quantity of imported goods. In 1895, the quantity of the imported goods

181 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 71–72; 'Āmir, *Tārīkh al-maghrib al-'arabī*, p. 156.

182 'Āmir, *Tārīkh al-maghrib al-'arabī*, p. 157.

183 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, 901/11936; Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 77; Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, pp. 55–56.

184 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 77; 'Ughlī, “al-Maṣādir al-muta'aliqa bi Libiyā”, p. 254.

185 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. II 11590.

was £ 4.000 while the exported goods reached a value of £ 29.000.¹⁸⁶ Generally, in these reports Britain was at the top of the list of European countries involved in trade with the province of Tripoli. The most important product exported to Britain was the sparto (*ḥalfa*). The earnings from export of this plant reached 2.500.000 French francs, in addition to the earnings from exporting ostrich feathers and ivory.¹⁸⁷ On the other hand, merchants brought tea, aromatic and medicinal chemicals and paints, ropes, cotton textiles, woolens, iron, and some minerals and other miscellaneous goods from Britain.¹⁸⁸ France and Italy came next in rank, with almost the same goods. The differences are in those goods imported from the European countries.¹⁸⁹ There was also significant trade with other countries such as Malta, Greece, Spain, the United States and Austria.¹⁹⁰



Picture 3: Goods in the port city of Tripoli and customs

¹⁸⁶ Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. 27611/96.


¹⁸⁷ Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, pp. 59–72.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 53–54.

¹⁸⁹ Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 75.

¹⁹⁰ Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 59; Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama' al-'arabī al-libī*, p. 191; the trade with Germany will be discussed in more details in chapter 3 of this study.

Concerning the slave trade, an important one reached its peak during the second half of the 19th century. The slaves were used locally as domestic workers and in farms where (*ħalfa*) was planted and cultivated. Slaves were also moved from Borno to Fezzan, from there to Tripoli, and from there they were sent abroad, particularly toward Anatolia.¹⁹¹ As for the trade line, it was as follows: Tripoli–Benghazi, Alexandria, then to the Ottoman cities like Romelia, Anatolia, Istanbul and Salonik and other places.¹⁹² This was before the decision to ban the slave trade (see Map 5).



Map 5: Slave trade lines and routes in 1850

Ghadames was also a place for buying slaves coming from West Africa. Some Ottoman slave traders would travel directly to Ghadames to sell their slaves there. Meanwhile, the traders in Benghazi tended to go to Murzuq to buy slaves. These traders also went to the center of Tripoli.

The province of Tripoli made a huge economic boom in the slave trade. However, Europe began to fight the slave trade after the second half of the century and held several conferences to intensify their efforts to stop it. Britain, with ambiguity led efforts to stop the slave trade completely, especially in the provinces controlled by the Ottoman Empire in North Africa and other regions. It

¹⁹¹ Rāfiq, *al-‘Arab wa al-‘ūthmāniyyūn, 1516–1916*, p. 161; Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 67.

¹⁹² Toledano, Ehud R., *The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression: 1840–1890*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1982, pp. 41, 47.

succeeded in convincing the Ottoman Empire to declare the permanent cessation of the slave trade in 1857.¹⁹³ Tunis was one of the first regions to abolish it in 1846. The Ottoman Empire then sent orders to the province of Tripoli stating the need to stop the slave trade. These orders were circulated among traders especially, those who used to trade between Tripoli and the city of Kano, where the slave trade was directly affected by these orders. Severe penalties were issued for violating those orders, and historical documents refer to the punishment of seven years' imprisonment for the sale of slaves and fourteen years for their purchase.¹⁹⁴

The slave trade was among the important trade activities in the North African states; this means that this policy and the British efforts to stop slave trade more widely caused significant damage to the structure of the economy, and led to the decline in annual revenues and a clear lack of financial resources. However, Britain was aware that the prohibition of the slave trade allowed British authorities to impose restrictions on the leaders of the African tribes and the governors of the provinces there.¹⁹⁵ Despite all these efforts, the slave trade did not stop at once, rather, it continued for some time. This is revealed in some European correspondence on this subject,¹⁹⁶ for instance, the messages sent by the German explorer Gerhard Rohlfs, who was in Murzuq in 1865¹⁹⁷ and the Italian agents working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Italian ambassador in Constantinople to inform him that the slave trade continued in the port of Benghazi, and was under the protection of senior Turkish officials there.¹⁹⁸ It is argued in the literature that the slave traders circumvented the authorities in order to continue their trade.¹⁹⁹ They would work in secret, anchoring their ships a short distance outside Istanbul to avoid discovery and bring the slaves into the city during the night. The transactions were carried out quickly and sometimes the traders would sell the slaves on board for fear of being discovered.²⁰⁰ To distract the attention

193 On this trade see the work of Toledano, *The Ottoman Slave Trade*.

194 Yūsha', *Wathā'iq Ghadāmis, Wathiqā 12 risālā min Moḥammad al-Ṣaghīr bin Moḥammad al-Thīni ilā Moḥammad al-Ṣaghīr Hīdāh fī Kānū*, 1856.

195 al-'Abīdī, Jāsīm Moḥammad Shaṭab, "al-Nufūdh al-birīṭānī wa tijārat al-raḥīq fī al-khalīj al-'arabī fī al-qarn al-tāsi' 'ashr", *Majallat al-buḥūth al-tārīkhīyya*, 26-2, markaz jihād al-libīyyīn ḍīd al-ghazū al-iṭālī, jāmi'at al-Fātiḥ, Ṭarābulis, 2004.

196 Boubaker, Sadok, "Considérations sur le rachat des 'esclaves' de la course à Tunis à l'époque moderne, in *Corsari, schiavi, riscatti tra Liguria e Nord Africa nei secoli XVI e XVII*, Comune di Ceriale, 2005, pp. 159–167.

197 Rulfis, *Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā*, p. 204.

198 Wathiqā 879, *Mursala min wizārat al-shu'ūn al-khārijīyyā ilā safīr İṭālī bi-l-Quṣṭanṭīniyya*, 18 *Uktūbar 1907, milaf tijārat al-raḥīq*, al-markaz al-waṭānī li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.

199 Rūsi, *Libiyā mundhu al-faṭḥ al-'arabī*, p. 379.

200 Ibid.

of authorities they would also move in small groups. From Istanbul, the slaves were sent to Egypt and Malta. A conference was held in Brussels, Belgium, in 1890 to eliminate this trade and a committee was commissioned to stop slavery in 1891. It worked with a group of people in secret to detect and prevent traders from continuing the slave trade.²⁰¹ The committee assigned Carlo da Borgo to guard the coast of Tripoli to control the passage of any ships carrying slaves, even as gifts sent to the Ottoman sultan in Constantinople.²⁰² In the same context, stricter control measurements were also discussed at the conference. A report from Carlod da Borgo, who was then living in Tripoli, was presented to the committee. This report shows the number of convoys carrying slaves from June 1907 through June 1908.²⁰³ According to the statistics, the number of slaves who entered the province reached about 550. One convoy carried 80 slaves; this convoy arrived in Tripoli on March 18, 1908.²⁰⁴ As a result of this report, the activities to liberate slaves were intensified and manumitted slaves were hosted in certain places until they were able to manage their own lives.²⁰⁵ Examples of these activities were conducted by the English consul in Benghazi and the Italian consul in the city of Tripoli, especially at the end of 1878, when help was offered to liberate slaves to improve their situation. It is stated that, from 1878 to 1879, 12 slaves were liberated by the Italian consulate.²⁰⁶

Ettore Rossi indicates that the first identification of the population of Tripoli was in the 10th century BC.²⁰⁷

The inhabitants of the province of Tripoli can be divided via geography into urban, rural, desert nomad populations. Some scholars indicate that the popula-

201 Ibid., p. 381.

202 Wathiqā 36, *Mursala min mas'ul murāqabat murūr al-'abīd bi al-sawāḥil ilā wazīr al-shu'ūn al-khārijīyyā bi Rūmā 19 Māyū 1907, Milaf tijārat al-raqīq*, al-markaz al-waṭaṇi li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis; see also Boubaker, Sadok, Réseaux et techniques de rachat des captifs de la course à Tunis au XVII^e e siècle, in *Le commerce des captifs. Les intermédiaires dans l'échange et le rachat des prisonniers en Méditerranée, XVe–XVIIIe siècle*, Etudes réunies par Wolfgang Kaiser, Ecole Française de Rome, 2008, pp. 25–46.

203 Boubaker, Réseaux et techniques de rachat des captifs de la course à Tunis au XVII^e siècle, pp. 25–46, op.cit.

204 Wathiqā 8, *Mursala ilā al-mu'tamar al-diblūmāsi fī Brüksil 1908, Milaf tijārat al-raqīq (al-istirqāq fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb wa Barqa 1907–1908)*, al-markaz al-waṭaṇi li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis.

205 Wathiqā 39, 26 Disambir, al-markaz al-waṭaṇi li-l- wathā'iq wa al-makhtūṭāt, Ṭarābulis, 2004.

206 Aḥmed, Khalifa Ibrāhīm, *Tijārat al-raqīq fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb khilāl al-qarn al-tāsi' 'ashar*, al-markaz al-waṭaṇi li-l-māḥafūḍāt, Ṭarābulis, 2014, p. 184.

207 Rossi, Ettore, *Storia di Tripoli e della Tripolitania dalla conquista araba al 1911*, Istituto per l'Oriente, Roma, 1968, p. 25.

tion of Tripoli is descended from the Upper Nile region and belongs to the Hamitic group, while others point out that they arrived from the southern Arabian Peninsula and thus are Semites.²⁰⁸ A small group of historians attributes its origins to the Mediterranean region,²⁰⁹ whereas there are also references made to groups referred to as Libyan tribes living in the region during this period. Still, there is no consensus about where these tribes came from. It is revealed in the literature that the city of Tripoli and the rural areas of Tripoli maintained their social structure throughout the rule of the Ottomans and were not significantly influenced by the so-called Turkish customs or social practices.²¹⁰ These were considered by many people as “alien” to the society.²¹¹ Another factor that contributed to the continuance of local social norms was that the Ottoman rulers tended to focus on aspects relating to political power and having the region submit to their administration. They did not intervene to change the local social and cultural structure. Thus, the society preserved its structure, particularly in the rural and nomadic areas.²¹²

Social structure was described by some historians as homogeneous in terms of three factors.²¹³ The first of these was its characterization as tribal and the importance of tribal relations in preserving social bonds. Second, the society was predominantly Muslim and the majority of the population followed the Maliki School, with the exception of the population of the western mountain and Zuwarah, who belonged to the Ibadi School. Finally, Arabic was the principle language.²¹⁴ However, beyond these three shared characteristics the population was also very diverse and the result of centuries of mixing. One factor was the existence of different ethnic groups, including indigenous inhabitants based mostly in the mountains, the central part of the province, and the coast. Centuries later, mixed situations were most common. A part of the population arrived in the province from Andalusia at the time of the reconquista and the expulsions that followed. Among them were both Muslims and Jews. There were also Jewish populations prior to the influx from Andalusia adding to the community of local

208 Ibid.

209 Ibid.

210 Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama' al-'arabi al-libi*, p. 25.

211 Ibid.

212 Rūsi, *Libiyā mundhu al-fatḥ al-'arabi*, p. 388.

213 al-Shikh, Ra'fat Ghunīmī, “al-Ḥayāt al-ijtimā'iyya fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb al-'ūthmāniyyā fī al-'aṣr al-'ūthmāni al-akhīr (1835–1911)”, *al-ḥayāt al-ijtimā'iyya fī al-wilāyāt al-'arabiyya athnā'al-'ahd al-'uthmāni*, vol. 1-2, intr. by 'Abd al-Jalil al-Timīmī, markaz al-dirāsāt wa al-buḥūth al-'ūthmāniyyā wa al-mūrisikiyya wa al-tawthīq wa al-ma'lūmāt, Zaghwān, n.d., p. 411.

214 Ibid.

Jews from Tripolitania. Later, more Jews came from other regions in the Ottoman Empire and the Mediterranean. The Berber population included both Muslims and Jews, although Muslims predominated. Many Jews in Tripoli lived in a specific part of the city referred to as *ḥāra al-Yahūd* (the quarter of the Jews)²¹⁵ but other Jews lived in the mixed quarter and it was not as clearly cut as generally described by European travelers. Indeed, these often speak of the existence of separate quarters. But there were also mixed quarters where Jews and Muslims lived together. Statistics indicate that during the second Ottoman period (1835–1911) the number of Jews reached a quarter of the population (14,142 persons in the province of Tripoli). It is said that they mainly lived in the coastal cities, but this was not the reality.²¹⁶ Most of the population were the result of intermarriage between local women and men from outside the region, as in the case of the *Kwārghliyya*. These were the sons of Ottoman officers of diverse origins who married women from Tripoli.²¹⁷ There were also populations originating from the South, like the Toubou tribes.²¹⁸ Diverse Saharan and sub-Saharan populations were also present. Representatives and officers of the Ottoman Empire were part of the ruling stratum in Tripoli along with local notables.²¹⁹ They had very diverse origins: Turkish, Greek, Arab, Caucasian, Albanian, Serb, Circasian, Tatar and Kurd. In the harbor, there were also populations of converts (Sards, Sicilians, Maltese, etc.). There were also foreign merchants, prisoners and navy operatives. A group of Italian Jews from Livorno (Granata) were among the most active merchants.²²⁰ Jewish merchants often traveled with merchant caravans²²¹ and owned workshops manufacturing jewelry from gold and silver.²²² In addition to all these groups, the presence of the Italians in Tripoli was a long-standing one. Some

215 De Felice, Renzo, *Jews in an Arab Land Libya, 1835–1970*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1985, p. 406.

216 Zorzi Tavanelli, a Venitian captain, was taken at sea by Tripoli pirates, sold to Jewish and Muslim merchants with his companions, and then ransomed through the intercession of the consuls of France and Sweden. He states that in 1749 Tripoli had sixteen to seventeen thousand inhabitants, almost half of them Jewish. This estimate is certainly too high. Another Venitian, the merchant Mariano Doxera, was probably closer to the mark in 1783 when he spoke of a population of about fourteen thousand, including about three thousand Jews “who, as in the other cities of Africa, are employed in trade and wear distinctive dress”, De Felice, *Jews in an Arab Land Libya*, op.cit, p. 7.

217 *Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī mā’at ‘ām 1286/1391H – 1870/1970M*, p. 412.

218 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā’ al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 17.

219 al-Shikh, “al-Ḥayāt al-ijtimā’iyya fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb”, p. 416.

220 al-‘Aḥwal, “al-Jāliyyāt al-ajnabiyya fī Libiyā 1835–1950”, p. 29.

221 Stein, Sarah Abrevaya, *Falling into Feathers: Jews and the Trans-Atlantic Ostrich Feather Trade*, *Journal of Modern History*, 79-4, 2007, pp. 772–812.

222 *Ibid.*

historians argue that the Italian presence in Tripoli goes back to the Roman Empire, when they came as traders and craftsmen.²²³ After Italian unification in 1870, the number of Italians in Tripoli increased. They started entering the province as immigrants and emigration reached its highest levels between 1885 and 1890.²²⁴ The migration of the Italians continued, and they managed to establish large-scale economic projects, especially after the opening of the Banco di Roma in 1905, and their influence obviously increased after the Italian occupation of the province. The Italian presence there included a significant number of Maltese. Their sizeable presence can be attributed to the proximity of the countries and the ease of travel between them.²²⁵ The Maltese started to move to the province of Tripoli, where they built their own neighborhood, known as the Maltese quarter, in the city of Tripoli. In 1882, their number was 2.000 persons and this rose in the following years to over 3.000. They were also successful traders and benefited by being under the protection of the English consulate.²²⁶ Alongside the Maltese and the Italians, there were other smaller communities such as the Jewish-Austrian community, which numbered 105 people.²²⁷ The French community consisted of approximately 564 people in Tripoli and 100 people in Benghazi. Approximately 100 Dutch were registered, some of them Jews. The Spanish community numbered 100 people in Tripoli and 50 people in Benghazi. The Greek community had 236 people²²⁸ whereas only 11 Germans were counted. Most of these communities gained a consul or representative for their interests in the province of Tripoli as it increased in size and significance.²²⁹ Another factor reflecting the heterogeneity of the society in the province of Tripoli is the significant disparity between the living standards of the inhabitants of Tripoli. The social structure reflected this stratification. At the top of the social pyramid were the rich or the politically powerful, alongside the most important religious scholars, the leaders of the school of Sufism (*ṭarīqah Sufīya*), which was a common phenomenon throughout the region in the 19th century) as well as the judges. This stratum was followed by the small traders and then the craftsmen, which were in turn above the foreign communities. The lowest social stratum was made up by the servants and

223 al-‘Aḥwal, “al-Jāliyyāt al-ajnabiyya fi Libiyā (1835–1950)”, pp. 160–161.

224 Ibid.

225 Lafi, Nora, Les relations entre Malte et Tripoli de Barbarie au XIXe siècle, *R.E.M.M.M.*, 71, 1994, pp. 127-142; Fīru, *al-Ḥawliyyāt al-lībiyyā*, p. 350.

226 al-‘Aḥwal, “al-Jāliyyāt al-ajnabiyya fi Libiyā (1835–1950)”, p. 173.

227 *Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fi mā’at ‘ām 1286/1391H–1870/1970M*, p. 422.

228 Ibid.

229 Kūrū, *Lībiyā athnā’ al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī*, pp. 23–24.

slaves.²³⁰ The basic unit of society was the family. This usually consisted of a father, a mother and their children living in one house, which was often composed of two floors. This house would be surrounded by other houses of the same size, which were occupied by members of the same extended family or tribe.²³¹ With regard to holidays and celebrations, people in the province of Tripoli celebrated the Muslim festivals of *Eid al-Fiṭr* and *Eid al-Aḍḥa* just as in other Muslim countries. The birth of the Prophet was also an important celebration. These events were celebrated at both the official and the local levels. The people in the province of Tripoli also cared about social events such as marriage and others.²³²

Local people relied on the quranic education among other knowledge provided in mosques and quranic schools for children, which focused on the memorization of the Quran and Sunna as well as the main principles of reading and writing.²³³ This model of education continued until the Ottoman government issued a number of decrees on education, including two resolutions issued and adopted in 1869 and 1871. Some governors, such as Aḥmed Ezzat (second term 1879–1880), set up schools that followed modern methods of education. Following this, the modern form of schools spread more widely and by 1877 it covered the province as far as Murzuq. This was part of a policy pursued by the Ottoman Empire in the various Ottoman provinces. The policy was made in accordance with proposals submitted to the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1869, which included the need to develop and organize education at various levels and to build schools that “corresponded” to the European model. In 1881, work on the practical implementation of the proposals seriously began. The work started by focusing on the elementary schools. The Ottoman government had developed a funding 1884 for construction and financing of the schools during the *Tanzīmāt* period.²³⁴ Thus the number of schools was on the rise in all the provinces of the Ottoman Empire,

230 See Carr, William and Harry Hearder, *The Wars of German Unification*, London, Routledge, 2014, 254p; see also Nuwār, ‘Abdul-‘Azīz wa ‘Abd al-Majīd Na‘na‘ī, *‘Aūrūbbā min al-thawrā al-fīrīnsīyyā, ilā al-ḥarab al-‘ālāmīyyā al-thānīyya*, Dār al-nāḥaḍa al-‘arabīyya li-l-ṭība‘ā wa al-nashir, Bayrūt, n.d., p. 272.

231 al-Sanīnī, Miḥṭāḥ Khalīl, *al-‘Umarā’ min ahl Barqa wa al-ṣaḥarā’*, Dār al-qimmah wa Dār al-imān, al-Qāhira 2011, p. 217

232 Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama’ al-‘arabī al-libī*, p. 25.

233 Belḥāj, Moḥammad al-Kūnī, *al-Ta’līm fī madīnat Ṭarābulīs fī al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī 1835-1911 wa atharahu ‘alā mujtama’ al-wilāyā*, markaz jihād al-libīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulīs, 2006, pp. 39, 43.

234 Evered, Emine O., *Empire and Education under the Ottomans: Politics, Reform and Resistance from the Tanzimat to the Young Turks*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2012, pp. 114, 116, 118.

including Tripoli.²³⁵ After this, the provincial government in Tripoli established one industrial school in 1895. The project was supervised by the administrative government in Tripoli and the governor Namik Pasha. The Hamidieh Industrial School was built in 1889, during the term of the governor Moḥammad Hafiz Pasha.²³⁶ The teachers were Ottoman.²³⁷ The main teaching languages were Arabic and Turkish; Turkish having been introduced to the education system in 1890.²³⁸ The Ottomans were also concerned with agricultural education, and in 1909 the council of the province issued a decree for the establishment of an agricultural school, along with the appointment of specialized teachers for its pupils.²³⁹ There were also a number of developments in terms of the media; newspapers were introduced for the first time, with first newspaper issued in the second half of the 19th century under the title West Tripoli. Historical sources give differing information regarding the date of its publication. According to some, it was published for the first time in 1866,²⁴⁰ whilst others maintain that it was issued in 1871.²⁴¹ It was a four-page official weekly newspaper in Arabic and Turkish and printed in the province. It was issued after the publication order of Sultan ‘Abdul-‘Azīz. This first newspaper was issued mainly to publish the Sultan’s orders, directives and declarations and continued until the entry of the Italian colonialists in 1911, when the printing press was destroyed by bombs. Other newspapers were also issued that had a significant role in spreading culture and information to the population. One example of these newspapers was *al-Taraqī*, issued in 1897 by Moḥammad al-Buṣayrī. These newspapers existed before the Young Turks achieved power in the Ottoman Empire. The most well-known newspapers that emerged during the rule of this group were: *al-‘Asr al-Jādīd*, which was issued in 1909, *al-Merṣād*, *Abugasha* and *al-Raqyyīb*, all of which were issued in 1910, and *al-Dārdānīl* in

235 Ibid., p. 124.

236 *Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī mā‘at ‘ām 1286/1391H–1870/1970M*, p. 87.

237 al-‘Āqil, Aḥmed Moḥammad, “al-Ta‘līm al-ḥadīth fī Libiyā khilāl al-fatra (1835–1950)”, *al-Mujtama‘ al-libī (1835–1950)*, a‘māl al-nadwā al-‘ilmiyya al-thāmina allatī ‘uqīdat bi-l-markaz fī al-fatra min 26-27/9/2000, ed. by Moḥammad al-Ṭāhir al-Jarārī, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2005, pp. 523, 525.

238 Ibid.

239 al-Ṭawīr, Moḥammad Aḥmed, “al-Zirā‘a fī wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb athnā’ al-ḥukm al-‘uthmānī al-thānī al-mubāshir lahā 1835–1911”, *al-Ḥayāt al-siyāsiyya li-l-wilāyāt al-‘arabiyya wa maṣādir wathā‘iquhā fī al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī*, vol. 1-2, intr. by ‘Abd al-Jalīl al-Tīmīmī, markaz al-dirāsāt wa al-buḥūth ‘an al-wilāyāt al-‘arabiyya fī al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī, Zaghwān, 1986, p. 521. 240 Āarībī, Moḥammad al-Ṭāhir, *Wathā‘iq al-Sarāya al-Ḥamrā’*, al-Dār al-‘arabiyya li-l-kitāb, Libiyā – Tūnis, 1977, p. 47.

241 Tarāzī, Filīb Dī, *Tārīkh al-ṣaḥāfa al-‘arabiyya*, volume 2-4, al-maṭaba‘a al-adabiyya, Bayrūt, 1967, pp. 206, 240, 314; *Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī mā‘at ‘ām 1286/1391H–1870/1970M*, p. 416.

1911.²⁴² In addition, an annual volume was released by the Ottomans. Entitled the Salname, this contained the most important information about the province including its history and geography.²⁴³ The Ottoman province of Tripoli between 1870 and 1884 and its resources and raw materials made the province an explicit prize for the colonizing forces. At the same time, it is important to highlight the social structure and the cumulative cultural heritage that aided in resisting colonial and foreign invasion by the European countries.

242 Tarāzī, *Tārīkh al-ṣaḥāfa al-‘arabiyya*, pp. 206, 240, 314; *Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī mā’at ‘ām 1286/1391H–1870/1970M*, p. 416.

243 Āarībī, *Wathā’iq al-Sarāya al-Ḥamrā*, p. 47.

3 The German “Scramble for Africa” (1882–1909)

Following the unification of Germany in 1871, it had no clear political interest in colonizing any parts of North Africa or Asia. However, it was involved in North Africa through political, diplomatic influence and economic engagement. This was unusual, given the focus on African and Asian territories reflected in the policies of most other European countries. This differing focus in comparison with other European countries, why and how Germany’s intervention in the regions were perceived and understood as strategic or economic interests is a question for historical research. This chapter is dedicated to the period called the “Scramble for Africa”¹ and will try to answer that question with a focus on the relationships between the Ottoman province of Tripoli in North Africa and Germany between 1882 and 1909. During this time, the province of Tripoli began to play a greater role in German writings and in its *Weltpolitik*. From 1884, Germany began to colonize some territories in Africa. The entrance of Germany into the *Scramble for Africa* and the overlapping interests of the European powers and their colonial ambitions in Africa resulted in heightened conflict between internally and between countries in Europe, in Africa and in the world. These conflicts led Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor, to organize the second Berlin Conference in 1884. Bismarck’s motivation for this conference was mainly to settle conflicts between European countries and Africa. The African continent was “opened” at this conference to give access to major river basins and resources. Access to Africa was also facilitated by drawing new colonial borders in the continent and creating new countries controlled as colonial territories. With this conference on November 15, 1884, Berlin put itself at the center of the European colonial enterprise. The letter of invitation sent to fourteen countries explained the main goals of this conference and included a treaty for new colonial occupations.² The decisions and agreements signed during this conference had, of course, a huge violent impact on the whole region of North Africa. It has been portrayed as the beginning of European colonization of parts of Africa.³ Some European powers at the time viewed Africa as a single region there to be colonized. Others thought of Africa in a very biased way, as composed only of tribes and ignorant

1 For the use of this expression by famous historians like Thomas Pakenham (born in 1933) and Sebastian Conrad, see Pakenham, Thomas, *The Scramble for Africa, 1876–1912*, Random House, New York, 1991, 738p; see also Conrad, op.cit.

2 See, for example, Craven, “Between Law and History”, pp. 31–59.

3 Conrad, *German Colonialism*, op.cit.

people ready to be divided.⁴ This reflected European powers' appetite and desire to divide Africa into different regions following only their own interests. They did not respect "ethnic" or "tribal" divisions, which in some cases led to areas occupied by a single tribe being subjected to two different European powers.⁵

But what about Germany in this colonial context? One way to answer this question would be to present a survey of European and German travelers and to portray their journeys in the province of Tripoli from the end of the long 19th century. Some of them were driven by their interest in the geography of the region, for example, the mystery of the desert, and they were keen to decipher its symbols. Some others were more driven by political interests. German travelers stressed in their own reports and letters the importance of the province of Tripoli and they included Tripoli as one important element to consider in political decisions that Germany's government could take. German politicians estimated its real economic and political value and decided to open a German consulate in this region.

The examination of how figures like C.F. Bläser (also written Blazer) G. Schweinfurt, G. Nachtigal, G. Krause or G. Rohlfs presented their own vision and interesting developments about the vision of North Africa. Bläser, for example, was important for the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. He was a German writer who studied law and political economy. His note and report were published in a book in 1882.⁶ It demonstrated explicitly the extreme strategic and economic importance of the province of Tripoli. The book stressed the benefits that could be gained if Germany managed to control it.⁷ Georg Schweinfurt (1826–1925), the famous German natural scientist and traveler, presented a comprehensive study of this province, especially the city of Tobruk that appeared in 1882. It contained important strategic and geographical information⁸ and provided an accurate description of the port of Tobruk in terms of depth and ease of movement of vessels for both commercial and military reasons. Tobruk was viewed as an important port for Germany because it could be used as a starting point from which to travel further into African regions and to reach the southern Nile

4 Stoecker, *German Imperialism in Africa*, op.cit., p. 38.

5 Ibid.

6 C.F. Bläser, *Deutschlands Interesse an der Erwerbung und Colonisation der nordafrikanischen Küsten Tunis und Tripolis in seiner grossen Bedeutung zumal hinsichtlich der handelspolitischen und gewerblichen Beziehungen*, Bohne, Berlin, 1882. The title can be translated as "Germany's interests in the acquisition and colonization of North African coasts". For more information on this book, see 'Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, "al-Maṣāliḥ al-'almāniyya fī Libiyā", p. 38.

7 Ghānim, "al-Maṣāliḥ al-'almāniyya fī Libiyā", p. 38.

8 Mūrī, *al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfi fī Libiyā*, p. 100.

bank. From there they could move freely between the central regions of Africa. Gerhard Rohlfs, a German scientific traveler, published many accounts of his African journeys.⁹ He participated in the French expedition in Kabiliya, where massacres occurred. He focused on collecting information to show the strategic importance of the province of Tripoli,¹⁰ arguing that German control of the city of Tripoli and its province would make it easier for Germany to control Sudan.¹¹ German politicians in the 19th century concentrated their attention on two aspects with regard to this place. The first was the study of its economic and geo-political importance. The second focused on studying the social life of the African population, the language, the customs and traditions of this part of Africa, seen as Roman and Greek territories with monuments.¹² This is why many associations for promoting the exploration of interior parts of Africa encouraged travel to the continent, but the main reason behind this was the German interest in the province of Tripoli as a potential bridgehead toward Africa. The importance of North Africa to individual expeditions illustrates how much the exploration of this continent was to a great extent a transnational endeavor often financed by geographical associations, but also by businessmen. Writers started to highlight the economic and strategic importance of this Ottoman province as a gate to the interior parts of Africa.¹³ The European scramble for Africa began between 1840 and 1870. The Industrial Revolution in Europe might be considered the actual beginning of the European competition over Africa. New industries had emerged. A significant increase in production resulted in an urgent need to search for external markets for those products. And the competition was also on about who would have first access to raw materials, whether agricultural or metal, to support their industries.¹⁴ The competition of European powers increased. Britain occupied the region of East Africa and the Niger River, while France was active in North Africa, particularly in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco and Central Africa. France tried to extend its influence across the desert to western Congo and West Africa. Meanwhile, Italy occupied Ethiopia and Abyssinia and the province of Tripoli. From 1884, Germany began to occupy parts of Africa in a political sense and established colonies in West Africa, Cameroon and Togo (1884) and in South West Africa, parts of Namibia (1884), and East Africa (now Burundi, Ruanda and Tan-

9 Gerhard Rohlfs' book (1881) was translated into Italian language in 1882; Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, *markaz jihād al-libiyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya*, Ṭarābulis, 2006, p. 55.

10 Rohlfs, *Reise durch Marokko*, Rulfis, *Riḥla ilā al-Kufrā*, p. 55.

11 Ibid.

12 Ghānim wa Shlūtir, "al-Qunṣuliyya al-'almāniyya fī Ṭarābulis", p. 4.

13 Ziyāda, *Libiyā fī al-'uṣūr al-ḥadīthā*, p. 59.

14 Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 17.

zania (1885). Togo and Cameroon were German colonies owing to a small group of investors and traders before 1884. In this year, they wanted to have ‘protection’ from the African tribal leaders, as they put it. They asked their government to work to achieve this goal. Tribal leaders themselves wanted agreements with the German government. This prompted the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck to send a delegation headed by Gustav Nachtigal. This German doctor and traveler succeeded in signing an agreement with them in 1884 to ensure the rights and security of the German traders.¹⁵ Britain benefitted from its large military forces, which enabled it to stabilize its colonial territory from the 18th century onward.¹⁶ British power dominated East Africa including the ports, land and sea lanes there. It had controlled Egypt since 1882, where it also had the strongest European fleet. Britain at that time had already also colonized Sudan, Kenya and Cape of Good Hope and other parts of Africa including Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Ghana.¹⁷ The British recognized the challenge represented by the increasing presence of Germany in the region, since Germany was persistently strengthening its relations there, starting with the sultan of Morocco. It had also augmented their trade activities and economic projects. For instance Germany received the privilege of building the port of Tangier, and their trade activities extended to reach both Algeria and Tunisia despite the fact that they were under the control of France.¹⁸ The decision of Otto von Bismarck to enter the imperial competition in 1884 led to conflicts with European countries and Britain in particular.¹⁹ The competition intensified when the Belgian King Leopold started to become active in the Congo Basin and invited some representatives of European powers, mainly Britain, France, Italy and Russia, to hold an informal conference in Brussels. King Leopold aimed at obtaining the approval required for exploration and exploitation of African regions and succeeded in establishing and gaining presidency of the African International Association, which was based in Brussels. All of these developments pushed the European powers to react, and they decided to hold an international conference to prevent any conflicts that may occur as a result of

15 Hofmann, Michael, *Deutsche Kolonialarchitektur und Siedlungen in Afrika*, Petersberg, 2013, pp. 9, 33.

16 Nuwār wa Na’na’ī, *al-Tārīkh al-‘Aūrūbbi al-ḥadīth*, p. 381.

17 Abu Jābir, Fāyiz Ṣāliḥ, *al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī al-ḥadīth wa al-‘ālāqāt al-dawliyya, al-mu’āshira*, Dār al-bashīr li-l-nashr wa al-tawzī‘, Amman, 1989, p. 137; al-Magraḥi, Milād, *Tārīkh ‘Aūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-mu’āshir*, al-Jāmi‘a al-Maftūḥa, Ṭarābulis, 1995, p. 232.

18 Muḥāfaẓa, *Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-‘arabiyya*, pp. 23–24.

19 Scherer, Friedrich, *Adler und Halbmond, Bismarck und der Orient 1878–1890*, Schöning, Paderborn, 2001, 571p; Ibrāhīm, *al-Muslimūn wa al-istiamār al-‘Aūrūbbi li-Afriqiyā*, 1989, pp. 15, 17–18.

this competition in the scramble for Africa.²⁰ To support this association, King Leopold established a company that worked in the same field. It succeeded in signing many agreements with the chiefs of the tribes in the Congo and the Belgians were thus able to control the Congo Basin.²¹ France did not accept this progress. France had already arrived at the Congo River in 1875, but did not succeed in signing any agreement there until 1883, when it sought to create a road linking French colonies in North and Central Africa.²²

With regard to the province of Tripoli, Germany enhanced its activities in this province because it was not under the control of any European powers. The province was under the authority of the Ottoman Empire which had strong relations with Germany. It should be noted that Germany was the only European country that did not capture any parts of the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, Germany did not initially have colonial aspirations, making it easier for them to be accepted and welcomed by the local population in North Africa. Germany then used this to strengthen relations with most of the Ottoman provinces in North Africa. Moreover, German military force at that time had also expanded rapidly.²³ The combination of these factors led to Britain's opposition to the variety of German projects in Tripoli. For instance, they were behind the failure of the German efforts to gain control of the important port of Tobruk and to build a railway to link the city of Tripoli from their colonies in the eastern Africa.²⁴ The Ottoman Empire was in a weak position during this period. It was going through a complex political process, especially in the mid-19th century, having lost many territories to European powers such as Britain and Russia. Hence, the Ottomans tried to deal cautiously with all the events and developments so as not to lose the new lands or to be involved in agreements that included loss of territories. Meanwhile, Germany tried to intensify its activities in Tripolitania until the Ottoman Ali Rida Pasha came to rule in 1876. He was reluctant to deal with the Germans.

20 Altahir, Hamdi, *Africa from Colonialism to Independence*, Humanities Library, Cairo, 1998, p. 5; Riad, Zaher, *The European Colonization of Africa in the Modern Era*, Universities Office for Publication, Egypt, 1960, pp. 15, 19–22.

21 Abu Jābir, *al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī al-ḥadīth*, p.138; al-ʿAnī, Raʿd Majīd, *Tārīkh ʿAūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-muʿāshir al-ṣirāʿ wa al-taḥalūfāt 1789–1914*, Dār kunūz al-maʿrifa li-l-nashr wa al-tawzīʿ, Amman, 2008, p. 155.

22 Ranūfān, Bīyir, *Tārīkh al-ʿālāqāt al-dawaliyya (al-qarn al-tāsiʿ ʿashar) 1815–1914*, translated by Jalāl Yaḥya, Dār al-maʿārif, al-Qāhira, 1980, p. 109.

23 Ghānim, ʿImād al-Dīn, *ʿAmaliyyat al-ghūwaṣāt al-ʿalmāniyya fī al-miyāh al-libiyyā wa ḥarakat al-jihād 1915-1918, dirāsa fī tārikh al-ʿālāqāt al-libiyyā al-ʿalmāniyya*, markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2003, p. 18.

24 Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmāniyya fī Lībiyā”, p. 42.

The German traveler Heinrich von Maltzan indicated that Ali Rida Pasha had treated the Germans with hostility for no apparent reason.²⁵ It seems that the competition among the European consuls, specifically the British and the French, in the province of Tripoli and their attempts to improve relations with this Pasha was the reason. This situation did not last long. Ali Rida Pasha was dismissed and a new governor came to power. This was appreciated by the German officials, as they were more welcomed by the other governors after Ali Rida Pasha.²⁶ As a result of this political change, the Germans began to be more influential, like the French and the British and other Europeans nationalities. There was a small community of Germans who lived in the province of Tripoli. Their situations were improved with the changing of the governor. Meanwhile, Germany began to gain influence in Europe and this was reflected in how the Germans were treated in the province of Tripoli, this in fact encouraged some Germans to migrate there, specifically to the eastern parts. Some literature indicates that their numbers exceeded 10.000 families settled in the area of the Green Mountain in Cyrenaica, with fresh air and fertile land among other advantages.²⁷ Moreover, in 1888, Germany in consideration of its strong relations with the Ottoman Empire, tried even to settle a number of German citizens in the same area. This was mentioned in the correspondences between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Germany offered through its consulate in Istanbul to send some German inhabitants to Cyrenaica. The Ottomans agreed and addressed their governor in Cyrenaica to identify suitable areas. However, this project was not implemented for two reasons.²⁸ The first was the unwillingness of the local population, and the second related to the cautious policy of the Ottoman Empire itself regarding European settlements in the whole empire. These settlements would have burdened the province. Indeed, despite the close relations with the Germans, they generally

25 Nachtigal, Gustav, *Sahara und Sudan: Ergebnisse sechsjähriger Reisen in Afrika*, Erster Band, Graz, Austria, 1967, p. 28; Mältisân, Hînrîsh Fûn, *Fî rihâb ʿArabûlis wa Tûnis*, translated by ‘Imâd al-Dîn Ghânim, markaz jihâd al-libiyyîn li-l-dirâsât al-târikhiyya, ʿArabûlis, 2008, p. 42.

26 Mältisân, *Fî rihâb ʿArabûlis wa Tûnis*, pp. 52, 200. On Ali Rida Pasha, the son of an Algerian qadi who fled French colonisation and its role in Tripoli during the Ottoman reform (*Tanzîmât*) and the European competition see also Nora Lafi, *Une ville du Maghreb*, op.cit, p. 221.

27 al-‘Azîm, Şâdiq Mu‘ayyad, *Rihla fî al-şahrâ’ al-kubra bi-Afrîqiya*, translated by ‘Abd al-Karîm Abu-Shuwîrib, revised by Şâlâh al-Dîn Ḥasan al-Sûri, markaz jihâd al-libiyyîn li-l-dirâsât al-târikhiyya, ʿArabûlis, 1998, p. 50.

28 Ghânim, ‘Imâd al-Dîn, “Mashrû‘ât al-‘istiṭân al-‘aurûbiyya fî Libiyâ ḥata sanat 1900” (‘araḍ wa dirâsa), *Majallat al-shahîd*, 2, markaz jihâd al-libiyyîn ḍid al-ghazû al-iṭâlî, ʿArabûlis, 1981, p. 17.

feared the presence of the Europeans in their territories.²⁹ The English newspaper *The Standard* wrote in 1898 that the German Kaiser, during his visit to Istanbul that year, had again suggested the establishment of a German settlement in the province of Tripoli. However, another document in the same archive denies the veracity of this information, arguing that the Kaiser never made such a suggestion.³⁰ This was also discussed at the conference, with conflicts emerging as a result of the competition of the leading countries in their scramble for Africa.³¹ The problem over competing claims to the Congo Basin, which was one important source of water in the region, was another very important point discussed at this conference.³² The Congo in particular was a point of conflict between Belgium, France, Britain and Germany.³³ The Berlin Conference led by Otto von Bismarck³⁴ reflected the distinguished position of Germany among the other European countries and also highlights the German role in conflict mediation and resolution in Europe at that time.³⁵ Von Bismarck was also planning to serve German interests by holding the conference in Germany. This was supposed to strengthen the position of Germany and its policy. The conference was also supposed to institute the German policy at the international level and to highlight the principles of open economic investment adopted by Germany to become available to all participants,³⁶ and thus benefit all European countries and end the conflict.³⁷ Thus, the conference was held from November 1884 to February 1885, in the presence of representatives of a number of European countries, the Ottoman Empire and the United States.³⁸ Historians stress the complete absence of African countries. Generally, the conference was the launch of European colonial policy and course of actions in Africa, even though they employed explicit goals like fighting the slave

29 al-'Azm, *Rihla fī al-ṣaḥrā' al-kubra*, p. 50.

30 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 1, 1895-1899, R16111, Nr. A12804, 4/11/1898; Nr. A12804, 8/12/1898.

31 Qāsmiyya, Khaīriyya, *Tārīkh 'Aūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-mu'āṣir*, (*tārīkh 'Aūrūbbā al-mu'āṣir*), Jami'āt Dimashq, Dimashq, 1981/1982, p. 143.

32 Stoecker, *German Imperialism in Africa*, p. 37; Minawi, Mostafa, *The Ottoman Scramble for Africa: Empire and Diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz*, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 2016, p. 8.

33 al-'Anī, *Tārīkh 'Aūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-mu'āṣir*, p. 155.

34 Ibrāhīm, 'Abd al-llāh 'Abd al-Rāzzāq, *Mausū'at al-tārīkh wa al-siyāsa fī Afrīqiyyā*, al-maktab al-Maṣri li-tawzī' al-maṭbu'āt, al-Qāhira, 1997, p. 5.

35 Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 36.

36 al-Magrahī, *Tārīkh 'Aūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-mu'āṣir*, p. 233.

37 Nuwār wa Na'na'i, *'Aūrūbbā min al-thawrā al-firinsīyyā*, p. 316.

38 Ibrāhīm, *Mausū'at al-tārīkh wa al-siyāsa*, p. 5.

trade and disseminating European civilization in these territories.³⁹ It seems that this step by von Bismarck came in response to the British arrangements to keep everyone away from the Congo Basin and put it under Portuguese influence, which could be easily controlled by Britain. The German Chancellor was also trying to spare the considerable risks that may eventually lead to the outbreak of war in Europe with the cooperation of Belgium.⁴⁰ It is important to note that the efforts of Otto von Bismarck and the rest of the leaders of Europe succeeded in realizing their goal and draw the map of Africa according to their political and economic interests.⁴¹ After three and a half months of meetings and discussion, they signed an agreement strengthening the neutrality of the Congo Basin and ensuring freedom of trade and navigation for the countries that had participated in the conference.⁴² They also made a decision to establish the State of Congo,⁴³ and set it under the control of the Association of Congo, which was an international institution concerned with trade under the control of the King of Belgium. Moreover, Britain agreed to share Guinea with Germany.⁴⁴ The province of Tripoli was of course mentioned at the second Congress of Berlin.⁴⁵ It functioned as a bargaining chip and was offered by Bismarck to Italy to avoid the outbreak of any military conflict. This happened without the knowledge of the Ottoman Empire, after the latter had lost their claim to Tunisian protectorate to France with the French declaration of protection in 1881.⁴⁶ The French were supported by both Germany and Britain. Thus, to satisfy Italy, the province of Tripoli and northern Somalia and Abyssinia were placed under Italian control in 1911.⁴⁷ Recall that the discussion of offering Italy control of Tripoli at the second Congress of Berlin was a continuation of the discussion initiated at the first in 1878. The offer was that Italy could exercise influence in the province of Tripoli and France be granted full

³⁹ Stoecker, *German Imperialism in Africa*, p. 37.

⁴⁰ al-Magraḥi, *Tārīkh 'Aūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-mu'āṣir*, p. 233.

⁴¹ Stoecker, *German Imperialism in Africa*, p. 37.

⁴² Nussbaum, Manfred, *Vom "Kolonialenthusiasmus" zur Kolonialpolitik der Monopole: Zur deutschen Kolonialpolitik unter Bismarck*, Caprivi, Hohenlohe, Akademie-Verlag Berlin, 1962, p. 16; Drifūs, Franswā Jūrij wa Rūlānd Mārkuṣ wa Rīmūn Būwādūfān, *Mausū'at tārīkh 'Aūrūbbā al-'am: mīn 'am 1789 ḥattā ayyamunā*, translated by Ḥusayn Ḥaydar, vol. 3, 'Uwaydāt, Bayrūt-Pāris, 1995, p. 327.

