EUROPE

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Narratives from Its Eastern Half

Edited by Johan Fornäs

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Chapter 1

Europe Faces Europe: An Introduction

Johan Fornäs

The European Commission (EC) has campaigned for a 'new narrative for Europe' to breathe new life into the European spirit. In March 2014, its cultural committee report emphasized the 'shared values of peace, freedom, democracy and rule of law' but also the role of culture as 'a major source of nourishment and supply for Europe's social and political body'. Indeed, cultural aspects linked to symbols and narratives seem increasingly central to Europe's future prospects, functioning as a means of identification and interaction between the severed halves of the continent.

Top European institutions, often in grand self-congratulatory terms, look for ways to use such aspects as strategic tools to secure popular support. This is done on several different levels, including, for instance, both the European Union (EU) and the much larger Council of Europe (CoE). However, redefining Europe is not just a top-down task for dominant institutions in Brussels. All over the continent, other actors have also for a long time been engaged in unfolding narrations that rework conventional traditions and thus redefine European identities, as critical movements and grass-roots debates either propel or challenge European interactions, adding new dimensions that serve to undermine or revitalize dominant discourses.

Since 1989, some of renegotiations of identity have particularly centred on the post-Communist borderlands of Eastern Europe. While this integration process has been a major concern for many on all levels and in all regions, little attention has so far been given to how East European voices themselves relate to Europe as a dynamic project. How is Europe identified in narratives from its eastern half? This is thus the core question asked in this volume based on the multidisciplinary research project 'Narratives of Europe'.[1] The book chapters' systematic in-depth studies of selected mediated discourses investigate how *Europe faces Europe* in a range of cultural fields, mapping, comparing and interpreting narratives circulating in phenomenological philosophy, international geopolitics, news journalism, social movements, visual art and popular music.

Narratives are powerful tools for shaping formations of identity, as they seek in various discourse fields to identify Europe's past, present and future. Such narratives are sometimes echoed in European studies but rarely closely investigated in terms of their main constituents and forms, or of the meanings and identities they give to Europe. Many previous studies of Europe have dealt with the political or economic dimensions of its history. Here focusing on cultural and narrative dimensions casts new light on the intricate processes that indicate in which directions European mentalities and structures of feeling are moving, and thus what Europe may become tomorrow.

This introductory chapter will first situate the issue of European narratives in relation to a series of recent and current transitions and then problematize the often assumed East–West divide. Next, theories of narrative identification are presented, leading to the suggestion of a methodological model for studying such narratives from a critical-hermeneutic perspective. Finally, some results of the six case studies will be summarized, indicating possible comparisons across cultural genres and fields as well as between different regions within Eastern Europe. The reading of this final part of the introduction can therefore also be postponed until after reading the empirical chapters.

Narratives of Europe

People living in as well as outside Europe develop ways to identify it in thought and (inter-)action, giving it a range of meanings that link it to a variable set of characteristic traits or values. Europeanness is then always intertwined with other identities, including those involving nationality, ethnicity, class, age, generation, gender, sexuality, religion and political affiliation. Identities are relationally constructed through discourses that construct differences to 'others', in Europe's case notably Islam, Asia, Africa and the US, even though they in some respects actually may also be regarded as integrated within that same Europe, for instance through Muslim immigrants or the strong US American influences on academia and popular culture.

Europe has no fixed essence or existence. It is always in a process of becoming: a Europe-in-process, always contested and always in a crisis. This process has – from varying positions and in shifting terms – been interpreted by a range of social theorists. Jürgen Habermas has, for instance, argued for new forms of interlinked public spheres that could serve as infrastructures for Europeans to communicate on shared issues and be 'united in diversity' (the European motto): with plurality not as a barrier but as a resource for unification.[2] Jacques Derrida has insisted on the acknowledgement of difference and alterity for a 'Europe still to become'.[3] Zygmunt Bauman likewise regards Europe as an unfinished adventure, defined by its lack of fixed identity and yearning for transgression.[4] Europe's rich history of superimposed differences has, Étienne Balibar argues, lent it a particular capacity to act 'as the interpreter of the world, translating languages and cultures in all directions'.[5] 'The future of Europe' is seen by Paul Ricoeur 'in terms of imagination', outlining a series of models for a 'post-national state' to combine identity and alterity at different levels: asking for a 'translation ethos' of hospitality that could mediate between different cultures, and where people take responsibility for 'the story of the other' in mobile identifications through readings that constitute narrative identities.[6]

Many have problematized the lack of sufficiently rich and successful narratives of a shared European identity. They have questioned the elitist and exclusivist nature of official conceptions of European identity, suggesting that they may obscure cultural complexity and diversity.[7] Policies devised and implemented by elites centrally and from the 'top down'

are too unresponsive to the more organically emerging cultural practices and symbols of European identity.[8] Oppositional narratives implicitly presuppose a grand narrative, usually centred on the EU HQ in Brussels, which serves as a contrast to their own alternative versions. Though the EU certainly has strived to develop a *doxa*, a core story of Europe's quest for greatness, this grand narrative is subverted and transgressed by the cross-currents of many different intersecting 'small' narratives found in the continent's various peripheries.[9]

Europe has thus always been an unfinished project, and in some kind of crisis. The twentieth-century world wars almost annihilated this whole project, and for more than four decades, it was in a semi-frozen state due to the forced separation between its eastern and western halves. The post-1989 eastern expansion of European institutions then demanded a reformulation of shared identities that could encompass diversity rather than being based on any given common characteristics.

This unexpected shift did not end the turmoil of European politics. Francis Fukuyama's vision of the end of politics in fact appears less and less relevant.[10] The reflections on narratives presented in this volume are not distanced meditations in a phase of calm stability. Instead, they are positioned in a highly transitory phase of history when European identity is again questioned and in crisis, as a series of further transitions and convulsions currently continue to challenge the project of European formation and integration. Geopolitically, there are changing patterns and growing sizes of migration as well as intra- and interregional shifts of balance, including the traumatic effects of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc on Russia's relations with the EU as well as with Ukraine and other neighbouring countries. The economy is troubled by shifting phases of marketization processes, including the raging financial crises that are even threatening to break up the EU. There is an ongoing restructuring of social relations between classes, genders, generations and ethnic groups, linked to the menacing growth of xenophobia, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, misogyny, anti-feminism and right-wing populist nationalism. Technological changes have given risen to the digital network media, which culturally enable new modes of representation across genres. These transitions are accompanied by swift political post-1989 changes, with the accelerating and expanding European integration process creating a demand to renegotiate the basic understanding of what it means to be European. Ann Rigney notes that '"Europe" is continuously narrativized, seen as a region in transition between the past (of division) and the future (of integration)'.[11] Integrating the experiences of ex-Communist East European countries into the European master narrative demands a renegotiation of how to evaluate and combine different regional and national experiences and traumas.[12] The EU and the geographically much larger CoE have sought ways to codify some kind of European identity, using key symbols to identify Europe from 'above' and 'within'.[13] Europe is more than just the EU, but this union's presence has installed a dominant institutional apparatus that frames how Europe is understood today, both inside and outside of the EU.

Such transformations of European identifications may be traced through the shifting narratives of Europe – as an idea, a geographical territory, a political-economic institution and a social community. Europeanness is identified and narrated in various

ways in different parts of Europe as well as in different genres of narration. Philosophical, political, journalistic, activist, art, musical and other mediated narratives have over time developed specific ways of depicting Europeanness, though there are also common threads between them.

Looking for New Narratives

In 2009, the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) initiated a project to look for 'New Narratives for Europe' since 'Europe needs a story to tell', according to ECF's then head of research and development, Odile Chenal.[14] ECF was set up in Geneva in 1954 and has since 1960 been based in Amsterdam. Its founders included the Swiss philosopher Denis de Rougemont and the French politician Robert Schuman, one of the leading architects behind the EU, the CoE and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and whose 'Schuman Declaration' proposed by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950 is annually celebrated on Europe Day (9th May).

Like several previous initiatives, often driven by the EU and the CoE, such as, for example, various 'People's Europe' and 'Europe for Citizens' initiatives from the 1970s until today, ECF's European narrative project was based on the apparent 'disconnection between Europe and its people, between the EU and its citizens', Chenal continued. The equation between Europe and the EU was taken for granted. The dissatisfaction with the Brussels bureaucracy seemed to fuel 'a withdrawal to within national borders'. 'Many people, especially young people, do not see the need for Europe between the local and the global. Europe as a project for peace and shared welfare, which was the vision after WWII, does not "work" any more. Even the magic of 1989 is forgotten.' Chenal argued that 'Eurocentrism is dead', and that 'WWII cannot engage as a widely-binding story across greater Europe' anymore, especially among the young generations in West and East Europe. Also, while 'unity in diversity' (or as the European motto actually goes, 'united in diversity') is a prominent narrative for European institutions, it is overly vague and too multiculturalist to convince Eurosceptics.[15]

ECF's wish to revitalize European narratives derived from two main factors, one temporal and the other spatial. One problem was the lapse of time and the generation shifts that made the historical motors behind unification slip into oblivion: young people apparently needed something more up to date than the last-century European wars to spark any enthusiasm for the EU. Another had to do with the geographical expansion eastward, as ECF representatives felt certain that East Europeans needed the European project to counteract Russian dominance in the region. However, these representatives suspected they wanted a slightly different kind of Europe than that constructed by the old West European narratives. To improve that situation, ECF supported and commissioned artistic projects, seminars and publications, gathering 'intellectuals, artists, politicians and journalists from across Europe and beyond'.

The EC 'new narrative' campaign mentioned in the beginning was a key step in that direction. In Brussels, on 23 April 2013, the EC president, José Manuel Barroso, launched another new project devoted to reformulating 'a new narrative for Europe'. 'Citizens' Dialogues' were organized, young people were specifically asked to contribute, and a special cultural committee of 20 distinguished members was set up, led by the Belgian art historian Paul Dujardin, artistic director of Palais des Beaux-Arts (BOZAR) in Brussels, and including, for instance, the Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas, the Icelandic visual artist Olafur Eliasson, the Basque sculptor Cristina Iglesias, the Hungarian author György Konrád, the director of the Free Word Centre, Rose Fenton, and the president of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Michał Kleiber. In Berlin, on 1 March 2014, the result was unveiled in the form of a declaration on a 'New Narrative for Europe'.[16] This initiative will be returned to later in this volume and is especially important for Carl Cederberg, who will relate the declaration to a long-standing philosophical tradition in European thought.

After some years of searching for a plurality of narratives, the report boldly stated that it is now time to present 'a new narrative for Europe for all citizens'. The declaration seems not to have impressed the general public. Just to mention one example, Michael Privot, director of the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), already on 27 February, two days before the declaration was launched, published a criticism on the EurActiv Network home page, describing the initiative as a move 'from myth to mythomania'. He attacked the illusions that the European project is motivated by a shared culture, spearheaded by the classical Western high culture heritage. Instead, the anti-racist ENAR network proposed its own 'progressive' narrative: 'Realising full equality, solidarity and well-being for All in Europe'. This critically responded to the leading institutions' austerity policies of crisis management, which had resulted in increasing resource gaps, the dismantling of social welfare and failing representative democracies: 'nobody can deny that culture and arts play a central role in our lives, but today Europeans want a future, not a culture'.[17]

Several narratives thus competed for influence, but Barroso and the cultural committee preferred to construct one coherent story out of this polyphony, abandoning the idea of 'new narratives' in favour of the singular: 'a new narrative'. Despite all initial talk of 'new' narratives for Europe, all reformulations seem also to reproduce what may be seen as 'a European master-narrative: the idea that all European nations have a history of bloody, deep, fundamental divisions that, at some point, were overcome', in the words of Amsterdam professor of European Studies Joep Leersen at the 2010 ECF seminar.[18]

The March 2014 Declaration of the EC Cultural Committee constructs a metaphor of Europe as a combination of mind and body. Europe's body consists of its social and political institutions, and this body needs a mind: it needs the sciences, the arts and cultural heritage to counter disintegrating 'populist and nationalist narratives'. The new narrative is meant to distil the essence of this mind: 'Europe is a state of mind formed and fostered by its spiritual, philosophical, artistic and scientific inheritance, and driven by the lessons of history'. It is based on 'civic, political and social movements that have defended the rights of those without power' and 'rooted in its shared values of peace, freedom, democracy and

rule of law'. The emphasis is on culture in the broad sense: 'Europe is an identity, an idea, an ideal'. Dark sides are mentioned, from colonial conquest, world wars and Communist dictatorships to the recent economic crisis – these together motivate the need for a narrative vision of a better future.[19]

Finally, 'Renaissance and cosmopolitanism' are suggested as the 'two cultural ideals' that should inspire Europe's future. These two concepts deserve some reflection. Both can be seen as just slightly revised versions of those core values that have long been central to Europe and are recurrently mentioned when European identity is discussed, for instance when Tzvetan Todorov identified rationality, justice, democracy, individual freedom, secularism and tolerance as Europe's leading political values.[20]

The EC Cultural Committee argues that 'Europe needs a societal paradigm shift – in fact, nothing short of a "New Renaissance"'. There was a general need for change, but instead of the too radical 'revolution' or the overly conservative 'resurrection', the more liberal term 'Renaissance' was used, combining a general idea of rebirth with a memory of those fifteenth- and sixteenth-century 'revolutions in thought' that laid the foundation for the modern 'Knowledge Society'. Just as that Renaissance period based its modernizing ideas on classical Greek and Roman heritage, this new European narrative likewise strives to combine innovative transformation with historical continuity.

The cosmopolitan spirit has for some decades been on the agenda in political practice as well as in social theory. The voice of Rem Koolhaas rings in the utopian vision 'to imagine Europe as one great mega-city interconnected by means of transportation and communication'.[21] This links to a European tradition of emphasizing intercultural communication, for instance symbolized by the windows, doors and bridges on the euro banknotes, but also resonant with the classical myth of the Middle East princess Europa being transported over the waters to Europe by a bull-shaped Zeus.[22] Translation, mobility and plurality have indeed long characterized this continent, and the focus on 'soft power' is in that spirit also recommended in this declaration. Cosmopolitanism combines the more general appraisal of (ethnic, linguistic, national, cultural and political) diversity with an urban sense of hybridity and transience that avoids the trappings of communitarianism and other kinds of identity politics that have threatened to undermine multicultural discourses from within.

These two ideals will not remain unquestioned. The nostalgic elements of the idea of renaissance might tend to reproduce traditional Eurocentrism and hinder those more critical voices from asking for a radical overturn of all forms of unjust domination, including those that have characterized each past 'golden age'. The city-centred ideology of cosmopolitanism might on the other hand annoy those who, for instance, wish to upgrade rural lifestyles. But their combination is effective, in that the difficulties of each (conservatism/trendiness) are balanced by corresponding strengths in the other, even though both tend to favour precisely those cultural and intellectual elites who support this declaration.

It is easy to criticize the declamatory pathos and blind spots of this recurrent quest for a visionary European narrative, not least when it is contrasted with the harsh realities of

South and East Europe's borderland conflicts on migration and Russia's backlash against the collapse of its former sphere of influence. Yet it may be wise to retain at least some version of the temporal perspective of resurrection or renaissance. Europeans may need to acknowledge their own participation in the self-inflicted tutelage and its ensuing disasters, and the necessity of taking responsibility for a better, more peaceful and just future. It may simply be more appropriate to build on narratives that live on among the people of Europe than to try and install an artificially constructed metanarrative from above. At the same time, it is important to retain a spatial and social perspective of communication based on diversity rather than on uniformity. The reason being that the striking national and subregional differences between cultures, languages and media systems within Europe – as well as its global interconnectivity through heavy two-way flows across its external borders – make it necessary to replace any unitary conceptions with a rich sense of diversity.

Divisions, Mirrorings and Continuities

There are thus multiple ways to identify as European, and such identifications continually transform through history. Identifications always come with divisions, and Europe has for long periods been subdivided along shifting axes, where each part mirrors itself in what it constructs as its opposite, while strong continuities still bind the halves together. The East–West divide is one such fold through which Europe faces Europe as the other yet the same, an imaginary dichotomy constructed by a number of discursive processes. Especially today, these processes are notoriously unstable due to the contemporary geopolitical transformations making all maps in need of continual revision.

Eastern and Western Europe were constructed as each other's opposites by the latter in the age of Enlightenment, with roots actually as far back as at least the division of the Roman Empire and Christianity into a western Catholic and an eastern Orthodox branch.[23] Eastern Europe was then ambiguously both included in and excluded from Europe, being placed in a precarious mediating position between Europe and the Orient. The post–World War II bifurcation drew the border differently, placing, for instance, Catholic Poland and other central European countries on the eastern side, but the divided structure remained in place.

This intermediary position has come into new focus as a consequence of the post-1989 fall of the Iron Curtain and the gradual inclusion of a series of former East bloc countries into the EU, subsequently necessitating a radical redrawing of the European map, redefining its internal and external boundaries, with the eastern periphery as one of the most intensely debated border areas.[24] This has called for a refiguring of European identity as well – what Europe and Europeanness means – as Eastern Europe's current efforts to re-identify its position within or vis-à-vis Europe are closely linked to Europe's parallel need to redefine its own meaning and identity, renarrating European history and reconfiguring its past, present and future.

By 1989, EU citizens had already for some time felt a growing need to vitalize a sense of European identification in order to underpin and legitimize the political-economic project of unification. This became even more urgent, as the inclusion of 'new Europe' radically expanded the geographic area and population of the EU, severely testing its political and economic resources. This expansion made a self-redefinition both necessary and much more difficult, as a lot of what West Europe had previously taken for granted was no more valid.

It is, in fact, impossible to map out a well-defined geopolitical East European area, as there are too many fuzzy borders involved. To the north and south, one may dispute which Baltic and Balkan countries belong here. To the east, it is virtually impossible to distinguish Eastern from Central Europe, as it is, for instance, hard to decide how much (if any) of the large Russian territory comes under Eastern Europe, and the post-Soviet countries as well as Turkey and other Middle East countries have shifting allegiances to Europe. The continent, therefore, has no clear eastern boundary. Since once divided by the Iron Curtain, even Germany may be seen as balancing between centre and periphery, and, for instance, the Czech Republic and Hungary are also variously identified as belonging to either Central or Eastern Europe.

Hence, East Europe is no strictly delineated entity. It is also far from homogenous. With radically divergent historical experiences, different countries have chosen distinct paths vis-à-vis the European project of unification – some joining the EU, others staying outside. Some regard themselves as East Europeans, while others prefer to see themselves as belonging to Central Europe, with the Soviet era merely a state of exception that by force temporarily prevented them from developing or displaying their true identity. Yet others are ambivalently split between self-identifying as either European or Eurasian.

This book thus questions the fundamental division between East and West. Still, it chooses to study precisely East European narratives that often define themselves as in some sense peripheral. There is of course a risk that this ambiguity might lead to an unintended reinforcement of the dichotomy. However, the intention here is to consider historical experiences and shed critical light on the conventions of European identities and differences in order to check where inherited categories do not suffice and make it possible to move further beyond the same divide.

The concepts of East–West as well as old–new Europe are thus all problematic dichotomizations that need to be carefully deconstructed, or in the words of Sudeep Dasgupta and Mireille Rosello at the University of Amsterdam:

> The rhetoric of linearity and teleology that separates old and new Europe not only hides the simplistic association between new and desirable, old and obsolete, but also obscures the fact that each part of Europe is both old and new in different ways and struggling to come to terms with what, about new and old, can be celebrated or critiqued.[25]

East–West divides, drawn both by Western and Eastern actors, are surprisingly persistent. Merje Kuus has highlighted postcolonial traits in the discourses that renegotiate Europe's East–West boundaries. She employs Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert M. Hayden's concept

of 'nesting orientalism' to describe how such dichotomy becomes a flexible gradation of Europeanness and Eastness, as each country strives to be accepted within Europe by othering its eastern neighbours, in a scale from Central Europe to East Europe's aspirations to Russia's outsiderhood.[26] Europe is never fully 'united' by this process, with the main dividing line being just continuously pushed eastwards.

Rather than focusing on any geopolitical mapping, this book will therefore give particular attention to a *peripherality of voice*. Different chapters will scrutinize and exemplify what this may mean and also discuss the problems of such an approach. The voices studied here claim to thematize Europe from a peripheral perspective, making a point of this marginal position, which they sometimes claim allows them to identify Europeanness differently than the central top-down statements from mighty European organizations such as the EU. Neither Europeanness nor peripherality can ever be defined once and for all, as they both are dynamic and relational concepts, always in a process of negotiation and contestation. The intervention made in this book aims to shift the focus from West to East Europe but even more to question the divide itself and reflect on the commonalities that transcend all such borders.

Peripheries are not necessarily of less importance than centres. On the contrary, Harold A. Innis has argued that changes tend to derive from the margins of society, where people need to invent new media and other cultural resources in order to challenge the authority of the centre.[27] Yuri Lotman has in a similar vein described peripheries of cultural spaces as more dynamic areas of 'semiotic dynamism', where new meanings are born of the confrontations between different cultural spaces, while centres tend to be more culturally rigid.[28] Meanings are most intensely renegotiated on the frontiers of a cultural field, and innovative renewal takes place through incessant interaction with the outside and the creation of innovatively hybrid cultural forms. This creative dynamic can only fully unfold when borders are at least relatively open, permeable and blurry, which was not quite the case during the cold war. However, in this sense, Eastern Europe has since the 1989 collapse of 'the wall' been a productive laboratory for the re-identification of Europe. Auksė Balčytienė argues that Eastern Europe's transitional societies are 'symbolic social laboratories where all the controversies and contemporary challenges of modern life can be tested' since these post-Communist societies have particularly rich experience of 'dealing with and assigning meaning to a very rapid change'.[29] If some East European narratives present themselves as peripheral to an imagined (Western) centre, they may therefore nevertheless be key to the formation of contemporary European identity.

The aim of this book is thus not to pinpoint an essential or fundamental Europeanness, nor any unitary East European voice. Instead, its purpose is to map out some of the crossing and multiple identifications that today are narrated and circulated in different media genres and geopolitical subregions in Eastern Europe, in counterpoint to such narratives of identification perceived as central and dominant. European identity is formed in interaction between symbolic identifications of Europe and the (individual and collective) self-understanding of Europeans. In this web of identification, narratives play a central and dynamic role, foregrounding the processual and temporal element of European

identifications, linking them to clusters of meaning that thematize Europe's character of an unfinished project moving from past to future.

Narratives of Europe are thus diverse and full of discursive tensions and contradictions, such as those between 'Fortress Europe' and Europe as a communicative node, between unity and diversity, stability and mobility, universalism and particularism, or pluralist cosmopolitanism and identity politics. Europe may be depicted as male or female, old or youthful, strong or fragile, linked to critical enlightenment or hyper-bureaucracy, steadily progressing to perfection, in tragic decline or resurrecting through catastrophes to maturity. Narratives of identification may refer to religious myths and rituals, historical events, political and economic practices and institutions, science and technology and the arts. There are traces of Christian heritage, colonial history, Enlightenment ideas of progress, experiences of war and many other kinds of old and new transnational connections. Some develop a quasi-utopian image of Europe as the cradle of Western civilization, prosperity, freedoms and rights. Others instead question such affirmative ideologies and formulate alternative or critical narratives of Europe in terms of colonialism, control and inequality. Still, others seem indifferent or direct themselves towards other poles of attraction, having no wish to jump on the pan-European bandwagon. This adds up to a complex and plural understanding of what Europe symbolizes and what it means to identify as European in different regions.

Narratives of Identification

Before introducing the case studies, the link between the concepts of identity and narrative deserves closer theoretical attention. The following is a general reflection on our own theoretical premises, which form a background to the following chapters, even when these basic assumptions may not be explicitly mentioned in them.

Identities are meanings attached to individual subjects or collective actors of some kind.[30] They emerge through acts of interpretation in which people use signs, symbols and texts of various kinds as expressions that characterize themselves or others. These identifying processes are dynamic, in that different people may in different contexts identify themselves or someone else differently, and also that such identifications change over time.

All personal, social and cultural identities are dynamic, multiple and relationally constructed through discourses that construct (but also emerge from) differences to various 'others', as, for instance, Stuart Hall repeatedly stressed:

> [I]dentities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions. They are subject to a radical historicization, and are constantly in the process of change and transformation.[31]

Julia Kristeva talks of the 'subject-in-process', and Ricoeur suggests a decentred selfhood of 'oneself as another' as a project or task rather than a given essence.[32] '[T]here is no essential

identity', Chantal Mouffe argues, 'but only forms of identification […], they are always contingent constructions made possible through a variety of practices, discourses and language games'.[33] Homi Bhabha stresses the openness and diversity of culture in his theoretical approach to cultural hybridity and in-betweenness. He defines culture in general as 'both transnational and translational' as a result of colonial histories of migration, making signifying processes increasingly complex.[34] He also notes that 'the margins of the nation displace the centre; the peoples of the periphery return to rewrite the history and fiction of the metropolis'.[35] Researching East European narratives of Europe is a way to trace precisely such multilevel interactions between centres and peripheries.

One symbolic form that in a particularly fascinating way identifies people is the *narrative*: the telling of stories. Storytelling has for quite a while now been a central keyword not only in social and cultural theory but also in various branding and policy discourses. This has even provoked a backlash, as some neo-materialist theories have tried to escape the spirals of narrative and look for other ways to analyse discourses. However, it remains stubbornly central to cultural processes and therefore also to cultural research. This is especially true for Europe, which is very much a product of narration about its fateful past and open-ended future.

Narratives are not all there is, but they are indeed a basic way of making sense of a person and community. Narration and identity are intrinsically interrelated, as narratives are integral to the formation of identities.[36] Collective as well as individual identities are construed through narrative acts. A basic condition of making sense of a person or community is that it is grasped in a narrative, relating it to a past and a future, and embedding it in a sociocultural web. Identities develop by the mediation of symbolic expressions forming narratives in words, images or sounds.[37] Narratives may be fragmented, jarred, discordant and incoherent, but they nonetheless enable signifying acts that produce webs of meaning that suggest some kind of identity for an individual or collective actor.

There are various ways to define the relation between discourse and narrative, but one option is to see narrative as a particular kind of discourse. In a very general sense, a discourse may be defined as a dialogically interwoven course of signifying acts or a conversation of voices where symbolic units are lined up into utterances.[38] Within this most heterogeneous dialogic flow, some textual units can form logical arguments or expressive performances, while some form temporal sequences that likewise tell temporally ordered stories – narrations.

While other modes of symbolic representation may offer still shots of identity positions, frozen into a fixed image of some kind, narratives add a temporal element of development and historical change. Lotman has described the symbol as serving as 'a condensed programme for the creative process', and the 'subsequent development of a plot' as 'the unfolding of a symbol's hidden possibilities'.[39] 'The essence of plot lies in selecting the events, which are the discrete units of plot, then giving them meaning and a temporal or causal or some other ordering'.[40] Narratives of identity are therefore particularly useful for understanding how identities are understood as transient and flexible processes, not just as fixed positions. It is certainly the case that Europe is emphatically in process rather than a frozen entity, and it is therefore useful to select narratives as a focus instead of flags, coins other more static modes of symbolic representation.[41]

Narratives construct a symbolic universe, an inhabitable textual world with which one may identify in order to understand oneself better. The interpretation of such narratives of Europe offers clues to the main ways in which Europe is today constructed. Lotman has emphasized how narratives give meaning to existence: 'By creating plot-texts humanity learnt to distinguish plots in life and in this way to make sense of life'.[42]

Ricoeur has developed similar ideas further and argued for the key role of narratives in self-understanding: 'To understand a text is to follow its movement from sense to reference: from what it says, to what it talks about. […] The text speaks of a possible world and of a possible way of orientating oneself within it'.[43] By following the 'arrow' of such narratives and reflecting upon where they point to, Europeans can get a richer sense of themselves and their collective trajectories. Narratives take part in constructing human lives, and 'the sense or the significance of a narrative stems from the *intersection of the world of the text and the world of the reader*'.[44] By 'applying to ourselves the plots that we have received from our culture and of trying on the different roles assumed by the favourite characters of the stories most dear to us […] we attempt to obtain a narrative understanding of ourselves'. Such *narrative identity* is 'a *self* instructed by cultural symbols, the first among which are the narratives handed down in our literary tradition. And these narratives give us a unity which is not substantial but narrative'.[45]

This is not only true of individual subjects but also of social collectives. 'We can speak of the self-constancy of a community, just as we spoke of it as applied to an individual subject. Individual and community are constituted in their identity by taking up narratives that become for them their actual history'.[46] Narratives and identities thus have a very strong bond. Hence, narratives of Europe are not just secondary elaborations of a pre-existing entity: rather than being produced by Europe, such narratives are the most central cultural processes through which Europe is produced!

Ricoeur distinguishes between 'two main uses of the concept of identity: identity as sameness (Latin: *idem*; English: *same*; German: *gleich*) and identity as selfhood (Latin: *ipse*; English: *self*; German: *Selbst*)'.[47] While sameness includes aspects such as numerical identity (in contrast to plurality), extreme resemblance (contrary to difference), uninterrupted continuity (in contrast to discontinuity) and permanence in time (contrary to diversity), the narrative identity of selfhood is a kind of ongoing project. It is the second sense of identity – as selfhood – that is of key interest in this context, where Europe appears not as anything already given or fixed in sameness but as a project in process. Narratives are necessary tools for identifying (individual and collective) subjects:

[T]he self does not know itself immediately, but only indirectly by the detour of the cultural signs of all sorts which are articulated on the symbolic mediations which always already articulate action and, among them, the narratives of everyday life. Narrative mediation underlines this remarkable characteristic of self-knowledge – that it is self-interpretation. The appropriation of the identity of the fictional character by the reader is one of its forms.[48]

Ricoeur's article 'Narrative Time' offers a complex philosophical argument against 'anti-narrativist epistemologists and structuralist literary critics' for having 'overlooked the temporal complexity of the narrative matrix constituted by the plot'.[49] In contrast to formalist and structuralist models, Ricoeur always emphasizes 'production, construction, dynamism' and defends 'the primacy of the activity that produces plots in relation to every sort of static structure'.[50] His three-level model of mimesis$_1$ or *prefiguration* (the proto-narrative structure of life itself), mimesis$_2$ or *configuration* (the work of composing textual narratives) and mimesis$_3$ or *refiguration* (the interpretation of narratives) expresses this processual perspective.[51] The following narrative studies do not strictly apply these terms but they also strive not to lock narratives into fixed structures; instead, they follow their historical development as a result of complex forms of social interaction and cultural dialogue.

What narratives add on top of what other modes of symbolic representation offer is thus a way of signifying transformation and change, making time meaningful. Ricoeur consistently stresses this point: 'I take temporality to be that structure of existence that reaches language in narrativity and narrativity to be the language structure that has temporality as its ultimate referent'.[52] What is ultimately at stake is 'the temporal character of human experience. The world unfolded by every narrative work is always a temporal world. […] [T]ime becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience'.[53] Ricoeur's hypothesis is 'that temporality cannot be spoken of in the direct discourse of phenomenology, but rather requires the mediation of the indirect discourse of narration'.[54] Working with mediating tools such as clocks, calendars and chronicles, narratives help culturalize temporality by bridging cosmological and experiential time in a similar manner as they assist people in inhabiting places, and thus culturalizing spatiality by linking geometrical to subjective space.[55]

Peter Brooks likewise underlines this 'dynamic aspect of narrative': 'the activity of shaping', which he calls 'plotting', through which stories 'come to be ordered in significant form'.[56] He also links narrative to temporality: 'Narrative is one of the large categories or systems of understanding that we use in our negotiations with reality, specifically, in the case of narrative, with the problem of temporality: man's time-boundedness, his consciousness of existence within the limits of mortality'.[57] His psychoanalytically oriented narrative interpretations strongly link temporality to mortality: 'If the motor of narrative is desire, totalizing, building ever-larger units of meaning, the ultimate determinants of meaning lie *at the end*, and narrative desire is ultimately, inexorably, desire *for* the end'.[58] However, this understanding is one-sided and needs to be supplemented with the other side of narrative: Ricoeur's emphasis on its creative capacity for shaping new possible worlds and giving birth to new adventures, new lives.

William Labov has defined narrative as a peculiar communicative technique to report a sequence of past events, retelling them in a similar order as they are remembered to have happened.[59] Description and narrative are, according to Tzvetan Todorov, two different modes of discourse or of fiction, where 'narrative requires the unfolding of an

action, change, difference', presupposing another kind of temporality than description.[60] Narratives may include descriptions, but descriptions alone are not enough to constitute a narrative. Narrative combines two main principles: *succession* and *transformation*.[61] It presents some kind of linear ordering that is not simply a succession of individual events but represents someone or something undergoing a transformation from one position or situation to another.

This means that narrative cannot be reduced just to temporality. It must also have other components, including the identification of a subject, an actor or a kind of character described by some means and then undergoes a process of change. Additionally, narrative is usually not merely this transformation process but a representation of such a process through various means of storytelling that make it possible to temporarily identify with that subject position and follow its transformation so to speak from within.

Studying Narrativity

To highlight the main dimensions of European identification thus requires a close study of key forms of narrative. There are many excellent examples of such research, particularly focusing on Eastern Europe. However, much of this research takes the concept of narrative for granted without explicitly specifying in any greater detail its core elements and dimensions. Often different narrative types are identified, labelled and mapped as they appear in various discourses, but without any clear account of the interpretive method used.[62] Heidi Armbruster, Craig Rollo and Ulrike H. Meinhof recount such narratives collected by interviewing different citizens; Kuus distinguishes between identity narratives (of civilization, sovereignty and security) among Estonians; and Anssi Paasi discusses spatial aspects of European images and identity narratives – but none makes quite clear what constitutes a narrative and how to analyse it.[63]

In their 1991 study of Yugoslavian TV news, Sabina Mihelj, Veronika Bajt and Miloš Pankov go further in this direction, as they examine how narratives construct an implied audience, key actors and dramatic structure; use deictic expressions, narrative voice and focalization and achieve different levels of narrative coherence.[64] In an interview study of US Americans, Hungarians and Russians talking about East–West relations, Attila Melegh also specifies an interpretive method aiming to reconstruct narrated life stories.[65] Still, much more can be said about how to map the dimensions and elements of such identifying narratives. Before outlining the specific narrative fields examined in the following chapters, some words, therefore, on how to approach narrative analysis, serving as a methodological reflection but not as a rigid model to be slavishly followed in each study.

As a symbolic mode of representation, narrative is the outcome of a cultural work, a meaning-making human activity. Gérard Genette has suggested useful concepts for this process, where a *story* is 'the signified or narrative content'; a *narrative* is 'the signifier,

statement, discourse or narrative text itself', and *narrating* is 'the producing narrative action and, by extension, the whole of the real or fictional situation in which that action takes place'.[66] It is the practice of narrating as a dynamic act that constructs narratives and thereby understands series of events (that would otherwise be unlinked fragments) as stories. As Ricoeur has stressed, all human life and identity are potentially narrative, and narrating practice can therefore make stories out of any experiential event, as there is a double affinity between texts and meaningful action, in that texts are in key respects dynamic action, while human acts, in turn, have text-like qualities and can thus be narrated.[67] As Marie-Laure Ryan argues, only some artefacts are deliberately constructed and normally understood and used as narratives, but all life, including images or music, can evoke a story and hence possess some degree of narrativity. The degree of narrativity is to some extent bound to which medium a text belongs to, and different theorists tend either to see it as an exclusively verbal phenomenon or as medium independent.[68]

In any case, narratives have a double bridging capacity. On one hand, playing with voices in narrating acts bridges the gap between self and other, by linking individuals to sociality, through constructions of identity and difference. On the other hand, the temporal process of narrating bridges the gap between past and present as the core mode of memory and historical consciousness.[69] Ricoeur strengthens the deep temporal dimension of narrativity in response to the a-chronological models of anti-narrative structuralism. He starts by describing the phenomenology of the act of following a story:

> Let us say that a story describes a series of actions and experiences made by a number of characters, whether real or imaginary. These characters are represented either in situations that change or as they relate to changes to which they then react. These changes, in turn, reveal hidden aspects of the situation and of the characters and engender a new predicament that calls for thinking, action, or both. The answer to this predicament advances the story to its conclusion.

> Following a story, correlatively, is understanding the successive actions, thoughts, and feelings in question insofar as they present a certain directedness.[70]

Ricoeur then mentions several ways in which structuralist narratologists have disregarded key features of how narrativity and temporality are mutually implicated. For instance, he identifies a commonly neglected 'fundamental feature of a narrative's temporal dialectic', which 'characterizes the plot as such, that is, as the objective correlate of the act of following a story':[71]

> [E]very narrative combines two dimensions in various proportions, one chronological and the other nonchronological. The first may be called the episodic dimension, which characterizes the story as made out of events. The second is the configurational dimension, according to which the plot construes significant wholes out of scattered events.[72]

Anti-narrativist writers overlook the latter dimension, as they reduce narratives to just sequences of isolated events: 'they do not see that the humblest narrative is always more than a chronological series of events and that in turn the configurational dimension cannot overcome the episodic dimension without suppressing the narrative itself'.[73] Ricoeur then reflects upon the role of memory, recollection and repetition in shaping temporality into something much more complex than just a linear succession from past to present to future, and narrative likewise into more than a linear progression from beginning to end.

Narration or storytelling is a mode of representation that thus through plotting (or emplotment) creates narratives that signify stories. Narratives represent and construct temporal processes by describing 'a series of actions and experiences made by a number of characters' in situations of change and action that 'reveal hidden aspects of the situation and of the characters'. Narratives have an 'episodic dimension' by consisting of a series of events, and a 'configurational dimension', as 'the plot construes significant wholes out of scattered events'.[74] In this way, narratives construct dynamic meanings and identities for individuals or collectives by having a temporal structure of beginning, progression and end, with main actors, problems and solutions.

The degree of narrativity differs between media genres. Narrative structures may be more easily discernible in verbal, literary and dramatic genres, but there may well be temporal sequencing in music and images as well. The narrative mode privileges the temporal sequencing of actions and events, but the composition work of narratives also makes room for the spatial simultaneity of complex multiplicities.[75] Narratives can take many shapes, making use not only of spoken and written language but also of musical and pictorial forms.

There are in all parts of human life always at the very minimum some elements of narrativity, at least as an inherent possibility. Most literary works are clearly narrative, often combining narratives on several different levels, from small stories and dialogues to the whole structure of a poem or a novel. In visual arts, narratives may sometimes be rudimentary in the artworks but then often instead spun around them in the interpretive discourses of artists, curators, reviewers and art publics. In music, narratives are presented in song lyrics but also in narrative musical structures – and here I disagree with Ryan's position.[76] In philosophical and political discourses, micronarratives will be found as elements of arguments with a descriptive or prescriptive rather than narrative overall character.

Todorov and Genette distinguish between three key parameters that together constitute narrative: (1) From where does the story come, what is its *point of view, aspect or voice*, who speaks in reality and in the story itself? (2) What *time or tense* does a narrative produce through the order and speed of its events? Selection, reordering, repetition, condensation and dispersal are compositional methods that both distort events and are simultaneously necessary for them to become intelligible; (3) What is the mood of a narrative, its type of discourse? For instance, showing by mimetic imitation or telling by diegetic narration.[77] Genette makes the observation that '*tense* and *mood* both operate at the level of connections between *story* and *narrative*, while *voice* designates the connections between both *narrating* and *narrative* and *narrating* and *story*'.[78] Ryan has formulated three slightly different

conditions of representation that a text must fulfil in order to qualify as a narrative: (1) creating a world populated by characters and objects; (2) recounting a series of unique events or actions that change this world and hence create temporality and history; (3) reconstructing 'an interpretive network of goals, plans, causal relations, and psychological motivations around the narrated events', giving them the character of a coherent and meaningful plot.[79]

Based on such ideas, we developed a model with *four dimensions* or key features to be considered when analysing and interpreting individual narratives as symbolic representations of temporal processes of transformation:

1. *Set-up: who and where?* Narratives represent a world populated by characters and objects given identifying characteristics and roles. These are normally made clear only through the narration itself, but, for instance, in theatre or cinema, the setting and characters are sometimes presented in the beginning so as to establish the main characteristics of the world of the narrative. There is first of all a *narrator*, but precisely who is that narrating voice? As for the *world* constructed as the context of the story, what kind of universe is this? And which *characters* (people, categories, objects) populate that narrated world? On this level, one may also identify the intended or implied *audience* of the story told: to whom it is primarily directed. In this particular case, the focus is on the place of Europe in each narrative: as subject or object in the narrated discourse, friend or enemy, actor or context, memory or dream.

2. *Process: what and when?* Since all narratives both are and represent temporal sequences, diachronic ordering is central to this analysis. The narratively constructed world goes through a transformation by way of a series of events shaping a temporal flow, a (hi)story. What is the dramatic structure, the timeline, the main events and the story told? How are past, present and future linked? This process may be mapped in three steps: *Beginning*: which are the mutual relations and main conflicts between actors in the narrated world? *Time*: in which order, speed and constellation does the story develop? Which central events and actions take place, and in which temporal order are they organized? How is the narrative started, unfolded and concluded? *End*: what result is depicted – is it happy or evil, same or different? However, while all narratives have a temporal direction and processual character, some are more open-ended, resisting any identification of a clear beginning or end. The analysis must therefore in each case first also assess the degree and kind of narrative coherence. This is of course always a particularly central dimension of narrative analysis, and the following studies will primarily look for and analyse significant stories told of Europe: whether they depict decay or progress, crisis or stability. Previous research indicates a kind of master narrative of resurrection: a widespread millenarian story of Europe having a glorious past, followed by tragic catastrophes (internal division, hostility and disastrous wars), but now regaining peace, unity and greatness, or in other cases nourishing a dream for such resurrection as an urgent task for the future. This temporal curve of development

is central to the founding myths of the EU and will presumably be strongly present in East European contexts as well, but the question is how its processual details vary or if there are different and competing storylines in some of these cultural fields.[80]

3. *Mode: how?* Which genre (journalism, art, music, etc.) and symbolic mode (verbal, visual, musical, etc.) is (or are) the basic one(s)? A painting or a sculpture offers other ways of narrating than a song or a news item. The narrative form (showing/telling, linear/nonlinear, explicit/implicit narrativity, etc.) is dependent on the genre and symbolic mode used. What is the attitude of the narrator and the author? Is there, for instance, an element of critique or apologetics, tragedy or comedy, irony or play? It is a particular challenge to interpret satirical or ironic narratives since they tend to produce ambiguous stories that allow for double and often-contradictory identifications.

4. *Meaning: why?* What meanings are narratively constructed, and how are various actors identified by being linked to certain specific values and spheres of meaning? How does the story configure characters and sequences of events and link them into a narrative whole that opens up dimensions of meaning? In this summarizing dimension, the previous ones can be combined, with a focus on their signifying effects. How is Europe identified and given meaning by different narratives? What does Europe signify in them?

Narratives are never found in splendid isolation. Like all cultural phenomena, they are always contextually positioned in larger webs of signification and can only be interpreted by immersing oneself in the ongoing conflicts of interpretation in which they occur.[81] They are intertwined with other narratives that they might integrate as starting points or elements within themselves, or perhaps speak against in open opposition or implicit contrasting. Single narratives are therefore always enmeshed in *internarrative* rhizomatic networks, making it necessary to interpret them by contextualization and comparisons with other narratives to which they point through shifting means.[82] This is of course true of narratives of Europe, which, for instance, are co-determined by their relations to comparable narratives of other continents and of individual nations.

The dimensions of set-up, process, mode and meaning should however not force every narrative analysis into a formalistic straitjacket but only be used when they seem fruitful. Instead of binding the analysis to strict models and frameworks, it is more rewarding to make flexible use of those elements that seem particularly relevant to a given textual material.

Traditional narratology distinguishes between the plot (or *sujet*), the order in which the story is told, and the fable (*fabula*), the sequence of events the text is understood as constructing. If the research focuses on the fable dimension, the investigated plots (for instance different stories told in news media, art, music, etc.) are merely means of access to the fable (here: the underlying (hi-)story of Europe). One might rephrase this in other terms by stating that the focus is then on the signified narrative content rather than the signifying narrative form of each story. The aim is to reconstruct the narratives of Europe at the level of what various discourses signify (from philosophy to pop music): on how Europe's historical process of becoming and progressing is constructed. The formal aspects

of those images, sounds or stories interpreted must of course be carefully scrutinized, but with the aim to find out what kind of narrative content they convey. This implies that it is less important how narrative various texts are as such; more important are the stories about Europe that they seem to keep alive. An artwork may itself have a rather static shape but can still instantly associate with a complex narrative like a myth or a fictional story. Less relevant then are those clearly narrative stories where Europe may figure as a reference but does not receive any particular narrative development.

Mapping and analysing various narratives in their discursive settings are an interpretive effort demanding a series of contextualizations that serve as moments of explanation to reach a deeper understanding in a hermeneutic spiral movement. It is based on a close analysis of each narrative and adds a widening set of contexts to enrich the clouds of meaning identified in that narrative. A simple model distinguishes three main axes of interpretation:

a. *Textual analysis*. First, interpretation of the narrative in question is based on hermeneutical spiral movements between its various levels: the (graphic or phonetic) *materiality* of its signifying elements, the (syntactic) *form relations* of their combination, the (semantic) *meanings* they induce among interpretive communities and the (pragmatic) *uses* to which they are put in various *contexts*. The level of meaning has priority when it comes to understanding narratives of identification. However, the other levels must also be taken seriously in a hermeneutical circle that integrates micro-textual elements and macro-contextual settings in a complex arc of interpretation.

b. *Historical development*. This interpretive work is never fixed to a specific point in time but can continue indefinitely by following a narrative through history. Going back to the *archaeology of production*, one may discern how narratives have been motivated by their tellers or regulators, including politicians, journalists, authors, artists, musicians, designers, publishers, etc. These narratives span the wider social settings and historical contexts in which they have been invented and told, extending from authorial intentions to the overarching 'structures of feeling' of a whole epoch.[83] These are never in a position to guarantee the definite 'truth' of any reading but can still give important clues to how narratives signify. However, in the opposite temporal direction towards the *teleology of reception*, one should also acknowledge how narratives are used and understood by various audiences and citizens, for instance in public criticism or social media, i.e. in their reception process or *Wirkungsgeschichte*.[84]

c. *Intertextual comparisons*. Identities are always formed together with differences in a complex game of similarity and diversity. The interpretation of identifying narratives is therefore finally also enriched by studying how they relate to other narratives, including in this case other narratives of Europe (both of the same genre type and in other genres and media) as well as comparable narratives of other communities (other continents, nations, etc.).

Moving spirally between these contextualizing levels and dimensions makes it possible to better understand how different narratives identify Europe as a concept or community in process.

Six Cases

Shifting combinations of these four key dimensions (set-up, process, mode and meaning) and three axes of contextualizing interpretation (textual analysis, historical development and intertextual comparisons) have been put to work in the 'Narratives of Europe' research project, resulting in six different studies of how Europe has since 1989 been narrated in its eastern 'periphery'. Any such study will necessarily also itself construct a new (meta) narrative of the collective it studies (here Europe), proposing based on multifarious interpretations a more complex internarrative understanding of how it is told and thus identified. Combining such different studies into an integral whole will offer a complex draft for how to better understand and renarrate the unfinished process of becoming to which each identifying narrative testifies. Such research reconstructs narrating processes going on in various genres of discourse, adding its own new cross-reading to the heterological polyphony of identifying narrating that is for Europe today an emphatically undecided quest. In this volume, six spheres of narration are investigated.

A. First, in 'Europe as Identity and Ideal: Reading Barroso's "New Narrative" Heretically alongside Hegel, Husserl and Patočka', *Carl Cederberg* traces the philosophical roots of the discourse of European identity. Beginning with Barroso and the EC Cultural Committee, he outlines a recurrent trope of Europe as the specific cradle of universal philosophical thought, with Hegel and Husserl as important contributors. His focus is then on the Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka, who, leaning on Plato, redefined Europe as care for the soul. Patočka's heretic ideas, in turn, influenced recent political discourses, not least through Charta 77 and Václav Havel. Cederberg critically scrutinizes this legacy of thought, acknowledging how Patočka transcends Hegel and Husserl but also remains caught in a problematic identification of identity and ideal: of existing European institutions and the universal ideals that must remain a goal rather than anything already accomplished.

B. Second, *Stefan Jonsson* in 'Clashing Internationalisms: East European Narratives of West European Integration' discusses how in the 1950s European unification was in Soviet and East German works on international geopolitics critically reinterpreted as motivated by a secret colonialist agenda. In official Western narratives, this agenda has been systematically repressed in favour of regarding today's EU solely as a benevolent peace project. This critical counter-narrative tells a radically different and less heroic story about Europe than most of those found and discussed in the other chapters, which is important to unveil in this context today, as it has repercussions in current European discourses on both sides of the EU–Russian border.

C. Third, in 'Narratives of War: Representations of Europe in News Media of Ukraine, Russia and Poland during Euromaidan', *Roman Horbyk* shows how politics and journalism in these three strategically chosen countries together form ideas of Europe. Political news reporting in leading daily and weekly journals link political institutions to street politics, and selected examples from popular media and user-generated content serve to enrich

this analysis. Horbyk distinguishes clearly different modes of narrating Europe in these countries, developed in a complex interplay between centres and peripheries. Whereas the Russian media tend to focus on Europe's internal crisis, their Ukrainian counterpart thematizes Europe symbolically as a set of values and goals, and the Polish news media more specifically deal with internal EU institutional procedures.

D. Fourth, 'Narrating Protest: Silenced Stories of Europe in Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia', written by *Anne Kaun*, focuses on social movements, in particular the major narratives of the Occupy movement in Sweden and Latvia, among activists and the mainstream news media. The most striking result is the apparent absence of a European narrative in how mainstream news media tell the stories of these movements. Although supranational European institutions and representatives have been major players in the financial crisis that led to the emergence of the Occupy movement, they remain in the background of how the movement is framed in the stories, particularly in the news. There was a remarkable disconnection between narratives among activists and in the news. The chapter asks whether the absence of a European perspective in these mainstream media discourses of Occupy is an expression of the continued democratic deficit of the EU or due to the particular character of the Occupy movement.

E. Fifth, in the chapter 'The Resilience of the Periphery: Narrating Europe through Curatorial Strategies', *Katarina Wadstein MacLeod* deals with visual art, focusing on four projects presenting art from Eastern Europe in exhibitions and books between 2009 and 2011. One striking aspect of this analysis is that these art projects, while often inspired by a wish to deconstruct the division between East and West, in effect tend to reinforce it by cementing Eastern Europe's cultural otherness. Despite all efforts to avoid dualist thinking, these curatorial practices have great difficulty escaping the image of Europe as divided into two halves. Another theme relates to the element of nostalgia that stubbornly appears when art exhibitions narrate European history. The chapter shows how multiple power structures are involved when Eastern Europe is represented as a periphery in relation to an imagined but also tangibly real Western centre to which oppositional Eastern voices tend to appeal. Institutional strategies of marketing certain art as East European expand the concept of Europe but simultaneously cement its bifurcation and the cultural otherness of its eastern half.

F. Finally, *Johan Fornäs* in 'Euro-Visions: East European Narratives in Televised Popular Music' studies how Europe has been narrated in finals and songs from Eastern Europe in the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC). This contest is full of narratives of Europe, which with closer inspection turn out to be variants of the same master narrative of Europe as resurrecting from past self-inflicted catastrophes. It is the same grand narrative that dominates the narratives of leading European institutions, including the EC Cultural Committee mentioned above. Some East European songs add freedom from oppression to peace after war as a leading value, but otherwise the main story is surprisingly constant, hinting at the persistence of this narrative.

Conclusions

Readers who first wish to read the empirical analyses may save the following last pages of this introduction and return to them afterwards, to get a summary of the results. Since others may like to already now at the beginning get a glimpse of what is to be expected, let me provide such a brief conclusion already here and now, offering a comparative overview to those readers who then want to move freely around among the following chapters.

We have no pretensions to offer any comprehensive, 'full' picture, as there could always be added other genres or fields of discourse, such as for instance maps, school books or literary genres. Yet, taken together, the six chapters confirm some general conclusions: (1) dominant European narratives in the West tend to be important also in Eastern Europe; (2) a number of key narratives of Europe criss-cross between locations and between cultural fields; and (3) there is a mix of continuity and change. Comparisons can be made between discourse fields as well as between subregions in each of the four main narrative dimensions defined above. Further details and nuances are presented in the individual chapters; here just a few general traits will be suggested.

1. *Set-up*. It is no mere coincidence that printed versions of Shakespeare plays start with information on who will act and where the action takes place. Any narrative in some way indicates its main actors and the context or stage for the narrated events. The narratives studied here place Europe in shifting positions or roles: sometimes as the narrating voice itself, the world in which the story takes place, one of its characters or its implied addressee. Several narrations analysed here have a rather complex and multiple mode of narration. For instance, news articles have individual authors, but not only editorials can be read as institutional expressions of the newspaper that publishes them; artworks are statements by artists, but when selected for exhibitions or catalogues, they also form curatorial statements; and ESC songs as well as finals combine a wide range of narrators, from singers and their personae to authors and composers to television producers and other actors in the two main cultural industries involved (television and popular music).

   In these case studies, narrators are usually defined as Europeans or at least wishing to identify with Europe. From philosophy to Eurovision, Europe often appears as a 'we' – a shared community or public to which the individual narrating author and/ or performer belongs. Europe could also be the addressee ('you') of the narration, for example in ESC calls for Europe to come together and make peace – or else a third-person actor in the form of institutions whose history and destiny are described in critical treatises or artworks.

   In the Occupy movements, Europe appeared as a more general location and territorial context for the narration. Although activists linked the economic crisis to the European level by identifying concrete policies and austerity measures as root causes of growing inequality, the mainstream media did not contextualize the movement in

the same way. Rather than considering their real motivations for occupying spaces in Stockholm and holding online discussions and protests in Latvia that largely concerned the European financial crisis, the mainstream media discourse emphasized the US American roots of the movement and its unsuitability for the European context. This created a stark contrast in narratives between the activists and the news media that reduced the potential European reach of the movement.

The continent is often depicted as a supranational unit consisting of clearly distinct national parts but also forming a collective totality that is, in turn, part of the global or universal humanity. Most of these discourses strive to represent a pluralizing diversity, evoking the European motto 'united in diversity'. However, this does not always succeed: instead, the totalizing uniformity of 'we are one' tends to sneak in even where it is clearly unintended. In particular, the stereotypical dualism of the East–West dichotomy is often reproduced at the same time as it is criticized.[85] Across cultural spheres and discourse fields, the Russian media often seem to reproduce the strict East–West divide – as do in another way the visual art discourses discussed here. In many instances, ESC songs focus on peace and unity across difference, though, for instance, the Lithuanian group InCulto also gave particular attention to the East–West dichotomy found in the art exhibitions. As usual, these stereotypical dualisms tend to unduly homogenize each of the two main poles (East and West), neglecting their internal differences while exaggerating their mutual contrasts so as to depict them as each other's opposites, and with a hierarchical element of regarding the East as inferior to the West in various ways (less developed and civilized, poorer or more suffering).

This risk for critics to in the end reproduce and reinforce precisely those dichotomous divisions they set out to deconstruct is also relevant to this book. Already formulating the task as listening to peripheral voices implies the existence of such a divide. However, in a situation where the European discourse has for such a long time been dominated by West European voices centred around Brussels, it is important to provide a counterpoint by listening to other less heard voices. This book is therefore not the final word but rather a strategic move in a transitional period, aiming at contributing to the dissolution of those same dualisms that it scrutinizes. One might in a similar spirit say that what Patočka most of all added to the discourse on Europe from his experience as a citizen of Eastern Europe was an acute awareness of the need to overcome the East–West divide.

2. *Process*. The form of the story told suggest a sequence of events, identifying what happens and when or in which order the events take place. In most of these cases, a dominant story is what has been described as the grand narrative of Europe, according to which Europe has first flourished as a classical cradle of reason, civilization and culture, then descended into years and centuries of internal strife and self-annihilation until the recent or current era has given birth to new hopes of peaceful unification. Emphasis and details may shift, but this grand narrative of resurrection from self-inflicted destruction is not only central to the EU institutions but also echoes in much art and popular music.

The long-past golden age is often identified with classical Greek antiquity but may also refer to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, where allegedly leading European values such as citizen rights were developed and formulated. The intermediate period of catastrophic fall and suffering mostly focuses on the great wars of the twentieth century, including the Holocaust and other experiences of mass destruction. It also includes at least certain negative aspects of colonialism, though even some voices that prefer not to be accused of Eurocentric and xenophobic racism tend to acknowledge specific positive values in the allegedly modernizing and globalizing effects of the voyages of discovery and international trade that European colonialism too supported. Hopes for future resurrection go way back in history; however, in current discourses, they are mainly located in two stages: at the end of World War II and then at the post-1989 reunification of Europe's two halves, which is also the main factor behind this book.

Political journalism mostly focuses on current events pointing to urgent crises that have to be solved. Philosophical discourse usually takes a much longer historical perspective but also tends to dramatize the contemporary situation in terms of a quest that Europeans and/or humanity at large have to pursue in order to secure survival and prosperity. The artworks discussed here likewise focus on current problems but place them in a historical perspective, whereas the ESC contains more stories of hope, love and faith in Europe's future. Notwithstanding, East European voices rarely depict Europe as just a success story since the complex experience of suffering and guilt is hard to avoid.

3. *Mode*. Choices of symbolic mode, aesthetic genre and stylistic attitude are also of importance, answering to the question how a story is told. Each of the six discourse fields presented in these chapters represents a specific range of constraints and possibilities – affordances that enable or prioritize certain narratives while preventing or problematizing others. Mainstream narratives about Occupy focused on spectacles and violence while marginalizing the protests, hiding their relevance to European issues. While philosophy, the news media and international politics allow for discursive argumentation, music and arts contribute non-verbal and in many instances emotionally charged modes of expression. Voices of movements, visual arts and the ESC are more often than the others ironical, playing with double voices that destabilize signification. However, on closer scrutiny, only very few cases seem to very much use these means, as, for instance, most Eurovision songs on Europe are, with just one or two exceptions, performed in what appears to be a quite serious way.

