

# The Integration of the Second Generation in Germany

*Results of the TIES Survey  
on the Descendants of Turkish  
and Yugoslavian Migrants*

INKEN SÜRIG & MAREN WILMES

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# Preface: The international research project TIES

TIES (The Integration of the European Second Generation), <http://www.tiesproject.eu/>, was started in 2005 as a research project on the second generation in eight EU member states. It was coordinated by the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) at the University of Amsterdam and the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI).

The TIES survey was aimed at the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, the successor states of Yugoslavia (SSYU), and Morocco. The 'second generation' was defined as those children of immigrants who were born and lived in their parents' country of immigration. At the time of the survey, these individuals were between 18 and 35 years old. Besides the second-generation groups, a non-migrant control group was also surveyed. This consisted of persons whose parents were both born in the country where the survey was carried out.

Identifying migration as a primarily urban phenomenon, the research was conducted in fifteen cities in eight countries: Paris and Strasbourg in France, Berlin and Frankfurt in Germany, Madrid and Barcelona in Spain, Vienna and Linz in Austria, Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Brussels and Antwerp in Belgium, Zurich and Basle in Switzerland, and Stockholm in Sweden. In almost all the cities, three different groups were interviewed: two second-generation groups and one control group. The two second-generation groups were of Turkish and Moroccan origin in the Netherlands and Belgium, and of Turkish and Yugoslavian descent in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. In France and Sweden, the funding allowed research on only one second-generation group (the descendants of Turks) and the control group. Due to the later influx of labour migrants, the Spanish project only addressed second-generation Moroccans and the control group.

As a first step, a preliminary TIES study in 2003 was funded by the Swiss Stiftung für Bevölkerung, Migration und Umwelt (BMU). The TIES study group formed in the course of this process comprised nine national partners and the international coordination unit. It convened in four international workshops to discuss the creation of a common research design. The second step was to secure funding, with the German VolkswagenStiftung being the first aboard to finance a core investigation, i.e. a survey among second-generation Turks in five countries. Further national and international funding



(including two ESF ECRP grants and sponsorship from the Bertelsmann Stiftung) enabled the TIES group to add three more countries and to include two additional respondent groups. We are grateful to all the sponsors whose support made the TIES project possible.

*Osnabrück, January 2014*

*Inken Sürig & Maren Wilmes*

# 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

This book presents a research report on the results of the TIES survey conducted in Germany in 2008. It elaborates various aspects of the integration of the second generation with a Turkish and Yugoslavian migration background in Berlin and Frankfurt. Topics covered include educational careers and educational outcomes, labour market positions, segregation and housing, ethnic and cultural orientations, social relations, and family formation and partner relationships. The focus of the report is the description and classification of quantitatively ascertained empirical data. It discusses a broad range of issues from migration research concerning the integration process of second generations. The relevance of this sort of research lies partly in its potential to clarify whether or not the German-born children of labour migrants have the same chances and opportunities as the children of native-born parents. A first, but important approach to answer this question is the following extensive description of second-generation migrants in various areas of German society.

## 1.1 The integration of the second generation: Theoretical considerations

There is a common expectation in migration research that the second generation of immigrants in Europe will be better adapted to and integrated into the different spheres of the receiving society than the first generation. Second-generation migrants are often assumed to be in the process of gaining equality with the majority population, a process that will lead to complete assimilation of the generations to come. They are thus seen as living in a transitional era in many respects. Another general understanding, however, is that migration shapes the host societies as much as these societies shape migration. Migrants of the second generation are therefore not simply the product of more or less successful integration into the society of a nation state. Instead, the societies in question are also the product of long-term migration processes, which endow them with greater cultural, linguistic, religious, and 'phylogenetic' diversity and plurality.

<sup>1</sup> The book at hand is the revised English version of the first report, which was published in German (Sürig & Wilmes 2011) by the Institute of Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS), University of Osnabrück.

For second-generation immigrants, following in the footsteps of the first, parental generation, 'integration' does not simply mean 'assimilation' into a well-defined majority. It means adjustment to multicultural, multilingual, and multi-religious neighbourhoods, schools, labour markets, and so on. Thus research on the second generation not only has to evaluate the success of unilateral assimilation into a single majority society, as shown by educational and economic achievements. It must also take into account the actual social realities, which are often different to what might be regarded as the 'national mainstream'.