⁴³ Wisīling, Hinrī, *Taqṣīm Afrīqiyā 1880–1914 'ahdāth mu'tamar Barlīn wa tawābī'ahu al-siyāsiyya*, translated by Rīmā Ismā'īl, al-Dār al-jamāhīriyya li-l-nashr wa al-tawzī' wa al-i'lān, Ṭarābulis, 2001, p. 202.

⁴⁴ Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 36; Stoecker, *German Imperialism in Africa*, p. 37.

⁴⁵ Stoecker, *German Imperialism in Africa*, p. 37.

⁴⁶ Abu Jābir, *al-Tārīkh al-siyāsi al-ḥadīth*, p. 139.

⁴⁷ Nuwār, wa Na'na'ī, *'Aūrūbbā min al-thawrā al-firinsiyyā*, p. 320

control over Tunisia. By agreeing to the general Act of Berlin 1884, the Ottoman Empire recognized the right of other participants to the Mediterranean coast of the province of Tripoli.⁴⁸ Another major result of the second congress of Berlin was the explicit agreement that obliged any European country seeking to extend its influence in Africa in whatever form to inform and consult with the rest of the European powers. Moreover, any country aiming to “protect” any part of Africa had to physically occupy the place, and these conditions were for everyone to respect and comply with.⁴⁹ It could be said that the second congress of Berlin had profound and violent impacts on the international community in general and on the region of North Africa, in particular. This was because the most important waterways such as the Suez Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar, as well as the Mediterranean Sea, are located in this region. This prompted many of the European countries to try to find a foothold in Africa, thus they tried to establish their area of political influence as they realized the benefits that could be gained there. The region thus entered a new stage and a new political and economic context of European policy on the African continent.

3.1 German Travelers in the Province of Tripoli and the Second Congress of Berlin

Many German travelers came to or passed by the province of Tripoli. Their writings can thus shed light on German interest in the province. This writing can be divided into two categories: The first comprises the travelers who came to this place to explore and research the historical and geographical aspects, such as Baron von Maltzan (1826–1874) and Gottlob Adolf Krause (1850–1938). The second group includes those who tried to study the province focusing on the political, economic and social aspects with the intention of collecting as much information as possible. This group was first used to serve the colonial objectives and includes such figures as Gerhard Rohlfs (1831–1896) and Gustav Nachtigal (1834–1885). Their journey account included geographical information on Africa.⁵⁰ The desert

⁴⁸ Minawi, *The Ottoman Scramble for Africa*, p. 9.

⁴⁹ Nuwār, wa Na'na'ī, *'Aūrūbbā min al-thawrā al-firinsiyyā*, p. 318; al-Magraḥī, *Tārīkh 'Aūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-mu'āshir*, p. 224.

⁵⁰ For an analysis of the Orient in German literature, see Khalifa, Mohamed, *Der Orient – Fiktion oder Realität? A Critical Analysis of 19th Century German Travel Reports*, Gerlach-Press, Berlin, 2015, 194p. For an overview on the European travelers in the 19th and 20th century see the work from a doctorate at La Sorbonne by the diplomat Missouri, Mofteh, *La Libye des voyageurs 1812–1912*, Lausanne, Favre, 2000.

represented a particularly strong attraction and was frequently described in the travelers' reports. They also focused on the geographic and strategic advantages of the province of Tripoli. This province was viewed by many travelers in their writings as the northern gateway to Africa.⁵¹ In 1788, the Association for Promoting the Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa, also known as the African Association, was established in London.⁵² It played a central role in Britain's exploration and dominance of this region until it was replaced by the founding of the Royal Geographical Society in 1830.⁵³ Britain had become the superior power in the exploration of Africa during the 17th and 18th centuries and the establishment of the association reflected this dominance. This association was initially founded to study the history of the region. Later, the association became more colonial in its nature, focusing on finding new markets and sources of raw materials for industry in Britain. The aim then evolved to include preaching the Christian faith, which became a clear goal later on.⁵⁴ The association's activities were focused on providing the information needed to introduce Africa to European colonization, in addition to providing an accurate description of the region that was not previously known. The association was provided with all the necessary resources for achieving the objectives noted above. It was able to invite and support whoever had the ability and willingness to take risks and was aware of and agreed with the organization's objectives. Consequently, it encouraged various European nationalities to be engaged in its services. The year 1778 is considered as the starting point for the long and organized journeys of Europeans heading to the province of Tripoli.⁵⁵ The British William Lucas was one of the first travelers who came to the province in that year.⁵⁶ He started from the city of Tripoli and ended in Misurata. Lucas intended to go further to Fezzan, but the prevailing conditions, particularly the way the indigenous people perceived the Europeans, forced him to stop and go back. However, he succeeded in paving the way for the rest of the

51 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. II22970/02.1901.

52 Mūrī, *al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfī fī Libiyā*, p. 8.

53 Appiah, Kwame Anthony, *Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience*, 5 vols., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 598; see also Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., *Records of the African Association, 1788–1831*, ed. by Robin Hallett Nelson, 1964; for more information on the association's activities.

54 Mūrī, *al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfī fī Libiyā*, p. 8.

55 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 114.

56 For more details, see el-Gaddari, Sara, "His Majesty's Agents: The British Consul at Tripoli 1795-1832", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 43-5, 2015, pp. 770–986.

explorers through the information he provided.⁵⁷ This journey was part of the first mission organized by the British Association because of the failure of a previous attempt to reach central Africa and the Nile.⁵⁸ The association then realized that to achieve the most in this area it was better to start from the province of Tripoli.⁵⁹ It was not long until another man became known for carrying the aspirations of discovery and research. This was the German Friedrich Hornemann (1772–1801).⁶⁰ Born in Hildesheim, a city in Lower Saxony, southeast of Hanover, Hornemann worked for the Association for Promoting the Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa in London. The association envisaged visiting the province of Tripoli according to a specific scientific research plan. Hornemann was appointed head of this mission and provided with all the resources necessary to ensure its success. The primary objective was designed as scientific research. Hornemann met different people who facilitated his journey. One of them was a Turkish trader who had several connections in the provinces of Tripoli and Tunisia. He provided Hornemann with valuable advice, including the sentence attributed to him that “Cities of Tripoli and Fezzan were the easiest and most guaranteed road to reach central Africa”.⁶¹ Instead of heeding this advice, Hornemann started his journey from Cairo in 1798, passing Siwah Oasis. After crossing the desert of the province of Tripoli, he succeeded in reaching both Awjilah and Murzuq, the capital of Fezzan in the south of the province.⁶² He was the first European to set foot in this area.⁶³ He could provide an accurate description and observations that were considered very valuable to the association he worked for.⁶⁴ His achievement highlighted the many opportunities that existed for the Europeans and encouraged other travelers to visit the province of Tripoli in the 19th century. Among those travelers was the Italian doctor Paolo Della Cella (1792–?),⁶⁵ a member of the Italian Scientific

57 His account was published in ‘Reports’, *The Journal of the African Association*; see also Kürü, *Libiyā athnā’ al-’ahd al-’üthmāni al-thāni*, p. 114.

58 Mürî, *al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfi fi Libiyā*, p. 9.

59 Ibid.

60 More information about Hornemann is given in Robinson, David and Douglas Smith, *Sources of the African Past. Case Studies of Five Nineteenth-century African Societies*, New York, 1979, p. 126.

61 Mürî, *al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfi fi Libiyā*, p. 13.

62 His account was published as Hornemann, Friederich, *The Journal of Frederick Horneman’s travels, from Cairo to Morzouk. The Capital of the Kingdom of Fezzan, in Africa*, Bulber, London, 1802.

63 Līyūn, Jūn Frānsis, *Min Ṭarābulis ilā Fazzān mudhakarāt al-raḥḥāla al-injilīzī Jūn Frānsis Līyūn 1818*, translated by Muṣṭafa Jūda, al-Dār al-’arabiyya li-l-kitāb, Lībiyā-Tūnis, 1976, p. 179.

64 Mürî, *al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfi fi Libiyā*, p. 13.

65 For more details on this author see Silvestri, Daniela, “Della Cella, Paolo”, in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 36, 1988, (translated into German and English in 1822 and in 1823 into French).

Academy. He arrived in Tripoli in 1817,⁶⁶ followed by others such as the British George Francis Lyon (1795–1833) fellow of the Royal Society, and Joseph Ritchie in 1818.⁶⁷ On their first journey together into the city of Tripoli⁶⁸ they were, however, more concerned with the central and southern parts of the province. Lyon wrote about the strategic and commercial importance of Ghadames.⁶⁹ Their second journey was in the period 1821–1822.⁷⁰ The British brothers Henry William Beechey and Fredrick William Beechey visited Cyrenaica and the central parts of the province in 1818. They were followed by R. Pacho, who arrived in Cyrenaica from Egypt. In 1835, the British traveler Major Alexander Gordon Laing (1794–1835) arrived in Ghadames and remained there for almost two months. From there he headed out to the city of Ghat with the aim of reaching central Africa. He traveled as far as Timbuktu, but he was killed on his return journey. These travelers/explorers and semi-spies and their achievements motivated the German officials and politicians to explore the province of Tripoli more and more. This also prompted the Scientific Academy in Berlin in 1820 to assign Baron Heinrich Menu von Minutoli (1772–1846) to lead a mission to Egypt. From there, he decided to travel to the eastern part of the province of Tripoli. The mission was well equipped and included a number of scientists, artists, archaeologists and others. The mission reached the outskirts of Cyrenaica, but the poor security conditions did not allow them to complete their journey and they had to return.⁷¹ With the beginning of the second half of the century, there was a steady increase in the number of missions heading to the province. However, most of them ended in the same catastrophic way: travelers were often killed by the local people, as happened to German traveler Moritz von Beurmann (1835–1863), who visited Sudan and decided to travel to Benghazi and Wadai. He wanted to discover the area but was killed in Kanem in 1863.⁷² Other travelers fell ill with transmissible diseases, such

66 Among his publications see Della Cella, Paolo, *Viaggio da Tripoli di Barberia alle frontiere occidentali dell'Egitto fatto nel 1817 e scritto in lettere al Sig. D. Viviani*, Genova, 1819.

67 See Fulford, Tim, Debbie Lee and Peter J. Kitson, *Literature, Science and Exploration in a Romantic Era: Bodies of Knowledge*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

68 See Lyon, George Francis, *A Narrative of Travels in Northern Africa in the Years 1818, 19 and 20*, London, 1821, for Lyon's own account of these travels.

69 Līyūn, *Min Ṭarābulis ilā Fazzān*, pp. 127, 129.

70 Mūrī, *al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfi fī Libiyā*, p. 13.

71 *Ibid.*, p. 32.

72 Nākhtigāl, Gūstāf, *al-Ṣaḥrā' wa bilād al-Sūdān, al-mujallad al-awal, al-kitāb al-awal: Ṭarābulis wa Fazzān, al-kitāb al-thāni: tibist ütū*, translated from German into English by 'Alin J.B. Fishr, translated with an introduction by 'Abd al-Qādir al-Miḥishī, raja' ahu 'an al-aṣil al-'almāni 'Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2007, p. 79.

as the German Leopold von Csillagh (d. 1883), who died of dysentery.⁷³ Other travelers were killed by local people for their money or because the local people did not want them to enter into their places, such as the traveler Alexandrine Tinné (1835–1869) who was killed by the Tuareg tribe. Other travelers were killed in some African kingdoms like Wadai, among them Eduard Vogel. Gerhard Rohlfs was attacked several times by local people during his journey to al-Kufra.⁷⁴ This had of course a negative effect on the flow of the European travelers who wanted to visit Tripoli and led to these missions being halted for a period of time. Nachtigal, however, was granted financial support by the Association for Promoting the Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa in London as well as by the Berlin Geographical Association (Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin). The German government tried to get a firman⁷⁵ from the Ottoman Sultan ‘Abdul-‘Aziz in 1878 for his benefit. This firman included orders to provide everything Rohlfs needed such as food, drinks, livestock and protection by providing a number of men to escort him on his journey across the desert.⁷⁶ Rohlfs was called Muştafa Bey⁷⁷ by some Ottoman officials.⁷⁸ The Ottoman governors also provided support to him and others like Nachtigal when he arrived in Tripoli. He received a recommendation to the *mutaşarrifiyya* of the other cities in the province. When he reached Murzuq, he received help from the *mutaşarrif* of Fezzan according to the recommendation he got from the *Qā'im maqām* of the province of Tripoli.⁷⁹ Quoting from Gerhard Rohlfs's words in his book *Rihla ilā al-Kufrā* that

... One of the missions of the African Association⁸⁰ was to reach the interior parts of Africa starting from North Africa ... the association accepted my proposal to study the northern parts of the Congo Basin and the surrounding areas ... the mission should start from Tripoli and passed through al-Kufra which are the best points to cross to these areas.⁸¹

⁷³ Näji, *Tāriḫ Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 144.

⁷⁴ Rulfis, *Rihla ilā al-Kufrā*, p. 458.

⁷⁵ A royal decree issued by a sovereign in certain historical Islamic states, especially by the Sultan of Turkey (<http://www.seslisozluk.net/?word=firman>).

⁷⁶ Rulfis, *Rihla ilā al-Kufrā*, p. 42.

⁷⁷ Bey is a Turkish title given to some governors in the Ottoman Empire, Şabān, *al-Mu'jam al-mausu'i li-l-maşālahat al-'ūthmāniyyā al-tāriḫiyya*, p. 63.

⁷⁸ Rulfis, *Rihla ilā al-kufrā*, pp. 91, 93, 95, 97, 99.

⁷⁹ *Risālā min wakīl Mutaşarrif Fazzān ilā Qā'im maqām wilāyāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, 24 September 1885, Wathā'iq Dār al-māḥafūḍāt al-tāriḫiyya al-Sarāya al-Ḥamrā', Ṭarābulis.

⁸⁰ He meant the Association for Promoting the Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa, also known as the African Association.

⁸¹ Rulfis, *Rihla ilā al-Kufrā*, p. 165; Rohlfs, Gerhard, *Kufra: Reise von Tripolis nach der Oase Kufra, ausgeführt im Auftrage der Afrikanischen Gesellschaft in Deutschland*, Leipzig, 1881.

The main advantages of starting from the North of Africa were also mentioned by Rohlfs.⁸²

[R]eaching the interior parts of Africa from the Mediterranean had so many advantages that cannot be ignored, it could keep the communication with the head quarter of the African Association and the motherland. If the negligence of the Ottoman was not there one could keep communications between Tripoli and Berlin so easily using the Telegraph ... With regards to that Tripoli has the easier and quicker possibility to keep communication with Europe more than Loango Angola.

Rohlfs went further and described Tripoli to be the Germans own old place.

... It could not be denied that the province of Tripoli could be considered our old place where Hornemann started his journey as well as Barth⁸³ who started and ended up his journeys in the province of Tripoli...

in addition to Vogel, von Maltzan⁸⁴ and Nachtigal⁸⁵ who started from the province of Tripoli his journey to Borgo and Wadai.

... One of the main advantages of starting from North Africa is that there is good means of transportation not like in the other parts ... in the north shore where livestock specifically camels are used and not the human being.⁸⁶

Heinrich Barth

He was born in Hamburg in 1821. He visited the province of Tripoli several times between 1849 and 1855, starting from the coast, and had various tours in the province during which he succeeded in reaching Gharyan, Murzuq, and Ghat. He crossed the geographical borders and arrived in Chad and Congo. Barth was the first European to visit Adamawa, in 1851, starting his journey from the city of Tripoli. The area he visited was between Tripoli in the north to Adamawa and Cameroon in the south and from Lake Chad and Bagirmi in the east to Timbuktu

⁸² Rulfis, *Riḥla ilā al-kufrā*, p. 166.


⁸³ Barth, Heinrich, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa*, London, 1857.

⁸⁴ Maltzan, Heinrich von, *Reise in den Regentschaften Tunis und Tripolis 1826–1874*, Dyk, Leipzig, 1870.

⁸⁵ Nachtigal, Gustav, *Sahara and Sudan: Tripoli and Fezzan, Tibesti*, translated from German into English by A. Fisher, vol. 1, Hurst, London, 1974.

⁸⁶ Rulfis, *Riḥla ilā al-kufrā*, p. 169.

in the west.⁸⁷ Barth provided information about the geography of the province and the most important routes that lead to central Africa, among other sorts of information.



Map 6: Barth's journey to the province of Tripoli

87 Kürü, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahid al'uthmāni al-thāni*, pp. 142–143.

Christian Bunsen, the Prussian ambassador to Westminster, suggested the appointment of Heinrich Barth, Adolf Overweg (1822–1852), and James Richardson to head a scientific mission of the English Association for Promoting the Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa to Central Africa to North Africa in order to build up commercial relations with the states in central Africa in 1849. They arrived in the city of Tripoli in 1849 and left in 1850. However, the deaths of Richardson (March 1851) and Overweg (September 1852), who died of mysterious diseases, left Barth to carry on the scientific mission alone. Later, Eduard Vogel (1829–1856) was sent by the British government to accompany Barth on his journey.

Adolf Overweg

Explorations were in many ways' European endeavors of national or individual interests. Adolf Overweg, a German explorer, could be an example. Born in Hamburg in 1822 he was then a member of the mission sent by the English Association for Promoting the Discovery of Interior Parts of Africa to Central Africa, the "3-man expedition". Overweg contracted a mysterious disease and died in Maduari (Chad) in 1852. He wrote valuable information on the nature of the region, the routes they used and its importance. He also wrote information about the vegetation in the area of Kuka in Borno (now Nigeria).⁸⁸

Eduard Vogel

He was born in Krefeld in 1829 and one of the best-known German travelers who came to the province of Tripoli. He worked for the British government. He had great knowledge in the fields of botany and astronomy, which helped him to find new information about the geography of the region. In 1853, Vogel left Tripoli with a caravan to provide supplies to the Barth expedition. Vogel used the trans-Saharan trade route to arrive in Kuka in Borno in 1854. He visited many places in this province such as 'Ayn Zara, Tarhuna, Bani Walid, Sawkanh, Murzuq and others. His reports directly contributed to cataloguing the geographical qualities of the province.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Nachtigal, Gustav, *Sahara und Sudan: Ergebnisse sechsjähriger Reisen in Afrika*, Erster Theil, Berlin, 1879, p. 7.

⁸⁹ Furu, *al-Ḥawlīyyāt al-lībiyyā*, p. 489; Mūrī, *al-Raḥḥāla wa al-kashif al-jughrāfī fī Lībiyā*, pp. 57, 59.

Gerhard Rohlfs

He was born in Vegesack, now part of Bremen, in 1831. He studied medicine but did not finish his studies, preferring to travel around Europe. He also traveled to Algeria, where he worked as a doctor.⁹⁰ This was his first connection to North Africa. His first journey was limited to Morocco and Algeria, but he attracted the attention of August Peterman, a German geographer, one of the most famous of the 19th century. He was interested in collecting geographical information for drawing maps of Africa. He encouraged Rohlfs to continue in this field. Rohlfs was the second European traveler to visit the region of the Draa River in the south of Morocco. Their efforts were later supported by the Berlin Geographical Society, the British Royal Geographical Society, and the Senate of Bremen, which provided them financial support and equipped the mission with all the necessary resources. For his work and the information that he provided, he was awarded the Patron's Medal of the Royal Geographical Society of London in 1868. Rohlfs began his journey from Oran toward Tangier and then took the route toward the interior of the country. He crossed the Atlas Mountains to reach 'Ayn Salih. From there, he took the road between Ghadames and the western mountains to reach the city of Tripoli. He was the first European to cross Africa from Tripoli, passing through the Sahara Desert to Lake Chad and along the Niger River in 1865–1867 (now Lagos on the Gulf of Guinea). Rohlfs' trips to the city of Tripoli were very productive, mainly because he used new routes and provided valuable information about the region. This granted him the confidence and support of those who were interested in his activities, which is why he returned to Tripoli in 1865. Moreover, he was widely welcomed in different communities in Tripoli as he created contacts with different merchants, consuls, government officials.⁹¹ Rohlfs' journey heralded the beginning of German interest in discovering the city of Tripoli. Although his first journey focused on collecting geographical information, he also became interested in the politics of the region and collected information on this aspect as well. It is worth mentioning that Rohlfs was in direct contact with the King of Prussia and obtained his consent to start his exploratory activities.

⁹⁰ Rulfis, *Rihla ilā al-Kufrā*, pp. 21, 26.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.



Map 7: Rohlfs' journey to al-Kufra in the province of Tripoli

Rohlfs' second journey started from the city of Tripoli, from which he headed first to Ghadames and then went on to Mizdah and Fezzan. He traveled along the road of Wadi al-Shati and reached Murzuq, where he met Moḥammad al-Kaṭronī, the guide who had accompanied the traveler Heinrich Barth on his journey. Al-Kaṭronī provided great help and support to many German travelers such as Barth, Rohlfs and Nachtigal, as they mentioned in their writings.⁹² Al-Kaṭronī was an expert who knew the routes and his experience helped them a great deal. In

⁹² Ibid.

addition, his knowledge and contact with the local people helped them to avoid many problems that faced earlier travelers. Rohlfs remained in Murzuq, which was an important trade center and the capital of the *mutaşarrifîyya* Fezzan,⁹³ until 1866. Then he continued his journey toward central Africa and reached Mandara in Cameroon. He was accompanied by Moḥammad al-Kaṭronî, but when Rohlfs decided to travel to the Gulf of Guinea, Moḥammad al-Kaṭronî decided to return to Fezzan. Rohlfs then reached the English colony of Lokogh in Niger where he was welcomed by the English who wanted to take advantage of his presence among them by involving him in some transactions with the leaders of the African tribes, due to his experience in dealing with them. He succeeded in completing the tasks assigned to him. He then continued to Lagos and from there took an English ship to Liverpool, ending a journey that had lasted two years.⁹⁴ Rohlfs returned to the province of Tripoli in 1867, 1868, and 1869 but this time he was commissioned directly by the Prussian King Wilhelm II and the Chancellor Bismarck. They requested him to deliver gifts from the King of Prussia to Sultan Omar al-Kanmî in Borno. Rohlfs' journeys to Tripoli did not stop there. In 1873–1874 he returned to the region, this time selecting the desert for his explorations. He managed to attract a number of German scientists who were interested in this area to travel with him, and was accompanied by Karl Alfred Ritter von Zittel, a German paleontologist, and the botanist Paul Friedrich August Ascherson. Rohlfs also brought a photographer called Remeleto to document the stages of his journey.⁹⁵ The last of Rohlfs' journeys to the province of Tripoli was in 1878–1879, when he visited al-Kufra and many other places in the central parts of the province. He left lengthy accounts summarizing the geography, nature and agriculture in these regions.⁹⁶ He also wrote important notes regarding customs and traditions, health, and trade in Tripoli in general.⁹⁷ Rohlfs had the capacity and skills that enabled him to achieve great success in collecting information about the province, which made it easier for him to write many documents and books that were used by the king and the chancellor when making decisions and convincing politicians.⁹⁸ The findings of his journeys were significant for the development of German policy

93 Nākhtigāl, *al-Şaḥrā' wa bilād al-Sūdān*, p. 52.

94 Rulfis, Ghirhård, *Rihla 'abar Afriqiyā mushāhadāt al-raḥḥāla al-'almāni Rulfis fi Libiyā wa Burnu wa Khalij Ghiniya 1865–1867*, dirāsa wa tarjama 'Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, markaz jihād al-libīyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1996, pp. 46, 48; Rohlfs, Gerhard, *Quer durch Afrika: Reise vom Mittelmeer nach dem Tschad-See und zum Golf von Guinea*, Leipzig, 1874–1875.

95 Rulfis, *Rihla 'abar Afriqiyā mushāhadāt al-raḥḥāla al-'almāni Rulfis fi Libiyā*, p. 60.

96 Rohlfs, *Von Tripolis nach Alexandrien*, pp. 63, 78.

97 Rulfis, *Rihla 'abar Afriqiyā mushāhadāt al-raḥḥāla al-'almāni Rulfis fi Libiyā*, pp. 265, 321.

98 Rulfis, *Rihla ilā al-Kufrā*, p. 164–165.

toward the province of Tripoli, especially given his good relations with the Prussian king and the chancellor. His proximity to decision-makers gave his opinion more weight than otherwise and qualified him to carry out many political tasks at different stages. Rohlfs submitted a request to the king to send a German consul to the province of Tripoli. He also had a certain vision concerning the eastern part of the province and he proposed it as a convenient place for settling European immigrants. Finally, the information that he supplied and his own views about the province of Tripoli were formative in awarding it a particular status as German policy in Africa was set. He mentioned that Tripoli is the “Key to Africa”. He died in Germany in 1896.⁹⁹

Heinrich von Maltzan

He was born in Dresden in 1826. Interested in the geographical features of North Africa, he was also known as an orientalist scholar, writer and poet. His first journey to Morocco in 1852–1853 was only exploratory. His second journey was to Tunisia, from where he decided to travel to the province of Tripoli in 1869 to conduct scientific research. He contacted the Austrian consul, Luigi Rossi (well known to the natives under the name Jiji),¹⁰⁰ who was responsible for the German residents in the province of Tripoli and asked him to provide the needed security measures for his journey and to facilitate his mission, which took place.¹⁰¹ The most important aspects of von Maltzan’s journeys to the province of Tripoli can be seen in his interest in the social life of people, including traditions and norms, using a scientific methodological research. He wrote also about the German inhabitants in the province of Tripoli and the poor treatment that they received at the hands of the Ottoman government there. He did not have any political orientations or colonial aspirations, as he came independently and was not supported by the German Geographical Association or any other association.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Rulfis, *Riḥla ‘abar Afriqiya mushāhadāt al-raḥḥāla al-‘almāni Rulfis fi Libiyā*, p. 29.

¹⁰⁰ See Gustav Nachtigal, translated by Allan G.B. Fisher and Humphrey J. Fisher, *Sahara and Sudan: Tripoli and Fezzan*, Tibesti, C. Hurst & Co, London, 1974, p. 17. This consul “was no career consul, but a merchant, born in Trieste; he had spent almost his whole life in Tripoli, and was familiar, as few are, with the country and its people”.

¹⁰¹ Māltisān, *Fī riḥāb Ṭarābulis wa Tūnis*, pp. 13, 34; Maltzan, *Reise in den Regentschaften Tunis und Tripolis 1826–1874*.

¹⁰² Maltzan, *Reise in den Regentschaften Tunis und Tripolis 1826–1874*.

Gustav Nachtigal

He was born in 1834 in Eichstedt, in the Prussian province of Saxony-Anhalt. He was a German doctor who had completed his medical studies at Halle University and his job was the reason for his presence in the North African region, which he first visited in 1862 while recovering from a lung infection. In 1863 he worked as a doctor in Tunisia and later started his exploratory activities.¹⁰³ He was then selected by von Maltzan and Gerhard Rohlfs to deliver the gifts from Prussia to the Sultan of Borno.¹⁰⁴ He spent more than five years on a journey started from the city of Tripoli which led him to the middle and interior parts of the Sahara and eventually to Borno.¹⁰⁵ Nachtigal obtained the help of the Ottoman authorities in the province of Tripoli to facilitate his journey toward Borno. This is indicated in an Ottoman document sent by the *mutaşarrıfıyya* of Fezzan to the governor of the province of Tripoli. The *mutaşarrıf* informed the governor that he had provided Nachtigal with the needed assistance when he arrived at Murzuq. Orders were given by the government of the province to provide all the assistance needed to facilitate this journey.¹⁰⁶ It is noteworthy that he reached some areas which had not been visited previously by any other European travelers. These included the Tibesti Mountains¹⁰⁷ and this achievement was recorded under his name. He wrote about health conditions, diseases and how the local people dealt with them in the southern areas of the province of Tripoli.

103 Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan*, p. 1.

104 Ibid.

105 Rūsi, *Libiyā mundhu al-faḥ al'arabī*, p. 396.

106 Wathiqā 4189, Wathā'iq Dār al-māhafūḍāt al-tārikhiyya al-Sarāya al-Ḥamrā, Ṭarābulis.

107 Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan*, pp. 34–35.



Map 8: Nachtigal's journey in the province of Tripoli

Gottlob Adolf Krause

He was born in 1850 in Ockrilla near Meissen. His journey, which started in 1868, was distinctive from those of other travelers. It took place in the context of broader European efforts to colonize many parts of Africa. German colonies had already been established in the center of the continent, such as Togo, Cameroon and other countries. In addition, he spent a relatively long period of time in the region compared with other travelers who visited North Africa.¹⁰⁸ He first visited West Africa, and then the province of Tripoli in the period between 1868 and 1869, when he was 18 years old. He met Gustav Nachtigal there. He succeeded in reaching Murzuq and returned to the city of Tripoli, then returned to Germany, having

¹⁰⁸ Krawzā, *Taqārīr Ghūtlūb Adūlf Krawzā al-ṣaḥafīyya*, p. 34.

decided to continue his studies, focusing on geographical discovery. It is worth mentioning that Gustav Nachtigal was interested in his work, which is why he asked the German Geographical Association to support him. The association provided him with financial support on his second journey to the province of Tripoli in 1872, where he stayed until 1882 before visiting West Africa.¹⁰⁹ His last journey to the province of Tripoli was between 1907 and 1912. He witnessed the Italian invasion and wrote reports to a German magazine about what was happening and what the Italians were doing there.¹¹⁰ A competent linguist, Krause developed his Arabic language skills until he was able to study a manuscript on history of the *mutašarrifiyya* of Fezzan. This was considered a significant academic achievement. He was also interested in the Hausa language, which drew the attention of the Academy of Sciences in Berlin, which awarded him financially for his scientific efforts unequaled by any other German traveler.¹¹¹

Ewald Banse

He was born in 1883 in Braunschweig and was chiefly known as a geographer.¹¹² He started his journeys when he was very young. He visited the province of Tripoli for the first time in 1906–1907. Gustav Nachtigal advised him to go back to Germany and finish his education first. He followed this advice, remaining in Germany for two more years before returning to the province of Tripoli in May 1909, where he stayed until the end of the year. His third journey was in 1911, when he experienced the Italian occupation of the province.¹¹³ The geographer Banse learned Arabic and resided in the province to understand its nature and how to deal with the local people. He also drew many maps of the city of Tripoli and took photographs of many areas. He drew a plan of the old city and included the recently constructed streets and modern buildings. He was the first traveler

109 Ibid., pp. 29, 33, 52.

110 Sebald, Peter, *Malam Musa/G.A. Krause 1850–1938. Forscher Wissenschaftler Humanist*, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1972, p. 37.

111 Ibid.

112 Uhdén, Richard: Ewald Banse, *Westermanns Monatshefte*, Bd. 138, 1925, p. 73–76. See also Lammers, Uwe, “Sieben Leben”, Technische Universität Braunschweig: Seminar für Philosophie, 2015, (electronically published January 23, 2015).

113 Banzā, Ifāld, *Ṭarābulis maṭla‘ al-qarn al-‘aishrīn fī waṣīf al-juḡhrāfī al-‘almānī Ifāld Banzā*, translated and studied by ‘Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1998, pp. 21, 27.

who used cars and trains, during his last journey in 1914.¹¹⁴ It is worth emphasizing the role played by some local people who helped and supported many German travelers such as Moḥammad al-Kaṭronī and his son Ali who accompanied Barth, Rohlf and Nachtigal. In addition to al-Kaṭronī, another man, Ṣalaḥ Ibn ‘Abd al-Ilāh al-Faḏānī, accompanied Banse on his journeys. In short, these travelers had a major role in drawing the attention of the German political leadership toward the province of Tripoli and highlighting its economic, political and strategic importance. Through their writings and explorative research, the province of Tripoli was viewed as an important center of trade and a bridgehead to cross toward central Africa.

3.2 Trade between Germany and the Province of Tripoli

Trade was one of the most important pillars of the relationship between the province of Tripoli and Europe. It constituted a linking point between the north and the south. The trade between the province of Tripoli and Germany in the period between 1884 and 1909 was important. The real development of trade between the two sides reached a significant volume in 1884, when German exports to Tripoli amounted to a total of £ 15.000. This level was the same in 1885. This information is stated in documents in the German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv) amongst the reports written by the British consul to Tripoli.¹¹⁵ In terms of total exports of the province of Tripoli to Germany, exports were estimated at £ 4.000 in 1886. Although this value was not enormous in comparison with other European countries, it gives a clear signal about trading traffic at that time.¹¹⁶ The Industrial Revolution in Europe led the European powers to seek new markets for their products. Also, in 1845, details were given on types and amounts of specific products. For instance, sponge in the value of 192.000 lira was exported.¹¹⁷ These statistics are limited to the business operations in the port of the city of Tripoli. The report by the British consul in the province of Tripoli included significant data about the volume of trade exchange between this place and Germany and shows that the volume of trade fluctuated. As stated in the report that Germany was

¹¹⁴ Banzā, *Ṭarābulis maṭla‘ al-qarn al-‘aishrīn*, p. 25.

¹¹⁵ Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. II 22970/02.1901.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, R901/52458.

ranked the sixth in the list of countries exporting to and importing from Tripoli. However, trade volume sometimes declined and at other times increased. To give an example, in the years 1888 and 1889, German trade volume fell to seventh place, as the report from the British consul indicated. German trade volume also declined in 1893 and 1894, Germany was then ranked the eighth with trade volume reaching £ 7.000 and £ 4.000 respectively. In return, Germany exported more to the province of Tripoli than it imported from there. In 1893, export value was estimated at £ 16.000, then showed a remarkable increase in 1894, when it reached £ 27.500¹¹⁸ and reached £ 29.000 in 1895.¹¹⁹ Germany also imported some tripolitanian goods, for instance the amount of imports in 1895 amounted to only £ 4.000 which was too small compared to the amount of German exports in the same year mentioned above. To highlight the volume of trade from 1895 to 1901 table 5 below¹²⁰ summarizes the value of German exports to the province of Tripoli during the period 1884–1909 in pounds sterling.

Table 5: Value of German import from Tripoli (1884–1909)

Year	Value in Pounds Sterling
1895	4.000
1896	3.000
1897	3.500
1898	2.500
1899	3.000
1900	2.500
1901	1.500

The value of exports of Germany to the province of Tripoli amounted to 50.000 golden francs in 1902, then in 1903 increased to reach 720.000 golden francs (currency as stated in the document). This encouraged the German consul in Malta to submit a proposal to his government indicating the need to create a direct line with the province of Tripoli starting from Hamburg. At the same time, he

118 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. II 11590.

119 Bulbid., Nr. 27611/96.

120 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. II 22970/02.1901.

explained how this could increase German trade with the province.¹²¹ Moreover, it is stated in a document written by the British consul that the city of Benghazi had received two German steamships in its harbor in 1902. The weight of their goods was 1878 tons. This line was always used by the German transport ships.¹²² During 1903, fifteen German steamships docked at the port of Tripoli. Their cargo was estimated at 16.026 tons. However, in the following year, the volume of trade declined to only twelve steamships carrying an estimated 13.140 tons.¹²³ In 1905¹²⁴ Tripoli received only five steamships carrying what estimated to be 4936 tons only which included various commercial goods the province of Tripoli imported from Germany. The following table¹²⁵ illustrates German exports in the period 1903–1906 with values estimated.

Table 6: Amount of German exports to the province of Tripoli (1903–1906) in kilogram

Type	1903	1904	1905	1906
Tea	3.280	3.840	5.320	210.000
Iron	2.200	–	3.000	12.000
Wool	1.840	No available data	960	–
Silk	1.000	740	920	–
Leather	240	No available data ¹²⁶	800	12.000
Gold and silver	1.900	–	400	4.000
Chemical and medicine	640	–	480	30.000
Glass and china earthenware	200	–	880	7.000
Alcohol	120	–	–	–
Sugar	–	1.600	–	–
Hardware store (Khardowat)	–	600	320	87.000
Rope for ships	–	640	640	–
Soap	–	–	80	–
Paper	–	–	320	–

¹²¹ Wathiqā 353, *Taqrīr al-quṣuṣ al-‘almānī fī Mālṭa 31/12/1905*, ‘Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-‘almānīyya fī Lībiyā”, p. 46.

¹²² Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 2, vom 16. Oktober 1904 bis Dezember 1909, R901/4411, Nr. II 3021/8.

¹²³ Ibid., Nr. II 22579/05, pp. 5–6.

¹²⁴ Ibid., Nr. II w 5828/07.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid., Nr. II 22579/05, pp. 5–6.

Machine	-	-	440	-
Colour	-	-	1.120	-
Cotton textile	-	-	-	60.000
Other	-	-	880 ¹²⁷	20.000 ¹²⁸

Starting from 1907 to 1909 it is noted in another report by the French consul in the province that there had been an increase in the number of ships arriving there. In 1907 there were seven ships heading toward the port of Benghazi, with cargo estimated at about 8617 tons. The number increased to ten ships, with an estimated cargo of 14.237 tons, in 1908.¹²⁹ This contributed directly to the strengthening of the status of German trade among other countries involved in trade relations with the province. Germany then ranked fourth place on the list. The diversification of imports from the province of Tripoli was behind this development. The imports were focused on two key types of goods: first, livestock which included cows, goats, sheep, foxes and rabbits in addition to poultry, pigeons and others, plus leather. The second important type of goods was the sponge.¹³⁰ The growing trade between Germany and the Tripoli prompted some German trade institutions to report to the chancellor on their activities. One of these institutions was the German Chamber of Commerce (Zentralstelle für Vorbereitung von Handelsverträgen). The German Chamber of Commerce, in their reports to the government, confirmed the importance of German trade with the province of Tripoli, and alerted the government that the volume of trade was not as sizeable as that of other countries, thus trying to encourage the government to develop this field. The reports also emphasized the need to take advantage of the business transactions and sea routes that already existed there. This was especially true after the Ottoman Empire applied a unified customs system, like all European countries had.¹³¹ Of course, the German Chamber of Commerce was not isolated from the ongoing political events in Europe, and was well aware of the Italian efforts to control the province of Tripoli; they also noted the colonial development of the French presence. Therefore, the German Chamber of Commerce warned the German chancellor that, if positive and practical efforts to strengthen German

¹²⁷ Ibid., Nr. II w 5828/07.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 2, vom 16. Oktober 1904 bis Dezember 1909, R901/4411, Nr. II o 3449/09.

¹³⁰ Ibid., Nr. II o 4196/09.

¹³¹ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 1, vom Juli 1869 bis Oktober 1888, A.Z.14524/99, Juni 1899, Zentralstelle für Vorbereitung von Handelsverträgen, R901/52508.

trade with this province were not undertaken, the situation would be difficult, especially given any new political changes in the region. The report presented Tunisia as an example of the deterioration of German trade that had occurred since France had taken control of the markets there.¹³² The report mentioned above referred to an important point regarding the connection between politics and economy, stressing that the success of German trade related primarily to its policies. The report further requested the government take a firm position on this subject, and explained that if Germany agreed on the occupation of France or Italy of the province of Tripoli then the country should enforce strict conditions to ensure its rights and to trade with the province to protect its interests.¹³³ Among the measures demanded by the German consul in Valetta named Tushar,¹³⁴ was the establishment of a German bank in the city of Tripoli. This was supposed to be a step forward in developing economic relations between the two sides. Moreover, because of the importance of this step, the consul insisted repeatedly that his government open the bank.¹³⁵ The government responded to these calls effectively and established a German bank in the city of Tripoli in 1905,¹³⁶ known as the Hans Bank.¹³⁷ However, there is not much information about its activities or what happened to the bank.

3.3 The German Consulate in the Province of Tripoli

Many international political powers were represented in Tripoli, especially those powers with which the province of Tripoli had strong economic relations. Accordingly, there were representatives there from different European states and cities as well as representatives from Arabic and other Ottoman provinces that had political or economic interests in the province, such as Tunis.¹³⁸ The consuls were

132 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. 16857, 17. Juni 1899.

133 Ibid.

134 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 10, vom 16. August 1906 bis 31. Dezember 1908, 12. Februar 1907, R16115.

135 Wathiqā 25, *Mursala min al-quṣṣul al-‘almānī fī Vālītā ilā al-khārijīyyā al-‘almāniyya*, 23/5/1905, Wathā‘iq al-‘arshif al-siyāsī, al-‘almānī bi-al-markaz al-waṭānī li-l-māhafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis; Wathiqā 86, *Mursala min al-quṣṣul al-‘almānī fī Vālītā ilā al-khārijīyyā al-‘almāniyya*, 31/12/1905, Wathā‘iq al-‘arshif al-siyāsī, al-‘almānī bi-al-markaz al-waṭānī li-l-māhafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis.

136 Kürü, *Libiyā athnā’ al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 80.

137 Kākiyā, *Libiyā fī al-‘ahd al-‘ūthmānī al-thānī 1835–1911*, p. 114.

138 Abid, Munir, “al-In‘ikāsāt al-mādiyya li-nashāt al-tujjār al-tūnisīyyin bi-Binghāzī min khilāl

considered observers of the situations in the country or province to which they had been sent because they were close to both the situation within the country and the political administration. Most of the European countries had opened consulates in the Ottoman Empire's provinces, including Tripoli. For instance, Austria had had a consulate since the 17th century to take care of the Austrians and the Germans in Tripoli prior to the opening of the German consulate.¹³⁹ The German diplomatic representation was established late compared to other European countries because of the internal political situation in Germany at that time. Before the German consulate was established, the Austrian consul was assigned to protect the citizens of what was called the Union of North Germany, supervised by Prussia. However, there were signs that some German citizens in the province¹⁴⁰ were under the protection of the British consulate, as well, and sometimes the Italian, but this was only temporary. This was revealed when some German travelers arrived seeking protection or requiring letters of recommendations. They would contact different consuls depending on the benefits that they could gain. For instance, when Gustav Nachtigal was in this place contacted the Austrian consulate,¹⁴¹ while Rohlf's sought protection from the Italian consulate.¹⁴² Some Germans decided to be the 'protection' under some European consulates according to their personal and economic interests. The Austrian consulate was supposed to provide protection to the German citizens in the province of Tripoli; this was stated in the agreement between the two parties signed on December 6, 1891. This agreement included many aspects, among them the commercial and political interests of both parties. Thus, the Austrian consulate carried out the necessary transactions for German citizens in the provinces where there was no German consulate and vice versa. All consuls were obliged to realize this agreement.¹⁴³ The consulate of France in the province of Tripoli was founded in 1630, in the first phase of Ottoman rule in this region. The English consulate was established in the Ottoman province Algeria in 1585 and supervised both the English and Maltese communities as Malta was then subject to the English Crown. This

ba'ḍ al-tarikāt wa 'alā ḍaū' rasā'il wukalā' al-iyālā al-tūnisiyya bihā", *a'māl al-mu'tamar al-awal li-l-wathā'iq wa-l-makhtūṭāt fī Libiyā wāqī'uhā wa afāq al-'amal ḥaulahā*, markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya wa-kuliyāt al-'ādāb Zilitin, 1992, pp. 1242–1243.

139 Ghānim, 'Imād al-Dīn, *al-Bi'thā al-'almāniyya ilā Libiyā 1912 wa mashafāhā fī Ghiryān*, markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2001, p. 13.

140 Māltisān, *Fī riḥāb Ṭarābulis wa Tūnis*, p. 34.

141 Ghānim wa Shlūtīr, "al-Qunṣuliyya al-'almāniyya fī Ṭarābulis", p. 5.

142 Rulfis, *Riḥla 'abar Afriqiyā mushāhadāt al-rahḥāla al-'almāni Rulfis*, p. 65.

143 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1881 bis 22. Februar 1883, Nr. Ic 8548/11, 31. Mai 1910, R16106.

was after they signed an agreement cornering trade and diplomatic representation, which provided them an opportunity to be in Morocco. Britain also established a consulate with Samuel Toker as the first British consul in 1658 after signing an agreement with the ruling government in the province of Tripoli in July 1658.¹⁴⁴ The British consul Warrington was responsible for number of citizens of different European countries, including Austria, from 1814 until 1826, as well as Hannover, Portugal, Sardinia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and others.¹⁴⁵ With regard to Spain, it signed an agreement with the province of Tripoli on September 10, 1784 identifying the political and trade foundations, with the first Spanish consul then appointed.¹⁴⁶ Italy had also opened a consulate in the province of Tripoli in 1861.¹⁴⁷ The Netherlands, the United States and Tuscany also opened consulates. Tuscany also signed an agreement between the Pasha in the province of Tripoli and the Lord Aksmot when he visited in 1816. It was agreed to open a consulate to be managed by consul Warrington, and this lasted until 1822 when the Tuscan consul took over consular functions.¹⁴⁸ German diplomatic representation in the province of Tripoli was not like the other European countries, since it had passed through two main stages: first with its establishment as a consular agency, but not a full consulate, and then when the diplomatic representation was developed into a consulate. Many questions from German travelers, traders and politicians arose that questioned Germany's presence in the province of Tripoli. These included the opening of a consulate there, the fate of German merchants there and the protection for them and their businesses? Gerhard Rohlfs had officially addressed his government in 1865 about the need for political representation in Tripoli and he expressly referred to the strong presence of other Europeans through their consuls. He mentioned that he personally asked some of them to ensure the protection of his journey and he thought this should be performed by his country. He also made a proposal to be the consul there.¹⁴⁹ He repeated his request several times supported by many factors, one of them his realization of the importance of the province and its characteristics, which he knew well, in addition to his strong relations with the Prussian King Wilhelm, who was informed personally about his journeys.¹⁵⁰ But what was the govern-

144 Furu, *al-Ḥawliyyāt al-libiyyā mindhu al-faṭḥ al-'arabī*, pp. 157, 537.

145 'Ughlī, "al-Maṣādir al-muta'aliqa bi Libiyā", p. 57.