4. *Meaning*. Interpretation makes it possible to discern what a story signifies. More specifically, the philosophical narratives analysed here tend to link Europeanness to universalist values of reason, justice, democracy, freedom, tolerance and care, and other chapters also exemplify how, for instance, the Ukrainian news media take such values extremely seriously. In addition, some popular songs such as the 2012 ESC hymn are linked to the justice and reason theme of the philosophical discourse. Contemporary Russian news journalism and the 1950s Soviet international politics discourse instead

talks about Europe's imperial conspiracy or internal crisis and failure, where Europe is described as an aggressive imperialist project disguised in universalist terms and doomed to fail. This contrast is reminiscent of how Timothy Snyder has described the escalating clash between Putin's idea of a US-led Western imperialist conspiracy, motivating Russia to extend and strengthen its own centralized Eurasian empire, and the Maidan idea of Europe as a free association of sovereign states based on vital civil societies.[86] One conclusion of our studies is that Europe is in reality an ambivalent and contradictory combination of both these sides, and every effort to reduce it to either of them has dangerous implications. The different approaches to Europe narrated by Occupy activists and the mainstream news media showed that narratives are rarely univocal. Instead, they form sites of struggles about the authority in meaning production, which is also addressed in the chapter on art exhibitions, when discussing narrative resilience in the periphery. Likewise, Russian Eurasian counter-narratives to the Eurafrican visions, sometimes nourished by the European Economic Community, share a problematic hiding of geopolitical power struggles behind ideological debates between Communism (in the 1950s) or authoritarian nationalism on one hand and liberalism and capitalism on the other. While Europe certainly needs to interact and communicate with other world regions – Asia as well as Africa – the colonial–imperialist mode of this interaction needs to be ruthlessly criticized.

Other narratives, for instance in the arts, also discuss the limitations and contradictions of Europe, not by comparing with an external ideal (Russia) but in modes of precisely such immanent critique, based on contrasting given promises (high moral values, human rights, freedoms, welfare and soft power) to realities (postcolonial inequalities and social divides, greed and surveillance) and thus identifying Europe's internal contradiction rather than reducing it to any coherent totality. Distinguishing these two aspects seems crucial: Europe as an ideal anchored in a set of universal values must be separated from Europe as an actually existing institutional identity. Moreover, just like Patočka, the EC's 'new narrative' tends to erase the tension between these two aspects in a highly problematic way.

No summary can do justice to the complexity and wealth of narratives encountered in these six studies. Listening to the East European voices thematizing Europe's trajectory from history to future offers rich material for self-reflexive critical reflection, which in any case may in light of the following chapters be seen as one of the key capacities that Europeans eagerly exercise.

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Notes

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(Transcription note by Roman Horbyk:) The subject of Eastern Europe, with its plenty of languages not always using Latin graphic, has naturally led to the problem of rendering proper names, literal quotations, transcriptions, etc. in English, in particular of those originating from writing traditions based on Cyrillic alphabets. As our book is directed to a wider academic audience, oftentimes without extensive area expertise, the use of phonetic transcriptions (very precise yet complex for non-specialists) that are found in linguistic literature was considered too ambitious an enterprise for our specific purpose, although we do not doubt the overall preferability of such precise transcriptions. For more or less the same reason, the more widely used Library of Congress system was discussed as an

option but eventually discarded. We believe that we made the right choice to opt for the BGN/PCGN system developed decades ago by two specialized institutions, the US Board on Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographic Names for British Official Use, as the most intuitive and time-tried system. It has a long tradition of international use and is adopted by many official institutions and international media (such as BBC). It would be one of the most familiar systems to a general leader. It also is more relevant in the European context, which is reflected in the system being recommended by Oxford Style Manual and used by Oxford University Press. The PGN/PCGN system was used as it stands on the website http://libraries.ucsd.edu/bib/fed/USBGN_romanization.pdf. For the same guiding principle of simplicity and the possibility of intuitive reading by non-experts, we have made a few simplifications to this system. One was a simplified transliteration of '-ий' in the endings of Ukrainian surnames and adjectives (Khmelnytsky) to avoid a rather clumsy and confusing '-yy' (Khmelnytskyy); likewise, the Russian '-ый' adjectives were dealt with as '-y'. For similar reasons, it was decided to sacrifice the sign of softness, rendered under this system as ['], as well the Ukrainian apostrophe and the Russian hardness sign (both transliterated as ["]). The proper names that relate to multiple or ambiguous national and cultural contexts (i.e., figures who could be alternatively thought of as representatives of one of the cultures (Ukrainian/Russian) or having mixed background (the notable Polish/Ukrainian/Russian contexts of Kazimierz Malewicz/Kazymyr Malevych/Kazimir Malevich), the more widespread Romanization was preferred to less known alternatives for the convenience of the reader, even at the expense of complexity and recognition of hybridity. The exception was also made for the proper names that came to be known in another transcription (Verka Serduchka). Naturally, these remarks do not concern the names and direct untranslated quotations from Slavonic and other languages that use Latin graphic where diacritics and language-specific letters were fully preserved: Žižek, Ciążyński, etc.

2 Habermas (2001); see also Delanty and Rumford (2005).
3 Derrida (1991).
4 Bauman (2004).
5 Balibar (2004: 235).
6 Ricoeur ([1992] 1995: 3, 5, 6–7).
7 Meinhof and Triandafyllidou (2006).
8 Tully (2007).
9 Nowak (2015) argues for acknowledging the diversity and instability of memories of Europe's past.
10 Fukuyama ([1992] 2006).
11 Rigney (2012: 608).
12 Rigney (2012: 613).
13 Anderson (2009: 46, 49); Fornäs (2012).
14 European Cultural Foundation (2010: 3).
15 All quotes in this paragraph are from the European Cultural Foundation (2010: 3).
16 European Commission Cultural Committee (2014).
17 Privot (2014).

18 European Cultural Foundation (2010: 9).
19 The quotes are from the European Commission Cultural Committee (2014).
20 Todorov ([2003] 2005: 63–72).
21 European Commission Cultural Committee (2014).
22 Fornäs (2012).
23 Wolff (1994: 4ff. and 11f.).
24 Wolff (1994: 7ff.); Delanty and Rumford (2005); Anderson (2009); Sooman and Donecker (2009); Ther (2014).
25 Dasgupta and Rosello (2014: 14).
26 Kuus (2004); Bakić-Hayden and Hayden (1992). See also Kovačevič (2008) on orientalist discourses in literature on Eastern Europe, and the *Journal of Postcolonial Writing* theme issue 48: 2, devoted to colonialism, communism and East-Central Europe.
27 Innis ([1950] 2007).
28 Lotman (1990: 134 and 141f.).
29 Balčytienė (2013: 29f.).
30 Anderson ([1983] 1991); Billig (1995); Cohen (1985); Hall (1996); Ricoeur (1991a, 1991b, 2005).
31 Hall (1996: 4).
32 Kristeva ([1974] 1984); Ricoeur ([1990] 1992).
33 Mouffe (2013: 45).
34 Bhabha (1994: 247).
35 Bhabha (1990: 6).
36 Ricoeur (1991a, 1991b); Hall (1996).
37 See Ricoeur ([1983] 1984, [1984] 1985, [1985] 1988); Mitchell (1981); Taylor (1989); Gundersen and Wikshåland (1992).
38 Fornäs (1995: 151–154).
39 Lotman (1990: 101).
40 Lotman (1990: 170).
41 Fornäs (2012).
42 Lotman (1990: 170).
43 Ricoeur (1976: 87f.).
44 Ricoeur (1991a: 26).
45 Ricoeur (1991a: 33).
46 Ricoeur ([1985] 1988: 247).
47 Ricoeur (1991b: 189).
48 Ricoeur (1991b: 198).
49 Ricoeur (1981: 167).
50 Ricoeur ([1983] 1984: 33).
51 Ricoeur ([1983] 1984: 46).
52 Ricoeur (1981: 165).
53 Ricoeur ([1983] 1984: 3f.; also 52).
54 Ricoeur ([1985] 1988: 241).
55 Ricoeur ([2000] 2004: 41–42, 147–150); Fornäs (2016).

56   Brooks (1984: xiii and xi).
57   Brooks (1984: xi; see also 22).
58   Brooks (1984: 52).
59   Labov (1997).
60   Todorov ([1978] 1990: 28).
61   Todorov ([1978] 1990: 30).
62   See e.g. Antohi et al. (2007).
63   Armbruster et al. (2003); Kuus (2002); Paasi (2001).
64   Mihelj et al. (2009: 64); see also Mihelj (2008).
65   Melegh (2006).
66   Genette ([1972] 1980: 27).
67   Ricoeur ([1971] 1981).
68   Ryan (2004: 9, 15). For further examples of models of analysis for films and new digital media, see Lothe (2000) and Tabbi and Wutz (1997). McDonald (2014) summarizes key issues in applying narrative research methods within media and communication studies.
69   Lawler (2008: 37).
70   Ricoeur (1981: 170).
71   Ricoeur (1981: 173).
72   Ricoeur (1981: 174).
73   Ricoeur (1981: 174).
74   Ricoeur (1981: 170).
75   Schlögel (2013: 327–333).
76   Fornäs (1997, 2003); see also Negus (2012).
77   Todorov (1966, [1978] 1990: 40f.); Genette ([1972] 1980: 29ff. and 186).
78   Genette ([1972] 1980: 32).
79   Ryan (2004: 8f.).
80   See Fornäs (2012) on European symbols. Such a narrative is activated in Europe Day, commemorating the Schuman Declaration, which on 9 May 1950 initiated the formation of the ECSC in the ruins of two world wars, but also in the European anthem, based on Beethoven's Ninth Symphony and celebrating new-won harmony and peace after great destruction (the Napoleonic Wars for Beethoven, World War II for the founders of the EU). It is echoed too in lots of popular songs about Europe (Fornäs 2012: 189–203) and appears to be the clearly dominant one in narratives of Europe found in the Eurovision Song Contest.
81   Ricoeur ([1969] 1974).
82   Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 2004) took the term 'rhizome' from biology to describe heterogeneous, multiple, interconnected and non-hierarchical networks of representation that have the form of an enmeshed root system or network without core or closure.
83   Williams (1977).
84   Gadamer ([1960] 1989).
85   Said ([1978] 1991); Hall ([1997] 2013).
86   Snyder (2015).

Chapter 2

Europe as Identity and Ideal: Reading Barroso's 'New Narrative' Heretically alongside Hegel, Husserl and Patočka

Carl Cederberg

The particularity of Europe, one could say, paraphrasing what Paul Valéry said about the French, is its claim to universality.[1] This is often taken further so that there would be an 'idea of Europe', meaning, more or less, universality. Here I will question the notion of such an 'idea of Europe', looking first at how this idea is put to political use, and then at its philosophical underpinnings from the European philosophical tradition. I take as my starting point president of the European Commission (EC) José Manuel Durão Barroso's call for a 'New narrative for Europe' and discuss the response to this call from the EC's selected cultural committee of artists, scientists and intellectuals. I will then show how the resulting narrative is not really new – it is the grand narrative of Europe, perfected by European philosophers such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Edmund Husserl. From the vantage point of their narratives of Europe, I will present how the idea of Europe was reflected upon by the Czech dissident philosopher Jan Patočka, who on one hand preserves the notion of Europe as care for the soul, and on the other hand claims that we have entered the epoch of Post-Europe. This European care for the soul is thus no longer actively lived, but a notion that Europeans still must try to understand through what Patočka presents as a 'heretical' philosophy of history.

Barroso and the Cultural Committee: A New Narrative for Europe!

'A new narrative for Europe', this is what Barroso called for in various public addresses in 2013–2014, in Brussels, Warsaw, Milan and Berlin.[2] In these speeches, the president of the EC prompted intellectuals, scientists and artists for a new narrative in order to 'breathe life in the European spirit'. When searching beyond the mere enthusiasm and grand rhetoric of these speeches, what emerges as Barroso's leading conviction is that Europe is, and should be, driven by a humanist telos, which these narratives should convey. In the Milan speech, Barroso specifies that '[a]t the core of the European vision is the human dignity of every human being'.[3] So then, while it is in some sense a call for a new narrative, its crucial features were perhaps already written. The reasons for requesting a strengthened humanist narrative for Europe are apparent: nationalism and racism have been growing stronger in recent years, and the nationalists are most often also Eurosceptics.

Following Barroso's call, the commission selected a cultural committee consisting of 16 artists, intellectuals and scientists (comprising, among others, the Icelandic artist Olafur Eliasson, the Spanish sculptor Cristina Iglesias, the Hungarian writer György Konrád and the Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas) to answer Barroso's call for a new narrative for Europe.

On 1 March 2014, they responded with a document, 'The Mind and Body of Europe', which later that year formed the centrepiece of a book (covering also some of the other events around the call for a new narrative) published under the same name by Europa Nostra, the organization for the preservation of European cultural heritage.[4] In this answer, a short text with artistic aspirations, the writers play with the idea of Europe as an organism of mind and body. One of the first paragraphs reads:

> *Europe is a state of mind* formed and fostered by its spiritual, philosophical, artistic and scientific inheritance, and driven by the lessons of history. It must also now become a genuine and effective political body that has the ability and sensibility to rise to all the challenges and difficulties that European citizens are facing today and will face tomorrow. From youth unemployment to climate change, from immigration to data security, the list is long, and the urgency is even greater.[5]

This small paragraph in a way mirrors the construction of the whole text: from Europe as a state of mind to the modern history of Europe to the present political body of Europe. After a brief introduction, six such short paragraphs follow (the paragraph just quoted being the first of those), each starting with the phrase '*Europe is a state of mind*' in italics. Monotony gives a certain rhythmic, maybe organic, sense – perhaps we are sensing the breath of the European spirit? After this comes a second part dealing with the historical events of modern Europe: the end of the war, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the recent economic crisis. The last part of the text comprises four paragraphs, including the phrase '*Europe as a political body*', declaring that European institutions need the sciences, the arts and cultural heritage in order to thrive, that is, to embody Europe as a state of mind. The rhythmical construction, which loses some of its impetus in the end, gives a sense of a spirit blowing life breath by breath into a slumbering, and perhaps even crippled, giant of a body.

Europe is a state of mind, they claim, shared by people throughout the continent, but also by many outside who adhere to those same ideals of the sciences and the arts. Yet even if it is not stated, it is clear from the sense of urgency of the text that Europe as a political body has not reached its full potential. Its potential is what it in a sense really is: its essence. The second of the paragraphs on 'Europe as a state of mind' reads:

> *Europe is a state of mind* that goes beyond a grouping of Nation States, an internal market and the geographical contours of a continent. Europe is a moral and political responsibility, which must be carried out, not only by institutions and politicians, but by each and every European. Europe is a source of inspiration from the past, it is emancipation in the present, and an aspiration towards a sustainable future. Europe is an identity, an idea, an ideal.[6]

The next paragraph adds that the 'identity, idea and ideal' of Europe are 'rooted in its shared values of peace, freedom, democracy and rule of law'. An identity is normally not the same

as an ideal. What we are, and what we should be, or desire to be, are different things. If we were what we should be already, it would be strange to think of it as an ideal. The reader might at this point wonder whether all the horrors once instigated by today's nations of Europe are to be forgotten. In passing, however, the authors mention that much of the prosperity was built on war and colonial conquest. But this still seems a matter of the past since they say that now in the modern era, 'Europe's state of mind matured and found a balance'. It is the political body that is being criticized between the lines for lagging behind. Be that as it may, 'Europe' remains the name of the project of universality, universal human rights and culture.

Is it really possible, however, to think of the events of colonialism and enslavement as a history past? Their repercussions in the contemporary world are undeniable. They have helped shape a world of huge differences, of which Western Europe and the European Union (EU) have become one of the richest and most peaceful parts. Not surprisingly, many people from poorer and war-ridden regions to the east and south of Europe seek refuge here. According to the International Organization for Migration, in 2014 alone, 3279 refugees drowned in the Mediterranean on their way to the EU; many of those who manage to arrive are forced to reside illegally in extreme poverty or are sent back to the dangers they were fleeing.[7] Here we see the rift between the 'identity and ideal of Europe', seemingly unnoticed by the cultural committee in its response to President Barroso discussed above.

For someone like myself, more at home in the history of philosophy than in political rhetoric, these notions of an ideal coming to maturity as 'unity in diversity', of a spirit looming over or uniting the minds of Europe, being fulfilled at a certain point in time, are redolent of Hegel, while the idea of a community of minds sharing the idea that anyone can become universal and therefore European is reminiscent of Edmund Husserl. Indeed, to say that these political declarations are *reminiscent* of these thinkers is too weak. Hegel and Husserl made important contributions to originally *thinking* these thoughts, setting the stage for this 'new' narrative of Europe. Before I turn to Jan Patočka's more unknown and critical thoughts on the notion of Europe, I will present the general framework of these two thinkers.

The attentive reader will already have noticed my critical attitude towards the romantic historization of Europe and might ask why it is necessary to turn to these thinkers, who are admittedly long since dead. Disregarding them is the standard option. Since Hegel's and Husserl's Eurocentrisms seem even stronger than that of Barroso and his cultural committee, why not just leave these old thinkers be, and focus on a future for Europe? What makes Hegel and Husserl interesting in this context is that they introduced the notion of Europe as a philosophical concept, used to understand the seeming paradox of a people who hold universality as their particularity. They try to think the history of the universal. Where the 'new narrative' unproblematically assumes and accepts that universality is a European property, Hegel and Husserl tried to think how it was possible that the universal would have a particular origin, and they did this under the name of Europe.

Hegel's Philosophy of History

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) makes Europe into a philosophical idea. This takes place in a certain philosophical context as the expression of the historical self-reflection of human reason. Arguably, this historical self-reflection starts out as a continuation of Immanuel Kant's Copernican revolution, which entailed viewing reality as always already structured by the categories of the subject. To convey René Descartes's rationalist intuitions, yet answering David Hume's sceptic questions, Kant describes the perceived reality as permeated by the structures of reason, for it is as structured by our rationality that we perceive it as rational. This means that what was earlier thought of as ideas or essences independent of the subject are now seen as categories of human understanding. It is thus *our* construction that makes the laws of logic, mathematics and physics valid for our understanding. Yet, Kant holds, the categories of reason and understanding are universal and unconditional. Any rational creature must (*qua* rational) perceive and understand the world according to these laws and categories of reason. Kant differentiates between the empirical human being and transcendental reason. I, as an individual (empirical) person, may think this or that, perceive this or that and thus have an individual and specific content to my cognitive-perceptive grasp of the world, but the *structures* of thought and perception remain the same for all rational beings. The historical period in which Kant is writing, the Enlightenment, is, in his eyes, the movement in which rational beings start making use of their own reason. But this does not mean that Kant sees reason and understanding as in any way a creation of European Enlightenment. Rather, it is a universal human possibility, finding a particular expression in a specific point in time. Kant sees a particular opening in his own time but does not hold that this was not possible in other times as well: the universality of reason, according to Kant, transcends history.

For Hegel, responding to Kant, this universality of reason cannot be a mere ahistorical given. It is a historically attained position; rationality produces itself historically. For Hegel, there is thus a certain historical narrative inherent in rationality. But even though this in a sense contextualizes reason, Hegel, in no way, gives up the universal claims of philosophy. On the contrary, since Hegel demonstrates how universal reason unfolds through history, he thereby shows rationality in its historical concretion. It is the nature of rationality to provide grounds for thinking, and Hegel's exposition of European thought purports to give the historical ground for rationality itself. The growth of European civilization corresponds to a stage of maturity of human rationality. Philosophy moves along with the development of humanity through history. It is the 'grand narrative' (Lyotard) if there ever was one.

Note that European philosophy was not always historically self-reflexive. Aristotle often starts his studies by constructing a theme using the statements of previous philosophers and scientists. Moreover, Socrates and Plato formulated the first universal claims of philosophy in response to the tendency of travelling historians and sophists to relativize

morality and reason and declare it to be entirely dependent on position and on culture. But even if Plato, Aristotle and Kant sensitively develop conceptions of their own historical role in relation to their predecessors, it is only with Hegel that philosophy reflects upon the historicity of rationality as such. It was Hegel's attempt to think a history of reason that made possible a philosophical reflection on the role of Europe in the historical development of universal rationality.

Hegel is the philosopher who first attempted to make philosophy into a narrative interwoven with the development of history. He argues that philosophy, in order to understand its aspiration to the absolute, must also understand its own philosophical and historical path to this understanding. In various texts and lectures – most famously, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, published in 1807 – he describes different stages of humanity's understanding of itself, ordered according to their levels of self-transparency. Even if these stages are logically ordered, they are also filled with content. They express an individual development of maturity but also the birth of European thought and civilization as aspiring to become the ultimately universal thought. It is as if the geopolitical colonization of the world had an ideal parallel. Hegel understands the development of universal reason as unfolding in the history of European civilization.

In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, originally held between 1822 and 1830, Hegel focuses on describing a unified history of the world. It is not only history, however, writes Hegel in his introduction – it is the philosophy of history: 'the thoughtful consideration' of history.[8] This, Hegel notes, must be differentiated from (1) *original history*, the history told by the ones who experienced the events themselves, or are reporting the stories of eyewitnesses, without adding their own reflections. Hegel considers the first Greek historians, such as Thucydides and Herodotus, to belong to this category. This is, in turn, dissimilar from (2) *reflecting history*. This history brings together different epochs into a unified story, creates an overview, makes compilations, highlights nuances and contextualizes. This is what modern historians generally do. The ultimate genre of history is, as already stated, (3) *philosophical history*. This is the most refined form of history, which more than the other forms produces that which historians promise to give: what has actually taken place. But what actually has taken place is not immediately there – it must be constructed and assembled to form a unity, appropriated to the movement of concepts out of a manifold of scattered facts. Philosophical history brings reason to these facts. It operates from the 'conviction and intuition […] that the history of the world […] presents us with a rational process'.[9] In these lectures, Hegel asks his audience to listen with the conviction that he, the philosophical historian, already has 'traversed the entire field' of world history and can therefore present this thesis as a result.[10] Hegel likens this conviction to the belief in providence, 'for Divine Providence is Wisdom, endowed with an infinite Power, which realizes its aim, viz., the absolute rational and final goal of the world; design of the World. Reason is Thought conditioning itself with perfect freedom'.[11] But it differs from an abstract belief in providence, for it must rationally understand the ways of providence in history. In other words, it is not

the faith in a 'divine plan' that we humble beings are unable to understand – for Hegel, it is merely a prejudice that reason would not be able to understand God. 'In the Christian religion God has revealed Himself – that is, he has given us to understand what He is; so that He is no longer a concealed or secret existence. And this possibility of knowing Him, thus afforded us, renders such knowledge a duty. God wishes no narrow-hearted souls or empty heads for his children'.[12] This makes Hegel's philosophical history a theodicy, inasmuch as it justifies God by reconciling evil with the thinking spirit. But it is not like Leibniz's abstract and metaphysical promise: the notion of the best of possible worlds. Hegel's philosophical history promises to show step by step how rational Spirit unfolds through history. Whatever atrocities were done in the name of progress, they are justified by their contributions to progress.

Barroso's plea for a new narrative in order to 'breathe life in the spirit of Europe' is in a sense completely rational in a Hegelian perspective – but also totally unnecessary. Spirit unfolds by its self-narration. The story of world history is that of the unfolding of Spirit. Unlike matter, it is the nature of Spirit to have its substance in itself. The difference between matter and Spirit is that the latter cannot become the object of knowledge of something other than itself, whereas the former can only be known by something other, namely Spirit. This makes self-consciousness the distinctive mark of Spirit. This mark is there, already in the beginning of history, like the seed holding the whole nature of the tree in itself. Therefore, Hegel can see the seeds of Europe already in 'the Orientals':

> The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit – Man as such – is free; and because they do not know this, they are not free. They only know that one is free. But on this very account, the freedom of that one is only caprice; ferocity – brutal recklessness of passion, or a mildness and tameness of the desires, which is itself only an accident of Nature – mere caprice like the former. – That one is therefore only a Despot; not a free man. The consciousness of Freedom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore they were free; but they, and the Romans likewise, knew only that some are free – not man as such […]. The German nations, under the influence of Christianity, were the first to attain the consciousness that man, as man, is free: that it is the freedom of Spirit which constitutes its essence.[13]

Thus, world history unfolds as a greater consciousness of the freedom of Spirit, which at the same time is an increased real political freedom. Hegel views history as moving across the earth, moving as the sun from east to west: In Asia, the dawn of history emerges, the beginning of everything; Europe is where history really happens; America is the land of the future. The American natives are, in Hegel's eyes, useless to the movement of history; hence, America can be seen as pure future, an entirely new continent to cultivate and explore. Africa, on the other hand, serves the role of providing Europe with slaves. Within this historical dialectics of Hegel, morality and reason are not only regarded as taking place here and now but are also to be viewed in the context of their historical progress, their part

in the completion of Spirit. This makes Hegel accept slavery ('in and for itself […] an injustice') as part of an 'education' of the Africans, whose fate is actually improved by being taken into slavery in America.[14] Here Hegel repeats an ancient trope, the idea of natural slavery introduced by Aristotle in the *Politics*. Aristotle held that some people were natural slaves, some natural masters, which meant that the slaves benefited from being part of the master's *ergon*, the work performed by the slaves. Hegel adds a pedagogical and historical dimension to this idea – only from coming into contact with Europeans, be it through slavery, can Africans grow to their full human potential.

Europe is the continent of Spirit, says Hegel. When comparing the progress of China and Europe, he does so most often to counter Europeans who are excited by how advanced Chinese science is. With examples from different areas such as mathematics, astronomy and inventions, he seeks to show how the Chinese have made some important discoveries ahead of the Europeans but have never known what to do with them. It is as if the Chinese discoveries did not have the context of a fertile Spirit to give them their destined effect. For example, the Chinese may have discovered gunpowder, yet it was the Jesuits who had to cast the cannons for them.

But even if the European Spirit implies progress, this does not prevent it from being, in some minor respects, a disadvantage. So for example in the making of porcelain:

> [T]he Europeans, just because of their intelligence, have not yet been able to imitate the superficial and perfectly natural cleverness of the Chinese. Their preparation of varnishes – their working of metals, and especially their art of casting them extremely thin – their porcelain manufacture and many other things, have not yet been completely mastered by Europeans.[15]

Thus, the Chinese way of making porcelain is described as a natural, almost animal, skill. Europeans cannot make porcelain like the Chinese, just as they never could make honey or build beehives like the bees. The Chinese, unlike bees, can be educated; Europe and the Europeans appear as a blessing to the world, to which they teach humanity.

What does this have to do with Barroso and his cultural committee? Certainly, Hegel's explicit subordination of everything non-European is on the surface quite different from the narrative requested and received by Barroso. But there are also interesting similarities. In both accounts, Europe is culture and humanity. The reality of colonialization and slavery is not denied, but they are not seen as part of its essential idea, even though they contributed to spreading the idea of Europe, helping Europe to become what it is. They become part of a maturing process. Hegel believed that the formation of the Prussia in which he lived was the utmost formation of Spirit, Spirit coming to itself, and accepted the historical costs of this effort. In the text of the cultural committee cited above, it is Europe, in the shape of the EU, which is described as having matured and now being ready to come to itself: the ideal coming to the identity of Europe, the identity approaching the ideal.

Husserl: Europe as the Community of the Universal

Another voice can be added to the narrative of Europe. Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), founder of the philosophical school of phenomenology, in 1936 wrote *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*.[16] As the title suggests, Husserl finds modern science, and indeed modern civilization, to be in crisis. He sees contemporary positivist attempts to base science on biological or psychological facts as utterly failed. The phenomenological foundation of science instead investigates the original givenness of meaning, the phenomenality of things as they appear in different aspects of our lifeworld. In this way, the preconditions of meaning can be examined in ever-new layers of meaning, corresponding to ever-new structures of a transcendental subject. Unlike Kantian transcendentalism, Husserlian phenomenology views itself as a never-ending project of the foundation. *Crisis* stands out in Husserl's production, for here this project of the foundation of meaning takes a historical turn. Husserl wants to show the historical genesis of scientific rationality. Much as in Hegel's critique of Kant, Europe comes into play for Husserl as a concept capturing the historical genesis of modern rationality, which in his earlier philosophy had been given a more static description.

For Husserl, the essence of European culture lies in the idea of the universal around which Europe has been united since the advent of Greek philosophy and mathematics. Europe is the philosophic-scientific community, upholding the idea of universality and of a universal humanity. In *Crisis*, Husserl outlines a history of science, from Greece to Galileo to the present. He provides a genealogy of universalism, showing how the notion of the universal, the idea of reason and the emergence of the universal human being are parts of an event – be it an event stretching over 2000 years. For Husserl, the advent of universality, reason and humanity coincides with the history of Europe. Where other cultures can be described, it is in order to show that they are limited to a certain world view. With Europe, the beginning of a universal culture takes place. Europe is of course a culture among others, which can be viewed as any other culture, but it is at the same time, according to Husserl, a culture that has made the universal to its essence. Unlike Hegel, Husserl does not really take political history and analysis of power into account. His interest in Europe is purely an interest in a certain community focused on the universal. Europe is the continent of universal science, of philosophers, who are 'the functionaries of mankind'.[17] Even though the universal project commenced in Europe, this universality can be shared by all. In a much-quoted sentence, blind to its own ethnocentrism, Husserl describes that 'in this broad sense, even the Papuan is a man and not a beast'.[18]

I think that the reason why this sentence has become so much quoted is that it rather effectively shows how aggressive the generosity of universalism can be. The question is: what differentiates this statement from the generosity that animates Barroso's cultural committee when describing Europe as a project of universalism that can be shared beyond the continent?

Patočka: Europe as Care for the Soul

Jan Patočka (1907–1977) is perhaps best known as a Czechoslovakian dissident and one of the founders of Charta 77. As a philosopher, he made his name as a phenomenologist, an inspiring interpreter of both Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. He developed their thoughts independently, sometimes under the label of an 'asubjective phenomenology'. His style of writing is often complex, presenting his philosophy hidden in interpretations of other philosophers and narratives of political and intellectual history. The title of his most famous work, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*, published in 1975, in many respects, summarizes this philosophical approach, thinking history and its philosophy anew.[19] Another way to summarize his multifaceted philosophical oeuvre would be to capture it in his rather idiosyncratic thesis: the essence of Europe is the Platonic notion of the care of the soul. This thesis, encompassing his metaphysical, political, psychological and historical philosophy, is what must be understood in what follows. Is this not an odd thesis? Does it not mix categories? Why should an ethical practice capture the essence of a continent?

Another question may pose itself: if the grand narrative is already provided by giants such as Hegel and Husserl, why should we listen to this backwater Czech philosopher? Zygmunt Bauman ends one of his texts on Europe as follows, 'It is Central Europe's memory that illuminates Europe's future. Can you imagine a centrality more central than that?'[20] Bauman finds that it is in the paradoxically diasporic centre of Europe, with its memory of fresh wounds and crossed identities, that Europe still has a meaning. My interest in Patočka comes from his taking on these grand narratives of Europe, neither disregarding them nor simply accepting them point blank, suggesting a different way to approach the question of Europe. Perhaps something can indeed be learned by juxtaposing the political declarations discussed above with these classical thinkers on Europe, alongside with Patočka's heretical thoughts, keeping in mind the context of the political dissident?

He first addresses the topic of Europe in an essay from 1936, 'Masaryk's and Husserl's Conception of the Spiritual Crisis of European Humanity'.[21] There, as a young writer, he examines the differing approaches of Husserl and Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937) to what they conceive as the European crisis. Masaryk was the pro-Habsburgian who came to be a Czech nationalist, the philosopher who became the father of the nation, the first president of Czechoslovakia. Patočka notes that both Husserl and Masaryk find Europe to be in the age of a crisis, rooted in the problem of modern subjectivism. But where Masaryk just thinks that we need to find our way back to the objective order of things (moral values, divine order), Husserl sees subjectivism as a worldview from which there is no return. Indeed, Husserl deepens the Kantian perspective on how the world is always given for a subject, providing a more flexible structure for constituting the givenness of the world. These reflections still lead, however, to a transcendental subject, giving the conditions of possibility for there being a subject, and at the same time for a world to be given. Even if Patočka does not take up arms with the great Masaryk, his future work on the question

of Europe was clearly to take Husserl as a starting point. Also for Patočka, Europe is tied to the question of subjectivity. Patočka's effort in this early review lies in emphasizing – perhaps with even more precision than Husserl himself – how Husserl's *Crisis* positions phenomenology in a global narrative of European culture. The following year he wrote a review in German on Husserl's *Crisis*, where he establishes this further:

> With the Platonic beginning, a totally new principle has thus appeared: turning life towards the essentials, establishing science in a general sense, thinking that human matters can be improved based on knowledge about them, the great teleological thought of West European culture, to which Husserl finally also connects, and of which he is, I think, the last original and utterly dedicated servant.[22]

Even if Husserl, like everyone else, sees the dawn of European thought in Greek philosophy, he puts no great effort into reading these inaugurating texts. Patočka, however, does. This becomes a lifelong occupation for him, culminating in *Plato and Europe*, a posthumously published book containing lectures held in his friends' homes in the late 1970s while he was barred from university.[23] In these lectures, he repeats Husserl's idea that Europe is in a crisis, and that the solution to this problem somehow must be connected to a deepened understanding of subjectivity. However, subjectivity is not understood from the template of Husserl's transcendental subject, but from what Patočka calls 'the soul', and from Plato's idea of philosophy as care for this soul. The first lecture ends, 'Can the care of the soul, which is the fundamental heritage of Europe, still speak to us today? Speak to us, who need to find something to lean on in this common agreement about decline, in this weakness, in this consent to the fall'.[24]

What is care for the soul? Care for the soul (ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς) or care for the self (ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ) as Plato also sometimes wrote, is philosophy seen as an activity.[25] Philosophy is the activity of bettering oneself and one's fellow human beings through the examination of life and its preconditions. This must not be understood as the self-centred or quietist preoccupation in the ivory tower, but as the philosopher's active participation in the polis. The soul is always understood as a relation, and the philosopher's care for his own and his fellow citizens' at the same time through his critical questioning. The care for the soul is also existential (concerning the individuals' relation to themselves), metaphysical (regarding the relation to that which is, to being and cosmos) and political (pertaining to the relation to others in the polis). The quest for self-examination is expanded by the turn to the ideas. The knowledge of the ideas is a necessity for knowing and bettering ourselves. Patočka here comes close to Hans-Georg Gadamer's 'Socratic' reading of Plato and Wolfgang Wieland's reading according to which the insight into the ideas only shows itself in practice.[26] This view on philosophy was in a sense overshadowed by the later Platonic school's ontological focus and by the legacy of Aristotelean metaphysics. It was preserved, however, in the Stoic tradition and plays a somewhat hidden role in western academic philosophy, even if, for example, the mystic tradition and later the existential tradition can be said to be following

this lead. Twentieth-century writers such as Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot made this tradition known again to a wider philosophical community.[27]

Husserl in one sense takes over this Platonic heritage, but he does so after the subjectivist turns of Descartes and Kant. Husserl's project no longer understands itself as a philosophical care of the self, but as a transcendental philosophy of the subject. Wherein lies the difference if it is not merely a difference of words? Husserl's project is a project of foundation where the philosopher assumes the responsibility to make sense of the scientific character of science, and where science and rationality are assumed to be the core of European thought. This, for Patočka, is a too narrow understanding of the core of European thought. The care of the self is the attempt to live a life that can be justified. Science is but a part of life, and scientific rationality but a part of what it means to live in truth. To reinterpret the Husserlian project as being in the tradition of the care of the self, Patočka reinterprets phenomenology.

Phenomenology is the attempt to understand things from their manifestation rather than from a pregiven idea about their essence. That for which the things manifest themselves, Husserl named the subject, the ego or the I. To avoid the idea of foundation encumbering Husserlian phenomenology, and to reconnect to the Platonic care for the soul, Patočka replaces the notion of subject with that of the soul; hence, the 'asubjective phenomenology'. It is not a mere change of terminology; whereas the Husserlian subject is not in the world but a pole of the world for which the world manifests itself, the soul is that for which the things manifest themselves, yet it is seen as part of the larger structure of the world. The manifestation of things as they are is truth, and the soul is thus 'what is capable of truth within man'.[28]

From this follows, 'Care of the soul is fundamentally care that follows from the proximity of man to manifesting, to the phenomenon as such, to the manifesting of the world in its whole, that occurs within man, with man'.[29] To exist as a soul is to relate to the phenomenon that shows itself. This can be done in different ways: 'On the basis that he stands between phenomenon and mere existence, man can either capitulate and degenerate into mere existence, or he can only then realize himself as a being of truth, a being of phenomenon'.[30] Like most of Patočka's texts, this is far from political in any clear sense. Yet the notion of the care of the soul as living in truth is a buzzword for that time, and in this context signals defiance of the Czechoslovakian authorities. It became a key concept for co-founder of Charta 77 and future president Václav Havel, whom we will return to below.

Care for the soul is not merely Husserlianism with a Platonic jargon. Patočka wants to make a distinction. Phenomenology in his version no longer teaches about the subject but about the manifestation of existence.[31] Patočka counters the argument that Husserl means the same thing, that the subject is nothing but this manifestation. Still, he says, the formulation leads to 'a definitive existent' – the transcendental subject. Instead, Patočka wants to return to what he finds to be Plato's original question: what is the manifestation, the 'showing' itself, manifestation 'in its pure structure'? 'Subjectivity itself has to show itself as something manifesting itself, as a part of a deeper structure, as a certain possibility, which is outlined in this structure and indicated as its component part'.[32]

These are tricky passages indeed. Patočka on the one hand wants to focus attention on philosophy as a care for the soul, and on the other hand, he wants to pronounce a phenomenological philosophy without the subject – in other texts, he calls this an asubjective philosophy. Husserl's conception of the subject as transcendental consciousness often misleads, with phenomena thought of as ideas for consciousness, which, according to Patočka, is not conducive to the notion of a care for the soul.

Now – Patočka reminds – the problem stated in the beginning was how to understand our situation with the help of philosophy. The next question is then: how can philosophy provide an orientation? Towards the ideas, and away from the merely phenomenal, one might expect a Platonist to say. But no, Patočka is concerned with 'that second Platonic act – the return back to the cave'.[33] Or rather the two movements, out of the cave and back into the cave, are really one: the act of philosophizing within the cave.

Patočka anticipates an impatient interruption: Why talk about myths like that of the cave? Does it not take us away from philosophy's real task of clarification, which Patočka should be practicing? And what is philosophy? Myths like that of the cave only create an image of philosophy as all important, but is that not exactly a myth in itself? Patočka counters, myths that contextualize philosophy are founding features not only of the tradition of philosophy but also of European civilization as a whole. To argue for this, Patočka needs to spell out what he means by myth. He does not mean myth in the sense it is often used: as uncritically accepted ideas, such as the 'myth of uninterrupted progress'. These are myths seen from the viewpoint of a self-sufficient rationalism. What Patočka understands as myth is not a stage once overcome in thought. It is 'something without which man can hardly live […]. Real myth is truthful'.[34] Or perhaps he should have said, it is that which lets truth and falseness appear as such. Myth is how the lifeworld articulates itself, or reveals itself to us in our culture.[35] Greek philosophy must be understood from its 'mythical framework' – how it conceives 'human revealedness'. Greek philosophy arises from this experience of revealedness, from the human situation of living 'within the revealedness of the whole'.[36]

What does this mean? My interpretation of these sometimes rather fragmentary lecture comments is that Greek philosophy does not work based on ontological presumptions that distance it from its world of myth. Myth provides a background, a *history*, whereas philosophy appears in the possibility to consciously reflect on this mythical background in the *present*. This is how Patočka reads the idea held by Plato as well as by Aristotle that amazement (θαυμάζειν) is at the origin of philosophy.[37] Philosophy is amazed by manifestation and wants to reveal it in its existence and structure. Philosophy sees not only what shows itself but also *that* it shows itself, and from this proceeds the amazement. The ground where it stands, in Greek philosophy, is myth. For Patočka's critical reading of Husserl, Greek philosophy proves an important asset since its turn towards the phenomena is not one towards the subject. Greek philosophy is concerned with the soul as a domain within a domain larger than the soul, a domain not of the property of the soul but that of the Gods. Emphasizing and retaining this structure do not imply that Patočka tries to

return us to a divine mythology, recreating the structure of presubjective experience in new mythological terms. The idea is merely to show that the manifestation of the world in the soul takes place in a larger structure in which the soul is rooted, rather than being its transcendental foundation (Husserl).

This provides a background for his reading of Democritus and Plato. According to Democritean atomism, man is initially not in truth. But the philosopher can cut through the appearances and perceive the world as it is, in its ontological constitution: the world as consisting of pure matter, of atoms. The soul also comprises atoms, according to this doctrine. Remember, Patočka's interest lies in the care for the soul – for Democritus, the care of the soul is not interesting for the sake of the soul but for the sake of the divine, the eternal. This is materialism at its origin, even though Democritus refers to the divine as that which gives meaning to the philosophical practice. For Plato, however, the insight into the ideas and the practically wise life form are always considered linked to each other:

> In Plato, we do not care about the soul so that we might penetrate right into the ultimate reasons, to the first causes of everything, and to look into the essence of things. This was Democritus's purpose. To the contrary, we know the world because through this we want to care for the soul.[38]

The Democritean care for the soul is a great influence for mechanism and for an objectivist worldview – Patočka talks of it as a rival to Plato's care for the soul, with strands continuing into the Enlightenment. In a sense, Husserl's scientism and his notion of a transcendental subject appear to Patočka as a concession to Democriteanism – the objectifying tendency of knowledge gets the upper hand of the project of the care for the soul.

What then is the specifically Platonic (Socratic) legacy?:

> Socrates leaves a heritage. Socrates did not help himself, but he helps others. In what way can a philosopher who is in such dire straits help others? In a philosophical way, through the outline of a city, where the philosopher can live, where the man who is to care for the soul can live, the man who is to care for the soul can live, the man who is to carry out the philosophical thought that it is necessary to live and think on the basis of insight [*nahlédnuti*], nothing else but that.[39]

This should not be misunderstood as a self-glorification of the philosophy professor. To understand the philosopher's role here, one must avoid the image of a certain member of the philosophical faculty. Neither Patočka nor Plato had a particular profession in mind, but the human possibility of leading one's life in search of truth. The philosopher is a certain human possibility, the example being Socrates. By acting as a philosopher, striving for wisdom is in his relation to himself, the polis and the cosmos, Socrates is not only the true philosopher but also the true statesman, and the true human being, living the best possible life.

Philosophical Activism: The Legacy of Charta 77

What role did the political context around Patočka play in his interpretation of Plato? Patočka was silenced by the authorities, and so he published exclusively in the samizdat underground press and only gave talks in private. There is even an uncanny correspondence between the Socratic ideal he advocates and his own work as a political dissident: a signer of Charta 77, dying in 1977 from a heart attack during a police interrogation.

Charta 77 was established as a protest against the Czechoslovak government imprisoning intellectuals and artists, insisting that the government uphold the human rights it had acknowledged by signing the Helsinki Agreement. In 'What We Can and Cannot Expect from Charta 77' (written just before his interrogation and untimely death), Patočka urges his fellow citizens to be brave and speak out against violations of human rights, reminding that 'submissiveness has never led to relaxations, only to greater severity[40]'. He finds that Charta 77 has already had some effect. The cornerstone of Charta 77 lies in its call to speak out freely; to live as if the human rights formally ratified by the Czechoslovak government were also actually valid – the call to live a moral life despite state repression. Charta 77 becomes in a sense Patočka's attempt to give expression to the care for the soul in a political act: 'Clear conscience and decency have proved to be also a powerful factor of political reality'.[41] In this text, he refers to Charta 77 as an attempt to 'strengthen legality'.[42] The whole document can be read as an effort to take part in effecting what his philosophico-historical writings have claimed possible; that the care of the soul not only is an idea but also a historical reality in the sense that it exerts real historical power. He can be said to have been right in that the Warsaw Pact dissolved a little more than a decade later, even if historians disagree over the extent to which the dissident movements were influential and to what degree it was the state Communist systems going bankrupt. Whatever the causes were, the legacy of 1989 also shows the ambiguity of historical causality. In many narrations of post-1989 events, Eastern Europe then became a part of Europe. It was invited into Europe, or reunited with Europe. Considering all of Patočka's writings on Europe, and his insistence that Czech culture open up to European universalism, did the event of 1989 not fulfil the dissident's wildest dreams?[43] However, when reflecting on the concept of Europe, it became more and more necessary for Patočka to emphasize that Europe as the project of the soul did not correspond to the Europe presented to him in contemporary history. I think Patočka could have regarded the present EU referring to itself as Europe in the same way as some Orthodox Jews look upon the modern state of Israel. Only the temporality is reversed. While they refuse to recognize the state of Israel since it can only exist after the Messiah's arrival (Israel does not yet exist), Patočka could not recognize the present EU as Europe since it no longer relates to the project of the care of the soul (Europe no longer exists).

And how would Patočka have viewed the turn of 1989? Even if he was a dissident in the Czechoslovak Republic, one should not immediately assume that this made him an advocate of capitalism, or that he would have approved of the neo-liberal policies to come. For the most part, his philosophy did not relate to contemporary politics. As for a deeper

historico-political analysis, he sees capitalism as moving hand in hand with the loss of the tradition of the Platonic care of the soul:

> Only the metaphysics of mechanism made possible the typical social phenomena of modern times, specifically modern capitalism, growing out of an equally extreme objective stance towards human affairs, subjecting human conditions to an equally law-like calculus and working directly with a mechanical model of human relations.[44]

It is one of life's ironies that the great admirer of Patočka and co-founder of Charta 77, Václav Havel, became president of Czechoslovakia in 1989 (and then in 1992 of the Czech Republic), and during his presidency, implemented one of the harshest and quickest neo-liberal shock therapies ever. Patočka was no critic of socialism; his political activism focused on human rights issues only. In 'The Philosophy of Czech History', a lecture held in 1969 at the Academy of Socialists, Patočka speaks of Czech culture as inherently democratic, placing the Czechs naturally in the socialist bloc. Equally naturally, he remarks, is that the Czechs, within this bloc, are particularly insistent on their democratic rights.[45]

When deciding on how to interpret Patočka's legacy, Havel becomes interesting on a further note. On human rights, Patočka wrote in a credo for Charta 77:

> The idea of human rights is nothing other than the conviction that even states, even society as a whole, are subject to the sovereignty of moral sentiment: that they recognize something unconditional that is higher than they are, something that is binding even on them, sacred, inviolable, and that in their power to establish and maintain a rule of law they seek to express recognition.[46]

The purpose of Charta 77, Patočka writes, is to remind of a higher authority than the state: a person's moral consciousness.

These words were written in the particular context of Czechoslovakian dissidence. However, when Václav Havel, more than 20 years later, defended the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) bombings of Yugoslavia in 1999, he leans on a very similar argument. In his argumentation, Havel, now ex-president of the Czech Republic, speaks about the human consciousness as 'the ambassador of eternity'. He repeatedly refers to human rights as transcending the rights of the state. However, Havel gives this a much more metaphysical foundation than Patočka. The final justification is, says Havel, that 'while the state is a human creation, human beings are the creation of God'.[47]

However one may feel about these bombings, they are not the core issue here. Nor is it about Christianity or about the acceptance of transcendence. Interestingly, in his introduction to his translation of Patočka's *Plato and Europe*, Petr Lom perceives the work to be 'a challenge to secularism', expressing the 'humble awareness that humankind is neither the master nor perhaps even the sole custodian of the universe'.[48] With these words, Lom is clearly intimating a secret Christian message in Patočka's work. But as

will be seen, Patočka has a much more historical and distanced interest in Christianity. Indeed, Lom's conception of Patočka's religiosity would rather describe what Patočka in the first heretical essay conceives as prehistoric culture, where '[h]umans are not in the center of the world. […] Only in reference to what transcends them are humans given their place'.[49]

The key issue is how transcendence is used in an argument. If we support a bombing by saying that human beings are the creation of God, we have left philosophy as the care of the soul and critical self-examination far behind. Of course, the roles of the intellectual dissidents and (ex-)presidents are different, and in political action, the critical self-examination must at some point come to a pause. But when the defence of war acts is crowned with the support of a transcendent being, there is a high risk that the political agency becomes unreceptive to critical questioning. 'Nobiscum deus!' 'Gott mit uns!' 'God (is) with us!' were battle cries of many versions of European imperialist warfare.

How then is philosophy to deal with that which transcends human affairs? Even if Patočka does not claim that God justifies his argument, he could not have denied that the same structure pervades his text on Charta 77; only that moral conscience takes the place of divinity. In *Plato and Europe*, Patočka discusses the notion of transcendence, arguing that at the heart of philosophy as care of the soul, it 'tries to negotiate with that which rejects every philosophy', discussing it in the name of something that philosophy helped conceptually to formulate such as the absolute.[50] Hence, even if philosophy concedes to existing transcendent ideals, these ideals were formulated, at least partly, in the tradition of philosophy, giving philosophy a key role in its interpretation. This is not only a historical obligation. If philosophy is care for the soul, it is a care that negotiates this tension between allowing the transcendent to be transcendent and realizing that the transcendent needs to be formulated and interpreted anew. This is a role of his heretic philosophy of history: not to negate the transcendental but to probe it historically, to study its appearance through history.

Patočka's Heretical Philosophy of History: Post-Europe

This is the reason that Patočka endeavours in the dubious discipline of a philosophical genealogy of Europe. He told the story of Europe while living in a bifurcated Europe. Czechoslovakia was part of the eastern bloc, a satellite of the Soviet empire, visualizing itself not through stories told of Europe of the past but of the future Communist era. And as one could read in, for example, an East German *Lexikon der Antike*, Plato was 'the founder of objective idealism' and the 'main representative of the ideology of slave holders'. The GDR (German Democratic Republic) author goes on to write, 'After the rise of Marxist philosophy, reactionary bourgeois philosophers used motives from the doctrine of ideas in order to fight against Materialism. This occurred […] primarily in the yet today influential movement of phenomenology (Husserl)'.[51]

These formulations may today cause some amusement, and probably did so in the days of their initial reception, even if the humour was darker at that time. Yet it is clear that a phenomenologically inspired study of the identity of Europe, building on Plato, the founder of the slave-owner ideology and idealism, was seen as a reactionary attack on the materialist doctrine, and not an innocent endeavour. As we saw, his later translator Petr Lom interpreted Patočka's philosophy as a religious critique of materialism. And yet even on the surface of his thought, he positions himself as a heretic. What are we to understand by his entitling his most famous collection of essays *Heretical Essays*? In the obvious account of Patočka as the Czech dissident, Patočka's heresy consists in his opposition to the historical doctrine of dialectical materialism.

Ivan Chvatík reads this heresy in relation to Patočka's use of Christianity as a 'non-Christian reflection' of Christianity, 'thinking Christianity to its end', 'taking leave of any idea of God as warrant of a totality of meaning'.[52] In Chvatík's view, Patočka's heresy signals his non-Christian rethinking of the Christian legacy, a third form of heresy. A fourth can be added: Patočka reads the history of Europe in another way than the master philosophers Hegel and Husserl (and Heidegger).

In my view, Patočka deliberately chooses the ambiguous figure of heresy because he intends to be heretical in all of the above senses. In a more general sense, heresy as such may be seen as a central tool for a philosophical historian. In the footsteps of Hegel, Patočka writes a *philosophical* history that unlike Hegel's is devoid of the idea of a quasi-providential rationality leading human history.

For the historically heretic thought of Patočka, Christianity can only be interesting insofar as it is a development of the European tradition of the care of the soul. This is found, for example, in his late essay 'Europe and the European Heritage until the End of the Nineteenth Century' (1975). Here Patočka leans on the analyses of major occidental thinkers in order to reconstruct an efficient narrative of the history of Europe. He takes as his starting point an interesting observation made by Hegel, who had seen Christianity as the 'Foundation of a State'. Nations at war were all of a sudden united in one State, the Holy Roman Empire. Of course, there is no such thing as a European state in Hegel's time or in Patočka's time:

> Europe is not a state, though once it had been one. Europe here means *western* Europe, united once by the crusades against the Islamic world (though, in the Third Crusade, also against Byzantium). Though it was war that forged and hardened European unity sufficiently that a sense of it persisted, even in the age of European particularism and disintegration into sovereign modern States.[53]

Patočka, who here effectively traces the division into Western and Eastern Europe as well as the one between Europe and the Islamic world, agrees with Hegel that European unity had a primarily spiritual foundation. But the spiritual unity rested on a political struggle; it was dependent on the crusades. It is important to see that what Patočka intends here is spirituality in a wider sense (not Lom's pious Christianity): Patočka is commenting on Hegel, for whom

Geist refers to the shared movement of self-reflection. The core of European self-reflection is for Patočka Plato's care of the soul.

After Plato, this spiritual essence of Europe is passed along through new layers of culture. Thus, interpreting the works of Seneca and Cicero, Patočka sees the ideals of the care of the soul as safeguarded among the intellectual elites of the Roman Empire. The care now extends to a care for the legal system. And later, in the Christian Sacrum Imperium, this expands to include much broader parts of the population, providing the effect of both discipline and inner depth. This continues the tradition of the care of the soul in a new form. 'The care for the soul', he says, 'is thus what gave rise to Europe – this thesis we can hold without exaggeration'.[54]

But sixteenth-century Europe enters a crisis: 'Not the care *for the soul*, the care to *be*, but the care to *have*, care for the external world and its conquest, becomes the dominant concern'.[55] This changes all spheres of the world: politics, business, religion and science. Capitalism becomes the ideology that most expresses this concern with 'having'. And Bacon is the thinker best conveying this new spiritual orientation: knowledge is power, and only efficient knowledge is real knowledge. Interestingly, and probably under the influence of Adorno and Horkheimer and that of Heidegger, Patočka views the Enlightenment as mainly in line with this decay of Europe, with an instrumentalizing view of nature, including human nature.[56]

Patočka's notion of post-Europe implies his view of contemporary society, a society where this idea of the care of the soul no longer can be seen to be instantiated in society. The concept also expresses a certain irony: The universalization promised by Europe, harboured in the very idea of Europe is what in the end-effect made it possible for Europe's dominance to be broken. In a late unfinished work written in German, 'Europa und Nach-Europa: Die nacheuropäische Epoche und ihre geistige Probleme'/Europe and Post-Europe: The Post-European Epoch and Its Spiritual Problems, he elaborates on the loss of Europe. Since 'Europe' is such a loose concept, he starts out by justifying his particular genre of philosophical history:

> The following attempt will probably appear unhistorical to the historians, as random historical events to the philosophers, and both would complain and hold it to be a mere construction. The risk is worth taking, since the objective is to show problems obscured by our most immediate difficulties; to dismantle that which is near and make visible that which is far away, one needs construction – sometimes even destruction.[57]

The philosophical quality here lies, I dare infer, in a particular narrative that focuses on a philosophical concept as it unfolds in history. Europe is an idea tied to the principle of caring for the soul. The story Patočka tells is the attempt to make this idea plausible. But philosophy shall not feed mere stories, as is known already since Plato, who explicitly pitted philosophy against the narratives of epic poets, rhetors, sophists and historians. Patočka seems to anticipate this objection: 'Philosophical-scientific thought, original and founded in

praxis, is no naked and pure vision, but a path from which it goes astray every time it seeks a metaphysical finalization [*Festlegung*]'.[58] Here is again the motif of heresy, the necessity of heresy against metaphysical finalizations (Democriteanism), thus distancing himself from the Husserlian transcendental subject or the Hegelian idea.

But metaphysical finalizations are not only a fault of the idealists; it might well be directed also at a Marxist-Leninist view of history. Patočka's account of Europe is certainly not a material history in the normal sense. In the fifth heretical essay, he states, '[H]istory is foremost a history of the soul'.[59] The reference to the soul does not mean that Patočka intends to study only the development of the human psyche of individuals. Rather, it is a critique of such understandings of material history that neglect the interior development of the soul, which is the real matter of history. 'For that reason, history is almost from the beginning accompanied by reflection on history'.[60]

Although his approach may seem to be a very idealist account of the history of Europe, Patočka does not want to give precedence to 'real' or 'ideal' factors. His point is not that ideal factors were more important in Europe. Patočka does not contest a 'materialist' account of history; he agrees that the centre of focus for a historical investigation must be power, which is, however, not only an economic and objective but also a subjective, or rather 'collective-subjective', phenomenon. This means that history must mainly be a political history, taking into account the role and view of the political subject:

> European history distinguishes itself in that 'here the attempt was from the beginning made to form the reality at hand, i.e. the appearing [*erscheinende*] reality through insight into the structure of Nature, Soul, Society – that is, through reflection'.[61] Patočka's elegant wording describes European history as marked by activism. He presents this as a variation of Husserl's thesis that Europe is a culture of rationality but in fact goes beyond Husserl and ends in an understanding much closer to that of Heidegger. The difference being, however, that Patočka does not interpret this activism as decadence, as a crisis in itself.

Patočka starts with the readings of Auguste Comte and Geoffrey Barraclough.[62] Comte's idea of a progression from a religious to a metaphysical to a positive worldview is rather swiftly dismissed, as Patočka notes that Comte does not try to give any account of the meaning of a concept like metaphysics. Instead, Patočka focuses on a critique of Barraclough, a historian he generally finds to be overly pessimistic about the European situation.

Barraclough writes that the world's power centre has left Europe. This was true already in the 1960s, and Patočka agrees with the diagnosis but finds Barraclough's description naive in three ways: (1) in a sense, Barraclough presupposes the world to be already totally Europeanized, reading, for example, the revolution in China as a modernization in the sense of a Europeanization. Patočka asks whether one cannot see a 'Chinaization of certain European cultural elements' in the Chinese adaptation of Marxism. The idea of a unified humanity is European, and it is a typically European blindness to overlook the cultural differences; (2) Barraclough uses European historical measures to describe the

non-European cultures as if they do not develop on their own accord; and (3) he fails to really grasp today's situation since he cannot see what is slipping away from Europe.[63]

This critique of Barraclough works excellently as a critique of Husserl – and of Barroso's cultural committee. If universality is talked about in a distinctly European tone, how can Europeans simply assume that the Chinese (or the Papuans for that matter) have adopted the same universalism?

Patočka sees the world as facing an extreme threat of a lack of resources. He believes neither in the Marxist ('radical-revolutionary') nor in the liberal ('empirical-contemporary') analyses of the situation. 'They cannot really grasp what the reality of post-Europe is about, since they are too submerged in European conceptual schemes to find a distance to the phenomenon of Europe'.[64] Patočka adds to the demise. For example, when commenting on an exhibition of contemporary American art, he finds that the element of subjectivism that had marked European modern art is gone; there is 'no attempt of making the invisible visible' since 'one captures the manifestations of the general intention immediately'. 'The "Decline of the West" of which [this work] speaks is no longer a pessimist prediction, based on assumptions of the periodical development of civilizations, but an empirical fact, which our work will attempt to explain by means of a historical analysis of ideas'.[65]

Conclusion: Separating the Identity and the Idea of Europe

Already Hegel and Husserl saw the notion of universality as a historical result, a result of human efforts. Even if the community aspect is more emphasized in Husserl, in both cases there is a belief in a singular path towards the universal.

Far from the peaceful process visualized in Husserl's work, and not at all the unitary system implied by Hegel, Patočka stresses the constant struggle and renegotiation of the universal. This is what he calls 'care for the soul'. Like Husserl, he chooses to tie this to Europe as a philosophical concept, a choice that must now be seen as problematic as it retains the confusion of identity and ideal.