Generally, 'integration' is understood here as referring to participation in the various subsystems of society, such as education, the economy, religion, and health care. The organisations representing the different domains of society address only specific groups of people in their particular function – children required to attend school, customers, members of faith communities, patients. Taking part in 'society' can therefore be conceived as an ongoing process of inclusion and exclusion (Bommes 1999). Participation in the education system, for instance, is only of life-long relevance for education professionals, while for others, leaving school or university usually means exclusion from the education system. Inclusion in the judicial system, again, might occur only momentarily and rarely in an individual's biography. Most individuals are excluded from the judicial system for most of their lives. Against this backdrop, a general notion of integration can be broken down into two main operational categories: the different domains of participation and the shape or extent of individual participation in the specific subsystems. In order to evaluate observations related to this, we commonly describe and compare social groups that we assume to differ due to specific characteristics such as gender, education, or, in the case of the TIES study, migration background.

Such comparisons support a general understanding that the conditions of participation in the modern state may be formally equal for everyone, but that opportunities to participate are dependent on the distribution of cultural, economic, and social resources (cf. Bommes 2004a). Inclusion in the modern welfare state is universal in the sense that no one is supposed to be barred from participation because of gender, race, religion, social status, and so on. However, exclusion is dependent on the individual resources that enable a person to take part in the specific activities of the social subsystems (Bommes 1999). Here participation in one area of society usually requires and affects participation in other areas, and vice versa. For instance, the lack of a university degree means exclusion from specific segments of the labour market. It can also lead to exclusion from

parts of the marriage market, and, with limited chances of accumulating wealth, exclusion from upmarket housing or costly leisure activities. This functional logic of individual histories of inclusion and exclusion means that immigration can be construed as the attempt to make use of opportunities for inclusion in a different national context (Bommes 1999). In the modern state, these opportunities are initially based on functional criteria that can, technically, be met by everyone. In this sense, 'integration' is not a specific problem of immigrants and their descendants. On the contrary, all individuals are confronted with the same terms of inclusion and exclusion in their respective societies, and have to operate on this basis. In order to make use of opportunities, all individuals have to adapt to given requirements and demands; the 'rules' of inclusion and exclusion are not different for immigrants and non-immigrants (Stichweh 2000).

In practice, however, the main factor limiting universal inclusion emerges with the differentiation between citizens and non-citizens. This entails a whole set of legal rights granted or not granted, from residence permit to work permit, to access to the social security system, to voting rights. Simply put, the political function of this differentiation is the preservation of the state's sovereignty in the form of control over its territory and population (Bommes 1999). This sovereignty is exercised by stipulating and enforcing conditions of membership that guarantee not only the state's legitimacy, but also – by means of fiscal revenue and expenses – its financial viability. Thus, limited rights mean limited access to various societal domains, as discussed later (in section 2.3) in relation to the first generation of immigrants. Obviously, limited access translates into limited participation, which in turn is likely to impede the accumulation of crucial economic, cultural, and social resources. Legally, there is of course a temporal aspect to immigrants limited opportunities for inclusion. Over time, they acquire rightful access to social security, unlimited rights of residence, and even claims to citizenship, with all its legal implications (Bade 2002).

On the one hand, this means that immigrants, undergoing substantial adaptation processes, become less and less legally distinguishable from non-immigrants. On the other hand, their prospects of success are still limited due to general competition for scarce commodities (e.g. education), and the daily practices of organisations which have trouble adjusting to their changing clientele (Bommes 2007). After all, the distinction between the descendants of immigrants and the non-migrant population is upheld simply by the social practice of observing different population groups according to specific criteria. In the case of second-generation migrants, such criteria are often based on assumptions about their cultural capital (e.g.

linguistic or religious characteristics) and their social capital (shaped by 'ethnic' communities or ties to the old country). In this context, the question of 'integration' tends to refer to a presumed gap between the generalised demands of mainstream society and the self-conception of immigrants in the face of such demands and expectations (Rauer & Schmidtke 2001). In the TIES project, a migrant background is initially treated as a mere demographic feature that does not refer to presumed culture, race, or social status, but only to the parents' country of origin. Here the differentiation between groups is based on the assumption that the conditions in which the parental generations immigrated to Germany strongly influenced their opportunities for social participation. This is then presumed to have had a palpable impact on 'the integration of the second generation', the object of the TIES study.