146 Rūsi, *Libiyā mundhu al-faṭḥ al-'arabī*, p. 306.

147 al-Abyaḍ, Rajab, *Ṭarābulis al-ghārb fī kitābāt al-raḥḥāla khilāl al-qarn al-tāsi' 'ashar al-milādī*, al-markaz al-waṭānī li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2009, p. 267.

148 Ḥasan, *al-Yawamiyyāt al-libiyyā*, p. 298.

149 Ghānim wa Shlūtīr, "al-Qunṣuliyya al-'almāniyya fī Ṭarābulis", p. 5.

150 Rulfis, *Riḥla 'abar Afriqiyyā*, p. 50.

ment's attitude toward these views? There was a clear discrepancy between the government's position and their individual demands to establish the consulate. The government considered the time not yet suitable, and that the number of merchants in the province of Tripoli was insufficient to justify opening a consulate. The arguments of the opposing party emphasized the historical evidence including the growth of commercial exchange between Germany and the province of Tripoli, which required diplomatic representative of the two sides. At that time Germany was ranked fourth after Britain, France and Austria in terms of their exports to the province of Tripoli. Before 1884, Gustav Nachtigal mentioned, the hanseatic cities and other German states were represented by Rossi, the official representation of the British consul.¹⁵¹ The province of Tripoli was viewed by Germany as a gate for the transport of German goods to central Africa, where Germany had established a political presence by the end of the 19th century.¹⁵² As part of Bismarck's more outward looking policies at the time, the government agreed to open a consular agency in 1884.¹⁵³ Rather than a German, the person selected as deputy consul was Aghido Rossi, the son of Luigi Rossi, who was also Austria's consul in Tripoli. Rossi received his position informally, from the German Kaiser, on January 13, 1884 and began his work from that date.¹⁵⁴ However, the consular agency was not opened until February of that year and it was not until January 15, 1885 that he took the oath of the office and had the responsibilities assigned to him.¹⁵⁵

Votre Altesse a bien voulu m adresser sous date du 14 fevrier de l annee derniere, qui accompagnait le diplôme de sa Majeste l Empereur, en vertu duquel a daigne gracieusement me nommer au poste de Vice Consul de l Empire Allemand a Tripoli.¹⁵⁶

Aghido Rossi owned a company in the province of Tripoli which was working in trade. He sought to be different, and he asked a German factory to produce a special flag for his company.¹⁵⁷ The consular agency building was located in the old city, but its location has not been identified exactly. The German traveler Krause referred to it as being close to but outside the city wall, probably in the newly constructed quarter, like the consulate of the United States of America and the Austro-Hungarian consu-

151 Nachtigal, Gustav, *Sahara and Sudan: Tripoli and Fezzan, Tibesti*, translated from German into English by A. Fisher, vol. 1, Hurst, London, 1974, p. 18.

152 Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 57.

153 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Nr. 3687.

154 Ibid., Nr. II 3687/284, 15. Januar 1885.

155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.

late. In other words, it was located in the area of Bab al-Bahar, near to the Draghot mosque,¹⁵⁸ while other information indicates that it was located in the Rabad, in the western part of the city.¹⁵⁹ Aghido Rossi continued as the German deputy consul until 1897 when he was removed from office due to complaints about lack of transparency and accusations of corruption. The complaint was presented by a certain Haller, who resided in Stettin (which belonged to the Germany territories at that time), and owned a factory that produced flags. He submitted his complaints to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that Aghido Rossi had not paid the debts owed. This included payment for the flag they had produced for his company.¹⁶⁰ Ernesto Labi was assigned as deputy consul in the province of Tripoli on December 24, 1897.¹⁶¹ He was also not German, but belonged to a Jewish family from the province of Tripoli that was well known as they were politicians and merchants. The German Kaiser Wilhelm appointed Labi deputy consul because of his good reputation and qualifications required for the position. Moreover, there had been no deputy consul at this period of time.¹⁶² On April 12th, 1898, the inaugural confirmation was made by the Ottoman Empire approving him as the German deputy consul in the province of Tripoli.¹⁶³ In the same year he took the oaths to exercise his new functions.¹⁶⁴ He was also the consular agent for Belgium in the province.¹⁶⁵ Ernesto Labi embodied the new way to be a consul in the new context of the latest Ottoman provinces of North Africa between the British and the French consuls, in competition for more control over the Ottoman land from the East (Egypt) the West (Tunis) and the South (Sudan, Chad, Mali, and Algeria). This is why Labi prioritized the documentation of political information and events as the other European consuls did. This was revealed in his reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Germany. All the information he documented contained both commercial and the political events. He wrote all correspondences in French. And the British National Archive mentioned that – he speaks and writes Italian fluently and has a fair knowledge of French and Arabic... He is a liberal minded – as it had

158 Ghānim, wa Shlūtir, “al-Qunṣuliyya al-‘almāniyya fi Ṭarābulis”, p. 12.

159 al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, p. 82.

160 *Ibid.*, p. 82.

161 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Nr. 29626⁹⁻⁷, R901/52508.

162 *Ibid.*; see as well National Archive, Series Foreign Archive, Kew Garden, London, FO 195-1082, Tripoli Dept. 1890.

163 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Nr. 9245, R901/52508.

164 *Ibid.*

165 Ghānim, *‘Amaliyyat al-ghūwaṣāt al-‘almāniyya*, p. 19.

been used in foreign affairs since the 17th century, which was a source of some tension in the late 19th century with other German politicians, who argued that he should write in German.¹⁶⁶ Other complaints by Hans Banks and German citizens residing in the province of Tripoli include the accusation that he was neglecting them and he was not taking care of German interests as he did for the Italians, and was not doing the required tasks properly.¹⁶⁷ These complaints were submitted by Hans Banks who ran the German shipping company in Tripoli. The German documents indicate that the complaint from Banks contained information about the negligence of the deputy consul and that their situations were getting worse day by day. They believed that the German government was indifferent to their needs and they stressed that this was not the first time these concerns had been raised. Banks added that the German consulate in Tunisia was also neglecting them and provided information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Labi had opened a new branch of an Italian company called the *Navigazione Generale Italiana*.¹⁶⁸ This new company enabled the Italian ships on the coast of the province of Tripoli to sail to the coast. Banks believed that this might cause serious damage to German trade. He also explained that Labi was also supervising the Italian consulate in the province of Tripoli and he argued that was why he did not honestly encourage and protect German trade and activities. Furthermore, he did not meet the German citizens personally and listen to their problems or demands, but left it to the employees of the consular agency.¹⁶⁹ Despite these complaints, Labi continued in his position until 1908. However, the complaints mentioned above had strengthened the demands of those insisting on appointing a German citizen to this position. Padel, the general German consul in Beirut, stressed that these demands were completely false and lacking facts and evidence. However, as the result of these complaints, Labi requested to be removed from the position. Thus, von Bari, of the German Consul General in the province of Tripoli, had to transfer Labi's responsibilities to Albert Altmann.¹⁷⁰ Altmann held the military

166 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 10, vom 16. August 1906 bis 31. Dezember 1908, R16115, Nr. A19653⁰¹, 1907.

167 Wathiqā 16032, Wathā'iq al-'arshif al-'almāni, 14.12.1907, mawajūda bi-shu'bat al-wathā'iq al-ajnabiyya, al-markaz al-waṭāni li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis.

168 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Deutsche Vizekonsulat in Tripolis, Bd. 10, vom 16. August bis 31. Dezember 1908, R16115, Nr. A19653⁰¹.

169 Ibid.

170 Politisches Archiv, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, November 1909 Konsulat, Bd. 6, Mai 1909 bis Dezember 1909, R141611.

rank of captain. He was appointed consul on April 2, 1908, during a period in which the Ottomans were trying to resist European expansion by increasing modernization in the region.¹⁷¹ The documents of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs state that, in accordance with a letter sent by Altmann personally, he had accepted the position and was assuming his responsibilities on the same date mentioned above. However, he did not receive the approval of the Ottoman government. Altmann was the deputy consul of the Reich¹⁷² and the first report he sent to the deputy of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated May 26, 1908.¹⁷³ By September 1908, he had received the approval of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷⁴ Albert Altmann was a businessman who had business interests in the province of Tripoli, where he was living. He was also one of the people who complained about Labi. He was observed to have performed the consulate tasks in an effective way and he wrote all reports in the German language. He provided in his report's rich information about the major projects in the province¹⁷⁵ and emphasized the importance of the province of Tripoli for German trade. He also suggested establishing a direct shipping line between Germany and Tripoli in order to oppose the French, British and Italian monopolies in the Mediterranean Sea. However, there were also many complaints against him. There was a report issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin at that time that stated that the Germans in the province of Tripoli were not satisfied when he was the consul and that they suggested the government send a representative to visit them and explore their situations and to appoint someone else.¹⁷⁶ Altmann himself did not hide his dissatisfaction. In one of his correspondences he indicated that the officials in the province of Tripoli did not want to deal with him on the pretense that he had been assigned to the position only temporarily.¹⁷⁷ Altmann continued in these

171 For more details on this period and on the discussion of modernisation see Lafi, Nora, *Ville arabe et modernité administrative municipale: Tripoli (Libye actuelle) 1795–1911*, *Histoire Urbaine*, 1-3 2011, pp. 149–176.

172 Politisches Archiv, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, seit November 1909 Konsulat, Bd. 6, Nr. Zc 6491/09.

173 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 10, vom 16. August 1906 bis 31. Dezember 1908, R16115.

174 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, Bd. 6, Mai 1909 bis Dezember 1909, Nr. Ic 6848.

175 Wathīqā 88, Wathā'iq al-'arshif al-siyāsī al-'almānī, *Risālā min na'ib al-qunṣul al-'almānī 'Altumān ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-'almānīyya* 4.5.1909, al-wathā'iq al-maujudā bi al-markaz al-waṭānī li-l-māhafūdāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis.

176 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche Deutsche Vizekonsulat in Tripolis, Bd. 6, Mai 1909 bis Dezember 1909, R141611, Nr. Zc 472, 1. Juni 1909.

177 Ibid.

responsibilities for only 14 months. Then the task was entrusted to another German, called Paddle, but he did not take it up. He sent a letter to the chancellor that he would go to the province of Tripoli to explore the situations first.¹⁷⁸ He arrived on June 17, 1909 and wrote to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he was personally supervising the situation and that somebody called Gerenz (the name as stated in the document) had taken over responsibility for the consular agency from Altman.¹⁷⁹ In the six months after Altmann, the Italian consulate was supervising the German consular agency through its Consul General Julius Pestalozza.¹⁸⁰ It was obvious from the German documents that Altmann had performed his duties very well and that he deserved to be honored by the government for his efforts. This was the opinion of the German government despite complaints against him.¹⁸¹ Voices were raised repeatedly during the time of the consular agency demanding the government establish an independent consulate in the province of Tripoli. This came from the German Colonial Association. They supported Rohlf's views and others who were advocating speeding up implementation of this request. They expressed their demand clearly and in public, when the government submitted the request to the German Chancellor in 1899 that there should be an independent German consulate in the province of Tripoli and the person in charge should be a German.¹⁸² The same demand was raised by other influential persons such as the German Consul in Valletta on Malta, an island very close to Tripoli but ruled by the British. He submitted a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explaining the general conditions in the province and stressing the need to open a German consulate to keep up with current events.¹⁸³ Another report issued by the German Foreign Ministry indicated the need to send a senior representative to assess the situation directly and confirm the importance of the province of Tripoli for Germany.¹⁸⁴ Altman had supported that view in a letter to the chancellor, indicating that many of the powerful and

178 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, 1/6/1909, Nr. Ic 8141.

179 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, Nr. Ic 8764/09.

180 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, Nr. Ic 8861, a letter from the German consulate in Rome to the German chancellor.

181 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, Bd. 7, vom Januar 1910 bis Dezember 1912, R141612, Nr. Ic 446.

182 Ghānim, *ʿAmaliyyat al-ghūwaṣāt al-ʿalmāniyya*, p. 19.

183 Ghānim, "al-Maṣāliḥ al-ʿalmāniyya", p. 45.

184 Politisches Archiv, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Vizekonsulat in Tripolis, seit November 1909 Konsulat, Bd. 6, Nr. Zc 472.

less powerful countries had consulates in Tripoli and encouraged Germany to do the same.¹⁸⁵ The establishment of a German consulate in Tripoli was increasingly viewed as a necessity. This led to a transformation of the consular agency into an independent consulate managed by the Germans. The consulate was opened on November 16, 1909 and Alfred Tilger was appointed as the first consul. He was born in the German city of Aachen. Tilger studied medicine in Würzburg and received his degree in medicine. He had worked as a doctor in Germany and later in Milan, Italy, especially for the Germans who were living there. He also worked in the German consulate there. He traveled to Tripoli when he was assigned to the position, and continued until 1914. With the beginning of World War I he returned to Germany and continued his profession as a doctor.¹⁸⁶ The Ottoman Government in Istanbul was contacted by the German authorities to inform them of the appointment of Tilger and requesting their approval.¹⁸⁷ The information contained in the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that the consulate was officially opened on December 9, 1909.¹⁸⁸ The information the Ministry received on the character of Tilger was encouraging and it seemed that he was the suitable person to represent the German Reich in the province of Tripoli because of his experience in this area. Tilger performed the consular task very well, and he was able to make many changes at the local and international levels despite the current circumstances, as Ali A. Ahmida depicted.¹⁸⁹ Internationally, there was a trend to form alliances and to expand political and economic influence; locally the Ottoman Empire had started to change its policy toward the province of Tripoli, which had become the scene of the hidden

185 *Ibid.*, Nr. Ic 6766.

186 Krawzā, *Taqarīr Ghūtlūb Adūlf Krawzā al-ṣaḥafīyya*, p. 279.

187 Politisches Archiv, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, Bd. 6, vom Mai 1909 bis September 1909, R141611, Nr. Ic/ 5426.

188 *Ibid.*, Nr. Ic 16416.

189 The compradore merchant class benefited from the enhancement of Ottoman state authority and the transition to a more capitalistic economy that meant greater communication and trading between cities and the hinterland. Composed mostly of Libyan Jews or Europeans (mainly Maltese, French, Italian) and dominant in local and import-export trading, this group had its own courts, some tax exemptions, and state protection. A number of these merchants, including Libyan Jews, held European citizenship, and they defended European interests before and during colonialism. In 1910, these non-Muslim traders and artisans numbered 18,093; these included 2,600 Maltese merchants of British nationality, and 930 Libyan Jewish merchants who were Italian nationals. In the city of Tripoli 8,609 Jewish Libyan artisans and traders had Ottoman nationality, and 500 others were French citizens. Ahmida, Ali A., "From tribe to class: the origins and the politics of resistance in colonial Libya", *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell'Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente*, 63-2, 2008, pp. 297–310.

conflict between the Ottomans and Italy. Italy was conducting many projects in the province that, were more economic in nature but with more and more ambiguous political intentions.¹⁹⁰ Tilger was distinguished from the other consuls since he had a broader vision and was assisted by his experience as a doctor, helping the local people at many times, in addition to his strong personality. This prompted the Ottoman governor to trust him.¹⁹¹ His relationships also included many of the local people, which enabled him to be close to local events. He established his own library inside the consulate building that contained many documents about the history of the province of Tripoli, maps, newspapers and some manuscripts.¹⁹² He was also interested in collecting the Italian newspapers and seeking to better understand what Italy was intending to do in Tripoli. He translated all this information into German, and offered his own analysis.¹⁹³ He also analyzed situations and sent varied reports to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His reports offer rich information about significant events during this important period of increased change in this Ottoman province. They very often contained economic information, but also political details. For example, his report in 1912 contained information on new customs procedures that had been implemented by the new authorities in Libya. He wrote about the current economic activities in the Libyan ports such as al-Khums, Misurata and Zuwarah. He stated that all these ports had implemented the new customs system with reference to the continued flow of Libyan exports to Germany.¹⁹⁴ This report contained mainly economic information. However, in 1913 his report contained varied information, speaking for instance about the war in Benghazi. Tilger reported on the battles between the Libyans and the Italians that had started in 1911 and continued through December 1913. He offered some details about the battle of al-Kuyfiya that took place on November 28, 1911 and the losses to the Italians, who had 70 soldiers killed or injured. He emphasized that the battles did not stop between the two parties, and that on January 16, 1913 there was a large battle known as the battle of Sidi Krāyīm al-Qārba' and Italian losses were heavy, with 79 killed and

190 Marx, Christoph, *Geschichte Afrikas von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart*, Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, 2004, p. 150.

191 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 11, vom 1. Januar 1909 bis 31. März 1911, R16116.

192 Ghānim, wa Shlūtīr, "al-Qunṣuliyya al-'almāniyya fī Ṭarābulis" p. 15.

193 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amt, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 13, vom April 1912 bis April 1913, R16118.

194 Bundesarchiv, Die Jahres-Handelsberichte des Ksl. Vizekonsulats in Tripolis (Tripolitaniern), vom August 1907 bis Juni 1916, R901/4443, Nr. II^o1526.

279 injured, while the Libyan *mujāhidīn* had captured 25 soldiers.¹⁹⁵ The war was taking place across the whole Ottoman region of Fezzan, Cyrenaica and Tripoli. In this context, diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire changed fundamentally. Italy started to re-organize the province of Tripoli in the context of Tripolitanian resistance. The Ottoman Empire lost the war in Tripoli after a protracted resistance. Italy had to find a way to implement new rule and demand new relationships with the local population. In early colonial Tripoli of 1911–1912, local elites had to follow Italian town-planning procedures for rebuilding the city and the infrastructure of the whole province.¹⁹⁶ In this context, Italy needed to stabilize its relationship with former consulates and this may be why Italy had not made any comments on the presence of the German consul and had accepted Tilger as the German consul in Libya.¹⁹⁷ However, Tilger preferred to be dismissed from the position despite his good relations with the Italians. According to a letter to the chancellor from the German consul in Constantinople, Tilger wanted to leave the job for personal reasons in addition to not being able to perform his tasks under the circumstances of the Italian occupation of the province. This was not a formal request but was mentioned in a personal correspondence between him and the consul in Constantinople. The consulate in the province of Tripoli was officially under the direct supervision of the ambassador in Constantinople, who felt the need to inform the chancellor, but Tilger remained in office and did not leave.¹⁹⁸ In 1914, when World War I broke out, Tilger was in Europe, where he had been called by the officer responsible for collecting information about the east. This was Captain Rudolf Nadolny. Tilger informed Nadolny about the new German strategy toward Tripoli to be applied on the ground. The new strategy was directed towards working against the British in Egypt and the French in Algeria and Tunisia. At the beginning, Tilger was not convinced of the tasks assigned to him, arguing that these were not connected to the work of a consul. But then he returned to Tripoli to serve his country. He was supposed to be performing tasks such as:

- Supporting the military operations of the German forces according to the available methods and constituents.

195 Bundesarchiv, Die Jahres-Handelsberichte des Ksl. Vizekonsulats in Tripolis (Tripolitaniien), vom August 1907 bis Juni 1916, R 901/4443, Nr. II^{9222/14}.

196 For more details see Bocquet, Denis and Nora Lafi, Local elites and Italian town-planning procedures in early colonial Tripoli 1911–1912, *Libyan Studies Journal*, 3-1, 2002, pp. 59–68.

197 Politisches Archiv, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, Bd. 7, vom Januar 1910 bis Dezember, R 141612, Nr. 15508.

198 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Das Kaiserliche deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, Bd. 7, Nr. Ic 1830.

- Strengthening German policy in Tripoli focusing on the Italian side, persuading them that the German presence did not intend to compete with Italy and that their interests were not opposed to Italian interests.
- Supporting the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement that could be used by the Germans against the British in Egypt in raising the spirit of *jihād* against the French, who were the main enemies of Germany. These were the new main tasks of Tilger in Libya and he worked hard to realize them. At the same time, there was a German called Otto Mannesmann who was working with Tilger to realize these goals. Mannesmann started working in the consulate in October 1914. It can be said that he worked as a communications officer between Germany and the Libyan *mujāhidīn* in the eastern part of the country with Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf. International developments and the formal alliance of Italy with the main powers Britain, France, and Russia who were all at war with Germany spelled the end of the presence of the German consulate. Indeed, the German consulate in Libya closed on April 28, 1915. The consulate properties were confiscated by the Italians until October 16, 1939, with the assigned consul Lepique in a newly built part of the modern city of Tripoli.¹⁹⁹ It is also worth mentioning that the Germans also tried to open a consular agency in Benghazi in 1911, but this project was not accomplished.²⁰⁰

Political developments had led Germany to open a consular agency in Tripoli in 1884, which became a full consulate in 1909. These institutions played vital roles and worked to develop relations between the two sides, especially political and economic relations.

¹⁹⁹ Ghānim, wa Shlūtīr, “al-Qunṣūliyya al-‘almāniyya fī Ṭarābulīs”, p. 18.

²⁰⁰ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 17, R16122, Nr. 1c 12071 ea, 4/10/1911.

4 German Economic Activities in the Province of Tripoli and Ottoman-German Relations in 1910

German-Italian economic interests in the Province of Tripoli faced both German and Italian activities and ambitions in the province. Italian reaction faced privileges provided to some Germans in Tripoli directly from the Ottoman government. This is discussed in German archives based mainly on some statistics on trade activity between them, trade exchange and the different stages of its development from the establishment of a direct shipping line in 1889¹ gathered by Banks, the director of the company from 1906² to 1918.

Before World War I, different phases of the relations depended on the rule of different Ottoman Sultans and the German Emperor. 1880 was the starting point of official German-Ottoman relations after German unification, which continued even during the deterioration of the Ottoman Empire. During this time, Germany supported the Ottoman Empire and relations strengthened until the heralding of a new relationship with Italy with the announcement of German neutrality during the Italian invasion of the province of Tripoli. The African continent had been the center of negotiations and competition between the European powers before World War I, leading to many agreements between the main European powers. Agreements involved Italy, Germany and the Ottoman Empire will also be the focus in this chapter, along with other agreements, in order to understand how the Italian occupation of the province of Tripoli happened. The Bank of Rome in Tripoli and other Italian actors took advantage, culminating in an occupation of Tripoli in 1911. The reaction of the Ottomans backed by the Germans was the declaration of a resistance *jihad*. The local people supported Tripoli with the help of Ottoman officers. A German health mission was sent from Germany in 1912 in order to help the *mujāhidīn* (local resistance) in their war against the Italians. Italian politicians considered the province of Tripoli to be part of their territories³ and they did not allow any other party to seek economic or political influence over the province. This was obvious from 1907 when, for example, privileges were given to a certain German named Wachs.⁴ Italy was not happy with this decision. An

1 Muḥāfaẓa, *Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-‘arabiyya*, p. 22.

2 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 10, vom 16. August 1906 bis 31. Dezember 1908, R16115, Nr. A 19653⁰¹.

3 For a very interesting interpretation of this issue see Novati, Gian Paolo Calchi, *L’Africa d’Italia. Una storia coloniale e postcoloniale*, Carocci editore, Roma, 2011.

4 No more names were given in the document and no description of who this person was.

Italian ambassador was sent to the province of Tripoli in order to persuade the Ottoman government of their own viewpoint and to limit such privileges to the Italians.⁵ This subject was the focus of correspondence between the German consul in Tunis and the Italian ministers in 1908.⁶ The correspondences also contained discussion on what had been circulating in Italy of late about the German interests in the province of Tripoli.⁷ Italy was closely following all the events taking place in Tripoli and they claimed that there were German weapon smuggling operations into the province.⁸ Italy also showed suspicion when the Germans acquired properties such as land in the province, trying to establish settlements.⁹ This could also be used to show the increasing German interests, in addition to the establishment of the new direct German navigation line passing Valetta.¹⁰ The German Hans Banks was behind the establishment of the maritime navigation line¹¹ and this helped Germany to greatly increase the volume of its trade with the province. This was more obvious in 1907 when its trade volume was six times higher than in 1906.¹² Credit was given to the new shipping line and to the German maritime agency Deutsche Levante-Linie shipping company Hamburg 1889–1970, which was managed by two Germans, Banks and Altman, with their ambition to expand their economic activity in Tripoli.¹³ The German maritime agency, with its good services, offered its good reputation to many traders to transport their goods to Tripoli and handle their business with the province.¹⁴ In addition, the German maritime company Bremer Dampferlinie Atlas was operating in the province of

5 Wathīqā A13216, *Mursala min al-safir al-'almāni bi- Istānbūl ilā al-khārijīyyā al-'almāniyya*, 20/8/1907, Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-'almāniyya fi Libiyā”, p. 47.

6 No names were given in the document.

7 Wathīqā 19, *Mursala min al-quṣṣil al-'almāni fi Tūnis ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-'almāniyya*, 12/4/1908, Wathā'iq al-'arshif al-siyāsi al-'almāni.

8 Wathīqā 324, *Mursala min al-Qāhira ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-'almāniyya*, 12/2/1907, Wathā'iq al-'arshif al-siyāsi al-'almāni.

9 Rāfiq, *al-'Arab wa al-'ūthmāniyyūn*, p. 463.

10 Wathīqā A13216, *Mursala min al-safir al-'almāni bi Istānbūl ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-'almāniyya*, 20/8/1907, Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-'almāniyya fi Libiyā”.

11 Wathīqā 242, *Mursala min Istānbūl ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-'almāniyya*, 27/12/1907, Wathā'iq al-'arshif al-siyāsi al-'almāni.

12 Wathīqā A12274, *Mursala min Hāns Bānkis (Hans Banks) ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-'almāniyya qisim al-shu' ūn al-quṣṣulīyya*, 14/12/1907, Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-'almāniyya fi Libiyā”, p. 48.

13 Wathīqā A19731, *Mursala min al-safir al-'almāni bi Istānbūl ilā wizārat al-khārijīyyā al-'almāniyya*, 27/12/1907, Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-'almāniyya fi Libiyā”, p. 52.

14 Wathīqā A10621, *Taqrīr wakīl al-quṣṣulīyya al-'almāniyya, bi- Ṭarābulis 'Altumān ḥawala al-auḍā' fi Libiyā*, 19/6/1908, Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-'almāniyya fi Libiyā”, p. 60.

Tripoli in 1907 and participated in the increasing volume of trade there.¹⁵ The Italian government established its own maritime line that linked the port of Tripoli and Misurata with Italy.¹⁶ The project establishing a new line with Alexandria was supervised by Ernsto Labi, agent for Italian maritime affairs and later the head of the German consular agency in 1909. Labi was responsible for Italian trade activities at this agency starting from late 1907¹⁷ and was simultaneously the manager of the Italian company Navigazione Generale Italiana, a company working in the city of Tripoli.¹⁸ Italy had also succeeded in opening the Bank of Rome.¹⁹ However, Italy assumed that these projects alone were not enough to establish strong economic influence able to compete with the German presence. Thus, the Italian ambassador in Istanbul met the German ambassador there and informed him that they did not accept what had been done by the German traders in the province of Tripoli in 1907, and asked him explicitly to limit these trade activities.²⁰ The Italians were also alarmed by the position of the Ottoman governor in Tripoli with regard to Germany, especially during the rule of governor Reçeb Pasha (1904–1908) in 1908. Reçeb Pasha refused to give the Italians any privileges and stood against their policy in the province.²¹ Italians started to campaign against such governors and against the German economic interests specifically. This Italian opposition to the German activities reached its peak when the Italian press published some investigations that warned the government against condoning these activities, and described the presence of the Germans as “a German colony in Tripoli”. This was because a former German officer named Hans von Lochow²² had bought a piece of land in the province as an investment²³ following the issuing of the Ottoman land code on properties. The government’s reaction was fast. The Italian foreign minister summoned the German ambassador, asking him to provide a full explanation on this issue. The Italian fear esca-

15 Politisches Archiv dess Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 10, vom 16. August 1906 bis 31. September 1908.

16 Wathiqā 359, *Mursala min al-Qāhira ilā wizārat al-khārijyā al-‘almāniyya*, 12/5/1907, Wath’āiq al-‘arshif al-siyāsī al-‘almānī.

17 Ibid.

18 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 10, vom 16. August 1906 bis 31. August 1908, R16115, Nr. A19653⁹¹.

19 Wathiqā A12274, Wathā’iq al-‘arshif al-siyāsī al-‘almānī; for a history of this bank see De Rosa, Luigi, *Storia del Banco di Roma: Dal 1911 al 1928*, Roma, Banco di Roma, 1983, vol. 2.

20 Wathiqā A19731, Wathā’iq al-‘arshif al-siyāsī al-‘almānī.

21 al-Zāwi, *Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, pp. 281, 284.

22 McClure, William Kidston, *Italy in North Africa, An Account of the Tripoli Enterprise*, 2013, p. 40.

23 Wathiqā A9389, *Risālā miwajahā min al-safir al-‘almānī fī Rūmā ilā wizārat al-khārijyā*, 12/6/1911, Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-‘almāniyya fi Lībiyā”, pp. 67–68.

lated to the degree that Hans von Lochow was accused of being a spy.²⁴ In fact, von Lochow came from Germany to settle permanently in the province of Tripoli and had begun to practice his life as a citizen of the province. He started to do business and trade in Tripoli. He bought a store in this city. In 1908 he extended his activity to the field of agriculture, renting a piece of land near to the center of the city of Tripoli from a British owner named Albert Lak. Later on, in 1911 he managed to buy another piece of land that contained 2.500 olive trees and 18 wells. He sent a request to the German government for agricultural machinery and supplies to extract water and build a network to irrigate the land.²⁵ He announced that he was trying to convince other Germans, specifically from the city of Schwerin, to come to his farm and settle there.²⁶ However, Germany showed limited interest in agriculture in the province of Tripoli.²⁷ On June 1, 1902, an incident happened to the German doctor Louay Brovsky, who was living in Sūq al-Turk (market in the city of Tripoli) involving harassment by some hired Jews. They had been hired by some Italians to distribute advertisements that insulted him, which led him to sue them in court. As a result, the Italians Lentu and Techichio²⁸ were accused of incitement to crime motivated by political reasons.²⁹ Their reasons were to keep the province of Tripoli from the political ambitions of the other European countries and to enable Italy to control the province.³⁰ Italy was not satisfied with the results of their efforts to fight against the German economic presence in the province. These efforts did not stop any of the German activities. Italy then tried to involve other parties. A dialogue between the Italian and the British government was established. As a result, Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian prime minister, expressed resentment about this situation. Di San Giuliano stressed at the same time that the Ottoman authorities represented by governors in Tripoli stood against any Italian economic activity while allowing the Germans to carry out many projects there. He used the example of the Germans being granted the right to build the port of Tripoli by the Ottoman government, while the Italians were denied the project. In addition, the Germans were allowed

24 Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-‘almāniyya fi Libiyā”, p. 68.

25 Ibid.; Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 3, vom Januar 1910 bis Mai 1912, *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, R901/4412, 12.6.1911.

26 Ghānim, “al-Maṣāliḥ al-‘almāniyya fi Libiyā”, pp. 68–69.

27 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 3, vom Januar 1910 bis Mai 1912, *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, R901/4412, 12.6.1911, Nr. Ito 855.

28 No more names were provided in the document.

29 It is not stated in the document if these Italians were official government representatives.

30 Wathiqā 12, *Milaf al-wathā‘iq al-ijtimā‘iyya*, 1/6/1902, shu‘bat al-wathā‘iq wa al-makhtū‘āt, al-markaz al-waṭani li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis.

to buy land in the province while the Italians were not.³¹ The German presence remained significant as they enjoyed special treatment by the ruling class and public alike. Moreover, German goods continued to flow into the province even during the period of Italian occupation, specifically the first year of the invasion. Despite this change in political atmosphere, the country continued to import materials manufactured in Germany, such as iron goods and some sewing machines and other products.³² The evolution of German political relations with the province of Tripoli left a positive impact on the economic sector in the province and contributed to the development of commercial traffic between the two parties. As the economy was closely connected to politics, any political progress reflected positively on the various other sectors. In Germany the rapid economic growth during the industrial revolution necessitated creating a new horizon for the disposal of production.³³ This was accompanied with efforts to support economic institutions by providing the raw materials that were needed from outside. The economic development resulted in increasing the wealth in Germany, which was estimated to be 11.000 million pounds in 1894, while it had reached 17.500 million pounds in 1910.³⁴ The economic growth was generated by mechanized industry. Machines were also exported abroad. Economic progress continued to move forward, strengthening the economic sector, which enabled Germany to assume a rank ahead of the United States of America and Britain in 1913.³⁵ German trade activities with the province of Tripoli began to grow gradually in the last quarter of the 19th century. German trade with Tripoli began in earnest with the initial stages of opening the German consulate agency in the province of Tripoli in 1884 and the consulate in 1909. The arrival of German goods from Saxony, Nuremberg, Hagen and other German cities in the port of Tripoli in 1904 was evidence of the commercial traffic between the two.³⁶ Other evidence³⁷ could be

31 Wathā'iq 119, *Mursala min al-sir 'Adward ilā al-sir 'Ad. Rūd, maktab khārijīyya*, 28/7/1911, Wathā'iq al-'arshif al-siyāsī al-injīlīzī, Wathā'iq ghīr muṣanafā, shu'bat al-wathā'iq wa al-makhtūṭāt, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-māhafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis.

32 Ghānim, "Taqrīr qunṣil al-rāykh al-'almānī bi-Ṭarābulis", p. 286.

33 Stoecker, *German Imperialism in Africa*, pp. 31–32.

34 (no author), "Tharwt Almāniy", *Majallat al-muqataṭaf*, Majallat 'ilmiyya, ṣinā'iyya zirā'iyya, al-mujalad 36, vol. 4, al-Qāhira, 1910, p. 413.

35 Brown, Jeffrey, *al-Madaniyya al-'Aūrūbīyyā fī al-qarn al-tāsi' 'ashr 1815–1914*, translated by Moḥammad Aḥmed 'Alī, Dār nahdat Miṣr li-l-ṭibā'a wa al-nashr, al-Qāhira, 1966, p. 151.

36 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 9, vom 1. Juli 1903 bis 15. August 1906, R16114, Nr. A533, 3. Dezember 1905.

37 For an overview of the economy in the wilāyat in the second half of the 19th century see Mantran, Robert, *La Libye des origines à 1912*, Aix-en Provence, CNRS.

found in the German documents and statistics about the active economic life in the province of Tripoli and illustrated the greater interest of the German officials in the province. Statistics reflected different aspects related to the economy and wealth there. For example, a German report mentions the number of livestock owned by the local people in the province including horses, sheep, cows, camels, goats and birds.³⁸ Some other statistical data found in the German Federal Archive in Berlin relate to a ship called *Aegina*, which started from Hamburg heading to the port of Tripoli on March 18, 1910. The report stated that the cargo load consisted of 200 kg wool, 700 kg buckshot, 300 kg Chinese ceramics, 3.000 kg iron products, 2.000 kg enamel, 24.000 kg flour, 7.000 kg tar, 300 kg leather and 700 kg shoes cream.³⁹ After this ship was offloaded in the port of Tripoli, it was reloaded with new goods from the province of Tripoli. These goods were transported to Egypt and Syria. The goods offloaded in Egypt included: 21.000 kg pigments, 200 kg wool, 1.000 kg butter, 1.050 kg mats. The ship then headed to Syria carrying 1.000 kg wool, 1.000 kg goat hair and 950 kg olive oil.⁴⁰ In March of the same year, the ship *Anatolia* departed from the port of Hamburg, carrying 3.000 kg of tea. It was heading to the port of Tripoli, but first docked in the port of Belgium where the ship was loaded with the following goods: glass for windows (1.000 kg), sugar (55.000 kg), sulfur (11.000 kg), wool (500 kg), wax (600 kg). After the ship arrived in the port of Tripoli and was offloaded, it was reloaded with goods from the province and set off to Egypt.⁴¹ The export of German goods to the province of Tripoli continued during the year 1911 according to reports by Alfred Tilger, the German consul there. It included exchange of products like tea, beer, flour, steel products, machinery, and enamel. The value of exports by Germany to the province of Tripoli reached 56.828 Italian lira.⁴² The following tables 7⁴³, 8⁴⁴, 9⁴⁵ and 10⁴⁶ illustrate the amount of exports from the German port of Hamburg to the port of Tripoli, transported by cargo ships (see also Appendix 1).

38 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936, Nr. II 11590.

39 Bundesarchiv, Die Jahres-Handelsberichte des Ksl. Vizekonsulats in Tripolis (Tripolitaniën), vom August 1907 bis Juni 1916, Tripolis, R901/4443, Nr. II⁹⁵⁵⁹¹¹.

40 Bundesarchiv, Die Kaiserlichen Konsularbehörden in Tripolis, vom Dezember 1912 bis Februar 1914, R901/3608, Bd. 1, Nr. II⁹⁵⁵⁹¹¹.

41 Ibid.

42 Bundesarchiv, Die Kaiserlichen Konsularbehörden in Tripolis, Bd. 1, Nr. II⁹⁵⁸⁰¹⁶.

43 Bundesarchiv, Die Kaiserlichen Konsularbehörden in Tripolis, Nr. II⁹⁵⁵⁹.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

Table 7: Goods transported from the port of Hamburg to the port of Tripoli by cargo ship *Khythnos* on May 19, 1910

Type of Good	Quantity in Kilogram ⁴⁷
Sugar	4.500
Sulfur	4.000
Iron product ⁴⁸	3.200
Iron product	1.900
Glass product	500
Copper	500
Sewing needle	400
Body cream	400
Furnishing	300

Table 8: Goods transported from the port of Hamburg to the port of Tripoli by cargo ship *Anatolia* on June 12, 1910

Type of Good	Quantity in Kilogram
Beer	2.000
Paper	1.200
Rivet	1.050
Iron product	900
Shoe cream	510
Manufactured leather	350
Iron product	310
Furnishing	300
Manufactured leather	300
Lamp	250
Essence	150
(Ammunition) lead	75

⁴⁷ All quantities were given in the report in kilograms.

⁴⁸ It is to be noted that some goods were repeated with different quantities and no justification is provided.

Table 9: Goods transported from the port of Hamburg to the port of Tripoli by cargo ship *Lipsos* on July 19, 1910

Type of Good	Quantity in Kilogram
Sugar	59.000
Beer	1.700
Spiritus	1.000
Manufactured leather	1.000
Color	700
Iron product	600
Eisenbach	600
Lamps	500
Wool material	200
Sewing machine	200
Tar	–

Table 10: Goods transported from the port of Hamburg to the port of Tripoli by cargo ship *Galata* on August 13, 1910

Type of Good	Quantity in Kilogram
Sugar	118.000
Beer	2.600
Tar	2.500
Glass product	1.400
Paints	1.150
Tea	900
Iron product	400
Ceramic	400
Paper	350
Manufactured leather	350
Sewing machine	250

A report written by German consul Alfred Tilger illustrated that trade from Germany to the city of Benghazi between November 1911 and 1913 included products like beer, tea, flour, iron products, and 'Emil machines'. The German consul estimated the quantities in Italian lira in his report as follows:

- From October to April 1912 the value of goods was estimated to be 56.828 Italian lira.
- From May 1912 to October 1912 the value of goods was estimated to be 128.176 Italian lira.
- From November 1912 to April 1913 the value of goods was estimated to be 110.573 Italian lira.⁴⁹

These tables and statistics referred to the evolution of trade between the province of Tripoli and Germany. These tables show that trade was more organized in the first decade of the 20th century, when the largest and most industrial products were exported to the province of Tripoli through the port city of Hamburg.⁵⁰ The German companies had a significant share in trade between the two parties; one of these companies was C. Sonnenkalb, which was a private company founded in Leipzig and focused on exporting tea to Tripoli.⁵¹ Moreover, most private companies focused their operations on the mining industries. They made considerable efforts to obtain the approval of the authorities of the province of Tripoli and the central government in Constantinople to pursue their activities in the province. The German private companies were at that time competing with the French companies, which were mainly interested in nitrates, which were very valuable. To give an example the company Aktien-Gesellschaft für Bergbau und Hüttenindustrie in Frankfurt/Main submitted a request to the German government to obtain the approval of the Ottoman authorities that allowed them to search for nitrates in the province of Tripoli in 1911 (see Appendix 2). Moreover, after similar discoveries of nitrates in Tunisia, the company submitted proposals to cooperate with the Ottoman authorities there.⁵² They were already in Tunis and asked to be allowed to work in Tripoli. Other German companies working in the province of Tripoli included a company called Abel und Schellenberg, which started in 1905 and faced strong opposition from the

49 Ibid., Nr. II^o580¹⁶.

50 Bundesarchiv, Die Jahres-Handelsberichte des Ksl. Vizekonsulats in Tripolis (Tripolitaniën), August 1907 bis Juni 1916, Tripolis, R901/4443, Nr. II^o559.

51 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 2, vom 16. Oktober 1904 bis Dezember 1909, R901/4411, Nr. II3021/8.

52 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 3, vom Januar 1910 bis Mai 1912, Tripolis, R901/4412, Nr. II^o 855.

Italian and the French.⁵³ In addition, there was a company named Deutscher Lloyd Transport-Versicherungs Gesellschaft Berlin, working in the shipping sector. The company complained several times to the German government about the difficult circumstances in the port of Benghazi, such as it not being able to accommodate the large ships. In 1910, the company asked the German government for insurance against any risks or losses there.⁵⁴ Other companies were working in Benghazi, such as H. Weickert und Enke, managed by the German Karl Sparig who arrived in Benghazi in 1900 to open the first branch of the company. Other German companies that worked in the province of Tripoli included: Hein und Co., Leipzig; Kästner und Toebelmann, Erfurt; Anton Robinson, Hamburg and Schneider und Rothacker, Alexandrien.⁵⁵ The commercial activities were pursued not only via these companies but included interested individual investors engaged in different types of economic activities abroad. German travellers submitted reports and proposals to the German government back at home clearly highlighting and stressing the importance of the province Tripoli for the German trade. Furthermore, they stressed the need for the German government to take positive steps to control the market in Tripoli, which was to help in accessing the market in sub-Saharan Africa. This prompted the German government to give its permission to the industrial and commercial sectors to initiate trade and business operations in the region, despite the small volume of exports from the province to Germany. These included goods like leather,⁵⁶ ivory, goat's hair,⁵⁷ poultry, nitrite and barley.⁵⁸ A 1914 report states orange peel was also exported from Tripoli to Germany.⁵⁹ The Ottoman Empire began different reforms starting with the efforts of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839) who began series of reforms called *Tanzimât*. These were extensive and included many sectors such as the economy, education, military and agriculture.⁶⁰ Sultan Mahmud II had initially focused on the conversion of state institutions from the traditional system to modern bureaucratic ins-

53 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 9, vom 1. Juli 1903 bis 15. August 1906, R16114.

54 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Bd. 6, Das Kaiserliche Deutsche Konsulat in Tripolis, vom Mai 1909 bis September, R141611, Nr. Ic 2783.

55 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, R141595, Nr. 489, Leipzig, 20. Oktober 1909.

56 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 6, vom Mai 1914 bis April 1915, R901/4415, Nr. II02225.

57 Nāji, *Tāriḫ Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 48.

58 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, pp. 75, 77.

59 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 3, vom Januar 1910 bis Mai 1912, R901/4412, Nr. II^o411.

60 Minawi, *The Ottoman Scramble for Africa*, pp. 6–7.

titutions. Reforms were announced in 1839, when a new tax system replaced the old one.⁶¹ These reforms were followed by the announcement of the constitution at the time of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1876.⁶²

The Ottoman sultans tried to rely on European aid for the success of these reforms, particularly Britain, which actually supported them at the beginning. It seems that the Ottoman Empire adopted some clearly European experiences, so that the Empire could cope with the developments in Europe and face the dangers surrounding it.⁶³ The European 'aid' was delivered by the British ambassador in Istanbul, who had enjoyed close relations with the Ottoman officials who were responsible for implementing the reforms. Moreover, the Ottomans brought trained Germans to train the military forces Istanbul.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, the Ottomans sent their missions to study and to be trained in Europe, mainly in Germany. The Europeans, particularly the British, had for their part tried to put pressure on the Ottomans for substantial reforms to benefit the Europeans living in the Ottoman Empire and, in particular, that they be treated equally to the Muslims. They focused their efforts on improving the status of some Christian denominations, such as the Catholics and the followers of the Eastern Church under the authority of the Pope. Those Christians who benefited from the Ottoman reforms were from different European countries such as France, Austria, Russia and protestant Britain.⁶⁵ The beginning of relations went back to before German unity, and were

61 Is the compulsory enlistment of people in a national service, most often a military service, Zürcher, Erik-Jan, *Turkey: A Modern History*, London, 2004, p. 53.