Does all of this have anything to do with Barroso and his Europhoric artists and intellectuals? To Patočka, our time was a post-European time. In a sense, this implies that he divorces idea and identity; that identity with which we are living in no longer corresponds to the idea of Europe. The cluster of institutions today identified by the name of Europe has only a historical connection to what he discusses as the idea of Europe. Patočka, however, retains a notion of Europe as an idea, Europe as care for the soul. At least in the present conjuncture, it seems to me necessary to go even further, and that it would be in the spirit of Patočka to do so. Europe needs to be disconnected from the notion of universality and from Patočka's own idea of care for the soul. This does not mean that the idea of the universal and the notion of care for the soul need not be ideals *for* Europe, or that Europe as a project should be abandoned. On the contrary, it is necessary in order for the universal values to function as an active ideal for Europe.

This recalls Plato's concept of the χωρισμός (*chorismos*), the separation between the ideas and that which they are ideas of. To talk at all about a just person or a just polis requires a notion of justice, which has often been seen as creating a gap between the ideal and the sensible. This might have been a too far-reaching interpretation of Plato. An idea is that from which something becomes understandable as that which it is, and from which the qualities of what is discussed can be judged. But things encountered in the world are what they are to a certain extent: they are, for example, big or small, good or bad, depending on what they are compared with. The function of the ideas is to help us judge things; to see things from the viewpoint of the idea. In order for this, there must be a separation (χωρισμός) between the ideas and the sensible things.

Socrates did not criticize Athens by saying that it did not fulfil the idea of Athens. His criticism was based on the fact that it did not correspond to the ideals of a just *politeia* described in the *Republic*. To criticize the present state of affairs, he conceived the ideal *politeia*. Yet the ideal *politeia* was based on the common notions of justice shared by the dialogue partners of Socrates, and refined through the investigative dialogue. In a similar way, in his writings for Charta 77, Patočka did not suggest new ideals for Czechoslovakian citizens but demanded that the human rights contained in the Helsinki Agreement signed by the Czechoslovak government be respected.

The fates of Socrates and Patočka show that questioning the moral standards of those in power is not always a safe practice. But even if not ideal, the EU is a rather safe place for intellectuals and artists. Hence, one could hope for more heresy, as well as for an emphasis on the difference between the European idea of universality and Europe as a current political actor. For this reason, it is better not to talk of Europe as harbouring the idea of universality, and not to confuse ideal with identity. Or to put it otherwise, in order for the idea of universality to be Europe's ideal, it cannot be thought of as constituting its identity.

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Notes

1　Valéry ([1924] 1977: 294).
2　Barroso (2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014). The EC's 'New Narrative' declaration is also presented and discussed in the introductory chapter to this book.
3　Barroso (2014).
4　Cultural Committee for the 'New Narrative for Europe' project (2014); Europa Nostra (2014).
5　Cultural Committee for the 'New Narrative for Europe' project (2014).
6　Cultural Committee for the 'New Narrative for Europe' project (2014).
7　IOM (2015).
8　Hegel ([1837] 2001: 22).
9　Hegel ([1837] 2001: 22).
10　Hegel ([1837] 2001: 24).
11　Hegel ([1837] 2001: 27).
12　Hegel ([1837] 2001: 28–29).
13　Hegel ([1837] 2001: 32).
14　Hegel ([1837] 2001: 117).
15　Hegel ([1837] 2001: 155).
16　Husserl ([1936] 1978).
17　Husserl ([1936] 1978: 17).
18　Husserl ([1936] 1978: 290).

19 Patočka ([1975] 1996).
20 Bauman (2012: 14).
21 Patočka (1936).
22 Patočka ([1937] 1991). A note on languages. Patočka was a true European in the sense that he published not only in his native Czech but also in German, and communicated extensively and fluently also in French. Translations of his work now exist in numerous languages. Thanks to the enormous effort of Erika Abrams and others, many of the important texts exist in French. Some, but not as many, have now also been translated into English. I have used the English translations whenever possible, and all translations from German (original) or French (translated) are my own.
23 It was first published in French by Erika Abrams, *Platon et Europe* (Verdier 1990), and was later translated into English by Petr Lom (Patočka [1979] 2002). The Czech text now exists in the published collected works (Patočka 1999).
24 Patočka ([1979] 2002: 14).
25 cf. *Apology* 29d-e; *Alcibiades I* 127e.
26 cf. Gadamer ([1930] 1990); Wieland (1998).
27 cf. Foucault (1988); Hadot ([1995] 1998).
28 Patočka ([1979] 2002: 27).
29 Patočka ([1979] 2002: 27).
30 Patočka ([1979] 2002: 36).
31 Patočka ([1979] 2002: 40).
32 Patočka ([1979] 2002: 40–41).
33 Patočka ([1979] 2002: 41).
34 Patočka ([1979] 2002: 43).
35 Patočka ([1979] 2002: 44).
6   Patočka ([1979] 2002: 49).
37 *Theatetus* 155d; *Metaphysics* 982b.
38 Patočka ([1979] 2002: 91).
39 Patočka ([1979] 2002: 87–88; translation altered, original italics).
40 Patočka ([1977a] 1989: 343).
41 Patočka ([1977a] 1989: 343).
42 Patočka ([1977a] 1989: 343).
43 cf. Patočka ([1939a] 1991: 143ff.).
44 Patočka ([1967] 1989: 245).
45 Patočka ([1969] 1991: 130ff.).
46 Patočka ([1977a] 1989: 341).
47 Havel (1999: 6).
48 Lom (2002: xxi).
49 Patočka ([1975] 1996: 12).
50 Patočka (2002: 108).
51 Irmscher (1987).
52 Chvatík (2003; my translation).
53 Patočka ([1975] 1996: 79).

54 Patočka ([1975] 1996: 83).
55 Patočka ([1975] 1996: 83).
56 Patočka ([1975] 1996: 88–89).
57 Patočka (1988: 207). This unfinished text was originally written in German by Patočka at some point in the 1970s, and was posthumously published (1988), only later to be translated into Czech. There is no English translation to date.
58 Patočka (1988: 209).
59 Patočka ([1975] 1996: 103).
60 Patočka ([1975] 1996: 103).
61 Patočka (1988: 212).
62 Barraclough (1964).
63 Patočka (1988: 227).
64 Patočka (1988: 228).
65 Patočka (1988: 229).

Chapter 3

Clashing Internationalisms: East European Narratives of
West European Integration

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Two Europes

In a pioneering work from 1961, Finnish political scientist Klaus Törnudd examined the ideological and political motives behind the Soviet Union's aversion to West European regional cooperation.[1] Törnudd diagnosed Soviet responses to virtually all integration efforts in the non-Communist part of the continent, from the interwar period and the immediate aftermath of World War II (the European Congress took place in 1948 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] was founded in 1949) to the establishment in 1957 of the European Economic Community (EEC; today's European Union [EU]). He found that Moscow interpreted all the reasons that West European leaders advanced for European unity and integration as signs of aversion and conflict. For instance, if European leaders hailed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – launched on 9 May 1950 by French foreign minister Robert Schuman and formally established with the signing of the Treaty of Paris a year later – as a step towards inter-European reconciliation and peace, Soviet commentators saw it as a scheme for the rearmament of France and West Germany and hence as an act of aggression.[2]

Törnudd was discouraged by the incompatibility between the views of European integration disseminated in the two parts of the divided continent. His conclusion, in the very last sentence of his book, speaks for itself: 'The basic difficulty is that there is no agreement even as to what exactly is reality'.[3]

If there were two Europes at this period in time – and few would deny that this was the case – this also meant that they did not agree on the same 'reality'. European integration had entirely different meanings on the two sides of the divide. That is to say, there existed at this point in history two fairly well-defined *geopolitical narratives* about the future of Europe. The first one projected a common socialist future that would be realized when the Western working classes overthrew capitalism in their respective countries and gradually, or through sudden revolutionary action, built a society modelled on the at-the-time apparently successful Soviet system. The second narrative projected a continuation of an allegedly progressive history of political emancipation and capitalist industrialization and trade, which would little by little bring to all Europeans the prosperity and welfare enabled by West Europe's economic and cultural dynamism.

Interestingly, these geopolitical narratives also entailed two opposing versions of the *global future* and Europe's contribution to it; this is what my title evokes as 'clashing internationalisms'. According to the first, the socialist states of Eastern Europe would help

dismantle an allegedly evil system of imperialist exploitation and colonial oppression, and instead institute socialism on a global scale. According to the other narrative, Western civilization would soon come into its own, shed its parochialisms and racist prejudices and bring 'social and economic development' to the poor populations of what was now called the Third World.[4]

For a long time, these two narratives mutually reinforced each other in the sense that the stronger one of them appeared, the easier it was for the other one to justify itself as indispensable to the protection of human civilization against the dangers of its evil opponent, and vice versa. The antagonism between these geopolitical narratives was, of course, conditioned by two opposed ideologies – for lack of space, I will call them Marxist-Leninism and liberalism. This ideological antagonism, in turn, is generally referred to as a feature of the cold war. Sometimes it is even seen as one of the causes of the cold war as such.

The Function of Geopolitical Narratives

This chapter aims to explore Soviet and East German geopolitical narratives about West European integration at the formative moment of the EU, that is to say, when the organization was founded in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome. This objective is relevant for at least two reasons that also help situate the present chapter in relation to other contributions in this collection. First, by looking at two contradictory geopolitical narratives of Europe – in their most intense and extreme forms, as it were – my chapter contributes to an understanding of the contents, forms, functions and effects of such narratives. Second, and as I shall contend in detail below, my objective offers access to historical arguments and disputes that still today, tacitly or openly, inform Russian and East European assessments of European integration, and this regardless of whether these assessments are dismissive of or enthusiastic about the EU. As I will show, both these reasons hinge to no small extent on the perceived global role and colonial agenda of the (West) European integration project at the time of its foundation.

My empirical material consists of significant analyses from Moscow, all of them found in official and quasi-official publications. Above all, I will discuss a text by the Russian expert on European affairs and international economics Georgiy Skorov. Published shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, this text presents a comprehensive analysis of the EEC's colonial agenda from a Soviet point of view. I will also refer to material from the German Democratic Republic (GDR), mainly the newspaper *Neues Deutschland*, mouthpiece of the ruling party, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, but also books and pamphlets published in the GDR that dealt with the EEC shortly after its foundation.[5] As we shall see, the GDR material is largely derivative of the Soviet discourse, and at the same time, and for obvious reasons, focused more on the EEC's implications for the division of Germany. It should also be said that my GDR sources are of a more journalistic kind and hence less authoritative than the Moscow sources as regards the official stance of the East European

bloc vis-à-vis West European integration. This mirrors the actual situation at the time in the sense that it was Moscow that set out the terms of the debate.[6]

In saying that I am examining geopolitical narratives, I must underline that I am not focusing on the political history and foreign policy of either the EEC or the Soviet Union and its satellite states. Obviously, my remarks are informed by cold war history and politics, but my contribution does not fall within that field of research but rather within that of critical cultural studies, or what may be termed 'ideology critique'. Hence, I am concerned with geopolitical narratives in the strict sense. Such narratives may be defined as derivatives, interpretations, mediations or popularizations of geopolitical analysis and doctrine. I will thus be dealing with narratives that serve to define the very meaning of Europe by relating it to a global constellation of power. More specifically, I will analyse two narrative ways of 'signifying Europe' with reference to the force field of geopolitics.[7]

Of course, these two narratives were not the only ones on offer in public debate and political analysis of international relations and geopolitics. They were the dominant ones, comparable to what narratology and narrative analysis conceive of as 'master narratives', which are characterized by their ability to structure reality through their often compelling simplicity.[8] Although it is true, for instance, that Polish and Yugoslav analyses of West European integration did not fully conform to Moscow's perspective, and although it is also true that not even Moscow's view of European integration was monolithic, immutable or unburdened by contradictions, it remains incontestable that – as geopolitical frames of understanding global power relations – the two narratives that I will be dealing with were the ones that carried political and ideological agency. A much more simple way of putting this is to say that geopolitical narratives are by nature totalizing, sucking up the lives and deaths of human populations, as well as all cultural and political differences, into a set of abstractions and generalities that aspire to explain the very course of human history, and thereby also – as I will return to at the end – to govern history.

This perspective necessitates a note on the general relationship between geopolitics and European integration. For it may be said that European integration was from its very outset, as it took shape after World War I, a geopolitical project. This is also the way in which the earliest advocates of pan-European collaboration viewed the matter. Reflecting both the aggressive lust for imperial expansion and the nervous obsession with Europe's uncertain fate in a new global situation after 1918, geopolitical science in its original sense was a theory that envisioned the world order as a struggle between various polities.[9] It saw states as dynamic and transmutable, owning specific quantities of energy and vitality often measured in population and production figures, which were subsequently translated into territorial reach. The 'vital force' of a certain polity would thus also determine what 'space' or 'scale' it needed to adequately develop its capacities. In geopolitical theory, political boundaries were unfixed and turned into elastic demarcations, shrinking or expanding depending on the force of a particular state and on the counter-force exerted by its neighbours and enemies.

The outcome of World War I, with the imperial expansion of Europe's nation states curbed by the emergence of new global powers to the east and the west, made European

debate and politics ripe for geopolitical speculations and calculations as to the future of the comparatively small and fragmented European states, which now had to look for new ways of ensuring the development and progress of their populations and economies. In this perspective, the integration of Europe's productive capacities was imperative. This is how political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, the inventor of the concept of geopolitics, described the dire situation of Europe in 1914:

> The European federation has not yet been seriously placed on the agenda, but it carries an old legacy; and what used to be a vague idea is now emerging as a necessity in the interest of Europe's self-preservation. Only through union [or amalgamation] can the present European states remain resistant to their rapidly growing adversaries, which already count their territories in two-figure millions and their populations in three-figure millions while they at the same time are self-sufficient in food production. We can already witness the shadows of the American, Russian and Yellow perils being cast over our continent. Thus, has Europe come under pressure that in due time will win out over the mighty facts and traditions that still split Europe into several sovereign small parts.[10]

As outlined by Kjellén, the European integration project was justified by references to internal dysfunctions as well as to a number of external pressures, one of these being the 'Russian peril'. Several other statements from the same period also call Russia and the 'East' or the 'Orient' the great opponent, in the face of which Europeans must either unite or perish. Kjellén's statement too reveals how geopolitical narratives function. Basing themselves on an algebra of power that correlates the inherent capacities and means of production of a specific community (its vital force) to the territory and resources under its command (its scale), such narratives delineate a history of political and civilizational expansion and integration or one of decline and disintegration. Often such narratives also come with this or that exhortation and legitimation regarding the necessity of holding on to, consolidating or conquering territories and resources.

Now, the statements I will discuss in order to reveal an East European geopolitical narrative about West European integration function in comparable ways. They recognize the inherent capacity of West European capitalism to expand across new markets and find new margins of profit through more efficient forms of labour exploitation and resource extraction. However, they also identify the limitations and contradictions of that expansion, which will eventually lead to the downfall of capitalism as such and of the states and classes that have benefitted from it.

This also goes to say that geopolitical narratives are typically stories about struggle, usually of a heroic kind. They portray a protagonist locked in zero-sum games for scale, reach, space, resources, dominance and hegemony. Since such phenomena also appear to be what ignites historical conflicts of various kinds, geopolitical narratives are often confused with political history in general. Yet political history – at least in the more stringent and nuanced form

that we should expect from it – can have no such clear-cut protagonists and antagonists as geopolitical narratives do. This difference is fundamental, which, of course, does not prevent history writing from frequently assuming the form of geopolitical narratives; thereby revealing a taking of sides or a willingness to serve or justify this or that historical subject or geopolitical agent. Historical accounts of European integration offer rich illustrations of such amalgams of a heroic geopolitical narrative mode and a more rigorous historiography. That this is the case should not surprise anyone, for just as conventional history tends to legitimize power, historical accounts of European integration normally take for granted, as an article of faith, the existence of a progressive historical agent called Europe. In the case of Kjellén's early geopolitical theory, this agent vies for its survival as a sustainable political community against 'the American, Russian and Yellow perils'. Similarly, a specifically heroic 'European subject' figures as a protagonist in former president of the European Commission Manuel Barroso's call in 2012 for a 'new narrative for Europe', which immediately activated the geopolitical dimensions involved in a European project that celebrates its ability to impose its *soft civilizing power* on the rest of the world.

West European Integration and Soviet Internationalism in the Hour of Suez

Even just a quick glance at the historical material reveals that geopolitical competitiveness was at the fore in the debate surrounding the foundation of the EEC. Again, European integration was here explicitly asserted as a way of withstanding external 'perils'. The Suez crisis in 1956 offers an instructive example. It cast West European integration as a polarizing venture in relation to a set of clearly identified antagonists, the Soviet Union being the most serious of these.[11]

In July 1956, Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, had nationalized the Suez Canal Company, until then controlled by the UK and France, who, in late October and early November, along with Israel responded to the nationalization with a military invasion. The Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, threatened with war if the attack was not halted. The US president, Dwight Eisenhower, for his part, was furious because his allies had planned the attack on Egypt without his knowledge. Taking it as a 'personal slap in the face', the Eisenhower administration immediately demanded a ceasefire while at the same time throwing the UK into a severe financial crisis.[12]

But the UK, and especially France, insisted on teaching the uppity Nasser a lesson. For many, a new world war seemed to be looming. On 5 November, Moscow dispatched telegrams to US, French and UK leaders, and in the evening a threatening message was publicly transmitted in a Moscow broadcast by the Soviet prime minister, Nikolay Bulganin, to his UK counterpart, Anthony Eden: 'In what position would Britain have found herself had it been attacked by more powerful states possessing all kinds of modern weapons of destruction? […] We are full of determination to crush the aggressor and re-establish peace in the East by using force'.[13]

The message gained credibility and incited fear due to simultaneous developments in Hungary, where, only days before, the Red Army had intervened and brutally suppressed uprisings in Budapest in ways that made the Soviet threat real to all West European leaders. At this critical juncture, the West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, decided to ignore the German Social Democrats' strong admonition to the contrary and go on a long-planned visit to Paris to sort out outstanding matters in the ongoing negotiations on the EEC with France's prime minister, Guy Mollet. As Adenauer's train arrived at Paris's Gare de l'Est on the morning of 6 November, a large crowd welcomed him. He was given a salute by honorary guards, and national anthems were played.[14] The symbolic message to the world was unmistakable: for the sake of European unity and Europe's geopolitical interests, West Germany rallied to the support of France's campaign in Egypt.

But it was for naught. The same night Anthony Eden phoned Mollet, informing him that he was forced to bow to US pressures and that the UK agreed to a ceasefire. Mollet was floored. In the history books, the Suez crisis has sometimes been described as a second Waterloo, this time not only for France but also for the UK and for colonial Western Europe as a whole. The crisis confirmed that the global balance of power had fundamentally shifted.

After Mollet hung up, Adenauer, who was present in the room, tried to comfort his friend, saying:

> France and England will never be powers comparable to the US and the Soviet Union. Nor will Germany. There remains to them only one way of playing a decisive role in the world; that is to unite to make Europe. England is not ripe for it but the affair of Suez will help to prepare her spirits for it. We have no time to waste: Europe will be your revenge.[15]

'Europe' as a means of revenge? On this night in Paris, in light of the events in Budapest and even more of the unfolding European defeat in Suez, the basic understanding between Mollet and Adenauer was further solidified. Four months later, the EEC, the foundation of today's EU, was established with the signing of the Treaty of Rome.

It was the pact between Adenauer and Mollet that enabled and formed the basis of the EEC and the Treaty of Rome. But the question remained whether the EEC would have been created without Nasser, or at least without the alternative future advocated by him and the anti-colonial movements of pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism. These movements, which from now on could count on Soviet backing, had links to the independence struggle in Algeria and had assumed leading roles in the so-called Bandung group, through which newly independent Third World countries demanded their right to choose their own political path.

To prevent this future from materializing, the statesmen of Western Europe realized that they had to join forces and promote European unity so as to facilitate the establishment of common European institutions and actions on the world stage. All of the actions and

decisions surrounding the creation of the EEC in the 1950s had a geopolitical undertone: Europe could regain its global influence only if it chose to unite.

When the EEC was formed, it was not due to a desire for peace. If peace and security had been the primary goal of European leaders, then NATO would have been sufficient, an alliance that since the late 1940s, and especially since the entry of West Germany in the mid-1950s, had given West European states the best guarantee possible against war between and among them. The threat was now the Soviet Union and, by extension, all those nations that risked falling under the thrall of Moscow, the anti-colonial independence movements and various charismatic and more and more globally recognized leaders, such as Nasser, Ahmed Ben Bella, Kwame Nkrumah, Ho Chi Minh, Sukarno and Patrice Lumumba, to mention but a few. Indeed, the outcome of the Suez crisis was a triumph for Khrushchev, who had gambled successfully with the nuclear threat.

Four years after the crisis, speaking in the UN General Assembly, Khruschev again lectured Western politicians and diplomats on the lessons of Suez and anti-colonialism: 'We must take a shovel and dig a deep grave, and bury colonialism as deep as we can, and drive in a stake so that this evil may never be reborn.'[16] Apparently, the Soviet Union was by now ready to champion the self-determination of the peoples of the Third World still under Western colonial dominance or in the process of liberating themselves from it. Under Khrushchev's leadership and after, the Soviet Union cultivated new allies in the Third World. Soviet leaders displayed strong support for Third World regional cooperation. They backed Lumumba and Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism as well as the Bandung initiative's anti-colonial efforts, not to mention the Kremlin's predilection for Cuba's regional initiatives after Castro's revolutionary takeover. The Soviet Union also built a new Friendship University in Moscow to bring in talents from Africa, Asia and the Middle East.[17] One kind of regional cooperation met with Moscow's strong aversion, however – the West European kind.

This hostility was unmistakable in early 1957, when it became clear that negotiations between France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands would result in the establishment of a new West European organization, the EEC. Mainly geared towards economic cooperation, the EEC also had strong political, cultural and geopolitical dimensions. Moreover, its sister organization, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), was tasked with coordinating the development of nuclear energy among the six member states. In January 1957 (the treaties establishing the EEC and Euratom were signed in Rome on 25 March), the party magazine *Novoye Vremya* (New Times) published a series of commentaries on the EEC. As one author wrote:

It is a tangle of contradictions, economic absurdities, fond hopes and fantasy. It is a cumbersome and unwieldy undertaking inspired by a feeling of despair in a situation charged with economic troubles, by attempts to tone down the resentment against imperialist adventurism. Measured against economic and political realities, it makes no sense.[18]

Soviet commentary in the winter and spring of 1957 greatly emphasized that the EEC was both inadequate to its tasks and destructive for the world. The organization would aggravate capital–labour conflicts within the six founding states, place the participating countries under the dominance of West German industry and business circles, enable West German militarization and prolong West Europe's imperial dominance in Africa and elsewhere. Borisov stated in an article:

> The realization of this plan is connected with the efforts to strengthen the military imperialistic bloc of the western countries. This bloc is directed against the camp of peace and democracy, against the vital interests of the labour movement, against the struggle of national liberation in the colonies and dependent countries.[19]

Throughout 1956 and 1957, the Soviet political and economic press were filled with commentaries on Euratom and the EEC, the latter being commonly understood, just as in West Europe, as standing on two legs: the common market or customs union, and the so-called Eurafrica plan, which entailed the integration of the colonies for the stated purpose of improving their economic and social development.[20] The most authoritative Soviet reactions came from the foreign ministry, published in *Pravda* on 17 March 1957, and from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, published in June and August of that same year by the journal *Kommunist* and subsequently disseminated in West European languages.[21]

Lenin versus Coudenhove-Kalergi

Before examining these statements, however, we should recall that the Soviet government already had a well-developed standpoint – and narrative – on European integration under the conditions of capitalism. This was the Leninist doctrine on the 'United States of Europe', which Lenin had formulated in 1915, a year into World War I. Referring to the war, which many saw as the ultimate breakdown ensuing from the senseless competition between Europe's imperial states, Lenin drew the following conclusion: 'From the standpoint of the economic conditions of imperialism – i.e., the export of capital and the division of the world by the "advanced" and "civilised" colonial powers – a United States of Europe, under capitalism, is either impossible or reactionary'.[22]

That such a union was unsustainable, and hence in the long run *impossible*, as Lenin put it, was because capitalism entailed an ever-fiercer competition between the capitalist trusts of Europe's imperial states, and this would eventually lead to a struggle to the death for new markets and resources between these states. In the short run, however, some basis for European unity could be established through a settled agreement on how to carve up the non-capitalist world and prevent it from falling under the influence of non-European powers; this, then, was the scenario that Lenin designated 'reactionary'. As Lenin argued, a

'United States of Europe under capitalism is tantamount to an agreement on the partition of colonies'. He went on to explain:

> Of course, *temporary* agreements are possible between capitalists and between states. In this sense a United States of Europe is possible as an agreement between the *European capitalists* […] but to what end? Only for the purpose of jointly suppressing socialism in Europe, of jointly protecting colonial booty *against* Japan and America, who have been badly done out of their share by the present partition of colonies, and the increase of whose might during the last fifty years has been immeasurably more rapid than that of backward and monarchist Europe, now turning senile. Compared with the US, Europe as a whole denotes economic stagnation. On the present economic basis, i.e., under capitalism, a United States of Europe would signify an organisation of reaction to retard America's more rapid development. The times when the cause of democracy and socialism was associated only with Europe alone have gone forever.[23]

Lenin went on to contrast this option to the prospect of a truly global integration. He argued that a *United States of the World*, but 'not of Europe alone', would be possible, although the notion itself was redundant since it would amount to the same thing as socialism.[24]

Now the global situation after World War I seemed to confirm Lenin's 1915 analysis at least in part. A fatigued and crisis-ridden Europe had to face the prospect of its diminishing global significance compared to the rising powers: the US and the new Soviet Union. In this situation, Kjellén's geopolitical prognosis gained relevance, and European leaders and thinkers placed European integration, a United States of Europe, high on the agenda. The Italian geopolitical theorist Paolo d'Agostini Orsini di Camerota asserted that Europe had become old and in desperate need of injections of fresh energy and blood.[25] European integration thus found its real support only after the spiritual shock, economic collapse and political destruction inflicted by the Great War. In this post-catastrophic atmosphere of anxiety and pessimism, where nationalist hubris was defeated and imperial Europe was perceived as being in decline, the grand geopolitical narrative of European integration took shape. 'Europe no longer rules in the world', wrote Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset in 1929.[26] As the demographer Lothrop Stoddard stated in his influential 1922 (and 1935) work, World War I and the ensuing reorganization of world politics amounted to a collapse of the political universe, which 'in one cataclysmic event' had lost the sun around which the planets moved in cosmic harmony. That sun was the 'European comity of nations', now being replaced by terrifying geopolitical processes that the title of Stoddard's book summed up as *The Rising Tide of Colour Against White World-Supremacy*.[27] A number of European thinkers of the interwar period – from Oswald Spengler and Martin Heidegger to Edmund Husserl and Paul Valéry – expounded similar views. They were reflected in policy proposals and political initiatives that aimed to save the position of Europe and the white race by reigniting its dynamism and bolstering its growth through a more thorough integration of the resources under its control. If this did not happen, there would be disintegration and destruction.

The most influential of these proposals for European integration was presented by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in his 1923 pamphlet, *Paneuropa*. This booklet launched his Pan-European Union movement, which was to gather both sizeable and influential intellectual and political support from the best and the brightest of his generation, including Nobel laureates Albert Einstein, Gerhart Hauptmann, Selma Lagerlöf, Thomas Mann, Nathan Söderblom, as well as statesmen like Winston Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, Ignaz Seipel, Karl Renner, Joseph Caillaux and Aristide Briand. For Walter Lipgens, the leading scholar on the history of European integration, *Paneuropa* was by far the most important of the many proposals for European collaboration of the 1920s. Moreover, this pamphlet largely mirrored the world view of internationalists and liberal progressives of the era.[28]

According to the Pan-European movement, a united Europe was paramount for political reasons, or simply to prevent a repetition of World War I. This was the argument for peace. Or as Coudenhove-Kalergi proclaimed: 'The alternatives today are clear: Pan-Europe or war!'[29] A united Europe was desirable also for cultural reasons, as history seemed to indicate that Europe made up some sort of civilizational unity. 'Pan-Europe should be the political expression of the European cultural community', Coudenhove-Kalergi explained. All the 'linguistic nations' of Europe would be gathered into 'one single racial nation', just as the pan-Hellenic movement in ancient times brought together the city-based polities of Greece 'into one great nation for all Hellenics'. Pan-Europe's self-proclaimed 'cultural aim' was thus 'the self-knowledge of the European race as an occidental nation'.[30]

Perhaps most important, the Pan-European movement put forward a third, economic argument for continental integration. The organization's economic programme, authored by the economist Otto Deutsch, listed three imminent threats to the European economy: 'the danger of a collapse of all industries' without close access to raw materials; 'the danger of a complete impoverishment of the European population because of increasing unemployment, decreasing production, capital export and indebtedness'; and 'the danger that the European economy in general will become completely dependent on North American capital'. As a remedy, Deutsch outlined an economic programme that would abolish trade barriers and economic imbalances such as those caused by the reparations forced on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. The programme also proposed a planned economy as well as a thorough 'Taylorization of the European industrial totality'.[31] However, this would not suffice to catch up with the rapidly growing US and Soviet economies. These countries enjoyed the advantage of organizing their economies on a continental scale, thus making them self-sufficient for most raw materials and providing greater markets for the sale of their products. Accordingly, the Pan-European economic zone suggested by Deutsch also presupposed, as 'an indispensable supplement', 'the communal exploitation of the Pan-European colonies from an economic viewpoint'.[32]

Gradually, then, the economic perspective became a geopolitical one that touched on the sensitive issue as to whether Europe would ever again attain its global influence. In this context, the African continent was seen as a necessary condition for economic

recovery and also as a sufficient reason for European unification. The Pan-European strategy designated Africa 'Europe's plantation', a reservoir of agricultural produce, subsoil mineral resources and hydroelectric power. Coudenhove-Kalergi certainly spoke for the majority of Europe's political and intellectual elite when he in 1929 pushed for a Pan-European colonial management of Africa and recounted what Africa offered: 'Africa could provide Europe with raw materials for its industry, nutrition for its population, land for its overpopulation, labour for its unemployed, and markets for its products'.[33] Coudenhove-Kalergi's arguments for assimilating Africa converged into one big argument for the unification of Europe. The common or synergetic exploitation of Africa was so unquestionably attractive and beneficial that it constituted in itself a reason for European states to make common cause. A geopolitical calculation based on two symbiotic benefits emerged: the new geopolitical sphere of a united Europe would be sustainable and prosperous thanks to its incorporation of Africa, and correspondingly, the bonds between once-antagonistic European states would be strengthened by the shared goal of developing Africa. As Coudenhove-Kalergi proclaimed: 'The African problem thus brings us back to Europe. Africa cannot be made available if Europe does not unite'.[34] In short, Europe's unification would start off in Africa. The joint European colonization of Africa was highlighted in Article 13 of the draft of a Pan-European pact of 1930 as one of the organization's defining priorities: 'All European citizens shall enjoy equal economic rights in the tropical colonies of Africa'.[35]

If all this served to confirm Lenin's analysis – 'The United States of Europe under capitalism is tantamount to an agreement on the partition of colonies' – it was, of course, ironic that European integration would find another major *raison d'être* in the undisguised fear of Lenin's own Russia (now the Soviet Union), which by this time had become capitalist Europe's worst danger. Indeed, the Pan-European organization as a whole was from its very beginning marked by Russia's geopolitical pressure. 'The whole European question culminates in the Russian problem', stated Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1923:

> The main goal of European politics must be to prevent a Russian invasion. There is only one way to avoid this: the unification of Europe. […] Europe's only prudent politics is to follow a politics of peace – but also to insure itself against all eventualities. Such insurance can be successfully attained only through the shared responsibility of all European states for the Russian–European border; through a Pan-European defence pact against the Russian peril.[36]

The same tenor characterized all other major interwar proposals for European integration. They were modelled on a geopolitical analysis that drew a divide between a Eurafrican sphere containing West Europe and Africa, and a Eurasian sphere dominated by Soviet Russia. Given the anti-Russian and anti-Soviet edge of the pan-European organization and similar proposals, it is not surprising that it was severely criticized by Moscow. When Maksim Litvinov, the people's commissar for foreign affairs, addressed the League of

Nations in 1931, he noted that European integration plans obviously were not based on geographical location but applied only to states with a specific 'social and political system'. He added that it was 'incomprehensible and surprising that a group of European states should arrogate to themselves the right to decide on the admission or non-admission of another group of European states into a community which claims the title "Pan-European"'.[37]

Interwar European integration plans thus tended to include colonial Africa but to exclude Russia.[38] At the same time, the necessity of including and exploiting Africa and of showing a unified front against the Soviet Union was itself presented as an argument for European integration. Both of these geopolitical issues – 'Eurafricanism' and 'anti-Sovietism' – were components of the Pan-European organization's make-up. They would turn out to be unexpectedly persistent as efforts to secure imperial control of Africa and to protect Western Europe from Russia would be part of propositions for European integration also after World War II. It is no surprise, then, that both Africa and Russia feature strongly in the rhetoric and negotiations discourse surrounding the establishment of the EEC.

The observations I have made above seem to support a conclusion made some forty years ago by political scientist Mathias Mossberg. Focusing on Soviet reactions to the EEC, he underlined that the Soviet leaders had reasons to perceive the EEC as a hostile organization which would entrench cold war antagonisms on European territory:

> Given the background that one of the main aims of earlier European integration efforts was to strengthen West Europe against the Soviet Union, that the West had been unwilling to recognize the Soviet Union as part of Europe and that the Soviet Union had been excluded from certain international organizations that are European in orientation, it is almost inconceivable that the Soviet Union could have welcomed the founding of the EEC as a positive occurrence in the international arena. The political nature of the EEC was not to be mistaken, and it was absolutely clear that the West regarded the establishment of the EEC and EURATOM as a crowning achievement of earlier integration efforts, which to varying degrees had been directed against the Soviet Union.[39]

'A Policy to Divide Europe': Moscow Responds to the EEC

The detour via Lenin's theory of imperialism and the interwar blueprints for a unification of Europe with African support helps us understand the geopolitical narrative about the EEC disseminated in the Soviet Union and East Europe in the late 1950s. Here it is appropriate to begin with an analysis by IMEMO, under the Soviet Academy of Sciences, published in June 1957. The authors first identify the initiators behind the Treaty of Rome:

> The agreements on the Common Market (with 'Eurafrica') and 'Euratom', therefore, mean, in essence, an agreement among monopoly capitalists to form even more

powerful cartels, conglomerates and trusts of banking and industry in the six states concerned. The governments have ratified these agreements; however, they do in no way benefit the interests of the people's majority. The people have not even been asked about their opinion. Modern monopoly capitalism, which dominates the state, has established the 'Common Market', 'Euratom', and, for a more extended reach, 'Eurafrica' according to the interests of the monopolies; these are also the main organizing agents of 'Little Europe'.[40]

The analysis then moves to the motives and aims of these initiators, stating that they conform to the characteristics of imperialism: 'the shared incorporation of export markets and raw material sources; the creation of zones of influence for capital investments, the partitioning of the world; the strengthening of the class interests of the exploiter, the protection of supra-state capital that does not recognize any homeland'.[41]

It is not impossible, the report asserts, that the EEC may boost production and trade in certain sectors. However, it does not correspond to the 'needs of the West European people, and also not to the strong national hopes of the African people'.[42] At the end of the day, it will only lead to 'an increasingly uneven development of capitalist countries and the dependency of a number of European states on the US, and in the long run also on West Germany'. It will hence have a destructive impact on international economic relations.

As should be clear, the text develops Lenin's argument on the reactionary character of any integration of imperial European states. The report specifies the structural contradictions that will be deepened because of the EEC: contradictions among the six member states of 'Little Europe' as regards market policies, financial policy, currency policy and agriculture; contradictions between the EEC and the US, between the EEC and the UK with its Commonwealth, and between the EEC member states and the rest of the world. The efforts of the 'monopolists of the member states of the Rome agreement to partition export markets, sources of raw materials and zones for capital investments amongst themselves' are the main thread connecting these contradictions.[43]

The institute's report concludes that the Common Market, Eurafrica and Euratom have brought the contradictions in the imperial world economy close to a tipping point. On the one hand, there is now the geopolitical alternative embodied by the EEC, 'the imperialist path of violence, despotism, coercion, inequality, subordination of the people through other states, exploitation of economically less developed countries. It leads to an economic, political and national repression of the people'. On the other hand, there is the socialist path – 'of economic cooperation between people on the basis of equal rights and voluntarism, the path of equality and mutual assistance. It leads to economic prosperity, economic rapprochement of peoples and states, to the consolidation of the political autonomy and national independence of all countries'.[44]

It is hard to find a more clear-cut formulation of the contrasting alternatives as seen from the Soviet point of view. Far more than being just propaganda, these two alternatives

constitute what I have called geopolitical narratives. These narratives in turn guide a set of concluding proposals for the future of European integration:

- No 'Common Market' of the six countries, which serves military-strategic aims, but economic cooperation of an inclusive European kind in order to strengthen international security.
- No 'Euratom' with the view of a nuclear war, but far-reaching international collaboration for the peaceful employment of nuclear energy and a ban on nuclear arms.
- No 'Eurafrica', which is directed against peoples of colonial and dependent countries, but collaboration with less developed countries on the basis of equal rights and mutual assistance.[45]

This analysis by IMEMO, usually referred to as the *17 Theses* (as opposed to the *32 Theses* on the EEC published five years later), amounted to a quasi-official codification of the Soviet Union's attitude towards the EEC at this point in history. The overarching conception of the *17 Theses* is that, again, the EEC and Euratom are intended as bulwarks against Soviet and East European influence. This point was also made clear already by the Soviet Foreign Ministry in March 1957:

It should be perfectly clear that the creation of a common market is one more link in the policy of dividing Europe, the 'positions of strength' and cold war policy. The common market project is intimately associated with the aggressive Atlantic bloc and the West European military alliance. […] All the talk about it being a purely economic venture cannot conceal its military aspect, or the fact that it is spearheaded against the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries.[46]

In his 1972 analysis of Soviet attitudes towards the EEC, Mathias Mossberg distinguished nine main arguments.[47] The first one has already been mentioned: (1) the West European integration project is, as a whole, intended to alienate the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is argued (2) that the EEC and Euratom will strengthen the position of West Germany in Europe, and potentially lead to renewed German expansionism. Two additional arguments follow from this: (3) that the EEC and Euratom increase insecurity and the risk of war, and (4) that national autonomy will decrease to the benefit of West Europe's really big political and economic players. To these political arguments are then added a set of arguments motivated by an economic logic but with political overtones. For one thing, (5) the contradictions and conflicts between West Europe's national economies and nationally based industries will not diminish but rather increase because of the EEC. This will then contribute to (6) a weakened position of the national working classes vis-à-vis supranational capital; the exploitation of the proletariat will thus increase. But it will also entail (7) greater difficulties for small business and agriculture in their respective home countries. Finally, the EEC has two major disadvantages on the world economic scale: (8) the EEC's association of

the member states' colonial countries and territories under the Eurafrican regime entails an emerging neocolonial exploitation of the peoples of the Third World; this also contributes to (9) a partitioning of Europe and the world into separate zones of interests and trading blocks that will impede economic growth and a rational management of the world economy.

'The Rome Conspiracy': East German Reactions

Similar arguments reappear in East German accounts. 'What is lurking behind the Common Market?' asked Fritz Gluth in a major analysis in *Neues Deutschland* on 29 January 1957. His answer was twofold: a US government eager to consolidate West Europe against Soviet and socialist influence, thus bolstering the strategic interests already invested in NATO, and West German business and political interests anxious to once again attain a dominating position in Europe, this time not by going to war but by trading and investing and to that end securing for itself the necessary fields of expansion in France and Italy as well as in France's and Belgium's African colonies (the oil and mining resources in French North Africa were particularly attractive). Gluth also remarked that the EEC and Eurafrica project would prevent efforts to bridge the cold war divide and prohibit the independence of the colonized peoples.[48] According to his analysis, the EEC would simply aggravate a series of conflicts on the three levels: nationally, it was the conflict between capital and labour, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; regionally and continentally, it would increase tensions between West and East Europe; and globally, it would prevent the struggle of the peoples of the Third World against colonialism from reaching a peaceful settlement. Gluth, therefore, concluded:

> [The Common Market] is part of the aggressive politics of integration that is directed against the socialist countries and also against the colonized peoples who are struggling for national sovereignty or are defending their sovereignty against imperialist assaults. Therefore, the project for a Common Market is not compatible with the peoples' interest in peace and security.[49]

This criticism of the EEC was repeated almost daily in *Neues Deutschland*'s coverage of the EEC in the spring of 1957. The newspaper drummed home the message that West European integration was a scheme devised by the US government and West German capitalists in order to secure new markets and investment zones ('Lebensraum') for West Germany's expanding banks and industry. Moreover, the new organization would only escalate the conflict between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world.

After the negotiations on the EEC and Euratom were successfully concluded in Paris on 21 February, *Neues Deutschland* carried a headline, apparently clarifying the matter: 'Atomrüstung und Kolonien'/'Nuclear Armament and Colonies'. Again, it was asserted that the EEC expressed the lust for power of West German industrialists and their like-minded

partners in France and the Benelux. Such ambitions now played themselves out in an effort to gain European hegemony (with US support) and Europeanize colonialism to the benefit of German trade and production.[50] These were also the main arguments in an editorial of 7 March that condemned the EEC and Euratom as 'an act of betrayal against Germany and Europe'.[51] Two weeks later, the day before the signing ceremonies in Rome, the newspaper spoke of a 'conspiracy' instigated by West German monopoly capital.[52] At the same time, *Neues Deutschland* was closely covering the anti-colonial movements in Africa and elsewhere. At the beginning of March 1957, the newspaper carried a long article on Ghana, the first African state to proclaim independence from colonialism, and on Kwame Nkrumah's plans for pan-African integration.[53]

During the months following the foundation of the EEC, East Germany reshaped its foreign policy in relation to West Europe. A partially new geopolitical narrative was disseminated from Berlin just as from Moscow. It targeted West German major industry and business ('monopoly capitalism') in particular. In April 1957, the GDR Foreign Ministry issued an official communique to this effect, denouncing West Germany as a neocolonial state because of its participation in the EEC's Eurafrican policy. It was asserted that West Germany, because of its participation in the EEC's Eurafrican association regime, was now among the colonial powers supporting the general exploitation of the Third World as well as the colonial wars in which France, the UK, Portugal and the US were involved to wipe out resistance movements around the world.[54]

It may seem surprising that the colonial question played such an important role in East German criticisms of West European integration. Further examples of this are Jakov Etinger's 1961 book, *Bonn greift nach Afrika/Bonn Makes a Grab for Africa*, published by Dietz in its series Wahrheiten über den deutschen Kolonialismus/Truths about German Imperialism, and Heinrich Schäfer's *Die Eurafrika-Konzeption in Aktion/The Eurafrica Concept in Action*. The former contains an extremely detailed account of West Germany's political, military and economic engagements in French Africa, whereas the latter is a doctoral thesis written in a more academic tone.[55] The GDR focus on Africa and colonialism hence was not only the result of the Marxist-Leninist view that European integration was essentially an imperialist project. In its time, throughout the 1950s, it was clear to East and West Europeans alike that the colonial question was an integral part of West European integration. The association of the colonies with the Common Market was thus seen as one of the Treaty of Rome's main features also in France, Belgium and other West European states; a fact forgotten today and virtually erased from contemporary scholarship on the history of the EU.[56]

The centrality of colonialism in the 1950s discussion on West European integration demonstrates as well the extent to which this discussion was steeped in geopolitical concerns. It explains too why it was often presented to the public – in East and West Europe alike – as a geopolitical narrative about Europe's standing in the world economy and the global order of the future.

Eurafrica according to Skorov

Georgiy Skorov's *Кому нужна Еврафрика/Who Needs Eurafrica?* is probably the most detailed analysis of its time of the colonial dimensions of the EEC and West European integration. Skorov spent his early career at the Institute of Economics (not to be confused with the previously mentioned Institute of World Economy and International Relations) at the Soviet Academy of Sciences. It was in this capacity that he wrote about the EEC's colonial association regime.[57] His brief book is a historically informed economic and political assessment of the EEC's geopolitical viability. He first relates how the concept of the EEC – as a 'third force' between the two world powers – harks back to interwar imperial ideas of Eurafrica, such as Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European organization. After the Second World War, influential circles of monopoly capital in West Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland supported the idea of Eurafrica, Skorov states. However, like many other commentators, he singles out West German monopoly capital as the strongest influence.

Skorov then goes on to explain why the idea of West European integration and Eurafrica became particularly urgent after the Second World War. The first reason was the weakening of European capital. A significantly stronger decline in Western Europe's share in world capitalist production and world trade was in evidence. To counter this tendency, the customs zone instituted by the EEC as well as plans for a more rational exploitation of Africa by European capital were needed. The second reason was the 'African awakening'. During 1956–1957, the number of African states that gained national independence doubled, Skorov points out. The colonial powers were no longer able to suppress the national liberation movement in Africa on their own. To stop colonies from escaping their control, they were therefore willing to sacrifice part of their colonial holdings in order to preserve the whole. In Skorov's view, this explains the increasing willingness to let previously monopolized spheres of colonization be 'shared' by several capitalist powers.

The third reason for the intense integration efforts in West Europe after World War II, according to Skorov, was the Western European bourgeoisie's desire to reduce its financial, economic and political dependence on the US. Increased extraction and exportation of materials and products from Africa would here help close Europe's apparently otherwise chronic dollar deficit. Moreover, the Eurafrican plans were seen as a way of securing Africa as a European geopolitical sphere of influence, and thus prevent the US – as well as the Soviet Union – from gaining a foothold.

At the same time, however, Skorov notes that the Eurafrican plans were linked to US security concerns, in that it would provide NATO with a military base and a guided missile centre to be used in the event of a nuclear war. Skorov recounts the West European argument, to which especially French and West German leaders subscribed, that having military positions in Africa was more important than having them in Europe because African territory would be less vulnerable to air attacks and more difficult to reach for land-based troops.

In the second part of his book, Skorov argues that the EEC may be viewed – and often views itself – as a step towards Eurafrica. That the initiative for the association of the African colonies with the Common Market came from the French testifies to the French financial oligarchy's change of mind regarding the methods of exploiting its colonies. Economic and financial circles in France found it necessary to use the European integration project to save what remained of their colonial empire. For France, the balance between its imperial and European vocation was a delicate one. On the one hand, French supporters of European 'integration' saw a need to transfer the territories of France to 'Europe' because otherwise it would lead to a weakening of their economic and political ties with the mother country. On the other hand, such a move could result in diminishing France's position in its own empire, as other states would have equal rights to trade and invest in Africa. To manage this contradiction, France opened its overseas market to participants from 'little Europe', but only under certain conditions, the most important being a customs barrier protecting colonial imports from competition at world market prices. In Skorov's view, this arrangement caused disagreements among supporters of European 'integration'. In particular, the UK opposed the French initiative and instead wanted to expand the European markets for its industrial products by creating a free trade area. The French proposal thus made it impossible for the UK to participate in the Common Market. But other countries also expressed their dissatisfaction, which is why a compromise decision was taken to establish an interstate investment fund for overseas territories.

Unlike the UK, West Germany was satisfied with this arrangement because, as Skorov states, it offered the country an opportunity – for the first time since it had lost its colonies after World War I – to expand on the African continent, which West Germany had pursued ever since the foundation of the ECSC and the Council of Europe, two organizations that had developed a similar Eurafrican agenda but had done little to further its realization.

But with the association of the colonies with the Common Market, a real path was opening itself up for West German capital to attain new possibilities of expansion. The same arrangement also enabled French interests to attain the capital they badly needed to sustain the viability of their colonial empire. According to Skorov, West Germany rejoiced at the prospect of gaining access to French Africa:

> It is very close to fulfilling its cherished dream – to establish itself on the African continent. What Guy Mollet tried to picture in describing the EEC as 'the great idea of the twentieth century' was actually the implementation of Germany's long-standing goal of putting the riches of the French African colonies into the possession of German or French–German (which makes no difference) trusts.[58]

Skorov sums up his analysis by pointing to the main contradictions that have brought the project into being and that will also, according to his prediction, lay the foundation for further controversy within the EEC. He identifies three types of contradictions: (1) between the imperialist powers of Europe and the peoples of Africa; (2) between the various factions

of European monopoly capital; and (3) between capitalist Europe and the US. If these contradictions all followed from Skorov's analysis of imperialism, heavily inflected by Lenin's argument, but also more generally by a Marxist understanding of capitalist expansion, it appears that they were determined as well by a fourth contradiction, namely the geopolitical relationship between the EEC and the Soviet Union as such.

Skorov seems to regard the first contradiction as the most decisive one, for he ends his book by discussing the EEC's Eurafrican dimension as perceived from an African perspective: 'What will Eurafrica bring to the African nations?' In this context, Skorov observes that the Eurafrican project is promoted under the banners of 'higher living standards, cultural progress, democracy boom and industrialization'.[59] He also notes that it is often said to bring about a symbiosis between the continents. In 1950s French political vocabulary, Europe's relations with Africa were also portrayed as one of 'interdependence', meaning that individual nations would have only stagnation and isolation to expect if they asserted their 'independence' vis-à-vis other nations; the future was by necessity one in which all political units were 'interdependent'.

Skorov rejects this as 'nothing but demagogy'. In his conclusion, he again nails the decisive contradiction down that is buried in the EEC's 'offer' of an association to its African 'partners':

> Eurafrica poses a serious danger to all African nations, whether they are politically independent or still under colonial rule. The concept of 'interdependence' that underlies Eurafrica is nothing more than the strengthening of unequal relationships based on actual inequality. Since the case is 'interdependence' between industrially developed Europe and underdeveloped Africa, most of which is politically dependent, it inevitably turns into a form of submission of the weaker to the stronger, into modernized colonialism in disguise and perpetuates the oppressed state of Africans. There is no doubt whatsoever that 'interdependence' in the framework of Eurafrica is aimed at making it more difficult for the oppressed African nations to liberate themselves from colonialism and at plunging, this time in a roundabout way, already politically independent nations back into colonial slavery. Therefore, African nations in alliance with all progressive forces of the world stand against the imperialistic Eurafrica plans and for the elimination of colonialism in any form.[60]

It should be noted that Skorov's analysis corresponds here to the programme to win Third World allies that Khrushchev launched at the time of the Suez crisis, which turned the Soviet leader into a champion of anti-colonial struggles in the Third World. It is no doubt against this background, too, that Skorov's geopolitical narrative finds its immediate political function. In part, it intends to depict the EEC – and by extension non-socialist Europe as a whole – as the great antagonist to all groups and organizations working towards Third World liberation. However, if Skorov's analysis is stripped of its Marxist-Leninist vocabulary and its contextually indispensable (this was Moscow 1957) predictions as to the historical

necessity of a socialist victory, it still stands as a fairly correct analysis of the historical background of the EEC's colonial association regime. This brings me to the conclusive question about the lessons and contemporary relevance of the corpus of Soviet and GDR writings on European integration that I have discussed above.

Conclusion

One striking feature of the geopolitical narratives about West European integration as told in East Europe is their strong focus on contradictions. This argumentative form is certainly indebted to a general Marxist-Hegelian methodology, which understands the historical process as driven by social struggles and economic contradictions. This is an attractive feature of the Soviet and GDR analysis, for, as Fredric Jameson, Slavoj Žižek and others have pointed out more recently, the dialectic method itself forces the analyst to approach history as a constellation of oppositions rather than as a harmonious narrative whole and thereby makes him or her less likely to subscribe to political and ideological fabrications.[61] The problem, of course, was that this dialectical gaze was so selectively outward looking, towards the Western opponent, and rarely allowed to detect the contradictions of the socialist narrative itself. This said, and given too that the contradictions Soviet and GDR writers identified in the EEC project were not resolved according to the predictions of Marxist-Leninist formulae, West European integration and the EU in particular have unquestionably been at least partially shaped by precisely those contradictions they identified at the end of the 1950s. For instance, it has been observed or argued that the early EEC pitted the interests of West European capital against those of its working classes, or that it served to consolidate European dominance in Africa, or that it contributed, at the time, to the cold war polarization of the European continent.

Perhaps needless to say, these contradictions are played down in West European geopolitical narratives about the same topics. Instead, a synthesis has often been held up as in sight, where the unification of Europe would be revealed as having been advantageous to all – without losers, as it were; or, in short, where the integration of Europe would be realized as a universally beneficial process for Europeans and others alike.

This produces another interesting conclusion regarding the conflicting geopolitical narratives of European integration. While the East European analysis discussed here points to the particular geopolitical interests and historical contradictions that hide under the universalist rhetoric of the EEC and the West European integration project, it also presents – or even embodies – an alternative socialist path towards continental and global integration. This path then serves as a universalistic narrative in its own right, what Schäfer terms 'alternative politics' (*Alternativpolitik*), or what the June 1957 issue of *Kommunist* described in more expansive terms as 'the path of economic cooperation between people on the basis of equal rights and voluntarism, the path of equality and mutual assistance. It leads to economic prosperity, economic rapprochement of peoples and states, to the consolidation of the political autonomy and national independence of all countries'.[62]

What stand before us in the case of these two geopolitical narratives, Eastern and Western, are thus two historiographical narratives, both of which present themselves as models for a 'universal history'. Both rely on what I have called, in a different context, an ideology of universalism.[63] By connecting the two together, by revealing how these East European analyses lay bare the EEC narrative's weak points and by also recalling how a certain critique of the Communist system uncloaks the ways in which actually existing socialism was at best a caricature of the real thing, one can distinguish how a geopolitical narrative reveals the ideological contradictions of its opponent, and vice versa.

But here, and as a third conclusion, attention should be paid to the central importance of West Germany in all East European geopolitical narratives of West European integration. This is interesting, for it points to a crucial difference in relation to West European narratives of the EEC and the EU, which shows *grosso modo* that France was the main driver behind the integration process, with West German capital in a more supportive function.

This reflects the central position attributed to the divided Germany in post-war Europe, and in the East European perspective in particular. For the Soviet Union, the West German standpoint on economic cooperation and political integration was decisive – because it indicated whether West Germany could become expansionist and pose a new security threat, as it had done in the preceding world wars, and because it indicated the possibility of the Soviet Union winning over the German working class, and perhaps also the European proletariat as such, to the socialist camp. In this sense, a similar importance was attached to the Italian Communist Party, which the Soviet leadership addressed directly in an effort to influence its attitudes towards the EEC.[64] This discourse thus exposes how the Soviet and GDR geopolitical narrative about European integration emerges as a crucial component of the build-up to the cold war 'German crisis' – symbolized by the Berlin Wall – just shortly after the polarizing event of the signing of the Treaty of Rome. With the EEC in place, and West Germany firmly in the opposite camp, no further reconciliation on the German question seemed possible.

After the fall of the Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe, the dispute over Europe's geopolitical position and role, especially in relation to the former African colonies, has apparently been settled in the West's favour. Today few even remember that the EEC and the Eastern bloc had distinct and diametrically opposed ways of collaborating with the African countries and furthering their development. Moreover, it may be hard these days to understand the relevance of this opposition. Yet this history merits attention today, and this is the fourth major conclusion to be drawn from the geopolitical narratives about European integration in the 1950s that I have discussed. For this history offers a glance, from the wings of history as it were, of crucial but otherwise often-hidden geopolitical stakes in the European integration project. Today this reminder is timely, as very few commentators and researchers admit that the EEC, and subsequently the EU, was designed in response to a set of urgent geopolitical pressures and tendencies that constrained the West European states during the post–World War II period. This insight is particularly important now that the EU is again faced with geopolitical developments – in Ukraine, Israel, the Middle East,

North Africa and the Mediterranean area generally – that have prompted it to develop a foreign policy and global mission for the twenty-first century.[65] The neglected sources I have discussed should therefore be seen as part of a broader analytic corpus in which some crucial aspects of a historical East European narrative about Europe's calling and destiny can be traced. This narrative is indispensable to anyone seeking to understand how the EU is today perceived in various corners of the world, by its 'partners' or its 'antagonists'.

Such a reflection might also provide an answer to the question as to why today's 'post-Communist' and 'post-Soviet' present remains haunted by the antagonistic narratives of the past, even if the antagonist itself has vanished. The Leninist narrative of socialism belongs to the dustbin of history, along with the Soviet Union itself. Could it not be reasonably expected, then, that the geopolitical narratives about Europe as told in the West and in the East are converging? Clearly, this is not happening. The Ukrainian crisis, to mention just the most obvious example, has not only propelled European states into a virtual arms race, but it has also polarized official political rhetoric about the aims and motives of European integration in a way unprecedented since World War II. Despite 1989, despite the fall of Communism and all the enormous transformations in its wake, geopolitical narratives about Europe are apparently still afflicted by the after-effects of the cold war.

There seems to broadly be two possible explanations for this state of affairs. Either the cold war past still weighs heavy on our geopolitical imagination. According to this explanation, we are even now busy working through a legacy marked by the struggle between two incompatible ideological forces that once vied for the support of all Europeans. It is certainly true that remnants of this ideological struggle can be detected in major East European narratives, which are sometimes lumped together as *Ostalgie* or melancholic valorizations of a Communist past. However, while it is correct that these narratives and sentiments to no small extent suffuse contemporary literature and popular culture, they hardly impact the political polarization between Russia and the EU at present.

To understand this more proper political polarization, one should perhaps venture an alternative explanation according to which the narrative *agon*, which I have been dwelling on, does not primarily testify to any after-effects of the cold war. Instead, cold war ideology itself was an effect of a conflict between geopolitical ontologies of longer duration, which subtend incompatible narratives as to Europe's and the EU's place and mission in the world. It could be argued that in this perspective even though the past clash between socialist and capitalist systems, or between Communist and liberal ideologies, has ceased to be the main motor of Europe's geopolitical landscape, its legacy still has repercussions in the contemporary situation, and these repercussions are now part of a more permanent conflict between the material interests of two geopolitical powers, which has largely lost its past ideological superstructure. The 1950s saw two overlapping but distinct oppositions relating to this topic. The first one was identified by Skorov, who described it as an emerging conflict between imperial capitalism and anti-colonial socialism. The second was the more

proper geopolitical conflict between the West European powers' colonial ambitions and the Soviet Union's global aspirations. Both powers tried to cover up these geopolitical ambitions underneath ideological defences for socialism and liberalism, respectively. Still, it is today telling that while these ideological differences tend to wane, the cold and hard conflicts of interest between Russia and the EU continue.