## 1.2 TIES Germany: Method and data base

The TIES project is one of the very rare endeavours to provide an internationally comparable collection of data on second-generation migrants in Europe. In order to reach this goal, two basic preconditions had to be met in each of the eight countries where the studies were conducted. First of all, a universal, workable definition of the target group of second-generation migrants had to be implemented. This primarily had to cover the two basic variables 'national origin' and 'age'. In accordance with the two target groups of second-generation Turks and second-generation Yugoslavs in the German survey, the criterion 'national origin' refers to the original country of the parental generation. At least one parent had to have experienced immigration to Germany first-hand in order to satisfy the definition of the 'first generation'. Combining the criteria 'children of the first generation', 'born in Germany', and 'of legal age', the targeted age group was determined as 18 to 35 (at the time of the survey).

As for 'national origin', official German statistics only take citizenship into account, so naturalised and German-born persons with immigrant parents cannot be identified from this source. Instead, lists of the 18- to 35-year-olds in the cities of Berlin and Frankfurt were requested from the local registration offices. These extracts from the registers of residents, which offer information on place of birth and citizenship, were then analysed in terms of linguistic features of first and last names in order to distinguish five

groups: second-generation Turks; second-generation Yugoslavs;<sup>2</sup> descendants of German parents; persons who do not belong to either of these groups; and persons who could not be clearly assigned to any group.

In a first interview loop, 750 randomly selected persons from each of the first three groups in both cities were approached over the phone, which, however, did not result in the recruitment of a sufficient number of interviewees. Therefore, a second loop with 1,000 randomly chosen persons from the list was conducted by a market research company, in which the addressees were asked to recommend further possible interviewees (snowball principle), who were contacted provided they also occurred on the previously compiled list. Table 1.1 shows the recruitment of the first and second loop.

**Table 1.1 Respondents of the first and second interview loop per group**

|           |                          | 1st loop (750) | 2nd loop (1000) | Total |
|-----------|--------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-------|
| Berlin    | 2nd-generation Turks     | 234            | 18              | 252   |
|           | 2nd-generation Yugoslavs | 166            | 36              | 202   |
|           | Control group            | 193            | 60              | 253   |
| Frankfurt | 2nd-generation Turks     | 186            | 67              | 253   |
|           | 2nd-generation Yugoslavs | 172            | 32              | 204   |
|           | Control group            | 182            | 68              | 250   |

Source: TIES Germany

In terms of 'national origin', the thus-identified second-generation Turks (503 interviewees in total) and second-generation Yugoslavs (403 interviewees in total) could then be contrasted with the control group of German origin (501 interviewees in total).<sup>3</sup> For purposes of comparison, a group of German-born interviewees without a migrant background was included (501 in total). Table 1.2 shows the composition of the thus-determined respondent groups in both cities under study. As far as the sexes are concerned, an equal distribution was targeted within the age group surveyed (table 1.3).

2 Children of refugees from the successor states of Yugoslavia (SSYU) were explicitly not included, only the descendants of the classic Yugoslavian 'guest workers'. The 'second generation' criterion could otherwise not have been upheld, due to the late arrival of the first generation during the civil wars. The relevant group is therefore referred to as 'of Yugoslavian descent' or as 'second-generation Yugoslavs' in order to distinguish it from immigrants from the regions and states of former Yugoslavia after 1990.

3 The varying numbers of participants in the different groups were the result of limited access due to financial constraints.

**Table 1.2** Composition of survey groups in Berlin and Frankfurt

|           | 2nd generation |           | CG  | Total |
|-----------|----------------|-----------|-----|-------|
|           | Turks          | Yugoslavs |     |       |
| Berlin    | 253            | 201       | 249 | 703   |
| Frankfurt | 250            | 202       | 252 | 704   |
| Total     | 503            | 403       | 501 | 1,407 |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

**Table 1.3** Age and sex distribution of TIES respondents by group (in %)

|        | Age group | 2nd generation |           | CG   | Total |
|--------|-----------|----------------|-----------|------|-------|
|        |           | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |       |
| Male   | 18-20     | 15.0           | 9.7       | 7.9  | 10.9  |
|        | 21-24     | 21.7           | 12.1      | 18.0 | 17.7  |
|        | 25-29     | 32.6           | 33.8      | 27.8 | 31.3  |
|        | 30-36     | 30.7           | 44.4      | 46.3 | 40.1  |
|        | Total N   | 254            | 198       | 255  | 707   |
| Female | 18-20     | 18.5           | 11.2      | 10.2 | 13.4  |
|        | 21-24     | 17.3           | 11.2      | 15.4 | 14.9  |
|        | 25-29     | 28.9           | 35.6      | 28.5 | 30.7  |
|        | 30-36     | 35.3           | 42.0      | 45.9 | 41.0  |
|        | Total N   | 249            | 205       | 246  | 700   |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