62 See the seminal work of, Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, 518p; see also an overview by the Majmū'a min al-bāḥithīn, *al-Mausū'a al-'arabiyya al-'ālamiyyā*, vol. 6, mū'assasa a'māl al-mausū'a li-l-nashr wa al-tawzī', 1999, p. 245.

63 al-Bustāni, Sulaymān, *al-Dawlā al-'ūthmāniyyā qabl al-dustūr wa ba'dah*, Ziyāda, Khālid (ed.), Dār al-ṭalī'a li-l-ṭibā'a wa al-nashr, Bayrūt, 1978, p. 25, 41; Rāfiq, *al-'Arab wa al-'ūthmāniyyūn*, p. 380; al-Jamīl, Sayyār, *al-'Arab wa al-'atrāk al-inbi'ath wa al-tahdīth min al-'athmana ilā al-'almanā*, markaz dirāsāt al-wahdā al-'arabiyya, Bayrūt, 1997, p. 55.

64 al-Ḥuṣārī, Sāṭi', *al-Bilād al-'arabiyya wa al-dawlā al-'ūthmāniyyā*, ma'had al-dirāsāt al-'arabiyya, maṭaba'at al-risālah 'Ābdīn, al-Qāhira, 1957, p. 60.

65 On the issue of the influence of Europe in the Ottoman Empire, some scholars have relativized the paradigms of imported and exported; see, for example, on the province of Egypt, Lafi, Nora, "Alhadatha wal-idāra al-hadāriyya fi Misr al-'Uthamāniyya. As'ila wa tafisrāt" (Modernity and Administration in Ottoman Egypt: Questions and Research Perspectives), in *Jadal al-mawḏū'iyah wa-al-dhātīyah fī kitābat tārikh Miṣr: Dirāsāt muhdāh ilā al-mu'arrikhah al-kabīrah Nillī Ḥannā* (Objectivity and Subjectivity in the Historiography of Egypt: In Honor of Nelly Hanna), ed. by Nelly Hanna, Nasser Ahmed Ibrahim, al-Hay'ah al-miṣriyyah al-'āmmah lil-kitāb, Cairo, 2012, pp. 263–273 and for the province of Tripoli: Lafi, Nora, "Mediterranean Connections; The Circulation of Municipal Knowledge and Practices during the Ottoman Reforms, c. 1830–1910", in *Another*

either political or religious relations. Prussia had signed a trade agreement with the Ottoman Empire in 1761; it was, in fact, a treaty of friendship and trade and was renewed in 1790 and again in 1803.⁶⁶ Prussia also played an important role in mediating between the Ottoman Empire and Russia to end the war between them through signing the Adrianople agreement in 1829.⁶⁷ The second war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire (known as the Crimean War) in the Balkans and Caucasus had started in 1877, when Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. Russia had endorsed this movement and entered the war. Russia wanted to regain territory lost during the Crimean War and to end the Ottoman rule in the Balkans and the Caucasus. The Ottoman Empire lost part of its territories in these areas in 1878.⁶⁸ Ottoman-German relations also had cultural and religious aspects; for instance, a number of German Christian clergy arrived in the territory of the empire within the framework of missionary activities in the mid-19th century, specifically to Palestine.⁶⁹ These missionary activities continued in different parts of the Ottoman provinces.

Relations evolved over time even during the stage of the declaration of a unified Germany and the rule of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck as a strong politician. Bismarck tried not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire and what known as the “eastern issue”.⁷⁰ However, political developments dictated that he takes a position on current events. He then called for the Berlin Conference in 1878 to settle this conflict, as mentioned above. Bismarck’s position was clear: in the Balkan war between 1877 and 1878 he supported the Ottoman Empire. This was driven only by the political and economic interests of Germany. Relations between the two sides had gone through two phases before the First World War. The first was in the time of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and lasted until 1908, when the second phase began with the coming of the Committee of Union and Progress to power in 1908, after ending the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in the

Global City. Historical Explorations into the Transnational Municipal Moment, 1850–2000, ed. by Pierre-Yves Saunier and Shane Ewen, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, Houndmills, 2008, pp. 35–50.

66 Sanū, ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf, *‘Almāniya wa al-islām fī al-qarnayn al-tāsi’a ‘ashar wa al-‘aishrīn, al-furāt li-l-nashr wa al-tawzi’*, Bayrūt, 2007, pp. 33–34.

67 Ibid.

68 Gökpinar, Hakan, *Deutsch-Türkische Beziehungen 1890–1914 und die Rolle Enver Paschas*, Marburg, 2011, p. 96; Menning, Bruce W., *Bayonets Before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army 1861–1914*, Indiana University Press, 1992, pp. 52–57.

69 Sanū, *‘Almāniya wa al-islām*, p. 31.

70 Ibid., pp. 31, 36.

same year.⁷¹ The year 1880 was the starting point of official German-Ottoman relations after German unification. As noted above, the sultans hired German experts in their reform process. The first German to arrive was the officer Helmuth von Moltke the elder (born 1800 in Parchim), who was asked by Sultan Mahmud II in 1838 to assist in modernizing the Ottoman Empire's army.⁷² Von Moltke was the commander of the German armies that defeated the French in the time of von Bismarck. He performed great tasks for the Ottoman state such as training the military forces, and when he returned to his country he monitored the training from there.⁷³ The German officer von Dergultich also played an important role in the education and training of the Ottoman army. He was a teacher at the School of Military Staff of the Ottoman Empire. His task was to train the army in the advanced, modern German method to be able to catch up with the European countries in this regard.⁷⁴ There were other German officers, for example von Hofes and Camp Hofes,⁷⁵ in addition to the German army commander Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, who arrived in Istanbul in (1882–1883) as head of the German military mission. The main task of the mission was to train the Ottoman army forces in accordance with the modern German methods.⁷⁶ To support these efforts, it had been agreed to provide the Ottoman army with German-made weapons, including the cannon called Krupp. This was in the time of Mahmud Şevket Pasha (ruled 1910–1912), an Ottoman general and statesman and grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁷ In addition, a large number of Ottoman students were sent to study in Germany. Some of them joined the military schools in Prussia, while others were enrolled in other institutions in order to benefit from German expertise.⁷⁸ A significant event that revealed the depth of German-Ottoman relations at that time was the visit of the German Emperor Wilhelm II and his wife to the Sultan Abd al-Hamid II in Istanbul. They arrived in Istanbul on board

71 Brürü, Taufiq, 'Ali, *al-'Arab wa al-turk fî al-'ahd al-distûri al-'üthmânî 1908–1914*, ma'had al-diräsät al-'arabiyya al-'älämîyyä, jami'at al-duwal al-'arabiyya, 1960, pp. 338–339.

72 Buchholz, Arden, *Moltke and the German Wars, 1864–1871*, Palgrave, 2001.

73 Gökpinar, *Deutsch-Türkische Beziehungen 1890–1914*, p. 37.

74 al-Ḥuşarî, *al-Bilād al-'arabiyya wa al-dawlā al-'üthmāniyyā*, p. 70.

75 Brükilmän, Käril, *Tārīkh al-shu'üb al-islāmîyya*, translated by Nabîh Amin and Munir al-Ba'alabakî, Dār al-'ilm li-l-malāyyîn, Bayrût, 1974, p. 593; Waḥîd, *al-Qawl al-mufîd fî ḥukum al-sultān 'Abdul-Ḥamîd*, p. 343.

76 Râfiq, *al-'Arab wa al-'üthmāniyyûn*, p. 427; Sanû, *'Almāniya wa al-islām*, p. 37.

77 Brürü, *al-'Arab wa al-turk*, p. 348.

78 For an overview on this issue see Römer, Matthias, *Die deutsche und englische Militärhilfe für das Osmanische Reich 1908–1914*, Frankfurt am Main, Lang, 2007; see also Waḥîd, *al-Qawl al-mufîd fî ḥukum al-sultān 'Abdul-Ḥamîd*, p. 343.

of the German yacht *Hohenzollern* in 1889.⁷⁹ They were received by Sultan Abd al-Hamid II at a time when most European countries were competing for the favor of the Ottoman Empire. The visit of the German emperor at that time was important in strengthening the relationship between the two parties, as viewed by the Ottoman Sultan.⁸⁰ It is obvious that this visit came within the framework of the consolidation of German policy toward the Ottoman Empire, and it was a milestone in the distinctive political approach to strengthening relations with them. The German emperor tried to take advantage of the international situation by highlighting the role of Germany as a non-colonial power. He visited the Ottoman Empire again in 1898. During this visit he gave a speech in Damascus confirming the strength and resilience of the relationship between the two sides, and clearly pointed out that he would remain faithful to good relations with the Ottoman Turks and the Muslims in general.⁸¹ This visit can be described as a working visit where bilateral agreements were signed to implement a series of economic projects in the territory of the Ottoman Empire; one of these projects was the Ottoman railway. The construction of the Ottoman railway started in the 1860s and 1870s with the aid of the British. Britain had obtained a concession to create railway lines linking the cities of Izmir and Aydin in Turkey, and in Tunis, another very telling example.⁸² The railway between Izmir and Aydin was opened in 1867. The French also implemented some parts of the railway in Tunis and in the area of Levant (*Bilād al-Shām*).⁸³ Later on, in 1888, a company was established with the help of the Deutsche Bank called Société du Chemin de Fer Ottoman d'Anatolie. This company was created by the Deutsche Bank to operate the Ottoman railway and completely took over its construction. This move came in the context of the competition between Germany and Britain to implement projects related to the infrastructure of the Ottoman state.⁸⁴ In addition, during the visit of the German Emperor in 1898, the Société du Chemin de Fer Ottoman d'Anatolie was granted the privilege of rebuilding Istanbul Haydarpaşa Railway Terminal, which took on

⁷⁹ Gökpınar, *Deutsch-Türkische Beziehungen 1890–1914*, p. 49.

⁸⁰ al-Bustānī, *al-Dawlā al-ūthmāniyyā*, p. 42.

⁸¹ Rāfiq, *al-'Arab wa al-ūthmāniyyūn*, p. 428; Gökpınar, *Deutsch-Türkische Beziehungen 1890–1914*, p. 48.

⁸² See Lafi, Nora, “Tunis als Laboratorium osmanischer Modernität: das Beispiel der Vorstadt-bahn (1863–1881)”, *Moderne Stadtgeschichte*, special issue “Die Osmanische Stadt”, edited by Nora Lafi and Florian Riedler (guest eds.), 2018-1, pp. 16–25.

⁸³ al-Jamīl, *al-'Arab wa al-'atrāk*, p. 92; Sanū, *'Almāniya wa al-islām*, pp. 4, 9.

⁸⁴ See for example Geyikdagi, Necla V., *French Direct Investments in the Ottoman Empire before World War I*, Bloomsbury Academic, London, 2011.

its classical structure when constructed in 1909.⁸⁵ In addition, a contract was signed assigning the Société du Chemin de Fer Ottoman d'Anatolie and the Deutsche Bank the task of extending the railway line from Izimit to Ankara, with work starting in 1892.⁸⁶ In 1894, the company was granted a project to extend the railway as far as Konya in Turkey.⁸⁷ Between 1900 and 1908, the company was given the task of extending the railway line between Damascus and Medina.⁸⁸ It was a part of the Ottoman Hejaz railway network that was supposed to extend the line from the Haydarpaşa Terminal in Istanbul beyond Damascus to the holy city of Mecca. A public subscription was opened throughout the Islamic world to fund construction. The railway was to be a *waqf*.⁸⁹ That is, an inalienable religious endowment or charitable trust.⁹⁰ Moreover, they succeeded in obtaining a privilege permitting them to exploit the mineral resources discovered on both sides of the railway, specifically in Iraq, to a distance of 20 meters.⁹¹ The Germans realized through their explorers and travellers that Iraq was an oil and mineral-rich country. This was followed by the flow of German capital to Turkey, for example, the signing of a huge contract to build the railway line between Berlin and Baghdad, which was signed by Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1903.⁹² Britain did not accept this contract and resisted the project in a violent way. The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 was a direct reason to block completion of this project.⁹³ Other projects included developing the ports of Basra and Alexandria, establishing the German Bank of Palestine in 1899, cultivating cotton in Adana in 1905, and restoring the ships in the Marmara Sea in 1899, among other projects.⁹⁴ Gene-

85 Jaschinski, Klaus and Julius Waldschmidt, *Das Kaisers Reise in den Orient 1898*, Bd. 27, Wolfgang Weist, Berlin, 2002, p. 65.

86 Brükilmān, *Tārīkh al-shu'ūb al-islāmīyya*, p. 593.

87 al-Jamīl *al-'Arab wa al-'atrāk*, p. 92.

88 Rāfiq, *al-'Arab wa al-'ūthmāniyyūn*, p. 428.

89 The word *waqf* is used in Islam with the meaning of holding certain property and preserving it for the confined benefit of certain philanthropic use and prohibiting any use or disposition of it outside that specific objective, extracted from <http://journal.mufad.org/attachments/article/452/7.pdf> (March 2016).

90 Nicholson, James, *The Hejaz Railway*, Stacey International Publishers, 2005.

91 (no author), "*al-Dawlā wa al-'Almān*", *Majallat al-Manār*, *Majallat shahriyya tabhath fi falsafat al-din wa shu'un al-ijtimā' wa al-'umrān*, maṭaba'at al-manār, al-Qāhira, 18-61, 333H/1915, p. 472.

92 Hagen, Gottfried, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg. Flugblätter und Flugschriften in arabischer, persischer und osmanisch-türkischer Sprache aus einer Sammlung der Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 1990, p. 15; Yāghī, Ismā'il Aḥmed, *al-Dawlā al-'ūthmāniyyā fi al-tārīkh al-islāmī*, maktabat al-'Abikān, 1998, p. 205; Brrū, *al-'Arab wa al-turk*, p. 38.

93 Jaschinski, and Julius Waldschmidt, *Das Kaisers Reise in den Orient*, pp. 64–65.

94 Sanū, *'Almāniya wa al-islām*, pp. 51, 59.

rally, Germany managed to acquire 67% of the total European investments in the Ottoman Empire by 1895.⁹⁵ It should be noted that the rapprochement between the Ottomans and Germans also included the cultural aspect. Germany opened a number of schools in the Ottoman provinces and some states under their rule, such as Palestine, in order to disseminate the German culture and language among the people of the sultanate.⁹⁶ Germany had also established a number of schools along a line parallel to the railway lines that they built. The Germans were involved in building schools in the Ottoman Empire, as were the French and the British.⁹⁷ The Germans tried to spread their educational system and culture. German-Ottoman relations were improving rapidly when Italy invaded Libya in 1911. Germany decided then to support the Ottoman Empire and tried to bridge the gap in viewpoints between Italy and the Ottoman Empire in Libya.⁹⁸ The situation developed significantly in 1915, when Germany and Turkey agreed to attack Britain in Egypt starting from Libyan territory. Germany also supported the power and authority of the Ottoman Empire in its territories in Asia, where France, Britain and Russia were trying to pressure the Ottoman government to comply with their demands, whether in Syria, where France was involved, or in Armenia, which was within Russian's sphere of interest, or the issue of the railway line Berlin-Baghdad by Britain, an issue that directly affected German interests.⁹⁹ At that time, the German ambassador in London, Prince Karl Lichnowsky, announced that the goal of these countries was not to serve the interests of the peoples of the region, but to divide the areas and subject them to their influence without taking into account the authority of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰⁰ Germany also tried to support Russia in their proposal to the Ottoman government to reform the Armenian states within their borders. The German position supported the rights of the Ottomans in the region, while Russia wanted to combine all the categories under one flag to be ruled by European or Christian Ottoman leaders. Germany then insisted on holding a conference, at which they adopted different local reforms primarily conceived to serve the interests of the residents.¹⁰¹ The situation in the Ottoman Empire was rapidly changing, especially when Union and Progress

95 Muḥāfaẓa, *Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya*, p. 22.

96 Brrū, *al-ʿArab wa al-turk*, p. 339.

97 Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, p. 15.

98 Mikhāʿil, *al-ʿĀlāqāt al-injilīziyya al-libiyyā*, p. 29.

99 Many articles have been published on these issues. See for example the research of Abu Shouk, Ahmed Ibrahim, "The Hijaz railway: motives, results and impacts", *Journal of Islam in Asia*, 6-1, 2009, p. 1-28.

100 Brrū, *al-ʿArab wa al-turk*, pp. 567-568.

101 Ibid.

ended the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1908. They declared him deposed by a decision issued by the senate with the approval of *shaykh al-Islām* Moḥammad Ḍīia'al-Dīn in Istanbul.¹⁰² This coup received wide acceptance from most of the European countries, in particular France and Britain, and here began the second phase of German relations with the Ottoman Empire. Germany then began to apply the cautious policy designed by their ambassador in Istanbul, Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein. At this stage, Germany realized that it required a more active policy to protect its special relationship with the Ottoman Empire, regardless of who held political power there. Thus, they announced their reservations about this change because of the special relations they had with Sultan Abd al-Hamid II. However, they were watching very carefully the rapprochement between the new government and the British and the French. Germany then tried to follow a policy of positive neutrality and reservation coping with the course of current events. The new Union and Progress government attempted to introduce new reforms and measures to serve the interests of the Ottomans first, and passed a resolution that included the abolition of foreign concessions; this did not satisfy the European countries. The situation developed further when the Grand Vizier¹⁰³ Moḥammad Kāmil Pasha, who supported the Europeans, was isolated. Then the conflict on the demarcation of borders between the province of Tripoli and Tunisia emerged in 1910. The conflict was between the Ottomans and France about the eligibility of the province of Tripoli. Germany then offered to mediate to resolve the crisis peacefully, without resorting to the military option. Germany actually succeeded in resolving the conflict and in forming a Turkish-French committee that took over the task of demarcating the borders.¹⁰⁴ Despite the fact that France was able to control some of the territory of the province of Tripoli, the issue was settled with the signing of the convention on the final demarcation of the border between the two sides in 1910.¹⁰⁵ The German-Ottoman relationship remained close until the First World War, by which time Turkey had become very dependent on its ally. One example of this dependence is the commander of the Ottoman

102 al-Shinnāwi, 'Abd al-'Azīz Moḥammad, *al-Dawlā al-'ūthmāniyyā dawlā islāmīyya muftara 'alayhā*, maktabat al-'anjālū al-maṣriyya, al-Qāhira, 1980, p. 117.

103 The Grand Vizier was the prime minister of the Ottoman sultan, with absolute power of attorney and, in principle, dismissible only by the sultan himself; Wittek, Paul, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, London, 1938.

104 On this issue see the thesis of Ben Sliman, Fatma, Thèse de l'Université de Tunis with an article: Ben Sliman, Fatma, "Frontière et nation. L'exemple de la frontière tuniso-algérienne avant 1881", in idem, *Penser le National au Maghreb et Ailleurs*, Dar Noqoush Arabia, 2012, pp. 45–63.

105 Shukrī, Moḥammad Fū'ād, *Milād dawlāt libiyā al-ḥadithā wathā'iq taḥrīrahā wa istiqlālīhā*, vol. 1, (1945–1947), maṭba'at al-i'timād, al-Qāhira, 1957, p. 430.

fleet in the Black Sea, the German general Otto Liman von Sanders, appointed in 1913. He was not new to this position, having supervised the training and development of the Ottoman army in the past. Von Sanders achieved positive results in reorganizing and rebuilding the Ottoman army and sent a report to his government presenting his achievements.¹⁰⁶ He was accompanied by a number of other German navy officers who occupied important positions in the Ottoman fleet. The Ottoman authorities appointed the task of supervising the castles and fortifications in the Dardanelles to the German officers.¹⁰⁷ At the outbreak of the First World War, Turkey then declared neutrality, but this position was short-lived, and Germany quickly convinced them to stand on its side after becoming its ally in September 1914. This was preceded by the signing of a treaty between the two sides at the end of July in the same year.¹⁰⁸ The agreement necessitated the commitment of both sides to neutrality toward the conflict between Austria and Serbia, and they were not supposed to intervene unless Russia entered the war in a way that threatened Germany and in turn Turkey.¹⁰⁹ Despite the serious political situation, good relations continued between the two parties by enhancing the cultural aspect, in particular, the establishment of the German-Turkish Association (*Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung*). Even after the outbreak of the war, German projects continued within the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The Eastern News Agency was established in Berlin in 1915 and was directed by Max von Oppenheim. The news agency played a major role in supporting the Ottoman Empire and the propaganda of the idea of Islamic *jihad* launched by Oppenheim. The main task of the Eastern News Agency was disseminating propaganda in the Ottoman Empire against the triple alliance, while the agency had also undertaken a significant role in spreading news as well as German culture within the Ottoman Empire. One of the outcomes of its efforts was the establishment of the German-Turkish Friendship House (*Haus der Deutsch-Türkischen Freundschaft*) in Istanbul in 1917.¹¹⁰ The question that arises here is whether Germany was genuinely interested in the completion of these large-scale projects in the framework of bilateral relations and the development of the Ottomans' economic and military institutions, or whether the projects functioned as a means of non-military incursion into the region to undermine British dominance. The answer to this question lies in the fact that Germany had prospered economically and militarily.

106 Sanū, *'Almāniya wa al-islām*, pp. 69, 87.

107 Yāghī, *al-Dawlā al-'ūthmāniyyā*, p. 220.

108 Shukrī, *Milād dawlāt Libiyā al-ḥadīthā*, p. 459.

109 Brrū, *al-'Arab wa al-turk*, p. 612.

110 Sanū, *'Almāniya wa al-islām*, pp. 83, 91–96.

Germany had controlled some areas in Africa, but remained a minor force in the region. This is why it looked to the Ottoman Empire as a partner first, and second because the latter extended its control over Asia. Asia was considered by the Germans as one of the vital areas for investment and exploitation of mineral wealth, as well as a strong market for their products and industries. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire was of high strategic importance for Germany. Cooperation with the Ottoman ruling powers would enable Germany to communicate with these areas without requiring the permission of the British, who controlled the majority of the sea ports at that time. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire itself was in need of an ally among the powerful countries that it could rely on, considering the ongoing political developments that had negative impacts on the empire and ultimately resulted in its losing control over large parts of its territories to the European countries. The political positions of the German government toward the issues related to the Ottoman state, in particular, and the region of the Mediterranean were generally different from the other European countries and this was also the case in the issue of the province of Tripoli.

Political Developments and International Agreements

The competition between the main European powers made it necessary to engage in negotiations and agreements. It is illuminating to consider main and competing interests of these European powers before discussing the individual agreements.

It was obvious that the African continent was the center of negotiations that led to many agreements between the European powers. This was the starting point in signing agreements between the different parties concerned with colonialism and economic expansion in Africa. The struggle over dividing Africa was conducted parallel to the process of dividing the properties of the Ottoman Empire in the north of the continent. The province of Tripoli was a center of conflict between Britain and France, specifically when both obtained contiguous colonies in Africa.¹¹¹ Britain began to feel the danger of Germany as a powerful new state, especially after its victory over France. It subsequently developed a new policy to maintain its strength within Europe and thereby protect its colonies abroad, and in particular its strategic interests in the Mediterranean, Egypt, and India.¹¹² Both

¹¹¹ al-Dijānī, Aḥmed Ṣidqī, *Libiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī au Ṭarābulis al-ghārb fī 'ākhīr al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī (1882–1911)*, al-maṭaba'a al-faniyya al-ḥadītha, 'al-aṣḥab bi-l-zaitūn, al-Qāhira, 1971, p. 312.

¹¹² Mommsen, W.J. (ed.), *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, Frankfurt, 1969, p. 72.

countries sent a number of travellers under the guise of geographical exploration and the study of natural phenomena, monuments, archeology as well as the history of the region. The reports presented by those travelers make clear that the attention of Britain was directed primarily toward the eastern part of the province of Tripoli, specifically Cyrenaica. The French focused their attention on the south, especially the city of Ghadames and its environs, in order to secure their colonial Empire. This was due to the location of Ghadames on the border with the Algerian territory which had been under French occupation since 1830. Ghadames was close to the Tunisian territory, which had been subjected to French protectorate since 1882. From these two regions they tried to extend their influence to Ghadames.¹¹³ Soon, Italy entered the conflict. The Italian politicians realized the seriousness and effectiveness of their expansion policy and correspondingly tried to take advantage of the situation in order to achieve their goals. At the beginning, Italy was interested in the eastern part of Africa, in an attempt to realize their ambition to establish a major empire starting from the east coast of Africa. Thus, from this standpoint, Italy struggled politically to gain control over the province of Tripoli, especially since Germany did not have any clear colonial ambitions in the region.¹¹⁴ It could be said that the preparation phase started at the beginning of the 19th century, Italy then focused its efforts to gain strong political acceptance from the major countries. As for Austria, it was seeking to establish an alliance with Germany because it did not have the power to enable it to engage in any new conflicts and thus ensure access to new gains through its alliances with Germany or other European countries. Russia's position was different because of strategic interests as it was in an opposite position to the Ottoman Empire. It supported France and tried to prevent its collapse, to keep the balance of power in Europe. At the same time, its strategic interests required it to enter into agreements, even with enemies.¹¹⁵ Germany's concern to strengthen its position in Europe led it to enter into a number of agreements and treaties that enabled the state to play an important political mediary role. Externally, Germany tried to secure its strategic objectives in Africa in particular.¹¹⁶ These are the goals that led von Bismarck to follow the policy of rapprochement with France to limit the power superiority of the British and at the same time to be an obstacle to any attempt at a French

113 Ḥasan, al-Faqīḥ Ḥasan, *al-Yawmiyyāt al-libiyyā*, vol. 1 and 2, 958h–1248h (1551–1832), taḥqīq Moḥammad al-'Uṣṭā wa 'Ammār Jihīdar, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1984, p. 21.

114 Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p. 110.

115 'Umar, 'Abdul-'Azīz 'Umar, *Tārikh 'Aūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-mu'āṣir 1815–1919*, Dār al-ma'ārifa al-jami'iya, al-Qāhira, 2000, pp. 196–197.

116 Mommsen, *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, p. 72.

attack on Germany.¹¹⁷ European powers engaged in agreements to ease the relations between them. Amongst these agreements were those that helped Italy to occupy the province. The political role of and agreements signed by Germany are also viewed as significant. One example is the German Italian agreement of 1887, which helped the Italians to occupy the province of Tripoli. It is argued here that all the conventions and treaties were only a step toward avoiding the opposition of European powers that might prevent Italy from occupying Tripoli. Italy also benefited from other agreements that were signed by other European powers, such as the Anglo-French Agreement.

The Triple Alliance (Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary) in 1882

The Berlin Conference is considered the start of the political agreements between the European countries concerning their colonies in Africa and other regions. From that point, Italy tried to work with Germany and Austria-Hungary to attain colonies in Africa. This agreement was known as the Triple Alliance and was settled in 1882.¹¹⁸ It focused mainly on the issue of the common defence policy.¹¹⁹ Italy considered this agreement a foundation for realizing its ambitions. The same agreement was used by Italy as a defense mechanism against France, to stop France from expanding in the province of Tripoli as it had in Tunisia before.¹²⁰

It is worth mentioning that this alliance was restored several times. First in 1887, when Italy obtained a guarantee of military support from Germany if France tried to change the situation in Tripoli to its advantage or to expand its control over Morocco.¹²¹ The alliance was next renewed in 1891, then in 1902 and again in 1912.¹²² The three parties worked to emphasize retaining the situation in

117 Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 21.

118 See for example Scott, Ivan, "The making of the Triple Alliance in 1882", *East European Quarterly*, 12-4, 1978, p. 399; See also al-Dijānī, *Libiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī*, p. 329; Shukrī, Moḥammad Fū'ād, *al-Sanūsiyya dīn wa dawla*, Dār al-fikr al-'arabī, al-Qāhira, 1984, p. 109; *Weltgeschichte der Neuzeit*, ed. by F. A. Brockhaus in cooperation with Gernot Dallinger und Hans-Georg Golz, bpb, Mannheim, 2006, p. 125.

119 *al-Mausū' ā al-'arabiyya al-'ālamiyyā*, J9, p. 199.

120 Muḥāfaẓa, *Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-'arabiyya*, p. 26.

121 Tishāijī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, *al-Mas'alā al-tūnisīyya wa al-siyāsa al-'ūthmāniyyā 1881–1913*, translated by 'Abd al-Jalīl al-Timīmī, Dār al-kutub al-sharqiyya, Tūnis, 1973, p. 192; Ismā'il, Ḥilmi Maḥrūs, *Tārīkh Afrīqiyyā al-ḥadīth wa al-mu'āṣir min al-kushūfāt al-jughrāfiyya ilā qiyām munazamat al-waḥda al-'afriqiyya*, vol. 1, mu'assasat shabāb al-jāmi'a, al-Iskandariyya, 2004, p. 263.

122 *al-Mausū' ā al-'arabiyya al-'ālamiyyā*, J9, p. 500.

North Africa. Italy was able to obtain a promise from Austria that the latter would restrain its ambitions in the province. This gave Italy the opportunity to extend its control there. The alliance continued to be the focus of European relations until the First World War in 1914.¹²³

Anglo-Italian Agreement in 1887

Italy did not limit its contact to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Following negotiations with Britain, an agreement of mutual support was published in 1887. It was initially a secret agreement as it had been agreed in 1883¹²⁴ based mainly on mutual pledges to maintain the situation as it was.¹²⁵ At the same time, Britain and Italy agreed to limit French influence in the Mediterranean. The main agreement specified that Italy would support Britain in Egypt, and Britain would support Italy in North Africa.¹²⁶ Thus Italy had British support for its political ambitions in Tripoli.

German-Italian Agreement in 1887

The Chancellor Otto von Bismarck signed a bilateral agreement with Italy; in this agreement Germany, stated the eligibility of Italy to occupy the province of Tripoli.¹²⁷ The position of Germany was clearly against France. It is obvious that most of the European powers tried to isolate France or form coalitions against it. That was the reason behind the German position in favor of limiting the influence of France in Tripoli and Morocco. Germany was prepared to provide military support to Italy when needed. By signing these agreements, Bismarck intended to defend Germany's rights, to confirm its neutrality, and to preserve its position as a major power in Europe. This was in spite of the earlier German position, which was somewhat moderate toward the Ottoman Empire. The German Italian agreement

123 Ibid.

124 al-Ḥarīr, 'Abd al-Maula Ṣāliḥ, "al-Tamhīd li-l-ghazū al-iṭālī wa mawqif al-libiyyin minhu", *buhūth wa dirāsāt fī al-tārikh al-libi 1911–1943*, vol. 2, majmū'a min al-asātidha wa al-bāḥithin, ishrāf Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Ḥasan al-Sūrī wa Ḥabīb Wadā'a al-Ḥisnāwī, markaz jihād al-libiyyin ḡidal-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1984, p.27.

125 Mikhā'il, al-'Ālāqāt al-injilīziyya al-libiyyā, pp. 16-17; Muḥāfaẓa, *Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-'arabiyya*, p. 26; al-Kaiyālī, 'Abd al-Wahāb et.al, *Mausū'at al-siyāsa*, vol. 5, al-mū'assasa al-'arabiyya li-l-dirāsāt wa al-nashr, Bayrūt, 1979, p. 554.

126 al-Dijānī, *Libiyā qubail al-iṭtilāl al-iṭālī*, pp. 330, 332.

127 Maḥrūs, *Tārikh Afrīqiyyā al-ḥadīth*, p. 263.

enabled both parties to work in accordance with their own interests. On the one hand, Germany guaranteed to keep Italy within the alliance, and on the other hand, the agreement ensured that an influential power depended on Germany, which paved the way for it to be involved in negotiations with other European countries sharing the same interests in the Mediterranean, such as Britain, France and others. Italy intended to enter into agreements with them to ensure its rights in the region. Article 3 of the treaty mentioned that, in the case that France extended its control over areas in North Africa, Italy would do the same to maintain its position in the Mediterranean. Italy was granted the right to take military action in the French territories in Europe in consultation with its ally Germany in accordance to this treaty.¹²⁸ It is worth mentioning that the same year witnessed bilateral negotiations between Italy and Austria-Hungary, and with Spain. The negotiations discussed the political activity of the Italians, who signed agreements with all the countries that were considered as obstacles on their way to occupying Tripoli, and thus had succeeded in signing different agreements with them.¹²⁹

Anglo-French-Italian Agreement in 1890

Italy succeeded through this agreement in receiving the explicit support of France and Britain to control the province of Tripoli. This agreement came shortly after the end of the Second Berlin Conference, and was signed because the conference did not refer explicitly to the right claimed by Italy in Tripoli. Thus, Italy engaged in individual negotiations with the major powers which resulted in the signing of an agreement on October 30, 1890 guaranteeing Italy what it wanted to achieve on the North African coast stretching between Egypt and Tunisia.¹³⁰

Anglo-French Agreement in 1899

Britain and France were considered the largest European colonial powers, which resulted in the many intersections of interests between them that led to several clashes. In order to avoid any negative developments, both sides agreed to enter into negotiations and reached a fair agreement in 1889. In this agreement, zones

¹²⁸ 'Umar, *Tārīkh 'Aūrūbbā al-ḥadīth wa al-mu'āṣir 1815–1919*, p. 223.

¹²⁹ al-Kaiyāli, et al., *Mausū'at al-siyāsa*, vol. 5, p. 554.

¹³⁰ Mannā', Moḥammad 'Abd al-Razāq, *Judhūr al-niḍāl al-'arabi fī Libiyā*, Dār maktabat al-fikr, Ṭarābulis, 1972, p. 15.

of influence for both parties were identified, both in relation to the continent of Africa and to some other regions.¹³¹ This agreement was viewed with suspicion by Italy, which considered it an obstacle to its presence in North Africa, specifically in the province of Tripoli. Italy's opposition was mainly based on Britain's recognition of the French presence in Saharan Africa and the southern region of the province of Tripoli, which was formalized in the agreement.¹³² In this, France began to seek control over Morocco by initiating many activities in the southern regions of the province of Tripoli and the west on the border with Tunisia, which was of course a French protectorate at the time. The Italians then started to express their concerns and opposition against the French political activities, prompting the French foreign minister to declare in 1899 that his country did not have any colonial ambitions in the province of Tripoli. This paved the way for the signing of several agreements between the two later on.¹³³

Italian-French Agreement in 1900

This treaty was a result of the agreement mentioned above, when Italy sought to work on several major directions to be able to mobilize the European powers to its side. Italy thus realized that there is nothing inappropriate when former enemies become allies of the day. This was accomplished with France, despite the previous disappointments, but that did not hinder the Italian attempts at rapprochement to keep France away from the province of Tripoli, with Italy thus starting to work effectively in that direction. The first step in this policy was to involve Germany as the strongest ally in mitigating the conflict with France. The real beginning can be attributed to 1885,¹³⁴ and again in 1898,¹³⁵ when Italy took an important step and dropped the obstacles in customs and taxes against France. This paved the way for the creation of a calm situation that accelerated the understanding between the two sides and ultimately led to the convening of a secret agreement in 1900.¹³⁶ This was followed by another agreement in 1901,

131 Mikhā'il, *al-'Ālāqāt al-injīlīziyya al-libiyyā*, p. 18.

132 al-Dijānī, *Libiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī*, p. 334.

133 Yaḥya, Jalāl, *al-Maghrib al-kabīr al-'uṣūr al-ḥadīthā wa al-hūjūm al-isti'māri*, vol. 3, al-Dār al-qaumīyya li-l-ṭibā'a wa al-nashr, al-Iskandariyya, 1966, pp. 706–707.

134 Qāsim, Jamāl Zakariyya, "Mawqif miṣr min al-ḥarb al-ṭarābulisiyya 1911–1914", *al-Majalla al-tārikhiyya al-maṣriyya li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya*, al-Qāhira, 1967, p. 308.

135 al-Dijānī, *Libiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī*, p. 332.

136 Lewis, Mary Dewhurst, *Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia 1881–1938*, p. 222.

which focused mainly on Mediterranean politics.¹³⁷ Through these agreements, Italy managed to receive the assurances of the French that they would not involve themselves in any kind of competition in the province of Tripoli.¹³⁸ The deal included the adoption of a dividing line between the areas of influence in the region. In return, Italy accepted the right of France to the occupation of Morocco.¹³⁹ Thus the rapprochement between the two countries led to a division of influence in the two remaining regions of Morocco and Tripoli in the north of Africa.¹⁴⁰

Franco-British Entente Cordiale in 1904

The Entente Cordiale was a significant part of the series of treaties that the European governments consistently signed during this vital stage of history. These two major powers tried to overcome their conflicts, mainly what was called the first Morocco crisis, to sign an agreement in 1904. The first Morocco crisis occurred when Germany was concerned about the relationship between France and Britain after signing the Entente Cordiale in 1904¹⁴¹ that ended the long conflicts between the two and declared Morocco a French sphere of influence. The entente made it possible to allow French control of Morocco without undermining the internal balance of power in Europe. Thus, it gave the right to France to land its troops in Morocco and Britain was given absolute control over Egypt.¹⁴² Germany then tried to highlight the weaknesses of the entente and the new relationship between France and Britain. According to Jones,¹⁴³ Germany made a dramatic movement to use the threat of war to stress to the European powers the significance of consulting Germany on imperial matters. Jones wrote that Kaiser Wilhelm II arrived in the city of Tangier in northern Morocco in 1906 and met the Sultan of Morocco, Moulay ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Ḥasan. The German Kaiser then declared Germany’s support for the sultan’s independence and the integrity of his kingdom, which made Morocco an international

137 Tishāijī, *al-Mas’alā al-tūnisiyya*, p. 234; Qāsim, “Mawqif miṣr min al-ḥarb al-ṭarābulisiyya”, p. 308; Kāmil, Maḥmūd, *al-Dawlā al-‘arabiyya al-kubra*, Dār al-ma‘ārif, al-Qāhira, (D.T), p. 332.

138 Tishāijī, *al-Mas’alā al-tūnisiyya*, p. 234.

139 al-Kaiyālī, et. al., *Mausū‘at al-siyāsa*, vol. 5, p. 554; Tishāijī, *al-Mas’alā al-tūnisiyya*, p. 334.

140 Ziyāda, *Libiyā fī al-‘uṣūr al-ḥadīthā*, p. 59.

141 See Williamson, Samuel Richard, *The Politics of the Grand Strategy. Britain and France Prepare for War in 1904-1914*, Ashfield Press, London, 1990; Embry, Kristi N., “The Entente cordiale between and France, 8 April 1904”, extracted from http://www.branchcollective.org/?ps_articles=kristi-n-embry-the-entente-cordiale-between-england-and-france-8-april-1904 (March 7, 2016).

142 Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, p. 205.

143 Jones, “Algeciras Revisited”, p. 5.

crisis.¹⁴⁴ France tried to offer a compensatory accord with Germany similar to the ones it had managed with other countries concerned with Morocco. However, Germany refused the offer and insisted on using the system of ‘diplomatic imperialism’ to humiliate France and called for an international conference to decide on the future of Morocco.¹⁴⁵ The Algeciras conference was thus held in 1906 to solve the first Moroccan crisis. Twelve countries, including Morocco, Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, and Portugal participated, as well as the American president Theodore Roosevelt.¹⁴⁶ Germany’s aim in the conference was to acquire political and economic gains in Morocco via ‘imperialism diplomacy’. However, it failed to achieve the required gains due to many factors.¹⁴⁷ One of them was the basic judgment errors and diplomatic failure that overestimated the help that could be gained from Russia and Spain. The conference act included decisions to build upgroups of Spanish and French troops to protect the Moroccan ports, which were seen as important for the French colonization of Morocco.¹⁴⁸ Despite these setbacks Germany tried to find another area in the Mediterranean region. Meanwhile, it worked on enhancing its relationships with other allies such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the province of Tripoli was considered in the German political and military strategy before the First World War. Despite the fact that Tripoli was not mentioned explicitly in this agreement, it was a cornerstone in the agreements that were signed after this date. This agreement was a significant turning point in the path that led the major countries to agree on controlling the region on the coast of the Mediterranean. It was the authentic beginning of the division of Europe into the two main encampments that took their final form in the First World War.

The Anglo-French-Italian Agreement in 1906

Italy did not spare any efforts to get the full consensus and support of Europe. In this regard, Italy entered into a tripartite agreement with Britain and France in 1906. This agreement explicitly identified the areas of influence of each party in North and East Africa and the Red Sea regions.¹⁴⁹

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

146 See Collin, Richard H., *Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion: A New View of American Imperialism*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, London, 1985.

147 Jones, “Algeciras Revisited”, p. 8.

148 Ibid.

149 Muḥāfaẓa, *Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-‘arabiyya*, p. 27.

The Italian-Russian Agreement in 1907

The Italian prime minister had tried to sign an agreement with the tsar of Russia, Nicholas II. The agreement assured Russian support to Italy in the province of Tripoli. In turn, Italy promised to support Russia in the area of the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles¹⁵⁰ and to hinder the expansion pursued by Austria in the Balkans. At that time, it was well known that Austria and Italy were allies. However, Italy was threatened by the expansion of Austria in nearby areas, which motivated it to support Russia more strongly. This agreement was a significant diplomatic support to Italy. In spite of the existence of several agreements that emphasized the need to maintain the territories of the Ottoman Empire by the major European powers, no real action toward this end took place on the ground.¹⁵¹ This was mainly because of the emerging ambition of the European countries that made each seek to strengthen its presence abroad. Moreover, each country tried to add new territories to provide the raw materials needed for the development of its economy. For instance, Britain did not respect its agreements with the Ottoman Empire when it obtained control over Cyprus in 1878, which had been under Ottoman rule from 1571. However, when the Italian government expressed its desire to colonize the province of Tripoli, it was supported by the British Foreign Minister Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881) without reservation.¹⁵² Thus, Italy was able to sign a number of political agreements considered a political victory. It could take advantage of the conflicting interests of the European countries and successfully exploited these to occupy the province of Tripoli. Taken together all of these events amount to Italy's preparations to colonize Tripoli. The preparing efforts were twofold. Firstly it was performed externally and included signing the agreements mentioned above, secondly there were internal activities concerning the Italian state itself. Internally, the Italian government tried to convince the parliament and the political parties of the idea of invasion.

4.1 Bank of Rome and Scientific Missions. The Italian Occupation

Italy started colonization activities relatively late due to the fact that the country was only united in 1870 and lacked the military capabilities. However, Italy had

¹⁵⁰ al-Dijānī, *Libiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī*, p. 336; al-Kaiyālī, et al., *Mausū'at al-siyāsa*, vol. 5, p. 554.

¹⁵¹ Sanū, *'Almāniya wa al-islām*, pp. 61–62.

¹⁵² Mannā', *Judhūr al-ṣiḡāl al-'arabī*, p. 15.

changed its policies in line with the rest of the European countries.¹⁵³ One of the Italian objectives behind the establishment of colonies was the political gains that expanding its political and economic influence would bring. It sought economic gains to support its economy by finding new markets for its products and thus creating new sources of revenue for the state.¹⁵⁴ Italy began to obtain territories on the African continent. It began first in eastern Africa, in Ethiopia, in 1882, but suffered a bitter defeat in the battle of Adwa in 1896.¹⁵⁵ Italy then directed its attention to North Africa, specifically toward Tunisia at first, but lost it to France. Italy then proceeded to take the necessary measures to carry out a military operation there. The government intended to prepare the ground in the province economically, politically and culturally before the declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire there. The Italian politicians were aware of the seriousness of the stage that they were preparing for, because the political situation in Tripoli was different from the rest of its neighbors in North Africa. This region was under the direct authority of the Ottoman Empire, which was one of the obstacles that Italy faced. The other obstacle was the local population. The Italian policy-makers had to be careful about their steps in pursuing their colonial goals and they started to work internally to prepare Italian public opinion to accept the idea of sending troops to war on the coast of North Africa. This was considered a challenge after their defeat in East Africa. This was intensified when the left-wing came to power and assured people it would improve their standard of living and alleviate all the economic and social problems. Moreover, they launched the idea of migrating to new lands that would be later Italian colonies.¹⁵⁶ As the Ottoman Empire, specifically in North Africa, was regarded as disintegrating by the French and British governments, Italy launched a huge economic investment in Tripoli and, through schools for the Jewish population, created a division between Jews from Europe and Jews from Tripoli.¹⁵⁷ The Italians were very focused on all the internal and external affairs of Tripoli, and the Italian government became very sensitive to everything that would oppose its activities there, especially the efforts of

153 Shukrī, *al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā*, p.103.

154 al-Ḥarīr, “al-Tamhīd li-l-ghazū al-iṭālī wa mauqif al-libīyyīn minhu”, p. 29.