In the Soviet relationship to West European integration, Eberhard Schulz wrote in 1975: 'one detects certain constants that have remained unchanged or essentially unchanged throughout Russian and Soviet history'.[66] Among these constants, Schulz included Russia's 'geographical position', the 'mentality of the Russian people', a 'demand for security' (*Sicherheitsbedürfnis*) and a 'missionary attitude' (*Sendungsbewußtsein*) towards the surrounding world.[67] Schulz's brief catalogue of the unchanging geopolitical features and mental faculties that once determined Moscow's responses to European integration is, of course, deeply problematical and hardly meaningful when taken as a description of life and politics. However, such a list of national and imperial traits becomes interesting once the question is asked whether it may not in fact be possible to draw up a corresponding list of 'constants' in West European perceptions of Russia that have remained essentially unchanged over the past centuries. For at this point, it turns out that these 'constants' are more properly to be seen as the generic themes of two dialectically intertwined but antagonistic narratives that address the geopolitical situation of Europe from opposite ends, as it were.

At this point, it is helpful to return to Klaus Törnudd's remark on the difficulty of finding any 'agreement even as to what exactly is reality'.[68] If the understanding of reality is largely generated and consolidated by ways of narrating, as Ricoeur and others have argued, it may be asked whether there exists some deeper narrative or historiographical logic that explains why East and West Europe tend to become placeholders for conflicting visions of and attitudes towards European integration. Once the question is posed in such terms, it becomes clear that there is indeed a particular metahistorical narrative in which Europe occupies a pivotal place. This narrative is in some sense at one with the birth of geopolitical thinking as such, and it concerns the geopolitical struggle between what was previously seen as a conflict between Eurafrica and Eurasia: the former being the formation embraced by many West European leaders from the Berlin Congress of 1884–1885 to the foundation of the EEC in 1957; the latter, according to the work of Mark Bassin and others, being a formation promoted by Soviet and Russian foreign policy thinkers and political leaders from Czar Nicholas II to Vladimir Putin.[69] That there is no 'agreement' as to the 'reality' of European integration is here a result of Europe attaining vastly different narrative articulations, and contradictory references, depending on whether it is placed within a Eurafrican or Eurasian frame of reference.

But here, finally, I must also note that there are, of course, more geopolitical narratives of Europe than the two discussed in this chapter. In Western, Eastern and Central Europe, alternative narratives about Europe's geopolitical position and calling have been, and continue to be, invented and asserted – narratives that are more complex, compelling,

beautiful, intelligent and worthy of support. However, the two narratives I have discussed have during the century since World War I been historically the most powerful ones. Often they pull all alternative propositions about Europe into their respective orbits and distort or flatten them out in the process. Hence, the existential and political dilemma still facing Europe today: a choice between two narratives, neither of which one must believe in; a choice between two European futures that both must be rejected.

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Notes

1 This chapter could not have been written without substantial input from Peo Hansen, Linköping University. It reflects the joint research project on the history of European integration that we have been conducting over the past years, some of the results of which have been published in Hansen and Jonsson (2014). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
2 Törnudd (1961: 131–140).
3 Törnudd (1961: 267).
4 Escobar ([1995] 2012).
5 For previous analyses of this material, see Törnudd (1961); Sannwald (1963, 1968); Zellentin (1968); Mossberg (1972); Schultz (1975).
6 See the remarks by Mayrzedt and Romé (1968: 7) in their early compilation of East European commentary on post-war West European integration.
7 Fornäs (2012).
8 On master narratives, see Jameson (1981: 17–101).
9 On the ambiguities of European geopolitics, see Heffernan (2009).

10 Kjellén (1914: 194).

11 For a more-detailed account of the Suez crisis in the context of European integration, see Hansen and Jonsson (2013, 2014).

12 Vaisse (1989: 142).

13 Fursenko and Naftali (2006: 134).

14 Schwartz (1997: 242).

15 See French foreign minister Christian Pineau's memoirs: Pineau (1976: 191). Also Bossuat (1996: 335). Translation from Kyle (2003: 467).

16 Khrushchev (2007: 893).

17 Fursenko and Naftali (2006: 292–322); Kanet (1987).

18 Molchanov (1957: 9).

19 Cited in Törnudd (1961: 153); original in Russian.

20 Mossberg (1971: 148–149).

21 For a bibliography of Soviet (and East European) reports and comments on the ECC, see Mayrzedt and Romé (1968: 13–42).

22 Lenin ([1915] 1974: 340).

23 Lenin ([1915] 1974: 341).

24 Lenin ([1915] 1974: 342).

25 Orsini di Camerota (1934: 4).

26 Ortega y Gasset ([1929] 1957: 129).

27 Stoddard ([1922] 2003: 198–221, 1935: 31–174).

28 Lipgens (1982: 38).

29 Coudenhove-Kalergi (1927: 1).

30 Coudenhove-Kalergi (1928: 8).

31 Deutsch (1927: 7).

32 Deutsch (1927: 8).

33 Coudenhove-Kalergi (1929: 3).

34 Coudenhove-Kalergi (1929: 18).

35 Coudenhove-Kalergi (1930: 149).

36 Coudenhove-Kalergi ([1923] 1925: 37–38).

37 Cited in Törnudd (1961: 78).

38 For an exception that included both Russia and the colonies as 'indispensable' to European integration, see Woytinski (1926).

39 Mossberg (1971: 48).

40 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 4–5).

41 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 6).

42 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 16).

43 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 35).

44 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 17).

45 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 48).

46 *Novoye Vremya* , no. 11, 1957, 20, quoted in Mossberg (1972: 149–150).

47 Mossberg (1972: 149–163).

48 Gluth (1957: 2).

49   Gluth (1957: 2).
50   *Neues Deutschland* (no. 46, 22 February 1957, 2).
51   *Neues Deutschland* (no. 57, 7 March 1957, 1).
52   *Neues Deutschland* (no. 72, 24 March 1957, 2).
53   Buckle (1957: 5).
54   *Neues Deutschland* (no. 87, 11 April 1957, 5).
55   Etinger (1961); Schäfer (1964).
56   On this point, see Hansen and Jonsson (2014).
57   Georgiy Yefimovich Skorov (1927–2011) graduated from the Institute of Foreign Trade in Moscow in 1949. Between 1953 and 1979, he was a researcher at the Institute of Economics. He was awarded the degree of Doctor of Economics in 1970. In 1979, he was appointed deputy director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies. Between 1961 and 1967, he worked in the UNESCO Secretariat in Paris. He published numerous works on the economic problems of the Asian and African developing countries. Among his last works were the articles 'Russia-EU: Issues of Strategic Partnership' (2005) and 'France-2006: Reform or Revolution' (2006). His publication 'Who Needs Eurafrica' has been translated into English by Marina Tsareva for the purpose of this chapter and is cited from her translation manuscript, with page references to the corresponding Russian original.
58   Skorov (1957: 22).
59   Skorov (1957: 38).
60   Skorov (1957: 44–45).
61   See, for instance, Jameson (2009); Žižek (1993).
62   Schäfer (1964: 290–301); Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 17).
63   Jonsson (2010).
64   Mossberg (1972: 149).
65   Hansen and Jonsson (2015).
66   Schultz (1975: 28–29).
67   Schultz (1975: 29–32).
68   Törnudd (1961: 267).
69   Bassin, Glebov and Laruelle (2015).

Chapter 4

Narratives at War: Representations of Europe in News Media of Ukraine, Russia and Poland during Euromaidan

Roman Horbyk

One of the most contested narratives of Europe in recent times has centred around the so-called 'Ukrainian crisis'. The meaning of the developments in and around Ukraine since 2013 may puzzle an outside observer. For some, it looks like a chance coincidence of circumstances, something that was not meant to happen and could and should have been avoided; a chain of unfortunate events that triggered other unfortunate events almost blindly, with both sides unleashing their unreasonable hatred and violence, enough to call it 'an unnecessary war'. This is an absurdist reading of the conflict; its fatal weakness (and its only strength!) is its reliance solely on chaos as an explanation. From a diametrically opposed perspective, the conflict is a well-orchestrated and smoothly executed puppet drama whose real actors pull the strings from behind the curtain: the rebellious Russia rising against US and Western dominance, with a few oligarchs making money in the background. Fair enough, but this version more or less completely denies agency to both sides of the conflict. These two views are expected, yet epistemologically flawed, preliminary interpretations and have to give way to more sophisticated constructions. To comprehend and potentially solve the conflict, one has to understand its meaning.

The outline of the 'Ukrainian crisis' – or what should more properly be termed a Ukraine–Russia crisis or a Russo-Ukrainian war – begins in the first half of 2013, when the ruling Yanukovych administration intensified its contacts with Brussels, and the signing of the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine was in sight. The agreement was, however, a product of the 2008–2013 negotiations and originated in the recognition of Ukraine's European choice after the 2004 Orange Revolution. Russia first responded to the prospective finalized agreement with the so-called 'trade war' when, beginning in July 2013, it dramatically limited Ukrainian imports. After a period of nerve-racking negotiations with the EU, the Ukrainian government, under pressure from the Kremlin, decided to change its external policy overnight and in the late autumn of 2013 announced a reorientation to Russia. This was the decisive moment: with millions of Ukrainians protesting with European flags in the streets and the government unable to contain them regardless of the means used, Euromaidan – literally the 'Eurosquare' – became first an agora for the pro-European activists and citizens, and later their battlefield on which to fight the government, its repressive apparatus and satellite anti-European groups.

The growing protest tended to refocus attention on the internal social agenda. The battlefield only expanded when Russia annexed Crimea after the bloodstained fall of the *ancien régime* and later went on to support directly the irredentist rebellion of the Russian

nationalists in the easternmost regions of Ukraine. But the core of the clash did not go away, with the vortex of the conflict beginning to suck in new motives and meanings. In March 2015, then Polish Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz admitted Ukraine was 'really for the first time spilling blood for the European Union, or for the attempt to integrate with the European Union'.[1] The people in Maidan were dying under European flags: why? For José Manuel Barroso and bureaucrats from rue de la Loi?[2] For the institutions that many see as having most recently terrorized member states like Greece into submission? For benefits? Or for neo-liberal free trade, which so many in Europe, including many Greek anti-austerity protesters, are ready to die *opposing*?

A year after Maidan, the prominent Ukrainian writer Yuriy Andrukhovych wrote in his essay for *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*: 'I have recently seen a TV report from Spain, where the farmers, annoyed by the EU trade sanctions against Russia causing them problems with selling their products – perhaps oranges – burned EU flags as a sign of protest. It was precisely with such flags that the murdered were enwrapped by our people in Maidan before putting the corpses in coffins'.[3] This heart-stopping contrast and its depth of misunderstanding could be an answer, but I believe it has to be turned into a question of what the meaning of Europe was for those who fought for it, fought against it and for those who watched from afar with compassion or indifference.

The meaning of Europe will here be reconstructed by studying how the influential and popular Ukrainian media have represented Europe against the backdrop of corresponding media discourses in the region's two other significant countries, namely Poland and Russia.[4] The main focus will be on Ukraine, but regional contexts frame the results for a number of reasons. First, the comparison helps qualify the interpretation of findings that might otherwise result in misleading conclusions. Second, looking at the Ukrainian material in isolation is much less productive, not because it is less interesting, but because Euromaidan transcended national borders and had regional consequences with global repercussions. It is only by comparison that the clashes of narratives about Europe and the stakes in these clashes reveal themselves; the analysis of these clashes seems to have the biggest explanatory potential in a war situation. Alongside Ukraine, Russia from the very beginning was an active agent in the conflict, with a great number of Russians undoubtedly emotionally involved, with either compassion or animosity, in the Ukrainian situation. Poland became an active supporter of Euromaidan and later Ukraine and has always been its major advocate in the EU.

Apart from their close interaction centred on Euromaidan, these three countries make an almost ideal case for comparison. With their intertwined histories and cultures, their political and social systems shared many common or similar features between 1945 and 1989. However, their paths after the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union have taken different directions in policies, reforms and approaches to democratization and European integration; this also created dissimilar media systems. Their political relations with the EU correspondingly differ vastly. Poland enjoys an insider view from within the EU, whereas both Russia and Ukraine use an outsider optic but of two different kinds: for

Moscow, EU accession is not on the political agenda at all, while Kyiv has seen many U-turns on its long and winding road of European integration. At the same time, each of the troika prioritizes its relations with Europe and perceives the self-identification towards it as the key to defining one's own place in the world, viz. Poland's ideas of 'the West's betrayal' or 'coming back to Europe', Ukraine's Westernizing and nativist projects and Russian Eurasianism. All these similarities and differences provide a perfect background for finding parallels in the three countries' media.

In this chapter, I will show how Europe was constructed in Ukrainian discourses as well as compare it with sometimes less detailed findings from Russia and Poland. These discourses inhabited different spaces: political and opinion pages in respectable newspapers, widely read blogs, web forums and street exhibitions showcasing political cartoons. Before delving into this material, I will focus on the historical narratives and overview what has already been written in academia on East European discussions about greater Europe. However, what all these previous inquiries leave unanswered is how Europe was depicted and viewed during Euromaidan in the press that seriously debated the events – the media outlets that can have the strongest influence on policymakers and the most active and empowered social classes. Equally neglected have been the 'people's' perspective and more ordinary everyday discourses. Therefore, such research is of considerable importance as it not only explains to some degree the media's place in the large-scale protests in Ukraine and the subsequent war with Russia but also puts it into a wider regional context and contrasts it with Russia, which has experienced neither European integration nor anti-government protests on such a scale. Moreover, it allows an understanding of what changes occur once a country becomes part of the EU, as in the Polish case.

The aim here is to find out what discourses on Europe have existed in Ukraine, Russia and Poland since the early stage of the Ukraine–Russia crisis. The most influential newspapers – read by decision makers and a sign of middle-class prestige – were selected for the initial stage of analysis. In Ukraine, these include *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*, an influential liberal weekly broadsheet with ties to pro-European political forces; *Segodnya*, a popular tabloid daily owned by an oligarch from Donetsk, Rinat Akhmetov; and *Korrespondent*, a liberal weekly magazine associated with the values of objective reporting until it was sold right before Euromaidan to the company with links to the Yanukovych family (and with that *Korrespondent* lost much of its reputation). The Russian newspapers analysed here are the pro-Kremlin *Izvestiya*, the more balanced *Kommersant* (both dailies) and the strongly oppositional weekly *Novaya Gazeta*. The Polish media is represented by the liberal-left *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the centre-left *Polityka* and the more conservative and establishment-oriented *Rzeczpospolita*. On top of that, I have included a preliminary analysis of the prominent online blog platforms where opinion leaders set principal frames for narrating Europe, such as Ukraine's most read blogs section at *Ukrayinska Pravda*, Russia's *Snob.ru* and *Natemat.pl* in Poland.

The research was based on thematic coding, which Jensen summarized as 'a loosely inductive categorization […] with reference to various concepts, headings, or themes'[5]; this is in fact one of the key stages of critical discourse analysis, especially in its discourse-historical

tradition, although the project was more driven by the concept of narrative than by that of discourse. The interaction with the material was guided by the moderately constructivist, post-positivist approach.[6] Notably, the chosen method prioritizes 'development of models and nonverbal tools as integral elements of a stepwise analytical procedure' as well as 'place[s] special emphasis on "data display" in the form of figures and graphics as aids in interpretation'.[7]

My focus on differences and similarities will inevitably lead to allegations of selective attention to certain aspects or even essentialism. Such allegations would profoundly misperceive both my objective and my interaction with the material. By concentrating on different narratives told and retold in the studied media, I do not seek to undermine the possibilities for dialogue or for adding more boundaries to this deeply divided world, as it may seem to a reader with a particular perspective. But what I want to accomplish is drawing attention to the inherent and long-standing heterogeneity of the region, which far too often is represented in the West as something homogenous to the point of impenetrability, unfit for understanding and inherently problematic. If I have any agenda in this text, it is to help dismantle this generalizing scheme and demonstrate not only that Eastern Europe has its story about Europe but that it has many contrasting stories, told in different languages, from different cultures and historical backgrounds, by different voices with contrasting levels of volume and audibility, clashing, overlapping, seeking to cancel out and mute each other, each with universalist aspirations and programmes, mutually incompatible more likely than not, and all naturally and indigenously formed rather than parachuted in by some external force. Equally, this is far from the 'clash-of-civilizations' talk on 'the West vs. the rest', a rosy-pink idealistic picture and the theorists' sterile lab; observing discourses in their natural habitat has indeed something of the study of wildlife. It brings a lot of smells from the field, and you get mud on your shoes; in this specific case, in the times of violence and war, it is easy to find your fingers sticky with blood.

This leads to the question of my own perspective and position as regards the material. Almost needless to say, I see the knowledge generated by this study as positional, but that makes it no different as positional knowledge is the only possible one. The observer is part of the system they observe, an active part. Where is the position located, then, from which the voice of the author is speaking in this text? The position in which the author listened to other voices represented here. I would demarcate this place somewhere on the outskirts of Euromaidan, distanced from the violent *mêlée* but not any closer to the seemingly apolitical 'above-the-fight' position.

For a long time during the protest, one of Euromaidan's barricades was adorned with a large placard featuring the words of the US-Ukrainian linguist George Shevelov (1908–2002): 'the world will only accept us as modern'. As a man born in Kyiv some 30 years ago, I share these words as a motto with many young men and women of my generation. These words pretty much encapsulate my own position: there is an acute sense of my active presence in the world rather than in a narrow national or regional context (often seen as provincial). At the same time, it expresses an unwillingness to abandon one's own identity after centuries

of peaceful and violent assimilation by many empires, as testified by virtually any book on Ukrainian history. And finally, there is a no less acute awareness that such acceptance is, and should only be, possible on rationalist, modern terms, which sets a progressive perspective that eschews all things backward, conservative, nostalgic or aggressively nationalist.

It is this perspective that also helps develop an optical system critical to my own bias. Whereas any observer inevitably taints the object of observation, there can be different degrees of intrusion as there are ways to reduce it. Also, equally important was preserving enough of the author in this study to make use of my sensitivity to nuances and contexts, something lauded by feminist ethnography, which inspired me to be open about my own presence in the study.

With that in mind, the stage is finally set for the theoretical perspective to emerge. This perspective oversees the landscape of the study with a Foucauldian gaze, although the initial impulse came from Habermas and his conceptualization of the 'public sphere',[8] and traces of this might be found in the final discussion. Still, rather than relying on the rational deliberative model, the narrative of Europe is seen as endowed with different power potential in the three countries under consideration, and discourse as such is seen as a function, manifestation and realization of power.

This Foucauldian framework provided a link to the methodological frame of discourse-historical analysis.[9] Pretty much the same perspective inspired by multimodal visual analysis (at the intersection of compositional and social modality) was applied to the pictures.[10] Just as in discourse analysis, I looked for reflections of social organization and self-positioning in acts of pictorial rather than linguistic expression. I will mostly focus on cartoons and images generated and/or actively adopted (e.g. shared) by users. Such cartoons and images connote general ideas rather than denote specific situations, which corresponds to my intention to study the imaginary and abstract general ideas about Europe.

The analysis could also be supplemented with a linguistic apparatus. When delving into my material, I realized that the language dimension was a key element in these discourses. I, therefore, added the conceptualization of metaphor and Laclau's concept of empty signifiers deriving from political theory. I will return to these concepts later on, where I discuss the respective findings. This was an encounter with the analysis of language and thus informed by linguistic theories that also left their imprint on the methodology.

'Grasp What a Miserable Asian Thou Art': A History of Europe's Semantical Adventures in Ukraine

Today's discursive constructions of Europe in *Ukraine*, as well as its two neighbours considered here, are the tip of the iceberg of different and interwoven histories. Kyiv Rus, a medieval feudal and commercial empire centred on Kyiv, received Christianity in AD 988 from Constantinople and was part of the West that 'was considered to be the East in the eyes of the West and which on occasion did not consider itself to be a part of Europe'.[11] However, large areas of Ukraine

were exposed to the influence of West European culture through Poland, which – originally baptized Roman Catholic – was always seen as belonging to the West by both Polish and Western sources until the Ottoman cultural influences moved it farther to the Orient in the European imaginary geography in the 1600s and 1700s.[12] Whereas Western influences on Kyiv were mediated through either Byzantium or Poland, Moscow had been receiving them from Kyiv in doubly mediated form until the Petrine reforms.[13] With the rise of Russia in the 1700s, it had immediate access to Western culture and technology for the first time, while short-lived independent Ukraine was partitioned between Russia and Poland, and the situation reversed: the West was now coming to the eastern half of Ukraine in Russian dress.

Early modern Ukraine was already aware of Europe as a concept. Moreover, it sought to position itself within Europe. In the decrees (*universaly*) by Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1595–1657), a Ukrainian hetman and the leader of an uprising that broke Ukraine away from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Europe is never mentioned (although he corresponded, alongside the Polish king, the Ottoman sultan and the Moscow tsar, in Latin with Hungarian and Swedish monarchs). Yet the chronicle by Samiylo Velychko (1670 to after 1728) attributes passionate speeches to this hetman, in all likelihood inventions of the writer, a member of the Ukrainian elite. In the speeches, the European realm, which focused on 'the famed European rivers of Vistula and Oder', is defined as a geographical denotation and the space where 'the Ukrainian glory' is spread as much as it is in the Asiatic lands, whose location is given as 'lying across the Black Sea'.[14] Furthermore, Velychko's pseudo Khmelnytsky lays claim for Ukraine to the AD 476 takeover of Rome, which 'can be named the mother of all European cities', by suggesting a 'Ruthenian', ditto Ukrainian, identity for 'our ancestor' Odoacer,[15] a Germanic king whose assault is now widely used to mark the watershed between antiquity and the Middle Ages.

This speech is quoted verbatim in one of the foundational documents of Ukrainian nationalism, *The History of the Rus* (written between 1769 and 1809). The anonymous manuscript by a member of Ukraine's old Cossack elite resurfaced in the late 1820s and became widely read among Ukrainian and Russian intelligentsia and nobility. It tremendously influenced those who developed a modern Ukrainian project, and through them it became part of the DNA of Ukrainian culture. Apart from this speech, the text mentions Europe well over a dozen times; there is a sensible perception of Europe, although many of the references concern wars between European countries. Europe is a geographical locus, a family of monarchies and monarchs indeed related between themselves, but also a gaze that observes the events and in front of whom the dramatic historical play unfolds. Like a person, Europe respects the Swedish king and is afraid of the Turks; in a few places, European courts speak to Khmelnytsky, the Ukrainian leader, directly on behalf of the entire community, expressing their common interest, for example in preventing Ukraine's alliance with Moscow for fear of the disproportionate rise of Russia. Europe also acquires a meaning of 'the civilisation *per se*': describing the Cossack massacre of the Polish troops who attacked them despite the ceasefire, the author says: 'their slaughter was cruel and ruthless like that of the filthy predators rather than European troops'.[16]

The nineteenth-century rise of Ukrainian nationalism was linked first to pan-Slavism, with the St Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood tasked to reunite Slavonic lands into a loose federation, with Kyiv as its centre.[17] The idea became increasingly objectionable, and Ukrainian nationalism later drifted towards socialism and merged with it in the political programmes of Mykhaylo Drahomanov (1841–1895) and Ivan Franko (1856–1916). Towards the late nineteenth century, Ukraine was often thought of not only as part of Europe but also as the most European part of the Russian Empire; still, the ambiguity of self-identification persisted until 1917.[18] Sometimes it was coupled with a ruthless critique of the national self-identity and the yearning for Europeanness expressed negatively through the rejection of Asia (later in the twentieth century, the Asiatic label was passed on to Russia as opposed to the idea of Ukraine as integrally European). In 1881, the writer Panteleymon Kulish (1819–1897) addressed his fellow countrymen in his 'To My Own People (on entrusting him the Ukrainian translation of Shakespeare's works)' as 'Ye people sans reason, sans honour, sans respect' and 'Barbar', and encouraged them thus:

> Take this universal mirror, see thyself therein,
> Grasp what a miserable Asian thou art,
> Find no pride in thy fierce unrule,
> Forget the filthy way of violence,
> And return to the family of the cultured.

He also addressed Shakespeare – emblematic of the now-universal Western European culture – as 'Homer of the modern world' in a twin poem dedicated to the start of his translational work, begging to 'Let us rid ourselves of barbarity in thy temple'.[19]

The next milestone in the history of the Ukrainian perception of Europe was after the 1917–1921 events, when the ambiguity in identifying as either European or Russian had catastrophic consequences for another short-lived independent Ukrainian state.[20] In 1920s Soviet Ukraine, a group of classically educated intellectuals and poets led by Mykola Zerov (1890–1937) called for a reorientation towards classical and modernist European culture in a tone subversive to the dominant political Bolshevik programme. They found an unexpected ally in Mykola Khvylovy (1893–1933), an ethnic Russian, and Ukrainian by choice, who was a passionate communist and follower of James Joyce's writing. He preached a global revolution that would free the colonial nations and spoke of 'the Asiatic renaissance' a few decades before Frantz Fanon's revolutionary writings and about ten years before Aimé Césaire invented the concept of 'Négritude'. Situated between Europe and Asia, Ukraine seemed a natural platform to launch such a project, but this was prevented by its provincial condition caused by Russian imperialism, which was also omnipresent in the Soviet Union. Therefore, Khvylovy coined slogans like 'Away from Moscow' and 'Towards the psychological Europe'.[21] For him, Europe was associated with technical and cultural – civilizational – achievements that the proletariat had to inherit and develop rather than destroy. To be sure, such ideas did not serve the Soviet leadership well, and after a few

years of ceaseless public penance, Khvylovy lost faith in the left idea and committed suicide in 1933, probably affected by the experience of the Great Famine. A couple of years later, Zerov's group almost entirely perished in the Gulag. For decades after the Stalinist purges, the discourse of Europe was hijacked by propaganda, and any other approach could only be practised in diasporic and underground circles.[22] On the more popular level, Europe and the US started invading the Soviet Union in the form of pop culture and mass-produced quality goods, creating what Oleksandr Hrytsenko described as cargo cults.[23] In the post-Soviet environment, the 'creolization' of the imported Western-looking goods (so-called 'euro-things': 'euro-windows', 'euro-doors', 'euro-renovation') gave them a new quality and fresh meaning, comparable to those in the aboriginal worship of foreign, typically Western, things. This melange of a consumerist cargo cult, the rediscovery of earlier discourses and the success of neighbouring Poland and other Central European countries created an urge for Ukraine to move towards Europe and to understand its own identity as European while not devoid of deficiencies; something that set the stage for Ukraine's European choice, peaceful between 2004 and 2013, and then militant.

Ola Hnatiuk has pinpointed the Westernization and Europeanization project as one of the key identity-building projects in Ukraine in the 1990s and 2000s, competing against the Soviet and the nativist ones.[24] Faced with the lack of a unifying national project, Ukraine as a 'nationalizing state' opted for this Europeanization, reaffirming its European identity as a compromise between democratic nationalist groups and the ruling post-Communist elites.[25] Still, this Europeanization can also be called 'declarative'.[26] Nothing has really challenged this account until recently; the Yanukovych government's fatal November decision became the major turning point of this declarative Europeanization. The events that took place before, during and after the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November 2013 confirmed this observation once again, yet also revealed a major discrepancy between conventional policymaking in Ukraine and civil society's aspirations.

Dariya Orlova has produced arguably one of the most interesting pieces of research on the representation of Europe in Ukrainian public discourses. This work can also be applied to other Eastern and at times even Central European contexts.[27] She focused mainly on the EU as a normative model in the most popular Ukrainian live political talk shows (2006–2010). According to Orlova, in the mediatized political discourse,

> 'Europe' is largely referred to as embodiment of normality and development, advanced social and political practices. However, this reference frequently constitutes part of the discursive strategies employed by actors of discourse to legitimise or delegitimise certain practices and decisions within the Ukrainian context. […] Therefore, 'Europe' is mostly referred to as a reference point, which evidences that symbolic aspect of references dominates over institutional.[28]

Thus, Europe could in the Ukrainian discourse be constructed twofold: as a final destination and a separate geopolitical entity.

'Europe Is Over' and 'Familial Europe': More Adventures in Russia and Poland

When it comes to the narrative of Europe, *Russia* shares the Soviet experience with Ukraine. However, earlier experiences were rather different. Zenkovskiy gave an adequate, if emotionally partial, account of how eighteenth-century Russian elites started developing their own idea of Europe, when, after a few decades of respectful interest that followed the top-down Petrine reforms (1696–1725), the Russian intellectual community split into two warring camps: the militant anti-European nativists or Slavophiles and the more moderate Westernists.[29] The discourse on Europe focused on the idea of the West's decline and decay. Few were as radical as Petr Chaadayev (1794–1856), who in his legendary *Philosophical Letters* lambasted Russia for lagging behind and praised Catholicism as a 'political religion'; his works were banned and he was later certified insane. Even such staunch Westernists as Aleksandr Herzen (1812–1870) could write: 'the role of today's Europe is entirely over: since 1826, its decay has grown with every step'.[30] The perceived terminal crisis of the West (nativists formulated it on much harsher terms) forced many authors to adopt the messianistic idea that Russia was supposed to save the West from its moral corruption and lack of spirituality. This anti-European mood deepened especially after the 1853–1856 Crimean War, when European countries were accused of 'hatred' towards Russia and the Slavonic populations of the Ottoman Empire. The early twentieth century, however, witnessed a trend towards reconciliation and some kind of middle way between nativists and Westernists; this evolution was cut short by the 1917 revolution, which rejuvenated the old critique of Europe and fused it with new communist elements. The émigré philosopher Nikolay Berdyayev (1874–1948) continued this line of development in France. In his *The Russian Idea*, he is critical of both camps but also has some praise for them and clearly sees the difference between Europe and Russia (a question he addresses specifically in this book).[31] 'But the type of Russian thinking and Russian culture was always very distinct from that of Western Europe', he wrote; 'Russian thinking was much more totalitarian [*totalitarno*] and integral [*tselostno*] than the thinking of the West, which is more differentiated and divided into categories'; and in another place: 'There is enshrined deep down in the Russian people [*naroda*] greater freedom of spirit than there is among the more free and enlightened peoples of the West'.[32] While Soviet Russia was typecast by its leaders and docile intellectuals as the Communist enemy of the capitalist West, Berdyayev's views enjoyed a resurgence in post-Soviet Russia and still defined the perspective of some Russian intellectuals.

From a postcolonial perspective, the relationship with the West created in Russia what some call an 'inferiority complex'.[33] According to David C. Moore, 'Whereas the British mimicked no one but themselves, the Russians were mimicking the French and British, to whom, again, they had long felt culturally inferior'.[34] This complicated dynamic of representation never seriously changed, neither in 1917 nor in 1991, as the same logic stubbornly reproduced itself in Russia's self-positioning in relation to Europe. Even the perestroika and glasnost periods were short-lived and then labelled a 'failed excursion from "the West" to "Europe"'.[35] Since at least Putin's first presidency period of 1999–2008,

the West in general, and, to a slightly lesser degree, the EU, is again perceived as a rival, as an adversary – and this is the image the Russian media were projecting too.[36] This is much facilitated by the country's media model, which Yelena Vartanova described as statist commercialized,[37] i.e. combining the decisive role of the state and the effects of a market-driven economy, where the 'integrated state-business elite has supported the use of political media in new circumstances as traditional instruments of political elite management'.[38]

'The spread of fear of alleged Western subversion carried out by opponents of the Kremlin has', Ilya Yablokov notes, 'served as the main tool of social cohesion' during Putin's third term (starting 2012).[39] The Russian political scientist Dmitriy Trenin recognized already ten years ago that 'Russia's leaders have given up on becoming part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system. […] In the past year, Russia has begun acting like the great power it was in tsarist times'.[40] Meanwhile, the internal situation in Russia qualifies the country for what in political science is called a 'hybrid regime', combining elements of authoritarian rule and a democratic facade with ineffective political opposition and low political participation.[41] Sparks and Reading (1998) emphasized that, despite many transitional processes, the changes in Eastern Europe were in many cases less significant than the continuities, and perhaps in Russia this is most clearly the case.[42]

Poland's encounter with Europe has been more intimate but no less complicated. Early Polish narratives of Europe (summarized, among others, separately by Andrzej Walicki and Andrzej Wierzbicki) focused on the country's own role as a natural barrier and a defender of the continent from the Asian threat.[43] As Andrzej Walicki noted, early modern Poland was actually suspicious of the absolutist monarchies seen as 'autocratic' and took much pride in its concept of Sarmatism, an embodiment of liberty and Poland's 'special way'. [44] The crisis of the state based upon this idea led to the first, barely successful, attempts at the Westernization of Poland in the second half of the eighteenth century.[45] At the same time, a loss of independence and the partitions of Poland in the late eighteenth century stimulated Polish thought towards fashionable pan-Slavism (shared with both Ukraine and Russia) and the idea of a European confederation, which, however, never resulted in any detailed project proposal. For a long time, anti-Western Slavophilism was as widespread among the Polish thinkers as it was in the Russian lands; this changed only with the rise of economic and social modernization agenda that could base itself only on the Westernist premises.[46] The Polish narrative appeared considerably more project-oriented and practical than those of its eastern neighbours: pan-Europeanism and regional or subregional projects of European cooperation became popular towards the early twentieth century.[47] The time was also characterized by the spread of geopolitics and the Jagiełło and Piast models of relations with neighbours, epitomized by the more accommodating patriotic socialism of Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–1911) and Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935) versus the more intolerant integral nationalism of Roman Dmowski (1864–1939).[48] In post-war Communist Poland, the context for the West and Europe was strictly negative, albeit freer than in the rest of the Eastern bloc.[49] The Paris-based journal *Kultura*, published by Jerzy Giedroyc (1906–2000), developed a perspective on Poland as both reconciled with its Eastern neighbours and an integral part of the West.

Poland's protest movement in the 1980s was in many ways different from Euromaidan, but interestingly the idea of Europe, and of Poland's return to it, figured prominently in the protest against the Jaruzelski regime, both during and after martial law (1981–1983). Just as in other Central European countries, this helped Poland to take a lead in the 'democratic transition' in the post-Communist camp.[50] But the contemporary perception of Europe and of Poland's place in it could be most immediately linked to the changes in symbolic geography ever since the *Solidarność* movement and the famous visits of Pope John Paul II, which offered the Poles a view of 'their country as an outpost of Western Europe. They were no longer an extension of the Soviet Union, but the somehow decentred heart of Catholic Europe'.[51] It has since become commonplace that Poland's view on Europe is determined by identity politics[52]; Poles often controversially feel both Europe's 'unwanted child' and the 'creators and defenders of the European values'.[53] Poles perceive Europe as part of their own lived familial experience: the history of Poland was marked by a feeling of being a severed part of Europe that strove to be reunited with the 'rest of the West' while viewing it critically and acting pragmatically.[54] The emotional link, however, is perhaps best represented in Czesław Miłosz's 1959 book, *Rodzinna Europa* (*Native Realm* in the published English edition, but meaning literally The Familial Europe). Rather unsurprisingly, the Polish media system became one of the most commercialized of all the former Eastern bloc countries while moving closer towards the Italian or Mediterranean model of relatively strong political parallelism and polarization.[55] Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska only partly agrees with that, emphasizing the last decade's influence of the liberal model, the post-Communist legacy and the democratic corporatist model elements.[56] As in many European countries, interpretation, commentary and the 'advocacy' type of journalism dominate the coverage.[57]

Dysfunctional Families: Semantic Mapping of the Ukrainian and Russian Press

The Ukrainian, Polish and Russian press analysed here share a few key features in their coverage of Europe. In the examined articles, there is certainly an ambiguity in what 'Europe' means, even in the narrower and most immediate sense (see Figure 4.1). First of all, Europe is a geographical entity; a continent with indefinite, yet somehow negotiated, limits that define whether or not any particular country is European according to a tacit agreement between journalists and audiences. Such is the context in *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya*: 'We are second in Europe […] in terms of HIV prevalence'.[58] This fundamental idea then may go through several rounds of clarification that narrow it further, as a rule, on the basis of institutional criteria. The wider institutional meaning is associated with the Council of Europe (CoE) (this is what is meant in the *Kommersant* article 'Russia responds to Europe', dated 1 October 2013, or when, in the same newspaper on 11 February 2013, the cancellation of a death penalty moratorium is called 'a provocation against Europe', i.e. the CoE).[59] One more step closer towards a narrower Europe is of course the EU, and it can be concluded that this is what is meant by Europe in most articles. In *Kommersant*, 'Europe' occasionally comes to

Figure 4.1. Europe: Gradations of meaning.

mean the European market, which is probably also thought to be equated with the EU. And then there is an even narrower definition that is typical of Polish newspapers, which meticulously define the eurozone as some special kind of Europe: the European hard core. This distinction is, however, largely irrelevant to the Ukrainian and Russian newspapers.

Some categories are found in all newspapers.[60] One such theme is what could be referred to as 'Europe in distress' and includes a depiction of economic and social troubles in the EU. Another fundamental narrative of Europe present in every newspaper is Europe as unity or, perhaps, a subject. While this might just mention Europe as a location of the events (the continent), most typically it is constructed as a political subject in phrases such as 'Europe is seriously concerned', or, in the context of external policy, as a consolidated geopolitical actor pursuing ends of its own: 'Europe begins to understand that its Ukraine policy, inflexible and declarative, proved ineffective'.[61]

These are virtually all the similarities between the newspapers, and the significant differences begin here, which is already evident in how the newspapers report the crisis. This category arguably takes up different amounts of space in these newspapers, as seen in the diversity of subcategories. While the Ukrainian media only report on some aspects of the financial crisis and the internal EU disagreements, the Russian newspapers paint a full-scale apocalyptic picture for their readers. For instance, a Spanish court, under pressure from the European Court of Human Rights, grants an early release and financial compensation to 54 dangerous terrorists: 'In Spain, terrorists and rapists walk free [*vypuskayut iz turem*]'[62]; the use of cocaine is spreading in Europe thanks to the crisis; a Roma girl on a school trip gets deported after she was captured by the French police; member states perceive the authority of Brussels as illegitimate.[63] *Izvestiya* is especially notorious for its overwhelmingly negative and sensationalist coverage of Europe, but although *Kommersant*'s reporting is far more balanced, its focus on the EU's migration problems, crisis of leadership and gloomy economic figures is more sombre than in any other sampled newspaper. And in a telling

Izvestiya								
Europe as unity		Europe in distress					Threatening Europe		
(Geopolitical actor)		Extreme crisis (economic, leadership)	Weakness and ineffectiveness	Protectionist and closed	Dependent and passive	Division	Hypocritical, cynical and hysterical	Aggressive	Authoritarian and imperialist Brussels

Kommersant							
Europe as unity		Symbolic Europe (better and more stable system)	Europe in distress			Conflict	Threatening Europe	
Europe as a market	Geopolitical actor		Crisis (economy, leadership, migration)	Division	Failing, weak and ineffective / But accepting the challenge	Europe vs. Russia	Aggressive	Unjust

Novaya Gazeta									
Europe as unity		Symbolic Europe	Europe in distress			Conflict	Phantom menace		Europe as different	
Actor	Unity as the goal	Europe as the goal	Weak economy	Weak political actor	Divided	Geopolitically opposing	Ideological project	Irrational and too emotional	Different (not always better) set of rules and norms	Political alternative to Russia

Figure 4.2. Semantic map of the Russian media, February 2013–September 2014.

sentence, one could read: '28 member states comprise the EU, but in none of them are the citizens content and happy'.[64]

The crisis of Europe has many dimensions, ranging from economic to social to political, but the alleged moral crisis is a significant part of this 'Europe-in-distress' discourse. 'Contemporary Europe has unlearnt to choose. In any case, it has unlearnt to choose the right thing', the journalist Mikhail Shakhnazarov wrote in *Izvestiya* on 11 May 2014 following Conchita Wurst's Eurovision triumph. '"The old woman" [Europe] is increasingly reminiscent of a sexless creature who at the end of its days has decided to offer its withered body for acts of abomination by sodomites'.[65]

It is worth noting that the discourses in the Russian newspapers tend to avoid identifying Russia with Europe or as part of Europe. It can often be hidden in a complex wording that initially admits Russia's 'Europeanness'. In an interview with Russian Minister of Culture

Vladimir Medinskiy published in *Kommersant*,[66] the interviewee responds to the journalist's question, 'If Russia is not Europe, what is it?' in the following way: 'Russia is not just not Europe. Russia is actually half of Europe. But it is way broader than just Europe. […] Rather, when it comes to values, the West is turning into its opposite, and Russia has to protect itself from this "anti-Europe" in order to protect at least for itself Shakespeare without paedophilia and "The Little Prince" without homosexual body language [*plastika*]'.[67]

In a strong and striking difference from the journalists from the other two countries, Russian newsmen often choose to portray Europe as an adversarial agent, as a threat. Brussels and Strasbourg act as authoritarian centres that command and exploit member states; the EU 'feels it is an empire'.[68] It is no coincidence the same newspaper interviewed the French far-right populist leader Marine Le Pen during her visit to Moscow.[69] 'European bureaucrats are obsessed with a messianic idea of a common home, erased borders between nations, genders, etc. These people perceive themselves and their task very pathetically, so they most likely will sulk over the renegade Ukraine for a long time'.[70] When Yanukovych rejected the association with the EU, 'Europe's political elite lost their face. A bacchanalia broke out. Yanukovych was openly teased, humiliated, and literally threatened [*derzili, khamili, bukvalno ugrozhali*]'.[71] Brussels 'corners the Eastern Partnership countries' to force them into choosing between Russia and the EU.[72]

Closely related to this 'aggressive Europe' category is the narrative that depicts the EU as being in a conflict with Russia. It occupies a prominent position in *Kommersant*: the EU has 'an objective to outplay [*pereigrat*] Russia' in Ukraine.[73] The CoE, *Izvestiya* claims, seeks to humiliate Russian pride with its demands, and if the Vilnius summit fails, 'we will celebrate another diplomatic victory'.[74] Europe, depicted as a weakling in most Russian newspapers, seems nearly doomed to fail everywhere: over Ukraine, the US spying affair, Syria, the South Stream project or just anything else. In the end, 'the most admired European', according to *Izvestiya*, is Vladimir Putin himself.[75]

It is especially worth noting that when speaking about the EU the Russian newspapers are keen on using emotionalized language that constructs Europe as unsure of itself and almost hysterical: 'the experience of Uruguay *scares* Europeans'; 'Europe is *afraid* of Russia'; '*shock* and *anxiety* [*trepet*], *disappointment* and *irritation* in European capitals'; Europe '*sulks*'; 'the whole of Europe *embittered* against the US'; and 'Europe *doesn't want* to serve in Afghanistan'.[76]

The oppositional *Novaya Gazeta*, also thought to be more 'highbrow', is a notable exception on a number of positions. While it assumes too that Europe is a sort of geopolitical actor and dedicates some space to covering its frail economy and political weakness and 'the conflicting thinking [*raznomysliye*] in [Europe's] capitals',[77] it nevertheless chooses to portray the conflict between Russia and Europe as more peaceful and gentler. Instead of the discourse on the European threats, what I call a 'phantom-menace' discourse is found here: Europe as a fictional threat, a paper tiger of sorts. Although the threats are listed once again, they are much more critically assessed and in many cases dumped. The symbolic approach to Europe is also to be seen, although it seems to appear episodically within

Dzerkalo tyzhnia							
Europe as unity		Europe as a goal		Symbolic Europe			Europe in distress (crisis and division)
As a region/location	(Rational) geopolitical actor	Europe as a task /challenge	Aspirations/prizes	Europe of values	Observing authority	Europe as the centre	

Korrespondent							
Europe as unity		Successful Europe		Symbolic Europe	Europe in conflict (EU vs Russia)	Europe in distress (Division)	
(Rational) geopolitical actor	Institutions	Attractive (investments)	Affluent	(Europe as choice)			

Segodnya					
Europe as unity		Europe as a (doubtful) goal: comparative perspective		Europe in conflict	Europe says 'no'
Geographical location	(Rational) geopolitical actor	Aspirations/prizes	EU: pro et contra	EU vs Russia	(Europe in denial)

Figure 4.3. Semantic map of the Ukrainian media, February 2013–September 2014.

largely Ukrainian contexts (or those of specifically Euromaidan); the writers are aware of the symbolic task Europe poses to the Ukrainians. Yet they seem unwilling or unable to accept this task for themselves (or at least to speak about it, whether openly or 'between the lines'). *Novaya* suggests another discourse instead of concentrating on differences between Europe and Russia. In many of its articles, the journalists spend dozens of lines comparing the levels of corruption and the treatment of opposition in Russia and Europe/the West. This comparison is also left hanging in the air as a statement on the order of things rather than a direct or indirect call for action to change backward practices. Europe appears from this comparison as Russia's sheer Other, a completely different system of rules and norms – sometimes but not necessarily better than the Russian model. In this normalization and almost justification of difference, 'progressive' Russian journalists strongly differ from their Ukrainian counterparts, as I intend to demonstrate now.

To some extent, the conflict narrative is also present in the Ukrainian media, at least in *Korrespondent*, which portrays external reactions to the Ukrainian situation as a clash between Brussels and Moscow, as well as in the Russian-language tabloid *Segodnya*, which saw the situation before Euromaidan in terms of a conflict and would strike a somewhat Eurosceptic tone every now and then. While acknowledging the EU as a goal, albeit an equal one to the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), the newspaper chooses to compare potential gains and losses of European integration. Even in this way, the tabloid eventually saw more benefits than losses, although the 'multi-vector' foreign policy receives its share of praise. However, suspicion of and disappointment at the EU reveal themselves in the negation forms typical of the headlines and highly unusual in other analysed media: 'EU requirements *not* realistic', 'Europe *won't* go to war over Ukraine', 'EU *won't* grant Ukraine a visa regime', 'Barroso: EU *not* ready to accept Ukraine'.[78] This type of framing and choice of phrases connote an idea of an unsympathetic and unwelcoming Europe, something in demand for the Eurosceptic section of the Ukrainian audience seeking confirmation of the idea that 'no one awaits us in Europe'.

But what really defines the dominant Ukrainian view of Europe are the categories of a successful and advanced society, a symbolic Europe of values that imposes 'attaining Europe' as both a task and a path to modernization. The Ukrainian coverage of Europe is as positive as the Russian is negative. Europe is a vessel of 'the European standards' and an investment 'resource'.[79] One *Korrespondent* columnist, a chief executive of a news agency, compared on 31 May 2013 the EU to a bourgeois family that had 'renovated its apartment in a European way, with comfortable furniture and good house appliances, and lives peacefully and safely', unlike Ukraine and Russia, which resemble down-and-out, dysfunctional families living in filthy holes. However, Europe can be idealized and criticized at the same time.[80] 'When we say "European choice", we mean political orientation and material abundance', the prominent Soviet dissident Yevhen Sverstyuk wrote in *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* on 11 October 2013. 'In fact, this implies the choice of the most vital values: freedom, human rights, rule of law. The Western world is far from ideal. It is diverse. Its freedom often borders on lewdness. Its democracy is sometimes a caricature. Its liberalism often means lack of principles'.[81]

The EU's inability to act decisively against Russia in the Ukrainian crisis further embittered many of its critics who remain sympathetic to the Europe of values while targeting political, commercial and bureaucratic elites who 'either do not grasp what Russia and its energy policy are or have a very flexible consciousness'.[82] In the words of another journalist, 'no matter how Europe threatens [Russia over Ukraine], no matter its formidable pose, it is all but clear that it is scared and backs off'.[83]

However, against the background of a Europe of values, Ukraine is perceived as deficiently European and its condition as lacking Europeanness:

Europeans and people from the Pechersk hills (Ukraine's ruling elite) speak different languages. They are not from different worlds, they are from different planets. 'We're absolutely

incompatible!' one European diplomat admitted in despair. Of course you are! Some (the Europeans) speak of principles and values and are used to trusting each other's word. Especially the one given at the presidential level. The others (the Ukrainian elite) only believe in and act according to the laws of the criminal world.[84]

These values constitute the symbolic Europe and thus empower those who can associate with them to speak from a position of authority. By 'right of birth', these are Western European countries, and the EU is their alliance and fulfilment of those same values. Europe is also the gaze that controls and monitors the actions of Ukraine's elite; it is in the eyes of the EU that Putin wants to discredit Ukraine.[85] Europe is also empowered to decide on how well Ukraine completes its self-assigned task of becoming part of Europe, which is, in some cases, also the centre where the most interesting and topical trends are to be found.

'Return the European Spirit to Europeans': Semantic Mapping of Europe in the Polish Press

For the Polish newspapers, Europe appears in its symbolic dress in articles on EU enlargement and suggested solutions to the perceived crisis of Europe.

The Polish newspapers do not shy away from what they portray as the crisis of Europe, viewed not only as an economic or social one but also as a deeper crisis of trust, ethics, values and even narrative. On 31 August 2014, Jacek Żakowski wrote in *Polityka* an open letter to the EU president-elect, former Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk, criticizing Europe's 'excess of bureaucratic pragmatism and deficit of meaning':

> You can do a lot to return the European spirit to the Europeans, [the spirit] that has been disappearing for years, replaced by the spirit of various egotisms. To accomplish that, you would first of all have to offer a new European narrative. Such [narrative] that would be an equivalent, at least during the first half of the twenty-first century, to the narrative created in the second half of the twentieth century by Robert Schuman, which lasted until the end of the 1900s but has now exhausted itself.[86]

This echoed the words of Tusk himself in an interview with *Polityka* a few months earlier, on 19 April 2014. Analysing the decision-making-process implications for Poland from an institutional perspective, the politician admitted the graveness of the crisis the EU was facing and acknowledged that 'Europe ceased to be the source of hope […] If you are asking me about my Europe, I will answer very briefly: political liberty and rule of law, constitutionalism and the idea of human dignity. Europe is [its] citizens'.[87] These two passages reflect to what extent the Ukrainian and the Polish perceptions of Europe as a symbolic, political and citizen-oriented value complex have moved towards each other in recent years.

Gazeta Wyborcza

Europe as unity			Identity	Institutional (internal) perspective		Europe in distress
As a region /location	(Geo)political actor	Pan-European trends	(Culture and history)	Complex structure and hierarchy	Institutions	(Crisis)

Rzeczpospolita

Europe as unity		Identity		Institutional (internal) perspective	Successful Europe		Symbolic Europe (Europe as a task/destination; values)	Europe in distress		
Geo-political actor	As a region/ location	Europe vs. Poland	History and culture		Recovery from crisis	Europe's potential and advancement		Division	Crisis: economy, ideology, trust, bureaucracy	Weak and failing

Polityka

Europe as unity			Institutional (internal) perspective	Symbolic Europe		Europe in distress
Location	Geopolitical actor	Institution		Europe as values	Europe of values	Crisis: economic, social, moral

Figure 4.4. Semantic map of the Polish media, February 2013–September 2014.

The symbolic Europe also helps Poland distinguish itself from Russia: 'That state [Russia] did not have the Middle Ages, gothic architecture, nor took part in the conflict of the faculties. It developed neither the respectable bourgeoisie nor the nobility. The tsar looked on everything from above, besides God, keeping his people in fear and obedience'.[88] Europe's relations with Russia, however, are seldom portrayed as conflictual; more often, the newspapers refer to the Russian influence without the framework of open conflict, for example: 'By overturning the table on which the Association Agreement must have been signed, Ukraine's government confirmed the opinion of those European politicians who believed Yanukovych led Europe a merry dance in order to bargain as much as possible from Russia'.[89]

What the Polish newspapers bring is some, albeit limited, attention to history and culture, mainly in the form of entertaining life stories (e.g. the one on Europe's most famous cemeteries; in this case, a death rather than life story). More significant is another Poland-specific category: the European institutions feature peripherally in some Ukrainian articles and items from *Novaya Gazeta*; but in the Polish newspapers, it is much broader and enriched with an internal EU perspective. Michał Krzyżanowski noted the importance of the institutional framework in the construction of European identity, particularly in Poland, where the journalists indeed report on Europe in much greater detail and with attention to many more subtleties than their

Eastern colleagues do.[90] They not only mention internal EU divisions and disagreements but also explain at great length where common interest lies, where particularism is stronger and what the most likely final outcome is. In *Rzeczpospolita*, Europe fortunately receives a rather optimistic reportage of the early signs of recovery from the crisis, the EU's great potential (mostly seen as unrealized) and its successes, such as the new space mission.[91]

While Russia isolates itself from Europe, and Ukraine accepts it as a task, Poland often reports on EU events with a sense of shared responsibility, yet, in many cases, also chooses to oppose Europe. One such article is 'Europe opens, Poland closes', which concerns the different retail opening hours of various countries, and another is 'Poland is one of the few countries that do not sell passports'.[92]

On an Exercise Machine to Paris: A Digression on the War of Visuals

While portraying Europe as a self-assigned task seems endemic to both the Ukrainian mainstream and popular media, Russian discourses on Europe reveal themselves to have much more in common with the anti-EU sentiment that is marginal in the Ukrainian context. It is not unlikely that the consumption of – or, rather, trust in – either the Ukrainian or the Russian media is related to the creation of such different images of Europe as in Figures 4.1–4.6. In the analysed Russian newspapers, only two cases activated such discourse, as was also the case in the Ukrainian context (a telling detail!), stating that 'many Ukrainians wish to integrate into Europe with its greater stability, better-developed institutions, welfare and security',[93] and mentioning Europe as the final destination for Ukraine.[94]

This perspective on Europe has spread well beyond the influential and/or popular printed media sampled here. Ukraine's civil society is largely coordinated by the informal elites often bound to state institutions through a network of personal ties, but they can also very much function as an oppositional force. Their thinking in the weeks before Euromaidan is pretty much summarized in a blog by Alyona Hetmanchuk, director of a Kyiv-based advocacy centre called the Institute of World Policy (IWP). In the months leading up to the Maidan events, the non-governmental organization team toured central and eastern Ukraine putting on a series of street events to promote European integration; the influential blogger and activist noted the level of resistance to their action from the local authorities controlled by the then declaratively pro-European Party of Regions. According to her, these street debates highlighted the locals' pragmatic attitude towards the EU, and they answered the most frequently heard question 'What will Europe give us?' with 'our children at least will have a better life'. Sceptics, interestingly, produced examples of Belarus as a perfect haven of clean streets and an effective state – a fact worth closer consideration as possibly highlighting the existence of at least two different kinds of ideal political imaginary among prospectively oriented pro-Western (pro-Ukrainian) and retrospectively oriented pro-Soviet (pro-Russian) Ukrainians.

Hetmanchuk summarized her impressions thus:

This is the case where we – experts, journalists, diplomats – have to be clear and understandable rather than smart and good-looking. Clarity is needed to explain the upsides of European integration without both manipulation and frightening potential supporters. For example, one does not need to be pathetic and claim there is no corruption in the EU. Rather, it is better to explain that corruption is a matter of choice in Europe, while it is unavoidable in our country. Or just to produce a fact: the EU member states are ranked highest in the corruption indices, while Ukraine is ranked joint 144th with Syria, Cameroon and [Democratic] Republic of Congo. We have to be understandable because many Ukrainians in the regions are impressed not so much by a certain statement by some EU member state ambassador but by the fact that he speaks Ukrainian (this was particularly discussed by a crowd of locals after the speech by the EU ambassador Jan Tombiński in Mykolaiv). Or the fact that he just went to talk to the people out in the street on the main square of a regional capital rather than going to a state-owned venue [*aktova zala*] with forced attendance before another election and with another set of propagandist slogans: without any bodyguards. Yes, it is very important when the officials talk about European values and behaviour models. Even more important is not to debase these values by going out, with a small army of bodyguards, to talk to the people and shaking their hands just as much as needed for two photographs. In such cases, European talk is too dissonant for a post-Soviet visual.[95]

The IWP also commissioned a number of political cartoons; one of them drawn by a well-known professional cartoonist from Kyiv called Ihor Lukyanchenko epitomizes the view of Europe typically found in the news media (see Figure 4.5). A traditionally clad Ukrainian Cossack seems to be cycling towards Europe, which he sees in front of him, yet the image is merely a framed picture, and he is sitting on an exercise bike. Or has he put the poster on the wall to motivate himself to become fitter? In any case, the core Ukrainian ideas associated with Europe are here: movement forward and progress, improvement and the idyllic picture of successful urban modernity. All of them symbolize the longings of a once-peasant nation, in the past nearly destroyed and forced backward. The image, no matter how ironic, still connotes Europe to the values of progress and the Enlightenment.

This picture, originally part of an entire exhibition, was not the only such cartoon. After the Vilnius summit, another set of pictures was commissioned from multiple cartoonists to help improve the EU's image among Ukrainians (as if much improvement was needed). Limited in reach and embodied in far from the most powerful form of propaganda, it hardly had any role in fostering pro-European sentiment, although it does indicate the dominance of a simplistic sender–receiver communication and influence model in the post-Soviet perception of the media. But this set of pictures also gives an intimate, albeit ironic, insight into the Ukrainian perception of Europe on the eve of Euromaidan (see Figures 4.5–4.9).

The cartoons focus on the most explicit comparison of a number of everyday situations that allow us a glimpse into the daily lives of Ukrainians and Europeans: police practices, the

Figure 4.5. Ukraine getting fit for Europe (courtesy of Ihor Lukyanchenko/ the Institute of World Policy; http://youpicture.org/?v=2014-09-16_no3azejl-p4h03qpc5e87t8b8p.jpg#.VgTiJsuvHIU).

Figure 4.6. 'Police with the People' (courtesy of the Institute of World Policy; http://iwp.org.ua/img/caricatures/prev/31.jpg).

Figure 4.7. 'Affluent Old Age' (courtesy of the Institute of World Policy; http://iwp.org.ua/img/caricatures/prev/15.jpg).

living standards of the elderly, corruption and care for the environment. In these and other cartoons (they number around twenty in total), the grim Ukrainian reality is contrasted with the image of a better way strongly bound to the European location (note the use of iconic landmarks from European capitals). Europe again is seen in an idealized way as the haven of righteousness and where things are done properly; to a West European eye, such a portrayal, as if what already exists cannot be 'bettered', may seem annoyingly uncritical; yet it should be remembered that the comparison with their own more difficult situation is what matters most for East Europeans. One can criticize what one already has, and for these cartoonists, Europe becomes not just an object of sentimental, almost nostalgic, longing for another place where everything seems better but also an objective, an explicitly stated current, and not necessarily ultimate, goal of progress in their part of the world.

There were also other takes on this. In the autumn of 2013, the Communist Party of Ukraine (an heir to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, arguing for its restoration and simultaneously supporting the then ruling Party of Regions as part of the parliament's oligarchic lobby) launched a costly TV advertising campaign under the slogan 'We speak one language'. In a number of adverts, people posing in front of the same recognizable European landmarks addressed the audience in English, German and French (without any translation or subtitles), narrating terrible stories of the economic and social misery engulfing the EU, where starving Asians are not welcomed. Interestingly, the advertisement meshed this fairly widespread EU criticism with an identity turn when it ended with a Russian jingle, 'You didn't understand a word? The Customs Union – we speak one language!' This implied of course that the EU is a foreign, alien and perhaps hostile entity, while the Russia-dominated ECU is where one would feel at home. The campaign apparently did not

Figure 4.8. 'Which Treatment is Better?' (courtesy of the Institute of World Policy; http://iwp.org.ua/img/caricatures/prev/20.jpg).

seek to convert any pro-Europe supporters but rather to mobilize the Soviet-nostalgic and pro-Russian population.