All interviewees were born in Germany and the majority of both second-generation groups held German citizenship, often in combination with other citizenships, as table 1.4 shows. Of the respondents with German citizenship, 87.4 per cent of the second-generation Turks and 75 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs state that they acquired it at birth. However, these numbers have to be deemed inconclusive in light of the age group<sup>4</sup> and the citizenship status of the parents (see section 2.3). Technically, a much smaller number of respondents could have been given German

4 Before the German citizenship reform of 2001, newborn children automatically acquired their parents' nationality.

citizenship by birth. Their belief that they are German by birth – regardless of when exactly they acquired citizenship – might indicate that they simply take this for granted.

**Table 1.4** Second-generation TIES respondents: citizenship by group (in %)

| 2nd generation | Citizenship     |                  |                 | N   |
|----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|-----|
|                | Only German     | German and other | Only non-German |     |
| Turks          | 53.8            | 30.0             | 16.2            | 502 |
| Yugoslavs      | 67.9            | 21.2             | 10.9            | 405 |
| Total          | 60.1<br>(N=545) | 26.1<br>(N=237)  | 13.8<br>(N=125) | 907 |

Source: TIES Survey Germany

The respondents with a Turkish background all held either German or Turkish citizenship or both. Obviously, the picture that emerges for the participants with a Yugoslavian background is much more diverse, due to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the many successor states offering citizenship since then. The three (sole or additional) nationalities named most often were ‘Serbian’ (23.3%), ‘Slovenian’ (26.1%), and ‘Yugoslavian’ (27.7%). Of course, Yugoslavian citizenship is now inoperative, so it is particularly striking that this was most frequently mentioned and thus the dominant affiliation.

The second precondition for a systematic international study was the implementation of a uniform questionnaire that would incorporate national specificities without compromising the general validity of the data. For example, the education systems in the eight countries under investigation differed substantially with regard to school types and school-leaving certificates. In Germany, the type of school attended was not always a reliable indicator of the qualification gained and vice versa, and transfers between different school types were not uncommon. The German questionnaire thus enquired about both school types and school-leaving qualifications. Besides education, the main topics of the questionnaire were labour market position, income, housing, ethnic and religious identity, social relations, gender roles, partner choice and transnationalism. In all modules, questions were also asked about experiences related to discrimination. However, it should be mentioned here that during the first loop of the face-to-face interviews, a considerable number of respondents did not complete the repetitive part of the section on education in the questionnaire, which asks



about the various schools attended. Those respondents whose answers so far implied that they had attended at least one more school type than the one already mentioned were once more contacted by phone in order to complete the full set of questions (table 1.5).

**Table 1.5 TIES respondents, repeated inquiry**

|                          | <b>Identified<br/>for repeated<br/>inquiry</b> | <b>Approached</b> | <b>Repetition<br/>conducted</b> | <b>Repetition<br/>denied</b> |
|--------------------------|--|-------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 2nd-generation Turks     | 422  | 372               | 361                             | 11                           |
| 2nd-generation Yugoslavs | 301  | 258               | 251                             | 7                            |
| Control group            | 363  | 332               | 317                             | 15                           |

Source: TIES Germany

The comparison of second-generation migrants with individuals without a migration background in a given national context implies that there is a 'standard' set within the majority population by which minorities can be measured. Obviously, inequalities also exist within the group of 'natives', so equalisation between majority and minority groups is not indicative of actual equality, but merely normality. In the first instance this normality has to do with indicators of structural integration, such as the comparison of school-leaving qualifications and wages. Other aspects of 'normal life', however, cannot be standardised as easily based on the 'native' average. This applies especially to the 'soft' determinants of integration, such as social relations, attitudes towards the multicultural society, and family constellations. Instead, a distinction can be made here between the ways in which people participate in social domains, and individual attitudes, strategies, and practices in the context of the multicultural society where participation takes place.

## 2 Migration history and basic demographic characteristics of the first generation

### 2.1 Introduction

The parents of the TIES respondents came to Germany in the course of 'guest worker' recruitment and subsequent family reunifications. The 'guest worker' recruitment was supposed to utilise foreign workers temporarily to fill short-term gaps in the German labour market. Based on a concept of work rotation, the idea was that each contingent of workers would return to their countries of origin after a limited period of time (Bommes 2004b). The Federal Republic of Germany signed bilateral recruitment agreements with Turkey in 1961 and with Yugoslavia in 1968. Between 1961 and 1973, the foreign workforce increased from 549,000 to 2.6 million, and the total foreign population to 4 million. Of these, 893,000 were Turks and 673,000 were Yugoslavs (Herbert 1986). It was not until the oil crisis of 1973 and the subsequent recession that recruitment bans were announced in West Germany as well as in other European countries (Bade 1984).