155 Qāsim, “Mawqif miṣr min al-ḥarb al-ṭarābulisiyya”, p. 308; Ismā‘il, *Tārīkh al-‘arab al-ḥadīth*, p. 262.

156 Mannā’, *Judhūr al-niḍāl al-‘arabī*, p. 14; Shukrī, *al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā*, p. 106.

157 See the work of Simon, Rachel, “The Relations of the Jewish Community of Libya with Europe in the Late Ottoman Period and Jewish-Muslim Relations in Libya in the 19th–20th Centuries”, in “The Socio-economic Role of the Tripolitanian Jews in the Late Ottoman Period”, in Abitbol, Michel (ed.), *Communautés juives des marges sahariennes du Maghreb*, The Ben-Zvi Institute Jerusalem, 1982, p. 253–63.

any other European country. One of these activities by the Europeans was the issue of identifying the borders of territories belonging to Turkey and the British in the border area between the province of Tripoli and Egypt in 1904.¹⁵⁸ When the Italian government was informed of this agreement in 1904, they immediately contacted the British government requesting an explanation. Britain then replied that this issue was not existent. The same happened with France, which repeatedly tried to gain territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire in the border region between the province of Tripoli and the former Ottoman province of Tunis colonized by France.¹⁵⁹ This prompted Italy to propose that the consuls of Italy and Britain, as well as one employee of the Ottoman state, should solve the problem of the eastern and western borders. The Ottomans refused this proposal, and considered the issue an internal affair of the sultan. Their refusal did not deter the Italian government from repeating the attempt, insisting on having an active and major role in the conflict, but all their efforts failed. On the same issue, the Italian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire announced in 1891 that Italy would not accept any activities that might change the balance of power in the Mediterranean region, especially by the French. Italy was aware of the attempt by France to strengthen its presence in Tripoli through varied cultural activities, as it tried to open French schools in the province. This effort also included great pressure put on the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the French government made several requests to the Ottoman government to facilitate the work of its ambassador in Tripoli. In this instance, France succeeded in getting the permission of *mutaṣarrifiyya* of al-Khums to build a church and a residence for priests in the city of al-Khums in 1903.¹⁶⁰

The question that arises here is what the motives of France were in implementing all these activities inside the province of Tripoli at this particular time considering the agreements they had already signed? The answer to this question was that, at this stage, France did not intend to gain benefits from Tripoli but intended to use it to exercise pressure on the Italian government to compromise and reach a settlement satisfactory to both parties in the region of North Africa.¹⁶¹ The press also played a major role as the Italian newspapers had been writing about the activities of France in the disputed areas with the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁵⁸ Egypt had been occupied by Britain since 1882.

¹⁵⁹ Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 186.

¹⁶⁰ Jhān, 'Alī Moḥammad, *al-Ḥayāt al-thaqāfiyya bi Miṣrāta athnā' al-ḥukm al-'ūthmāni al-thāni 1835–1911*, markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2007, p. 77.

¹⁶¹ Muḥāfaẓa, *Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-'arabiyya*, p. 27.

They worked to highlight the attacks by France on the borders of the province.¹⁶² They did not ignore the news that the French were trying to obtain the privilege of building the port of Tripoli in 1905.¹⁶³ The Italian government then started to investigate this information supported by the press. This prompted France to immediately declare it as rumors to reassure the Italian government.¹⁶⁴ The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs named Tatony¹⁶⁵ explained this issue in the Italian Senate. The Italians then assigned their ambassador to the Ottoman Empire to clarify the Italian policies with the Ottoman sultan. He argued that they were only intended to maintain the situation in the region and that their goals were purely peaceful. The main argument used by the Italians to explain the situation was that if the Sultan granted any privileges in the province of Tripoli to other countries, this would negatively affect their economic interests and would therefore inevitably lead to force the government to change its policy toward the Ottomans.¹⁶⁶ Germany was also attacked by the Italian press because Italy sought to strengthen its in the internal affairs of the province. The newspapers then doubted the German intentions, stressing that their activities were not only economic in nature but that they sought to control the province politically.¹⁶⁷ The newspapers indicated openly and directly that Germany was seeking to take control of the important port of Tobruk by leasing it from the Ottoman government, but went even further by stressing that there were negotiations taking place between the Ottomans and the Germans.¹⁶⁸ Germany was also subjected to propaganda from the French and British newspapers, as they tried to depict Germany as suspicious and mistrusted considering its activities in North Africa generally and in Tripoli, specifically. That was after Germany had tried to mediate between the Ottomans and the French on the issue of the borders between Tripolitania and Tunisia. The French press wrote then that Germany was seeking to internationalize the issue, especially with regard to the oasis of Janet,¹⁶⁹ located

162 Tishāijī, *al-Mas'alā al-tūnisiyya*, pp. 193, 206–207.

163 A plan of the harbour of Tripoli was drawn a bit before; for this question, see *Plan du port de Tripoli de Barbare levé en 1816 et 1821*, Dépôt général de la Marine, 1823.

164 Yaḥya, *al-Maghrib al-kabīr*, pp. 716–717.

165 As the name mentioned in the reference.

166 Yaḥya, *al-Maghrib al-kabīr*, p. 717.

167 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 11, vom 1. Januar 1909 bis 31. März 1911, R16116, “Die Deutsche Flagge in Tripolis”, *La Grande Italia*, Nr. 2, 8. Januar 1911.

168 Ismā'īl, *Tārīkh al-'arab al-ḥadīth*, p. 266.

169 For mode details on this issue see Pottier, René, *La Tripolitaine vue par un Français*, Dar al-Fergani, Tripoli, n.d.

near the confluence of influence between the province of Tripoli and Algeria, and Germany was accused of defending the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷⁰ Generally, Italy was supported by the flexibility shown by the European countries that measured the political situation according to their economic strategic interests and all agreed that the Italians should focus their efforts on their goal of occupying Tripoli. In doing so, they intended to keep Italy away from other regions like the Balkans, for example, and thus Italy found the support of all the Europeans. 1889 could be considered as the actual beginning of the Italian penetration into the province of Tripoli, especially with regard to the cultural aspects like schools, language and mass media, and extending the work of the Bank of Rome.¹⁷¹ The Bank of Rome was expanding inside the province,¹⁷² as it opened branches in Benghazi,¹⁷³ in Darna,¹⁷⁴ and in Gharyan in 1907¹⁷⁵ in addition to the branch in the city of Tripoli. It conducted initially normal banking activities, then started to buy agricultural land from the local population and paid very high prices,¹⁷⁶ prompting many of the local people to sell their land. Moreover, the bank started to grant the local population loans. A guarantor was needed to repay the loan later if the recipient was unable to repay it. A debtor who was unable to repay had his land confiscated.¹⁷⁷ This helped the Italians to establish a huge economic base in the province of Tripoli. The Bank of Rome also established companies that came to be administered directly by the bank officials and succeeded in attracting a number of Libyan citizens to work for these companies.¹⁷⁸ Information indicated that the number of these workers ranged

170 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1881 bis 22. Februar 1883, R16106, *Berlin Tagblatt*, Nr. A13737, 8.8.1906.

171 ‘Abd al-Qādir, ‘Iṣmat, *Daūr al-nuwāb al-‘arab fī majlis al-mab’ūthān al-‘ūthmānī 1908–1914*, al-Dār al-‘arabiyya li-l-mausū‘āt, Bayrūt, 2006, p. 245.

172 Qāsim, “Mawqif miṣr min al-ḥarb al-ṭarābulisiyya”, p. 307.

173 Mirt, Azjān, “Nashāt maṣraf Rūmā min khilāl al-wathā’iq al-‘ūthmāniyyā”, translated by ‘Abd al-Karīm abu- Shuwārib, *Majallat al-wathā’iq wa al-makhtūṭāt*, 19/ 20, markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2003–2004, p. 178.

174 Sebald, “Eine unerschlossene Quelle zur Geschichte Libyens: die Artikel des deutschen Afrikaforschers Gottlob Adolf Krause (Malam Mosa) aus dem Jahre 1911 zur italienischen Kolonialeroberung”, in *Libyen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, ed. by Burchard Brentjes, Halle, 1979, pp. 21-22.

175 Ghānim, ‘Imād al-Dīn (translator), *Taqārīr bi’tḥat al-ṣalīb al-aḥmar al-‘almānī fī al-ḥarb al-libiyyā al-iṭāliyya, 1911–1912*, rev. and intr. by Ḥasan ‘Alī Fahmī Khishīm, maṭaba’ al-thawrā al-‘arabiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1987, p. 43.

176 Maḥmūd, Ḥasan Sulaymān, *Libiyā bain al-māḍi wa al-ḥāḍir*, mu’assasat sijil al-‘arab, al-Qāhira, 1962, p. 220; Mannā’, *Judhūr al-niḍāl al-‘arabī*, p. 15.

177 al-‘Aqād, Ṣalāḥ, *Libiyā al-mu’āsira*, Ma’had al-buḥūth wa al-dirāsāt al-‘arabiyya, al-maṭba’a al-fāniyya al-ḥadīthā, shāri’ al-aṣbagh bi-l-Zaitūn, 1970, p. 12.

178 Sebald, “Eine unerschlossene Quelle zur Geschichte Libyens”, p. 21.

between 200 and 300. The activities of the bank varied to a great extent and were all done under the guise of investments in the province and the introduction of modern industries that included e.g. an ice factory, an olive oil factory and varied other projects. All these projects aimed to introduce the Italian influence into the province. As a result, Italy managed to acquire 22 % of total foreign trade with the province of Tripoli in 1911.¹⁷⁹ The staff of the bank were involved in collecting as much information as possible about the province while trying to win the trust of the local people and prepare them to accept the Italian presence on their land.¹⁸⁰ The Italian government started to establish a number of Italian schools within the province,¹⁸¹ in addition to the Italian schools already opened in 1876 during the reforms (*Tanzīmāt*) and in 1878¹⁸² (both were located in the center of the city of Tripoli). Later on, the Italian government opened eight more schools in some other coastal cities such as Benghazi, in which they opened five schools. In Derna there were two schools, and three schools were opened in al-Khums in 1911.¹⁸³ Italian sources estimated the number of students enrolled in these schools at about 3.000 pupils in 1911, a figure reflecting a widespread interest in learning the Italian culture. The project was supported by the Italian government, which dedicated 46.000 Italian liras per year to ensure its success.¹⁸⁴ It is worth mentioning that some of those schools taught in both Italian and Arabic, side by side, as a way to attract a large number of Arabs who wished to teach their children the Arabic language and refused to let them into schools that taught only Italian. It is notable that education in these schools was free.¹⁸⁵ Italy also sent a number of scientific and medical missions to identify some of the natural phenomena, the geography of the area, and to study some medicinal plants and herbs. al-Ḥarīr mentioned that these were sometimes connected to colonial aspirations and not just scientific missions.¹⁸⁶ They succeeded in collecting accurate information

179 Ibid.

180 al-Ḥarīr, “al-Tamhīd li-l-ghazū al-iṭālī wa mauqif al-libīyyīn minhu”, p. 32.

181 al-Ḥasan, Ḥasan, *al-Anẓima al-siyāsiyya wa al-dustūriyya fī Lubnān wa sa’ir al-buldān al-‘arabiyya*, Bayrūt, 1967, p. 389.

182 Ḥasanīn, ‘Alī al-Ṣādiq, “al-Madāris al-iṭālīyya wa taṭawuruha fī Libiyā 1835–1950”, *a’ṃāl al-nadwā al-‘ilmiyya al-thāminā allatī ‘uqīdat bi-l-markaz fī al-fatra min 26-27/9/2000*, ed. by Moḥammad al-Ṭahīr al-Jarārī, markaz jihād al-libīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2005, pp. 431-432.

183 Sebald, “Eine unerschlossene Quelle zur Geschichte Libyens”, p. 21.

184 Ismā’īl, *Tārīkh al-‘arab al-ḥadīth*, p. 265.

185 al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, pp. 39, 47.

186 al-Ḥarīr, ‘Abd al-Maula Ṣāliḥ, “al-Taḥarukāt al-siyāsiyya al-iṭālīyya, wa al-tamhīd li-iḥṭilāl Libiyā”, *Majallat al-buḥūth al-tārikhiyya*, 10-2, markaz jihād al-libīyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1987, p. 14.

about the geography of the province.¹⁸⁷ The Italian government sent a group of specialists to study the nature of the coast of the province of Tripoli. These specialists reached the city of Tripoli as sponge hunters and actually worked in this field there, which allowed them to carry out comprehensive surveys of the coast and present to a thorough study to the Italian authorities and the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸⁸ Among the most important of those missions was that of Count Sforza, which arrived in Tripoli in 1910. Sforza, who was the head of the mission, claimed that they had come to search for minerals, and specifically to detect phosphate. However, the real motive behind their activities was revealed later: they were on a military mission to draw strategic military maps.¹⁸⁹ The Ottomans then arrested the members of the mission and some of them were put in jail; the O'Shea Lausanne treaty (between the Italians and the Ottomans) freed them in 1912.¹⁹⁰ The Italian government also encouraged Italian citizens to migrate to the west of the province of Tripoli,¹⁹¹ and by 1911 there were 620 Italian citizens there.¹⁹²

Some Ottoman governors played a major role in hindering the Italian mission in Tripoli; these include Reçeb Pasha (1904–1908). Reçeb Pasha was aware of the seriousness of the situation; this was revealed in his many efforts to introduce reforms and to develop the military forces in Tripoli. In addition, he established schools as an effort to raise the level of education and awareness of the local population to the level demanded by the events and possess the ability to confront Italy, as he was aware of the Italian attempt to occupy the country.¹⁹³ Reçeb Pasha was not the only governor who stood up to the Italian project. Governor Ibrahim Pasha (1910–1911) was also highly aware of the extent of the Italian colonial project and influence over the country. He very soon began to fight against this project by organizing the conscription and training of volunteers from the local population. Ibrahim Pasha also worked hard to obstruct the activities of the Bank of Rome, and contacted the government in Istanbul to provide the latest on Italian colonial intentions, but he did not receive any response to those reports.¹⁹⁴ Instead, the Ottoman Empire issued an order to immediately open a branch of the

187 Shukrī, *al-Sanūsiyya dīn wa dawla*, p. 12; Ḥasan, *Libiyā baina al-māḍi wa al-hāḍir*, p. 219; al-'Aqād, *Libiyā al-mu'āṣira*, p. 12.

188 Lütiski, Vladimir, *Tārīkh al-aqtār al-'arabiyya al-ḥadīth*, translated by 'Afifa al-Bustāni, revised by Yūri Rūshīn, Dār al-taqadum, Moscow, 1973, p. 368

189 Ismā'īl, *Tārīkh al-'arab al-ḥadīth*, p. 265.

190 Shukrī, *Milād dawlat Libiyā al-ḥadīthā*, p. 428.

191 Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 131.

192 Sebald, "Eine unerschlossene Quelle zur Geschichte Libyens", pp. 20–21.

193 al-Zāwī, *Wulāt Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, pp. 281–282.

194 *Ibid.*, p. 284.

Ottoman Bank in the province of Tripoli in 1906,¹⁹⁵ to work together with their Agricultural Bank, which had been established previously. The government then decided to reduce the profit margins from 6 % to 4 % in response to the Bank of Rome's activities to access land. They also issued a decree to facilitate all the procedures for the citizens and not to impose tough conditions. Moreover, they emphasized to the bank's administration that in cases of losses they should resort to the Ministry of Finance to compensate them and not to impose taxes on the people of Tripoli. However, the government was cautious in implementing these procedures, which were discussed secretly. The governor was asked to be cautious in implementing these procedures so as not to attract the attention of the Italians or other European countries. The government of Ibrahim Hakki Pasha (1910–1911) in the Ottoman capital was not in a position to fulfill the serious responsibilities entrusted to it (it was in a difficult situation due to the onset of decline within the empire at the same time), which is why it disregarded these warnings when alerted to the imminent danger in the province of Tripoli.¹⁹⁶ The government then took a very dangerous act in response to the pressures of the Italians and isolated the governor Ibrahim Pasha in September 1911, and did not send someone to take on his responsibilities. This allowed the Italians to reveal their true intentions¹⁹⁷ and take the initiative to send parts of their fleet to the Mediterranean, particularly off the coast of Tripoli. They demonstrated their force as a prelude to the invasion. At that time the country was suffering of poor conditions due to the negligence of the government of Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, which withdrew a large number of soldiers sent to Yemen for the necessities of security. The government did not replace the soldiers.¹⁹⁸ The internal political situation in the province of Tripoli helped Italy to succeed in most of these activities; the province was being neglected by the government in Istanbul due to the difficult political situation in the empire (distance between the province and the center of government). Not enough reforms had been conducted in the province, especially the reforms required at this crucial stage, except for the efforts of individual governors in Tripoli. On September 27, 1911, Britain and France confirmed an alliance against the Italians and Ottomans. An eco-

195 The Branch of Benghazi was opened in 1911 and closed in 1912, like in Tripoli. The London-Galata-Istanbul Izmir opened in 1856 and Djeddah in 1912 and closed in 1916. For a more detailed history see Autheman, André, *La Banque impériale ottomane*, Comité pour l'Histoire Economique, Paris, 1996; see also Billiotti, Adrien, *La Banque Impériale Ottomane*, Paris, 1909.

196 al-Wāfi, Moḥammad Abd al-Kārīm, *al-Ṭarīḡ ilā Luḏān*, Dār al-Furjānī, Ṭarābulis, 1977, p. 69.

197 Qāsim, "Mawqif miṣr min al-ḥarb al-ṭarābulisiyya", p. 310.

198 Prātor, Sabine: *Der arabische Faktor in der jungtürkischen Politik: Eine Studie zum osmanischen Parlament der II. Konstitution (1908–1918)*, Berlin, 1993.

conomic and strategic competition pushed Italy to engage more in the direction of a military occupation in the region.¹⁹⁹ The Ottomans did not estimate the Italian motives in the way they deserved; they thought that if they provided all the necessary measures and procedures that they could deal with the situation.

The Italo-Turkish War in 1911

Italy was determined and declared war on the Ottoman Empire on September 29, 1911. The Italian military fleet was composed of 23 ships carrying 40.000 troops. They attacked the center of the city of Tripoli. Another military fleet was directed toward the east; some historical documents state that the fleet consisted of 36.000 troops, in other sources 32.000 troops²⁰⁰ arrived on 19 ships. They were under the command of General Ottavio Bricola and their destination was the city of Benghazi.²⁰¹ Thus the Italian navy sequentially attacked the coastal cities of Tripoli and al-Khums, Benghazi, Darna and Tobruk in the first days of October.²⁰² They first concentrated their attack on the port of Tripoli, and succeeded in sinking a number of ships anchored there. They were also able to destroy the maritime telecommunication line that connected Tripoli to Istanbul on October 3, 1911.²⁰³ This was the first day of the Italo-Turkish war in Libya. The Italians were able to reach the city of Tripoli on October 5.²⁰⁴ The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs had received news of the attack via a telegraph sent by Alfred Tilger.²⁰⁵ Faced with

199 al-‘Aqād, *Libiyā al-mu‘āshira*, p. 13; Brrū, *al-‘Arab wa al-turk*, p. 328.

200 Hūwīdī, Muṣṭafa ‘Alī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā khilāl al-ḥarb al-‘ālamiyyā al-‘ūlā*, revised by Ṣālāḥ al-Dīn Ḥasan al-Sūri, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1988, p. 27.

201 Mannā‘, *Judhūr al-niḍāl al-‘arabī fī Libiyā*, p. 19; Kāmil, *al-Dawlā al-‘arabiyya al-kubra*, p. 332.

202 See Gallica BNF: Tripoli, guerre italo-turque (Italo-Turkish War) [camp de l’armée italienne au pied de remparts]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol], Documents iconographiques, 1911, Tripoli, and see also Guerre italo-turque [militaires italiens dans une maison de Tripoli]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol], Documents iconographiques, Consultable in Gallica; Maḥmūd, *Libiyā baina al-māḍi wa al-ḥāḍir*, pp. 221–222.

203 McClure, William Kidston, *Italy in North Africa, an Account of the Tripoli Enterprise*, Darf, London, 1986, p. 41.

204 Tshanar, Frāntis wa Fritis Shitiyyāt wa Salwā al-Khamāsh, *Tārīkh al-‘ālam al-‘arabī*, Dār ṣādir, Bayrūt, 1975, p. 234; al-Tilisi, Khalifa Moḥammad, *Ma‘arik al-jihād al-libī min khilāl al-khiṭaṭ al-ḥarbiyya al-iṭālīyya*, al-munsha‘a al-‘āmmā li-l- nashir wa al-tawzi‘ wa al-i‘lān, Ṭarābulis, 1982, p. 19; al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, p. 80.

205 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 5, vom März 1913 bis April 1914, R901/4414, Nr. II° 3798.

this violent attack there was no option available to the local population and the local government other than to resist using the available weapons, which were few and some were very old.²⁰⁶ Despite the lack of weapons and the lack of sufficient forces, they resisted and were accompanied by some of the Turkish officers. Nashat Pasha, the governor of the province of Tripoli in 1911, was in charge. He was based in the western region, and had taken the area of al-Aziziyah has, a military base.²⁰⁷ The Ottoman Empire then entered into direct negotiations with the Italians in order to settle the war in Libya.²⁰⁸ The negotiations were held in Lausanne in Switzerland and resulted in the signing of an agreement between the two sides, known as the Treaty of Lausanne, on October 18, 1912.²⁰⁹ The Ottomans then withdrew from the province of Tripoli, which was then named Libya. The Ottomans announced that Libya was being granted independence, even if Libya was then occupied by Italy. The Ottomans left Libya to face its destiny to Italy.²¹⁰ However, the Ottomans retained some of their concessions in Libya, such as the appointment of staff for religious affairs in 1912,²¹¹ and allowing the people to pray for the Ottoman Sultan in mosques.

The residents of Libya were exposed to a harsh policy by the Italians during the occupation.²¹² The Italians restricted the movement of people and placed a blockade on the whole country to prevent the arrival of any aid or weapons. They also placed strict controls on the borders, which led to a severe shortfall in food and other consumer goods that had been imported. This blockade had very negative impacts on the prices of the available goods, which became much more expensive. The drought that hit the country in 1911 made the situation worse.²¹³ According to a report²¹⁴ in the German political archives on the general situation

206 Sebald, "Eine unerschlossene Quelle zur Geschichte Libyens", pp. 28–29.

207 al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, p. 93.

208 Since 1911 Province (*wilāyāt*) of Tripoli was named Libya; see Larfaoui, Mahmoud-Hamdane, *L'occupation italienne de la Libye: les préliminaires, 1882–1911*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2010.

209 Bundesarchiv, Nr. A5735; Vandewalle, Dirk, *A History of Modern Libya*, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 25; Wright, *Libya: A Modern History*, p. 28.

210 Tshanar, *Tārīkh al-'ālam al-'arabī*, p. 234.

211 Brūkilmān, *Tārīkh al-shu'ūb al-islāmīyya*, p. 601.

212 See on this issue the picture: Guerre italo-turque (Italo-Turkish War) [militaires italiens derrière une barricade dans une rue de Tripoli] [Image fixe]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol], Gallica, BNF Paris, Publication: [Novembre 1911], Reference 17067; see also 10-10-11, Tripoli [groupe de militaires marchant dans une rue] [Image fixe]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol] Gallica, BNF Paris, Publication: [Octobre 1911], Reference Number 16590.

213 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Tripolis, Bd. 7, vom Januar 1910 bis Dezember 1912, R141612, Nr. 691, Mai 1912.

214 Ibid.

in Tripoli in 1911, the agricultural harvest of that year was very poor and poverty was widespread among the population of the city of Tripoli. It also stated that the number of beggars on the streets had greatly increased. The report mentioned that this situation was not unique to this city and that the same phenomenon could be witnessed in other parts of the country. Moreover, the report stated that prices of buying or renting land or houses had increased significantly.²¹⁵ The report illustrated that the many battles that had taken place had damaged agriculture fields in rural areas. Consequently, there was a severe reduction in the production of oranges, olives, palm trees and others.²¹⁶

4.2 Jihad in Libya and the German Position toward it

The Libyan fighters were called *mujāhidīn* and the whole war against the Italians declared as *jihad*. The term Libyan *mujāhidīn* is also used in this book to describe the *mujāhidīn* in Libya and it does not mean that this was a nationalist movement.²¹⁷ Many of the *mujāhidīn* refused to recognize the treaty of Lausanne and decided to proceed with *jihad*. They regarded the treaty of Lausanne as having surrendered the country to its enemies. Thus, the Islamic *jihad* and the Libyan *jihad* were officially announced as a response to Italy's declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire in September 1911. Even if *jihad* in Libya at that time was not a nationalist movement, the *jihad* movement was composed of many local movements. The majority of the local movements were coordinated by tribal leaders. Using the weapons that were available to them, they launched attacks on Italian encampments, cities, or centers of occupation. It is worth noting that the majority of fighters in the various independent local movements were not trained soldiers, but took part as part of an ideological battle against Italian occupation. Neither did they come from any particular social class, but represented all sections of Libyan society. In addition to *mujāhidīn* they were also referred to as volunteers. These fighters were joined by troops from the Ottoman forces, who had a greater degree of military training.

Among the *mujāhidīn* was Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, who was one of the *mujāhidīn* leaders in Yafren in the Western Mountains, Moḥammad Sūwf al-Maḥmūdī who was the tribal leader of al-Maḥamīd tribe in north east of the city of Tripoli, and

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ See Simon, Rachel, *Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism: The Ottoman Involvement in Libya during the War with Italy, 1911–1919*, Klaus Schwarz, Berlin, 1987.

Moḥammad ‘Abd al-llāh al-Būsayfī, one of the *mujāhidīn* leaders in the Western Mountains and others.²¹⁸ One of the well known *mujāhidīn* was Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf al-Sanūsī, who belonged to *al-Sanūsīyya* political – a religious Sufi order, tribe and political movement²¹⁹ that played a major role in the history of Libya. The movement and its relations with the Ottomans were important.²²⁰ Following the outbreak of war between the Italians and the Libyan *mujāhidīn* in Libya, Germany sent a number of journalists to report on what was going on there and to evaluate the situation. Not only Germany, but also Britain and France had reporters in Libya.²²¹ Nevertheless, the Italian politicians were suspicious of the activities of these reporters and put many obstacles in their way.²²² They also imposed strict censorship on all reports that were sent to Europe before they were published. These actions led some German journalists and others to stop their work and return to their countries, reporting the harassment of the Italian authorities.²²³ As the conflict developed and, following a number of unequal battles between the Libyan *mujāhidīn* and the Italians, the Italian government released a decree on November 5, 1911 announcing its suzerainty over all of Libya.²²⁴ In return, Germany issued a rejection of this decree, followed by France and Britain.²²⁵ The German rejection meant that this decree was not granted internati-

218 Khishīm, Ḥasan ‘Alī, *Ṣafaḥāt min jihādānā al-waṭanī*, Dār maktabat al-fikr, Ṭarābulis, 1974, p. 54.

219 Ibrāhīm, Maḥmūd, *al-‘Alāmah Moḥammad bin ‘Alī al-Sanūsī al-ḥazā’iri mujtahidan mujāhidan 1788–1859*, dīwān al-maṭbu‘āt al-jami’iyya, al-Jazā’ir, 2009, p. 124.

220 *al-Sanūsīyya* was a religious movement in Libya at the beginning of the 19th century founded by al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī and gained his name, *al-Sanūsī* is the title of all the sons of al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī, who took the leadership. They are the followers of al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī politically, ideologically and personally, see Ibrāhīm, *al-‘Alāmah Moḥammad bin ‘Alī al-Sanūsī*, p. 124.

221 On this issue see Tripoli, les officiers étrangers suivant la guerre [Image fixe]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol] November 1911, Gallica, BNF, Paris, Reference 17327.

222 See Labranca, Nicola, *La guerra Italiana per la Libya: 1913–1931*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2012, 293p.

223 Ghrifintīs, Ghayūr Ghafūn, *Tārikh al-ḥarb al-libīyyā al-iṭāliyya*, translated by ‘Imād al-Dīn Ghānim, revised by al-‘Amin al-Ṭāhir Shaqlilā, markaz jihād al-libīyyin ḥid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1986, p. 112.

224 See on this issue: Tripoli, l’état-major italien pendant la lecture de l’acte d’annexion [Image fixe]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol] Octobre 1911, Gallica, BNF, Paris, Reference 17330. And see also Tripoli, le général Caneva lisant l’acte d’annexion; à sa droite, l’amiral Borea Rica [Image fixe]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol] Gallica, BNF Paris, Publication: [Octobre 1911], Reference number 17313; Māsāi, Būl, *al-Waḍa‘ al-dawalī li-Ṭarābulis al-ghārb: nuṣūṣ al-mu‘āhadāt al-libīyyā al-firinsīyyā ilā nihāyat al-qarn al-tāsi‘ ‘ashar*, translated by Moḥammad al-‘Alāqī, revised by ‘Alī Ḍawī, markaz jihād al-libīyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1991, p. 153; Ghrifintīs, *Tārikh al-ḥarb al-libīyyā al-iṭāliyya*, p. 123.

225 Rāshid, Aḥmed Ismā‘īl, *Tārikh ‘aqṭār al-maghrib al-‘arabī al-sīyāsī al-ḥadīth wa al-mu‘āshir (Libīyā – Tūnis – al-Jazā’ir – al-Maghrib – Mūrītāniya)*, Dār al-nāḥḍa al-‘arabiyya, Bayrūt, 2004, p. 40.

onal legitimacy. However, this uncompromising attitude did not last long, especially after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1912. It seemed that if Italy did not succeed in imposing political and military pressure on the Ottoman Empire and some European countries, Italy could not sign that agreement. It led to the international recognition of the Italian existence in Libya even if it was not explicitly announced. Even if Germany initially opposed Italy's aims, strategic interests and the political and economic relations with the rest of Europe determined its position in the end. Thus, the German government in Berlin was primarily serving its interests, which is why it had declared its opposition at first, and then changed its decision and declared its support of the Italians. They maintained their strong relationships with the Ottoman Empire in parallel with their support for the Libyans.²²⁶

A number of German officers were fighting on the frontline alongside Enver Pasha and his *mujāhidīn* in the city of Derna in the far eastern part of Libya against the Italians. These officers sent their reports to the government in Berlin; among those officers was the Baron von Dalwing.²²⁷ Furthermore, they had taken on the task of helping the Turkish leaders in the management of war battles and organizing the *mujāhidīn* and those Germans can be described as guides for military operations.²²⁸ This German position was echoed by the leaders of the Islamic Libyan *jihad*, in particular by Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, who led the *jihad* movement in the western part of the country, specifically the area of the western mountains. He trusted the German Emperor Wilhelm II and believed he was pursuing a moderate policy toward Libya. He also worked to spare the country from entering war on a number of occasions. From this point, Sulaymān al-Bārūnī (1872–1940) was in contact with the German emperor several times, especially after the signing of the Treaty of Ouchy in 1912 between the Italians and the Ottomans. His initial message dating to December 27th, 1912 required Germany to recognize Libya as an independent state that had its existence based on that convention. On January 4th, he sent another message asking the German government to protect the Libyans and their rights. He asked the emperor of Germany to do his best to influence the king of Italy, considering that they were allies, and make him announce the independence of Tripoli. He also asked the emperor to impose pressures on the Italians to

²²⁶ Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, p. 13.

²²⁷ Ghrifintīs, *Tārīkh al-ḥarb al-libiyyā al-iṭālīyya*, p. 354.

²²⁸ Rāthmān, Lūthar, “Niḍāl al-sha‘b al-libī ḍid al-isti‘mār”, *Muḥaḍarāt al-mawsam al-thaqāfi al-awal 1979–1980*, ed. by Moḥammad ‘Abd al-Sālam al-Jafā‘iri, markaz jihād al-libiyyin ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1989, p. 212.

withdraw their forces from Libya.²²⁹ He pointed to the uncivilized methods pursued by Italy in Libya, including but not limited to paying some local leaders to stop fighting against them and join the Italian army, which would lead to a weakening of the Libyan front.²³⁰ Sulaymān al-Bārūnī resumed his contact with Germany in 1913.

Following the signing of the Treaty of Ouchy in Lausanne (1912), the leaders of the independence movements were divided as to how to respond to the new developments. One faction argued for continued conflict with the Italian forces, whilst the other faction preferred the option of negotiation on the basis of the treaty. Sulaymān al-Bārūnī belonged to the former faction, even going so far as to proclaim the independence of Tripolitania. As Italian hostilities continued, he decided to travel to Turkey, where he was elected a general for the West Mountain Front in the Turkish Council of Commissioners. The majority of the independence fighters and a number of tribal leaders supported al-Bārūnī and by this stage he was also supported by the Ottoman state.²³¹ His requests to Germany to support the nationalist movements stressed the country's desire and ability to be independent from foreign rule. Germany continued its support for the independence movement in Libya which became more explicit during World War I. Germany's position had become very complicated due to the alliance with Turkey. They were seeking to use Libya as a base to attack the allies in North Africa (Britain, France and Italy). At the same time, Italy controlled Libya, which until that point was neutral and had not announced joining any of the parties to the conflict in World War I. Thus, Germany had to take steps to ensure the achievement of its interests. Germany tried to influence Sayyid²³² Aḥmed al-Sharīf, the commander of the *mujāhidīn* in eastern Libya, to stop the war against the Italians and to start fighting the British in Egypt. However, when Italy declared Italy's accession to the Allies, Germany began to reconsider its position and pursued a completely different policy; it began providing financial and military support to the *mujāhidīn* in their war against the Italians.²³³ German forces managed to pene-

229 al-Shaqrūnī, Tawfiq 'Ayād, "Wathā'iq 'an taḥrukāt Sulaymān al-Bārūnī al-dawliyya", *Majallat al-wathā'iq wa al-makhtūṭāt*, 6-6, markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1991, pp. 148, 150.

230 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, vom April 1912 bis April 1913, R16118, Nr. A115.

231 al-Ghatmī, Maḥmūd al-Mahdī, "Sulaymān al-Bārūnī", *Majallat al-wathā'iq wa al-makhtūṭāt*, 19-20, markaz jihād al-libiyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 2003–2004, p. 251.

232 A religious position and title for the leaders of *al-Sanūsiyya* movement in Libya. See Morimoto, Kazuo (ed.), *Sayyids and Sharifs in Muslim Societies: The Living Links to the Prophet*, Routledge, 2012.

233 Rāfiq, al-'Arab wa al-'ūthmāniyyūn, p. 47; al-Ḥasan, *al-Anẓima al-siyāsiyya wa al-distūriyya*, p. 390.

trate the blockade imposed by the Italian troops on all sea ports that could be used to bring weapons into Libya. The blockade was evaded using German submarines. The aid was unloaded at the cities of Sirte, Misurata and Tobruk in 1915. At the same time, German aid reached the *mujāhidīn* more indirectly, as in the case of a convoy loaded with about 2.000 Mauser guns, which had been made in Germany. This was in addition to six mountain defenders with ammunition and some other equipment. The weapons were delivered by an officer working for the British occupation forces in Egypt, who delivered the weapons to the *mujāhidīn* across the Egyptian-Libyan border.²³⁴ In the eastern part of Libya, German support for the men of the Libyan resistance was a source of great concern to the Italians as well as to the British in Egypt. They had been watching the situation closely, inspecting the German intervention and continuous aid provided to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf via Istanbul.²³⁵ The delivery of Germany military aid to the Libyan *mujāhidīn* was not an easy job as the country was under strict observation by the Italian forces, especially the borders. In addition, the British supported Italy in their observations, particularly after Britain's recognition of the Italian ambitions in Libya in the Secret Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) and the British-Italian agreement of July 31, 1916.²³⁶ Following these agreements, Britain intensified its efforts to prevent German interference in Libya.²³⁷ It was obvious that Germany was working to strengthen its position as a political force in the Mediterranean, despite the Turco-Italian signing of the Treaty of Ouchy in October 1912, which confirmed the influence of these two countries over the region and implied that other countries should refrain from interfering in the situation. Despite this, Germany continued to support the Libyans in their armed struggle against Italy.²³⁸ Although the social history of Tripoli is not the main focus of this study, it is worth noting that the population of this region suffered badly as a result of the political and military conflicts. The Italian leadership imposed a blockade on Tripoli to prevent weapons and other forms of support for the *mujāhidīn* from entering the city. At the same time, surveillance of the borders

234 Ramaḍān, Bashīr, *al-Qiyādā wa al-'imādā fī ḥarakat al-jihād al-libī*, markaz jihād al-libīyyin li-l-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1999, p. 396; Rāthmān, “Niḍāl al-sha'b al-libī ḍid al-isti'mār”, p. 214.

235 Wathīqā 371, 16 September 1914, wathā'iq al-kharījīyyā al-injilīziyya, shu'bat al-wathā'iq al-ajnabiyya, al-markaz al-waṭani li-l-māhafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis.

236 J.C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics. A Documentary Record*, vol. 2, “British-French Supremacy, 1914–1945”, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1979, p. 146.

237 Rāthmān, “Niḍāl al-sha'b al-libī ḍid al-isti'mār”, p. 241.

238 Wathīqā bidūn Tarqīm, al-'arshif al-'ūthmānī, *Mursala min waḍarat al-ḥrbiyya al-'ūthmāniyyā ilā al-safārā al-'ūthmāniyyā fī Lundun*, shu'bat al-wathā'iq al-ajnabiyya, al-markaz al-waṭani li-l-māhafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis.

led to a decrease in the amount of food supplies that could enter the country. This created a rise in food prices and a decrease in the market availability of basic foodstuffs. The situation was complicated further by a drought in the same year, which also caused a sharp drop in the agricultural output of the country. A report in the German political archives describing the general situation in west Tripoli in 1911 refers to the poor yield of this year, linking it to a rise in poverty and an increase in the number of beggars in the streets. The author of the report notes that the situation was not limited to Tripoli, but that other regions of Libya were affected by the same degree of poverty, with the same results. The same document notes that the military conflict between the *mujāhidīn* and the Italians had a negative effect on the agricultural yield of the region and that the orange trees, olive trees and date trees were particularly badly affected.²³⁹

Despite the orders issued from Istanbul on October 4, 1911 to the Ottoman troops to withdraw from Libya and the subsequent withdrawal from al-Khums, Derna and Benghazi in the same month, some Turkish officers decided to stay in the country and help the Libyans to resist Italian colonialism.²⁴⁰ Even if they were few in number, they still managed to influence the *jihad* process. They were divided into two sections: the first remained in the areas surrounding the city of Tripoli, with the other directed toward Cyrenaica in the east, where they received commands from ‘Azīz al-Māšrī in Benghazi, while in Derna the leadership was entrusted to Muṣṭafa Kemal Atatürk.²⁴¹ The chief of command for the region of Cyrenaica was Enver Pasha, who was able to organize the *mujāhidīn* there, while being the field commander in several attacks against Italian soldiers. For instance, he commanded the attack on the Italian fortifications in Lombardia and Calabria,²⁴² but Enver Pasha was forced to leave Libya in 1912. The commander in the eastern region was then ‘Azīz al-Māšrī.²⁴³ Then he was transferred to the area of al-Jaghbūb, where Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf al-Sanūsī lived and informed him of the latest developments and what Turkey had decided concerning Libya, and that Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf al-Sanūsī was now in charge. Enver Pasha then left to Turkey.

The resistance was united in eastern Libya under the leadership of Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf al-Sanūsī, who moved to the east of the country and took

²³⁹ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Tripolis, vom Januar 1910 bis Dezember 1912, R141612, Nr. 691, Mai 1912.

²⁴⁰ See Falls, Ewald J.C., *Drei Jahre in der libyschen Wüste. Reisen, Entdeckungen und Ausgrabungen der Frankfurter Menasexpedition (Kaufmannsche Expedition)*, Herder, 1911.

²⁴¹ Ziyāda, *Libiyā fī al-‘uṣūr al-ḥadīthā*, p. 82; Mannā‘, *Judhūr al-niḍāl al-‘arabī*, p. 26.

²⁴² Shukrī, *al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawla*, pp. 138, 140.

²⁴³ Rāshid, *Tārīkh ‘aqtār al-maghrib al-‘arabī*, p. 38.

over.²⁴⁴ The political and military developments led the Libyans to regroup and take a stand to defend their land. They entered into fierce battles against the Italians from the beginning of the invasion along the Libyan coast. The most important battles were al-Hani, (called Shara' al-Shat), the coastal route in October 1911, when the militants managed to repel the Italian attack, despite the disparities in equipment and numbers of soldiers.²⁴⁵ The battle of Sydī Abd al-Jālīl in the west of the city of Tripoli on June 8, 1912 was recognized by the Italians themselves as one of the most effective battles. The Italians wanted to extend their control over the entire west coast of the country.²⁴⁶ At this stage, the *mujāhidīn* led by Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, Moḥammad 'Abd al-llāh al-Būsayfī, and Moḥammad Sūwf al-Maḥmūdī were able to resist the Italians for a period of time. During that time, many battles took place, such as the battle of Jendouba on March 23, 1913, which was one of the most important battles in the history of the Libyan *jihad*. Despite the courageous resistance of the *mujāhidīn*, they were unable to stand for long against the Italian forces, which were well equipped. The result of this battle was the defeat of the *mujāhidīn* and the success of the Italians in controlling the mountainous area in the western part of the country. Later on, they were able to control the entire western region of South Libya, including Swanee bn Adam, and Sidi Kraim Alqrbā in eastern Libya. This was the first battle under the command of Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, member of the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement.²⁴⁷ The battle took place on May 16, 1913. The *mujāhidīn* were able to defeat the Italians and forced them to reorganize their forces and to recognize the entry of the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement as a new factor in the war. The Italian forces in Libya experienced repeated defeats at the hands of the Libyan *mujāhidīn* despite the differences in disarmament and number of troops. The famous battle of Gasr Bu Hadi took place on April 28, 1915. It represented a painful defeat to the Italians, and is considered one of the most important battles in the history of the Libyan *jihad*. It showed clearly the development of the military capability enjoyed by the *mujāhidīn* and their ability to take advantage of the prevailing conditions. The Italian defeat forced the Italian commander Colonel Miani to flee the battlefield with the rest of the soldiers.²⁴⁸ This defeat concurred with their defeat in Europe at the hands of the German and Austrian troops and the awful defeat in the battle

244 Maḥmūd, *Lībiyā baina al-māḍi wa al-ḥāḍir*, pp. 224-225; Shukrī, *al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawla*, pp. 138,146.

245 Ismā'īl, *Tārīkh Afriqiyā al-ḥadīth*, p. 273; Rāshid, *Tārīkh 'aqṭār al-maghrib al-'arabī*, p. 41.

246 al-Tilīsī, *Ma'arik al-jihād al-lībī*, p. 30.

247 Evans-Pritchard, Edward E., "The Senusi of Cyrenaica", *Journal of International Africa*, 15-2, 1945, p. 61; see also Slousch, N., "Les Senoussiya en Tripolitaine", *Revue du monde musulman*, 1907.

248 Ḥasan, *Ṣafaḥāt min jihādānā al-waṭanī*, p. 23.

of Kaporta. The position of the Italians became critical, especially in view of the resistance of the Libyan *mujāhidīn* to the sophisticated Italian weapons at that time. This played a major role in weakening the power of the Italians and forcing them to retreat toward the coastal cities.²⁴⁹ In order to maintain its survival in Libya, Italy had withdrawn its military garrisons scattered around the city of Tripoli, Zuwarah and al-Khums in the west and center of the country. The situation of the Italian troops was critical until 1917.²⁵⁰ They were pushed to take refuge in the French military post deployed on the Libyan-Tunisian border and on the Algerian border.²⁵¹

The Ottoman – *al-Sanūsīyya*

The *al-Sanūsīyya* movement began as a religious movement. The leader, Sayyid Moḥammad Ibn Ali al-Sanūsī (1787–1859), was born and grew up in the Ottoman province of Algeria but settled in Libya after years of travel. The beginning of the movement was in the area of the Green Mountain in eastern Libya.²⁵² The founder of the movement first settled in Cyrenaica, but in 1854 decided to move the headquarters of the movement to the south of the country to be isolated from direct contact with the power of the the Ottoman rulers at the time. He decided on the al-Jaghbug Oasis and used it as a base for his operations and home for the *al-Sanūsīyya* family and their followers from 1856.²⁵³ It seems that the choice of al-Jaghbug was influenced by several factors. Al-Jaghbug was far from the centers of political power in the North Africa region: the French, who were stationed on the western border, specifically in Tunisia and Algeria, the Ottoman Empire in Libya, and the British in Egypt on the eastern borders of the country. Al-Jaghbug was also situated on the caravan traderoute, which was helpful for the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement in terms of the financial returns that this could bring, which would be

249 Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, p. 189; Qāsim, “Mawqif miṣr min al-ḥarb al-ṭarābulisiyya”, p. 340.