The campaign nonetheless angered pro-EU activists and they responded to it in September 2013 with an amateur video that was viewed 86,000 times as of March 2015. The video consists of a number of clips from earlier user uploads filmed at different times and locations showing people saying 'fuck you' [*poshël na khuy*] in Russian, ending with the same jingle, 'We speak one language!' Thus, the EU supporters returned the identity reading suggested by the anti-EU campaign back to where it started, inscribing backwardness and brutality into the Russian identity, just as failure and indifference were etched into the European identity by the original campaign: a narrative harbinger of the more physical clash to come.

The basic ideological disposition before, during and after Euromaidan, from 2014–2015 to the time of writing, the Donbas war, is extremely clear in a comparison of the IWP commissions and a user-generated cartoon (Figure 4.10), likely by an amateur cartoonist from Donetsk called Ruslan Smak. Here, once again, we see a Cossack figure symbolizing Ukraine; yet again, there is a comparison of two pictures. However, this time, everything is reversed: the dimly lit European side curiously presents Hitler, gay men kissing, drugs, the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) and EU flags and the devil himself. Opposing him is an angel in a Russian folk costume defending bright traditional values, including the large nuclear family, religion, reverence for the history and worship of the victory in

Figure 4.9. 'Clear Water!' (courtesy of the Institute of World Policy; http://iwp.org.ua/img/caricatures/prev/23.jpg).

Figure 4.10. Ukraine facing choice between decadent West and traditional Russia, a.k.a. 'I Choose Freedom' (courtesy of Ruslan Smak; http://i.imgur.com/LDDGQeK.jpg).

Figure 4.11. 'Berkut' wallpapers (courtesy of Rammist/Look.com.ua; www.look.com.ua/98958-berkut-geroi-shhity-bogatyri.html).

World War II (symbolized by the period tank mounted on a pedestal), space exploration and military power.

This cartoon could be accompanied by a later post-Maidan wallpaper picture (dated 12 April 2014) by a so far unidentified author whose barely legible signature can be seen on the second-to-right shield (Figure 4.11). The visual literally puts the infamously brutal and subsequently disbanded *Berkut* riot police in the same row as Kyivan Rus princes framed as guardians of history, tradition and possibly native soil, almost in the *Blut und Boden* tradition. The striking difference between pro-European and pro-Russian Internet imagery provides an explanation for the later armed rebellion in Donbas as a war between not so much two different identity allegiances as two incompatible ideological positions and perspectives on the world as embodied in the Maidan and anti-Maidan communities (as East Ukrainian rebels like calling themselves), hence also the imminence of the clash and the ensuing war, as evident in the recent violent experience (bloodshed in Maidan) and the active Russian support for one of the sides. Europe is at the core of this clash as a geopolitical actor, a symbol of stakes and choices as well as an empty signifier into which each side reads its own agenda, values and objectives.

Online Discussions: 'Brothel Europe'?

The study of networked online discourses confirms the findings of the press and both mainstream and folkloric visuals. During the autumn and winter of 2013–2014, the blog section of *Ukrayinska Pravda* became a hub of discussion on the association with the EU. This is a site where many public figures (politicians, analysts, writers, artists, lawyers, activists and journalists) keep their diaries and which, to some extent, sets an agenda for the political and cultural debate. Here Europe is used as a 'reference point', in the words of Orlova.[96] In his blog entries, Vadym Kolesnichenko, one of the most resented pro-Russian MPs and a staunch Yanukovych supporter, demanded, based on European Parliament resolutions, that Ukraine's rightists who celebrated the birthday of Stepan Bandera, a historical figure associated with their movement, should be punished.[97] Kolesnichenko had also published a much earlier entry called 'The future belongs to the united Europe'.[98] The pro-opposition journalist Serhiy Andrushko explained 'Why our politicians do not want to integrate into the EU': 'Being in the EU means transparent tender procedures. […] Buying raspberries for 70 euros [per kilo] or a metro station bench for the price of an inexpensive car will be impossible. […] Look at how MEPs declare the gifts they receive'.[99] One of the protest leaders, Yuriy Lutsenko, summarized this more succinctly: 'Europe is a system of relations where a man [*lyudyna* – literally "a man", "a human being"] is the centre of power. Everything works towards the man [*lyudyna*]'[100] (NB the parallel with Tusk's 'Europe is [its] citizens').

The trend is, however, unfortunate for Europe. As the protest went on without any tangible support from the EU, the discussions in January 2014 became more sober if not sombre. 'Europe is responsible for violence in Kyiv because of its inaction and silent observation', one activist and journalist argued. 'Neither government nor Europe hear us; people are forced to resort to an uprising as the last option. So we urge Europe to intervene and impose sanctions. If Europe just stands by watching, we can repeat Munich 1938'.[101] In a final chord, the frontman of one of Ukraine's leading rock bands exclaimed: 'Stop referring to the protest as "pro-European". Europe doesn't give a shit about us. And it's not about it anyway'.[102]

Bloggers on the important Russian blog platform *Snob.ru* reiterated the same apocalyptic and agonistic discourses as their country's mainstream media. Anecdotic evidence suggests that Russian webspace is already awash with half-invented stories about the West's moral decay, juvenile justice, gay prides for kids and other symptoms of the *Untergang* of *Geyropa* ('Gayrope', an ironic reference by the Russian ultraconservatives to the European understanding of human rights). On *Snob.ru*, one could recently read entries on the idea of Europe being destroyed by the US and Russia,[103] an open question on whether Jews are really fleeing Norway because of the xenophobic migrants,[104] reflections on the geopolitical epic battle for Ukraine between the EU and Russia,[105] and French neocolonialism in Africa.[106] Eduard Limonov, the leader of Russia's National Bolsheviks and an almost classic modern writer, suggested: 'In fact, it would be good for us if Europe collapsed. It is in our interests, in the interests of Russia to support the migrants in Europe against the European indigenous populations to weaken Europe'.[107] At the same time, unlike the printed media,

on the Internet one can also find examples[108] of the symbolic use of Europe as the source of values and righteous practices. One blogger dwelled on how the idea of Europe coincides with that of political modernization. Importantly, the website launched a series of articles entitled 'Why Russia lags behind Europe'.

Poland may lack a prestigious blog platform that takes part in agenda setting and framing the most important issues. Most blogs on the news outlets' websites belong to the journalists who work for them. A more popular blog platform *Natemat.pl* suggests strong identification with Europe among its authors. In many cases, whenever Europe is mentioned, Poland is also included in the pan-European or pan-Western 'we'. This, however, does not make the stance less critical. The journalists and bloggers attack Europe (and very often Poland itself as a part of it) whenever possible, from underreaction to overreaction to the events in Ukraine. Ukrainians themselves feature notably in the blogs: the lawyer and politician Bartłomiej Ciążyński, while criticizing the EU's lack of unity, quoted from a Ukrainian activist's address to Europe: 'You are too old, blind to what is happening; you are deaf and can't hear screams. […] Above all, you don't want to help anybody until it brings you profit'.[109] Similarly, one blogger, the self-styled 'conservative punk' Maciej Borowicz, supported the important writer Andrzej Stasiuk in his criticism of 'Poland becoming part of the overly calculating West' too quickly.[110] The participants discuss the crises of Europe and question its adherence to its own values; sometimes the conservative discourse similarly occurs regarding how it is in Russia, for instance when the journalist Kamil Sikora cited a right-wing MP (albeit in an ironical context): 'Europe is a brothel where everything is allowed, with a goat, a horse, an ape, another woman, a child, with anybody'.[111]

Words to Play With: The Rhetorical Uses of Europe

The observation of Polish blogs and especially newspapers leads to an interesting conclusion. One practice extremely typical of both *Rzeczpospolita* and *Gazeta Wyborcza* is the generalization of Europe. The article often contains a story from just one or maybe two countries still generalized as representative of Europe and featuring in the headline and/or lead, for example the *Gazeta* articles 'Europe Homo+' on the legalization of gay marriage in France and 'Europe protects its culture from the US' on new French measures to close the markets to American cultural products.[112] Although these stories may have some significance for other European countries, there is nothing in them for us to assume it is about more than merely national action. The 'Europe' of these articles is rather a figure of speech, in this case a synecdoche, which substitutes the whole with its part or vice versa. In a peculiar specificity, this approach is untypical of, and almost unknown in, both the Ukrainian and the Russian sources analysed here.

Europe in general is made sense of through a set of metaphors and related rhetorical devices. Metaphor could be defined as 'seeing, experiencing or talking about something in terms of something else'.[113] Lakoff and Johnson posit the defining role of this form of speech

for human activity in general: 'metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action'.[114]

There is a certain lack of clarity and consensus as to the relationship between synecdoche, metonymy and metaphor (itself abundant with subspecies). Different authors consider them separate figures, forms of each other or parts of a greater umbrella concept. This disagreement is of minor importance to my analysis as long as a categorical distinction is made between them, and they represent different ways of perceiving certain phenomena.[115] I largely agree with Lakoff and Johnson when they say that 'the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another', while metonymy is defined by 'using one entity to refer to another that is related to it'.[116]

> Metaphor and metonymy are different *kinds* of processes. Metaphor is principally a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another, and its primary function is understanding. Metonymy, on the other hand, has primarily a referential function, that is, it allows us to use one entity to *stand for* another. But metonymy is not merely a referential device. It also serves the function of providing understanding. For example, in the case of the metonymy THE PART FOR THE WHOLE there are many parts that can stand for the whole. Which part we pick out determines which aspect of the whole we are focusing on.[117]

One of the primary differences between the three countries' narratives of Europe lies in how they use Europe as a linguistic device. Overloaded with different meanings, the word 'Europe' functions as a semantically empty trope: Europe is not '*what*'; it is '*how*'. Broadly speaking, it is most likely a metonymy; something called by the name of something else closely associated with it, instead of being called by its own name.

1. Ukrainian texts tend to prefer ordinary metonymy, employing Europe as shorthand for the values and practices seen as important, useful and vital to Ukraine's own survival, just because the values originated in Europe and are associated with it. When a blogger writes 'Ukraine has to become a European country', they do not mean it should be recognized as a geographical part of the continent – this has already happened a long time ago. Rather, they establish a category of advanced, affluent, developed, democratic societies to which Europe belongs or even gave birth to, thus using a metonymic device to refer to the political goal in a more concise spatial rather than ideological context.

2. For Poland, an EU member, any part thereof can more easily substitute the whole in a synecdoche (which is indeed often seen as a form of metonymy. Again, the question of classificatory hierarchy is really secondary for this analysis as long as we agree to distinguish between the concepts in principle). In a typical use of 'Europe allows same-sex marriages' in an article on France, the Polish journalist reveals the perception of Europe as a whole (which invalidates the question of the exaggeration in the article – if it is a whole, it does not really matter which part of it does something), whether this perception reflects an actual or a desired reality.

3. Russian sources often push the limits of metonymy further to almost extreme forms of metaphor where anything at all can substitute for anything else, such as in a catachresis – literally 'an abuse' of a word used arbitrarily without any connection to its semantic context; therefore facilitating the construction of the metaphoric, if not hyperbolic, stories of decline and fall or epic battle. Many authors (including Jacques Derrida) discuss catachresis as a violent form of metaphor that takes the concept out of its common-use context to denote a concept for which no word exists. This also hints at the arbitrariness with which Europe has been taken out of its context to function as a geopolitical enemy and a symbol of the 'decadence of progress'. The cartoon lumping together LGBT flags and Hitler to signify 'the European choice' defines Europe by arbitrarily associating with mutually contradictory phenomena the Russian conservative ideology sees as wrong and adversarial, thus committing conceptual violence, which is at the heart of catachresis. The article that claims terrorists walk free from European prisons, based on a particular case of an amnesty in Spain, does pretty much the same thing. Both cases also demonstrate the use of synecdoche and hyperbola, but they function in this specifically catachrestic way, which is very foreign to, say, Polish discourse. At the same time, the Russian case also allows for more variation compared to the two others. And the aforementioned historical examples indicate that the catachrestic use of Europe has for a long time been endemic to Russian discourses and extremely unusual in Poland or Ukraine.

There is of course a more down-to-earth explanation for this. Polish newspapers see Europe from within and have a more precise idea about it; this is perhaps one of the reasons for the presence of institutional and market aspects as they entail a more accurate definition of Europe. What Europe is, is clearly defined and demarcated (see Figure 4.4). In Russia and Ukraine, these criteria are more blurred and therefore more metonymic and even catachrestic. If the aspect of values and authority dominates in Ukraine, Russia sees Europe from the perspective of a conflict and a geopolitical game where Europe is destined to be the losing side.

Conclusion: Europe as an Empty and Floating Signifier

The political meaning of this situation of conceptual emptiness is that Europe has become the main driver of East European domestic politics and the signifier that mediates internal political struggle. It is tempting more specifically to invoke the concept of empty signifier, which Ernesto Laclau theorized as 'a signifier without signified'.[118] An empty signifier is different from a floating signifier, which can be attached to different signifiers. Unlike floating signifiers, an empty signifier refers to something that does not exist but politically is perceived as a lack: 'The emptying of a particular signifier of its particular, differential signified is […] what makes possible the emergence of "empty" signifiers as the signifiers of lack, of an absent totality'.[119] For example, in the Hobbesian condition of the natural state,

"'order" as such has no content because it only exists in the various forms in which it is actually realized. However, in a situation of radical disorder "order" is present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of that absence'.[120] 'Order' is one example, but other empty signifiers could include liberation, revolution, progress and change.

The political nature is exactly what makes it different from a case of complex polysemy or plurality of interpretations. It is precisely when such a polysemic concept is politicized as necessary and lacking that it becomes an empty signifier; empty because it can be filled by a set of goals that a certain political actor claims are identical to the assumed positive content to which the empty signifier refers. For instance, to achieve 'progress', a classical example of an empty signifier, one group can insist more economic growth is needed, while another can call for exactly the opposite, degrowth and deindustrialization.

Juxtaposed with the situation presented in this chapter, this line of thinking would suggest that while 'European standards' exist in their actual – nation-specific – forms, the perceived lack of modernity and of 'Europe' urges the participants of the political struggle in Ukraine to bring about 'Europe'. Whatever group succeeds in persuading others that its goals are the most compatible with that task is the one which fills that lack and wins the political struggle.[121] The critical perspective would then imply not so much criticizing the perception of the lack of Europe associated with modernity and progress but rather attacking group-specific claims of the ability to overcome it, which lay the foundation for the hegemony of those groups. Instead of targeting Ukrainians' aspirations of becoming part of Europe, an adequate critique would have to attack the claims to bring these aspirations about made by various groups within the Ukrainian political class.

In Russia, *Evropa*/*Geyropa* can, on the contrary, be seen as a floating rather than an empty signifier. The former can be deliberately attached to whatever is perceived as a negative value (including also vastly different concepts such as LGBT rights and Pax Americana), while the true Russian empty signifier, the great lacking good, is the restorative, nostalgia-driven sense of an unfair lack of greatness, superpower status and respect. In Poland, the process of filling Europe – once an empty signifier very similar to the one we can see in Ukraine today – with more specific content is under way right now. However, the completion of such a project is sheer utopia. As long as Europe remains polysemic and political, it will produce empty signifiers at this intersection. This is at least the case if such a perspective is adopted, which I am proposing here as a final theoretical hypothesis rather than a definite empirical finding and as a suggestion for a more detailed enquiry.

Three main concluding points can be suggested:

1. Discourses in all three countries agree that Europe primarily has geographical and institutional dimensions. Journalists tend to see it most typically as a locational frame of reference or associate it with the EU (even the qualitative analysis gives the impression that this understanding is dominant) while at times also identifying Europe with the larger CoE or just the smaller eurozone.

2. Although all seem to agree more or less that Europe acts as a political subject and hardly faces its best times, there are vast differences in how Europe is identified. Russians focus on the EU's dramatic internal crisis, along with the perceived otherness and often aggressiveness of Brussels. In contrast, Ukrainians prefer a symbolic understanding of the Europe of values or Europeanness as a self-assigned task, and Poles are unique in their self-identification with Europe and their attention to the EU's institutional framework.

3. These dissimilarities coincide with each country's political status in Europe and their different vocabulary on Europe, with different semantic and rhetorical form, thus suggesting a dominance of synecdoche in Poland, metonymy in Ukraine and catachresis in Russia. For all three, Europe is a different figure of speech as much as a different meaning.

Looking at this summary in the project's wider context, I believe that one of the striking conclusions is the continuity of the official Soviet/mainstream Russian anti-European narrative, as is evident from Stefan Jonsson's contribution in this volume. The Polish case reminds of the relatively optimistic perspective of the Latvian press on Europe in the wake of the 2008 crisis and the Occupy movement (cf. Anne Kaun's findings). In a more general sense, these public discourses may be lacking the near-identical versions of the narratives of the kind that Johan Fornäs found in the ESC entries although the generality and level of abstraction of some perspectives on Europe as either declining or resurging, an arch-enemy or an epitome of progress and modernity, sometimes make news media seem to be plucking the same strings as pop music does. But eventually, both pro- and anti-European narratives are very far from what Jan Patočka, according to Carl Cederberg, understood as 'care for the soul' in an alternative conceptualization of Europe. Regardless of their claims, these contemporary Ukrainian, Russian and Polish narratives of Europe remain within the Hegelian paradigm of thinking Europe as spirit, which monopolizes progress and modernity or, in an incarnation of its ugly twin, desires to banish this spirit in the hopeless melancholic longing to restore tradition and turn the tide of history. In this sense, a centuries old spectre is indeed still haunting Europe: the spectre of Europe itself.

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Notes

1 Polskie radio (10 March 2015). Unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own.

2 Brussels' main street for EU and governmental buildings.

3 Andruchowytsch (2014, quoted from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2014). I refer to the German transliteration of the name as given in the article.

4 While the semantic complications and contradictions of the notion of Europe will be given due consideration here, during the actual research a more 'ad hoc' understanding was adopted: *what the analysed texts and statements imply by 'Europe'?*

5 Jensen (2002: 247).

6 I decided to sample the items published between February 2013, a date that roughly marked the beginning of a more intensive rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU, and September 2014, the first Minsk agreements, which represented the end of the earliest stage of the war in Donbas. However, no strict sampling procedure was performed, given the qualitative character of the methodology applied here. All in all, about 200 articles from nine newspapers were analysed, plus 17 blog entries from three blog platforms. I tried to avoid any preconceptions and develop categories directly from the material. While reading the articles closely, I marked the themes and frames that construct Europe as reported, and the repeating themes were then put into categories. If new semantic constructions appeared later on, they established a fresh category. The articles were read and analysed until no new categories appeared, and the results demonstrated the expected saturation. The analysis was qualitative, not quantitative, and does not represent any statistical data.

 7 Jensen (2002: 247).
 8 Habermas ([1962] 2011, 2006).
 9 See Wodak and Meyer (2009).
10 See Rose (2001).
11 Ševčenko (1992: 175–176).
12 Ševčenko (1992: 178).
13 Shevelov ([1954] 2009).
14 Krypyakevych and Butych (1998: 252).
15 Krypyakevych and Butych (1998: 256).
16 Anon. (1991: 151).
17 See Plokhy (2015) for more details of this period.
18 Borets (2012).
19 Kulish (1994: 385–386).
20 Borets (2012); also see Yekelchyk (2007).
21 Khvylovy (1983: 172–174).
22 See Yekelchyk (2007) for more details of this period.
23 Hrytsenko (2001).
24 Hnatiuk (2003).
25 Wolczuk (2000b).
26 Wolczuk (2000a).
27 Orlova (2010).
28 Orlova (2010: 26–27).
29 Zenkovskiy (1997). While Zenkovskiy's book was translated in English in 1953 (*Russian Thinkers and Europe*, Ann Arbor, published for American Council of Learned Societies by J. W. Edwards), the edition could not be consulted in due time to reference the quotations; therefore, the available Russian edition is referred to here.
30 Zenkovskiy (1997: 58).
31 Berdyaev ([1946] 1992).
32 Berdyaev ([1946] 1992: 41, 45).
33 Sahni (1997: xiv).
34 Moore (2001: 120).
35 Neumann (2002: 191).
36 Zassoursky (2005); Kratasjuk (2006).
37 Vartanova (2012: 142).
38 Vartanova (2012: 129).
39 Yablokov (2014: 633).
40 Trenin (2006: 87, 92).
41 Ekman (2009).
42 Sparks and Reading (1998).
43 Wierzbicki (2010).
44 Walicki (1994: 9).
45 Walicki (1994: 12–13).
46 Walicki (1994: 21).

47 Wierzbicki (2010).
48 See Maszkiewicz (2013).
49 Dobek-Ostrowska (2012: 30).
50 Carothers (2002: 9).
51 Dayan and Katz (1994: 166).
52 Cordell (2002).
53 Törnquist-Plewa (2002: 239).
54 Michnik (2003).
55 Jakubowicz (2007).
56 Dobek-Ostrowska (2012: 49).
57 Dobek-Ostrowska (2012: 36).
58 *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* (6 December 2013).
59 *Kommersant* (1 October 2013, 11 February 2013).
60 A few sentences on Figures 4.2–4.4, which organize and present the data. They contain no quantitative findings and simply codify the discourses present in the newspapers without referring to their prevalence. The width and height of each table cell should not be read as suggesting any statistical representation; the colouring is just for the sake of a clearer understanding. The lower-tier categories represent more specific themes extracted directly from the material: the upper-tier categories are broader generalizations that unite particular second-level categories and enable some theoretical conceptualization.
61 *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* (13 December 2013); *Kommersant* (19 December 2013).
62 *Izvestiya* (25 October 2013).
63 *Izvestiya* (13 September 2013, 23 October 2013, 22 October 2013).
64 *Kommersant* (22 January 2014).
65 *Izvestiya* (11 May 2014).
66 *Kommersant* (15 April 2014).
67 *Kommersant* (15 April 2014).
68 *Izvestiya* (1 November 2013, 25 October 2013).
69 *Izvestiya* (25 June 2013).
70 *Izvestiya* (25 November 2013).
71 *Izvestiya* (2 December 2013).
72 *Kommersant* (18 October 2013).
73 *Kommersant* (19 December 2013).
74 *Izvestiya* (29 November 2013).
75 *Izvestiya* (15 January 2014).
76 *Izvestiya* (23 January 2014, 15 January 2014, 25 November 2013, emphases added); *Kommersant* (26 October 2013, 22 October 2013, emphases added).
77 *Novaya Gazeta* (14 February 2014).
78 *Segodnya* (4 December 2013, 17 June 2014, 12 December 2013, 7 April 2014, emphases added).
79 *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* (15 November 2013); *Korrespondent* (26 November 2013).
80 *Korrespondent* (31 May 2013).
81 *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* (11 October 2013).
82 *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* (8 August 2014).

83 *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* (15 August 2014).
84 *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* (15 November 2013).
85 *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* (13 December 2013).
86 *Polityka* (31 August 2014).
87 *Polityka* (19 April 2014).
88 *Rzeczpospolita* (18 January 2014).
89 *Gazeta Wyborcza* (22 November 2013).
90 Krzyżanowski (2010).
91 *Rzeczpospolita* (25 January 2014).
92 *Rzeczpospolita* (25 October 2013, 21 December 2013).
93 *Kommersant* (3 December 2013).
94 *Novaya Gazeta* (13 January 2014).
95 Hetmanchuk (2013, quoted from *Ukrayinska Pravda* 2013).
96 Orlova (2010).
97 Kolesnichenko (2014, quoted from *Ukrayinska Pravda* 2014).
98 Kolesnichenko (2013, quoted from *Ukrayinska Pravda* 2013).
99 Andrushko (2013, quoted from *Ukrayinska Pravda* 2013).
100 Lutsenko (2013, quoted from *Ukrayinska Pravda* 2013).
101 Sokolenko (2014, quoted from *Ukrayinska Pravda* 2014).
102 Yarmola (2014, quoted from *Ukrayinska Pravda* 2014).
103 Tikhomirov (2013, quoted from *Snob.ru* 2013).
104 Yanov (2013a, quoted from *Snob.ru* 2013).
105 Timofeyev (2013, quoted from *Snob.ru* 2013).
106 Tikhonov (2013, quoted from *Snob.ru* 2013).
107 Limonov (2013, quoted from *Snob.ru* 2013).
108 Yanov (2013b, quoted from *Snob.ru* 2013).
109 Ciążyński (2014, quoted from *Natemat.pl* 2014).
110 Borowicz (2014, quoted from *Natemat.pl* 2014).
111 Sikora (2014, quoted from *Natemat.pl* 2014).
112 *Gazeta Wyborcza* (24 April 2013, 5 June 2013).
113 Ritchie (2013: 8).
114 Lakoff and Johnson (2008: 3).
115 This analysis concerns uses of different figures in different countries; it does not matter much whether the concepts are part of a larger complex or not as long as we think they are different enough between each other; specific relations between the figures are irrelevant as in this section I am preoccupied only with their different rhetorical uses.
116 Lakoff and Johnson (2008: 5, 35).
117 Lakoff and Johnson (2008: 36, original emphasis).
118 Laclau (1996: 36).
119 Laclau (1996: 42).
120 Laclau (1996: 44).
121 Laclau (1996: 44).

Chapter 5

Narrating Protest: Silenced Stories of Europe in Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia

Anne Kaun[1]

'Our time to act has come!'

<div align="right">Blockupy Frankfurt's call to protest</div>

With 'Our time to act has come' Blockupy, a European protest network that is an offshoot of the Occupy movement, started the call to block the opening ceremony of the new headquarters of the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt am Main on 18 March 2015. Particularly targeting the ECB – one of the troika besides the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission (EC) – Blockupy opposes austerity measures imposed by the troika to tackle the eurozone financial crisis. Clearly reframing the initial Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement, on which Blockupy draws symbolically, the activist network articulates a European perspective on the flaws of global capitalism. This chapter deals with European forerunners to the Blockupy call for action. It considers local versions of OWS and analyzes the European recontextualization of activist narratives as well as narratives constructed by the mainstream news media.

On 17 September 2011, activists gathered in Manhattan to start what has come to be known as the OWS movement, whose idea and practices quickly disseminated globally, and encampments emerged in numerous cities worldwide. As a reaction to the financial crisis in 2007–2008, Occupy grew as a protest movement, spreading hope for sustainable and democratic change.[2] Questioning *the sensible*, namely what is visible and audible in society,[3] the movement had a broad agenda and was explicitly multi-voiced. However, the movement was most prolific in its critique of the financial markets and of the increasing inequality in the US. The movement has of course changed over time, but it has also remoulded itself by moving to different national, regional and local contexts.

While the OWS movement was identified with criticism of the US American economic and political system, the focus of which changed for its sister movements in Europe. Although Swedish and Latvian Occupy activists clearly rooted their activism in the regional and national context, in both cases European narratives are absent throughout the mainstream news media's reporting. This is somewhat surprising, since predecessors of the Occupy movement such as the Indignados in Spain and the Indignant Citizens Movement in Greece as well as the European versions of OWS palpably expressed European perspectives by addressing institutions of the European Union (EU) as being responsible for the crisis and the consequences of strict austerity policies.[4]

This chapter addresses particularly the lack of a European perspective in mainstream news narratives generated in the context of Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia – both

geographically and politically – and in conclusion suggests reasons for the disconnection between activist and news narratives. The aim here is to identify major narrative strategies employed by the mainstream newspapers in their reporting on the movement in Sweden and Latvia. Looking at Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia, I move from the central arenas of global capitalism to its periphery, which is no less affected by the contradictions of accelerated capitalism, which OWS addressed in its criticisms. Consequently, I examine how the Swedish and Latvian mainstream news media recontextualize the Occupy movement according to their specific contexts while I also consider activists' narratives gathered through in-depth interviews and the monitoring of social media, particularly Facebook groups set up by activists. Furthermore, the chapter aims to contribute a new perspective on the analysis of the global Occupy movement, moving away from the network metaphor proposed by, for example, Castells and a focus on central nodes.[5] Instead, I argue that rather than being one strongly interlinked network based on communication infrastructures, the global Occupy movement is a travelling narrative characterized by very specific reshapings and reinterpretations in different localities.[6]

The Mediation of Occupy Wall Street

The narrative of OWS predominantly starts with a call by AdBusters, a Canada-based, not-for-profit, anti-consumerist magazine, to occupy Wall Street by introducing the hashtag #occupywallstreet on Twitter. After the attempt to take Wall Street, a camp was set up in Zuccotti Park – a privately owned space. The protest camp remained in place until the first eviction in November 2011. Although the mainstream media only barely reported on the movement during the opening days of the occupation, word of OWS spread around the world, not just to the main European capitals. This led to further adaptations of similar tactics and different versions of OWS on a global scale. In the financial centres of Europe, such as London and Frankfurt, the protesters began to occupy public spaces, promoting the slogan 'We are the 99%', but also in cities and areas often perceived as peripheral to global capitalism, the ideas and ideals of Occupy were spread and appropriated to the specific context.

In the American context, commentators on OWS often highlight the mainstream media's complete news blackout during the first eight days of the occupation.[7] As a consequence, various digital media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, have been essential in spreading images of, and information about, the movement all over the world. With the help of self-produced media,[8] the occupiers in New York City disseminated tactics and strategies that other encampments picked up and modified. At the same time, these platforms have been subsequently highlighted by commentators and the mainstream news, steering the focus away from the movement's political practices as such.[9] Later on, granting the movement some attention and in some cases even sympathy, as Todd Gitlin notes,[10] the mainstream media's reporting largely downplayed the importance of Occupy as a global

movement for social change. Navigating within the realm of the post-political condition, the mainstream news media focused on individual activists and highlighted the spectacle character of OWS and its global spread.[11]

In research focusing on Occupy and the media, Twitter, Facebook and blogs are highlighted as the main communication and organizational platforms.[12] Castells, for example, characterizes the movement as a networked movement navigating the space of flows.[13] Bennett and Segerberg develop the notion of connective instead of collective action, using Occupy as an example.[14] Gerbaudo provides a critical view on the role of social media for the Occupy movement,[15] arguing that the emergence of Occupy as a networked movement was mainly a myth produced by the mainstream media:

> [T]he emergence of Occupy Wall Street was characterised by a tortuous development in which social media were only partly used as a means for a choreography of assembly, setting the scene for public protest, and often became more a kind of channel for the reverberation of events taking place on the ground.[16]

Unlike these previous works, this study shifts the focus towards the representation of Occupy in the peripheries of global capitalism, in countries and cities that are, however, similarly strongly affected by the outgrowth of the global economic system. Representations of Occupy as a global movement aiming for an alternative political, social and economic organization help develop an understanding of how shared values are negotiated in contemporary societies. Mainstream media representations not only serve as a source of arguments on which politicians, the cultural elite as well as citizens draw to form their own meanings and opinions; however, they are also sites of a struggle about dominant views on political and cultural norms. Symbolically, they are sites of the expression, enactment and legitimation of norms and values.[17]

The Economic Crisis and Occupy in the European Periphery

Although the Swedish and Latvian encampments and the mobilizations around the Occupy movement were not nearly as big as in the US, they represent an interesting point in the case of transnational activism, which forms a global movement, but which is very much rooted in local causes and previous activism. As Michael Gould-Wartofsky shows in his careful narration of OWS, the New York mobilization has a long history of local and international activism.[18] Similarly, the activists in Sweden and Latvia have personal and collective histories of political activism. At the same time, Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia, although small and sometimes including only a handful of activists, represent one of the clearest European responses to the economic crisis, addressing European institutions and hence serving as an entry point to looking at European narratives generated by and around protest movements.

Occupy Latvia

According to the IMF, the Baltic countries have suffered considerably from the financial crisis that peaked in 2008.[19] With the gross domestic product shrinking by 14.2 per cent in 2009, compared to the previous year, and an unemployment rate as high as 19.5 per cent in 2010, Latvia was, after a period of rapid growth, faced with an extreme economic situation.[20] As in other EU member states, the crisis was tackled with a strategy of 'internal devaluation', including extensive cuts in wages and public spending.[21] Despite these strong austerity measures, Anders Åslund[22] and Valdis Dombrovskis, the former prime minister of Latvia, argue in a 2011 book that the democratic institutions worked well. Therefore, they propose, there were only few protests and very little public criticism. The celebration of political institutions silences, however, accounts of social unrest that appeared. Latvia had seen crisis-related protest mobilizations already in 2008–2009 predating the global Occupy movement, but employing similar protest tactics. On 13 January 2009, for example, a protest against the government's and Europe's handling of the crisis was met with strong police action. Protesters, mainly students and youths, were calling for the resignation of the government. During the mobilization, a number of protesters tried to hinder MPs from entering the parliament by camping in front of the main parliament building. After the resignation of the government, the protest quickly faded, as the activists seemed to have reached their goals. Additionally, in the autumn of 2009, a group of approximately 20 activists camped in front of the Cabinet of Ministers, the main Latvian government building. The encampment remained until the summer of 2010. The camp's activists put forward a broad range of demands directed at the Latvian government. Some of the main issues were unemployment and austerity measures. Despite these early occupations of different public spaces, Latvia has never seen an occupation connected to the global Occupy movement. However, with the global spread of Occupy, loose online networks linked to the movement appeared discussing economic greed and politics in Latvia. These online groups were linking themselves symbolically to the global movement with the help of social media platforms. The analysis considers the online engagements linked to the Occupy movement, particularly activities of the Occupy Latvia Facebook group. As reason why no Occupy encampment emerged in Latvia after 2011, two of my informants suggested that the name Occupy did not appeal to citizens and potential activists, given Latvia's occupation by Germany and the Soviet Union in the first half of the twentieth century. In that sense, one of the Occupy movement's main aims, namely to overturn and reclaim the notion of occupation, failed in the Latvian context.[23]

Occupy Stockholm

Compared to other European countries, Sweden has often been described as having coped relatively well with the effects of the financial crisis. However, in Sweden, the economic stress

indices reflected growing tensions in the markets in 2009,[24] and the youth unemployment rate, compared to the average rate of unemployment, was actually the highest among OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries.[25]

A local branch of the Occupy movement emerged in Stockholm in October 2011 and – with changing locations in the city centre and suburbs – kept an encampment until July 2012. Like other camps, Occupy Stockholm quickly diversified into several groups and committees working on specific issues; one of the largest was the media group, including a number of subdivisions working on its home page, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, printed outlets and posters as well as graphics. Other divisions were dedicated to demonstrations and to a study group that met weekly between January and May 2012. As two informants involved with Occupy Stockholm have suggested, many first-time activists joined the group in the beginning. During the late summer of 2012, however, more and more members vanished, and with that, the actual occupation ended. A core group of five people remained and held regular general assemblies until October 2012, when they decided to dissolve Occupy Stockholm until the decision is taken to revive it.

The topics around which particular mobilizations evolved were broad and included homelessness, support for the demand to restrict the size of international banks, general Europe-wide protests against public debt and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), World Environment Day, demonstrations against US war policies, support for the protest against European Stability Mechanism (ESM) funds, demonstrations against privatization and the financial system, Occupy May 1st and protests against weapon exports and the Data Retention Directive. Although Occupy Stockholm mobilized around specific European causes, this was not reflected in the reporting on the movement.

Swedish and Latvian Occupy Narratives

In choosing Swedish and Latvian recontextualizations of the Occupy movement, the analysis builds on two heterogonous samples: Sweden, which actually had several Occupy encampments, and Latvia, which although it never saw an Occupy camp, the idea of Occupy resonated with alternative political voices and was invoked in different digital initiatives and offline mobilizations. Latvia and Sweden also represent historically different political activism contexts. As Kerstin Jacobsson and Steven Saxonberg argue, post-Communist countries such as Latvia have often been considered as having weak civil societies, which is linked to their political history of state authoritarianism.[26] However, the authors demonstrate that a broad variety of political activism exists in the post-Communist context, which, perforce, has not taken the same paths as in the West. Although I am not necessarily interested in reinforcing an East–West divide, the question of different historical contexts adds complexity to the analysis of protest movement narrations. At the same time, Latvia and Sweden share specific historical experiences such as the economic crisis – though to different degrees – which justifies a comparative perspective.

The economic ties become particularly evident when looking at the three main banks in Latvia, which are all Swedish. Furthermore, Swedish media conglomerates such as Bonnier had been active in Latvia, which makes a comparison of mainstream media narratives especially interesting.[27]

Besides the comparative aspect, the material gathered for the analysis here emerged in different institutional settings. The chapter combines mainstream news with narratives developed and spread by activists, expressed in both texts circulating in social media and in-depth interviews I conducted with the activists. In that sense, the analysis moves between different sites and perspectives and could be considered a multi-sited narrative approach.[28] The sample of the mainstream news media consists of major Swedish and Latvian dailies reporting on Occupy. The choice of newspapers includes a broad spectrum of political positions (from liberal to conservative) as well as quality and tabloid. For the Latvian case, the sample includes the most important Latvian and Russian-language daily newspapers, which are mainly read by the strong Russian-speaking minority (approximately 27 per cent of the Latvian population).

All articles featured in the Swedish newspapers *Dagens Nyheter*, *Svenska Dagbladet*, *Aftonbladet* and *Expressen*, the Latvian newspapers *Diena*, *Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze*, *Latvijas Avīze* and the Russian-language newspapers *Chas* and *Vesti* that referenced the Occupy movement from September to November 2011 were included in the material. The period was chosen based on the main OWS activities. The Swedish sample consists of 63 articles in total, whereas during the same period, the Latvian newspapers published only 17 articles mentioning the Occupy movement. The first report in Sweden appeared on 29 September 2011 in *Svenska Dagbladet*; it was a fairly long article in the finance section. In Latvia, the earliest article on the Occupy movement was published on 3 October 2011. Additionally, I aimed to capture Occupy narratives from the activists' perspective. Hence, I monitored the main social media sites: the Facebook groups Occupy Latvia and Occupy Stockholm. Furthermore, I conducted in-depth interviews with activists involved in either of these movements.

Analytically, I suggest considering Occupy in terms of the reshapings of a metanarrative in different contexts, instead of focusing on central nodes of a global protest network. Narrative analysis, rooted in literature, history, anthropology, sociology and linguistics, encompasses a variety of research practices and analytical strategies.[29] In general, the notion of narrative may refer to an actual text or a more abstract discourse. Narrative analysis enables, therefore, the inclusion of individual voices and more abstract discourse. The inclusion of individual voices is of particular importance in the context of the Occupy movement, which was, and is, characterized by a broad diversity of political views and actors. Stories and narratives are here considered expressions of emplotment, which refers to the ordering function of narratives for all kinds of experiences in different contexts. The narrative establishes an order for all experiential elements in a contiguous plot. By way of ordering, the situational elements are given meaning; in this way, a specific role in the plot and a temporal structure are established. At the micro level of stories, as well as at the more abstract discursive level,

narratives establish some kind of coherence in a world of disorder.[30] Focusing on narratives allows me to follow the emplotment of individual and collective experiences, here in the sense of recontextualization.[31] In line with van Leeuwen's framework, recontextualization considers all social practice as reformulated in talk and texts. Through discursive articulation, practices become meaningful from a specific point of view grounded in material, socio-economic contexts. Van Leeuwen constructs a chain of recontextualization, moving from social to discursive signifying practices to discourse. Reisigl and Wodak suggest a number of narrative strategies often employed in recontextualizing social practices.[32] Based on the analysis of the material gathered for this project, I have identified the four major strategies: nomination, predication, perspectivation and mitigation.[33] Nomination refers to the discursive construction of social actors, objects, events and actions. Predication, in contrast, pertains to the evaluation of the events, focusing on the discursive qualification of actors, objects, events and actions. Perspectivation takes the writer's or speaker's point of view into consideration and encompasses the involvement of specific actors within the narrative. Mitigation refers to the modification of 'the illocutionary force and the epistemic or deontic status of utterances'.[34]

Lack of a European Perspective

In the following, I will take a closer look at the question of specific European narratives constructed by the mainstream newspapers and the activists themselves. A European perspective can in that context be understood in diverse ways. Moreover, it makes a necessary distinction between the EU as an organizational, ideological entity and Europe as a geographical region that might be linked discursively to shared history, cultural expressions and values.[35] In the context of Occupy, references to Europe potentially include questions about the transnational European solidarity of the movement and established contacts and mutual support between activists in different European cities. The EU is often seen as an organizational and political entity representing neo-liberal values and austerity measures dictated by core countries, such as Germany and France, to countries experiencing the harsher consequences of the financial crisis, such as Greece, Spain and Portugal. I, therefore, expected such themes to be at the heart of the criticism expressed by Occupy, which would also be reflected in the reporting on the movement. Monitoring the social media activities of Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia confirmed this expectation. In the case of Stockholm, several anti-EU protests were organized, which attracted numerous supporters. For example, Occupy Stockholm, two of whose core demands were national and European financial reform, protested against the ESM.

However, conducting a simple word search of the articles of the mainstream news media considered here using the terms Europe, European, the European Union or the EU reveals the lack of a European perspective (if defined as referring to the geographical region or

political institutions) in conjunction with the discussion of Occupy Stockholm or Occupy Latvia. Only 7 out of 85 articles mention the EU or Europe when discussing the Occupy movement. European institutions such as the ECB are foregrounded in articles that focus on the status quo of the eurozone financial crisis and mention the Occupy movement. In these articles, however, the Occupy movement remains a sidekick, as the following short quote from *Dagens Nyheter* illustrates:

> The EU countries and the US have done their best not to compromise on the idea of progress for the sake of progress and on the indispensability of capitalism. […]

> The march went over to the European Central Bank's skyscraper, where approximately 5000 had joined in. There were different events in around 50 German cities.

> (*DN*, 20 October 2011)[36]

In general, Europe is referred to as a geographical region to which the American movement has spread. No further connections are constructed beyond this merely place-based signification. In the Latvian context, the disconnection of the Occupy movement from its European context is also expressed in the fact that most of the articles are published in the foreign news section. In contrast, the Swedish newspapers published most articles in the economics or financial section, thus indicating quite different approaches.

None of the articles analysed here highlights important differences between OWS as an American movement and Occupy Stockholm or Occupy Latvia as European versions of the movement. The only comparison provided recontextualizes Occupy Stockholm as being mainly amateurish without being rooted in a serious cause. Most of the articles include cynical observations both on OWS and Occupy Stockholm. One article in *Dagens Nyheter*, for example, comments on the comparatively small size of the movement, arguing that the number of protesters in New York City was rather small compared to the size of the city: 'Nor are there that many of them. A few thousand protesters in a city of 8.5 million inhabitants is not impressive for a movement whose slogan is *We are the 99 per cent*'.[37] The article goes on to suggest that the movement is ill-suited to the Swedish context, which never really experienced the crisis. Unemployment and poverty are not as high, and Swedish society is less polarized. Furthermore, salaries have increased considerably in the last 20 years. As a consequence, the reasons for the local occupations throughout Sweden, and especially in Stockholm, are questioned, and the significance is mitigated:

> It simply is not true. Ninety-nine per cent of Swedes do not at all have to choose between paying for food or rent. Of course, the inequalities have increased the last couple of years, but the majority of the Swedish population is doing quite well financially.

> (*Expressen*, 22 October 2011)[38]

Sweden is different. The average income increase since the end of the 1970s is around 100 per cent, and even considering absolute wages, a Swedish worker has almost 30 per cent more income today than 20 years ago.

For a leftie, this difference should of course be stressed. That it is better here for the majority is not a coincidence, but, on the contrary, a result of more than one hundred years of political and trade union work.

(*Expressen*, 22 October 2011)[39]

Although comparing the divergent contexts of the Swedish and American movement, there is no reference to the role of EU institutions. This is despite the activists considering the very same European institutions strongly involved in causing, and later trying to profit from, the financial crisis. Counter to the arguments presented in the article quoted above, Sweden has experienced heightened economic stress levels, and inequality has significantly increased. The article fails to acknowledge the activists' specific reason for mobilizing in Sweden. It is particularly the achievements of past political campaigns, especially those by trade unions, that Swedish activists aimed to preserve in an increasingly neo-liberal environment characterized by new public management, privatization, profit-making welfare institutions and increased bureaucratization. This lack of a specific European perspective could be related to the general discursive practice of mitigation of the movement in both Latvia and Sweden.

In the Latvian articles, mitigation was mainly constructed by firstly ignoring the event – only 17 articles were published on the topic – and secondly by denying any relevance to the Latvian context not considering how activists and non-activists experienced and discussed the crisis. None of the articles in the Latvian newspapers related the Occupy events to current political and economic developments in the country. Two articles suggested that there might be protests in Stockholm, and two others included information that, according to the interactive map on 15october.net, protests on 15 October might also take place in Riga. This is the closest the articles came to connecting the Occupy movement with the Latvian context. The journalists did not reach out to organizers of the protest events held in Riga, which were based on the language and aesthetics of OWS. Furthermore, they failed to discuss why the Latvian protests did not become bigger, although there had been predecessors and the general public had strongly felt the consequences of the crisis. The articles also relied almost exclusively on press releases from international press agencies and quoted international news outlets. The Occupy movement remained largely a matter of foreign affairs and was looked upon from a distance as not having any relevance to the Latvian experience. Even editorial pieces, despite informing the public of the possible protests in Riga and expressing a positive attitude towards the international protests, did not discuss the local or European context.

Besides, in the context of the lack of a European perspective, mitigation as a discursive strategy is especially palpable regarding the discussion of the movement's tactics, practices and symbols. Both the Latvian and Swedish articles often include descriptions of it as

a leaderless movement, involving Guy Fawkes masks as well as the slogan 'We are the 99%'. However, the articles include relatively little or no discussion of how the camps were actually organized. In particular, the main decision-making forum in the General Assembly as well as communicative strategies such as the hand-sign system and the people's microphone are absent in the reports, although they became emblematic of the movement:[40]

> Initiators of it [OWS] were inspired by the example of the Arab revolution. The protesters do not have a united leadership; for communicating with each other, they use social networks (mainly Twitter). They are united by common slogans.
>
> (*Chas*, 3 October 2011)[41]

Why Is Europe Not There?

In countries forced to introduce severe austerity measures, like Spain and Greece, the mainstream press drew a clear link between protests and EU institutions.[42] However, that was not the case in the Swedish and Latvian mainstream narratives. In Latvia, strict austerity policies were not questioned, and journalists rather focused on the hope for better times. In Sweden, the euro crisis was presented as less urgent and with less severe implications for Swedish society at large. Hence, protests against, for instance, Eurobonds were considered slightly exaggerated. Although recontextualized forms of the Occupy movement in Stockholm and partly also in Latvia addressed the role of EU institutions as the root causes of the financial crisis and as drivers of a neo-liberalization of European societies, this was not reflected in the narratives constructed by the mainstream newspapers.

This finding could be considered in the light of previous research focusing on the EU and its institutions that has outlined three deficits: a democratic, a public-sphere and an identification. The democratic deficit is often referred to in terms of questions of representation, especially a lack of direct influence by European citizens. The European Parliament, the only directly elected EU body, had for a long time been bereft of the necessary authority in the legal process. Connected to the democratic deficit, research has identified a lack of a shared European public sphere. If there were one, it might have positive consequences for EU citizens' identification with the Union. Although current analyses have documented a strengthening of a European public sphere, EU citizens' identification with the EU is still mainly pragmatic and not in sense of an imagined community.[43] Especially with the financial crisis, the urgency to overcome the deficits in democratic participation, identification and the public sphere has been addressed and voiced through public protest, such as the Spanish Indignados and the Indignant Citizens Movement in Greece, calling for real and direct democracy.

Structurally, the European Parliament has been identified as key to solving the democratic deficit, and especially after all member states ratified the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which saw the parliament gain more legislative power. Now the European Parliament appoints the President of the Commission, and its co-decision powers have been extended to new areas, including the budget, agriculture policy, justice and home affairs.[44] This changed role became especially apparent during the ACTA negotiations in 2012, which the European Union and 22 member states signed. After massive mobilization, starting in Poland, the European Parliament, however, declined its support. The protests mobilizing against ACTA capitalized on the emerging opportunity structure, placing the European Parliament more prominently in the European decision-making process. The massive protests addressing the European Parliament and its members directly forced the elected representatives to act.

This was not the case for the Occupy movement, which was not as clearly linked to EU institutions by the traditional news media, although activists issued several demands relating to EU institutions. As indicated earlier, the articles analysed here mitigate the role of the movement in both Latvia and Sweden, albeit in distinct ways. The lack of a European perspective is part of and reinforces the general downplaying of the movement's relevance. While in Latvia the movement came under the foreign news section from the beginning, it was framed in Sweden as having no real foundations. In Latvia, the framing of the Occupy movement was hence in line with how early protests have been reported, namely as something foreign that was not part of the Latvian political landscape.[45] In the Swedish context, the focus was on the event character of the early encampment and of specific mobilizations; the interest quickly faded without confrontations and conflicts between the activists and the police. Thus, the lack of a European perspective in the discourse constructed by the mainstream news media prevented the movement from putting serious pressure on the European institutions that played a major role in how the economic crisis developed. At the same time, the Occupy movement did not address one specific political issue such as a trade agreement but advocated a broader, long-term social change by linking different smaller initiatives discursively. In the context, the downplaying of the movement is connected with the continued European crisis of democratic representation – the democratic deficit.

Conclusion

While Blockupy is one example of the European-wide mobilization against austerity policies and the EU's neo-liberal foundations, the chapter has shown that the Swedish and Latvian mainstream news media had no European contextualization of OWS. The lack of linking and explaining the specific European context for the mobilization of Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia is an indicator of the general mitigation or downplaying of the Occupy movement in Europe. Although activists drew clear links to the European economic crisis by identifying concrete policies and austerity measures as the root causes of growing inequality, the mainstream media did not recontextualize the movement in the same way. Rather

than considering their reasons for occupying spaces in Stockholm and for holding online discussions and street protests in Latvia that were largely about Europe, the mainstream media discourse emphasized the US American origin of the movement and its unsuitability for the European context.

In terms of the narrative mode, the mainstream media narratives about Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia hence represent typical examples of the protest paradigm, which captures the mainstream news media's tendency to focus on spectacles and violence in the context of protests. At the same time, the mainstream media have a propensity to marginalize or mitigate protest movements such as Occupy by focusing on other concerns than the ones addressed by the activists.[46] For Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia, this was clearly the case, given that there was, as implied by the activists, no discussion of the European perspective. Furthermore, the relevance of Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia was downplayed by focusing on short-term media tactics such as social media practices rather than on long-term political decision-making and the set-up of the encampment.

Comparatively, there are, however, clear differences in the discursive practices of the recontextualization of the movement in Sweden and Latvia. In the Swedish context, the discourse manifests the underlying idea that the situation is fundamentally different from the American experience. The dominant narratives are as follows: Compared to the structural inequality and the magnitude of the crisis in the US, Sweden is much better off. As a consequence, the protests and occupations are treated patronizingly: they are amateurish and lack serious concerns. In the case of Latvia, the underlying argument refers to the recurring hardship that Latvian society had suffered historically while always hoping for a better future. Latvia has in that context been presented as a success story of how severe austerity measures have enabled it to end the crisis.[47] This perspective is shared by the Latvian and Russian newspapers despite their otherwise very profound differences in reporting.

The findings show that tracing European narratives in the Swedish and Latvian Occupy discourse entails certain difficulties. Similarly, Johan Fornäs has pointed out in his chapter that it is hard to pinpoint one European narrative from the eastern periphery in the context of the Eurovision Song Contest. The differences between Sweden and Latvia in the European narratives are here not necessarily based on an East–West divide, but they definitely have historical roots. The governments and citizenry of both countries responded differently to the crisis. The analysis has also reinforced that narratives are never stable but always in the making based on the specific context within which they are constructed. In the case of protest, they, however, show particular patterns when constructed by the mainstream news media, e.g. the protest paradigm.

The different views on and approaches to Europe narrated by the Occupy activists and the mainstream news media emphasize that narratives are always also sites of struggles over the authority over meaning production, which Katarina MacLeod's chapter on narrative resilience in the periphery addresses. In that sense, the approach to combine activist narratives with narratives constructed by the mainstream news media is a fruitful way to capture this ongoing struggle over the authority over European narratives.

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Notes

1 The author would like to thank Iveta Jurkane-Hobein for her crucial contributions to the Latvian part of the study.
2 Butler (2012); Chomsky (2012); Žižek (2011).
3 Rancière (2004).
4 Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis (2014).
5 Castells (2012).
6 Mörtenbock and Mooshammer (2012).
7 DeLuca, Lawson and Sun (2012).
8 Kellner (2012).
9 Gerbaudo (2012).
10 Gitlin (2012).
11 A similar analysis of the Indignados movement in Spain is offered by Kyriakidou and Olivas Osuna (2014).
12 Ganesh and Stohl (2013); Halvorsen (2012); Juris (2012); Juris et al. (2012); Tremayne (2012).
13 Castells (2012).
14 Bennett and Segerberg (2012, 2013).
15 Gerbaudo (2012).
16 Gerbaudo (2012: 102).
17 Smitherman-Donaldson and van Dijk (1988).
18 Gould-Wartofsky (2015).

19 Purfield and Rosenberg (2010).
20 Eurostat (2013).
21 Åslund and Dombrovskis (2011).
22 Anders Åslund is a Swedish economist, who until 2009 was the economic advisor to Valdis Dombrovskis.
23 Pickerill and Krinsky (2012).
24 Holmfeldt et al. (2009).
25 United Nations (2012).
26 Jacobsson and Saxonberg (2013).
27 Bonnier sold its shares in *Diena* and *Dienas Bizness* in 2009.
28 Marcus (1995).
29 Creswell (2007).
30 Ricoeur (1984).
31 J. Bennett (2013); Van Leeuwen (2007); Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999).
32 Reisigl and Wodak (2009); Wodak and Meyer (2009).
33 Reisigl and Wodak (2009) as well as Wodak and Meyer (2009) identify additional discursive strategies, such as argumentation and self-perception. Here I have only focused on the strategies relevant to the analysed material.
34 Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 95).
35 Fornäs (2012).
36 *Länderna i EU och US har länge gjort sitt bästa för att inte tumma på idén om tillväxt för tillväxtens skull och kapitalismen som oersättlig […]. Tåget gick till Europeiska centralbankens skyskrapa, där drygt 5000 personer hade anslutit sig. Aktioner hölls på ett 50-tal orter i Tyskland.*
37 *Inte heller är de särskilt många. Några tusental demonstranter i en stad av 8,5 miljoner invånare är inte lysande för en rörelse som har parollen 'Vi är de 99 procenten'* (translation of the author).
38 *Det är ju inte sant. 99 procent av svenskarna måste inte alls välja mellan att betala mat och hyra. Visst har klyftorna ökat på senare år, men de flesta svenskar har det ekonomiskt rätt bra.*
39 *Sverige är annorlunda. Den genomsnittliga löneökningen sedan slutet av 70-talet ligger här på flera hundra procent och även om man räknar reallönen har en svensk arbetare nästan 30 procent högre inkomst i dag än för 20 år sedan.*
   För någon från vänster borde den skillnaden vara självklar att lyfta upp. Att läget är bättre för de breda lagren här är inte en slump utan tvärtom resultatet av mer än hundra år av politiskt och fackligt arbete.
40 The people's mic, or human microphone, refers to the strategy of amplifying speakers' voices by repeating what is said. In that way, electronic equipment is made obsolete (Graeber 2013).
41 *Его основателей вдохновлял пример арабских революций. У протестующих нет единого руководства, для связи между собой они используют социальные сети (в основном* Twitter*). Объединяют их общие лозунги.*
42 Kyriakidou and Olivas Osuna (2014).

43   Risse (2010).
44   Baraliuc, Depreeuw and Gutwirth (2013).
45   Kaun and Jurkane-Hobein (2015).
46   Weaver and Scacco (2013).
47   Åslund and Dombrovskis (2011).

Chapter 6

The Resilience of the Periphery: Narrating Europe through Curatorial Strategies

Katarina Wadstein MacLeod

Introduction

'It is very important to develop a regional exchange of ideas', says Łukasz Gorczyca, the co-founder of Raster Gallery. 'We understand each other well because of the black hole of communism that we all went through'.[1]

The story of Eastern Europe has taken shape in the visual arts with few parallels. The curator and art historian Andrzej Szczerski points out that art played a crucial role in renegotiating the history and construction of Europe after 1989.[2] When art from Eastern Europe became more accessible and known, a new story had to be renegotiated between a perceived centre and periphery. New inclusions had to be made in art history, a discipline that traditionally adheres to a modernist master narrative of inclusions and exclusions, underpinned by a notion of newness: new art, new materials and new tendencies. Some 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are still tensions in art history and curatorial discourses regarding the dichotomy between centre and periphery. The concern of this chapter is how art exhibitions have narrated this tension between 2009 and 2011 at major art institutions in the West, and how it entertains a bifurcated Europe. The focus is on four examples that address Eastern Europe. In each, there is a pronounced *need* to define this vast geographical and cultural area but equally a reluctance to *do* that. Art from Eastern Europe deserves to be exhibited, marketed and researched, but what does Eastern Europe mean and where to draw the line, and from whose experience?

The aforementioned quote from the co-founder of Warsaw's Raster Gallery reflects the influx of so-called Eastern European art into the art fair in Basel, one of the great hubs for the international commercial art market. The journalist writing the article expresses an interest in, if not surprise at, the growing number of galleries from Eastern Europe exhibiting at the art fair. Artists from Eastern Europe have long been showcased on the international scene, but the increasing number of galleries representing 'their' artists was in 2010 perceived as a rather new event. This increase is matched by a rise in private funding.[3] Perhaps it is surprising that the art market has taken so long to welcome and profit from art in this region. Yet as the art gallery owner Gorczyca points out, the 'black hole of communism' continues to perpetuate the perception of art from Eastern Europe as a regional matter.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the lifting of the Iron Curtain, there have been a number of exhibitions mapping the newfound terrain of Eastern Europe. It can be described

as a gold mine for (Western) art history and curators to (re)discover art last seen long ago but also, more importantly, essential to the construction of identity from an Eastern European perspective.[4] There have been numerous exhibitions and research projects mapping this 'new' terrain – writing and rewriting history – through which art from Eastern Europe has been returned and reinstated into a general, or rather Western, narrative. This tradition has been established by, for example, epic exhibitions, such as 'Europa Europa' in Bonn in 1994 and 'After the Wall' in Stockholm in 1999. Since then there has been a trickle of exhibitions addressing the relationship between art from Eastern Europe and its reception particularly in Western Europe and North America, with a sudden resurge between 2009 and 2011.

The four case studies are taken from this short and recent period in time and are listed in the order in which they appear in this chapter:

Example 1: *Contemporary Art in Eastern Europe*, editor Nikos Kotsopoulos, published by Black Dog Publishing in London, 2010.
Example 2: 'Ostalgia', at the New Museum, New York, 2011, curated by Massimiliano Gioni.
Example 3: 'Promises of the Past: A Discontinuous History of Art in Former Eastern Europe', Paris, 2009, curated by Joanna Mytkowska and Christine Macel.
Example 4: 'Gender Check: Femininity and Masculinity in the Art of Eastern Europe', at mumok (Museum Moderner Kunst Stiftung Ludwig Wien), 2009, curated by Bojana Pejić.