250 al-Tilisi, Khalifa Moḥammad, *Ba’d al-qurḍabiyya dirāsa fī tāriḫ al-isti’mār al-iṭālī bi Libiyā (1922–1930)*, al-Dār al-‘arabiyya li-l-kitāb, Libiyā-Tūnis, 1978, pp. 5, 11.

251 al-Turki, ‘Arūsīyya, *Fuṣūl fī tāriḫ al-ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya al-tūnisīyya al-mu’āṣira*, maktabat ‘alā’ al-dīn, Ṣafāqīs, 2005, p. 52.

252 See Brūkilmān, *Tāriḫ al-shu‘ūb al-islāmīyya*, p. 651; al-Sayyid, Yūsuf, *Fajr al-ḥaraka al-islāmīyya al-mu’āṣira al-Wahābiyya – al-Sanūsīyya – al-Mahdiyya*, Miṣr al-‘arabiyya li-l-nashir wa al-tawzī’, al-Qāhira, 2000, p. 60.

253 Marx, *Geschichte Afrikas*, p. 90; ‘Amīsh, *al-Tāriḫ al-siyāsī*, p. 87; al-Sayyid, *Fajr al-ḥaraka al-islāmīyya, al-mu’āṣira*, p. 60; Shukrī, *al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawla*, p. 65; Yāghī, *al-Dawla al-‘ūthmāniyyā fī al-tāriḫ al-islāmī*, p. 29.

important in providing a livelihood for the followers living there.²⁵⁴ The protection that this location allowed the followers to exercise over the caravan traders also enabled them to expand their sovereignty in the region. Given the numbers adhering to the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement and the popularity and authority that its followers enjoyed in the region, the Ottoman Empire treated it with a certain wariness. Relations between the Ottomans and *al-Sanūsīyya* movement had been characterized by mutual caution since the settlement of the movement in Libya. The Ottomans avoided direct confrontation, preferring instead a policy of cooperation when possible. Their relations tended to be characterized by the principle of mutual interests. For example, a decree was issued from Istanbul exempting the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement from paying taxes. This came as a proactive step to bridge the gap and enhance relations.²⁵⁵ The movement had the task of protecting and securing the interior affairs in the region in which they lived. Thus, *al-Sanūsīyya* began to play a significant political and social role in Libya. The *al-Sanūsīyya* movement performed its power in territories stretching from Benghazi to the frontiers of sub-Saharan Africa.²⁵⁶ The movement's leaders led the Islamic *jihad* in eastern Libya during World War I, which increased pressure on the Ottoman Empire to maintain cordial relations with them. Accordingly, the two parties signed an agreement on their united struggle against European colonialism.²⁵⁷ The same interest brought the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement closer to the Ottoman rulers to confront the British in Egypt, as both parties considered it to serve their interests.²⁵⁸ The goal that brought them together at this time was fighting the British and the Italians during World War I.²⁵⁹

254 On the *al-Sanūsīyya* see Triaud, Jean Louis, *Tchad 1901–1902. Une guerre franco-libyenne oubliée? Une confrérie musulmane, la Sanūsīyya, face à la France*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1988, 208, 32 p., and Triaud, Jean-Louis, *La légende noire de la Sanūsīyya. Une confrérie musulmane saharienne sous le regard français (1840–1930)*, Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris and Aix-en-Provence, 2 vols., Institut de Recherche et d'Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman (IREMAM), 1995, 1151p.

255 al-Sharif, Miftāḥ al-Sayyid, *Masīrat al-ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya al-libiyyā al-Sanūsīyya*, maktabat dār al-istiqlāl, al-Qāhira, 2008, pp. 84, 88.

256 Minawi, *The Ottoman Scramble for Africa*, p. 29.

257 Marx, *Geschichte Afrikas*, p. 149.

258 al-Sharif, *Masīrat al-ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya al-libiyyā*, p. 178; for the roots of these confrontations see Boahen, A. Abu, *Britain, The Sahara and the Western Sudan, 1788–1861*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1964.

259 Wathīqā 47, *al-Wathā'iq al-iṭāliyya, al-majmū'ā al-'ulā*, translated by Shamis al-Dīn 'Urābī, i'dād al-Furjānī Sālim al-Sharif, markaz jihād al-libiyyin ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭāli, Ṭarābulis, 1989, p. 166.; Hūwidī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 51.

4.3 German Declaration of Neutrality toward Libya and German Health Missions

The German government's position was explicitly stated following the announcement of Italy's war on Turkey in Libya. Germany tried to stop the war, especially when the Ottoman Sultan submitted a request to some European countries. Germany then took the initiative despite the fact that it was not confident that it would be a success. The resolutions stated by Germany were thought to be moderate and included proposing a truce to end the military conflict, giving Italy some areas in Libya and the necessity of negotiation and reconciliation between the two parties.²⁶⁰ The direct order from the German emperor was to conduct the mediation in favor of the Ottoman Empire with Italy, stressing that the effort should be undertaken as a long-term project, rather than a one-off attempt. This position was very different from that of the rest of the European countries, which took a neutral stance on the whole issue.²⁶¹ However, they practically applied the terms of the conventions signed with the Italian government. This was obvious in the response of King George of Britain to the request submitted by the Ottoman sultan to stop the Italian invasion in the province. The British monarch then apologized, citing the inability of Britain to perform this role, and that the country would remain neutral.²⁶² The position of Germany could be also classified as neutral, but with a note on what Germany was trying to achieve on the ground. Germany took the initiative at this stage, especially at the expense of Britain, in addition to trying to attract the largest number of countries to pursue a policy of peace. However, they were seeking to attain the maximum advantages in doing so. In sum, the German approach was new in modern European politics. It can be considered as a kind of political maneuvering that had been pioneered by Germany, which excelled in implementing it as the country succeeded in leading the situations during the dispute between the Italian and the Ottoman governments until the outbreak of war between them in Libya. Germany continued to assume these responsibilities toward the issue of Libya, and its neutrality led to it being asked by Italy to protect Italian interests against the Ottoman side. The same request was also made by the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Germany took over the evacuation of the Ottoman from Tripoli using German ships. They eva-

²⁶⁰ Mikhā'il, *al-'Ālāqāt al-injilīziyya al-libiyyā*, p. 32.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*

²⁶² Baghni, 'Amr Sā'id, Wathiqa 376, "Mukhtārāt min maḥfūdāt shu'bat al-wathā'iq wa al-makhṭūṭāt bi markaz jihād al-libiyyin ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī", *Majallat al-wathā'iq wa al-makhṭūṭāt*, markaz jihād al-libiyyin ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, p. 156.

cuated people including soldiers, doctors and pharmacists who had decided to leave the country. The German consul Alfred Tilger was in charge of their evacuation.²⁶³ He also mediated the transfer of the belongings and property of the Ottoman soldiers in Libya to Istanbul in 1913, with the German ship *Olos* securing the transfer of this baggage.²⁶⁴ The position of German public opinion did not differ from the position of the government; thus, when the Italian fleet visited the ports of the province of Tripoli, the German newspapers took a unified stance. They made clear their reservations about the move.²⁶⁵

Tripoli was a station for many German doctors who arrived there during varying periods of time, many of them having provided their services to the local residents. It is to be noted that during the Italian invasion of Libya, Germany sent a health mission there, in 1912. The German health mission in the province of Tripoli could be divided into two phases: The first deals with the German doctors who worked individually, with most of them having been travelers. The second phase included the mission sent by the German Red Cross to Libya in 1912. The doctors came to Tripoli individually and on an unofficial basis. They were also included in the category of travellers and geographic explorers. One of those was Gerhard Rohlf, who did not have a medical degree because he had not completed his university education in Germany. Instead, he stopped his studies of medicine and decided to travel to a new country. Gerhard Rohlf studied the health situation in the province of Tripoli and visited a number of hospitals in the east and south of the province in 1865. He provided a lot of information in his writings in terms of organization and methods of treatment used in the country. The historical information indicates the presence of another German doctor who was responsible for the hospital in the city of Benghazi in the east of the province during the second half of the 19th century.²⁶⁶ The doctor Gustav Nachtigal differed from his predecessors in that he had extensive experience in the region in general. He also studied the health situations in the province of Tripoli in terms of the spread of diseases, particularly those coming from central Africa carried by trade caravans. Moreover, he studied the customs, traditions and ways of indigenous medicine.²⁶⁷ Nachtigal had an opportunity to practice his profession and also wrote a book in which he addressed communicable diseases in the

263 Ghānim, *al-Bi'thā al-'almāniyya ilā Libiyā*, p. 25.

264 al-Sāhili, Khālil, "Wamaḍāt min al-wathā'iq al-'ūthmāniyyā ḥawl al-fatra al-'ūlā min al-jihād al-libī", *Majallat al-shahīd*, 3, markaz jihād al-libīyyin ḍid al-ghazū al-iṭālī, Ṭarābulis, 1982, p. 295.

265 Yaḥya, *al-Maghrib al-kabīr*, p. 713.

266 Ghānim, *al-Bi'thā al-'almāniyya ilā Libiyā*, p. 16.

267 al-Fandarī, Munīr (translator), *Ṭabīb al-maḥalla al-bilād al-tūniyya fī mabayn 1863–1868 min khilāl rasā'il al-ṭabīb al-'almāni Ghūstāf Nākhtigāl*, markaz al-nashir al-jāmi'i, Tūnis, 2003, pp. 47–48.

region.²⁶⁸ He pointed out which areas had a good climate and were suitable for a better quality of life. The book focused on the south of the province and referred to diseases including typhus, malaria, fever, and cholera, which were the main causes of death of many residents, in addition to smallpox and other diseases.²⁶⁹ Nachtigal referred to tuberculosis as the most serious common disease.²⁷⁰ He also described local methods of treatment, which tended to be unsuccessful, and referred to the belief of the local people that some diseases originated from *al-Jinn* (supernatural creatures) and could be prevented using amulets or hanging parts of animals to expel al-Jinn.²⁷¹ Nachtigal provided his medical services to the local people. Here he was helped by his experience gained in both Algeria and Tunisia. He also benefited from the local healers who were not only men, but there were a number of older women who practiced the profession of indigenous treatment according to their experience. Nachtigal had noted that the modern medical knowledge has not yet reached these parts of the country.²⁷² His work intended to first help the local people to combat epidemic diseases and the second intention was to give a clear picture to the government in Germany about the existing epidemic diseases in the north and center of Africa.²⁷³ They benefited a lot from this information in establishing their colonies there.

In 1911, the first year of the Italian war in Libya, the German doctor Felix Tlhaber volunteered to work in Libya with the Turkish Red Crescent and he remained in Libya from November 1911 to January 1912.²⁷⁴ Tlhaber arrived in Libya and headed to al-Aziziyah, used by the *mujāhidīn* as a gathering point and a military center for their leadership. He referred to one lady, the widow of a German captain in the army who made Tlhaber an offer to establish a hospital in Libya. Tlhaber found the health situation to be very bad in the country, and this prompted him to send a telegram to Berlin urging them to prepare a German medical clinic to

268 Nachtigal, Gustav, *Sahara und Sudan*, 3 vols., Berlin, Leipzig, Weltgeist-Bücher Verlags-Gesellschaft m.b.h., 1879–1889.

269 See on the cholera disease in Tripoli, Tripoli, cadavres de cholériques [Image fixe]: [photographie de presse] [Agence Rol], Gallica, BNF Paris, [Novembre 1911], Reference 17336. And see also Tripoli, cadavres de cholériques [Image fixe]: [photographie de presse], [Agence Rol] Publication: [Novembre 1911], Reference 17321. See as well on the same issue, Tripoli, cadavres de cholériques [Image fixe]: [photographie de presse]/[Agence Rol] Publication: [Novembre 1911] Idem, Reference 17314.

270 Ghānim, *al-Bi'thā al-'almāniyya ilā Libiyā*, pp. 19–20.

271 Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan*, pp. 144, 147, 158.

272 Ghānim, *al-Bi'thā al-'almāniyya ilā Libiyā*, p. 22.

273 Nākhtigāl, *al-Saḥrā' wa bilād al-Sūdān*, p. 213, 215.

274 Ghānim (translator), *Taqārīr bi'that al-ṣalīb al-aḥmar al-'almānī*, p. 9.

provide emergency aid to the people in Libya. He made great efforts to win the approval of the German authorities. This stage came within the framework of efforts by the German government to provide medical assistance specifically to the Libyan victims of the Italian war, as well as to provide treatment for the many common diseases in the country. The Italian attack on Tripoli had reverberated strongly in Germany and there was great sympathy with the people of the country, as the news presented the inhumane behavior of the Italian forces in Libya, which found stiff opposition from the German public opinion. The German authorities submitted a request to the Italians to provide such assistance, but the offer was rejected.²⁷⁵ At the same time, another request was submitted to the Ottoman authorities, who welcomed the idea and the Ottoman Red Crescent started to be involved in providing help to the local people in Libya at this critical time.²⁷⁶ The timing of the proposal to provide financial aid was at Christmas in Germany, a period of celebrations, and therefore it was not possible to collect the amount of money necessary to prepare the medical mission and send it to Libya. On the other hand, the German Red Cross was unable to provide this amount of money. Thus, an appeal was announced to collect donations from the people; however, they were not sufficient to cover the expenses of the mission. German officials tried to overcome this financial problem.²⁷⁷ The idea of sending a health mission prompted a number of Germans working in the field of trade and industry, in addition to bankers, to form a special committee taking upon itself the responsibility of financing and supporting the health mission to Libya.²⁷⁸ Due to the concerted efforts of many Germans, they succeeded in equipping, the mission, which included three doctors, including Dr. Goebel, who was the chef of the mission, Dr. Fritz, and Dr. Schütze, three medical students, twelve nurses,²⁷⁹ a chemical doctor, electricity technician and a mechanical worker, and it was noted that they came from different cities.²⁸⁰ After the group completed their preparations they

275 Ibid., p. 17.

276 Ibid.

277 Ibid.

278 Central-Komitee der Deutschen Vereine vom Roten Kreuz (eds.), *Beiträge zur Kriegsheilkunde. Aus den Hilfsunternehmungen der Deutschen Vereine vom Roten Kreuz während des Italienisch-Türkischen Feldzuges 1912 und des Balkankrieges 1912/13*, p. 1.; Kimmle, “Die Hilfsexpeditionen des Deutschen Roten Kreuzes nach Tripolitanien (1912) und nach dem Balkan (1912 und 1913)”, in *Beiträge zur Kriegsheilkunde*.

279 al-Barikī, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Umar, “al-Ṭib al-sha‘bi wa da‘ur al-ba‘thāt khilāl fatrat al-jihād”, *Majallat al-shahīd*, 10, markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-l-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis, 1989, p. 140.

280 Central-Komitee der Deutschen Vereine vom Roten Kreuz (eds.), *Beiträge zur Kriegsheilkunde*, p. 1.

started their journey on a ship called *Pera* from Hamburg on January 11th, 1912²⁸¹ toward the port of Ben Guerdane, which was located on the Libyan-Tunisian border. 300 camels and twelve wagons were rented to transport the luggage and materials to Gharyan, where they decided to establish the medical center of the mission; the mission had been fully equipped with equipment, medical devices, food, medicines and other items. The mission and the establishment of the hospital were directed mainly to provide the necessary services for people in the war zones and equipped according to the pattern of military missions. The hospital's function was not limited to this, but also took care of Libyan patients suffering from chronic diseases like typhoid, malaria, lung diseases and other diseases prevalent in the country at that time. The German doctors spared no effort in helping the local people, according to reports from those involved in the hospital, about 1.000 patients were treated,²⁸² the diseases were also mentioned as follows: 43 patients with skin diseases, about 122 suffering from esoteric diseases, and 750 suffering from injuries or different diseases.²⁸³ Despite the seriousness of these diseases, they were treated by the German doctors, some of whom also became infected. Dr. Schütze and two of his assistants died. All were buried in Gharyan.²⁸⁴ It could be argued that the German mission provided great services to the Libyans in spite of the period of time they spent in the country, which was relatively short. Moreover, the results of their scientific research were very important in terms of assessing the situation and identifying the communicable diseases and indigenous treatments methods and medicine. Most important of all was the moral support provided by the Germans to the people of the country in a critical period. This positive German position was acknowledged by the international community and became a feature of the German policies adopted during the First World War.²⁸⁵

281 Ibid., p. 2.

282 Ibid., p. 10.

283 Ghānim, (Translator), *Taqārīr bi'that al-ṣalīb al-aḥmar al-'almānī*, pp. 19, 22, 25

284 al-Barīkī, "al-Ṭīb al-sha'bi", p. 140.

285 Ghānim, *al-Bi'thā al-'almāniyya ilā Lībiyā*, p. 22.

5 German-Ottoman Rapprochement Policy and its Impact in Libya during World War I (1914–1918)

The German-Ottoman policy of rapprochement and its impact on the situation in Tripoli during World War I (1914–1918) starts with a different approach of the German and Ottoman policy toward Britain and France and their ambitions in the Mediterranean. This is a significant turning point in international politics. Therefore, it is important to examine the German position toward the Libyan *jihād*, with special emphasis on German motives and goals in supporting the Ottoman Empire, and the presence of Germany in Libya. This was after an explicit announcement by Germany that it would play a more active role in the political developments of the country by supporting the Libyan national movements. Here, they concentrated their support on two main currents of nationalism; the movement headed by Ramaḍān al-Swiḥli (1879–1920) and Sulaymān al-Bārūnī in the west, and the *al-Sanūsiyya* in the east.¹ Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, who came from a relatively distinguished family and represented the area of the Western Mountains, tried to organize a force to oppose the Italian landings, but did not receive the support of the Ottoman government.² Germany supported the Ottoman Empire in the revival of its influence in Libya. This development led to the declaration of war against the British in Egypt in 1915 according to the German-Ottoman geo-strategic project that aimed to weaken the power of the British in the Mediterranean, maiming battles of the Ottoman war against the British in Egypt. An examination of the German policy toward Libya at the end of the First World War in 1918, and an analysis of how this was reflected in international developments on the orientation of the policy in Libya is to be understood in the light on what was going on in this part of Africa. How the defeat of Germany and the Ottoman Empire in World War I led them to abandon their project in Libya and the region?

World War I

World War I is seen as an influential event in the history of the world as it included the major powers and took place on different continents. The beginning of

¹ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, R16106 Nr. A33454, 9/12/1916; on Ramaḍān al-Swiḥli see St. John, Ronald B., *Historical Dictionary of Libya*, Toronto, 2014, p. 316.

² Childs, Timothy W., *Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya 1911–1912*, Brill, Leiden, 1990, p. 89.

World War I was when the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne was assassinated on June 28, 1914, and the government in Austria declared Serbia to have been involved, starting hostilities after refusing any sort of negotiation.³ The major powers, mainly Russia, Germany, France, and Britain, joined the war, which developed into a world war.⁴ It is argued in the literature that the major causes of World War I were economic imperialism, in terms of extending colonies outside Europe and driven by the Industrial Revolution. Other factors included the nationalism movements and the system of secret alliances and agreements that divided Europe into two main blocs.⁵ One was the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, until May 1915.⁶ The other alliance was France, Russia and Great Britain; later, Italy announced that it would join the Allies. In 1914, with the outbreak of the First World War, the world was divided into two camps. The Ottoman Empire later joined the alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In addition to these two alliances, there were many other alliances and agreements signed secretly or publicly between the major powers, and included other countries.⁷ Moreover, one of the main causes of World War I was the desire of the major powers to expand their navies and military forces and control more territories. As the war continued, the smaller countries and states joined these two main powers in accordance with their political and economic interests. As Koller states, the fighting extended rapidly to several other countries including Japan, Belgium, New Zealand, and South Africa, which joined the German colonies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific.⁸ The Ottomans decided to enter the war on the side of Germany on October 29, 1914⁹ after signing a military contract with Germany on October 27, 1913. The contract stipulated that Germany would take over the reform of the Ottoman military forces.¹⁰ This was a step taken by Grand Vizier and Minister of War Mahmud Shevket Pasha (1856–1913), who was trying

3 Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig (eds.), *The Origins of World War I*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 10.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 12.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 16.

6 Straub, Eberhard, *Weltgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. Daten, Fakten, Dokumente in chronologischem Überblick*, Drömer Knauer, Munich, 1985, p. 58

7 Hamilton and Herwig, *The Origins of World War I*, p. 10.

8 Koller, Christian, “The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and their Deployment in Europe during the First World War”, *Immigrants & Minorities*, vol. 26, no. 1-2, March/July 2008, pp. 111–133.

9 Uyar, Mesut and Edward J. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk*, Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, California, 2009, p. 243.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 237.

to restore the Ottoman Empire, which was collapsing due to the loss of several territories and much power in the Ottoman-Italian War of 1911 and the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913.¹¹ Part of the efforts of the Germans and the Ottomans was to mobilize as much support for their entrance into the war as possible. To this end, the policy-makers in the Ottoman Empire promoted the idea of Islamic holy *jihad* and asked the Islamic countries, especially those under their control, to join them on this basis. It seems likely that this strategy was developed in response to a suggestion by an official at the German Embassy in Cairo, von Oppenheim.¹² By invoking the concept of *jihad*, the Germans hoped to mobilize more Muslim support for their efforts against the Russian,¹³ British and French forces in the region.¹⁴ Thus, the propaganda of the German and Ottoman Empire began to be directed toward Libya per German-Ottoman plans that had been prepared earlier. The first step was the declaration of *jihad* against Britain, France and Russia issued by the Ottoman Sultan Moḥammad V (1844–1918).¹⁵ He then used a *fatwa*¹⁶ provided by the *Shaykh al-Islam* in Istanbul supporting the necessity of *jihad* to the path of God against the enemies of religion, particularly when these had taken control of Islamic countries.¹⁷ Thus, a set of messages and letters was prepared and addressed to the leaders of *jihad* in those countries, including Libya, which occupied an important place in German-Ottoman military plans at that time due to its strategic location.¹⁸

The Turkish authorities worked hard on this project and presented it to the Arab politicians residing in Turkey. These included the Libyan Bashīr al-Sa‘adāwī, and the *Shaykh* Şaleḥ al-Tūnisī, Moḥammad Farīd and ‘Alī Pash Ḥāmbah, and others. These individuals, who made up a committee called *Lajnat Tashkilāt*

11 Ibid., p. 236.

12 Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, p. 13.

13 Lüdke, Tilman, “(Not) Using Political Islam: The German Empire and its Failed Propaganda Campaign in the Near and Middle East 1914-1918 and Beyond”, in Zürcher, Erik-Jan, *Jihad and Islam in World War I: Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck Hurgronje’s “Holy War Made in Germany”*, Leiden University Press, Leiden, 2016, p. 83.

14 Lüdke, Tilman, *Jihad Made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War*, Lit, Münster, 2005, p. 45.

15 Wathīqā 46, *al-Wathā’iq al-iṭāliyya*, p. 163; for an overview see Stoddard, Philip Hendrick, “The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918”, PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1963.

16 A legal opinion or learned interpretation by a qualified jurist or mufti given on issues pertaining to Islamic law; Hallaq, Wael B. “Fatwa”, in *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, Encyclopedia.com

17 Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, p. 190.

18 See Micheleta, Luca and Andrea Ungari, *L’Italia e la guerra nella Libya*, Storia Studium, Roma, 1974, 490p.

Makḥṣūṣa, headed by Sulaymān al-‘Askarī, were amongst the most prominent political personalities of the period and were considered essential to supporting the propagation of the idea of *jihad*. Moḥammad Farīd was the head of the Egyptian Nationalist Party (*al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī al-Miṣrī*), while ‘Alī Pash Ḥāmbah and Ṣaleḥ al-Tūnisī were leaders in a Tunisian movement calling for the removal of the French occupation there.¹⁹ The idea was approved by the majority, except for Bashīr al-Sa‘adāwī, who justified his reservations on the grounds that the *mujāhidīn* in Libya were not in a position to confront the British and the Italians at the same time, and that it would be better to expel the Italians before approaching the British. However, the enthusiasm of the others for the idea, and the support of Enver Pasha who in 1914 showed great confidence in the successful outcome of the idea, led them to send a message to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf urging him to stand by the Ottoman Empire and to declare war on its enemies. A number of letters were sent for this purpose, particularly to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, who led the war in eastern Libya against the Italians. The letters encouraged him to support the plans to weaken the British military presence in Egypt from the Libyan side of the border. At the same time, they requested Enver Pasha from Bashīr al-Sa‘adāwī to accompany the Ottoman officers to Tripoli, but he apologized because the duty did not precisely conform to his political stances toward this work.²⁰ The Germans and the Ottomans tried to support *jihad* movements in many Arabic countries where the allies ruled, including Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya. In the next part of the chapter, their support for the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement to fight the British in Egypt, instead of fighting the Italians in Libya, is illustrated.

5.1 German-Ottoman Support to the *al-Sanūsīyya* Movement

The Ottoman Empire decided to revive its influence in Libya in 1914. The Libyan population responded positively to the renewed interest of the Ottoman Empire.²¹ This gave Germany, as an Ottoman ally, more opportunity to develop its own presence in the region. The decision of the Ottomans to revive their influence in Libya was supported by the German government, which wanted to reduce the control of the allied nations everywhere. The methods they chose to achieve this

¹⁹ Hūwīdī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 52; Shukrī, *Milād dawlāt Libiyā al-ḥadīthā*, p. 245.

²⁰ Shukrī, *Milād dawlāt Libiyā al-ḥadīthā*, pp. 460–461.

²¹ Ibid.

goal included spreading unrest and military skirmishes and supporting revolts against the European powers, particularly in the Arab countries, e.g., the British in Egypt, and to increase the level of resistance against the Italian occupation in Libya.²² Meanwhile, there were two main factions within the Libyan *jihād* movement. The first of these was the Western Independent Libyan Movement, which was led by Ramaḍān al-Swiḥli and Sulaymān al-Bārūnī and was based in Misurata. The second was *al-Sanūsīyya* movement led by Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf al-Sanūsī in the eastern region of the country.²³ The debate within the German political field was about which of two factions Germany should support and which would be more beneficial to German-Ottoman interests.²⁴ The decision was finally taken to support the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement, by supplying them with ammunition and weapons in 1915.²⁵ Al-Sharīf had been recognized by the Ottoman Empire and was even granted the title of deputy sultan in the region by the Ottoman sultan²⁶. He was also visited by Enver Pasha at the movement's headquarters in the southern part of the country, in al-Jaghub, and was handed the decision issued by the sultan appointing him as his deputy and conferred the leadership of the region in Libya.²⁷ The same period also witnessed the arrival of Nuri Bey, an emissary of his brother, Enver Pasha, and Jā'far al-'Askarī, an Ottoman officer of Iraqi origin,²⁸ who arrived on board a German submarine that docked in the port of Bardia (al-Burdi/Burdija) on the east coast of Libya in December 1914.²⁹ The Ottoman authorities sent with them the higher ranked medals as well as a senior medal to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf and other members of the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement.³⁰ They held a meeting attended by these parties as well as some *al-Sanūsīyya* chieftains and advisers of Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf at the end of 1914. The discussion was about the establishment of a Muslim state in North Africa supported by Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman

22 Yāghī, *al-Dawlā al-'ūthmāniyyā fī al-tārikh al-islāmī*, p. 317.

23 On the *Sanūsīyya* movement see Vandewalle, Dirk, *A History of Modern Libya*, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 17–25; On the *Sanūsīyya* see Triaud, Jean-Louis, *La légende noire de la Sanūsīyya*, op.cit.; and also Triaud, Jean-Louis, *Tchad 1901–1902. Une guerre franco-libyenne oubliée?*, op.cit.

24 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 17, R16122, Nr. A33454, 9/12/1916.

25 Ibid.

26 *Osmanli Belgelerinde: Trablusgarb*, 2013, p. 577.

27 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 17, R16122, Nr. A33454, 9/12/1916.

28 Wathiqā 47, *al-Wathā'iq al-iṭāliyya*, p. 166.

29 Shukrī, *al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawlā*, p. 247.

30 Wathiqā 49, *al-Wathā'iq al-iṭāliyya*, p. 179.

Sultan addressed an appeal to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf to support the declaration of holy war against the British, Italians, French and Russians, alluding to the serious situation that might result from the control of these countries over the Islamic world, and added that this would weaken the power of Islam.³¹ Therefore, religion obliged him to fight these enemies. Sultan Moḥammad V (ruled 1909–1918) also tried to influence Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf by sending him a letter praising the founder of the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement, and mentioned his efforts to protect Islam and the respect that the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement enjoyed in Libya and the Muslim world.³² The Sultan did not fail to mention Germany in this letter in which he confirmed the country as a friend to the Muslims and a God-given means to reform the situations of their countries. He added that this was a real opportunity to get rid of the occupation of the Italian, French and British alike. The sultan had pointed out that their declaration of *jihād* would lead the rest of the peoples in North Africa to follow them, enabling them to obtain freedom and all their rights.³³ Most people supported the idea of Muslim *jihād* against the infidels, especially in light of the assistance promised by Germany.³⁴ Germany was able to send a group of German and Turkish officers to the *mujāhidīn* camps in eastern Libya in November 1914 to train the *mujāhidīn* on the use of weapons. Moreover, the Germans provided them with submarines, which were the most effective weapon during this stage of the war, due to their ability to move more freely and in accordance with a schedule and well-studied plans. Germany relied heavily upon the use of submarines during World War I, both in military operations and as a safe means of communication between them and their allies. The submarines were also used to transfer arms and military equipment, and for the transport of soldiers to and from the shores of Libya.³⁵ Some submarines were well known, such as the submarines UC20, UC73, and UC12, which was rebuilt in August 19, 1912 and began its activity toward the Libyan coast in early December 1915. The German submarines started their journey from Cattaro (Adriatic Sea) to the port of al-Burdi (Burdia/Burdija) and then returned to transfer materials and equipment to be used by the Libyans and Ottomans.³⁶ In addition, Germany pro-

31 Mannā', Moḥammad 'Abd al-Razāq, *Aḥmed al-Sharīf ḥayātahu wa jihādahu*, mu'assasat nāṣir li-l-thaqāfa, Dār al-Waḥda, n.d., p. 70.

32 Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, p. 200; *Osmani Belgelerinde: Trablusgarb*, p. 577.

33 On the *jihād* and Germany see the work of Tilman, *Jihad made in Germany*, 251p; Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, pp. 200, 203.

34 Hüwidi, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, pp. 52–53.

35 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, pp. 1-5; see Microfiche Copex HDP13, LOS 4, Asw A+, Politisches Archiv WK Nr. 11u, 134277 (73), 14. November 1915.

36 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 1.

vided financial aid and other assistance to the Ottomans and the Libyan *mujāhidīn* in that area. They created the impression that the aid was sent by the Ottoman Empire³⁷ to provide the appropriate environment for the Ottomans to work and to gain respect from the *mujāhidīn*.³⁸ In this context, the German and Ottoman efforts were focused more on fighting the British in Egypt. Otto Mannesmann was selected by the German political leadership to support their goals in Libya.³⁹ Mannesmann was one of the intelligence officers of the German army and became the German consul in Libya in October 1914, arriving there in December 1914.⁴⁰ It is worth mentioning that Otto Mannesmann was fully aware of the situation in North Africa because he was living in Morocco, where he oversaw the management of Mannesmann industrial businesses, of which he was an owner. He also owned large farms in the area of Sus in the south of Morocco and had strong relations with the tribal leaders.⁴¹ Thus, he had extensive experience in dealing with the Arabs and their leaders. Mannesmann had proposed to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send a special delegation consisting of Ottoman and German representatives to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf.⁴² Permission was given by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the preparations described in the report of the military command in Tripoli.⁴³ Upon receiving the approval of the ministry, preparations for the delegation began, with a focus on selecting people with high capabilities and skills in persuasion to strengthen the idea of the struggle against the British in Egypt, but not the Italians in Libya. The Germans took this action because they were aware of the rapprochement between Sayyid Idris al-Sanūsī and the British. Thus, careful preparation was taken to ensure the success of this delegation. This also required extensive communication with all the parties involved, which was the reason for the reconstruction of a telegraph station in Misurata. The construction was undertaken by German experts under the supervision of Oberleutnant von Todenwarth.⁴⁴ In 1914, Otto Mannesmann arrived in the eastern part of Libya to support the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement and the Ottoman pre-

37 Wathīqā 48, *al-Wathā'iq al-iṭālīyya*, pp. 175–176.

38 Hūwīdī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 72.

39 Ibid.

40 Ghānim, *ʿAmaliyyat al-ghūwaṣāt al-ʿalmāniyya fī al-miyāh al-libiyā*, pp. 41, 45.

41 Ghānim, wa Shlūtīr, “al-Qunṣuliyya al-ʿalmāniyya fī Ṭarābulis”, p. 10.

42 Sayyid Idris al-Sanūsī was also present in the region, Idris al-Sanūsī was supposed to be the leader of the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement but, because he was young, the position had been assigned to his cousin Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf until Sayyid Idris became eligible.

43 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 17, R16122, Nr A33454, 9/12/1916.

44 Ibid.

sence in the region and to serve the strategic interests of Germany.⁴⁵ He had been sent as part of German-Ottoman plans to fight the British in Egypt. Mannesmann was sending his reports to the German military leaders.⁴⁶ He was accompanied by the Turkish commander Nuri Bey. The political significance of their presence in the eastern part of Libya led to discussions about German intervention in Libya within the German Foreign Ministry.⁴⁷ The leadership team of the military and political department there was given the responsibility of studying the situation in Libya, in general, and the military situation, in particular. The study was based on information and reports from Libya, especially those derived from the reports of Mannesmann, Oberleutnant von Todenwarth and a third person who was an informant working as an interpreter, referred to as Salama. Salama, who receives no further identification in the reports, appears to have been an Arab and evidently had a great deal of knowledge of the region. The German policy was centered on the Libyan *jihad* movement and how to use it to German strategic benefit. Mannesmann contacted Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf personally, and mentioned that they were going to award him with a senior medal from the German emperor and a book selected by him.⁴⁸ The Italians were present in Libya during this time, but had withdrawn their troops to the coastal areas, where they were mainly concentrated in the cities of Tripoli, al-Khums and Benghazi. The Italians placed weak control over some ports like al-Burdi (Burdia/Burdija), Sirte, which provided important docking points for German submarines.⁴⁹ The Italians also worked to strengthen their relations with Britain in Egypt to put more pressure on the *mujāhidīn* in the eastern part of the country.⁵⁰ In April 1916, the Ottoman Empire sent Sulaymān al-Bārūnī to Libya as a governor on behalf of the Ottoman sultan.⁵¹ al-Bārūnī traveled from Istanbul to Vienna and then to Libya. His journey took place under the auspices of the German government, which provided al-Bārūnī with a German submarine for the last stages of the journey, until his arrival in the city of Misurata.⁵² al-Bārūnī was carrying with him the decision of his appoint-

45 This finding is supported by a document in the German Political Archive containing information for which Mannesmann is described as the source. See Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Tripolis, vom 15. Februar 1914 bis 31. Oktober 1915, R16120, Nr. A33454, 9/12/1916.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, p. 303.

50 Ibid.

51 al-Turkī, *Fuṣūl fī tārikh al-ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya al-tūnisiyya*, p. 69.

52 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Bd. 17, R16122, Tripolis, Nr. A27104.

ment as a deputy of the sultan in the west, as well as money and weapons that had been provided by the Ottoman Empire.⁵³ Sulaymān al-Bārūnī was able to reorganize the *mujāhidīn*, and led a movement of struggle against the Italians, which continued through 1917.⁵⁴

5.2 Attack on the British Army in Egypt and Battles with the Libyan *Mujāhidīn* in 1915

Meanwhile, the German-Ottoman propaganda to declare *jihad* had begun to spread worldwide. However, a decision could not be taken by Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, who wanted to wait to make an appropriate decision. He wanted to continue the war against the Italians and wished at the same time to secure the help of the Ottomans and the German for his own goals.⁵⁵ His relations with the British were not hostile but were characterized more as being cautious. The two sides did not share the same aims or political direction but, in some cases, the British did permit aid coming from Egyptian sources to pass over the border to the *mujāhidīn* in Libya.⁵⁶ Apart from Tunisia, this had become the only means by which they could gain access to any form of assistance.⁵⁷ In addition, Britain had also begun to improve their contact with Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, as they recognized the danger constituted by the German-Ottoman presence on the eastern borders of Libya. The British tried to persuade him to join their side to ensure that there would be no more disturbances in the western border region of Egypt.⁵⁸ Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf was frequently visited by messengers of the British offering their friendship and, at times, alliances. The messages sent by Lord Kitchener, the commissioner of the British in Egypt addressed to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf carried expressions of respect and appreciation of the British and indicated at the same time the importance of his position for them, as well as the British desire for friendship and mutual support. It was a clear attempt to induce him to their side.⁵⁹ This was after they had learned about the presence of Turkish envoys sent to sign an agree-

53 al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, p. 303.

54 Ismā'īl, *Tārikh Afrīqiyyā al-ḥadīth*, p. 453.

55 De Candole, E.A.V., *The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya*, Ben Ghalbon, Manchester, 1990, p. 27.

56 Hūwīdī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 72.

57 Ibid.

58 Wathīqā 48, *al-Wathā'iq al-iṭāliyya*, p. 174.

59 Mannā', *Aḥmed al-Sharīf*, p. 53.

ment with Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf and ally with him against Britain and Italy.⁶⁰ They tried to gain time and to keep Aḥmed Al-Sharīf out of Ottoman-German influence so as not to offer strategic support.⁶¹ Therefore, Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf was hesitant to help Germany and the Ottomans at the beginning; in addition, he was aware of the extensive preparations that attacking the British in Egypt would require, including large quantities of equipment and military assistance. Given that the *mujāhidīn* were constantly involved in smaller conflicts with the Italians, it was a matter of concern as to whether this degree of preparation was possible. Meanwhile the British imposed a tight control on the Libyan-Egyptian border and the Libyan-Sudanese border. This hampered the progress of convoys loaded with ammunition and weapons coming to Libya. There was then a crippling blockade on the country.⁶² The situation was further complicated by the British prevention of many Egyptian volunteers (*mutaṭawī‘ūn*) leaving to Libya. These volunteers tended to come from the regions of Egypt close to the Libyan border and many of them originated from tribes with Libyan origins.⁶³ They were inspired by the idea of *jihad* against European occupation and decided on this basis to make their way to the camps of the Libyan *mujāhidīn* and to join their battle against the British.⁶⁴ This was particularly prominent following the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the war in 1914 on the side of Germany, and its declaration of *jihad* against the allied forces. Given the religious and Islamic principles with which Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf had been educated, it would have been difficult for him to relinquish his support of the Ottoman Empire, especially when it had raised the banner of Islam and *jihad*. There was a religious and moral obligation to respond to this appeal, despite the risks that this would entail.

Aḥmed al-Sharīf was advised by some not to support the German and Ottoman plans. These people included Sultan Ḥussein Kamel, the Sultan of Egypt, Henry McMahon, the viceroy of the British king in Egypt, and the commander of the British army in Egypt, General Maxwell. Maxwell also offered British help in obtaining Libyan independence; therefore, Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf refused the German-Ottoman offer. The Ottomans reacted using their diplomatic relations to ignite fighting on the eastern front of Libya. They realized that Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf did not want to commit his men to a war that would not help the Otto-

⁶⁰ Wathīqā 289 /56219, Wathā‘iq al-arshif al-injilīzī shu‘bat al-wathā‘iq al-ajnabiyya, al-markaz al-waṭānī li-l-māhafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārīkhiyya, Ṭarābulis.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Mannā‘, *Aḥmed al-Sharīf*, p. 52.

⁶³ Hūwīdī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭāniyya fī sharq Lībiyā*, p. 72.

⁶⁴ Mīkhā‘il, *al-‘Ālāqāt al-injilīziyya al-libiyyā*, p. 54.

mans in their fight against the Italians. It was obvious that Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf failed to determine his position once and for all. The difficulty increased for him when he realized that the German Ottoman plans included temporarily stopping the *jihad* against the Italians in Libya. At that time, the idea of a truce between the *mujāhidīn* and Italy was raised to concentrate all the forces on the war against the British in Egypt.⁶⁵ Nuri Bey sent a letter to his brother Enver Pasha, referring slightly to al-Sharīf's lack of commitment to his own country and to his close relationships with the British.⁶⁶ Al-Sharīf's rejection did not prevent Nuri Bey and Jā'far al-ʿAskarī from mobilizing and training fighters and volunteers in far eastern Libya. These fighters were from the area of Cyrenaica. They were joined by many from the ʿAūwlad ʿAlī tribe, who inhabited the Egyptian desert and who traced their origins to the region of eastern Libya. The Ottoman officers wanted to guarantee the success of this project, which is why they began to receive German arms via German submarines in the Mediterranean Sea (see Appendix 5 and 6).⁶⁷ All these pressures led Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf to decide for war against the British in Egypt;⁶⁸ especially after the intensive Turkish propaganda led by Jā'far al-ʿAskarī, who used all the human and financial resources available to improve conditions on the Libyan-Egyptian border. He also worked to win the support of many Libyan *mujāhidīn* who were under the influence of this idea. This prompted some of them to attack effectively on Egyptian territory without the knowledge of the *al-Sanūsīyya* military leadership in Libya, which did not leave any other choices to Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf but to accept the Ottoman-German proposal.⁶⁹ Consequently, Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf decided to wage war against the British within British-controlled Egyptian territory with the support of the Ottoman Empire and Germany. The attack took place in 1915.⁷⁰

The Libyan leadership of the *mujāhidīn* was well aware of the seriousness of the situation, especially with the presence of the Italians. The German-Ottoman project aimed to encircle the British; the movement of troops from Libya would have a significant role in the defeat of the British in Egypt, especially as the internal situation allowed them to do so after the victories they had achieved against the Italians. At the same time, the Ottoman army move coincided with the Libyan attack to control the Suez Canal.⁷¹

65 Kāmil, *al-Dawlā al-ʿarabiyya al-kubra*, p. 336.

66 Mikhā'il, *al-Ālāqāt al-injilīziyya al-libiyyā*, p. 54

67 De Candole, *The Life and Times*, p. 26.

68 Hūwīdī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 66.

69 al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, p. 256.

70 Ismā'il, *Tārīkh Afriqiyā al-ḥadīth*, p. 453.

71 Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, p. 19.

Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf and Nuri Bey led the *mujāhidīn* forces in this war. All were motivated by the main aim of ending the Italian occupation in their land using the aid of the Germans and the Ottomans, who promised to declare the independence of Libya if they won the war against the Italians. Moreover, the *mujāhidīn* believed in the idea of *jihād* and its success in fighting the occupiers.⁷² The choice of battle location depended on the strategy of the site and was sometimes determined by the *mujāhidīn* because they knew the country well.⁷³ The first attack was on Sallum, a village on the Egyptian-Libyan border at the beginning of November 1915,⁷⁴ where the militants managed to achieve a victory over the British forces. In conjunction with the start of the ground attack, the German submarine U35 made some military movements that led to the destruction of the British aid ship *Tara* in the Mediterranean Sea.⁷⁵ The German support to the *mujāhidīn* was highly effective, confirmed by the success of the German submarine in sinking that ship in the Gulf of Sallum on November 5, 1915. This resulted in the capture of the captain of the ship, one officer, and 79 soldiers who were on board and taken to Libyan territory, specifically to the Gulf of Bardia, where they were handed over to the Ottomans as war prisoners (see Appendix 7).⁷⁶ The maneuvers of the German submarines did not stop; the same submarine was able to destroy two other boats in the port of Sallum carrying guns to support the land army.⁷⁷ Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf did not play a real role in the attack. The *mujāhidīn* themselves planned and implemented the attack after hearing the news that their leaders had agreed to this project. The presence of Nuri Bey in the region also supported their situation.⁷⁸

Umalrakham Battle in 1915

The German submarine U38, led by Captain Valentiner, reached the eastern shores of Libya on December 12, 1915. The German Consul and a Turkish officer named Jamal were on board, accompanied by two Arab leaders; the ship was

72 Ahmida, Ali Abdellatif, *Forgotten Voices*, Routledge, London, 2005, 108p.

73 Hūwidī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, pp. 74, 76.

74 Brūkilmān, *Tārīkh al-shu‘ūb al-islāmīyya*, p. 652; Lūtiskī, *Tārīkh al-aqṭār al-‘arabiyya al-ḥadīth*, p. 372; Ziyāda, *Libiyā fī al-‘uṣūr al-ḥadīthā*, p. 87.

75 ‘Azzām, “Kifāḥ al-sha‘b al-libī fī sabīl al-ḥurrīyya”, p. 432; al-Sāḥlī, “Wamaḍāt min al-wathā’iq al-‘ūthmāniyyā”, p. 323.

76 De Candole, *The Life and Times*, p. 27.

77 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 1.

78 Hūwidī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 66.

also carrying 6 tons of munitions destined to the *mujāhidīn* to support them in continuing the fight against the British.⁷⁹ The area of Umalrakham, located near Matrouh in Egypt, was where the first clash between the forces of the Libyan *mujāhidīn* and a number of volunteers from the tribe of ‘Aūwlad ‘Ali on the one side, and the British on the other, took place. The battle lasted from morning until evening, but the *mujāhidīn* persevered and suffered minor losses, while the British lost many soldiers.⁸⁰ After the end of the battle, the British retreated and the *mujāhidīn* withdrew to the area of Wadi Majid.

Wadi Majid Battle in 1915

A second battle between the two sides took place at the end of December 1915, in the area of Wadi Majid in Egypt.⁸¹ The British army received reinforcements and military support represented by the arrival of 15.000 troops to the battlefield. In contrast, the Turkish commander Jā’far al-‘Askarī arrived as the head of a group of troops to rescue the *mujāhidīn*, while Nuri Bey led the battle. Nuri defeated the British, forcing them to withdraw toward Matruh in Egypt after they suffered extensive losses.⁸²

Bir Tunis Battle in 1916

Bir Tunis was located near Bir Majid in Egypt, where the Libyan *mujāhidīn* got their supply of water. The British wanted to end the war quickly and to eliminate the Libyan forces. So, they decided to mount a surprise attack, but natural factors had a role in delaying it. There was heavy rainfall that impeded the movement of the British army and thus delayed the start of the battle between the two parties in Botons to late January 1916. Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharif participated in this battle, in addition to Nuri Bey and some German officers who took part in the fighting. The losses of the two parties were large.⁸³ Despite the small number of *mujāhidīn*, the result was in their favor. The fact that a German officer was among the dead led the British to assert that the senior leadership and management of the battle

⁷⁹ U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 1.

⁸⁰ Hūwīdī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 73.

⁸¹ De Candole, *The Life and Times*, p. 28.

⁸² See Microfiche Copex HDP13, LOS 4, Asw A+, Politisches Archiv WK Nr. 38, 1. Februar 1916.

⁸³ Hūwīdī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, pp. 77–78.

had been performed by the German. Rather, this was because of the nature of the battle and the steadfastness of the *mujāhidīn*. However, there was no question that most participants were Libyan *mujāhidīn* who were motivated by the ideology of *jihad* and the goal of expelling the Italian occupation from their country. After this battle, more officers and soldiers were sent by the Ottoman Empire to eastern Libya. Although the document does not specify numbers, it does record that submarine U38 brought 6 officers and a load estimated at 10 tons of weapons to the *of King Idris* on February 10–11, 1916. The submarine was unloaded at the port of Bardia.⁸⁴

Controlling Siwa Oasis in 1916

Following these clashes near the coast, Aḥmed al-Sharīf commanded the *mujāhidīn* to distribute their forces and not to be concentrated on one front. This was why he sent the Egyptian Captain Moḥammad Ṣaleḥ Ḥarb to Siwa Oasis.⁸⁵ He succeeded in controlling the oasis and dominated the neighboring area. In addition, he controlled the area of Farafra Aldakhila. After this success deep in Egyptian territory, a military contingent was led by ‘Abd al-Ilāh Tamaskat to the Bahriyya oasis, where he defeated the British garrison and controlled the provinces of Fayoum and Minya.⁸⁶ The intensification of fighting between the Libyan *mujāhidīn* and the British and the losses on both sides prompted Germany to intensify its financial and military support. This was reflected by the arrival of the German officer Paul Freiherr Wolff von Todenwarth⁸⁷ with his companions, in addition to four Turkish officers along with ammunition and weapons on April 20, 1916 on board submarine U21.⁸⁸


⁸⁴ U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 2.

⁸⁵ Mikhā’il, *al-‘Ālāqāt al-injilīziyya al-libiyyā*, p. 61.

⁸⁶ ‘Azzām, “Kifāḥ al-sha‘b al-libī”, pp. 434–435.

⁸⁷ Halpem, Paul G., *The Naval War in the Mediterranean: 1914–1918*, Routledge, London, 2016, 630, p. 246.

⁸⁸ U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 2.



Map 9: Battle to control Siwa Oasis in 1916, Libyan-Egyptian border provinces and places of battles during World War I

The Second Battle of Majid in 1916

After the arrival of more military reinforcements, the Libyan *mujāhidīn* continued their war against the British. The next clash between the two sides was at the second battle of Majid. Jā'far al-ʿAskarī led the forces in this battle, while General Wallace led the British. The British suffered losses again in spite of the small number of *mujāhidīn* who forced them to withdraw from the battlefield. The advance of the northern unit of the Senusi-army through the coastline stretch, which was cleared by the English east of Sellum up to east of Nedjaila, was coming to a stop near Majid. Small skirmishes had been taking place close to Umm-er-Rham and Majid. Afterwards, the English attacked on December 26th with superior forces; they were very well equipped both in terms of weapons and men. Jā'far held position with only 40 men. Given the superior forces of the English, they would have hardly changed much in the outcome of the skirmish.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Ibid.

Agagia Battle in 1916

Agagia (also Agagiya or Aqqaqiya) was located near the coast of the Mediterranean and the battle ensued between the two sides there. The *mujāhidīn*, in particular the forces under the command of Nuri Bey, were suffering of a severe shortage of supplies and ammunition. In contrast, the British army had received reinforcements and supplies, which is why they won the battle. It should be noted that ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Azzām was involved in this battle.⁹⁰ It led to great losses for the *mujāhidīn* and they were forced to withdraw from the battlefield. Moreover, most of the forces that participated in the fighting withdrew from Egyptian territory toward Cyrenaica, within Libyan territory.⁹¹ This gave the British a chance to move forward. They succeeded in taking control of the region of Sidi Barrani on February 28, 1916⁹² and then occupying Sallum on March 24, 1916.⁹³ Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, along with Moḥammad Ṣaleḥ Ḥarb, was able to seize most of the Egyptian oases, i.e. Farafra, Dakhla, al-Kharija and the Bahria.⁹⁴ They succeeded in tightening their grip on the road to the oases, implementing the agreement between the Germans and the Ottomans, which also required the sparking of a revolution in Egypt led by Ahmed Jamal against the British. This was supposed to be synchronized with the arrival of Ottoman forces coming from Syria to the Suez Canal to encircle the British; however, this plan failed.⁹⁵ The British managed to control the interior territories of Egypt and thoroughly repressed the revolution. Thus, Ahmed Jamal could not carry out his task of enabling Ottoman penetration via the Suez Canal by diverting British attention toward the eastern border and internal unrest.⁹⁶ This was despite careful preparation and the assistance by German officers,⁹⁷ in addition to the approximately 3,500 troops who were supposed to perform this task. Britain succeeded in repelling the attack of the Ottoman Empire after the success of the Ottoman army in moving overland across the Sinai Desert toward Ismailia. The Ottomans began to withdraw. That was how the German-Ottoman plans to control that front failed.⁹⁸

⁹⁰ Hūwidī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, pp. 82–83; ‘Azzām, “Kifāḥ ‘al-sha‘b al-libī”, pp. 438, 441, 443.

⁹¹ Hūwidī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, pp. 82–83.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁹³ Kāmil, *al-Dawlā al-‘arabiyya al-kubra*, p. 338.

⁹⁴ Mikhā‘il, *al-‘Ālāqāt al-injilīziyya al-libiyyā*, p. 62.

⁹⁵ Brūkilmān, *Tārīkh al-shu‘ūb al-islāmīyya*, p. 604; Mannā‘, *Aḥmed al-Sharīf*, p. 70.

⁹⁶ Hūwidī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 95.

⁹⁷ al-‘Aqād, *Libiyā al-mu‘āṣira*, p. 19.

⁹⁸ ‘Atīq, Wajih ‘Abd al-Ṣādiq, *Muḥāḍarāt fī tārīkh al-‘arab al-mu‘āṣir*, Dār al-thaqāfa al-‘arabiyya, al-Qāhira, 1994/1955, p. 20.

5.3 Libyan Defeat in Egypt and German Policy

Following these dangerous developments, Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf and his army in the Egyptian oases became isolated from any contact with the rest of the front. This became worse with a cholera outbreak among the soldiers. Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf was forced to withdraw his troops toward Siwa, Farafra and Bahria,⁹⁹ where he was attacked by the British in a battle on February 28, 1917. This forced him to retreat toward Libyan territory,¹⁰⁰ where he arrived with his forces in the areas near al-Jaghbug. They were pursued by the British forces, which wanted to eliminate the troops of Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, which resulted in a battle between the two sides in the region of Guba. However, the British failed to defeat the *mujāhidīn*, who were helped by natural factors to avoid more deaths and losses. This battle was the last between the two parties.¹⁰¹ However, the British were not satisfied, and sent a warning to Sayyid Idris al-Sanūsī, who was in al-Jaghbug, to leave the area as soon as possible. They informed him that if he did not, the British forces would fully destroy the city of al-Jaghbug in addition to the burial place of Sayyid Moḥammad bin Ali al-Sanūsī. This place was of central emotional and religious significance to the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement and its loss or destruction would be a great blow.¹⁰² Upon hearing this threat, Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf decided to leave the area. He went toward the al-Agalia area.¹⁰³

Military operations around the desert oases continued between 1916 and early 1917. The fighting coincided with the arrival of German submarines. In July 1916, submarine U39 arrived, carrying two military missions from the Turkish army with ammunition and equipment. It had first docked in the port of Barqa on July 8th, 1916 and then went to the city of Misurata on July 10, 1916. The submarine itself returned in October carrying Turkish officers and weapons to support the combat capability of the Libyans.¹⁰⁴ The submarine was carrying orders for General Todesfarth to return to Germany.¹⁰⁵ Ottomans suffered in this campaign. Officers and soldiers who took part in the fighting did not leave Libya. They ini-

⁹⁹ al-Tilisi, *Ba'd al-qurḍabiyya*, p. 456.

¹⁰⁰ al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, p. 257.

¹⁰¹ Hüwidī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fi sharq Libiyā*, p. 94.

¹⁰² Shukrī, *al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawla*, p. 288.

¹⁰³ Kāmil, *al-Dawlā al-'arabiyya al-kubra*, p. 338.

¹⁰⁴ The Germans did not focus on the support of the Libyan *mujāhidīn* in war only, but they also provided them with food to fight against the widespread hunger in Cyrenaica at the time. For more information, see Microfiche Copex HDP13 in IA – Weltkrieg WK Nr. 114, R21284-2, Bd. 2, 31. Dezember 1916, held in the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts.

¹⁰⁵ U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 2.

tially remained in the city of Ajdabiya, and then moved to the city of Misurata.¹⁰⁶ The reason behind their stay was the insistence on the importance of their presence in the country and that the war was not yet over. Second, Turkey was determined to maintain its control over Libya for as long as possible, and they did not want to lose this geographically important part of the region. That was the reason behind Nuri Bey continuing to work to serve the interests of the Ottoman Empire. His work was focused on the restoration of confidence in Turkey and the revival of Turkish influence, in addition to control over the Turkish military. Nuri Bey tried to be closer to the new political leadership in Cyrenaica led by Idris al-Sanūsī, who ruled from 1917 and did his best to influence them to continue the war against the British in Egypt. He offered great promises to provide aid via German submarines. But the new commander of the *Sanūsīyya* movement had a different point of view to that of the Ottomans.¹⁰⁷ Especially after the *Sanūsīyya* movement's failed attack on Egypt, he believed that the interests of the country required them to enter negotiations with the British and the Italians alike and to not engage with them in an unequal war. From this point, Idris al-Sanūsī decided not to listen to the appeals of the Ottomans and even ended his connection with them. This led to a changed attitude on the part of the Ottomans, who began to regard him and the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement as opposition.

The new Turkish policy was thus to attack the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement. Nuri Bey then sent three Turkish officers with their troops to the south of Libya, where Moḥammad Abed al-Sanūsī, the brother of Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, was managing the affairs of the region. The soldiers brought gifts to Moḥammad Abed al-Sanūsī to hide their movements and intentions and to reassure the latter that their presence did not hold any other purpose. They then made the sudden move of seizing the city of Murzuq. Moḥammad Abed al-Sanūsī tried but failed to recapture the city. In addition, the Ottomans also seized the city of Zwila and continued to hold it, despite the repeated attempts to recover it by the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement, until July 10, 1917 when the Ottomans withdrew from Murzuq and Zwila. They turned toward the city of Sebha and regrouped there, especially with the arrival of supplies from Nuri Bey in the city of Misurata. This led them to intensify their control over Fezzan to force Moḥammad Abed al-Sanūsī to leave it and go to the city of al-Kufra.¹⁰⁸ The Ottomans controlled Fezzan until the end of World War I.¹⁰⁹ During this time, the Italian presence was concentrated in the coastal

106 Khishīm, *Ṣafaḥāt min jihādanā al-waṭani*, p. 73.

107 Hūwīdī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 116.

108 Shukrī, *al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawla*, pp. 189–190.

109 Hūwīdī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 116.

regions only. Due to their involvement in the war in Europe around this time, they did not undertake large scale military activity in Libya. They did, however, make a few smaller attacks on the *mujāhidīn* when this did not present a great risk to their own side. Within the framework of *jihad*, the Ottomans not only started the war in Egypt, but also sought to declare war on the French in Tunisia by mobilizing the *mujāhidīn* in the western region. To achieve this goal the Turkish envoy Hassan al-Sharīf traveled to the city of Misurata and met Ramaḍān al-Swiḥli and Saif al-Dīn al-Sanūsī, one of *al-Sanūsīyya* movement leaders, and offered them the project of attacking the French in Tunis, but they did not agree. Saif al-Dīn al-Sanūsī refused the plan while Ramaḍān al-Swiḥli accepted it. This led the al-Sanūsī leader to leave the city of Misurata.¹¹⁰ Saif al-Dīn al-Sanūsī's point of view was that the country could not bear the burden of fighting three major European countries (Italian, British and French) at one time, especially at this particular time. He was particularly concerned by the financial and economic problems and deteriorating military forces. Despite this, some Ottoman officers attacked the Ben Guerdane area in September 1915 and succeeded in capturing 40 French soldiers. France then moved quickly and decisively addressed the leadership of the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement to discuss the necessary measures. Saif al-Dīn al-Sanūsī quickly directed a stern warning: The Ottoman officer who was in charge was forced to stop the attack on the French and return to Fezzan.¹¹¹ Germany's role in these events became clear when it commissioned the consul Mannesmann to join the Ottomans in their attack on the western border. However, Saif al-Dīn issued orders banning him from reaching his destination so as not to complicate matters even more. Mannesmann had moved with the Turkish leaders to Misurata after they left Cyrenaica.¹¹² The position of the Ottomans at this stage was sensitive, especially given the lack of united rule over Libya. The eastern and southern parts were under the control of the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement, the center of the country was subjected to the tribal leaders, while the west was disputed. That was the reason behind the attempts by the Ottomans to renew their relationship with Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf. To show their good intentions, they sent two convoys loaded with food and other supplies that the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement needed. The convoy should have departed from Misurata, but the leader of Misurata, Ramaḍān al-Swiḥli, refused to permit the passage of these goods to *al-Sanūsīyya*, due to his own hostile relations with the movement. He took control of the convoy and pre-

110 al-'Aqād, *Libiyā al-mu'āṣira*, p. 21.

111 Shukrī, *al-Sanūsīyya dīn wa dawla*, p. 201; see also Martel, André, "La Libye, 1835–1990. Essai de géopolitique historique", *R.E.M.M.M.* 59-60, 1991, p. 291.

112 al-Zāwī, *jihād al-abṭāl*, p. 290.

vented it from reaching its target. Following these developments and the refusal of Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf to cooperate politically with the Ottomans, the Turkish commander Nuri Bey distanced himself from the Turkish promises¹¹³ and decided to leave the territories under *al-Sanūsiyya* movement influence despite the difficult economic conditions. He retired from the political sphere and refused to enter an armed conflict with his cousin Sayyid Idris al-Sanūsī, who became the leader of the movement and the holder of actual political power in the region of Cyrenaica.

An analysis of the events that occurred reveals that the failure of the war against the British in Egypt was due to a combination of factors. These included the imbalance of power in addition to the fact that the *mujāhidīn* had been fighting for more than three years against the Italians and the *al-Sanūsiyya* movement was internally divided. As a result of this war, the *al-Sanūsiyya* movement divided into two groups: the first, a group of supporters that followed its religious and national senses, and led by Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, and the second, which took into account the internally difficult situation and led by Sayyid Idris al-Sanūsī, each governed by their own beliefs, opinions and political orientations. In sum, the military campaign against the British in Egypt led to the failure of the Libyan side. They did not make any significant gains on the ground or even political gains, and suffered different types of human and material losses. In spite of all these failures that hit the German-Ottoman plans in eastern Libya, their determination was not weakened in their action in the north of the country. Libya became the focus of the Ottoman-German interests again, which led them to take further practical steps. The first was the arrival of an Ottoman envoy in May 1918 to monitor the situation closely. Then a mission was appointed to Prince Osman Fouad who was appointed commander of the African military forces in Libya by the Ottoman authority. He was to report about everything happening on the ground to the Ottoman authorities to be able to take the necessary measures. He went to Istanbul to present the results of his tour to the powers there and kept in contact with the leaders of *jihād* in Libya. He wrote to Aḥmed Bik al-Marīḍ, one of the *jihād* leaders in the city of Terhona, and briefed him on the latest developments, promising him that he worked for the benefit of Libya and would secure all the needed assistance before returning to Libya.¹¹⁴ The German submarines took over the transfer of messages between the two sides. The results were very encouraging for the

113 Shukrī, *al-Sanūsiyya dīn wa dawla*, pp. 224–225.

114 Wathīqā 11, *Risāla min al-'amīr 'Uthmān Fū'ād ilā Aḥmed Bik al-Marīḍ*, 2-2-1918, al-Wathā'iq al-ijtimā'iyya, shu'bat al-wathā'iq wa al-makhtūṭāt, al-markaz al-waṭanī li-l-wathā'iq wa al-māḥafūḍāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis.

Ottomans, as they had Misurata as a field of their activity. That was the reason for the return of Prince Osman Fouad to Libya, representing the Turkish side.¹¹⁵ The German Paul Freiherr Wolff von Todenwarth was commissioned to resume representation of the German side and to implement the German policy in 1918.¹¹⁶ Both leaders arrived and worked on the implementation of the task. The German baron assumed the task of managing the telegraph in Misurata, and therefore was responsible for communication, coordination and command operations, which was a delicate task at that particular stage. It was decided by the Ottomans that Libya was to be the main base of their operations in North Africa. The two sides decided to make a major change in the process of moving the front of Libya. This time, the main emphasis was laid on the extension of the *mujāhidīn* in the west, with better arms and financial support. This decision was issued by German military staff in Berlin,¹¹⁷ which sent a letter to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 4, 1917 to inform them of the plans.¹¹⁸ The military leadership sought to implement this plan in Libya, supported by weapons and equipment transported by German submarines from Germany.¹¹⁹ The starting point was to be from the west heading east and thus involving the largest possible number of Libyan people. This time, the primary aim of the *mujāhidīn* was to expel the Italian presence from Libya. The Ottomans received assistance from Germany in the delivery of military support to the Libyan *jihād* in Misurata (see Appendix 4). The Italians tried hard to prevent the arrival of those supplies. For example, the German submarine UC73, led by Commander Schebeler, reached the city of Misurata carrying three Ottoman officers, 1,000 rifles, 200,000 bullets in addition to 18 boxes filled with gold. Bad weather forced the submarine to dock in the Gulf of Sirte, where its cargo was unloaded on May 26, 1917.¹²⁰ The Italian forces tried to take possession of the submarine and even continued in their efforts when it reached the port, but the counter-attack of the *mujāhidīn* forced them to retreat.¹²¹ This Italian attack came as a reaction against the German forces attacking Italian targets in April 1917. Examples include the German submarine U20 missile attack on an Italian ship in front of the city of Zuwarah in western Libya. They

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Wathīqā 12617, Wathā'iq al-'arshif al-siyāsī al-'almānī, wathā'iq muṣawarā bi-shu'bat al-wathā'iq al-ajnabiyya, al-markaz al-waṭānī li-l-māhafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis.

120 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 2.

121 al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, p. 291.

also attacked another frigate off the coast of Tripoli and detonated it.¹²² The political action was moving toward reviving the idea (begun in 1914) of establishing the Republic of North Africa. This idea received strong support from Germany, Austria and the Ottoman Empire in 1915. A number of *jihad* movements established by youth from Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco aimed at *jihad* against the European occupation participated in these activities. Their aim was also to establish one united republic in North Africa. They aimed to build the republic with political borders starting from the Red Sea in Egypt in the east, to the Atlantic Ocean in the west. They took the Tunisian-Libyan border as the starting point for their activities. Their activities were supported by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which received representatives of this entity and promised them support and assistance. The German ambassador in Istanbul was one of the strongest supporters to this movement. Germany and Austria committed to this movement. Germany provided equipment and weapons.¹²³ The internal situation in Libya was very suitable for the development of this scheme because Italian control over the country during this stage was weak and limited to a few coastal cities. Despite this, the Italian administration in Tripoli discovered the scheme.¹²⁴ Despite all these events, German-Ottoman aid to the Libyan *mujāhidīn* did not stop. The reliance on German submarines made the port city of Misurata a vital area for the movement and landing of cargo.¹²⁵ The Germans intensified their activity during 1917, particularly between May and December. In May, a mission from the German army reached the submarine U20, led by Rittmeister Freiherr (baron) v. Todenwarth. The other submarine, UC20, was doing the same during the month of July 1917 and had succeeded in its mission. On July 30, it bombed important Italian military targets in the city of al-Khums near Misurata, the Italians bombed back, which forced the submarine to dive and stay away from the coast.¹²⁶ In October 1917, the submarines attacked Italian targets while at the same time continuing to transfer military support for the Libyan *mujāhidīn*. On October 4, the submarine UC73 transported an estimated 25 tons of military equipment to the city of Misurata and on October 6 attacked the Italian vessel and an Italian protection boat which had been docked in Tripoli with two missiles. On the next day, Italian fortifications in the city of Tripoli were attacked.

122 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 2.

123 'Amīsh, *al-Tārīkh al-sīyāsī*, p. 101.

124 Wathīqā 322/371, al-wathā'iq al-injīlīziyya, shu'bat al-wathā'iq al-ajnabiyya, al-markaz al-waṭa'ni li-l-māḥafūḍāt wa al-dirāsāt al-tārikhiyya, Ṭarābulis.

125 al-Tilisi, *Ba'd al-qurḍabiyya*, p. 12.

126 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 3.

The Ottoman Empire tried in 1918 to reinforce its influence in Libya after the loss suffered in Egypt and the failure of all the Turkish activities inside Libya. Evidence of this is provided by the fact that the Germans were behind the selection of Prince Osman Fouad as a general governor in Libya in 1918 (see Appendix 7) because Germany wanted him to mobilize the *mujāhidīn* to reignite war in Libya.¹²⁷ Germany had offered to provide Turkey with two German leaders to accompany him on his mission. But Enver Pasha rejected the German offer. However, he arrived in Libya accompanied by a number of German experts on board a German submarine. Their field of operation was telecommunications and advisers to Prince Osman Fouad.¹²⁸ In addition, he was assigned the task of reconciling the views of the Ottomans and Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf. During the negotiation between Germany and Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf, he sent Moḥammad Ṣadiq as his delegate to reach an agreement with the German party.¹²⁹ The fact that Sayyid Aḥmed al-Sharīf sent a representative to the meeting on his behalf reflected his support for the German project. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Azzām had fought against the British in Egypt and then returned with Nuri Bey to Libya and remained with him until they left together in early 1918 to Turkey. From there he was sent to Berlin to enter negotiations with Germany to send military equipment to Libya. Therefore, he was well known to the military and political powers in Germany, who approved him to be the companion of Prince Osman on his new mission in Libya.¹³⁰ Despite the departure of Nuri Bey from Libya, the Ottoman government sent a number of leaders to take over and complete the task that he had begun. Ishaq Pasha, an officer in the Ottoman army, was selected as Nuri Bey’s replacement as the commander of Ottoman forces on the western front in early 1918. However, unlike Nuri Bey, he did not take Misurata as a center for his leadership, but headed west and settled in the city of Zawiya. A conflict developed between Ishaq Pasha and Ramaḍān al-Swiḥli over leadership tasks, and Ramaḍān al-Swiḥli maintained that he was the higher commander. The conflicts intensified over the issue of who should receive the military and financial aid sent by German submarines to Libya. Whilst Ramaḍān al-Swiḥli argued that this aid and ammunition should be kept within the area of influence, the Ottoman commander Ishaq Pasha recommended the transfer of all arms and ammunition to the headquarters at Zawiya, arguing that the western region was the most important field of fighting against the Italians and experienced the most battles

127 Hūwidī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 170.

128 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 4.

129 Hūwidī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 168.

130 Shukrī, *al-Sanūsiyya dīn wa dawla*, pp. 229, 231.

and clashes at this time. The conflicts intensified to the extent that the Turkish commander set up a military campaign to force Ramaḍān al-Swiḥli to execute his orders. However, the intervention of Prince Osman Fouad came with positive results and prevented further losses on the side of the *mujāhidīn*.¹³¹ At the beginning of 1918, the German submarine continued to assault Italian targets in Libya. For example, submarine UC73 attacked the Italian ships on the coast of the city of Tripoli on January 2, 1918. At the beginning of November 1918, some of these submarines were attacked in Tripoli, making it difficult for them to continue their activities. They had also received orders that the coast where they operated was unsafe.¹³²

This period was the end of World War I, when the defeat of Germany had become clear. Accordingly, the field of the military operations developed negatively for the Ottoman Empire and Germany alike. They were defeated by the allies. This was the background to the signing of the Treaty of Modros at the end of October, 1918.¹³³ One of the terms of this treaty was that the Ottoman state had to withdraw all armies from all the Arab countries. Based on that, they issued orders to their officers in Libya to abandon military operations against Italy and even surrender to the Italians. They were also obliged to hand over all the ports under their control to the allied armies.¹³⁴ This was the beginning of the end of Ottoman-German relations in Libya, as it was also the start of breaking the link between the Ottomans and Libya, in spite of which Prince Osman Fouad continued to be present in Misurata.¹³⁵ Von Todenwarth was present in Misurata at this time and received the news of the defeat over the radio in October 1918. He received orders to leave Libya, along with Prince Osman Fouad and all the Turkish officers as well as the German who were working with him. He received these orders, but did not carry them out directly. He thought it was wise to postpone the execution of these orders somewhat so they could arrange the political situation in Libya.¹³⁶

During this time, von Todenwarth learned that Germany intended to continue the war until the end, and that they were committed to helping the Libyans with money and weapons. In return, the leaders of *jihad* in Libya announced their willingness to form a local government to ensure the continuity of the war against the Italians in a united manner. In the meantime, there was a German submarine

131 Hūwīdī, *al-Ḥaraka al-waṭaniyya fī sharq Libiyā*, p. 167.

132 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 4.

133 Brūkilmān, *Tārīkh al-shu‘ūb al-islāmīyya*, p. 605; ‘Amīsh, *al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī*, p. 63.

134 al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, pp. 304–305.

135 Wathīqā 54, *al-wathā‘iq al-iṭālīyya*, p. 207.

136 ‘Amīsh, *al-Tārīkh al-siyāsī*, p. 63.

docked off the coast of Misurata.¹³⁷ This submarine arrived to take Prince Osman and the German Baron and their officers and soldiers. But they decided to stay and were supported by the commander of the submarine in their decision, who told them that the route was not safe and it was not the right time to travel. Thus, the submarine turned back. The *jihād* leaders in Libya, Prince Osman, and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Azzām held an emergency meeting to take the appropriate decision in line with the dangerous developments.

Prince Osman sent an invitation to all tribal leaders to come to Mislata for a meeting, which took place in the city of Mislata in 1918 and concluded with the declaration of the Republic of Tripoli.¹³⁸ The republic included all tribal leaders and dignitaries in the western region of the country. This stage was particularly critical because Germany and the Ottoman Empire had withdrawn from the conflict, which meant the end of military supplies and equipment for the *mujāhidīn*¹³⁹ essential for their struggle against the Italians. This made the role of local fighters even more crucial. The local leaders had a prominent role in the events that occurred during the final phase of World War I, particularly in the central and western regions of Libya. They included Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, who took leadership in the western region, Ramaḍān al-Swiḥilī, who had an alliance with the Italians and fought against the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement, and ‘Abdul Nabī Bilkhīr, who was the leader of the Warfalla tribe in the area of Bani Walid in the north-west of Libya, who had also collaborated with the Italians, and Aḥmed Bik al-Mariḍ, the leader of the Tarhuna tribe in the southeast. The idea of proclaiming the Republic of Tripoli was an extension of the idea of the Republic of North Africa, which had been adopted and supported by Germany during the early years of World War I. At this stage, Germany also supported this idea, but on a small scale. It was seeking to achieve political gains after its defeat in the war. The leaders of the Republic of Tripoli wanted to obtain international recognition. They sent messages to Britain, France, Italy and the United States to this end but their efforts did not achieve the desired results.¹⁴⁰ However, they kept their contact with Italy independently and succeeded in signing an agreement with it in 1919. The direct result was the immediate issuance of a basic law for Tripoli, by which the Libyans could form a parliament in the presence of a governor to be appointed by the king of Italy.¹⁴¹ With the defeat of Germany and the Ottoman Empire and the actual withdrawal

137 U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der Libyschen Küste 1915–1918, p. 4.

138 al-Zāwī, *Jihād al-abṭāl*, pp. 310–311.

139 ‘Amīsh, *al-Tārikh al-siyāsī*, p. 63.

140 al-Ḥasan, *al-Anẓima al-siyāsīyya wa al-distūriyya*, p. 390.

141 *Ibid.*, pp. 390–391.

of all officers from Libya in 1919, the Ottomans were subjected to strong pressures by the allied powers and forced to sign a number of treaties that led to the end of their influence and the despoiling of large territories that were under their control. This deteriorating situation led Muṣṭafa Kemal Atatürk (ruled 1881–1938) to declare a Turkish secular state when he separated the sultanate and caliphate. He then canceled the sultanate and announced the republic in October 1923.¹⁴² At that time, Germany had elected a new government called the Weimar Republic.

These international events greatly affected German policy toward the Mediterranean countries in general and Libya in particular, as the latter had been at the heart of German policy in this area during World War I.

142 Waḥīd, *al-Qawl al-mufīd fī ḥukum al-sulṭān ‘Abdul-Ḥamīd*, p. 307.

Conclusion

This book explored the nature of German interests in the province of Tripoli between 1884 and 1918, and Tripoli's role in German politics during the scramble for Africa. This was undertaken through an analysis of the general situation in Tripoli during the period in question to understand the nature of the relationship between Germany and Tripoli. An important aspect in understanding German policies of the time is the role of German travelers, who lobbied hard to attract German politicians to the province, and, along with a number of businesspeople, pushed for the opening of a German consulate there. Furthermore, the period of the Ottoman Empire reforms (*Tanzīmāt*), which led to changes in policies towards the province and in a way allowed the Italian occupation mainly in the North. It allows in a way as well, the main international events and agreements in the context of the imperial and colonial competition. The German role during the World War I and its impact on the Libyan *jihad* movement against the occupation and colonization beginning from the year 1915. Germany was trying to emulate the major European powers, notably Britain and France, by extending its control beyond Europe. Germany had political, strategic and economic interests in North Africa, especially in the province of Tripoli, but did not pursue colonial intentions like the other European countries. To realize these goals, Germany started to strengthen its relations with the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 19th century. It supported the development and training of the Ottoman military forces via the transfer of German military personnel and equipment to Turkey.¹ In this way, Germany provided the Ottoman army forces with weapons specifically for the artillery and infantry, different types of German-designed and manufactured field guns, rifles and carbines.² It also established large-scale economic projects, most prominently the Baghdad railway. Germany already had a political and military presence in parts of central Africa, and Germany viewed the province of Tripoli as the gate to reach the German colonies in Africa in the context of European colonization of different parts of Africa. World War I ended with the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The Political Archive and the Federal Archives in Berlin (Politisches Archiv and Bundesarchiv), and the National Center for Documentation and Archives in Libya, and the Casbah Qaṣba (archive in Tunis bring new information on the economic exchange between Germany and the province

1 Trumpener, Ulrich, German Military Aid to Turkey in 1914: An Historical Re-Evaluation, *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 32-2, June, 1960, pp. 145–149.

2 “The Ottoman Empire”, New Zealand History, Ministry for Culture and Heritage, <http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/ottoman-empire>, updated 2-Sep-2014-2014, p. 12.

of Tripoli. It shows that the military aid provided by Germany to the *mujāhidīn* in Libya was important. It shows as well how the German involvement in Libya at that time was important for the reconstruction of a telegraph station like in Misurata in 1914. German expansion beyond Europe primarily aimed at strengthening its own position in Europe. Thus, this book shows that Germany employed the province of Tripoli to serve its growing international influence and competitiveness in Europe, particularly with Britain and France. Conrad and Osterhammel portray German activity in the province of Tripoli (then Libya) as falling within the informal colonial expansion of the German empire. In other words, the province of Tripoli was included in the informal colonial German Empire. To make this point clearer, Germany used trade as well as political penetration to gain control over territories that were not colonized in a military sense. Only in some territories, where the political and economic influence could not be guaranteed otherwise, Germany employed military means to secure its position. Tripoli was within the informal colonial sphere of Germany and was used not only as a gateway to its colonies in central Africa, but also as a market for its products. Most of all, however, Germany considered it as a means to jockey for a better position in Europe. Even if Germany did not colonize the province of Tripoli using any military means of occupation, it was able to penetrate the province economically and used it in a way that helped its international policy (*Weltpolitik*), described by Baumgart as an expression of its striving for world power (*Weltmacht*).³ The term “*Weltpolitik*” obtained its popularity after its use by the German Emperor Wilhelm III in his speech on January 18, 1896, as he celebrated the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the German Reich.⁴ German colonization in Africa was begun by the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1884–1885. This was later in comparison with Britain and France which had begun their expansionist policies in the 16th century. As the German chancellor had explained to Eugen Wolf, an explorer, much to the colonial enthusiasts’ regret in 1888:

Your map of Africa looks nice, but my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia, and here is France, and we are here at the very center; that is my map of Africa.⁵

This anecdote illustrates well the theoretical argumentation and the distinction between colonialism and imperialism suggested by Jürgen Osterhammel. Impe-

³ Baumgart, Winfried, “German Imperialism in Historical Perspective”, in *Germans in the Tropics. Essays in German Colonial History*, ed. by Arthur J. Knoll, Lewis H. Gonn, Greenwood Press, New York, 1987, p. 151.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

rialism as a relationship of domination between two culturally different powers in which one party controls the decisions of the other, who is forced to deal with these external pressures and serve the interests of the dominant party.⁶ Tripoli fell within German informal colonial expansion and penetration.

Firstly, Tripoli was a focus, not only for Germany, but for many European interests, because its ports were located in the middle of the Mediterranean and any power seeking to dominate the eastern, western, or internal parts of Africa would take this province as starting point. Thus, Tripoli's strategic importance lay in the fact that it made access to different parts of Africa easier. In addition, Tripoli was ruled by an Empire which had started to lose territories at an increasing rate. It started in a way in 1820s with the creation of Greece, this Ottoman province which began to campaign for its independence from the Ottoman Empire, and the creation of its own state. Since the Treaty of Berlin in 1878,⁷ the Ottoman Empire had lost 52% of its territories and 51% of its population.⁸

Secondly, the increasing number of German travelers who visited the province of Tripoli and the information they provided to their government reveal the imperial intentions of Germany toward the province. A number of these travelers were supported by the King of Prussia and then by Otto von Bismarck such as Friedrich Gerhard Rohlfs and Gustav Nachtigal, or Heinrich Barth amongst others. In addition to the support that the travelers received from their own government, they were also supported by the Ottoman Empire, which was focusing on building strong relations with Germany and strengthening its positions through the implementation of wide-reaching reforms. Consequently, the German travelers were more successful than others in their missions. The traveler Friedrich Gerhard Rohlfs (who traveled to the province of Tripoli several times in the 1860s) reported on the geography, the nature and the agriculture in these regions.⁹ He also wrote important notes regarding customs and traditions, health, and trade in Tripoli. He also wrote a number of documents that were sent to and used by the German chancelleries, who used them in making decisions and convincing the politicians.¹⁰ This information contributed substantially to the development of German policy on the province of Tripoli, especially in view of the good relations between the Prussian king and the chancellor. Rohlfs submitted a request to the

6 Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus: Geschichte – Formen – Folgen*, p. 21.

7 al-Jamīl, *al-'Arab wa al-'atrāk*, pp. 63–64.

8 Yorulmaz, Naci, *Arming the Sultan. German Arms, Trade and Personal Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire before World War I*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2014, pp. 2, 256.

9 Rohlfs, *Von Tripolis nach Alexandrien*, pp. 63, 78.

10 Rulfis, *Rihla ilā al-Kufrā*, pp. 228, 245, 249, 253, 265.

King to send a German consul to the province of Tripoli. The information that he supplied and his own views about the province of Tripoli were formative in awarding this province a particular status in the development of the German policy in Africa. He mentioned that Tripoli is “the key to Africa”.¹¹ Germany succeeded in reaching the southern desert in Africa by German travelers who used the province of Tripoli as a starting point. From here they were able to travel to many African kingdoms, such as Zanzibar. Germany also built strong relationships with the peoples of these kingdoms on the basis of cooperation and economic exchange without resorting to military occupation.

Thirdly, the entry of Germany into the scramble for Africa and the overlapping interests of the European powers and their ambitions in Africa resulted in conflicts between them. These conflicts were the main reason behind Otto von Bismarck’s organization of the Second Berlin Conference in 1878. This conference sought to settle the conflicts and to mark the borders of influence of each of the countries participating. The decisions and agreements signed during this conference had a significant impact on the region of North Africa and it has been argued that this conference was the beginning of European colonization of parts of Africa.¹² By calling this conference, Bismarck called himself the “honest broker” willing to solve the conflicts of the European powers without benefiting personally. Bismarck wanted Germany’s role in this conference to reflect its distinguished position among the other European countries and to highlight the German role in conflict mediation and resolution in Europe at that time. At the same time, however, his reference to the role of the disinterested “honest broker” denied any German ambitions to benefit from their hosting of the conference. His denial has been questioned in some studies, particularly given the threat that any rapprochement between Russia and France would constitute for Germany. For example, Carlson observes that

[t]he ‘Honest Broker’ worked to save the peace of Europe and to secure the interests of Austria at Russia’s expense for the benefit of Germany.¹³

11 Rulfis, *Riḥla ‘abar Afriqiya mushāhadāt al-rahḥāla al-‘almāni Rulfis*, p. 29.

12 Conrad, *German Colonialism*.

13 Carlson, M. Dale, “Bismarck the Dishonest Broker?”, Masters thesis submitted to the Department of History, Political Science and Philosophy. Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas (<http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/25771>), 1964, pp. 100–102.

Bismarck aimed at isolating France and was hostile to Russia, even if he was not averse to supporting their position in cases where this coincided with his own aims.

Bismarck was willing to come to a close understanding with Russia and to support them in an aggressive policy in the Balkans. However, Bismarck made his price high. German support of Russia in the best would be given only in return for support of German policy against France.¹⁴

European powers used the conference to realize their goals that enabled them in the scramble for Africa. Germany used the province of Tripoli as a bargaining chip at this conference. This is reflected in Bismarck's offering of Tripoli to Italy in exchange for Italy's desisting from military conflict. This bargain happened without the knowledge of the Ottoman Empire. The offer made was that Italy could exercise influence over the province of Tripoli, in return for permitting France full control over Tunisia. Germany's interest in strengthening its own position in Europe led it to enter into a number of agreements and treaties that enabled it to play an important international political reconciliation role. Thus, Bismarck's policy of rapprochement with France can be seen as limiting the primacy of Britain in the power constellation, while also constituting an obstacle to any attempt of a French attack on Germany.¹⁵ Tripoli was a point of conflict between Britain and France, especially when the two countries obtained contiguous colonies in Africa.¹⁶ Britain began to regard Germany as a threat due to its increasing political power, especially after the victory over France's traditional ally Britain. It therefore began trying to draw a new policy aimed at maintaining its strength within Europe and protecting its colonies abroad, particularly its strategic interests in the Mediterranean, Egypt, and India.¹⁷ Britain was primarily interested in the eastern part of the province of Tripoli, specifically Cyrenaica. By contrast, the French focused their attention on the south, specifically the city of Ghadames and its environs. This was due to the location of Ghadames on the colonial border with the Algerian territory, which had been under French occupation since 1830.¹⁸ Ghadames was also close to the colonial Tunisian territory, which had been subjected to the French protectorate since 1882. From these two regions, the French

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 103.

¹⁵ Conrad, *German Colonialism*, p. 21.

¹⁶ al-Dijānī, *Libiyā qubail al-iḥtilāl al-iṭālī*, p. 312.

¹⁷ Mommsen, *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, p. 72.

¹⁸ Nāji, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 77–78.

tried to extend their influence and control to Ghadames.¹⁹ Soon, Italy entered the conflict, as the Italian politicians realized the seriousness and effectiveness of their expansion policy and correspondingly used it to achieve their goals. Thus, Italy entered into an agreement with Germany and Austria-Hungary to obtain colonies in Africa. This agreement is known as the Triple Alliance, which was signed in 1882.²⁰ The same agreement was used by Italy as a defense mechanism against France, to stop France from expanding in the province of Tripoli as it had done previously in Tunisia.²¹ This alliance was restored several times. Italy also signed an agreement with Britain in 1887. In the same year, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck signed a bilateral agreement with Italy confirming Italy's right to occupy the province of Tripoli.²² Germany's stance was unambiguously hostile to French interests. Most of the European powers tried to isolate France or form coalitions against the French. This was also Germany's motivation for supporting the limitation of French control and influence in the provinces of Tripoli and Morocco. This was followed by the Anglo-French Agreement in 1899, the British-French-Italian Agreement in 1890, the Italian French Agreement in 1900, and the Franco-British Entente Cordiale in 1904. There were many results, but the most significant one in relation to the province of Tripoli was Italy's ability to acquire a political victory by taking advantage of the conflicting interests of the European countries and successfully exploiting these conflicting interests to occupy the province of Tripoli in 1911.

Fourthly, this book supported the argument of J.A. Hobson (1858–1940) that the economic gains were crucial for many colonial powers during the Industrial Revolution, when the European powers were competing for new markets and sources of raw materials. This book argues that Germany had economic interests in Tripoli and that there is evidence for an unequal trade balance between Germany and the province. Importing raw materials from the province of Tripoli was not as significant for Germany as using the province of Tripoli as a market for German products and as a means of transporting German exports further into Africa. Many trade centers and networks of routes were used by convoys were long established in the province of Tripoli, with significant economic uses for Germany. Examples of these routes are the Tripoli-Kano (Nigeria) road and

19 al-Ḥarīr, "al-Tamhīd li-l-ghazū al-iṭālī wa mauqif al-libiyyīn minhu", p. 21.

20 al-Dijānī, *Libiyā qubail al-iṭīlāl al-iṭālī*, p. 329; Shukrī, *al-Sanūsiyya dīn wa dawlā*, p. 109; *Weltgeschichte der Neuzeit*, p. 125.

21 Muḥāfaẓa, *Mawāqif al-duwal al-kubrā min al-waḥdā al-ʿarabiyya*, p. 26.

22 Ismāʿīl, *Tārīkh Afrīqiyyā al-ḥadīth*, p. 263.

Tripoli-Borno²³ road that lead to central Africa. Cities and ports like Tripoli, Benghazi, Sawkanh and Ghadames constituted important centers for German trade as the report²⁴ of the Political Archive (Politisches Archiv) in Berlin (July 1869 and October 1888) demonstrate. The report shows as well that Germany was collecting detailed information about raw materials available in the province, but did not import large amounts of these raw materials itself. In addition, the maritime commercial activity between the province of Tripoli and Germany was evidenced in the establishment of the German line (Deutsche Levante-Linie), which was one of the most important shipping companies. The main task of this company was the transportation of materials and products coming from or going to both Germany and Belgium.²⁵ However, not many goods were transported from Tripoli to Germany. Rather, goods exported from Tripoli tended to be destined for ports such as Egypt and Beirut. It is therefore defensible to argue that German imports into the province of Tripoli were more significant than the goods exported from the province. Goods imported by Germany into the province of Tripoli included haberdashery items, blankets, tea, sugar, iron, glass, perfumes, chemicals and medical materials, textile yarns, ropes, cotton, wool textiles, porcelain, gold and silver ornaments, and alcohol.²⁶ The export of German goods to the province of Tripoli continued during the year.²⁷ According to reports by Alfred Tilger, the German consul in the province of Tripoli it included the exchange of products like tea, beer, flour, steel products, machinery, and enamel.