Example 1, *Contemporary Art in Eastern Europe*, stands out in format. Unlike the other cases, which are exhibitions with catalogues, it is a book whose hard covers and glossy pages make it very suitable as a 'coffee-table book', popularizing rather than academically analysing its theme. Yet the edited selection corresponds largely to that of the exhibitions in the other case studies. Several artists are well known to an international art scene; others have re-emerged since the fall of the Berlin Wall; others yet are of a younger generation and also well established outside of their native countries. Example 2, 'Ostalgia', and example 3, 'Promises of the Past: A Discontinuous History of Art in Former Eastern Europe', are both based on discussions about the geoculturally specific experience of having lived life behind the Iron Curtain and a sense of memory of and nostalgia for the former Eastern Europe. The exhibition with the most diverse set of artists is example 4, 'Gender Check: Femininity and Masculinity in the Art of Eastern Europe', where the starting point was to show the 'other' of the 'other'. Interesting to note is that in all catalogues a range of critics and writers contribute with a contextual framework. Several artists and writers reappear in the exhibitions and catalogues and are people who have shaped the understanding of art from Eastern Europe in a number of books, exhibitions and research projects, as, for example, the writers and curators Bojana Pejić and Joanna Mytkowska, and the art historians and critics Piotr Piotrowski and Boris Groys. Artists who appear in at least three of the cases studied are, for instance, Boris Mikhailov

(b. 1938), Marina Abramović (b. 1946), Jiří Kovanda (b. 1953), Roman Ondák (b. 1966) and Anri Sala (b. 1974).

The relationship between an individual piece of art and a narrative framework is complex – wherein lies the narrative? Any piece of art harbours its own narrative, however abstract or conceptual. When set in a larger curatorial context, it also goes beyond its own narrative and becomes part of another story. The historian Hayden White points out that historical events can be told through narrative accounts, but they do not have to be. There are other ways to communicate information without embedding it in a narrative form. He makes an important distinction between the historian who retells the events, that in a way is always to narrate, and the person who narrativizes these events.[5] In other words, there is an implied difference between accounting for facts and telling a story. The curatorial tradition is deeply embedded in this tension between accounting for facts and telling stories. Facts about artists and artworks are at times embedded in a narrative designed to tell new stories or cast fresh light on known artworks; to rediscover new artworks or redraw the historical map.[6] Some would have curating to be the new art history. The art historian Charlotte Klonk points out that if museums in the past represented applied art history like a 'textbook in space', i.e. recounting 'facts', there has been a turn since the 1960s for exhibitions to produce knowledge, i.e. to narrate and further a change in attitudes.[7] For art from Eastern Europe, past and present, the exhibition format has been crucial to both understanding cultural aspects of the area and to bridging gaps. An artist's origin may be of relatively little consequence to the contemporary art scene. Hans Belting expertly shows how much has happened in an ever-globalized art scene where the trajectory of art history and its concepts of art, origin and art productions are increasingly outmoded.[8] Yet in the examples studied in this chapter, the idea of origin in terms of geographical belonging is paramount for the constructed narratives.

Klonk makes a convincing argument for curating taking on the task of art history in telling new narratives: filling in missing gaps, changing our understanding and creating new knowledge. But the exhibitions and projects here are not only representing art – art represents more than itself. As Szczerski writes, when Europe is being rewritten, it is in no small part done so in the language of visual art.[9] In the examples explored in this chapter, there is a shared ambition to reshuffle centre and periphery and to emphasize the cultural, social and geographical impetus from Eastern Europe. Yet all these projects took place in the West, or had Western publishing houses, and what this text looks at is how an East–West dichotomy is both disputed and perpetuated. The periphery, it seems, is resilient when art from Eastern Europe is thematized.

The primary empirical material for this study consists of exhibition catalogues and accompanying books such as *The Gender Check Reader*. These constitute the material remnants, situated in a public archive of knowledge once the short-lived exhibitions are dismounted. Whilst it is the artworks and how the curator has put them together that make an impact, it is the catalogues that produce knowledge of history. Catalogues, reproductions and reviews add to the larger narrative of a particular theme, regardless of the quality of an exhibition. Therefore, this text gives special attention to the overall portrayal of Europe

through the chosen examples rather than critically focusing on the artistic achievements of the different exhibitions, catalogues and books.

In the introduction to this book, *four dimensions* or key features are described as a guide to interpreting narrative structures: (1) *the structure of the narrative*, according to the model, is rather straightforward: leading museums and institutions that put on major curated exhibitions, and as in example 1, a popularized edited book. The narrators are, from this perspective, curators and editors rather than individual artists or artworks. The longer answer is, as we will see, a more intricate web of mechanisms that has to do with funding, canon formation in the sense of which artists and what kind of art is seen as relevant. A longer answer needs to take into account the conflicting views of what it means to represent art from a given geographical area. Furthermore, who defines what or who is Eastern Europe?; (2) *the temporal perspective* is also rather straightforward. The four examples, which are only a selection of exhibitions and books covering the field of interest of art from Eastern Europe, are framed through current interest; however, they have a particular focus on art from the 1960s to the present; (3) the genre is curating rather than art, as it is the curatorial strategies and their reception that are the focus of the analysis; (4) the final point is the meaning of the narratives. This chapter is to be understood within its context, of understanding narratives of Europe, and has two main concerns. Firstly, to uncover the narratives underpinning the recent return to exhibitions portraying art from Eastern Europe. Secondly, to discuss what these narratives tell about the portrayal of Europe.

Mapping Europe

> The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory.
>
> (Jean Baudrillard)[10]

A map, according to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, is in its most traditional understanding a 'graphic representation, drawn to scale and usually on a flat surface, of features – for example, geographical, geological, or geopolitical – of an area of the Earth or of any other celestial body. Globes are maps represented on the surface of a sphere. Cartography is the art and science of making maps and charts'. Rather than conveying truths, each map can be read narratively as visual images telling stories of specific geographical areas. Furthermore, one can instantly recognize the political narrative implied in any map defining nation-state borders, which are always man-made. Maps are also documents, and even narratives, of time and place. An out-of-date map can be interpreted as a historical document of colonization, repression and certainly of political change.

For the philosopher Jean Baudrillard, the construction of a map precedes actual nation-state territory. We can understand this as the map dictating reality, and the way it is drawn

and a nation's border penned in has an impact on the lived world. A map, therefore, is in Baudrillard's terms never mere representation because that implies a relationship where 'the sign and the real are equivalent'.[11] An image can transgress between different stages of relations to the real: from mimicking reality to masking it – where the last stage is pure simulation. The map is for Baudrillard an example where the reality of a territory has imploded. Rather than drawing lines around a geographical area, the simulacrum of a map imposes itself on lived reality. Baudrillard dresses in words the tense relationship between nation borders, politics and lived experience. This is a core question in all the curatorial examples studied here, as a geographical area, defined by how lines are drawn on maps, precedes how the art is exhibited and narrated. In a European context, the most striking case is how lines were redrawn with dramatic consequences after World War II. In an art context, a line drawn on a map and imported to real life makes art from East Berlin and art from West Berlin belong to different art histories.

There are two major strands of thought regarding geography and art production in the four examples on which this chapter focuses. The first could be described as 'birthplace': the geographical area where an artist is born defines his or her inclusion in an exhibition. In example 1, *Contemporary Art in Eastern Europe*, with an emphasis on '*in*', birthplace is the logic for selection. So too for the academically framed and critically researched exhibition in example 4, 'Gender Check', where the focus is both on showcasing women artists and highlighting different political frameworks for feminism and representations of gender in Eastern Europe. The second strand is by association or out of interest such as in example 3, the exhibition 'Ostalgia'.

The geopolitical narrative of origin and belonging has a long track record. The first wave of major post-1989 exhibitions explicitly aimed to make visible what was hidden from the West, with a focus on art that went under the radar of oppressive regimes. The aim of *After the Wall* (1999) at Moderna Museet in Stockholm was to scrutinize the contemporary art scene ten years after the fall of Communism. The then director David Elliot wrote: 'In the majority (but not all) of the twenty countries we have visited, Communism (Marxist-Leninism) is an ideology which has been firmly consigned to the past and is now regarded as an irrelevance, if not an embarrassment'.[12] The political experience was highlighted in the catalogue texts and through several of the artworks, but the predominant focus for selection was on artists from the geographical area.

Example 2, 'Ostalgia' and example 3, 'Promises of the Past', have a less directly geopolitical selection, and focus more on social and psychological experiences from the 'Communist' period. The focal point of both is the area of Eastern Europe but with inclusions of artists who work with relevant themes out of interest, not necessarily through birthright. Thus, in examples 1 and 4, the experience of Eastern Europe is predefined, albeit in example 4 with lengthy discussions as to what that experience may entail. The other two examples, 2 and 3, investigate the psychological realities of this notion.

The trajectory of unveiling and mapping which art has come from where, and highlighting a plethora of artists missing from a Western story of art, was the focus of the Slovenian

artist group IRWIN's 'East Art Map' – a large-scale project that also took as its starting point geographical origin, although many of the artists live and work in Western Europe and North America. A group of artists and curators staged art from Eastern Europe by evoking the metaphor of the map, both as a curatorial strategy and as illustration. It is an evocative picture that sets the scene in the printed book version *East Art Map*.[13] On a white page, a section of the world map is presented, from the Americas across to Europe. Up until the eastern edge of Western Europe, the map is as we know it, delineated with borders, country names, the pink of mountain chains marked out from the otherwise green landmass, encircled by the blue seas. To the right, the landmass of the former East is black. All differences such as nation borders, names and geographical undulations are blotted out. This map sets the tone from the start of the book: here it seems to say, is that you have no idea about, of what you think is Eastern Europe, closed off until the Iron Curtain was pulled up. The project East Art Map opens up this field of knowledge by inviting curators, scholars and artists from each country in the region to name a set number of people to be included. The project becomes an infinite and always-unfinished project, at least as it is portrayed in the book and on the website. It is a symbolic geography based on the realization that, as such, it is always in contrast to lived experience. Nationality as origin is the context of art history and in some sense as uncertain as aesthetic judgement. The necessarily subjective choice of any selection of art is therefore emphasized, regardless of how neutral the parameters are argued to be. However, this project was also among the range of exhibitions during the 1990s and 2000s that created a bipolarity of West and East, and as the art historian Louisa Avgita writes: 'the logic that sustains the essentialisation of these concepts'.[14]

In example 1, *Contemporary Art in Eastern Europe*, the visual idea of East Art Map is inherited but reversed: Western Europe is in a dull grey, whereas Eastern Europe is still painted black but with country names clearly marked. Added to this, there is a timeline with crucial events setting the frame. The timeline begins with art historical events and the first is the death of the Russian artist Kazimir Malevich (b. 1878) in 1935, 'the pioneer of the Avant-Garde Suprematist movement'. The timeline ends in April 2010 with the opening of the Regina Gallery in London, specializing in Russian art. Between these two reference points, isolated art events are pointed out, such as the Marina Abramović show at the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) in New York in 2010, as well as political events of major historical significance, such as Warsaw Pact troops invading Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Albania and Croatia joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2009. Example 4, 'Gender Check', is structured by a more complex understanding of time, politics, experience and representation but largely follows a similar logic in which all the artists included have a physical connection to the geopolitical area of Eastern Europe. The relationship between geography and art is complex. What was previously a harsh critique of any mega-narrative on Eastern Europe is now a common understanding, namely that the 'Communist experience' is not one; they are many and varied. Furthermore, artists from Eastern Europe cannot be easily lumped together. Yet the geographical distinction with its cultural specificity of having been behind the Iron Curtain is what defines

the selection. Perhaps one could claim that an artist like Christo (b. 1935 as Khristo Vladimirov Yavashev), who moved to Paris in 1958 at the age of 23 and met his artistic partner and wife, Jeanne-Claude (1935–2009, Jeanne-Claude Denat de Guillebon), born in Morocco, is more closely related to the Western European art scene, where he has had a stellar career for half a decade. He was born in Bulgaria, perhaps forever marked by the experience, but what makes him, or anyone, an Eastern European artist? Is it the nation state of your first passport, your lived experience or the context in which you as an artist developed? At any rate, the title of the book *Contemporary Art in Eastern Europe* is in this case misleading.

The map is a complex affair, both as a guide to the real world and a metaphor for charting art. Critical cartography points to how political and ideological aspects are always embedded in maps – three-dimensional geographical areas are difficult, impossible even, to represent in a two-dimensional space. Even when represented as a globe, certain choices have to be made – the world translates itself with difficulty to another scale.[15] Regardless of what a map depicts, it is a narrative image that tells a story not only about what it claims to represent but also how it is represented. In other words, the narrative levels can be read not only in the cartographer's choice of perspective and placing of land and countries but also in the choice of colours, how the map is framed and onto what paper it is printed. The use of maps in cartography, artworks and curating is based on a collective understanding of something shared.

Dimitrije Bašičević, aka Mangelos (1921–1987), made manifestos painted onto ready-made globes and they are included in example 3, 'Promises of the Past' (and in the *East Art Map* catalogue). The manifestos of art, made between 1971 and 1977, are named manifests of 'relationships', 'death' and 'energy'.[16] These globes are transformed with paint in variations of black, white, red and gold, onto which there is neatly joined-up writing between two drawn lines. The aesthetic effect is schoolbook like. The artist, theorist and art historian Mangelos's work is also a textbook example of conceptual art as it developed during the 1960s and 1970s. In short, Mangelos transformed found objects by imprinting words and theoretically grounded propositions. In one version, a globe purchased by MOMA in 2005, the title reads 'Manifest de la Relation'. Painted monochrome, the globe erases all geographical relationships. Any preconceived notion of a map or globe is challenged by the white surface. Or it is made blank to start again. Sinziana Ravini writes how the association of school implies learning. But in his art, Mangelos unlearns: his art 'demonstrates the importance of starting afresh after having wiped out the traces of past histories'.[17]

Mangelos's work portrays the enigma of the periphery, a peep hole into the art scene that in its aesthetics and intellectual endeavours was part of the conceptual art that developed in the 1960s across Europe and North America. Yet the peripheral positioning keeps being entertained each time groups of artists are framed through an Eastern European headline. Mangelos's work would only ever be an enigma of the other, marked by its geographical origin and at the fringe of the conceptual scene when presented as an add-on to the Western canon of conceptual art.[18] Restaging Mangelos's work in big exhibition projects as part of the

Eastern European narrative certainly helps spread knowledge about his work, yet it seems that art history's margins take a long time to shift. In his globe manifestos, Mangelos is predominantly interested in the conceptual art discourse of questioning the meaning and value of the art object. On the MOMA globe, purchased the same year as the gallery Peter Freeman, Inc., hosted an exhibition of the late artist's work, the words play with the notion of 'thinking functionally'. For Mangelos, this contrasts with intuitive thinking or intuitive art (like abstract expressionist art).[19] This line of enquiry is a shared concern of several artists of his generation, across the art world, and not least in New York and Paris. Suffice to say that Mangelos's work adheres to multiple mega-narratives in art history. The turns of exposure, transaction and incorporation into one of the most prestigious collections in the world also support what Boris Groys observed: the power of art is intricately related to being exhibited, and that, in turn, is fundamentally dependent on external financing.[20] The making and showing of art are reliant on financing, and it is when money starts to roll in that the influx of art from Eastern Europe becomes mainstream. In turn, when something exists in the mainstream, it belongs to a central narrative of art. Mangelos's globes capture in a sense the whole problem of art from Eastern Europe pinned on a narrative of periphery. To escape the margins, you cannot erase knowledge by painting the globe white, but you also cannot just add on knowledge, risking creating a genre of art from the periphery.

The idea of centre and periphery seems integral to a narrative of Europe, as discussed in several of the chapters in this book. Europe as organized around a relationship between centre and periphery, within its continent and certainly beyond, is also a historical narrative that seems innately dependent on maps. The media scholar William Uricchio asks his readers to imagine Europe and concludes that any picture of the continent (whether or not it is as the mythological figure Europa or as a map) is defined by its cultural, historical and political history and any present. The whole, he says, must be defined in relation to its parts. When looking at Europe through different mappings of populations and geography, the necessity arises of also questioning what narrative is told. Uricchio seems to say: what does a map really tell?[21] Moreover, the historian Michael Wintle points out in *The Image of Europe* that a map of a region from a given point in time is a way to understand the mindset of a people and their relation to the rest of the world. It can also either alter or amplify a self-understanding of people in a region as to their political and cultural standing.[22] Wintle points to a number of critical cartographic works highlighting the intrinsic political, social (and aesthetic) effects of maps throughout the centuries. In the first chapter, where Wintle explores 'A Changing Concept of Europe', he keeps returning to the lack of knowledge of the geography of Eastern Europe in historical maps produced in the West. There was a lack of production of maps from the eastern part and also a somewhat hazy understanding of actual borders with other continents.[23] Larry Wolff suggests that the eighteenth-century mapping of Eastern Europe was in fact far from accurate compared to standards at the time. He even pins the failure of the Swedish king Charles XII on a cartographic mistake where the map and the reality were not aligned: 'His failure to conquer Russia, like his original intention, was thus partly a matter of mapping'.[24]

Mapping Europe's art scene is a complex task linked to a historical perception of what the map contains. The many exhibitions showing art in relation to the geographical area of Eastern Europe paint several pictures. They portray a common story of the contemporary art world searching for the latest, of art historians wanting to find new empirical data to process and lay bare hidden treasures. More importantly, the exhibition as a collective effort answers to a need for representation, a need to mend a broken Europe. Yet despite all good intentions, the divide is sustained not just in history but also in the present. Mapping art from Eastern Europe is an achievement; more art is made visible to more people, and knowledge expands and shifts. Nevertheless, each time this narrative, 'Art from Eastern Europe', is perpetuated without fundamental institutional changes to, for example, Europe's museums of modern and contemporary art, it is also partly a failure.

N/ostalgia

Narrative, the philosopher Paul Ricoeur has shown, is necessarily related to time. A literary or fictional narrative takes time and is placed in time. Time is a central concept of all the cases studied in this chapter, as the past is remembered and processed. What is remembered is art from a historical and political period, largely from the 1960s to today. What is processed through curatorial concepts and sometimes in individual artworks is the experience of this specific political climate and its impact in present times. Curatorial efforts fast become history and are set in a specific time and place, but the artworks are always encountered in the present. Time is narrated through these curatorial concepts as well as through individual pieces and is a necessarily fluent concept.

Time is also very specific. The narratives of all four examples are orientated towards the 1989 events when the world changed. The torn-down walls, real and political, allowed art to flood across between East and West. Art in Europe took a new turn. It is a real point in time; real bricks and mortar were demolished, but it is also a fictionalized time. Cultural critics have pointed out that this date has a political resonance as a focus for narrating history but is also blatantly Eurocentric, putting other cultural and language areas on the periphery. Eastern Europe was through Soviet domination deeply embedded in a global system, and other historical milestones are therefore, for instance, the start of Gorbachev's perestroika in 1985, Chernobyl in 1986, or in 1991 with the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the newly independent states.[25] However, none of these are as visually striking as the tearing down of a wall and the uniting of a people, nor as frequent in visual representations. The year 1989 marks a shift in understanding European art through the changes in Europe. But the story of Europe did not stop at its national borders, as Piotr Piotrowski points out. The narrative of European and Western art was transformed when the world changed in 1989, including, for instance, the massacre in Tiananmen Square and the start of the abolishment of South African apartheid. The post-Communist condition affected, and continues to affect, the world.[26] And the surrounding world also affects Europe.

In all four examples, the year 1989 and its before and after are paired with a more diffuse experience or nostalgic longing. The title of example 2, 'Ostalgia', means what it says: it plays with the German concept *Ostalgie*, employed in 1990s Berlin, where a certain nostalgic feel for the former East started, expressed through films like *Good Bye, Lenin!* (2003). In the 1990s, *Ossi* parties, *Ostivals* and Ostprodukte went from being devalued as useless, an embarrassment from a defunct system, to symbols of nostalgia in a liberal, market-driven society. It also turned into an income opportunity when the 'Made in GDR' stamp became a selling point.[27] Already the titles of example 2, 'Ostalgia', and example 3, 'Promises of the Past: A Discontinuous History of Art in Former Eastern Europe', declare the act of remembering a central concept for understanding the effect of time in Europe. The title of the Paris exhibition (example 3) played with the idea of what the past holds for the future. Nostalgia is central to narratives of Eastern Europe. This nostalgia, according to the anthropologist Dominic Boyer, is not necessarily about longing for a specific social or cultural set-up or for a home in a place, but rather a 'sociotemporal yearning for a different stage or quality of life'.[28] Nostalgia, one could say, is to long for something that can never come back. It is firmly set in the past. Svetlana Boym describes modern nostalgia (different from the eighteenth-century illness) as 'a mourning for the impossibility of mythical return, for the loss of an "enchanted world" with clear borders and values'. She also differentiates between two types of nostalgia. Restorative nostalgia, typically featured in nationalism sees truth in tradition. Reflective nostalgia, typically about cultural memory, inhabits an ambivalence as to what is longed for and the feeling of longing or loss.[29]

In example 2, 'Ostalgia', the Berlin art scene is at the heart of the exhibition. In the much-acclaimed film 'Marxism Today' by the British artist Phil Collins (b. 1971), the artist engages with the past educational model of the German Democratic Republic, portraying teachers of Communism 20 years after their professions had become obsolete. They tell their stories, and the film shows what has happened to all those people whose knowledge lost its meaning. The film can be described as nostalgic in the sense of looking back at a time and life that cannot return. But it is also set in the present, reflecting on what has happened to these people and what they have done with their lives. The overall curatorial ambition of example 3 is to look at contemporary artists and other artists who address issues of the East–West divide relevant in present society, and more precisely Berlin.

In Collins's work, there is a desire to unpack what has happened in the present to the teachers of Marxism, then linchpins of a society that no longer exists. In 'The Praise of Laziness' (1998), a piece by Mladen Stilinović (b. 1947) that is also included in the Ostalgia exhibition, the artist declares how art can no longer exist in the West: its systems have invalidated the meaning of art. Art, he says, could only exist under the auspices of totalitarian regimes. In Eastern Europe, he writes, art was made impossible, but it is precisely why it could exist. 'Artists in the West are not lazy and therefore not artists but rather producers of something'. They are preoccupied by things without importance: 'production, promotion, gallery system, museum system, competition system (who is first), their preoccupation with objects'.[30] Both artists grasp the impact of Eastern Europe and its past socialist structures

on the present. Stilinović also expresses a particular view and experience of artists working behind the Iron Curtain. The exhibition 'Gender Check' shows very clearly how divergent the art scene was; some worked both as official artists and under the official radar with less acceptable forms of art. Or indeed, art produced within the field of vision may also have importance today.

It is in the arts, some would argue, that private memories and individual points of view can be represented. 'Whereas the collective memory of Communism is described and analyzed in political, historical, and sociological studies, private memories of the previous system are portrayed predominantly in *belle lettres*, film, and theatre'.[31] And in visual art. When grouped into a curatorial narrative, these individual representations become part of a collective story. However multifaceted, this larger narrative hinges on political and historical frameworks, and there is a tension between each piece and the larger curatorial concept it is subjected to. Sometimes an artwork is enlarged by it, sometimes reduced by it. Some of the artists included in example 2, Ostalgia, were just becoming established on the international art scene, such as Berlin-based Petrit Halilaj, born in Kosovo in 1986. It also included several artists who grew up in Western Europe and have dealt with the culture of Eastern Europe, like Phil Collins or Tacita Dean (b. 1965). Simon Starling (b. 1967) is yet another Western European artist who has explored an interest in Eastern European culture and an East–West divide through his piece 'Flaga', which questions the economic and symbolic relationships between East and West. Starling's 'flag' was made up of a Fiat car, purchased in Turin and driven back to Poland, where it was made, and altered, then returned to Turin and mounted on a wall. Hung on the side like a painting, the Fiat car featured the colours and patterns of the Polish flag, with a red body, white front doors and a white bonnet.

From these few examples, it is clear that several artworks in example 2, 'Ostalgia', dealt with how Eastern and Western Europe relate to each other: economically, politically or ideologically. *The New York Times* critic Holland Cotter claimed it to be 'an exhibition that finally portrays something new with a political twist, that goes under the surface of what it meant to live under communism, making any singular view of art and culture during Soviet times obsolete'.[32] However, the choice of artists prompts a number of questions regarding, for example, to what extent the artists' birthplaces became synonymous with the subject matter of life in Eastern Europe. The artist André Cadere, for instance, was born in Poland in 1934, grew up in Romania, emigrated to Paris in 1968, where he died ten years later. Cadere intricately dealt with conflating painting and object, as well as critiquing the system of marketing artworks.[33] Perhaps his critique was intrinsically dependent on his birthplace, but it is likely it can equally well be positioned in the context of the left circles in which he lived and worked in Paris.

The curator for example 2, 'Ostalgia', Massimiliano Gioni explains that what he had in mind with this exhibition was how a number of artists related to Eastern Europe. Not all critics were equally taken by the Ostalgia premise of making a psychological portrait through artworks from 20 countries across different generations based on a contemporary fascination with *Ossieness*. Whose nostalgia, or *Ostalgia*, is at stake, asked the art historian

Corina Apostol. 'What I want to get at is that *Ostalgia* can also be interpreted as a symptom of the West's longing for the cultures of the East – which still holds a powerful sway over its imagination'.[34] The article ends by mocking the curator yet puts it succinctly: the Western healing curator will help identify both problems and solutions. The result of which is that the West through these narratives assumes the task of healing Europe by reconstructing its narrative, but always from a perceived cultural centre, a given core.[35] In an analysis of the underlying paradigm – to show the world, or the West, art from Eastern Europe – the art historian Edit András identifies projects such as example 1, the book *Contemporary Art in Eastern Europe*, as an outright backlash. The book, she argues, cements a simplified history based on a one-eyed view of art as having ever been on the outside, taking for granted a centre and a periphery. Her comments pinpoint the whole problem of understanding art: how can art ever be outside of anything when it is first and foremost itself? Moreover, she sees example 2, 'Ostalgia', as a colonization of experience hijacked by scholars, artists, curators working from 'within'. Nostalgia, András argues, is a term that cannot be employed without implicit connotations of power struggles where the East is necessarily suppressed. When she asked in her article 'Whose Nostalgia', she concluded: 'The vision, mediated by *Ostalgia*, surely does not match with the landscape seen by those about whom it purports to represent, and it is not about the East either, but rather about the desire and fantasies seemingly still existing in the West'.[36] The New York critic's relief at seeing something new on his art scene may be as valid a point of view as András' scholarly take and critique. The critic and the scholar may also focus differently on what is at stake in this exhibition. Yet András argues how there is an inherent power relationship between East and West even in the mere concept 'nostalgia', even more so in 'Ostalgia', to which the curator and later the critics seem to be oblivious.

The works taken from example 3, 'Ostalgia' in this passage all deal with matters important in contemporary art, such as political systems and a capitalist art market, or simply the conditions of life and death. The framing of the exhibition could in theory have been from a different angle, but it is not the aim of this chapter to suggest a better curatorial take. What is important to identify is that as soon as there is a distinction of experience and/or origin through a bipolar understanding of history, it is a matter of *who* is addressing *what* on behalf of *whom.*

The title of the exhibition in example 3, 'Promises of the Past: A Discontinuous History of Art in Former Eastern Europe', announces that it is representing a patchy, 'discontinuous' history of art in former Eastern Europe. In the introductory text, the curators declare from the outset that this area does not exist. Perhaps it never existed beyond a paper construction when Europe was split between East and West after the Second World War. They also highlight how Eastern Europe, with all its artistic output, has been squeezed out of a canonical Western centre. They maintain it is now time to move on from the stage of rediscovering that 'there has been art made beyond Western Europe and North America', and they go on to say that 'attempts to reformulate the narrative, such as the artistic and editorial project

'East Art Map' by the group IRWIN, have achieved their purpose'.[37] The curators took their cue from an article by the cultural critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin, entitled 'On the Concept of History', written after the signing of the Soviet–German pact in 1939. What the curators took from Benjamin's ideas was to create a history that goes against the grain, i.e. a nonlinear history always full of ruptures, 'arabesques and imbrications'.[38]

Example 2, the 'Ostalgia' exhibition, received a mixed reception: praised by New York critics for showing the local scene something new, yet heavily critiqued by people whose stories it told. The Paris exhibition (example 3), in turn, created a complex platform, adhering to a tradition of understanding memory as never complete but always a patchwork of differences. Critics and academics have praised the effort and it stands out as well researched in every single detail, from the Benjaminian concept to the exhibition design – staged as an analogy of several parallel narratives. With the help of 'nooks and crannies', different routes and stories were orchestrated. It was impossible to walk a linear narrative, but one had no choice but to keep running into impasses and dead-ends. Having to retrace your steps, to go back and form new impressions of what you have already passed, seems an unusual strategy for exhibition designs, often set out to lead their visitors forwards, not back and forth or in and out.

Another imperative of this exhibition was as an art historical self-reflection of what it meant to define art as Eastern European 'today', i.e. Paris 2010. It was also an exhibition in close collaboration with academic work on renegotiating art history. Piotr Piotrowski has emphasized the need for parallel histories where art from Eastern Europe is concerned, because what may look the same such as conceptual art might respond to profoundly different circumstances.[39] The curators also refer to Slavic and comparative literature scholar Svetlana Boym's idea of 'off-modern', which allows for a variety of modernisms, sometimes at odds with each other. 'Can we really assume that Pompidou is representing common history? Isn't it rather a particular history that speaks with an accent, just as I speak with an accent when I talk about history? I am curious to know what that accent is.'[40] Hence, the starting point, Paris 2010, provided an opportunity to analyse 'specific positions, the political conditions that have provoked them, intercultural influences and intergenerational connections, without reducing them to illustrations of the East-West opposition'.[41] The artists included in the exhibition reflected current interests in art. It also moved slightly beyond the East–West divide of Europe, including a couple of artists from the Middle East, Asia and the US in an acknowledgement of how Europe affects the world and vice versa. New names in the narrative of art from Eastern Europe were added, and others resurfaced: Marina Abramović, the Gorgona group with Mangelos, or Tacita Dean.[42]

The narrated stories of Europe in examples 2 and 3 revolve around the concept of nostalgia, whether this should be understood as blatant or nuanced. In a Benjaminian reading, there is no reason for nostalgia to be futile; rather, the empowerment from nostalgia comes out of 'active remembrance as a ritual summoning and invocation of the traditions of the oppressed in violent constellation with the political present'.[43] In example 2, 'Ostalgia',

nostalgia is the linchpin onto which curatorial framing and artworks are pinned. In example 3, 'Promise of the Past', remembering is the theoretical starting point. In both cases, the effect of narrating art from Eastern Europe, and Eastern European influences, in terms of dialogues and correspondences, is discussed. It is not naïve or unknowing. Yet it is within a tradition of understanding Europe as a bifurcated continent. It is a divide with a long history, as Larry Wolff showed in 1994. When coining the term 'the invention of Eastern Europe' as a Western construction, he showed how the East–West divide went beyond the cold war. It stems from long before the construction of modern society. Other writers bring the discussion back to precisely the cold war divide, because it is only when this history is fading away from a black-and-white history that any alternatives can come forth. The historian and philosopher Maria Todorova contends that the coming to terms with the trauma of Communism, which stretched over a long period of time and vast geographical areas, is not only traumatic. Remembering socialist times is also to remember what many people perceived to be a truly modern project. Thus, a key question for Todorova is to be precise in 'who is speaking or performing nostalgia' when bringing together the term within the geographical, social, cultural and heterogenous area of Eastern Europe. In other words, from what position is the speaker speaking or curator curating, and on whose behalf? And from what generation? Those who have lived their experiences or younger generations with a fresh interest in their cultural or personal past? Secondly, 'What does nostalgia express?' The post-Communist nostalgia is multivalent, both in content and in relation to geocultural specificity. And last, 'What are the spheres of life and particular genres in which nostalgia is expressed?'[44]

However, simply engaging with the idea of nostalgia at all is contested in the context of studying Eastern Europe. Edit András argues that the turn to nostalgia by curators and academics (such as Todorova) is a practice firmly situated in a Western scholarly or artistic context, regardless of the writer's or curator's relation to Eastern Europe. It reflects a need for 'stuffing the region back into the old straitjacket'.[45] It is a colonial and derogatory project of a need in the West to keep the myth about the Eastern Europe masked as light entertainment. However many strands of differences the curatorial framings reiterate, how many calls for the need to reconstruct an art historical narrative, the genre itself seems to confirm Wolff's description: Eastern Europe is a Western construction. Dominic Boyer spells it out: the urge for returning to nostalgia has to do with colonialism. Nostalgia narratives are about ideology: 'an ideological necessity of post-imperial Western Europe, a suppressed recognition of a constitutive practice of domination upon which the imagination of Western European (and also more generally Western) freedom, autonomy and futurity is contingent'.[46] The effects of the division of Europe have had a far-reaching impact on European art history. It is no coincidence that the Irwin Group illustrates its project East Art Map with a black map. Art history books are devoid of knowledge of art from Eastern Europe, partly because of a real lack of a cold war exchange of art and artists, although nowhere near to the extent as has commonly been described, but also because of the nature of art history as a discipline, structured by a narrow selection of which examples can be highlighted. Museums have

limited floor space, art history courses limited time frames and collectors tend towards what is already known. These four examples help remedy and patch up these stories. But these cases begin to paint another picture, one that has to do with art history and curators' need for labelling. This desire to comprehend through labelling a collective goes hand in hand with a narrative of a divided Europe.

The Periphery

In the introduction to *Primary Documents: A Sourcebook for Eastern and Central European Art since the 1950s*, Laura Hoptman and Tomáš Pospiszyl pinpoint the problem of the pervasive label 'Eastern Europe'. It is a concept that is 'neither geographic nor social; it is economic and political'; it is constructed and not given. When the concept is repeated in the various curatorial projects discussed here, its political connotations dominate the art under its umbrella. Engaging with the idea of Eastern Europe implies, according to some, an engagement with the peripheral.

Between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the growth in the 2010s of commercial galleries specializing in art from Eastern Europe, there have been a number of exhibitions on reconsidering, recognizing and re-establishing art from Eastern Europe, both in the West and in the former East, in which East/Eastern is paramount to the narratives told. Alternative notions have emerged as a response, such as the ambitious project of conferences, exhibitions and research under the umbrella 'The Former West' (2008–2014), led by the curator Maria Hlavajova. It addresses the fact that 'the other' is never alone, and rather than focusing on how art and culture from outside the West is also important, a Western centre for understanding art and culture is negotiated. Knowledge of the West must be restructured, because art from Eastern Europe changes the whole scene, not just its 'own' regional discourse.[47] Narratives of art and Europe must fundamentally change according to this line of thought: the centre and periphery that come with the East–West divide in art history must be challenged.

Many curators, artists, critics and art historians would strongly oppose a singular story and a simplified canon formation of modern masters. Diversified storytelling may be a widespread ambition; yet as has been discussed above, artists from Eastern Europe who were not established in the West during Soviet Communism are marginally represented at museums and art institutions in Europe and North America. Art from Eastern Europe keeps resurfacing in different narrative frameworks with references to geographical regions and cultural experiences, where a dichotomy between inside and outside seems firmly resilient. The impact of projects such as The Former West is too soon to assess. The terminologies in the different curatorial and theoretical texts that frame each exhibition discuss how to talk about the area of Eastern Europe, where there is a shift in nuance between a spatial concept and a temporal definition of politics and culture. In some exhibitions, the prefix Eastern is carefully avoided; in some, overtly stated; in all of them, implied.

The political scientist and anthropologist Iver B. Neumann stated in 1999:

The use of 'the East' as the other is a general practice in European identity formation. 'The East' is indeed Europe's other, and it is continuously being recycled in order to represent European identities. Since the 'Eastern absence' is a defining trait of 'European' identities, there is no use talking about the end of an East/West divide in European history after the end of the Cold War. The question is not *whether* the East will be used in the forging of new European identities but *how* this is being done.[48]

Neumann underlines the inherent understanding of the link between the East and the 'Other' in European identity formation. Piotrowski has pointed out: 'Of course, it is impossible to deny that East-Central Europe has functioned as a type of a periphery for Western Europe. One must, however, transform such position into an analytic advantage, a tool that will allow us to reveal the meaning and the dynamic of the place in its entire, complex identity'.[49] In the arts, numerous exhibitions have tried an inclusive strategy without naming their inclusions, just as it is normal to expect women artists in contemporary curating without pointing it out. One such example is 'Manifesta 2' in Luxembourg in 1998, curated by Robert Fleck, Maria Lind and Barbara Vanderlinden, which included a range of artists from all across Europe without pointing out their geocultural belonging. At the subsequent 'Manifesta 3' in Ljubljana in 2000, curated by Francesco Bonami, Ole Bouman, Maria Hlavajova and Kathrin Rhomberg, the previous curators' standpoint of silent inclusion was debated. The team of curators maintained that removing identity undermined those who had a specific Eastern European experience. In examples 2 and 3, Europe and Eastern Europe are also a psychological affair.

According to Bojana Pejić, the curator of example 4, 'Gender Check: Femininity and Masculinity in the Art of Eastern Europe', to be an Eastern European artist was also to be a male artist. Through the extensive exhibition and the accompanying *The Gender Check Reader*, Pejić created a platform for understanding gender politics and difference in the countries from former Eastern Europe, as a comment to what art had been exhibited in previous projects. Of the four case studies, the exhibition 'Gender Check' stands out as the most different because it not only included such a large number of women artists (but also male artists) but also challenged the Other of the Eastern European otherness. It questioned too the canonizing effects of Western feminism and its colonizing understanding of gender politics in representation. Perhaps its most notable difference was its refusal to adhere to a Western canon of what was regarded as important art, largely art with a conceptual base, which went under the radar of totalitarian regimes. To understand gender politics, and the lack thereof in many instances, in Eastern European countries, example 4, 'Gender Check', exhibited material ranging from socialist realism posters to art produced in the official Soviet art system to subversive accounts of sexual politics in present times.

'Gender Check' has been praised as a landmark exhibition, creating a platform for self-defining how 'we' are spoken for in the exhibition.[50] The art historian Martina Pachmanová writes that the reason why Eastern European artists, and women in particular, have been consistently excluded is not just the West's fault, rather the lack of a self-created platform from which to speak.[51] It was also criticized for precisely not speaking of a broad enough 'we'. One of the exhibition's participants, Marina Gržinić, artist and theorist, presents a vehement critique. Not only does she portray the curatorial strategies leading up to the opening as unethical – the names of the Eastern European artists were not even on view until the last minute, unlike the invitees based in the West. But the whole idea of categorizing East and West after the Berlin Wall was seen as redundant.[52] This exhibition adhered to two strands of curatorial narratives. Whilst it denied a one-sided understanding of Eastern European art through a Western paradigm that conceptual art is good art, it still clearly and knowingly performed Eastern Europe in a Western art institution. It also adhered to a need for creating a platform for women artists and questions of representation of gender, a strategy with roots in nineteenth-century European culture.

As shown here, the notion of Eastern Europe as a way to organize art keeps being reiterated 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is natural to compare with how the 'woman artist' is a concept that refutes any categorization despite women artists keep being packaged collectively. The art world these exhibitions are within, to a certain extent and with many local exceptions, may have moved beyond the need to identify art by way of the artist's gender.[53] Yet the category of 'the woman artist' has become a narrative concept of its own,[54] detached from historical and present-day practice but keeps finding validation, for better or worse. The history of curating 'the woman artist' started with exhibition projects such as the 'Union of Women Painters and Sculptures', founded in Paris in 1881, which helped exhibit women artists' work.[55] Throughout the twentieth century, numerous exhibitions have manifested the institutional neglect of women artists. In the last decade, exhibitions such as 'Wack! Art and the Feminist Revolution' and 'Global Feminisms' (both 2007), 'Elles@Pompidou' (2009) and 'Royalists to Romantics: Women Artists from the Louvre, Versailles, and Other French National Collections' (2012) continue an established trajectory, of which the exhibition 'Gender Check' is a part.[56] Focusing on the category of the woman has historically been a necessity for women artists to be recognized at all in art history.[57] Yet it has also become its own narrative category that can be seen to perpetuate its marginalization.

Being labelled a 'woman artist' can indeed be a double-edged sword. It is also a narrative genre in curatorial work that mirrors the attempt to group artists from Eastern Europe across similar differences, although here culture, geography or political systems are the defining factors. Citing example 4, 'Gender Check', the art historian Katja Kobolt counterposes arguments for and against changing the canon. The exhibition was, in her view, a productive expansion: 'The exhibition worked critically and creatively with different historical and contemporary canons, including the canons of socialist imagery,

nonconformist avant-garde and critical contemporary art, all of which tended to be male-dominated in most of the Eastern European cultures represented in the show'.[58] The critique of the master narrative of the woman as other, or the Eastern European other, concerned their essentializing effects: binding what someone produces in terms of identity, body or nationality is demeaning. The counterargument goes that a 'woman-only' policy may be necessary as a kind of strategic essentialism as long as the institutional structure dictates an 'othering'.[59]

In some ways, all the exhibitions analysed here can be seen as failures since in each case the peripheral notions are perpetuated and repeated, despite wordy introductions promising the opposite. On the other hand, all the exhibition curators argue how they have turned the notion of periphery into an analytical argument and possibly also an advantage. For a centre to exist, a periphery is necessary. The literary scholar Yuriy Lotman has shown that the margins may not be a bad place to be, but are instead where new intersections can take place, where new knowledge may form.[60] Each time the periphery is named in the exhibitions, the art from this 'periphery' is made visible – but also kept in the margins. Many thinkers have claimed the importance of naming as the basis of exclusion or subordination. One example is Frantz Fanon, one of the founders of postcolonial theory, who refused to stop identifying his skin colour – which is what made his identity. The curators of Manifesta 3 insisted on the importance of acknowledging and naming the identity that an Eastern European experience dictates. It remains unresolved whether the naming of identity – related to gender, nationality or geography – is constructive for change or, on the contrary, cements traditions.

However, this study is not concerned with finding an art historical solution, or even pointing at an impasse in the curatorial discourse. Its ambition is to see what happens with the idea of Europe when narrated through art. As for exhibitions and mediatized images of art from Europe between 2009 and 2011, what is most striking is the return to the old impetus of representing, showing and making known the periphery. The dichotomy between centre and periphery is a narrative that underpins each example.

Every time art has been exhibited and marketed under the cultural umbrella of Eastern Europe, more artists are added to a greater bank of knowledge, and the image of Europe is expanded. Simultaneously, the same umbrella cements Eastern Europe beyond a geographical area and reinforces its cultural otherness. In his book *In the Shadow of Yalta: Art and the Avant-garde in Eastern Europe, 1945–1989*, Piotr Piotrowski paints the picture of a homogenized view of Western canonical standard and East European art as an exotic other. Although interesting, not least as a new commercial opportunity, art and narratives from the former East, Eastern or central Europe have been synonymous with being 'not-as-good-as' the West.[61] In a later book, Piotrowski further discusses how art history has continuously had a hard time shifting its geographical focus and is more or less consciously led by the idea of a Western European sense of universalism.[62] The examples explored in this chapter show the difficulty art institutions have in progressing from the idea of Europe as divided in two. If art, as Andrzej Szczerski claimed, was important for portraying the new

Europe, it has struggled to paint a sufficiently diversified picture.[63] Not through individual artworks but through the curatorial projects, creating art history for the future is to come. Despite good intentions, the image of Europe pictured in these case studies is divided rather than 'united in diversity' according to the EU motto.

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Notes

1 Brownell (2010).
2 Szczerski (2013).
3 Piotr Piotrowski has commented on how the West's interest in art from Eastern Europe, Russia and central Europe was paired with a market opportunity in art 'marked by difference' Piotrowski (2012: 43).
4 András (2010).
5 White (1981: 1–23).
6 For an overview of the curatorial tradition, see, for example, Greenberg, Ferguson and Nairne (1996).
7 Klonk (2009: 174–185).
8 Belting (2013: 178–185); Belting and Buddensieg (2009).
9 Szczerski (2013).
10 Baudrillard (1988: 166–184).
11 Baudrillard (1988: 171).
12 Elliot (1999: 11).
13 IRWIN (2006).
14 Avgita (2013: 13).
15 See, for example, Jacob (1996: 191–198).
16 For examples of Mangelos's manifestos, see Stipančić (2002: 80–87).
17 Ravini (2011: 120).
18 Piotrowski ([2005] 2011).
19 Guilbaut (1985).
20 Groys (2011).
21 Uricchio (2009: 13–21).
22 Wintle (2009); Bassin (1991: 1–17).
23 Bassin (1991: 1–17).
24 Wolff (1994: 144).
25 Lisiak (2006).
26 Piotrowski (2013: 178–185).

27 Berdahl (2010: 192–211).
28 Boyer (2010: 18).
29 Boym (2001: 40–48; 49–55)
30 Stilinović (2011: 100).
31 Lisiak (2006).
32 Cotter (2011).
33 See, for example, Godfrey (2008); Cummings (2013).
34 Apostol (2011:4).
35 Apostol (2011).
36 András (2013: 171).
37 Macel and Mytkowska (2010: 18).
38 Macel and Mytkowska (2010: 14).
39 Piotrowski ([2005] 2011).
40 Filipovic et. al. (2010: 23).
41 Macel and Mytkowska (2010: 19).
42 The Pompidou is praised for the nuanced way it bridged the East–West divide and its lack of outright nostalgia in 'Les Promesses du Passé: Shaping Art History via the Exhibition', in Orišková (2013: 36–43).
43 Eagleton (1985: 64).
44 Todorova (2010: 3–4).
45 András (2013: 167).
46 Boyer (2010: 27, 23).
47 Sheikh (2013).
48 Neumann (1999: 207).
49 Piotrowski (2011: 29).
50 Dimitrakaki (2012: 29).
51 Pachmanová (2010).
52 Gržinić (2009).
53 See, for example, Milevska (2012); Talpade Mohanty (2003: 499–535).
54 Skrubbe and Hayden (2010).
55 Garb (1994).
56 At the Museum for Women Arts, Washington, 24 February 2012–29 July 2012, and at Nationalmuseum, Stockholm, under the name 'Pride and Prejudice: Female Artists in France and Sweden, 1750–1860', 27 September 2012–20 January 2013.
57 See, for example, Kokoli (2013: 187–204).
58 Kobolt (2012: 48–49).
59 Kobolt (2012: 51–54); see also the argument that the category of 'woman artist' is useful because in the production of art gender matters, regardless if it is avoided or claimed. Wagner (1998: 1–27).
60 Lotman (2005: 205–229).
61 Piotrowski ([2005] 2011: 12).
62 Piotrowski (2012).
63 Szczerski (2013: 126–137).

Chapter 7

Euro-Visions: East European Narratives in Televised Popular Music

Johan Fornäs

There are several good reasons why the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) is a particularly suitable place to search for East European narratives of Europe. Other genres and kinds of music could also be relevant, in art music as well as in popular music.[1] However, the ESC is a unique annual event of particular significance for the European unification process, offering a limited set of songs in a yearly televised event that has a very broad audience all over Europe. The event is a unified official ritual organized by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and at the same time stages a number of individual songs selected by national audiences and therefore representing a range of different stylistic and regional approaches. It is significant that an EBU spokesman has described the ESC as a rare example of 'an entertainment programme with a message', which makes it particularly interesting to interpret.[2] The ESC is a big annual television event constructed for manifesting Europe in music; it is hence reasonable to expect that it will be a rich source of narratives of Europe.

Besides the defining institutional context of the event, the ESC has three general traits of significance here: it is based on *music*, on *popular* music and on *televised* popular music. (1) It combines sounds with lyrics, commentary, visual performance and graphic representations, *music* is a symbolic mode with a strong emotive impact, used for intensifying rituals of community and collective identifications, combining emotive appeal with social interaction in ways that offer rich resources for identifying practices.[3] (2) The focus on a *popular* genre supplements studies of literature and visual arts. The ESC has an enormous transnational attraction, reaching out to roughly 125 million TV viewers each year watching some 40 competing national acts, in stark contrast to cultural genres and fields in the high arts. (3) The emphasis on how the ESC is *televised* – rather than experienced live by local audiences – adds an element of mediation that involves an inter- or transmedial combination of two distinct cultural industries: music and television.

The ESC deserves to be taken seriously because it is to a certain extent a forum for dealing with current issues of European integration. In fact, it is surprisingly reminiscent of the 'agonistic' model of political democracy advocated by Chantal Mouffe:

> Contrary to the antagonistic friend/enemy relation in which there is no shared symbolic terrain and in which the different sides aim at eliminating their opponent, in an agonistic relation the adversaries share a common symbolic space and they recognize, at least to some degree, the legitimacy of the claims of their opponents. A sort of 'conflictual consensus' exists between the various groups. They agree about the ethical principles which should inform their political association, but they disagree about their interpretation.[4]

Artists and nations in the ESC likewise form an agonistic arena, sharing 'a common symbolic space' and recognizing each other's legitimate right to participate and voice their claims in a 'conflictual consensus' typical for such contests – and partly similar to sports events such as the European Champions League. The ESC rules are determined 'from above' by the EBU, but history shows that they can be renegotiated on the initiative of participant countries, and therefore are the result of international agreements. The ESC does not result in a consensus where everyone agrees that the best tune won; still, all participants accept the rules, and if they have objections, they voice them in next year's competing songs, instead of coming to blows and tearing the arena apart.

Mouffe herself would probably strongly hesitate to include the ESC in her agonistic model of politics. One might, for example, object that televised entertainment and pop concerts do not constitute any form of political association. The ESC is in a sense not quite 'for real': it is a *symbolic* event – a fun game that no one is prepared to die for. But this just makes it even more important as a model and an arena for exploring how other formations of Europeanness might be developed elsewhere. It is actually a relatively successful experimental effort at 'keeping antagonism at bay by establishing institutions allowing conflict to take an agonistic form'.[5] Also, the impact of such aesthetic and affective communities should in general not be underestimated. The ESC might be widely ridiculed, but such emotively constituted communal experiences of transnational relations should still be taken seriously. Ridicule is itself actually also a form of self-distancing reflexivity that can be found in various kinds of European texts, and that may strengthen rather than weaken the efficiency of this agonistic arena.

Here one may again refer to Mouffe's acknowledgement of 'the crucial role played by affects and passions in politics'.[6] 'In the current stage of post-Fordist capitalism, the cultural terrain occupies a strategic position because the production of affects plays an increasingly important role', Mouffe further argues.[7] The ESC may not be the most vital among 'agonistic public spaces where counter-hegemonic struggles could be launched'.[8] Rather than forming an autonomous counter-hegemonic public space, it functions as a media space allowing different national voices to suggest competing versions of what may count as a hegemonic European identification. In this way, the ESC constitutes a terrain 'where the construction of political subjectivity takes place'.[9] Indeed, Philip V. Bohlman argues that the ESC illustrates how 'New Europeanness enters the public spheres'. While it 'furthers a type of European unity', it has also 'provided a public space for the emergence of alternative voices and politics'.[10]

The purpose of the ESC events is to annually decide the best newly composed European song in this specific format. Participants agree that each entry is to be listened to carefully and that there should be a voting process with equal rights for the competing countries. A good ESC winner supposedly expresses some relevant and cherished aspects of what Europeans desire and feel at that moment. Different countries and individual voters may interpret this differently: some looking for sheer entertainment and uplifting tunes, others for serious messages linked to shared values or sounds with a strong emotional impact, etc. But they do agree on taking part in the institution of this competition itself, as a way to produce some kind of affective communication across the continent, sharing at least

Figure 7.1. ESC logos from the 1950s and the 1990s (logos.wikia.com/wiki/File:Eurovision_montage.jpg).

a brief moment of excitement and joy – and for some, disappointment and a desire to improve next year.

When discussing European symbols or media, the ESC is repeatedly cited as the most publicly successful example, comparable to the official symbols and forums established by the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU), including the European flag, anthem, and motto and Europe Day as well as the euro currency. The ESC finals and song entries constitute a broad, popular format that negotiates between central institutions and dispersed audiences. The whole event is highly centralized and regulated by the EBU in a way that leaves limited space for diverging voices. The EBU is not involved in the preceding national selections, only requiring them to be 'fair and transparent', hence leaving room for different solutions depending on the local status of the competition and the habits and norms of each nation's political and cultural public spheres: some organize public voting, while others let specialists select the competing entries. On all levels, there is a balance between particular (national) and general (European) values. The ESC's status as an institutionalized pop music extravaganza certainly delimits the range of statements it can allow, but this does not prevent it from offering keys to unlock hegemonic discourses in this widely popular context.

Here follows first a presentation of the ESC finals, beginning with a general introduction to this media format and its eastward shift, followed by a condensed survey of the post-1989 finals, and concluding with a thematic summary of their main narrative strategies. The second half of the chapter investigates the individual songs. After a general introduction and some illustrative examples follows a structured summary of the main narrative dimensions found in these songs. The final section then begins with a comparative and contextualizing commentary and ends with some concluding words.

Singing Europe

As they are broadcast on television, all finals have a similar narrative structure, with a fixed beginning (opening sequence and welcoming presentation) and ending (vote counting, celebrating the winner and ending credits) surrounding a standard set of intermediate stations (song performances, host dialogues and entertaining interludes). Individual songs too tend to form narratives, with the lyrical and musical development from intro to verses and choruses to the customary rise in key and the final coda. Music is a symbolic mode based on temporal development and with signifying capacities that make it highly capable of narrations. Music also represents a virtual sequence of events in an audial mode that builds more on emotive-sensual levels of development than on cognition and rational argumentation.[11] Single sounds, words or images such as flags or maps may not always obviously be narrative, but their sequential combinations tend to be interpreted narratively, and when explicitly referring to European topics, they are relevant here. In this study, the intramusical narratives serve to qualify and fill in the thematic content of the song lyrics and the visual performance. Certain elements of sound texture and musical form structure will be taken into account here, but the most obvious narratives of Europe are verbally expressed. Televised images, words and musical sounds thus combine in forming narrative structures at several levels.

To some extent, all ESC songs take part in constructing a super-narrative of Europe just by being performed in this context. As soon as a singer constructs a 'we' together with the audience, Europe may in some way be implied. Specific sounds, lyric themes and visual expressions can often be linked to European issues, and the ESC context makes such interpretations more plausible than for songs performed elsewhere. Ivan Raykoff has argued that 'countless popular songs describe love and desire, or breakup and heartache, but the Eurovision context can lend a political connotation to familiar amorous sentiments', and that 'more specifically, some Eurovision songs present an analogy between romantic union and European Union'.[12] His examples include the UK's 'I Belong' (1965) and 'Power to All Our Friends' (1973) as well as the Swedish group ABBA's victorious 'Waterloo' (1974), which can be heard celebrating integration with lines such as 'Promise to love you for ever more, couldn't escape if I wanted to, knowing my fate is to be with you!'

However, some particular songs more explicitly focus on Europe, for instance when lyrics or even song titles clearly talk about 'Europe', thematize European identity or tell stories about its history and future. Surrounding texts and commentaries may also interpret songs in terms of Europeanness. Visual elements of artist performance or its framing through stage setting, videos or CD covers may further assist in inserting a song in a narrative about the fate of Europe. Finally, the musical sounds themselves may have a temporal structure that implies an intended reading of them as forming a narrative of Europe.

The ESC events and songs are of course never *only* about Europe. They always also thematize and signify other topics, such as love and grief, competition and cooperation, the power of song and music, or the role of television and other modes of mediated

communication. Much previous research in this field has focused on such other themes, not least the way that nation branding is played out in these events.

Here the focus is on stories about Europe found either in the framing events of those ESC finals that since 1989 have been staged in East European countries or in East European ESC entries. The interpretation of these events and songs will be contextualized in relation to (1) the documented intentions of their *producers* (politicians, broadcast authorities, artists, writers and composers); and (2) the *reception* history through which music listeners and media users interpret this music and use it to construct their own narratives of Europe. In both cases, this analysis can only hint at some selected aspects that might be relevant based on Internet sources such as ESC websites, YouTube clips, fan sites and blogs. Further, horizontal *comparisons* have then selectively been made with (a) West European ESC finals and songs from the same period, in particular since 2000; (b) some East European music from other genres; (c) official European anthems; (d) songs and music from other European peripheries and from Central and Western Europe, including independent or alternative songs with divergent views on Europe; and (e) a few examples of music linked to other continents or big countries. Most existing ESC research has studied the ESC as a total event, the nation-branding strategies activated by the competing entries and the identity themes of ethnicity, gender and sexuality.[13] Here the focus is rather on how Europe itself is in the ESC context narrated from its eastern periphery.[14]

Turning Eastward

Yugoslavia, non-aligned since 1948, was between 1961 and the post-1989 events the ESC's only Communist East European participant. The ESC started as a West European project; however, since 1965 it was also broadcast in Eastern Europe by Eurovision's counterpart: Intervision, organized by the Organisation Internationale de Radiodiffusion et de Télévision (OIRT). The OIRT was the East European equivalent to the EBU, and it included too Finland's YLE (but not Yugoslavia's JRT!) among its members. Mari Pajala has analysed the complex relations between the two, emphasizing elements of cooperation across cold war divides.[15] Especially in the late 1960s, the hosting presenters often referred to this wider audience and sometimes also addressed viewers in Russian as well as in English and French, creating an imaginary sense of communion across the Iron Curtain. But besides Yugoslavia, the competing countries were all from the non-Communist side of that division. From 1977 to 1980, the OIRT also held in Poland the Intervision Song Contest, as an alternative to the ESC.

Yugoslavia won in May 1989 – coinciding with the fall of the Berlin Wall – and therefore staged the 1990 final, shortly before the country violently disintegrated. Until Estonia won in 2001, all other finals took place in Western Europe (or outside Europe, with Israel in 1979 and 1999). The geopolitical balance started changing drastically after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and in particular after the millennium turn. In 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia participated for the first time, followed by Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania,

Poland, Romania, Russia and Slovakia in 1994 and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1998. Latvia followed in 2000, Ukraine in 2003, Albania, Belarus and Serbia and Montenegro in 2004, Bulgaria and Moldova in 2005, Armenia in 2006, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Montenegro and Serbia in 2007 and finally Azerbaijan in 2008. These new participants were welcome since they added something fresh to the show, probably invested much in the events and also multiplied the number of voters and brought in East European viewers/listeners with different tastes. These combined factors eventually turned out to make them victorious. The 2000s have therefore seen almost half of the ESC finals held in East European countries: Estonia, 2002; Latvia, 2003; Ukraine, 2005; Serbia, 2008; Russia, 2009; and Azerbaijan, 2012. There has thus been a striking post-1989 eastern turn in the history of the ESC, particularly emphasized in the new millennium.[16]

On each such occasion, surrounding presentations on television and on the ESC website constructed a mix of strategically designed narratives of Europe's past and future, where the host nation located itself in relation to Europe as an evolving totality. The national competition format itself frames all the narrations it contains. Competition is always double-edged: on the one hand, it implies some kind of animosity, of dividing up and taking sides for one's friends (presumably the team of one's own country) against one's enemies (other countries' songs), and on the other hand, competition also presupposes a shared understanding that the rules of competition are acceptable, and that victory is worth fighting for. This might be linked to Mouffe's aforementioned 'agonistic politics' but also to how Pierre Bourdieu's cultural sociology implicitly assumes that polarized social fields are based on a shared understanding that some key values and positions are worth fighting for. On such a basis, national teams and viewers – even when taking an ironic position – tacitly share a belief in Eurovision as a public space for constructing competing affective identifications since they invest in a narrative of European nations uniting around a common good, sharing an enjoyment in each other's voices: symbolically 'united in diversity', as the European motto goes. Even without any symbolic underpinning in the actual televised performance, the structural phenomenon of the ESC as such therefore acknowledges competitive collaboration between nations under a pan-European label. Pajala has found five rather permanent characteristics of European music broadcasts: a sense of liveness in the co-presence of a dispersed international audience; a rotating organization between participating countries; an emphasis on national characteristics; symbolic references to Europe at large; and an element of competition.[17] All this was, and remains, central to the ESC, which explains its continued success.

Initially, winners were selected by national juries, but elements of televoting have been added since 1997, and from 2009 a 50/50 system has been followed, in which half of the votes are awarded by a national jury and half by viewer televoting in that country. As more and more countries participated, and it was impossible to manage much more than two dozen entries in one programme, various forms of qualifying rounds were introduced from 1993, with the break-up of Yugoslavia into several countries, until a semi-final was introduced from 2004, and two semi-finals from 2008. As an extra bonus, having two semi-finals also

made it possible to group competitors in order to reduce the impact of neighbour voting, for instance by dividing the Nordic countries between the two semi-finals or keeping Cyprus and Greece apart. This may be regarded as yet another way to strengthen the common goal against mutual fighting, in a similar manner as through the fundamental rule that national audiences are not allowed to vote for their own entries. Still, the finals are full of mutual competition between nations (states, countries) and implicitly also between larger regions (religions, cultures, historical trajectories).[18]

The ESC thus offers a complex set of overlapping virtual maps of Europe. It is first framed by how transnational institutions such as the CoE, EU and the eurozone construct Europe. All EBU members form another map, as does each year's competitors and voting countries, flanked by other countries where the show can be seen. In a further step, the actual voting behaviour of viewers tends to inhabit these maps by constructing lines of sympathy. In a statistical study, Marta Blangiardo and Gianluca Baio have scrutinized the 1998–2012 televoting and found no negative bias, indicating that there are no persistent animosities between particular countries.[19] However, they found slight positive biases that indicate cultural affinity patterns constituting four main regions: South and Central Europe, the Balkan region, the former Soviet bloc and the Nordic region, to which also the UK and Ireland tend to belong. Such friendly neighbour voting reconstructs Europe as composed of distinct cultural taste regions. They are not invisible but tend to be acknowledged by many, including the EBU, which tries to counteract such effects. It does so by way of carefully designed voting rules and the semi-final allocation draw, which ensures that not too many countries from each of these regions compete in the same semi-final and hence can vote for each other. This counter-strategy subverts as well as confirms this spontaneous viewer activity, trying to counteract any tendencies for Europe to fragment into an inter-regional battlefield. In this way, the resulting total image of Europe is a contested compromise between different superimposed and mutually interacting or sometimes conflicting mappings, whether institutionalized or merely imagined. This complex negotiation process explains the tenacity in how such maps evolve, as many actors tend to stick to older conceptions where Europe still had its centre on the French–German border.

Eurovision songs that deal with European issues tend to become political, forming a precarious dividing line for the event. According to the ESC rules, 'political' statements are forbidden:

> The lyrics and/or performance of the songs shall not bring the Shows, the ESC as such or the EBU into disrepute. No lyrics, speeches, gestures of a political or similar [sic!] nature shall be permitted during the ESC. No swearing or other unacceptable language shall be allowed in the lyrics or in the performances of the songs. No commercial messages of any kind shall be allowed.[20]

The Georgian entry 'We Don't Wanna Put In' by Stephane & 3G fell foul of this rule and was duly banned in Moscow in 2009 since its title could be heard as anti-Putin, the then Russian

prime minister. On the other hand, the Ukrainian singer Verka Serduchka's 'Lasha Tumbai', which many thought sounded like 'Russia, goodbye', was allowed in Helsinki in 2007. Several songs with a political edge have still not been hindered, for instance Anastasiya Vinnikova's nationalistic 'I Love Belarus' in a 2011 Düsseldorf semi-final, Genealogy's 'Face the Shadow' (#16 in Vienna, 2015), whose words 'Face every shadow you denied' and 'Don't deny' may well refer to the Armenian genocide or the gay rights issues so prominent in the Malmö final in 2013. The 2014 Copenhagen final also had political repercussions as it coincided with the intensification of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. When one year later, in 2015, the local audience in Vienna repeatedly booed Russia, the EBU drowned out the noise by fake applause in a vain effort to depoliticize the soundtrack, and the local programme hosts felt obliged to exclaim: 'Please remember that our motto is "building bridges", and music should stand over politics tonight, and all our artists deserve equal treatment and respect, and it's all for the music!'

ESC narratives often interact closely with political narratives in a narrower sense, but they can also in themselves be seen as political media events – or at least these two aspects are hard to distinguish. This has often become clear when politicians from EU candidate nations have drawn analogies between ESC activities and the larger political transformations, publicly interpreting their ESC success as signalling the future integration of their countries into the EU.

On 18 May 2013, right before the Stockholm ESC final, Swedish TV programme 'Studio Eurovision' noted that the contest was 'born as a peace project': it had gone through the Balkan war, Franco's Spain and the conflict in North Ireland, and had 'influenced the whole development in Europe'; it became a cold war symbol for 'pleasure, pop and freedom', feared by Soviet authorities until Gorbachev lifted the Iron Curtain and 'let Eurovision flow freely in the Soviet Union'; Serbian President Slobodan Milošević tried in vain to stop Bosnian artists from participating in 1993; the ESC has 'taken a stand against a conservative Europe and embraced the gay movement', with the transgender Dana International winning for Israel in 1998 and the lesbian Marija Šerifović for Serbia in 2007; there was police repression of gay activists while artists and audiences celebrated diversity inside the Moscow arena in 2009. Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt was asked at the time why the ESC is so important, and he answered: 'First, it is fun, which we must not forget – this is the key thing. But then – as this live transmission shows – it has an influence. It unites; it creates a feeling of community; it mitigates some antagonisms. It also gives nations that have been oppressed or had problems an opportunity to suddenly step forward on the stage, feel pride in themselves.'[21] He was in Belgrade and in Latvia immediately after their respective victories, which they interpreted as important signs that 'they are now a part of Europe'. Bildt claimed that in Kosovo someone even believed ('and it can very well be the case') that Kosovo 'was more anxious to join the ESC than the UN'! He found it important that newly liberated countries could appear as independent and show themselves to the world: 'Communities of people and cultures are not just politics. Government and politics may quarrel, there may be various kinds of problems, but this unites in a completely different way'. Bildt mentioned

how recently warring Balkan countries still vote for each other in the ESC, which shows that 'after the war, music could actually bring them together again, which I found great'. Asked how to deal with undemocratic states, Bildt stressed that it is not regimes that compete, but people: 'We should try and unite people, and sooner or later the regimes will unite'.

In fact, all popular culture is always in some way political in Mouffe's sense of a 'dimension of antagonism, which can take many forms and emerge out of diverse social relations, but which can never be eradicated'.[22] The EBU's rule to ban everything 'of a political or similar nature' from the ESC is thus untenable, which the word 'similar' already hints that the EBU is probably well aware of. Popular culture can never be reduced to 'mere entertainment', even though many wish to do so: fans want their desires to be left alone, while elitists deny that the popular has any relevant content. It is probably wise to stop open conflicts between nations from erupting, but there can never be any determinate border between the ESC and politics. It is all about situated negotiation. The very setting of the ESC is arguably political – channelling antagonistic voices to form a sense of togetherness among a set of countries. This is done by organizing an 'ensemble of practices, discourses, and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and to organize human coexistence in conditions which are always potentially conflictual'.[23] The ESC and its songs express and comment on current issues that are partly political: war and peace, cooperation and competition, etc. It is therefore impossible to decide once and for all where the line is drawn between acceptable and non-acceptable political lyrics, speeches or gestures.

Viewers are not the same as citizens; however, symbolically, the public voting system has sometimes been seen to signify democracy, while jury groups represent meritocracy. In this way, the competition format has political implications that may confirm official European values in contrast to totalitarian regimes. However, there are limits to this parallel. The ESC is in many ways just a mock simulation of democratic rule, as the 'Big Five' phenomenon shows. In 1996, Germany failed to qualify for the final. Under the threat that such big contributors to ESC funding could withdraw completely, it was decided as of 2000 to let the EBU's largest funders always automatically qualify for the final. There were originally four such countries, but from 2011 Italy was also added, so the Big Four became the Big Five. The ESC rules of 2013 state that there shall be six guaranteed places, one for the host country and one each for France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK. This Big Five rule has a West European bias that compromises the event's 'democratic' legitimacy, but its basis in hard economic realities has made it difficult to abolish.

The contest between East and West is one of the most prominent polarities evident in the ESC and has been markedly present in recent years as a result of the post–cold war sentiments linked to the EU's eastern expansion. Opening up Europe is a recurrent theme in these events, as are elements of mutual distrust between 'old' Western and 'new' Eastern Europe, when, for instance, senior ESC nations used to being awarded high points suddenly lose ground to juniors with different tastes. There is a temporal as well as a spatial aspect to this. The ESC by tradition has since 1956 taken place in May, the optimal spring month. This also happens to be the month when Europe Day is held, celebrating the Schuman Declaration of

9 May 1950, which proposed a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a means to put an end to inter-European wars. Spring may in many ways be seen as a European month, with the awakening after a frozen winter symbolizing a political resurrection after years of divisive wars. This seasonal metaphor was employed when the events in North Africa and the Middle East starting in early 2011 were nicknamed 'the Arab Spring'. However, it can also be traced back to 1848, when a sudden wave of bourgeois revolutions, under the banner 'Spring of Nations' or 'Springtime of the Peoples', and combining nationalist and democratic sentiments with class struggle, spread from France to much of Europe and Latin America. Celebrating European values in May, therefore, has a long history and makes sense as a way of underlining a desire, after long periods of deep darkness, to inaugurate a new flourishing era of peace and prosperity.

Symbolically, opening up has also geographically become a key motif for the EU. One example is the euro banknotes with their windows, doors and bridges, which are meant to signify the mutual openness and cooperation between Europe's nations as well as communication with the surrounding world. Since World War II, this process has progressively expanded eastwards, with the ESC in the vanguard.

In the ESC finals, efforts are made to cross different spaces: the host city and its arena; visual representations of the host country; the participating nations, sometimes represented by crowds gathering to experience the event in other city squares; and the home environments where most viewers are.[24] In this framework, Europe is represented through the competing singers and songs as well as through references to the dispersed transnational audience.

Final Story: Opening Doors

Already before the expansion of the competition, the show was transmitted to parts of East Europe as well. Thus, in *Lausanne 1989*, the Swiss hosts emphasized that the big TV audience stretched 'all the way to the Soviet Union'. Yugoslavia won for the first time, but this eastward shift was not specifically commented upon, and the song itself (Riva: 'Rock Me') made no explicit reference to the East–West dimension.

This changed abruptly in *Zagreb 1990*, when the European identity's collapsing East–West divide was repeatedly alluded to. Being the first East European final host, Yugoslavia was still formally one single country; under President Josip Broz Tito, it had secured independence from the Soviet bloc and had a reputation for being relatively open and liberal. The Eurovision logo was travestied in a many-hued and childish pastel coloured version, with the letters looking like toy flowers, emphasizing playful diversity rather than serious homogeneity. The opening sequence featured an animated 'Euro-Cat' and various musicians playing classical or pop music, gradually switching to Marc-Antoine Charpentier's 'Te Deum', composed in the late seventeenth century and has since 1954 been the Eurovision theme tune.

Opening a visual interlude before presenting the votes, the middle-aged programme hosts made an analogy soon to be tragically contradicted by the host nation's collapse: 'We

think that Yugoslavia is very much like an orchestra […]. Just as in an orchestra, where the string section and the wind section, the keyboard players and the percussionists sit next to each other, so in Yugoslavia there are all different kinds of climates, cuisines and, of course, cultural influences altogether'. Just a few years before the explosive civil war started and dashed such idealism, Yugoslavia's internal diversity was with this musical metaphor described as a model example of how the ESC promised to help uniting Europe in its diversity (agonistically, to use Mouffean language). Having depicted various tourist sites, the interlude then ended with a sunset over the Mediterranean, some dramatic church bells and after that an animated sequence with the European stars spiralling upwards into the sky together with a seagull.

This was the year that Toto Cotugno won for Italy with his 'Insieme: 1992', with its striking refrain 'Unite, unite, Europe'. Moving stars were projected in the background to even further emphasize the political context. Cotugno thanked his Italian associates and then twice exclaimed, 'Per un'Europa unita!' (For a united Europe!), before repeating his winning tune, surrounded by audience members and lots of cameras. This song otherwise had much more substantial elements of a European narrative than the rest of the event.

In the following years, European unification continued to be on the agenda. In the *Rome 1991* final in Italy, an introductory animation showed stars coloured as national flags transforming into the star circle of the European flag. In *Malmö 1992*, the competition coincided with Europe Day (9 May), which the Swedish hosts commented thus: 'The map of Europe is rapidly changing. Old countries disappear, new ones are being formed. And when East is no longer East, and West is no longer West, Europe has become greater. This we celebrate today, the ninth of May, Europe Day'. Also, the EBU Executive Supervisor Frank Naef was asked about the future of the ESC, to which he answered that they had to 'analyse a new formula for the newcomers from East and West Europe'. The following finals also continued to show various animation sequences that played with the European flag symbol, and the Irish hosts in *Millstreet 1993* welcomed the new EU members:

> Now the countries of Europe have forged close economic and cultural links through the EEC, particularly in this, the first year of the European single market – a market made up of over 350 million European citizens. We welcome them, and all the other millions of viewers from the rest of Europe and around the world. Yes, the Eurovision Song Contest is growing bigger, and this year we offer a special welcome to three new states: Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Again, in *Dublin 1994*, the 'seven new states competing for the very first time in the Eurovision Song Contest' were welcomed. The Norwegian hosts in *Oslo 1996* likewise stressed Europe's new unity: 'This evening would like to unite Europe in music'. In *Birmingham 1998*, the host Terry Wogan's jokes placed himself and Britain outside Europe by symbolically referring to a band 'between here and Europe', thus implying that Britain was not really part of Europe. The Swedish hosts in *Stockholm 2000* excelled at speaking lots of languages to express the

transnational dialogue and polyglot diversity of the expanding continent, in a manner often repeated with slight variations in the following finals.

The first time the finals were staged in a former Soviet bloc country was in *Tallinn 2002*, after Estonia had won in Denmark the year before, and Prime Minister Mart Laar triumphed: 'We are no longer knocking at Europe's door. We are walking through it singing'.[25] This allusion to Estonia's so-called 'singing revolution', however, turned out not to be the whole truth. Communal singing has a strong tradition in Estonia, with the annual Estonian Song Festival, held since 1869, becoming an important mobilizing tool in the struggle for independence from the Soviet Union. In 1988, more than 300,000 participants openly called for independence.[26] Singing accompanied and fuelled a series of East European triumphs, but 'new' Europe's efforts to claim the same identity rights as 'old' Europe continued to meet dogged resistance.

By celebrating this victorious integration in those terms, Laar simultaneously confirmed the existence of the door itself, and that Estonia and the other new members were in the past practically and/or symbolically outside Europe. The statement signified a passage from exclusion to inclusion, but also it affirmed the border itself and the transformation of parts of Eastern Europe from being outside or at least peripheral to becoming European. Similar demarcations continue to be made in subsequent finals. East European hosts tend to argue for their countries to be included by stressing their valuable difference from the West. In contrast, West European shows are inclined to reproduce the image of old Europe being just recently expanded by the addition of 'new' geopolitical units on its eastern frontier.

Staging the Tallinn final represented Estonia's cultural and political geography as now at last again a part of Europe. The country was actively interacting with the rest of Europe and celebrating that its half-century of political, economic and social isolation behind the Iron Curtain had finally been broken.[27] Images were shown of masses watching big screens on the streets of cities all over Europe, implying that the whole continent was now at last focusing on Estonia and letting it into their hearts.

Estonia introduced a specific slogan or motto for that year, which has since become an annual tradition. Estonian television chose 'a modern fairy tale', making it possible to stage the show around the topic of fairy tales, for instance in the 'video postcards' between tunes.[28] The presenting duo's introductory comments made the most out of it, using almost-desperate rhetorical devices to fuse Estonia with Europe:

SHE: And Europe itself is the only continent that starts with E, because all the others start with A.

HE: And in Europe there are not many countries that start with E. Estonia is one of them!

SHE: So, this is the perfect place to hold the big E – the Eurovision Song Contest! […]

HE: Estonian history is like a fairy tale too, with a happy ending.

SHE: Just like tonight's show!

Estonian history was thus likened to a fairy tale whose happy ending finally closed the door on decades of suffering. Similar associations are often made, striving to link the ESC event to abstract themes of love and community as well as to larger political issues of unification. However, the TV commentary of older ESC member states, such as the UK, Germany and Sweden, often tended by employing ironic distancing to reconstruct the same Estonia as some kind of Eastern Other, with Sweden safely positioned in Western Europe, but Estonia remaining outside, vainly trying to enter.[29] In fact, the opening sequence and other elements of the hosting performance were ambivalent in this respect: it certainly strove to include Estonia within Europe, yet often stressed what is peculiar to this unique country, thus fuelling its own exclusion.[30] A similar struggle between inclusion and exclusion can be traced through all ESC events, as such mechanisms are inherent in the competition format, which opens up Europe for each host and participating nation while offering them a chance to present their unique difference.[31] However, it was given special intensity in the subsequent East European finals, where this European belonging could not be taken for granted in advance.

When Estonia and other Baltic and East European countries achieved independence and opted for a 'return to Europe', they did not erase the border between East and West. Instead, they moved it eastward by creating a new boundary between Europe and Russia as a new Eastern 'other'.[32] The whole emphasis of gaining independence implied an 'enemy' to be released from. Russia could not avoid playing that role due to not only its historical 'guilt' of having been its neighbours' oppressor but also its current dominance as the largest and strongest power in the region. The combination of these aspects makes it virtually impossible to even consider Russia ever becoming a full EU member, and Russia is thus doomed to remain an outsider in Europe. The 2002 Tallinn final discreetly contributed to such exclusion, for instance by showing right before the Russian entry a video postcard based on Alexander Pushkin's fairy tale of a caught goldfish, with the slogan 'Freedom' then appearing immediately before the Russian flag.[33] If the Baltic States had just escaped Russian influence to reunite with the rest of Europe, the topic of freedom from oppression had the side effect of raising a new curtain along Russia's western borders.

The implicit exclusion of Russia also required suppressing the internal ethnic differences within Estonia, as Paul Jordan has pointed out.[34] The video clips made no reference to multiculturalism and avoided any mention of the Russian-speaking minority, for instance by never referring to Estonia's third-largest city, Narva, with its Russian-speaking majority. This year, the theme of diversity was thus sacrificed in favour of national unity against the Russian big brother.

In 2002, Estonia's neighbour Latvia won, and the *Riga 2003* final chose the slogan 'an enchanting rendezvous'.[35] This year, the introduction to the event was a sequence depicting entering a galaxy of stars and then coming down to earth, where colourful flowers bloomed. An image of the Freedom Monument, an iconic site in downtown Riga concluded the video tour of the city, mixing new images with old photos. Live footage showed Russian cosmonauts sending real-time greetings from their international space station. Following an established

tradition, the visual star symbols were much used, deriving from the European flag's perfect circle of twelve stars, which is also echoed in the EBU and ESC logos. Presentations often let the stars stand for individual nations, artists or citizens but also more generally for festive fireworks of light and energy.

When Turkey hosted the final in *Istanbul 2004*, with the slogan 'under the same sky', the only clear European reference was to Istanbul as bridging two continents. The lack of other such explicit references to Europe is itself interesting to analyse but falls outside the scope of this study since Turkey is not a post-Communist state. In *Kiev 2005*, it was Ukraine's turn to arrange the final, again making plenty of use of floating-star graphics. 'Awakening' was a featured keyword in the aftermath of the 'Orange Revolution', which had revitalized democracy in Kyiv. At the official opening that year, Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Tomenko had emphasized the political importance of the event: 'This contest is a serious step for Ukraine towards the EU'.[36] When Greece won, President Viktor Yushchenko presented a special Ukrainian prize to the winners, using the word 'Europe' no less than five times: 'Dear friends, dear Europe, good evening! I am congratulating all of you for this wonderful European night. The golden pectoral I am holding in my hand is a Ukrainian prize to the best European song, to the best European performer, for the united Europe. Congratulations on your victory!'

Neither *Athens 2006* nor *Helsinki 2007* made much out of the European theme, with their slogans 'feel the rhythm' and 'true fantasy'. While Zagreb in 1990 had stressed the multicultural character of Yugoslavia, which soon became so disastrously compromised, Serbia 18 years later instead chose to stress its own firm unity. In *Belgrade 2008*, with the slogan 'the confluence of sound', the show started with a musical montage of a choir singing the Eurovision tune, followed by last year's Serbian winner, after whom the two presenters had a brief dialogue, including an interesting turn of the post–cold war discourse:

SHE: We have waited more than half a century for the Eurovision Song Contest to take place here on the banks of the Sava and Danube rivers.

HE: Good evening, Europe, where have you been all this time?

Here the fifty years of isolation were reinterpreted in a more self-assured manner, questioning the West's previous lack of attention rather than just celebrating vanishing boundaries. The challenging words 'where have you been all this time' not only seem to relate to the post–World War II period of isolation but also to the post-1989 period of negotiations for EU membership, during which there had been much hesitance to include Serbia after its Bosnian war. The sarcastic comment could resonate with how Serbs in large parts of (Western) Europe feel they have been abandoned and treated as evil pariahs in Western popular culture, making this ESC final craze appear as a sudden change of mood.

The sloganless *Moscow 2009* had the Montréal-based Cirque du Soleil performing at the opening to celebrate Russia's interest in circus arts. The presenting duo's subsequent

introduction expressed not a small country asking to be allowed into the European community but a great and proud superpower being benevolent towards its neighbours and critical of how the rest of Europe looks upon it through US American lenses. 'They say Russia is very cold, and it's always snowing', said one host, to which the other responded: 'And that is true… if you learned all you know about Russia from James Bond movies!'

The ESC was again envisaged as the shining galaxy that unites across borders, but the East–West balance was here different from when the Baltic States, escapees from the Eastern bloc, were hosting the event. Russia instead was depicted as a strong and self-sufficient other or neighbour, welcoming Europeans but not really striving to integrate with them, and certainly not as any returning family member (and even less so than, for instance, Turkey, which at least has a pending EU membership application). Russia thus placed itself in the same role as that in which it was positioned by those parts of East Europe integrating with the rest of Europe, for instance the 2002 Tallinn final tended to depict Russia as the new 'other' of Europe.

In *Oslo 2010* and *Düsseldorf 2011*, the topics of European identity and unity were again relatively peripheral. Instead, the power of musical co-presence was the focus point, with slogans 'share the moment' and 'feel your heart beat'. In *Baku 2012*, the situation was again slightly different, as the final took place in Azerbaijan, which is certainly far away from Central Europe both geographically and symbolically. It is instructive to study somewhat closer the dialectics with which this peripheral nation tried to link to Europe and at the same time had its peripheral status reconfirmed. 'Light your fire' was that year's slogan, accompanied by a kind of yellow, orange and red fire flower. Whirling stars were again a prominent feature of the visual graphics. 'Live from the easternmost part of Europe' was an

Figure 7.2. The logo and slogan of the ESC final in Baku 2012 (www.eurovision.tv/page/press/photo-downloads?gal=4 3373&type=Press).

expression used to emphasize the peripheral boundary origin of the transmission. The video postcards between the tunes combined aestheticized images from the host country with phrases describing its culture and nature: 'Azerbaijan – land of X' or 'Baku – X city' (where X was, for instance, 'mountains' or 'holy'). Sometimes these images and phrases seemed to correspond to the competing nation they introduced, for instance when mountains preceded Switzerland's entry and 'holy' came before Israel's. In this manner, a kind of homology was hinted at between the country and Europe as a whole, lending support to the claim that Azerbaijan might belong to Europe rather than Asia. In the second semi-final that year, an interlude potpourri of previous winning songs from Russia 2007, Serbia 2008, Norway 2009 and Germany 2010 ended with ABBA's 'Waterloo', 'the greatest winning song of all time'. This was also an attempt to integrate the host country in the heritage line of the past events. In the final itself, the opening acts and interludes tended to emphasize the national folk idioms that would feel rather exotic to contemporary urban audiences in the rest of Europe.

In the aforementioned 2013 Swedish TV programme, Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt looked back at this final. He underlined the importance of the ESC to Azerbaijan in 2012, 'which is not evidently democratic, to put it mildly': 'There it meant very much since it is a Muslim country, [under] strong pressure from more fundamentalist forces, and here everybody performs, in all types of dress, with joy… and this means very much to reinforce this country's deep-rooted secularism'. Similar to Estonia 2002, Azerbaijan tried to convince the world that it had knocked on Europe's door and could now walk through it, singing. Again, the ironic, sceptical commentary found in some West European TV presentations reinterpreted this in characteristic ways. Whereas Azerbaijan wished to convince everyone that it had now entered Europe's core and heart, what Western Europe often seemed to actually experience was rather a kind of brief tourist visit in an exotic foreign place.

However, one important bridging element should be mentioned. Not only did artists from different corners of Europe meet and sing together on the ESC stage. It is also striking that for each year, more and more entries are the result of transnational cooperation. In 2012, for instance, Swedish artists (singers, writers, composers and choreographers) were involved in at least ten nations' songs (Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Malta, Norway, Spain and the UK, besides Sweden).

In *Malmö 2013*, the slogan was 'we are one', strangely abandoning the diversity theme in favour of the melting-pot image of unification, which strikingly contrasted with the fragmenting realities in this time of crisis for the EU and the euro. An introductory animation depicted a little green caterpillar's journey from Baku through Greece, Italy, France, Switzerland, Germany and Denmark to Sweden, where it had turned into a butterfly. The journey made a characteristic bow shape in order to avoid East Europe as much as possible, and thus reproducing instead the dominance of the Big Five and the traditional South and West European touristic odyssey. In this way, a very traditional virtual map of Europe was tacitly reproduced, where, like in the 1950 Schumann Declaration and the ECSC, the French–German border was the central axis, and territories east of the old Iron Curtain were silently erased. A newly written ESC song, 'We Write the Story', by ex-ABBA

members Björn and Benny with DJ Avicii, called for a 'new Enlightenment' with justice, peace, liberty, equality, reason, conscience and human rights. An interval act in one of the semi-finals acknowledged the positive role of the eastern expansion, as the voice-over spoke: 'In the new millennium, the Eurovision Song Contest opened up its doors to even more countries and cultures, as the East came in to join the party. The East brought some well-needed energy back into the competition that we love so much.'

The *Copenhagen 2014* final further developed the uses of social media to enhance audience interactivity, under the slogan 'join us!' The opening sequence went from neighbouring Malmö to Copenhagen, starting with the significant words: 'There is one show / one competition / everybody wants to win', displayed in different languages while enthusiastic crowds waved national flags in the arena. What received most media attention was, however, that year's winner, Conchita Wurst (a drag persona of Thomas Neuwirth), who strangely combined a long white dress with a tidy beard.

Lastly, the *2015 Vienna* final took place in the central European city celebrating its 200-year anniversary of having hosted the Congress of Vienna, which reorganized Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, and to which Ludwig van Beethoven composed some of his most heroic and later least appreciated works. Hence, it was no coincidence that in the opening sequence, Vienna's Philharmonic Orchestra was shown from the Schönbrunn Palace performing a classical musical montage, starting with Charpentier's Eurovision theme and then launching into the European anthem, which since 1972 has been based on Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy' theme from the final movement of his Ninth Symphony (1823). These two European tunes were linked and thus symbolically married to each other by the overture to Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart's opera 'The Marriage of Figaro', which premiered in Vienna on 1 May 1786. This opening linked Vienna's central position in European classical music and European heritage to Europe's contemporary music and media culture. The year 2015 was also the ESC's 60-year anniversary, celebrated by letting Australia participate as a 'very special anniversary guest', and the hosts proudly announced that this final was broadcast live in China! These transgressions of Europe's territorial boundaries underlined its success but risked diluting its defining basis. The slogan this year was 'building bridges', which Conchita Wurst interpreted as expressing the fundamental ESC idea that 'everybody is allowed to come as they are […] and this is such a beautiful message from the Eurovision to the world – that it is all about respecting people!' At the opening, the hosting trio sang about building bridges that reach out to 'touch the borderlines', a children's choir sang of 'reaching out to the stars', the competing artists entered the stage on a 'magic bridge', and the hosts again talked about Eurovision building bridges 'between countries, cultures, music styles and, most importantly, between people'. Juxtaposed videos showed fans interacting virtually across European countries and cities but also in Australia, the US, South Africa, Sri Lanka, India and Japan. Despite Vienna being one of those cities that can claim to bridge East and West, East–West relations were not foregrounded this year, perhaps indicating that its role in structuring the European imagination had shrunk. What instead resurfaced was the theme of human rights, identity and difference: the Serbian singer Bojana Stamenov's 'Beauty Never Lies' (#10) contained

lines such as 'Finally I can say: yes, I'm different, and it's okay! Here I am!'; same-sex kisses were shown in the fan film montage and then on stage behind Lithuania's Monika Linkytė and Vaidas Baumila singing 'This Time' (#18); and in the Swedish winner Måns Zelmerlöf's concluding words, expressed with emotional earnest: 'We are all heroes – no matter whom we love, who we are or what we believe in – we are *all* heroes!'

Final Strategies: Four Positions

All in all, the finals held in Eastern Europe slightly more often referred to European unification than those in the West. When Europe was thematized in these events, the most common trope was to represent its vitalizing expansion and enjoyable diversity, based on the power of song to support togetherness. Europe was narrated as once divided and limited but increasingly integrated and expanding, with the powers of music and television media a key tool for this progressive development. Internal differences between competing nations and regions continued to threaten the overall unity but were also depicted as a source of energy and mutual attraction. Europe appears as an unquestionable entity, safeguarded by institutions such as on the one hand the EBU/ESC for music and television and on the other hand the EU for politics and the economy. This entity is never openly challenged; instead, a double struggle is staged: to expand the virtues of Europe to encompass the whole geographical continent and to open it up enough to fully accommodate the rich diversity of its new nations. These two tasks are necessarily intertwined, and the ESC is presented as a vanguard model in the cultural media arena for how this process ought to be pursued also in the political field. This highly ideological framing conceals the fact that among the growing set of participating countries, there are actually very divergent degrees of identification with any expressed idea of European culture. The success of the ESC is therefore very uneven, varying between countries and regions, and not necessarily corresponding to any real success of European values or cultural identities.[37]

Participants compete for being best at entertaining Europe, and this often includes efforts to depict oneself as the European par excellence. Such a struggle is visible both between the host nation and the TV commentators who present the transmission to their respective national audiences, and between the competing entries in each show. One may tentatively discern four main strategies or attitudes in each host country's relation to Europe's cultural space:[38]

1. *Exclusion*. In Eastern Europe, only Russia seemed content with being Europe's neighbour, hence, to some extent, accepting its own marginalization by its released neighbours. This strategy of (self-) exclusion was made possible by being proud of being big enough on its own. After Conchita Wurst's victory in 2014, some Russian and Belarus nationalists denounced the 'collapse' of the EU's moral values, depicting Europe as Russia's 'decadent' other. They declared that they did not need Europe at all, calling instead for a culturally and morally conservative Eurasian alternative. Despite

such criticism, Russia and other authoritarian regimes have so far remained in the ESC and competed with other European nations, sometimes with a tone of symbolic self-othering, sometimes (for example, Russia 2013–2015) with calls for peace that have in neighbouring countries been suspected of hiding propagandistic purposes related to contemporary geopolitical conflicts. The nearest West European counterpart to this strategy would be that of the UK, where some also tend to exclude themselves from Europe.

2. *Polarization*. Azerbaijan in 2012 presented itself as an exotic other that through its difference might be attractive to the rest of Europe. This strategy of polarization always risks that more Central European representatives will see this polar difference as an otherness that rather places the country outside the European boundaries, instead of accepting it as an attractive and vitalizing internal contrast. Outside of the former Eastern bloc, mainly countries such as Turkey and Israel tend towards this category as they play with rather double-edged discourses of Orientalism.

3. *Hybridization*. A more common strategy found in many regions of the continent is to present Europe as a diverse plurality and the host country as one of a colourful multiplicity of cultures that together form the hybrid totality of the ESC. This strategy of hybridization is most common among new East European participants, and it corresponds well to official EU policies as expressed in the European motto 'united in diversity'. One way to succeed with this strategy is to make repeated parallels between the diversity of the host country and that of the rest of Europe. This shows that hybrid diversity is a fundamental condition for them both, so that adding the host country does not fundamentally break up any previous unity but conforms to the European standards. As shown in the case of Estonia 2002, the strategies could be quite mixed, since depicting a nation as contributing to the diversity of Europe in general could well be combined with suppressing any internal diversity within that nation.

4. *Assimilation*. A more ambitious strategy is one of full assimilation, where the host country's unique difference is downplayed; rather, it is taken for granted that the host country is already a core part of what is typically European. This could, for instance, be done by underlining how the nation's cultural traditions have always been an integral element of the European whole. It is easier for the more established parts of the European integration process to succeed with such a strategy. East European hosts have so far not tried this, but one may expect such examples to appear in the future, for instance if Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic ever host the event. Outside Eastern Europe, countries such as Sweden, Ireland and Greece could switch between elements of this strategy of assimilation and the previous one of hybridization.

However, these strategic attitudes are not as such yet actual narrations of Europe, but rather positions taken towards Europe and thus part of the narrative set-up.[39] When Europe explicitly figures in these events, it is either as the collective to which all participants belong or as the addressee of the host's call for viewers to enjoy and to vote: 'Hello, Europe!' As for

the narrative process, the finals' framing events mainly seem to perform Europe as always celebrating its growing strength and perfection, though some East European hosts also add a discrete element of remembering now-overcome hardships. Narrative elements are thus certainly present in the framing ESC events but more developed in the competing songs, to which I will therefore now turn my attention.

Songs of Europe

Among the more than 1,400 songs performed in the ESC finals or semi-finals between 1956 and 2015, seven had 'Euro' in their titles and a lyrical topic that explicitly thematized Europeanness – the Belgian group Telex, 'Euro-vision' (#17 in the 1980 Hague final); the French group Cocktail Chic, '*Européennes*' (#17 in Bergen, 1986); Ireland's Liam Reilly, 'Somewhere in Europe' (#2 in Zagreb, 1990); Italy's Enrico Ruggeri, '*Sole D'Europa*' (#12 in Millstreet 1993); Spain's Rosa, 'Europe's Living a Celebration' (#7 in Tallinn, 2002), the Lithuanian group InCulto, 'Eastern European Funk' (did not qualify from a 2010 Oslo semi-final) and Montenegro's Rambo Amadeus, 'Euro Neuro' (semi-final in Baku, 2012).[40] The Italian singer Toto Cotugno's 'Insieme: 1992' (1990), with its prominent call for Europe to unite, should be included among them.[41] However, dozens of other songs also referred to European issues without mentioning it in their titles.

In West European ESC songs of Europe before the turn of the millennium, two main topics stood out. One was a touristic celebration of Europe's rich historical heritage, focusing on the urban culture in the traditional western part of the continent. Always the beautiful West and South European capitals were celebrated, combining holiday pleasures with European history's cultural treasures, and with travel and mass media as communicative resources binding them together and making them accessible to all Europeans. Europe was in those songs mainly described as a united, but diverse, site of pleasure, an old, but still vital, continent, sometimes juxtaposed as an ancient alternative to the more youthful and technically advanced US.

A second topic that became most prominent from 1990 onwards was the blessing of an intensified and expanding European integration. Many West European songs from 1990 to 1993, in particular, expressed the idea of a united Europe as attractive. The post-1989 period was formative for unification, preparing for the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, which established the EU. The former Eastern bloc's inclusion still lay in the future; however, the ground was prepared by tunes that called for uniting the whole of Europe, not just its Western half, though none explicitly mentioned Eastern Europe as such.

Looking closer at the 1989–2015 period, in nearly 90 entries (less than ten per cent of the total number of participating songs in finals and semi-finals), one can discern lyrical topics that can easily be heard to imply European issues. More than 50 of them are from Eastern Europe. Only two of those had 'Europe' in their name (Lithuanian group InCulto's 'Eastern European Funk', 2010, and the Montenegrin artist Rambo Amadeus' 'Euro Neuro',

2012), but a few more mentioned 'Europe' in their lyrics, and the others seem relevant since they name different European nations or talk about borders, unification, peace or a future collective utopia in ways that appear to refer to collective European issues rather than to just the general and ordinary human love experience.

Deciding which metaphors are associated with Europe is a matter of interpretation, and the song selection made here is therefore too arbitrary to allow any strict statistics. However, since 1989, perhaps twice as many East European ESC songs have seemed to have had a relevant European topic than their West European counterparts.

To begin with, a glance at the German songs from 1989 onwards hints at how the new era started. With the reunification of East and West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Germany can be seen as an ambiguous case, fusing traits from the West European centre and the former Eastern bloc. In the Swiss Lausanne final of 1989, just as East Germany began to collapse, Nino de Angelo, in a black suit and white shirt, standing still and alone with his microphone, performed the intense ballad '*Flieger*/Flyers' (#14), singing about a 'you' and 'me' who not long ago flew so high in 'an aeroplane full of young dreams'. 'You' remain anchored in 'my' heart, and 'I' remember that 'you' often said: 'we are strong, we two'. Considering the contemporary situation and the ESC context, this might have been heard as a poetic reference to the still two separate Germanys longing for a reunion. By the 1990 Zagreb final in Yugoslavia, the Berlin Wall had been open for several months, and just two weeks after this ESC final, the two states signed a reunification treaty. That year's German entry was Chris Kempers and Daniel Kovac's '*Frei Zu Leben*/Free to Live' (#9), explicitly about the new feeling of being 'free to live and look forward / step by step, hand in hand'. Miracles can happen: 'we simply just have to go together across all borders'. This was again a solemn ballad, now with a more rock gospel sound. The singing couple dressed like the year before in black and white, but this time discretely moving around, with a rock group decked out in white standing behind them.

The following year after Toto Cotugno's victory, the 1991 final in Rome featured Germany's Atlantis 2000 with '*Dieser Traum Darf Niemals Sterben*/This Dream Must Never Die' (#18). No less than six singers stood on stage: five suit-and-tie men in black and white plus one woman in black trousers and a glittering but not very 'sexy' top. The music was a mighty ballad with full orchestral backing, recalling a 'time for lies' that 'will have to come to an end': 'when there's no more hate, we will be forever free'. There were allusions to a past world of surveillance and control and hopes for a future in freedom. In the Swedish city of Malmö in 1992, a group called Wind sang '*Träume Sind Für Alle Da*/Dreams Are There for Everybody' (#16). This time the singing woman had a pure white dress, and her male partner (playing the electric guitar) just had a red jacket over his otherwise pristine white clothes. The music was a happier and more relaxed swinging tune with full orchestra and much trumpet. Again, the topic was about dreaming of a better future: 'tomorrow is another day', 'it is never much too late', etc. The previous hopes obviously had not been fulfilled.

In Millstreet, Ireland, in 1993, the pop and rock band Münchener Freiheit sang '*Viel Zu Weit*/Much Too Far' (#18), in which utopia was even further displaced. Again, the group

was dressed in white, with a grand piano on stage and string orchestra backing. The music was rather laid back, with a slowly falling chorus melody in a melancholic minor mode. In 1988, the band had a UK one-hit wonder with 'Keeping the Dream Alive', which later featured on 'American Idol'. That tune had also talked of dreams: too lofty but nevertheless kept alive. Five years later, the ESC entry was troubled and pessimistic: 'Somewhere in time and space / there must be distant worlds / untouched and beautiful / but filled with life / […] But that is much too far away / out there in the darkness / Much too far / Here is our reality'. The song placed Paradise in the distant past at the beginning of life and ended with the unsettling question: 'What came then?'

The impact of dreaming about a brighter future seemed to have ceased, and the more pessimistic prognosis of postponing utopia was not particularly successful. Having for three years finished either 16th (once) and 18th (twice) in the finals, Germany changed course, switching from 1994 onwards to competing with less overt political songs about love, partying and fun. This turned out to be much more successful, as the young girl group MeKaDo's catchy and happy upbeat 'Wir Geben *'ne Party*/We're Throwing a Party' with its deliberately smooth r'n'b feel rocketed Germany up to #3 in Dublin in 1994. The five German songs from 1989 to 1993 together offer a fascinating but rather bleak and gloomy mini-story of the rise and fall of reunification dreams. The present was characterized as caught between dream and reality and between past and future, wavering between hopes and disillusion. These songs focused on Germany but were metaphorically also relevant to the complete reintegration of ex-Eastern bloc countries into the European community.

Before overviewing the whole song material, a few prominent examples will serve as illustrations of how such narratives may be constructed.

In the 2003 Riga final, the Polish band Ich Troje's '*Keine Grenzen – Żadnych Granic*/ No Borders' (#7) was performed in a mixture of German, Polish and Russian.[42] It painted peaceful unification as a dreamt utopia and did not explicitly hint at any past glory. The singer wished to be an astronaut looking down at the earth: 'No borders, no flags / From up there, the world is just beautiful / No countries, no nations / No wars can be seen from up there'. This 'unlimited world without flags […] without quarrels, explosions, rage and wars' knows 'no stupid quarrels, no different races / no wars, no states' and is therefore 'just beautiful'. The slow, romantic singer–songwriter ballad was performed by a couple where the man in grey patched outfit and red-dyed hair possessed a husky, hoarse voice full of professional charismatic intensity; the woman sported a white dress and a queen-like silvery coat. The blue stage was decorated with planets, a map of the globe and twelve-star circles reminding of the European flag. Europe was also present not only through the ESC context of performance but also in the symbolically seamless combination of the three languages – firmly rooting this general topic in a European West–East setting – in the spirit of the European motto 'united in diversity'. In the final, Germany gave this tune the maximum 12 points, while Russia awarded it nul points – symptomatic of how the East–West divide had moved eastward after the cold war. This was at a time of a gradual rapprochement in

Polish–German relations, unlike Polish–Russian relations. The song was an invitation to friendship across the Oder–Neisse Line, which after World War II became one of Europe's and the world's greatest divides and whose transgression could therefore serve as a model for global peace through universal transnationalism.

Katrin Sieg's critical analysis of this song has argued that 'the band's choice to embody this integrationist discourse in a family that allegorizes different civilizations, activates essentialist divisions between genders and generations which have long fed colonial fantasies'.[43] She supports this with an analysis of the languages used in the song. The woman sings mainly in Polish, the man mainly in German (both also sing some lines in Russian), which Sieg believes genders the East–West relations in an orientalizing manner. He moves around; she is static and repeatedly places her hand on her belly, which Sieg believes reminds viewers that the female singer was pregnant at that time. The man embodies 'active, western modernity', while she stands for 'the passive, mythic, fecund East'. Her way of signifying Poland as a mother lines up with a long and rather conservative historical tradition. The end, where he kneels before her and she seems to bless his bowed head, Sieg interprets as indirectly conveying 'religious connotations of transcending earthly strife', supporting 'a universalist rhetoric of peace, freedom and brotherhood'.[44] East–West relations are thus ethnified, gendered and

Figure 7.3. Lithuania's InCulto performing 'Eastern European Funk' in Oslo 2010 (photo Ane Charlotte Spilde; es.wikipedia.org/wiki/InCulto).

eroticized through a mythic family imagery that seems to contradict the lyrics' dissolution of boundaries and instead reinforces and naturalizes international power differences.[45]

This example may generally be interpreted as telling a typical European story about international relations. The tension between celebrating inter-European borders and erasing them is one that underpins and drives the whole ESC event, which like sports games and other contests is on the one hand based on fierce competition between representatives of different countries, and on the other celebrates a shared identity, in that it is supposed to promote peaceful friendliness and coexistence and offer a space for appreciating mutual diversity. The narrative locates the unifying erasure of borders not in the present but in a distant future, as a utopian dream and task, thereby implicitly confirming and perhaps even reifying them in the contemporary context.

The first East European song entry that actually had 'Europe' in its title was the Lithuanian group InCulto's 'Eastern European Funk' (2010), which in an Oslo semi-final presented a challenging perspective on unification seen from the 'new' part of the continent:

> You've seen it all before
> We ain't got no taste we're all a bore
> But you should give us a chance
> 'Cause we're just victims of circumstance
> We've had it pretty tough
> But that's ok, we like it rough
> We'll settle the score
> We survived the reds and two world wars
> Get up and dance to our Eastern European kinda funk!
> Yes Sir we are legal we are, though we are not as legal as you
> No Sir we're not equal no, though we are both from the EU
> We build your homes and wash your dishes,
> Keep you your hands all soft and clean
> But one of these days you'll realize Eastern Europe is in your genes

The five boys first made rhythmic sounds by just beatboxing, and played air-guitar and other imaginary instruments, perhaps illustrating doing hard work. This explicit class perspective on European interrelations is unique in the ESC context, and was maybe too provocative to allow the tune to advance to the final. With pantomime movements, they illustrated housebuilding and dishwashing, then showing their white hands to the audience before touching their genitals to signify the genetic invasion from Eastern Europe. At the end, they ripped off their long trousers and continued dancing in shiny silver shorts. The music was a funky modern dance tune with a few rhythmic, but slightly anarchic, Balkan brass elements giving it a mildly eastern sound.

This song expressed the Schuman Declaration idea of rising from war disasters to glory, but transposed onto the post-Communist experience and adding an East–West tension

to the equation. Its roots dated back almost two millennia to at least the division of the Christianized Roman Empire into a western and an eastern half. InCulto made explicit the mutual distrust that has surfaced both politically and within the ESC. Since the early 1990s, the ESC has repeatedly debated how to balance the taste structures of Eastern and Western Europe, which came to disturb the already-precarious balance between North and South European preferences. As always, this song was thus typical of its time, after the first euphoria of eastward EU expansion had faded but had not yet been transformed into crisis management. In 2015, the Romanian group Voltaj with '*De La Capăt*/All Over Again' touched upon related topics in the accompanying gloomy b/w video images showing an abandoned young child trying to reach his parents working abroad: 'More than 3 million Romanians are working abroad, trying to make a better life for their children. Unfortunately, the children are left behind'. This hinted at the difficult cross-European migration problems, but the song lyrics actually did little to further address this issue, except the vague chorus, 'You will be the reason to start all over again', and to strengthen the statement, at the end the singer, therefore, exclaimed: 'Don't leave the children behind!'

'Eastern European Funk' thus presented itself as a peripheral voice narrating a story about Europe's destiny to be forced to acknowledge and integrate its own forgotten, subordinated and disorderly eastern half, transforming it from a repressed underside to an actually enjoyable equal part. Such lyrics could never have represented a non-Eastern country. 'We' were depicted as a kind of European proletariat, but instead of looking for a fight, it invited all of Europe to 'get up and dance', and finally predicted that 'you' in the affluent West will one day 'realize Eastern Europe is in your genes': that the initially ugly, tasteless and poor Eastern Europe is really an integral part of the continent and can also offer some pleasure in the form of these funky tunes. Again, music is the main agent of change from hostility and suppression to mutual recognition and unification in diversity.

This can be interpreted as a kind of colonialist story in line with Hegel's famous master–slave dialectic (see Cederberg's chapter in this book). In this reading, European unification becomes an example of how through migrant labour and other dependencies based on imperialist relations of the peripheral East to the dominant West, established communicative links also enable, besides exploitation and subordination, a mutual learning and creative impulse. With no reference to any happy origin, and describing a divided present that is being unified so that old hostilities can become shared pleasures, 'Eastern European Funk' fits into this narrative category as well.

This is in some way true too for Rambo Amadeus' (real name Antonije Pušić) 'Euro Neuro' (Montenegro, 2012), which did not qualify from its semi-final, this time in Baku. The composer, writer and performer is described as a 'charming king of jovial pop', making 'crazy jazz-funk music, interesting texts and unpredictable live performances, spiced with brutal satire'.[46] This is a valid description also of his song 'Euro Neuro', where he rapped in broken East European English, backed by heavy beats intertwined with Oriental fragments.

Figure 7.4. Montenegro's Rambo Amadeus performing 'Euro Neuro' in Baku 2012 (photo Anton Mukhin, used by permission; www.ridus.ru/news/33769).

Euro sceptic, analphabetic
Try not to be hermetic! A-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha…
Euro neuro, don't be sceptic, hermetic, pathetic, analphabetic
Forget all cosmetic, you need new poetic, aesthetic, eclectic, dialectic
Euro neuro, don't be dogmatic, bureaucratic; you need to become pragmatic
to stop change climatic, automatic.
Need contribution from the institution to find solution for pollution
to save the children of the evolution
Euro neuro, Euro neuro,
Euro neuro – monetary break dance
Euro neuro, Euro neuro,
Euro neuro – give me a chance to refinance […]
Euro neuro, I don't like snobbism, nationalism, puritanism,
I am a different organism. My heroism is pacifism, altruism,
I enjoy bicyclism, liberalism,
tourism, nudism, optimism, it is good for rheumatism […]

Behind Rambo stood a wooden Trojan Horse by whose closed door hung a white peace or surrender flag. From behind the horse suddenly came three young male dancers who sometimes breakdanced in the background, and sometimes unfurled three white–red

rolls of song lyric lines. At the end, one of them was wrapped in the rolls and carried out by the other two. The song lyrics linked the European financial crisis to the global climate crisis and called for joint unbureaucratic action. The lyrics were in contrast to anti-EU sentiments ('don't be sceptic'), asking for a 'contribution from the institution to find a solution for pollution', and for a 'chance to refinance'. The song called for 'non-hermetic' openness both among national citizens and within EU institutions. It seemed to argue that just like the Greeks who left their wooden horse at the city gates of Troy as an offering to Athena, the goddess of war, and inside concealing a deadly weapon (in that case in the form of armed men), so does the EU; its euro currency presents itself as a peace project but is in reality unleashing forces that are destroying the welfare of the ordinary citizen. The monetary policies fetter the free people, just as those rhetorical word strings tied up the poor man who was then carried off the stage as a lame prisoner. Again, this song could only have been sung at this particular moment when Europe was in a deep financial crisis. It would have made little sense ten years before when the European economy still seemed to be growing.

In an MA thesis on nation branding in the ESC, Albert Meijer has a partially different interpretation of 'Euro Neuro'.[47] First, he stresses that Antonije Pušić clearly is a comedian whose performing persona Rambo Amadeus is meant to appear like 'a drunk man talking politics in a bar'. Second, he interprets the wooden animal as a Trojan donkey rather than a horse. In the song's promotional video, Amadeus rides a donkey through tourist environments (from open landscapes to a discotheque). On stage, he shows his empty pockets, indicating that he has lost or wasted all his money. The music mixes self-exoticizing Balkan reed instruments with hyper-Western hip-hop rhythms. Amadeus reflects on the euro-crisis and calls for the EU to support its weaker member states. But Amadeus is not necessarily Pušić, and the lyrical message may be ambiguous. Meijer points to the fact that Montenegro, with its largely pro-EU population, has the euro as its official currency, is a candidate country for EU membership and receives financial support. Amadeus' Eurosceptic tone may therefore perhaps not represent Pušić or Montenegro but can be understood as a satirical parody of profligate nations like Greece who beg for financial support. In Meijer's reading, the Trojan donkey and the many '–isms' with Greek origin also point towards Greece. Meijer concludes that the song has a double message: it is both a criticism of European institutions for being too bureaucratic and not sufficiently supporting poor countries, as well as an attack on profligate countries. He hears words like 'give me a chance to refinance' as drunk bar talk, and argues that the performance intends rather to place Montenegro in Europe's smart and urban centre, in contrast to backward neighbours like Greece. Perhaps it is not the euro as such but instead Greece and other countries that are the problem – sneaking their way into EMU (European Monetary Union) collaboration and destroying it by not managing their economies.

This might surely be a relevant subtext, but it is still hard to avoid the main, primary storyline, according to which the cool guy formulates an alternative solution to Europe's financial and ecological crisis. In any case, the narrative again avoids mentioning any

glorious past, instead telling about contemporary problems and hinting at a better future if only the right measures are taken.

Narrative Dimensions of the Songs

With these few examples in mind, it is now time to more systematically overview how all the ESC songs examined here elaborate the four key features or dimensions of narrative: set-up, process, mode and meaning:[48]

1. *Set-up*. Narratives represent a world populated by characters and objects given identifying characteristics and roles, and are told by a narrator. As for peripheral ESC songs, the narrator most commonly represents an East European individual or nation, whereas Europe is either implicitly present as the world of the narration or explicitly thematized in the form of a symbolic character.
2. *Process*. Narratives both are and represent temporal sequences: they form chains of signifiers that are supposed to be 'read' after each other while also signifying some series of consecutive events. Their diachronic ordering is therefore central, as the narratively constructed world undergoes a transformation through a series of events shaping a temporal flow, a (hi)story with some kind of beginning, middle and end, located in a sequence from past to the contemporary present to the implied (feared or hoped) future.
3. *Mode*. The narrative can take on many forms, such as showing/telling, linear/nonlinear, etc. It can also be told in various moods, such as tragic or comic, serious or ironic, apologetic or critical. Such modes are established by a combination of textual and contextual features, and, in turn, tend to determine how readers or users interpret the narrative.
4. *Meaning*. The story links characters and sequences of events into a narrative whole that gives some kind of identifying meaning to Europe. Narratives tend to convey certain core values and identifications that an analysis of the previous features help discover.

All narratives are positioned in larger webs of signification and intertwined with other narratives they integrate or contradict. Hence, interpretation needs to include elements of comparison with other narratives. Bearing all these features in mind, my song analysis will mainly focus on the set-up and process dimensions, which together make it possible to identify prominent tropes of Europe. The reason being the selected genre of ESC songs already delimits the modes and contexts relevant in this case.

Narrative Set-up: Positioning Europe

As for their narrative *set-up*, several West European ESC songs have given Europe an acting role in the story told. Only the French group Cocktail Chic identified the singing 'I' as European in 'Européennes' (1986): 'We're European girls'. Toto Cotugno in 'Insieme: 1992'

(1990) addressed Europe as a 'you' when taking the role of an Italian urging Europe ('not far away') to unite. It was more common to make Europe a third-person agent, for instance the Belgian group Telex in 'Euro-vision' (1980) sang that 'old Europe cheers the country that wins'; Italy's Enrico Ruggeri in '*Sole D'Europa*' (1993) begged for the sun to 'cover Europe with light'; and Spain's Rosa sang 'Europe's Living a Celebration' (2002). In 'Dancing Lasha Tumbai' (#2 in Helsinki, 2007), Ukraine's Verka Serduchka exclaimed that 'Europe is dancing', and Georgia's Stephane & 3G in 'We Don't Wanna Put In' (withdrawn before the Moscow final in 2009) explained, 'I like all Europe countries and I love Europe', but no other East European songs gave Europe any active narrative role.

More commonly, Europe has appeared as the narrative context of the story told. This was the case with the Irish singer Liam Reilly's 'Somewhere in Europe' (1990), when Ireland's Dervish in 'They Can't Stop the Spring' (#24 in Helsinki, 2007) celebrated that 'the curtain has been raised, and Europe's all one stage', or when Finland's Paradise Oskar in 'Da Da Dam' (#21 in Düsseldorf, 2011) sung about a boy who 'knows each European country by heart'. An example from Eastern Europe was when Hungary's Gjon Delhusa in 'Fortuna' (semi-final in Oslo, 1996) depicted how the polar star was 'sending an urgent message over Europe', calling for singers from different countries to gather. References to the ESC media context itself appear from time to time, for instance when Russia's Polina Gagarina in 'A Million Voices' (#2 in Vienna, 2015) sang: 'Now as the world is listening / from cities and satellites'. Such songs thereby place their stories firmly on European soil and by extension connect them to European issues.

Europeanness can also appear as an identifying characteristic, for instance when Lithuania's InCulto in 'Eastern European Funk' (2010) concluded that 'Eastern Europe is in your genes'. Without mentioning the word 'Europe', it was clearly signified when the Romanian entry Monica Anghel & Sincron in the tragic 'Rugă pentru pacea lumii/Prayer for World Peace' (a 1996 Oslo semi-final) complained that 'we are born too much on the eastern side of the map' and therefore have had to shed tears and blood, abandoned by God. In some cases, Europe as such only indirectly appeared through the mentioning of the ESC itself, for instance when the UK entry Scooch in 'Flying the Flag (For You)' (#22 in Helsinki, 2007) sang about a 'Eurovision flight', or when Lithuania's LT United in 'We Are the Winners' (#6 in Athens, 2006) described themselves as 'winners of Eurovision'. Another indirect presence was in Montenegrin Rambo Amadeus' 'Euro Neuro' (2012), where Europe is implied by its € currency.

In the remaining majority of songs, Europe is not even mentioned but serves as the contextual framework for the drama told, and thus as an implicit shared identification of the textual 'I' and 'you'. For instance, roughly a dozen songs named a number of European nationalities that cojointly mapped a common geopolitical space. This could be bilateral, with a link to or contrast made between two main poles, or more widely international, when different countries and/or capital cities were lumped together. In both cases, a shared participation in the same continent was evident, even when there was no truly transnational explicit naming of Europe as a distinct totality. One can in this respect identify two balancing

or competing models of European unification. The most common was to construct Europe as an additive composite of individual nations: different flags, songs and/or peoples sharing the same moment of love, for instance. The other model would instead start with the European totality and construct it as an organic whole, hence giving national and other divisions only secondary importance.

The latter approach is particularly absent. It is, in fact, impossible to find anyone from Eastern Europe who took up the theme from 'Insieme: 1992', visualizing Europe as a homogenous totality: 'a woman without borders' where 'You and I' are united as one, 'under the same flags', 'uniting more and more'. Cotugno's gendered way of depicting Europe as a woman is, of course, a highly problematic objectification that from a masculine perspective inscribes citizenship in a familial sphere of imagination, which tends to naturalize social relations and symbolic traditions.[49] But even if it is a relief that such images have not flourished recently, it may be a bit surprising that so few voices dare to speak of East and West Europe as an integral community. National boundaries certainly remain dominant in this context.