Fifthly, the establishment of the German consulate in the province of Tripoli was a clear sign of growing German imperial intentions, as well as the country's desire to compete with other European powers. That was mainly because many European powers such as Britain, France, Spain and Italy had consulates in the province of Tripoli long before Germany, which decided only in 1884 to open not a consulate but a consular agency (*al-Wikāla al-Qunṣuliyya*). This was due to the insufficient number of German inhabitants in the province. However, this was changed in 1909, and the consulate was opened at a very critical point in time when the Ottoman Empire had started to change its policy towards the province of Tripoli. This was obvious as the Ottoman Empire started to introduce

23 'Āmir, *Tārīkh al-maghrb al-'arabī*, p. 157.

24 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten von Tripolis, Das Kaiserliche Konsulat in Tripoli, Bd. 1, vom Juli 1869 bis Oktober 1888, R901/52506.

25 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 76.

26 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, vom Juni 1884 bis Oktober 1904, R901/11936; Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 77; Nājī, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 55–56.

27 Bundesarchiv, Die Handels- und Schifffahrtsverhältnisse mit Tripolis, Bd. 1, Nr. II^o580¹⁶.

reforms and change the Ottoman governors when the province of Tripoli became the scene of the hidden conflict between the Ottomans (the Germans' friends) and Italy (with which Germany had entered into different agreements). At the same time, Italy was conducting many projects in the province of Tripoli that were more economic in nature, but with political intentions.²⁸ Moreover, the German consul Alfred Tilger provided very important information in his reports to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs containing not only economic but also political information. For example, one of his reports dating from 1912 contains detailed information on the new customs procedures implemented by the new authorities in Libya and the current economic activities in Libyan ports such as al-Khums, Misurata and Zuwarah. He states that all these ports had implemented the new customs system with reference to the continued flow of Libyan exports to Germany.²⁹ This was a critical time because Italy had occupied Libya (province of Tripoli) in 1911. During and after the Italian occupation of Libya, the German position was limited by two main factors. The first of these was its signing of the Triple Alliance and the second was its good relations with the Ottoman Empire. Despite these good relations, when Italy started the war against the Ottoman Empire in the province of Tripoli, Germany did not oppose Italy as Germany was part of the Triple Alliance. However, it did support the Ottomans in their war against Italy. In the meanwhile, World War I began in 1914 between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy (the Triple Alliance), and on the other side France, Russia and Great Britain. The Ottomans entered World War I in support of their ally Germany on October 29, 1914³⁰ after signing a military contract with them on October 27, 1913. This contract stipulated that Germany would take over the reform of the Ottoman military forces.³¹ Germany and the Triple Alliance tried to mobilize as much support as possible for their entry into the war. Thus, the policy makers in the Ottoman Empire promoted the idea of Islamic holy *jihad*, and asked the Islamic countries, especially those under their political control, to join them on this basis. It seems likely that this strategy was developed in response to a suggestion by an official at the German Embassy in Cairo, Max von Oppenheim.³² By invoking the concept of *jihad*, the Germans hoped to mobilize a larger degree of Muslim support for their efforts against the Russian, British and French forces

28 Marx, *Geschichte Afrikas*, p. 150.

29 Bundesarchiv, Die Jahres-Handelsberichte des Ksl. Vizekonsulats in Tripolis (Tripolitanien), R901/4443, vom August 1907 bis Juni 1916, Nr. II⁹1526.

30 Uyar and Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans*, p. 243.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 237.

32 Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, p. 13.

in the region.³³ However, because Libya was under Italian occupation, Germany tried to redirect the Islamic *jihad* in Libya toward fighting the British in Egypt rather than the Italians in Libya. Germany provided significant military support to the *mujāhidīn* in the form of military equipment, weapons and German submarines that helped in the transportation of military forces and equipment. Once again, Germany was successful in using Libya to serve its own goals and policies and could convince the Libyans to engage in many battles against the British in Egypt between 1915 and 1917.

1918 was considered the end of the scramble for Africa because of the defeat of the Triple Alliance in World War I and the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from different provinces in North Africa, including Libya. In this year, the Republic of Tripoli was declared, during which time the Weimar Republic was founded in Germany. To conclude, this book argues that the province of Tripoli fell within the sphere of informal German colonial expansion, where it was used to serve its imperial interests and policies. This was the case even if Germany did not occupy Libya militarily, but in a more informal sense, through its relationship with the Ottoman Empire.

33 Lüdke, *Jihad Made in Germany*, p. 45.

Glossary of Arabic Words

ʿAyyūn (sing. *ʿayn*): water sources or springs¹

Aqḍīya (sing. *qaḍā*): administrative divisions of the provinces ruled by the Ottoman Empire²

Bey: Ottoman title given to some governors in the Ottoman Empire³

Eyālet: largest administrative divisions in the Ottoman Empire⁴

Fatwa: legal opinion or learned interpretation by a qualified jurist or mufti given on issues pertaining to Islamic law⁵

Ḥāra: neighborhood.

al-Ḥalfa (sparto or Cortaderia selloana): species of palms, grows in poor and very dry soil and very high temperatures in North Africa, among other places, leaves are thin (one-millimeter width) and can be one meter long, used in handicrafts like producing mats⁶

Ḥaṣīr (mats): made of the sparto (*ḥalfa*), made manually or with looms and used domestically to sit on⁷

Ḥenna: plant, which leaves are dried and used to dye hair, skin or fingernails as body art⁸

al-Ḥizb: political party.

Eid al-Aḍḥa: Islamic festival two months after the fasting month of Ramaḍān, celebrated after Ḥaj⁹

Eid al-Fiṭr: Islamic festival, celebrated immediately after the fasting month of Ramaḍān, there are special prayers at this festival that gathers all Muslims together¹⁰

Jihad: armed struggle to defend Islam, whether in a territorial or ideological sense¹¹

al-Jihādiyya: tax imposed by the Ottoman Empire used to cover the expenses of *jihad*, at the beginning temporary, later continued to be permanently taken from local people in all Ottoman provinces and territories¹²

al-Jinn: supernatural creatures

Kalīm (mats): thicker than *ḥaṣīr* because they are made of wool and used to cover the walls or the ground to be protected from humidity¹³

1 Majma' al-lughā al-ʿarabiyya, *al-Muʿjam al-wajīz*, wizārat al-tarbiya wa al-taʿlīm, al-Qāhira, 1994, p. 443.

2 al-Wibā, *al-Idārā al-ʿuṯmāniyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 63.

3 Ṣabān, *al-Muʿjam al-mausuʿi li-l-mṣṭalahat al-ʿuṯmāniyyā al-tārikhiyya*, p. 63.

4 Ibid., p. 45.

5 Hallaq, Wael B., "Fatwa", *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*; Encyclopaedia.com, McAuliffe, *Encyclopaedia of the Quran*, pp. 35–42.

6 Nājī, *Tārikh Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 35.

7 Ibid., p. 51.

8 Majma' al-lughā al-ʿarabiyya, *al-Muʿjam al-wajīz*, p. 174.

9 Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-libī*, p. 36.

10 Ibid., p. 35.

11 McAuliffe, *Encyclopaedia of the Quran*, pp. 35–42.

12 al-Wibā, *al-Idārā al-ʿuṯmāniyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 160.

13 Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtamaʿ al-ʿarabī al-libī*, pp. 151–152.

- al-Kuwāriḡhliyya*: sons of Ottoman officers of diverse origins who married women from Tripoli¹⁴
- Liwā*: one of the largest administrative divisions in the Ottoman Empire and its provinces, headed by a *mutaşarrıf*, who was responsible to the governor¹⁵
- Majlis al-baladiyya*: municipal Council¹⁶
- Mujāhidīn*: persons involved in fighting in *jihad*¹⁷
- Mutaşarrıfıyya*: administrative divisions of Ottoman provinces, also called *sanjak*¹⁸
- Mutaṭawīūn*: persons who were voluntarily enlisted in the conscription or any military actions to defend their country¹⁹
- Nawāḡhī* (sing. *nāḡhiya*): smallest administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire and its provinces, and many of them were under the supervision of *qaḡā*; ²⁰ established in Tripoli after the reforms in 1869 that eliminated the position of *Shaykh al-balad*, while the Ottomans instead established localities with an elected board of elites of the city or town²¹
- Öşür* (*ushr*): Ottoman tax paid on agricultural products, farmers had to pay one tenth of their agriculture production such as wheat, barley and olives to the government²²
- Pasha*: Ottoman title given to honor some governors with military ranks in the Ottoman Empire, also given to the governors of the Ottoman provinces²³
- Qā'im maqām*: officer appointed by the Ottoman at the head of any district
- Qirsh*: silver currency used in the Ottoman Empire²⁴
- Qunşuliyya* (consulate): highest diplomatic representatives of a state in the territories of another state²⁵
- Ra'īs al-Baladiyya*: head of each municipality (*baladiyya*) and municipal council who was elected by local municipal notables with active suffrage (censitary suffrage)²⁶
- Şaḡra*: Great Desert at the beginning of south Libya, known by the main trade routes linking Tripoli with other trade centers in the south of the Sahara in Africa²⁷
- Sayyid*: Traditional title of descendants of the prophet and a religious position and title given to the leaders of the *al-Sanūsīyya* movement in Libya²⁸
- Shaykh al-balad*: mayor of the city.

14 *Baladiyyat Ṭarābulis fī mā'at 'ām 1286/1391H*, p. 412.

15 al-Wibā, *al-Idārā al-'ūthmāniyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 60.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 73–77.

17 Majma' al-lugha al-'arabiyya, *al-Mu'jam al-wasīf*, Dār al-shrūq, al-Qāhira, 2004, p. 124.

18 Masūwd, Jūbran, *al-Ra'ad mu'jam laghawī a'şrī*, Dār al-'ilim li-l-malāyīn, Bayrūt, 1992, p. 709.

19 *Ibid.*

20 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-'ūthmānī al-thānī*, p. 26; Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama' al-'arabī al-libī*, p. 19.

21 Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama' al-'arabī al-libī*, p. 30.

22 al-Wibā, *al-Idārā al-'ūthmāniyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, pp. 135–136.

23 Şabān, *al-Mu'jam al-mausu'ī li-l-mşālahat*, p. 52

24 Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama' al-'arabī al-libī*, pp. 205–205.

25 Majma' al-lugha al-'arabiyya, *al-Mu'jam al-wasīf*, p. 762.

26 Ibn Mūsā, *al-Mujtama' al-'arabī al-libī*, p. 30.

27 Brūshīn, *Tāriḡh Libiyā min nihāyāt al-qarn al-tāsi' 'aḡhar*, p. 43.

28 Morimoto, Kazuo (ed.), *Sayyids and Sharifs in Muslim Societies*, pp. 2, 11.

Shaykh al-Islām: It was the highest Islamic position in the Ottoman Empire, also called a mufti with not only a religious role, but also political and legal roles²⁹

Shaykh al-maḥalla: Head of a tribe, responsible in his area in front of the governor.³⁰

Sunna: deeds and sayings of the Islamic prophet Moḥammad

Sūq: market³¹

Tanẓimāt: political reforms between 1839 and 1876

Tarīqa Ṣūfiyya: mystical/spiritual schools or orders followed by some Muslims, Sufism emphasize the implementation of the orders of God and to avoid his prohibitions³²

Waqf (endowment): property withheld from market circulation to be dedicated to philanthropic or religious purposes³³

Werko: Ottoman annual tax also known as *mīrī*.³⁴

al-Wikāla al-Qunṣuliyya (consular agency): diplomatic representation of a lower grade than a consulate, provide help and support to national citizens and strengthen political, economic and cultural relations, sometimes the responsibility of such consular agency was given to a consulate of another state³⁵

Wilāyāt (province):³⁶ see *Eyālet*

Wukālā' (sing. *wakīl*): middleman or broker working for a person or company to represent them in commercial transactions³⁷

al-Yahūd: The Jews

29 Ḥalāq, Ḥasan wa 'Abās Ṣabbāgh, *al-Mu'jam al-jamī' fī al-muṣṭalāḥāt al-ayūbiyya wa al-mamlūkiyya wa al-ūthmāniyyā dhāt aluṣūl al-'arabiyyaa wa al-fārisiyya wa al-turkiyya: al-muṣṭalāḥāt al-idāriyyā wa al-'askariyya wa al-siyāsiyya wa al-iqtisādiyyā wa al-ijtimā'iyya wa al-'ailiyya*, Dār al-'ilim li-l-malāyīn, Bayrūt, 1999, p. 133.

30 Kūrū, *Libiyā athnā' al-'ahd al-ūthmāni al-thāni*, p. 27.

31 'Amara, Moḥammad, *Mu'jam al-muṣṭalāḥāt al-iqtisādiyyā*, Dār al-shrūq, al-Qāhira, 1993, p. 299.

32 Majma' al-lugha al-'arabiyya, *al-Mu'jam al-wajiz*, p. 374.

33 Extracted from <http://journal.mufad.org/attachments/article/452/7.pdf>, March 2016.

34 al-Wibā, *al-Idārā al-ūthmāniyyā fī Ṭarābulis al-ghārb*, p. 141-142.

35 al-Naṣar, 'Abd al-Waḥid, *al-Mu'assāt al-dawaliyya*, Dār ḥaṭīyn, al-Rabāt, 1994, p. 135; Farḥat, Ibn Ṣaf, *al-Ālāqāt al-qunṣuliyya*, Risālāt mājistir, Jami'āt Qsanṭina, 2013–2014, p. 88.

36 For this point see Isiksel, Günes, *La diplomatie ottomane sous le règne de Selim II*.

37 Majma' al-lugha al-'arabiyya, *al-Mu'jam al-wajiz*, p. 680.

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Appendix

1: Table of German exports to the province of Tripoli in 1910

Ein- & Ausfuhr-Liste
der Dampfer der "Deutsche Levante-Linie" in resp. aus Tripolis [Beck]
1910. Folgenr. N. 3


Name des Dampfers	Jahr	Von Hamburg ausgegangene Ladung	Von Beirut ausgegangene Ladung	Ausgangene Ladung f. Tripolis	Ausgangene Ladung f. Beirut & Sidon	Bemerkungen
Cleopatra	18. II. 10	100 kg. Kaffeebohnen 1000 - Indurumen 500 - Pfeffer 2000 - Indurumen 10000 - Reis 1000 - Leder 700 - Schokolade	/	5000 kg. Kaffeebohnen, Leder 500 - Pfeffer 1000 - Indurumen 1000 - Pfeffer 2000 Schokolade	1000 kg. Kaffeebohnen 1000 - Indurumen 900 - Pfeffer	nach Syrien
Anatolia	1. IV. 10	3000 kg. Tee	1000 kg. Kaffeebohnen 5000 - Pfeffer 1000 - Indurumen 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Kaffeebohnen	2000 Schokolade 500 Indurumen 2000 kg. Pfeffer 500 - Kaffeebohnen	1500 kg. Kaffeebohnen	nach Gambia na Alexandria
Thasos	7. V. 10	/	1000 kg. Kaffeebohnen 1500 - Pfeffer 500 - Indurumen 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer	/	5500 kg. Kaffeebohnen 1000 - Pfeffer	nach Amman - Libanon
Hybmos	19. V. 10	400 kg. Kaffeebohnen 400 - Pfeffer 1000 - Indurumen 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer	/	2000 Schokolade 500 Pfeffer 1000 kg. Pfeffer	/	/
Clodia	2. VI. 10	/	25000 kg. Kaffeebohnen 25000 - Pfeffer 1500 - Indurumen 100 - Pfeffer 100 - Pfeffer 100 - Pfeffer 100 - Pfeffer 100 - Pfeffer	1500 Schokolade 500 kg. Pfeffer 1000 - Pfeffer 1000 - Pfeffer	100 kg. Kaffeebohnen	nach Syrien
Anatolia	12. VI. 10	1200 kg. Kaffeebohnen 1000 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer	/	2500 Schokolade	1000 kg. Kaffeebohnen 500 - Pfeffer	nach Syrien
Sipont	19. VI. 10	500 kg. Kaffeebohnen 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer	/	1500 Schokolade 500 Pfeffer 250 Pfeffer 500 kg. Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer 500 - Pfeffer	2000 kg. Kaffeebohnen	nach Syrien

b. W.

Fortsetzung.

Name des Samplers	Datum	Von Hamburg eingegangene Ladung	Von Antwerpen eingegangene Ladung	Ausgang Ladung an Lyoner	Ausgang Ladung an diverse Länd.	Bemerkungen
Galata	13. VII. 10	400 kg. Seidenwaren 1400 „ Seidenwaren 400 „ Seidenwaren 350 „ Seiden 350 „ Seidenmaschinen 500 „ Leder 1000 „ Eisen 1150 „ Eisen 1500 „ Eisen 11000 „ Eisen	/	1500 Schafe 16 „ Wölfe 16 „ Kanarienvögel 18 400 kg. Wollgarn 4800 „ Wollgarn 2000 „ Wollgarn 1250 „ Wollgarn	/	/
Hios	18. VII. 10	/	1800 kg. Seiden 10 000 „ Seidenwaren 5800 „ Seidenwaren 58 000 „ Seiden 550 „ Seidenmaschinen 250 „ Seidenmaschinen 8000 „ Seiden 200 „ Leder 2000 „ Seidenwaren 400 „ Seidenwaren 400 „ Seiden	10 Kanarienvögel 2000 Bienen 4000 Wollgarn 750 Bienen	/	/
Os	14. IX. 10	/	800 kg. Seidenwaren 1500 „ Seiden 3000 „ Seidenwaren 350 „ Seiden 400 „ Seiden 30 000 „ Seiden 30 000 „ Seiden	700 Schafe 55 Kanarienvögel 40 Wölfe 3800 kg. Wollgarn 5000 „ Wollgarn 2000 „ Bienen 2000 „ Wollgarn	1400 kg. Wollgarn 150 „ Seidenwaren 100 „ Seidenwaren	nach Beirut nach Fappa
Os	23. IX. 10	/	24000 kg. Seiden 200 „ Seidenwaren 2550 „ Seiden 550 „ Seiden 1000 „ Seiden 1800 „ Seiden 400 „ Seiden	10 Kanarienvögel 140 Schafe 2000 kg. Wollgarn 1000 „ Seidenwaren	/	/
Tripolis (Afrika) den 21. Dezember 1910.						

2: A request submitted to the German government by Aktien-Gesellschaft für Bergbau und Hüttenindustrie in Frankfurt am Main to obtain the approval of the Ottoman authorities to search for nitrates in the province of Tripoli 1911



TELLUS
AKTIEN-GESELLSCHAFT
FÜR BERGBAU UND HÜTTENINDUSTRIE
FRANKFURT A. M.

24
FRANKFURT A. M., 6. März 1911
ZEIL 56-64.

grösster Beschleunigung eine Expedition auszurüsten und zu entsenden.

Das südtunesische Salpetergebiet reicht bis zur tripolitanischen Grenze, die erst vor kurzem von einer französisch-türkischen Kommission vermessen worden ist. Da es nicht unwahrscheinlich ist, dass die Nitratlager in tripolitanisches Gebiet hinein fortsetzen, möchten wir die eventuell zu entsendende Expedition einen Vorstoss in die tripolitanische Wüste ausführen lassen, was nur mit Unterstützung der Kaiserlich Ottomanischen Regierung angängig sein würde.

Im Hinblick auf die Bedeutung nordafrikanischer Nitratlager für Deutschland glauben wir auf das Interesse der Kaiserlich Deutschen Regierung für unsere Bestrebungen rechnen zu dürfen. Wir gestatten uns demzufolge die ganz ergebene Bitte, durch Vermittlung der Kaiserlich Deutschen Botschaft in Konstantinopel feststellen zu lassen, ob die Kaiserlich Ottomanische Regierung geneigt sein würde, die Untersuchung des zwischen dem Meridian von Ghadames und dem neunten Längengrad oe. v. Paris liegenden Teiles von Tripolitaniens auf nutzbare Mineralien zu bewilligen und zu unterstützen, sowie uns die Zusicherung zu erteilen, dass in-

nerhalb des Untersuchungsgebietes während der Expedition und der sich daran anschliessenden Studien, d.h. bis Ende 1912, an keine anderen Interessenten Schürferlaubnisse oder Konzessionen auf nutzbare Mineralien gegeben werden.


Wir wären bereit, mit der Kaiserlich Ottomanischen Regierung einen Vertrag einzugehen, nach welchem uns die Regierung das Ausbeutungsrecht auf irgendwelche durch die Expedition zwischen dem Meridian von Ghadames und dem neunten Grad östlicher Länge von Paris nachzuweisende Minerallagerstätten zugestände, wogegen ihr ein Anteil von 25% an dem nach Abzug einer Vordividende von 8% verbleibenden Reingewinn eingeräumt würde.

Ueber die südtunesischen Nitratfunde sind noch keine Nachrichten in die Öffentlichkeit gedrungen. Die Angelegenheit wird von den beteiligten Kreisen mit strengster Diskretion behandelt. Wir gestatten uns auf diesen Umstand aufmerksam zu machen, da das Bekanntwerden der Nitratfunde besonders in türkischen Kreisen zu übertriebenen Vorstellungen führen könnte und bitten ganz ergebenst, gütigst dahin zu wirken, dass bei den erbetenen Erkundigungen die Nitrate nicht erwähnt werden, sondern als Zweck der beabsichtigten Expedition eine Erfor-



schung der Mineralreichtümer im Allgemeinen angegeben wird,

Wir empfehlen uns
in ausgezeichneter Hochachtung
ganz ergebenst

TELLUS Aktiengesellschaft
für Bergbau und Hüttenindustrie



3: Libya's borders in the 19th and 20th centuries



4: The German submarines on the Libyan coast during World War I

U-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine an der libyschen Küste
1915-1918

19.	08.	1915	„UC 12“/Kptl. Palis, das vom 19.8.1915-9.12.1915 in <u>Polg</u> für Transportzwecke umgebaut worden war, vollführte 9.-23.12.1915 ein Fahrt von <u>Cattaro</u> nach <u>Bardija</u> an der nordafrikanischen Küste und zurück, um einen Materialtransport für die türkisch-arabische Landkriegführung zu überführen. Auf dem Hinwege wurde „UC 12“, nachdem es das begleitende „U 38“ verloren hatte, längere Zeit von „U 39“ geschleppt; auf dem Rückmarsch hat das nur 168 t große Boot die rund 700 sm lange Strecke mit eigener Maschinenkraft ohne Aufenthalt zurückgelegt.
12.	10.	1915	„U 35“/Korv. Kapt. Kophamel: Besondere Unternehmung nach der türkische (libyschen) Küste in Nordafrika. 28.10.1915: Bei Signalstation Heringstand auf Gallipoli Verbindung mit Land, Befehle der Mittelmeerdivision eingeholt, dann Marsch nach dem türkischen Stützpunkt <u>Orak</u> an der Kleinasiatischen Küste. 1.11.1915: dort 10 türkische Offiziere und Munition an Bord genommen zur Überführung nach Nordafrika, um die türkische Kriegführung gegen Ägypten zu unterstützen. Auch übernahm es „U 35“ unterwegs, 2 türkische Segler mit 120 Soldaten und Munition für Afrika, zeitweise in Windstille zu schleppen. 4.11.1915 nach beschwerlicher Überfahrt mit dem überlasteten Boot bei drückender Hitze im Hafen von Bardija an der afrikanischen Küste geankert, türkische Offiziere und Munition ausgeschifft. 5.11.1915 in der Bucht vor <u>Sollum</u> englischen Hilfskreuzer „Tara“, 1862 T, durch Torpedoschuß versenkt, Die Besatzung - Kommandant, Offizier und 79 Mann - in Booten nach Bardija geschleppt, als türkische Kriegsgefangene abgegeben. Danach im nahen Hafen von Sollum zwei zu Anker liegende englische Kanonenboote durch Geschützfeuer schwer beschädigt.
26.	11.	1915	„U 39“/Kptl. Forstmann: 13.12.1915: Begegnung mit „UC 12“, das als Transportboot von Cattaro nach der afrikanischen Küste unterwegs war, von „U 38“ dorthin hatte geschleppt werden sollen, die Verbindung mit „U 38“ aber nach der Oranto-straße verloren hatte. „U 39“ nimmt „UC 12“ in Schleppe, südwärts. 15.12.1915 abends wirft „U 39“ in Nähe von Bardija „UC 12“ los, tritt mit 20 t Treiböl Rückmarsch an.
19.	12.	1915	„U 38“/Kptl. Valentiner mit „UC 12“ zusammen von Cattaro ausgelaufen. Auf „U 38“ eingeschifft Der deutsche Konsul Dr. Pröbster, der türkische Major Djemal Bey, zwei arabische Häuptlinge, ferner 6 t Kriegsmaterial für die türkisch-arabische Landkriegführung in Afrika, 315 Gewehre, 93 000 Patronen, 1000 Pistolen mit Munition, eine Funkstation und Geld. Aufgabe für „U 38“: 1) „UC 12“ zur Überführung eines Transports nach Afrika durch Schleppen unterstützen. 2) Die eigene Ladung und das Personal nach Bardija bringen. 3) Handelskrieg. 9.12.-12.12.1915: „U 12“ zeitweise geschleppt, dann nicht mehr gefunden. 14.12.1915 in Bardija eingelaufen, Personal ausgeschifft, Ladung gelöscht. 15.12.1915: Der Kommandant „U 38“ entschließt sich nach Unterredung an Land über die militärische Lage in Nordafrika, sich und sein Boot noch länger in den Dienst der türkisch-arabischen Sache zu stellen. Die darauf folgenden Unternehmungen des U-Bootes gingen auf Kosten der Durchführung der Hauptaufgabe, des Handelskrieges, und waren nicht im Sinne des Flottenchefs und des Admiralstabs. 15.-19.12.1915 Aufenthalt an der afrikanischen Küste vor Bardija und Umgebung zur Deckung der an Land im Gange befindlichen Kampfhandlungen ohne nennenswertes Eingreifen des U-Bootes. 19.12.1915 abends von Bardija an die syrische Küste. 2.1.1916 in Marmaritsa, Kriegsmaterial für Afrika geladen; mit sechs türkischen Offizieren und Unteroffizieren nach Bardija in See gegangen. 4.1.1916 in der Bucht von Sollum wegen schlechten Wetters keine Ausschiffungsmöglichkeit. Daher Beschluß, Rückmarsch anzutreten, ohne Material und Personal an Land gebracht zu haben. 10.1.1916 Cattaro.
21.	12.	1915	„U 34“/Kptl. Rucker von Cattaro. Aufgabe: 1) 5 t Munition, Gewehre und Funkeinrichtung für die türkische Kriegführung gegen Ägypten nach Bardija bringen. 2) Verbindung suchen mit „UC 12“; dieses nötigenfalls von Bardija zurückschleppen. 22.12.1915 im Ionischen Meer „UC 12“ getroffen; Schleppen in dem stark bewachten Seegebiet nicht möglich. „UC 12“ setzt daher nach Vereinbarung Marsch nach Cattaro allein fort.

			26.12.1915 Bardija angelaufen und nach Löschen der Ladung wieder verlassen.
05.	02.	1916	„U 38“/Kptlt. Valentiner Befehl: 1) Sechs türkische Offiziere und Unteroffiziere sowie 10 t Kriegsmaterial nach Bardija zu bringen. 2) Handelskrieg. 10. und 11.2.1916 Das türkische Personal und Material in Bardija an Land gebracht.
10	04.	1916	„U 21“/Kptlt. Hering: Aufgabe: 1. Heerestransport, bestehend aus deutschem Oblt. Frhr. v. Todenwarth nebst Begleiter, vier türkischen Offizieren und Unteroffizieren, sowie Waffen, Munition, Funkeinrichtungen, Geld, nach Nordafrika bringen. 15.4.1916 östlich Tripolis an der Küste der Küste der Großen Syrte angelangt. Teils wegen Brandung, teils weil Verständigung mit arabischen Führern an Land nicht zu erreichen ist, kann Ausschiffung von Personal und Material nicht stattfinden, trotzdem dies bis zum 19.4. an mehreren Stellen der Küste versucht wird. 20.4.1916 Ankerplatz bei Marsa Brega verlassen, um Handelskrieg zu führen. Nach Verlauf dieser Unternehmung beschloß der Adminlstab, sich bezüglich der Entsendung von U-Booten nach Nordafrika gegenüber den Anforderungen des Heeres künftig mehr zurückhaltung aufzuerlegen.
05	07.	1916	„U39“/Kptlt. Forstmann hatte Auftrag, zunächst eine deutsche und eine türkische Heeresabordnung, erstere unter Führung des Oblt. Frhr. v. Todenwarth, zusammen sieben Köpfe, sowie Kriegsmaterial an die tripolitanische Küste zu landen. 8.-10.7.1916 die Heeresangehörigen und Munition an zwei verschiedenen Küstenstellen in Tripolis, bei Marsa Brega und Misrata, ausgeschifft. Danach Handelskrieg vor der nordafrikanischen Küste zwischen Tunis und Algier.
08	10.	1916	„U39“/Kptlt. Forstmann von Pola ausgelaufen mit der Aufgabe, Handelskrieg im westlichen Mittelmeer zu führen. Daneben sollte eine türkische Mission, bestehend aus dem Gouverneur von Tripolis, vier türkischen Offizieren und zwei arabischen Begleitern, an der tripolitani-schen Küste nebst Waffen und Munition gelandet sowie der deutsche Oblt. Frhr. v. Toden-warth von dort abgeholt werden. 13.10.1916 an der afrikanischen Küste bei Marsa Brega geankert; von dort auf Grund erhal-tenen Nachrichten nach Misrata, wo am 15.10. Personal und Material für Zwecke der türki-schen Kriegführung gelandet werden. 27.10. bei Misrata verabredungsgemäß Oblt. Frhr. v. Todenwarth und einen türkischen Offi-zier abgeholt, dann nochmals Marsa Brega angelaufen, dort nach Besprechungen einen wiete-ren türkischen Offizier sowie einen führenden Araber mit Begleitern auf „U 39“ emge-schifft und nach Cattaro gebracht.
00	09	1917	„UC 20“ und „UC 73“ waren für Transportzwecke im Mittelmeer besonders hergerichtet. Es wurde für notwendig gehalten, die türkische Kriegführung in Nordafrika gegen die Italiener und Engländer von den österreich-ungarischen Stützpunkten her durch Kriegsmaterial ver-schiedener Art zu unterstützen. Nur mit Tauchfahrzeugen war dies möglich. Statt der Minenschächte, welche bei den übrigen Booten des C II-Typs den Raum des Vor-schiffs einnahmen, besaßen die Transportboote Laderäume. Die Torpedo- und Geschützaus-rüstung der beiden Boote war die gleiche wie die der anderen CII-Boote
29	03.	1917	„UC 20“/Oblt z.S. Franz Becker. Überführung von drei türkischen Offizieren, vier türkischen Unteroffizieren und einer Ladung Kriegsmaterial (Geschütze, Maschinengewehre, Munition, Geld, Sanitätsmaterial) von Pola nach Tripolis. Handelskrieg vor der afrikanischen Küste. 4.-7.4. und 13.4.1917 an der afrikanischen Küste südlich Misrata das türkische Kriegsmaterial in besonderer Bootseinrichtung an Land geschafft. 11.4.1917: Vor <u>Zuara</u> westlich der Stadt Tripolis den auf Reede zu Anker liegenden, beim Löschen seiner Ladung beschäftigten italienischen D. „Candia“, 1045 T + durch U-Torpedo-schuß. 12.4.1917: Kasernenanlagen der Küstenstadt Homis beschossen. Zwei Landbatterien erwidern das Feuer des U-Bootes und zwingen zum Tauchen. 14.4.1917: Ital. Segler „Cingue Ottobre“, 39 T, mit Granaten abends ital. Schlepper „Pro-gresso“, 29 T, mit einem Leichter in Schlepp vor Tripolis angehalten, gesprengt, ebenso 15.4.1917 ital. Segler „Alessio Cocco“, 29 T, mit Ausrüstungsgegenständen für italienischen Truppen in Tripolis. Später am 15. U-Torpedofehlschuß, vielleicht durch Netz aufgehalten, gegen zu Anker liegenden Dampfer auf der Reede von Homis. Allgemein: Vor der tripolitanischen Küste nur geringe Bewachung.
24.	04.	1917	„UC 73“/Kptlt. Schapler: Von Helgoland über die <u>Shetlands</u> nach dem Mittelmeer zur U-Flottille Pola. Eingeschifft ein türkischer Offizier, drei türkische Unteroffiziere; Ladung: 1000 Gewehre, 200 000 Gewehrpatronen, 18 Kisten mit Gold und militärische Ausrüstungsgegenstände, zu überführen nach der afrikanischen Küste bei Misrata. 16.5.1917: Bei Misrata eingetroffen. Durch Brandung verspätetes Löschen der Ladung am

			21./22.5. 26.5.1917: In der Großen Syrte italienischen D. „Agrapas“, 850 T, aufgebracht, am gleichen Tage der türkischen Leitung zur Verfügung gestellt, italienische Besatzung in türkische Gefangenschaft gegeben. Dampfer auf Strand gesetzt und am 27.5. gesprengt. 30.5.1917: In der Morgendämmerung den Küstenplatz Bengasi mit 40 Granaten belegt. Kurz danach ein italienischen Torpedoboot zur Stelle, das zum Tauchen zwingt. Dauer der Unternehmung 44 Tage	
X	14.	05.	1917	„UC 20“/Oblt.z.S. v.d.Lühe: Transportfahrt nach Misrata, Handelskrieg Eingeschifft eine deutsche Heeresabordnung – Rittmeister Frhr. v. Todenwarth, ein Offiziersstellvertreter und vier Mann – sowie ein türkischer Hauptmann. 21.5.1917: An der afrikanischen Küste bei Misrata geankert, dort auch „UC 73“. 22.5.1917: Das als Ladung überführte Kriegsmaterial und die Expeditionsteilnehmer ausgeschifft. 27.5.1917: Wieder nach Misrata zurückgegangen. 30.5.1917: Dort eingetroffen. Wegen Brandung gelingt es erst am 3.6., türkisches Personal gemäß Vereinbarung an Bord zu nehmen. Dann Rückmarsch nach Pola.
	21.	07.	1917	„UC 73“/Kpdt. Schapler: Nach Melfa, Westseite der Großen Syrte, mit Kriegsmaterial. 25.7.1917 Am Ziel angelangt, Ladung gelöscht. Auf Rückmarsch befehlsgemäß kein Handelskrieg.
	22.	07.	1917	„UC 20“/Oblt.z.S. v.d.Lühe: Nach der Tripoli-Küste mit vier türkischen Offizieren und einer Ladung von 21 Tonnen Gewehre und Munition. 28. und 29.7.1917 Ladung und Personal am Bestimmungsort in Gegend von Misrata ausgeschifft. 30.7.1917 Militärische Anlagen des Hafens Homs beschossen. Landbatterien erwidern sofort das Feuer, U-Boot taucht. Rückmarsch. Auf Angriffsfähigkeit unterwegs wurde befehlsgemäß verzichtet, um nächsten Transport beschleunigt vorzubereiten.
	11.	08.	1917	„UC 73“/Kpdt. Schapler: Nach Misrata mit Gewehren, Gewehr- und Geschützmunition. 16.8.1917 Ladung am Bestimmungsort gelöscht.
	15.	08.	1917	„UC 20“/Oblt.z.S. v.d.Lühe: Nach dem gleichen Ziel mit einem türkischen Offizier, zwei türkischen Unteroffizieren, Gewehren, Gewehr- und und Geschützmunition sowie anderem Kriegsmaterial. 26.8.1917 Ladung bei Misrata gelöscht. Personal ausgeschifft, ohne Störung von feindlicher Seite.
	29.	09.	1917	„UC 73“/Kpdt. Schapler: Transportfahrt nach der libyschen Küste, Handelskrieg. 4.10.1917: 28 Tonnen Kriegsmaterial ohne Störung bei Misrata gelöscht. 5.10.1917: Für Rückfahrt 3 ½ Tonnen Rohgummi an Bord genommen. 6.10.1917: Westlich Tripoli zwei vergebliche Torpedoangriffe auf flachem Wasser gegen zu Anker liegenden italienischen Dampfer und Bewacher. 7.10.1917: In dem gleichen Gebiet einen befestigten Küstenplatz der Italiener unter Feuer genommen. 11.10.1917: Nordöstlich von Misrata griech. Segler „Georgios“, 560 T, + durch Geschützfeuer und Sprengen, ebenso 14.10.1917: vor Misrata italienischen D. „Lido G.“, 1003 T. 16.10.1917: Befestigte italienische (libysche) Küstenstadt Homs mit 42 Granaten belegt. Feuer wurde von Landgeschützen schwach erwidert. Rückfahrt wurde wie üblich ausgenutzt, um türkische Verbindungsleute zum Verkehr mit deutschem Generalstab nach Pola zu bringen.
	17.	10.	1917	„UC 20“/Oblt.z.S. v.d.Lühe: Transportfahrt nach der libyschen Küste, Handelskrieg im mittleren Mittelmeer. 28.10.1917: Vor der afrikanischen Küste bei Misrata geankert, Ladung an Land gegeben. Als Rückfracht Baumwolle und Rohgummi an Bord genommen. Abends am 28. Ankerplatz verlassen mit zwei Türken an Bord.
	27.	11.	1917	„UC 20“/Oblt.z.S. v.d.Lühe: Transportfahrt nach Misrata. 2:12.1917: Am Bestimmungsort geankert. Löschen der Ladung begonnen, aber wegen zunehmender Brandung abgebrochen. Bis 7.12. vor der Küste auf Beruhigung des Weiters gewartet, schließlich am 7. Rückmarsch angetreten, ohne den Rest von 16 Kisten Munition an Land gegeben zu haben.
	19.	12.	1917	„UC 73“/Oblt.z.S. Wiedemann: Von Pola Transportfahrt nach Misrata. 25.12.1917 nachts Löschen der Ladung in Misrata 1.-3.1.1918 Vor der Tripolitanischen Küste nach Angriffszielen gesucht.

			<p>2.1.1918 Vormittags zwischen Zuara und Tripolis ergebnisloser Angriff auf einen Gruppe von 2 italienischen Dampfern.</p> <p>3.1.1918 Nochmals auf der Reede von Misrata geankert, türkische Passagiere an Bord genommen, dann Rückmarsch.</p>
26.	12.	1917	<p>„UC 20“/Oblt.z.S. Kämpel: Transportfahrt von Pola nach Misrata</p> <p>3.1.1918 Vor Misrata enttroffen, Ladung gelöscht und ausgelaufen.</p> <p>4.1.1918 Vor Tripolis Unterwasserangriff auf einzelnen Dampfer. Torpedotreffer. Dann aufgetaucht um den Dampfer, der beschleunigt verlassen wird, durch Geschützfeuer zu versenken. Boot muß jedoch, nachdem der Dampfer einige Treffer erhalten hat, wieder unter Wasser gehen, da eine Landbatterie von Tripolis wirkungsvoll Feuer eröffnet.</p>
12.	02.	1918	<p>„UC 73“/Oblt.z.S. Wiedemann: Von Pola Transportfahrt nach der afrikanischen Küste. Als Passagiere zur Überfahrt 3 türkische Offiziere und 4 Unteroffiziere.</p> <p>18./19.2.1918 Ladung bei Misrata gelöscht.</p> <p>19. – 26.2.1918 Marsch von Misrata nach Aguila westlich Barsa Brega an der Großen Syrte, um türkische Offiziere nebst einer Ladung zu Zwecken der türkischen Landkriegführung dorthin zu überführen.</p> <p>Nach Erledigung dieses Auftrages von Misrata aus Rückmarsch.</p>
19.	03.	1918	<p>„UC 73“/Oblt.z.S. Wiedemann: Von Pola Transportfahrt nach der afrikanischen Küste mit 3 türkischen Offizieren und 3 Unteroffizieren.</p> <p>25.3.1918 Von der afrikanischen Küste bei Misrata geankert, Ladung gelöscht.</p> <p>29.3.1918 Westlich Tripolis 7 griechische Segler, zusammen etwa 100 t durch Sprengen versenkt. Danach Rückmarsch.</p>
09.	04.	1918	<p>„UC 20“/Oblt.z.S. Kukat: Von Pola Transportfahrt nach Misrata.</p> <p>19.4.1918 Im Laufe von 7 Stunden bei Kap Ras Chara, südlich Misrata, Ladung gelöscht, Rückfracht an Bord genommen.</p> <p>21.4.1918 Einen Amber nebst Ladung an einen Küstenplatz der Großen Syrte an Land geschafft. Dann Marsch nach Tripolis.</p> <p>24. – 27.4.1918 Vor Tripolis gekreuzt, kein Verkehr</p>
11.	05.	1918	<p>„UC 73“/Oblt.z.S. Wiedemann: Von Pola Transportfahrt nach der afrikanischen Küste.</p> <p>17.18.5.1918 Ladung bei Misrata gelöscht, Rückfracht an Bord genommen.</p>
30.	05.	1918	<p>UC 20/Oblt.z.S. Kukat: Von Pola Transport nach Misrata, danach Handelskrieg. Ladung: 18 t Munition, in Begleitung von 4 Türken.</p> <p>6.6.1918 Bei Misrata Ladung gelöscht. Bis 10.6. Aufenthalt in der Großen Syrte für Zwecke der Landkriegführung.</p> <p>10.6.1918 Von Misrata aus Rückmarsch.</p>
19.	06.	1918	<p>„UC 73“/Oblt.z.S. Otto Gerke: von Pola Transportfahrt nach Misrata</p> <p>26.6.1918 Bei Misrata Ladung gelöscht und Rückladung an Bord genommen.</p> <p>27.-30.6.1918 Verkehrsfahrt zwischen Misrata und Aguila für türkische Offiziere. Dann Handelskrieg</p>
27.	07.	1918	<p>UC 20/Oblt.z.S. Rohne: Von Pola Transportfahrt nach Misrata.</p> <p>2.8.1918 Vor Misrata geankert türkische Passagiere und 2 F.T.-Gäste für deutsche Landfunkstation ausgeschifft.</p> <p>3.8.1918 Ladung gelöscht – Danach bis 15.8. Verkehrsfahrt von „UC 20“ nach 2 Küstenplätzen an der Großen Syrte zum Überführen türkischer Passagiere hin und zurück. Beratungen an Land betreffend Krieg der Semussen.</p> <p>15.8.1918 Rückmarsch angetreten mit türkischen und arabischen Passagieren.</p>
24.	10.	1918	<p>„UC 73“/Oblt.z.S. Hagen: Letzte Transportfahrt von Pola nach Misrata, an die sich der Rückmarsch des Boots nach den heimischen Gewässern anschloß. Ladung Munition, Kriegsmaterial und Ausrüstungsgegenstände für ein arabische Expedition sowie eine Kiste Gold, 4 Kisten Silber. Als Begleitung türkische Offiziere.</p> <p>31.10.1918 Vor der afrikanischen Küste östlich Misrata geankert, türkische Passagiere an Land gesetzt.</p> <p>1.11.1918 Ladung gelöscht.</p> <p>2.11.1918 Von feindlichen Motorbooten auf flachen Wasser mit Geschützfeuer angegriffen. Daher auf tiefes Wasser gelaufen und wegen allgemeiner Unsicherheit der Küstengewässer sofort den Rückmarsch angetreten.</p> <p>4.11.1918 Im Ionischen Meer Funknachricht des B.d.U. aufgefangen, daß die Adria Häfen wegen ausgebrochenen Unruhen nicht mehr benutzbar wären. Rückmarsch nach Deutschland angetreten. Trinkwasser und Lebensmittel knapp, da die Besatzung des Bootes durch 10 deut-</p>

			sche Passagiere, die aus Misrata zurückgezogen werden sollten, auf 39 Köpfe angewachsen war. 2.12.1918 in Kiel eingelaufen.
30.	09.	1918	UC 20/Oblt.z.S. Rohne: Von Pola Transportfahrt nach der afrikanischen Küste. Tagebuchaufzeichnungen liegen nicht vor. 25.10.1918 Nach beendeter Transportfahrt in Spalato an der dalmatinischen Küste eingelaufen.

Quellen: Der Krieg zur See, Handelskrieg mit U-Booten, Band 3 bis 5 (Marinearchiv)

Erlebnisberichte dazu sind in folgenden Büchern zu finden:

„Ubootfahrer und Kamelreiter“, Ludwig Dinklage, Stuttgart 1939

„U 38 – Winkingerfahrten eines U-Boots“ Max Valentiner, Berlin 1934

5: Movement lines used by the German submarines journeys



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