Whereas before 1989 the North–South polarity was the strongest line of cultural division in the ESC, since then the West–East polarity is undoubtedly the most prominent one. It is the only apparent regional tension evident in this material, but the songs take varying positions regarding the European project. The four attitudes mentioned for the final events are also present in the individual songs.

1. *Exclusion*. Only some Russian songs clearly employ a strategy of self-exclusion, accepting its own marginal status in relation to Europe, and being a self-sufficient superpower without any explicit desire to merge with the others. When Buranovskiye Babushki sang 'Party For Everybody' (#2 in Baku, 2012), the charming group of elderly women baked around a big oven, singing and dancing to a kind of folk tune. The song was an invitation to 'kids' and 'relatives' to come 'back home' to a party with happy dancing: 'We are singing extremely strongly / because we are together!' The overflowing happiness was linked to strength and to a traditional, already-achieved unity. The 'we' here appeared to be rather Russia than Europe. Like the whole 2009 Moscow final, the song was a friendly invitation to Russia as a strong alternative to the internally divided and weakened EU, rather than a step towards placing Russia within Europe. The phrase 'waiting for kids coming back home' might actually be heard as an invitation to ex-Soviet lost sons to return to Mother Russia's embrace, in which case the words 'the relatives have come' could stand for the rest of Europe seen as a separate neighbour with a shared history. The song may thus be interpreted as expressing a mellow kind of Soviet nostalgia.[50] Mumiy Troll with 'Lady Alpine Blue' (#12 in Copenhagen, 2001) likewise contrasted the 'Siberian' 'I' with a Central European lady whom he courted but with 'no promises' – hardly ground for any joint treaties.

    Prime Minister's 'Northern Girl' (#10 in Tallinn, 2002) represented (Western!) Europe by way of pretty but non-threatening girls from Rome, Paris, Lisbon and Madrid, pushed

into the background as irrelevant to the desires of the singing 'I', possibly a nationally non-specific male due to the lyrical content, the English language and the multi-ethnic singer mix, even though the song competed for Russia. An intertextual reference may be heard to the Beach Boys' 'California Girl' (1965): in both cases, the 'I' has met so many pretty girls around the world, but only one has won his heart. The identity of the 'Northern Girl' remained mysterious – 'a real mystery', a 'Snow Queen' and 'Northern Star', a 'Lady Ice' with 'frosty eyes' who 'never cries' and is 'tough like a pearl'. One line of interpretation is that she might have represented the Nordic (or perhaps even Estonian, as a gesture to that year's host of the final) blonde, finally melting for the charms of the singing Russian boy. However, she may also stand for Russia itself, remaining a forbidding but alluring mystery for Europe. In any case, the song carefully upheld the divisions rather than suggesting any transgressive unification.

This self-sufficient Russian tradition changed only in Malmö in 2013, when Dina Garipova with 'What If?' (#5) took a different stance, asking, 'What if I could make us unify?' and then continuing:

What if we would open up the doors?
What if we could help each other more? […]
What if we all opened our arms?
What if we came together as one? […]
Together we can change the path of time
Together we have power to decide […]
Let's unite and make a change
Let's unite and write a new page
Come on sinners, come on saints
Have faith […]

Directed towards Europe at the ESC, this invitation to cooperate in the spirit of 'Insieme: 1992' thus temporarily broke with the previously dominating tendency for Russia to pursue a strategy of self-sufficient exclusion. Garipova, with her long black hair and wearing a lace-like white dress, sang this serious ballad backed by strings, piano and percussion. The song itself created a hot, gospel-like r'n'b vibe with four backing vocalists in white and light grey standing close behind her, holding and shaking each other's hands to visually illustrate the song's lyrical message.

2. *Polarization*. A couple of East European songs chose a strategy of polarization that depicted a deep East–West divide. In the Romanian entry 'Prayer for World Peace' by Monica Anghel & Sincron (1996), 'we' were 'born too much on the eastern side of the map', and the Lithuanian song 'Eastern European Funk' (2010) painted a vivid contrast between the tough and tasteless East and the West, which has yet to accept that both sides are part of Europe. Such polarizing moves may serve to highlight the existence of a radical plurality within the confines of this continent, but it may

also risk reifying stereotypic dichotomies. The actual outcome depends on how the polarities are further developed within the narrative in question: whether the two sides are locked into fixed distinct camps or if their juxtaposition opens up into a mutual interaction across the boundaries – the two mentioned songs tend more towards these latter dynamics, moving towards the next category.

3. *Hybridization*. There are also a few examples of hybridization. The Russian group t.A.T.u in '*Ne ver', ne boysya*' (#3 in Riga, 2003) vaguely talked about 'different people', but the Bosnian & Herzegovinian entry Feminnem's 'Call Me' (#14 in Kyiv, 2005) heard a 'million hearts' that 'beat as one': 'Different flags, but nations gathered / from the north to the south, all standing side by side'. The Hungarian group Compact Disco in 'Sound of Our Hearts' (#24 in Baku, 2012) likewise made an even clearer case for the 'united in diversity' motto by stating that differences may 'enrich things' and should just be turned 'in key' to become a positive resource for communication.

4. *Assimilation*. However, the by far most common song strategy was assimilation. Lots of examples could be cited of a shift to fuse many into one or to define problems, fates and hopes as universal, thus taking one's own inclusion into the European cultural space as self-evident. This seemed easier to achieve in individual songs than in those final events held in Eastern Europe.

One way to position oneself in relation to the rest of Europe is through the choice of language for the song lyrics. I have here used the English translations found on 'The Diggiloo Thrush' website (http://www.diggiloo.net) and on the ESC website (http://www. eurovision.tv), but the effects of songs, of course, differ considerably whether performed in English or in other native languages.[51] In two periods, 1966–1972 and 1977–1998, the EBU forced all nations to perform in their own native language, which possibly tended to favour Ireland, Malta and the UK, then the only ones whose language most Europeans could at least understand reasonably well. During the periods 1956–1965, 1973–1976 and since 1999, songs may be performed in any language. In the first period, no winners performed in English, and between 1973 and 1976 three out of four chose English (one of them being the UK). Since the year 2000, around 70 per cent of the final songs have been performed in English. Only one of the seventeen winners between 1999 and 2015 was performed in a non-English language: Marija Šerifović's 'Molitva' in Serbian (2007). (Ruslana's 'Wild Dances' [2004] was just partly sung in Ukrainian.) Since ABBA's 'Waterloo' (1974), choosing to sing in English, therefore, appears to be a more successful strategy than using one's own native language. Among the songs studied here, roughly the normal two-thirds of those from non-anglophone countries were sung in English, with no apparent differences between East and West in this respect. Linguistically, Europe is thus performed mainly in English (with various accents), which is also true for most contemporary popular music in many European countries, as well as on other continents. Hence, English has become the lingua franca in this context, thanks to post–World War II UK and US pop music.

However, no less than a one-third minority also offered sounds of multilingual diversity. The final hosts likewise tended to mix different languages with the dominant English, flanked by their own national language and French as a second diplomatic resource. They also made forays into other European languages to underscore the diversity aspect of the competition. Hence, across the anglophone hegemony, the presence of different languages in hosting presentations as well as in non-English and even more multi-language songs makes the multilinguistic character of the European context explicitly audible and present in the ESC. To some extent, this keeps Étienne Balibar's vision alive of Europe as 'the interpreter of the world, translating languages and cultures in all directions'.[52] The ESC's increasingly multilingual routines have of course not fully realized such ambitious ethics but are nevertheless a small step towards that goal, developed through the televisual practice of handling the discursive interaction between different nationalities rather than by realizing any abstract ideal.

Narrative Process: Communicative Resurrection

When starting this analysis, I expected to find a range of clearly different key narratives. Having previously studied West European ESC tunes, I had found at least two major stories told: one about vivid memories of Europe's glory in the form of imaginary or real travels between great South and West European cities, and another (though sometimes slightly overlapping) of a process of increasing unification. Looking outside the ESC, other narratives could also be added. However, few East European ESC songs deviated from a standard narrative that just appeared in slightly shifting variants. There is perhaps generally not one single completely shared narrative of Europe, but within this particular genre context, there are unexpectedly few contrasts or contradictions between different mutually contesting stories, i.e. surprisingly few competing narratives. In fact, it seems possible to distil one main narrative that most of these songs follow, only with minor variations in tone and attitude or in the disposition between its main phases and steps.

This master narrative depicts a divided and/or tormented Europe with a uniquely rich history, followed by a long period of self-destructive internal division from which it is now – or at least soon – rising up to acquire new unity and strength with respect for internal diversity. The depicted Europe finds itself in a peace and welfare project of unification and expansion, tearing down internal boundaries and uniting on a new basis to overcome its suffering and to gain redemption through dialogical communication. It tends to refer to the post-1945 and/or post-1989 events as key opportunities for opening up such new possibilities.

This almost-mythical theme was present in many West European songs, for instance when '*Insieme*: 1992' ecstatically celebrated the new unity after an age of separation: 'With you, so far and different / With you, a friend that I thought I'd lost / You and I, having the same dream / Together, unite, unite, Europe'. In Copenhagen in 2014, the Austrian singer

Conchita Wurst's 'Rise Like a Phoenix' had lines like 'Rise like a phoenix / out of the ashes / seeking rather than vengeance / retribution'. His performance replaced the terrors of war with the crime of sexual discrimination but retained the similar gesture of rebirth and reconciliation.

There are three structural steps in this resurrectional or millenarian master narrative of Europe:

1. Europe's *glorious past* of endeavours that have accumulated a growing treasure of cultural heritage, thus making Europe unique and indeed almost chosen for a great mission, sometimes with sacred overtones. This aspect may well be common in other societies as well, but in the ESC it is generally just a prehistoric memory of origin to which some songs tend to look back slightly nostalgically.
2. Europe has then experienced a long period of *recent suffering*: a story of loss, decline, crisis and wars. In some variants, this phase is still ongoing. The causes are sometimes found in ecological carelessness or materialistic greed, but more often in internal division and mutual hostility between European nations. East European versions typically add totalitarian oppression and occupation to the wars focused in Western Europe.
3. Most songs articulating that crisis also point out a solution indicating a *redemptive future on a communicative basis*. This has either already begun in the current unification process, or lies in the near or distant future as a task, a wish or a dream of a better world to come if only people could enter mutual dialogue and cooperation across borders. Again, peace and friendship among nations are the most general aspect of this utopian paradise, but in Eastern Europe, freedom is sometimes also added.

A problem-solving narrative that describes how a protagonist experiences difficulties – whether external or internal – to finally gain redemption is an almost-omnipresent trope in *popular culture*, from ancient sagas to Mozart's 'The Magic Flute' to contemporary Harlequin romance or crime fiction. This may to some extent explain its impact also in ESC songs. However, one may well find other storylines in other ESC songs with lyrics that do not specifically identify Europe. For instance, many songs do not so much present any dynamic narrative but rather elaborate an emotion, bodily experience or dilemma, for instance feelings of desire or disappointment. Others perform some kind of little drama where two individuals work out their mutual relations of love or hate. But almost all songs that in some way refer to Europe contain at least important elements of the narrative of resurrection.

Another reason for this narrative's dominance could be that the *competition* itself invites precisely such a storyline. Artists have struggled to qualify for participation, and the winner will also be able to look back on the difficulties with a happy ending. Songs and artists with a reflexive relation to themselves may well be tempted to select such a narrative, which will then also be near at hand for the television audience. However, this again has not prevented other songs from telling other stories that may also for them resonate with other aspects of the ESC experience, not necessarily as a journey

through darkness but, for instance, perhaps instead as a string of shining pearls, from expectations to fulfilment, which would imply a slightly different narrative structure.

However, this reading of history is not limited to popular genres or competitions but deeply embedded in official European self-understanding, from the European anthem to the Schuman Declaration, which serves as a founding myth of the EU and is celebrated on Europe Day (9 May). The millenarian narrative, in fact, has an even longer prehistory, dating back to ancient stories of suffering and relief, not least in a mixed Promethean–Jewish–Christian lineage that partly overlaps the phoenix story. Prometheus, who steals fire to set humanity free, resonated with the self-understanding of Enlightenment and was celebrated by Beethoven in his Ninth Symphony theme, which is now the European anthem. The myth of Europa and a bull-shaped Zeus is another example, where the nymph Europa was enchanted by the white bull who then took her from her family and friends, over the ocean, to found a new dynasty on Crete: here the abduction and dislocation were passing troubles that ended happily with three half-divine sons and a new life on European soil.[53] A third example is that of Jesus Christ in the Bible, who must die in order to rise again and go to heaven, and thereby deliver humanity from sin. All these tales resonate in the current songs of Europe and lend a sense of precariousness and vulnerability to Europe: this is a continent that feels it has experienced a particularly deep crisis; yet it has also been chosen and elevated by this suffering and is destined for a noble, great and bright future.

While the millenarian master narrative is an imaginary tradition, it is also founded in specific real experiences, including the whole series of inter-European wars, for instance the Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-German war and the two 'world wars'. Étienne Balibar, Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur have all in different ways argued that these experiences of disastrous division have finally given Europe competences for overcoming wars and concluding peace. They contend that such learning from history is a task for Europeans to live up to, not only for Europe to obtain happiness but also as a contribution to universal world peace and as a way to re-compensate for the immense global suffering historically caused by Europe's ruthless hunger for resources and power, from crusades to colonialism. Similar ideas were formulated by the philosophers and politicians discussed in Cederberg's chapter in this book. Ann Rigney has suggested that this 'European master narrative has also morphed into a metanarrative of memory itself: out of multiple bitter experiences Europeans have been forced to learn the art of reconciliation and how to transcend the past while also remembering it':

> An increasingly dominant narrative has thus linked European identity and integration precisely to this ability to deal with divisive and troublesome pasts for the sake of a better future, by allowing stories to be told from different perspectives, but above all through performances of remorse that help transform the affective charge of grievous events and hence help the parties involved to transcend their enmity.[54]

The ESC songs analysed here exemplify precisely such stories 'told from different perspectives', generally in 'performances of remorse' rather than, for instance, accusation or revenge. These

songs thus realize this shared master narrative in slightly different ways. Sometimes this appears to result in a different basic narrative that does not fully present the aforementioned three key phases. However, it is mostly possible to still interpret them as conforming to the master narrative, as either a phase may be seen as implied if not explicitly mentioned or there is only a slight variation in the emphasis or timing of the transitions between phases. In other instances, the variation is even more clearly within the main template, in the form of nuances as to how each phase is realized and filled with qualitative content:

1. *Golden vs. dark past*. Many songs do not explicitly describe, or even refer to, the first stage of European history: its glorious past. Only a few narratives begin with a true fall that is reversed in the end, whereas most instead present a more linear narrative from darkness to light. There is thus a spectrum between songs stressing the initial fall from greatness to catastrophe and those silently taking it for granted and concentrating all narrative effort on the coming renaissance for peace and glory.

   Only a handful of song lyrics hence mentioned a glorious European past, which in the sad present could inspire dreams of a better future world. They depict a lost Paradise or Arcadia by nostalgically specifying a golden age: a remembered time when you and me 'flew so high' (the German singer Nino de Angelo: '*Flieger*', 1989), when we had 'faith in a blue sky' (the Romanian entry Monica Anghel & Sincron: 'Prayer for World Peace', 1996), when dreams had not yet died (the Latvian duo Walters & Kazha: 'The War Is Not Over'; #5 in Kiev 2005), when 'all that we've built' had not yet gone (Ukraine's Alyosha: 'Sweet People'; #10 in *Oslo 2010*).

   Two entries from the 2013 Malmö event also belong to this subgroup. One was Moldova's Aliona Moon with the dramatic 'O mie/A Thousand' (#11), sung in Romanian and speaking of clouds, tears and 'the pain of losing you'. She initially remembered when 'that great feeling came to stay within my soul' before doors started to close. There was an abstract and general sense of loss and destruction – 'We built up memories for ourselves, which we then destroyed' – but also a wish for a new start: 'I can't believe that the feeling we had is in the past / I want a new beginning'.

   The other example from 2013 was the Estonian singer Birgit's '*Et uus saaks alguse*/So There Can Be a New Beginning' (#20). This solemn ballad spoke of difficult times but with a confidence that 'everything may change for the better':

   > The ice will melt again and the leafless tree will blossom
   > Every end is just a new beginning
   > We need the night, so the day can bring light
   > so there can be a new beginning
   > Let the past be past
   > so there can be a new beginning again
   > The curtain opens again
   > The next act is about to begin, where I get up

> The same soul, but with a new game ahead
> My destiny can be changed, my path renewed
> and I know, I know
> everything may change for the better
> Every door that closes will once open again

New beginnings, ice melting, trees blooming, doors opening and destiny changed seemed obviously to refer to Estonia's post-Communist renaissance, and talking of a 'curtain' being opened also clearly placed the song in post-1989 Europe, based on Baltic memories of having been fenced in by the Iron Curtain. The message was visually underlined when one-third of the way into the tune, the singer emerged from the darkness and showed her long white dress, stretching her left hand up to the sky while the musical backing went from a lonely piano to an orchestra.

However, the majority of songs studied here never explicitly refer to any ancient happy origin. This hidden first phase of the master narrative may still echo as a concealed background to the experience of war, division and oppression that the songs present; yet in these songs, the experience is never developed in full, lacking any nostalgic mode of narration. They painted a similar contrast between a dark present and a brighter future, but without referring nostalgically or otherwise to a golden past, which was instead just silently implicated as a hidden origin before the fall into misery. This was, for instance, true for the songs interpreted above: the Polish group Ich Troje's 'Keine Grenzen – Żadnych Granic' (2003) and the Lithuanian entry InCulto's 'Eastern European Funk' (2010).

I am therefore not of the opinion that the songs' European self-identification relies strongly on a nostalgic strategy. With some few exceptions where memories are evoked to inspire the future, the changes asked for are rarely simply restorations of a remembered past but rather presented as a genuinely new step for Europe in the world. It was, in fact, easier to find nostalgic lyrics in West European popular songs, both in the ESC and elsewhere.

2. *Dreaming vs. acting present*. A second distinction can be made between songs that place resurrection either in the dreamt future or in the ongoing present. Either the present is still within the dark phase 2, and the happy ending of phase 3 is yet just a dream for the future, or phase 2 has already ended and phase 3 begun. I found roughly the same number of each kind. Those songs that started with a glorious past tended to paint the present in rather dark colours and place the utopian solution in the future, possibly because it might otherwise had become too difficult to press two temporal shifts into the narrated past: first the fall from Paradise to Purgatory and then onwards to the heavens again. It was subsequently easier to place the whole second shift in the future.

At the darker end of the scale, where wars and terror still seem to rule, and utopia is more of a dream and a hope for the future, Romania's Monica Anghel & Sincron with 'Prayer for World Peace' (1996) cried out for help and wished for a final release in the future: 'We gave tears, and we also gave blood / Where are you, God? Where did you

go? / May we all have peace in the years to come'. Georgia's Diana Gurtskaya in 'Peace Will Come' (#11 in *Belgrade 2008*) likewise placed European resurrection in the future as a dream or a mission: 'My world is slowly dying / Say it out loud: peace will come'.[55] Hungary's Boggie in 'Wars for Nothing' (#20 in *Vienna 2015*) complained that 'our earth is a mess / All the wars for nothing, it never ends', as 'Soldiers walk towards the dark' – yet still 'All the souls deserve a chance at life', and in the background, steel-grey piles of arms miraculously turned into green trees. The Czech duo Marta Jandová and Václav Noid Bárta in 'Hope Never Dies' (semi-final, same year) were first very pessimistic ('There is no light to pray for') but then let love bring light anyway: 'we can rise and fight / for a light to live for […] / We will walk, walk reborn / Hope never dies'. At the same time, Russia's Polina Gagarina in 'A Million Voices' had even stronger hopes: 'We believe in a dream / Praying for peace and healing / I hope we can start again'. Sometimes such rays of hope are described as emanating from stars in blue heavens, which in the ESC context adds a European touch, for instance in Gagarina's words, 'Together like the stars in the sky / we can sing / we can shine', or when Azerbaijan's Elnur Hüseynov in 'Hour of the Wolf' (#12, also 2015) sang, 'I'm ready / for the stars to guide me'.

One group of songs was more positive in describing Europe's resurrection from misery to glory as having already begun. None of them had room for delving into a more ancient glorious age. The already-mentioned Hungarian Gjon Delhusa's '*Fortuna*' (1996) belongs to this subcategory. Another example was Feminnem's 'Call Me' (for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005), with the sound and stage show notably referencing ABBA's classic ESC hit 'Waterloo'. The three girls sang that they previously thought 'that we could never make it / that a million hearts could never beat as one', but now:

Singer after singer, remembered
Different flags, but nations gathered
from the north to the south, all standing side by side […]
Call me […] Sing with me, it's how it should be
for the rest of our lives

In a self-reflexive move, the song thematized the competitive performance, asking viewers to call in and vote, as if that could itself create togetherness. It all seems so simple: 'United in the song, that's all it takes'. The happy international gathering was of course the ESC but by extension also Europe in general, as the words 'Fifty candles on the party cakes / for the many years of happiness' point to the year 1955, possibly referring to the European unification process, as that was, for instance, the year when the European flag was adopted by the CoE and there was a period of intense political activity. The process had its ups and downs ('There was laughter, and there was crying'), but happiness prevails.

The Hungarian group Compact Disco's funky electronic 'Sound of Our Hearts' (2012) likewise took up the theme of transnational unification:

> The whole big world is just one place […]
> Harmony can be achieved,
> just find some way to get connected
> Differences may not be wrong
> They enrich things that we know
> Different faiths, different views
> All we can do is to turn them in key […]

The visual design of the performance added a background that mixed hearts and peace signs with doves and a map of Europe. The recipe advocated here confirmed the EU principle of subsidiarity and the European motto by acknowledging the positive value of diversity and of communication across borders. The unifying desire is 'the sound of our hearts', 'a zeal from above' and 'a fever they can't take away', a kind of heavenly impulse that has grown within each citizen. Europe is here implicitly given a global mission to take the lead in overcoming internal strife and understanding the value of difference. This song narrative is therefore related to a theme of millenarian resurrection – from mutual hatred to mutual love – and with the positive turn having already started in the present.

3. *Unified vs. diversified future*. A further distinction is along a continuous scale from dreaming of an integrated Europe without borders to acknowledging differences as a positive resource. This concerns both how explicit songs represent a West–East dichotomy and what recipe is offered for the European unification project. A West–East polarity was most clearly expressed by Lithuania's InCulto, whose 'Eastern European Funk' (2010) described the poor Eastern Europe as the low Other of Western Europe: its subordinate opposite that (West) Europe has to accept as an integral part of itself. Most others just vaguely talked about a division between nations in general terms. Poland's Ich Troje in 'No Borders' (2003) hoped to erase all differences between people, in a world without borders, flags, nations and wars. Hungary's Compact Disco in 'Sound Of Our Hearts' (2012) instead acknowledged that 'differences may not be wrong', as they enrich the world and should just be attuned to each other. From Bosnia and Herzegovina, Feminnem in 'Call Me' (2005) opted for a middle way by depicting nations from North to South Europe with 'different flags' but 'standing side by side'. Unity and diversity are thus balanced with shifting emphasis.

4. *Internal vs. external evils*. Finally, songs differ as to whether or not their future wishes add *freedom* from external oppression to *peace* after mutual (and in a European sense 'internal') war. West European songs painted an image of Europe coming to terms with World War II and more recently the Balkan wars, but some East European ESC voices also add the Soviet occupation as representing more recent dark times. The painful memories of two world wars are then superimposed by Communist dictatorship and isolation in the confines of the Soviet empire. A quick check indicates that only roughly a quarter of the East European songs studied here talk in terms of a transition from

oppression and occupation to freedom. In contrast, the vast majority of the remaining selected songs focus on the deliverance from war and division to peaceful reunion. The handful of songs with oppression/freedom as a central motif included the two German songs 'Free to Live' by Chris Kempers & Daniel Kovac (1990) and 'This Dream Must Never Die' by Atlantis 2000 (1991), but also the Estonian entry Sahlene's 'Runaway' (#3 in Tallinn, 2002) and the Albanian duo Adrian Lulgjuraj & Bledar Sejko's 'Identity' (did not qualify from its 2013 Malmö semi-final). The Armenian group Genealogy's 'Face the Shadow' (#16 in Vienna, 2015) had the line 'Once you've risen, you are meant to be free' but otherwise dealt more with guilt and responsibility than liberation as such. The Belarusian duo Uzari & Maimuna's 'Time' (Vienna semi-final, 2015) dreamt of breaking out from a confinement: 'Now I'm willing to fight / and I know that time is on my side / Time is like thunder'. The theme of liberation is not quite unproblematic since it highlights an external enemy in the form of an oppressive power (usually Russia as the main successor of the Soviet Union) that has been – or needs to be – overthrown. This does not erase the boundary between East and West but rather moves it eastward. It risks hiding one's own responsibilities for past evils, eroding the self-critical discourse of peace after internal wars, and instead constructing a new we–they boundary that potentially implies a Fortress Europe ideology.

Besides the narrative of rising from darkness to light, only faint traces were found of two other narratives that might be described as 'remembered glory' and 'in crisis and needs a new direction'. Sometimes there was not even a trace left of any memory of hardships or crisis. This can be seen as just concealing the period when the dominant narrative temporarily declined. But it is also an example of another marginalized story that depicts Europe as a happy place, all the way from its glorious past to its (equally or even more) glorious future – either described as an eternal, unchangeable present of pleasure and joy or as a steady progression from a promising start and towards perfection.

Some West European ESC songs constructed a touristic narrative presenting Europe as an old great heritage site at the centre of the world, cultivating nostalgic memories of a magnificent past and with beautiful treasures or fun experiences still to enjoy. This story of a classical or romantic paradise that lives on in the collective memory and can even today be enjoyed by the cosmopolitan tourist presents Europe as rich, just and peaceful. Such a narrative tends to forget all the dark times of inner divisions and disaster, instead focusing on the glorious and sunny aspects of history – and seldom mentioning how Europe's colonial history oppressed and exploited people on other continents. This narrative is expressed in several West European ESC songs, from Liam Reilly's 'Somewhere in Europe' (1990) to Christer Sjögren's 'I Love Europe' (Swedish national finals, 2008). However, it is strikingly absent in songs from Eastern Europe. No real efforts have been made to update such a vision of European cultural treasures by integrating East and West European cities and countries into one totality. This might indicate the difficulty of imagining Europe as a whole in such a narrative. That such stories seem yet unthinkable hints at the persistent problems

in reinventing an integrated larger Europe on similar terms, as it was previously possible to imagine Western Europe as one single but heterogeneous cosmopolitan space.

In 'Flying the Flag (For You)' (2007), the British group Scooch sang of 'flying the flag for you' from London to Berlin, Paris to Tallinn, and Helsinki to Prague, alluding to the EU bridging East and West, but few East Europeans echoed that kind of gesture. The Hungarian singer Gjon Delhusa's 'Fortuna' (1996) was rather alone in at least making an effort to mention cities from both halves of the continent. It described how the polar star (like the one over Bethlehem) sent a message via TV and radio across Europe, getting singers together from Dublin, London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Oslo, Copenhagen, Budapest, Prague and Sarajevo to change the world in a shared belief in the future. The guiding star had Christian associations to how the three kings were led to Bethlehem, but the media context immediately transposed it to the EU and Eurovision level. 'The ether is burning' and Lady Fortuna's 'wheel of destiny' will bring miracles to some who 'believe in something beautiful'. This was a unique occasion where cities from both West and East Europe were listed, and the song clearly made the ESC a metaphor for European unification and for hopes for future change in general. However, while West European touristic narratives tended to focus on the rich heritage of countries and cities, 'Fortuna' did not construct this as a touristic arc between capitals but rather subsumed it under the quite different temporal narrative of millenarian resurrection, i.e. within the dominant storyline summarized above.

A divided Europe entering a deepening crisis was the other secondary narrative. Romania's Monica Anghel & Sincron in 'Prayer for World Peace' (1996) had a very dark tone: 'Abandoned by our dreams, our star fades […] Where are you, God?' Still, this gospel-influenced ballad ended with a firm hope: 'Give us again the faith in a blue sky / May we all have peace in the years to come'. In 'Peace Will Come', Georgia's Diana Gurtskaya (2008) likewise sang of a sky 'crying cold bitter tears': 'My world is slowly dying'. However, at the end, the artists surprisingly did a clothes change (from black to white) and chanted, 'Peace will come'. The German band Münchener Freiheit's '*Viel Zu Weit*' (1993) was ambivalently torn between hope ('Life like in paradise […] I believe in it') and despair ('But it's too far away'), which in the end sounded more like impatience and thus after all did not really contradict the master narrative. A few years later, Germany's Bianca Shomburg with '*Zeit*' (#18 in Dublin, 1997) was again quite pessimistic: 'Can we live happily in peace? – No', but still opened the door for future redemption: 'Time, time, even if the road is long / All I need is a little time'.

The most pessimistic example of them all was perhaps the Ukrainian singer Alyosha's tragic jazz ballad 'Sweet People' (2010), lamenting how people kill and destroy the earth. 'The end is really near', she sang, exhorting everyone: 'Don't turn all the earth to stone / because, because, because / this is your home'. Even without any explicit European reference, it was not hard to place this typical song in a European context, and even in this bitter song, there was at least a hint of resurrection in exhorting those in power to become sensible and stop the killing.

It should be noted that a certain ambiguity in reference is inherent in most of these songs, in that they address both global and European issues. This ambivalence is typical of

the universalizing tendency of much European thought and discourse. There is a tendency to perceive European topics as evidently universal, while global issues are discussed in terms that take a European perspective for granted. My interpretive focus on narratives of Europe might sometimes read songs as more European-focused than they perhaps actually are; the ESC setting too steers interpretation in that direction. It should be remembered that many songs speak in very general terms of communication across borders. From a different perspective, some of them could equally well be heard to thematize worldwide transnational relations rather than just those within this particular continent. In any case, specific references to Europe's relations with other continents are extremely rare. I could not find any such song from Eastern Europe and only very few from West European countries, most of which came from ex-colonial nations such as Portugal with Lúcia Moniz's '*O meu coração não tem cor*/My Heart Has No Colour' (#6 in *Oslo 1996*), and typically tended to deny rather than affirm any such we–them polarity. A polarity between Europe and (US) America could also be formulated in some older West European entries such as the French group Cocktail Chic's '*Européennes*' (1986), which compared Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Capri, London, Paris and Saint-Tropez with L.A., trying to reconcile the continents as different but complementing each other.

In the Montenegrin entry Rambo Amadeus' 'Euro Neuro' (2012), Europe was seen as deeply, or even increasingly, divided and in crisis. Moreover, the official institutions were doomed to fail to break out of the 'monetary breakdance' of the mutually reinforcing financial and ecological crises. This perhaps signals a more radically different narrative than the dominant one, as the literary scholar Ann Rigney has suggested: 'As we reel from one Euro-crisis to another and governments struggle to control the financial markets, the contours of a new narrative about the rise and erosion of the social democratic welfare state in postwar Europe may already be emerging'.[56] But there too the ESC format did not really seem to allow a fully developed dystopian discourse. The story was therefore squeezed into the dominant form by hinting at a future alternative solution (a 'different organism') outside the current institutional structures – in new social movements, civic society or ordinary citizens' lifeworlds – to find better ways to combine the local with the global. In this way, the song could anyway end by promising a future paradise, conforming the dominant narrative.

These two – and other – deviant European narratives may well be found in other musical genres outside the ESC. In *Signifying Europe*, I, for instance, analysed a wider set of popular songs, including much more critical lyrics by left- and right-wing subcultural groups of various kinds, but they have not as yet been heard in the ESC.

The supremacist narrative of a colonial Fortress Europe standing up to its external enemies is virtually taboo in the ESC. The Georgian singer Nina Sublatti's aggressive performance of 'Warrior' (#11 in *Vienna 2015*) could be critically interpreted in those terms, with lines such as 'World's gonna listen to me / Violence / Set it free / Wings are gonna spread up / I'm a warrior'. However, the threat is soon neutralized by assuring that the world is 'gonna light up in peace'. (The same year, an equally challenging tune with the same title was sung by Malta's semi-finalist Amber: 'Never look back, the past is the past / I had no choice but to become a warrior / I had to conquer'.) In much more outspoken terms, supremacist voices can be

heard in genres that are a far cry from those that appear in the ESC, in more or less fascist rock music, where Europe is depicted as having a glorious imperialist past and an original unity that must be defended against external threats from Islam, migration, multiculturalism, feminism and other modern evils. Such examples include Skrewdriver's 'Mother Europe' (1994), Ancient Rites' 'Mother Europe' (1998) and Globus' 'Europa' (2006). Such a narrative would violently contradict the basic ESC idea and probably not even be accepted. But also outside the ESC, the master narrative's reflections on having to overcome disastrous wars and mutual animosity are more common in tunes such as the occultist Killing Joke's 'Europe' (1985) or the leftist Asian Dub Foundation's 'Fortress Europe' (2003). However, it should be remembered that the silencing of any mention of Europe's relations with other continents may well express another kind of violence that suppresses the others not by words but by silence.

Narrative Mode: Serious Reflection

As for their narrative *mode*, all these songs were by definition popular songs, making use of typical combinations of music, lyrics and visual performance. Only some few (less than a fifth) had a humorous or *comic* mood, like the Lithuanian entry InCulto with 'Eastern European Funk' (2010), and only Montenegro's Rambo Amadeus with 'Euro Neuro' (2012) had an *ironic-satirical* attitude. Ironic narratives are notoriously hard to interpret since each of their statements can be deciphered in alternative ways, either as standing for what they apparently say or as in fact meaning quite the opposite, through a distancing act of reversal.

Very few ESC songs are fundamentally *tragic* in the sense of the distinction between comedy and tragedy in classical Greek drama. They all tend to be comedies in the sense of at least hinting at a possible happy ending. This is true for the ESC in general, and it therefore comes as no surprise that it also holds for the selection discussed here. When speaking above of a 'comic mood', it is not that dramaturgical structure that is intended, since all of the master narrative of resurrection would, in principle, belong to that category. The reason being it references at least some future reconciliation and redemption after the endured hardships. It instead concerns the general happy tone of presentation, opposed not to the tragic but to the serious. In modern, and particularly late modern, times, when the idea of a divine fate has lost much of its force, that is in many genres (at least within the ESC) a more relevant distinction than the one between comic and tragic plots.

An overwhelming majority of these songs had such a *serious* tone. Again, just a few told clearly narrative *tales* with a sequence of events, either in the third person or with a self-biographical element. The most common subgenre was a general *reflection* on the current situation (in almost half of the songs), followed by slightly fewer that formulated a call, prayer or *plea* urging the listener(s) to in some way work for a better future. Very few East European songs referring to European themes were just *hedonistic celebrations* of bodily pleasure.

Unsurprisingly, those songs that presented the full resurrection narrative, starting with some memories of a long-past golden age, were always serious and never humoristic in

tone. The same was true for those songs that formulated a plea (roughly a quarter of the whole set).

The most common rhetorical configuration found in half of the songs was for the lyrics to focus on an 'I' and a 'you' that together might fuse into a 'we'. Only half as many instead relied on an 'I' who stood alone without any obvious 'you' partner, though sometimes linking up with a collective 'we'. A third, and slightly less common, option was to have a 'we' as the main character, possibly relating to a 'you' or a 'they' of some kind.

Only a quarter of the songs' lyrics have a clearly *linear* temporal organization, evidently corresponding roughly to those that told a tale. The most common narratives (in particular among the comic ones) were instead *nonlinear*, without any clear beginning and end.

Finally, a rather firm belief in a better future was dominant in at least two-thirds of these songs. A sense of *futurity* thus definitely prevailed, looking forward and hoping for progress. This was, for instance, true of every comic song in the material. Only two songs were dominated by a *nostalgic* mood, as they looked backwards with a sense of loss: the German singer Nino de Angelo's 'Flieger' (1989), with lines like 'I've never totally forgotten the time / when we were flyers' and 'The two of us, it was so great', and the Moldovan artist Aliona Moon's 'O mie' (2013), with lines such as 'A thousand sunsets lost in the sea, lost within us', 'We built up memories for ourselves, which we then destroyed' and 'I can't believe that the feeling we had is in the past'. A slightly larger minority of the songs were quite *pessimistic* about the future, but without nostalgically remembering any lost paradise. As already shown when discussing Alyosha's 'Sweet People' (2010), even the most pessimistic of songs did not really go so far as to abandon the master narrative of communicative resurrection, even if there was just a faint suggestion of a possible happy ending hidden in a desperate call for people to come to their senses and finally stop ruining the world.

In all, this mixed picture may be summed up by concluding that most songs about Europe were *serious reflections*, calling listeners to help improve the world, and more rarely telling a linear story. Most of them focused on the singing 'I', relating to a beloved 'you', and sometimes also part of a larger 'we'. As a rule, there was a belief in a happy future, and nostalgia was rare, though there were slightly more examples of a pessimistic outlook.

Narrative Meaning: European Values

Europe's millenarian master narrative of resurrection is thus found in East Europe's ESC entries, suggesting a development from past glory to internal strife to peace and unification. One of its narrative elements has to do with its meaning – in this case, how Europe is identified or which values and traits are associated with being European. This is hard to assert in any straightforward manner, but based on the narratives analysed here, a preliminary interpretation points towards at least three important elements or tropes for identifying Europe that recur in songs and final events.[57] Each of these values link to one of the master narrative's three main phases:

1.   *Unique universality*. The ESC event and many songs about Europe share an idea that Europe is somehow *chosen* for a particularly important mission and challenge, in some way elevated above the other continents. This affirms a long heritage of religious, philosophical and historical thinking activated in the Enlightenment, for example in Friedrich Schiller's 'Ode to Joy' (1785), which Beethoven used for the lyrics to his Ninth Symphony. The musical creativity and transnational unification of the ESC and its participating nations are presented as a unique resource that gives Europe particular capacities that no other continent or country can surpass. This confirms a theme of nobility or *elevation* found in other European symbolism as well – from the myth of Europa, where the nymph's abduction transforms her into a unique founder of a new dynasty of half-divine men, to the European flag with its perfect star circle, signifying nations rising up together into the sky to guide others. Animations and films in the finals as well as many ESC song lyrics often make references to Europe's rich cultural heritage, reproducing the idea of Europe as the cradle of Western civilization and modernity at large, with enlightened reason and human rights.

This entails not least a unique capacity for (imagined) *universality*. Europe appears from its mythical origin to be chosen for a grand mission: elevated to universality, which it has a duty to share with the rest of the world in a spirit of equality and solidarity. In various disguises, a universalism is inherent in remarkably much of European thinking. From a critical perspective, this serves to underpin a Eurocentric narrative of the West as taking the global lead with its privileged mode of modernity, which has throughout history legitimized the fearful atrocities of crusades and colonial powers. This might on the other hand also explain the ease with which human rights discourses have been lately adopted and promoted by the ESC, even though political contents are in principle banned and equal rights for women, gays or ethnic minorities are in several countries still a challenging political issue. This trend was particularly strong in the 2013 Malmö final, where LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer) rights formed a central focus of the hosting framework. That event also launched a new ESC final anthem written by ex-ABBA members Benny Andersson and Björn Ulvaeus together with DJ Avicii: 'We Write the Story'. This was a solemn tribute to the 'Legacy' of 'Justice and Peace and Liberty' among 'humans born free and equal', welcoming 'a new Enlightenment' where 'Reason and conscience' may one day 'rule the world' – 'We are humans / We are one!' Even though this was an extreme example, it is possible to hear echoes of similar convictions in several competing songs as well.

It can be noted that the combination of European specificity and universalism is a notoriously tricky one. The high ambitions of Europeans to defend universality always risk attracting the accusation of being blind and ultimately imperialist Eurocentrism. An interesting example of the tension was the decision to adopt the 'Ode to Joy' theme as the European anthem but without any words.[58] This lack of lyrics mirrors two problematic borderlines for European identification. One argument was that German (or indeed any specific language) was not appropriate since it would not be European but prioritize

one nation. If this argument expressed the need to differentiate the European from the national, the other argument instead stood for the other main demarcation – that between the European and the global: the objection that the lyrics 'all men are brothers' [*alle Menschen werden Brüder*] was a too universal message. The 'united in diversity' motto serves to negotiate between the European and the national, whereas the accusation of an empty abstraction in the European flag relates to the European–universal interface. There is thus a risky balance between uniqueness and universality, but their combination seems to be a typical European trait, in the ESC narratives as elsewhere.

2. *Resurrecting from division*. If the first phase of the ESC master narrative points back to Europe's birth as an elevation to universality, the second phase is equally important. Strikingly many ESC songs speak of *division*: war, disaster and destruction. Europe and Europeans have experienced deep misery, which has made them acutely aware of their *precariousness* and that of their fellow beings. It is this vulnerability that motivates the desire for peaceful coexistence and mutual cooperation. Similar tropes appear in the Christian Passion story, 'Ode to Joy' and the Schuman Declaration.[59]

    It is this experience of loss and pain that fuels the dreams of peace so often repeated in the ESC songs. Singing about having suffered is almost only done in songs from East European countries, describing themselves as having become strong and tough due to such hardships. Without the European downfall into deepest agony, there would not be the profound sense of *resurrection* that is central to the millenarian narrative. This value of resurrection is linked to that of elevated nobility. Wars destroy the ancient cultural heritage but also breed science and technology and indirectly too culture and reason through the experience of loss that makes Europeans sensitive to the suffering of others and to one's own ethical responsibility. On the other hand, the dialectics of Enlightenment nourish destructive forces but also an intense longing for overcoming them.

3. *Communicative mobility*. A third key value may be derived from looking closer at the third phase of the master narrative: the process or dream of unification. This is often expressed as a desire for change, and though this change may basically be a temporal transition to a new situation, it often also entails a spatial shift or reconfiguration. Displacement, dislocation and a general sense of *mobility* are three of the core European values that the ESC too cherishes. Artists travel to the host city in order to meet each other in the final, and their bodies explore new moves on stage, stirring the public's emotions. Broadcasters transmit their tunes to a dispersed European (and tendentially global) audience. Many songs also describe such moves across physical and/or social space. And again, this value has several links to other symbols: Europa was abducted from the Middle East to Crete, and the euro banknotes are full of windows, doors and bridges that also celebrate mobility.

    This kind of mobility has to do with communication, and *communicativity* is indeed a central value in the ESC as well as in other parts of the European unification process. There are certainly cases (like the hymn 'We Write the Story' and the slogan 'we are one') where equality and community develop into homogeneity or even

uniformity. However, most ESC voices, especially from Eastern Europe, tend rather to emphasize that peaceful unification must accommodate difference. This is also the case with the European motto 'united in diversity'. Communication with others is one of the competition's key values, but it is thematized too in many songs which stress that Europe's diversity not only causes divisive conflicts but also underpins a desire for polyphonic yet harmonic togetherness. Peaceful coexistence is here intrinsically united with freedom and mutual dialogue.

Again, this value interacts with the other two. The unique mobility of capitalism accumulates riches, rich empires invest in communications, and Europe's noble universalism is based on trust in dialogical communication. On the other hand, migrations lead to conflicts, and wars produce refugees, so there are also negative dialectics of mobility and precariousness.

Concluding Reflections

Other songs not involved in the ESC and from other genres of popular music than mainstream pop add varied flavours to the identification of Europe. Some join the ESC chorus by giving a positive image of Europe's historical richness and beauty, often with a nostalgic glow of memories of experiencing inter-European encounters. Others tell the story of a continent that has risen from destruction to a determination to unite and prosper, in some cases simply celebrating this recent achievement, and in others, breeding a fear of new waves of war to come. Some just pay homage to European beauty, culture, diversity or unification; some are pessimistic laments of a Europe in decline or falling apart; some warn of authoritarian, violent, racist, xenophobic or fascist developments; others instead call for patriotic deeds in a necessary new war against an alleged Muslim threat.[60]

The musical styles and expressions of all these songs cannot be reduced to any common denominator. Traits either from European ethnic folk music or from the European art music tradition are often used to suggest a shared legacy, just as with the European anthem. However, within these broad frameworks, the songs can make considerably diverging statements. Like the ESC entries, the most 'mainstream' other tunes express a joyful pleasure of sharing happy experiences across borders, which is similar to the message of the official EU symbols. The more artistically ambitious ones tend instead to focus on painful memories and fears of alienation, strife or even destruction, constructing Europe as something deeply problematic and filled with unresolved tensions. Many tunes are quite open in their interpretations, merely pointing at the risks of new conflicts, but some are more politically explicit: either problematizing ongoing developments from critical positions questioning the new power structures that marginalize various weak others, or from a right-wing position of traditionalist nostalgia for strong nations, emanating in a xenophobic, racist and even overtly fascist discourse. No such openly xenophobic voices have so far been heard in the ESC finals, nor any calls for crusades against alleged non-European enemies, whether represented by

Islam, East Asia, Africa or America. In fact, the ESC songs tend to construct Europeanness in a universalizing manner: they do not make explicit any external boundaries of Europe or specify its 'other(s)', whether in friendly or hostile terms. Implicitly, like the 2014 New Narrative declaration by the European Commission's cultural committee discussed in the introduction to this book, they make sporadic references to undemocratic authoritarianism or nationalist populism as something Europe needs to avoid; however, the cosmopolitanism they generally advocate is too internally diverse to allow any explicit 'other' to be pinpointed. In this, they strongly differ from, for instance, some Islamophobic rock tunes.

The themes of European cultural treasures and the desire and need for unification are found both in the ESC and elsewhere. What most songs about Europe have in common is an idea that Europe is somehow chosen for a particularly important mission and challenge, confirming the theme of noble elevation so widespread in European symbolism. None of the relevant West European ESC songs depicted their own country as fundamentally other or different from the European norm but instead celebrated Europe's cultural and touristic city gems. This kind of cultural approach to Europe's rich heritage is almost totally absent in the Eastern European entries. Both halves of the continent have songs expressing a desire for unification, peace and communication, but whereas nations in Western Europe describe themselves as already integral parts of Europe and breed contentment with its cultural treasures, those in Eastern Europe tend to struggle with a sense of marginality and a desire to enter, but not based so much on any cultural desire for the dominant European culture as on a desire for recognition and for sharing Western democracy's economic wealth and political resources. (Countries like Russia and also Turkey were less so inclined, appearing to be rather more self-sufficiently proud of their position as great powers bridging East and West.)

The omnipresent master narrative of communicative resurrection takes different shapes. Some neglect to mention an ancient period of glory that would explain Europe's global importance. The more negative ones place happiness in an urgent dream for the future, while the optimists describe the present as having already taken decisive steps towards reconciliation. War and peace are the most common topics in these narratives, though some East European countries add oppression and freedom, alluding to their particular experience of having been forced into the Soviet bloc.

Of course, no songs fully represent 'their' countries, nor are their voices totally confined to their national belongings. The aim here is not to identify what 'is' European, but how it is discursively and culturally constructed, and the same applies to national identities. Yet it is not hard to discern a pattern where, for instance, Russian (and British) voices define themselves as external observers of Europe's process of unification, while especially the Baltic states often thematize a new-won freedom from oppression.

In terms of time periods or phases, one may discern utopian hopes blossoming from 1989 to the mid-1990s. A period of negotiations and increasing realism or even pessimism followed up to around 2005, when the referendums rejected the Lisbon Treaty and instilled an increasing sense of failure and crisis, which the financial euro-crisis further accentuated some years later. At the same time, the ESC itself appears to be a huge success story, with

decisive steps to include new members, and revising the event's format to accommodate them can be traced from 1993 onwards, with the introduction of televoting (1997) and semi-finals (2004) as technical means to improve the event. Estonia's victory in 2001 saw the 2002 final take place in Tallinn, which was followed by a series of other East European finals. Consequently, the ESC's focus moved eastwards, and today the ESC appears to be one of the most successful pan-European initiatives there are – both within the media sector and more generally. While the unification project increasingly staggers along on other frontiers, as also mirrored in song lyrics, the ESC itself follows a slightly different pattern, giving new authority and self-confidence to the finals and songs that claim to show Europe a better way forward. This non-contemporaneity makes it hard to neatly divide up these years into distinct periods. The German entries (here analysed as an ambiguous border case between West and East) point to a certain decline in optimism from 1989 to 1993, but 1993 was at the same time the start of an eastward shift in the centre of gravity, manifested by the series of East European finals from 2002 to 2012.

As a discourse genre, the ESC finals and songs are a kind of compromise formation, filtered through many layers of censorship and selection, which partly explains the uniformity of the narratives found. The ESC's grand narrative corresponds to both the old and the 'new' narrative of Europe. Alternatives certainly exist in popular music outside the ESC as well as in other cultural fields, but the dominant narrative is strikingly uniform and coherent in relatively more regulated subfields such as the ESC. In this popular media landscape, the ESC plays a productive institutional role by offering a cultural public space for agonistically constructing and exploring European-wide musical modes of affective and collective subjectivity and identification.

Generally in the finals, it was hard to find any developed narratives of Europe, besides general references to Europe as a highly diverse continent of mutually collaborating but also competing nations. The East European hosts' most common strategy seems to have been hybridization, i.e. describing their own contribution to the shared European community in terms of a voice in a mixed choir where multicultural diversity is a strength and resource rather than an obstacle to unification. This is very much in line with the official symbols and narratives launched by the leading European institutions, including the CoE and the EU.

As for individual songs from Eastern Europe, they have also remarkably adhered to the official EU mythology, expressed in the old founding narrative celebrated on Europe Day in remembrance of the Schuman Declaration. Virtually all songs that seemed to have a European message contained at least some fragments of the grand 'master narrative' of Europe: a tale of resurrection from a catastrophic state of inner division, wishing to revive an original greatness and overcoming fragmentation and war, and instead communicating and cooperating across borders to make the whole world a better place. This old narrative of Europe seems very much alive in the ESC today, and certainly in Eastern Europe, thus confirming a tradition that goes back not just until the start of the ESC but long before that: for over centuries being voiced again and again after each European war.

The East European ESC finals and songs thus do not present any radically different, emphatically *new* narrative of Europe. Instead, they tend to reactivate, revitalize and, to some extent, also revise the old EU narrative of communicative resurrection by reminding of the continued relevance of counteracting war and other forms of mutual hostility. Their theme of resurrection through communication across differences rests on an established tradition; however, the emphasis is on shared values and responsibilities similar to the cultural ideals of renaissance and cosmopolitanism foregrounded in the European Commission's document *New Narrative for Europe* (2014). The East–West divide has certainly for a long time been a powerful European discourse. Although this must be recognized and critically analysed, it is important not to contribute to its reproduction as a stereotypical dualism that like Orientalism rather oversimplifies collective identity relations into sterile binaries. It is crucial not to get stuck in such divides, and instead be open to understanding how they interact with numerous other interactions, crossroads and dynamics, transgressing every such rigid division. Integrating previously excluded East European experiences into the European master narrative is a slow and complex process that has indeed reinforced discourses of translation and transborder friendship.

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Notes

1 Fornäs (2012: 149–204) explores how Europe is symbolically identified in a wide range of songs, starting with the European anthem and other anthems of well-known pan-European organizations, comparing them with a much larger selection of popular songs.

2   Jørgen Frank in 2011, the EBU's then interim director of television, quoted in Fricker and Gluhovic (2013: 101).

3   Hesmondhalgh (2013).

4   Mouffe (2012: 632f., see also 2013: 8f., 138f.).

5   Mouffe (2012: 633, see also 2013: xii).

6   Mouffe (2012: 637, see also 2013: 6, 9, 137).

7   Mouffe (2013: xiv).

8   Mouffe (2013: xvii).

9   Mouffe (2013: 143f.).

10 Bohlman ([2004] 2011: 217).

11 For a critique of theorists who describe music as a purely formal and/or material mode of expression with little capacity for telling stories or even creating meaning, see Fornäs (1997, 2003). See also Negus (2012) on music, time and narrative. A classic example of musical narrativity is how the eighteenth-century sonata form was based on emotionally charged stories of conflict and resolution, closely related to the modern novel's construction of subject development as well as the visual central perspective. Philip Tagg (2000; see also 2009) similarly shows that the verse–chorus structure of ABBA's 'Fernando' subverts or betrays the message of the lyrics, convincingly exemplifying how the narrative analysis of musical sounds can be used for an ideology critique of a tune's political implications.

12 Raykoff (2007: 5–6).

13 Alf Björnberg (1987) has analysed musical changes in Swedish qualifications during the first three ESC decades. There is an official ESC history written by John Kennedy O'Connor ([2005] 2010). Several highly relevant and interesting studies primarily examine nation branding, competition and issues of ethnicity, gender and sexuality in the ESC finals: Bohlman ([2004] 2011, 2008); Płaneta (2005); Wolther (2006); Raykoff and Tobin (2007); Jordan (2012); Fricker and Gluhovic (2013); Tragaki (2013); Stychin (2014). A collective media ethnographic case study of the 2002 final in Estonia's capital, Tallinn, also offers relevant insights (Ericson 2002). Further references are given in Fornäs (2012).

14 For inputs and feedback on this analysis, the author is grateful to the co-researchers in the 'Narratives of Europe' research project as well as to the 'Beyond Boundaries: Media, Culture and Identity in Europe' conference at Bahçeşehir University in Istanbul, 2009; the Centre of Cultural Research at the University of Western Sydney, 2009; the Music Department of the University of Edinburgh, 2010; the NordMedia conference in Akureyri, 2011; the 'Cosmopolitanism in a Wider Context' conference at Södertörn University, 2011; the Media and Cultural Studies seminar at the University of Wisconsin–Madison; the Aesthetic Seminar at Aarhus University, 2012; the 'Narration and Narratives as an Interdisciplinary Field of Study' conference at Örebro University, 2012; the Centre for Research on Europe at the University of Gothenburg, 2012; the ECREA conference in Istanbul, 2012; the Eurocult programme at Uppsala University, 2013; the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet) seminar on the EU in Stockholm, 2013; and the ICA conference in London, 2013. Special thanks to Ann Werner for her insightful comments on an earlier draft.

15 Pajala (2013).

16 Various aspects of these trends are covered in Raykoff and Tobin (2005) and Fricker and Gluhovic (2013).

17 Pajala (2013).

18 On voting rules and trends, see Jordan (2012: 45–48).

19 Blangiardo and Baio (2014); see also Yair (1995) for older patterns; Götz (2011: 54f.) and the information on the ESC found on Wikipedia and on the ESC website.

20 Eurovision (2013).

21 All these translations from the Swedish Television programme are the author's.

22 Mouffe (2012: 632).

23 Mouffe (2012: 632; see also 2013: 2f.).

24 Åker (2002).

25 Raykoff (2007: 7).

26 Jordan (2012: 93–98).

27 Raykoff (2007: 7); Arntsen (2005: 152f.); Ericson (2002).

28 On the fairy-tale theme and the imagery, see Jordan (2012: 128–135).

29 Åker (2002: 20).

30 Arntsen (2005: 150).

31 Arntsen (2005: 155).

32 Jordan (2012: 11–12).

33 Jordan (2012: 135–137).

34 Jordan (2012: 137).

35 See also Arntsen (2005: 153f.).

36 Fawkes (2005).

37 Bourdon (2007: 266).

38 In the context of relations to various 'others' in Swedish jazz discourses (1920–1950), Fornäs suggests a similar set of strategies (2010).

39 The concepts of narrative set-up and process are further explained below in the section on songs.

40 The first time a tune is mentioned, its final position in the ESC competition will be noted since this hints at how successful it was, which, in turn, is at least an indication of how it was received.

41 See Fornäs (2012: 189–195) for an analysis of these songs.

42 See also Raykoff (2007: 7).

43 Sieg (2013a: 251; see also 2013b).

44 Sieg (2013a: 252).

45 Sieg (2013a: 253, 258f.).

46 Artist presentation at http://www.eurovision.tv/page/history/year/participant-profile/?song=26833. Accessed 6 June 2016.

47 Meijer (2013: 81–85).

48 See the introduction to this volume.

49 For a convincing critique of such ideological discourses, see Yuval-Davis (1997).

50 Kalinina (2014).

51 'The Diggiloo Thrush' website was very easy to access, offering lyrics and other information on all entries up to 2013. It has since been discontinued but may hopefully be rebuilt in the future. Meanwhile, the ESC official website (http://www.eurovision.tv) is the most reliable source of information.

52 Balibar (2004: 235).

53 See Fornäs (2012: 8–17; 2014).

54 Both quotes are from Rigney (2012: 614).

55 See also Bohlman ([2004] 2011: 257f.).

56 Rigney (2012: 615f.).

57 Similar values were found in Fornäs (2012).

58 For further details, see Fornäs (2012: 156, 176–179).

59 The European anthem does not itself express the chaotic suffering, but it is presupposed as the narrative background to which the anthem's joyful message tacitly relates, and which in Beethoven's Ninth Symphony is expressed in the movements that precede the final movement and in the introduction to its 'Ode to Joy' theme.

60 A number of such songs are analysed in Fornäs (2012: 195–201).

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Narratives from Its Eastern Half

Europe Faces Europe examines East European perspectives on European identity. The contributors to this volume map narratives of Europe rooted in Eastern Europe, examining their relationship to philosophy, journalism, social movements, literary texts, visual art, and popular music. Moving the debate and research on European identity beyond the geographical power center, the essays explore how Europeanness is conceived of in the dynamic region of Eastern Europe. Offering a fresh take on European identity, *Europe Faces Europe* comes at an important time, when Eastern Europe and European identity are in an important and vibrant phase of transition.

Johan Fornäs is professor in the Department of Media and Communication Studies in the School for Culture and Education at Södertörn University, Sweden. His previous books include *Digital Borderlands*, *Consuming Media*, and *Signifying Europe*, the last of which was published by Intellect Books.

'This is an excellent thinking guide for today's Europe whose narratives are filled with suspense and the happy end is far out of sight.'

Maria Bakardjieva is professor of communication at the University of Calgary, Canada.

'Centred around Fornäs' explanation of the concepts of narrative and identity as applied to Europe, this collection contains many valuable insights into the big questions about Europe: what it is, what it means, where it is going, what it stands for. This book brings some order to the bewildering diversity of narratives of Europe from the East. It deserves a place in every academic library.'

Michael Wintle is professor and head of the Department of European Studies at the University of Amsterdam, Netherlands.

'The book offers a brilliant multi-disciplinary, cross-platform analysis of the new European master narrative and the view of Europe as a symbolic universe. The book is a major contribution to the fields of European studies and cultural studies as well as research on transnationalism.'

Vlad Strukov is associate professor in film and digital culture at the School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, UK.

'*Europe Faces Europe* offers a penetrating and timely twist to default notions of Europe by exploring how it is identified in narratives from its Eastern half. And in the process, it wonderfully demonstrates the forensic power of cultural analysis.'

William Uricchio is professor of comparative media studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US, and professor of comparative media history at Utrecht University, Netherlands.