In the meantime, however, it had become obvious that the concepts of work rotation and temporary residency were not going to coincide with the actual developments. Many 'guest workers' settled in West Germany and got their families to join them. Once they had become legally entitled to access the welfare state, they could not easily be sent back. Little by little, the labour migration, originally regarded as temporary, became permanent immigration. After the 1980s, this was accompanied by national and local integration programmes (Bommes 2004b). In the long run, the recruitment ban of 1973 turned out to be a catalyst for a steady increase in the foreign resident population born in Germany and abroad. As this population grew, many of their traditional jobs (those 'gaps' in the labour market that their recruitment was intended to fill) were lost in the context of economic adjustments, leading to increasing unemployment in this group (Bade 1984).

The normalisation of the presence of migrants and the related cultural pluralisation of West German society have involved a socio-structural transformation of social domains. One aspect of this is the persistent inclusion of the first generation in unskilled labour market segments, with its members remaining at the lower end of the social hierarchy. Other socio-structural

transformations have included the acquisition of constitutional rights and the spread of Islam. Political integration, being bound to citizenship, has mostly emerged at the local level. Integration into the education system, however, became relevant only for the second generation, and gradually led to adjustments in teacher training and changes to educational programmes and organisational structures (Bommes 2004b).

## 2.2 The two cities under study: Berlin and Frankfurt

More than half of Germany's migrants live in cities with over 100,000 residents, 28 per cent of them in the fourteen cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants.<sup>1</sup> Roughly one third of the children and teenagers in metropolitan areas do not have German citizenship.<sup>2</sup> More detailed statistical data on migration backgrounds are scarce and not collected consistently throughout the country, especially when it comes to correlating migration backgrounds and national origin. Thus, the only category for which extensive, reliable data are available is that of non-citizens, i.e. residents without German citizenship (table 2.1).

**Table 2.1** Persons without German citizenship in Germany's ten largest cities

|                | <b>Percentage of residents without German citizenship (in %)</b> | <b>Of these: Turks (in %)</b> | <b>Of these: Yugoslavs (in %)</b> | <b>Total residents</b> |
|----------------|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|
| Munich         | 23.6   | 14.0                          | 17.1                              | 1,294,608              |
| Stuttgart      | 23.1   | 16.0                          | 21.5                              | 597,176                |
| Frankfurt a.M. | 21.1   | 19.4                          | 17.3                              | 652,610                |
| Düsseldorf     | 17.9   | 14.5                          | 14.9                              | 577,505                |
| Cologne        | 16.9   | 38.1                          | 8.0                               | 989,766                |
| Dortmund       | 15.9   | 28.4                          | 3.2                               | 587,624                |
| Hamburg        | 14.2   | 23.4                          | 6.6                               | 1,754,182              |
| Berlin         | 13.9   | 25.2                          | 9.5                               | 3,404,037              |
| Bremen         | 12.9   | 34.0                          | 6.9                               | 547,934                |
| Essen          | 11.8   | 25.2                          | 11.4                              | 583,198                |

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2007); own calculations

1 Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt am Main, Stuttgart, Dortmund, Essen, Düsseldorf, Bremen, Hanover, Leipzig, Dresden and Nuremberg.

2 Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund – Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2005; DeStatis.

In each of the ten major German cities, the percentage of non-citizens is higher than the German average of 8.9 per cent. The three cities with the largest shares of foreigners are located in Southern Germany (in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Hessen), where labour migration started earliest and where labour markets continue to attract considerable migration (see Häußermann & Kapphann 2008). Almost all over Northern and Western Germany (the exception being Düsseldorf), the percentage of Turks exceeds that of all other groups. This is mainly due to their extensive migration for labour from the 1950s to the early 1970s, the recruitment period of the 'guest workers'. For the subsequent period, the Turkish share of the population can be mostly attributed to family migration and reproduction. Until the implementation of the German citizenship reform in 2001, citizenship was granted on the basis of German descent or length of stay, and not by birth. Percentages of persons from the former Yugoslavia reflect, on one hand, the classic recruitment of 'guest workers' and subsequent family migration and reproduction, and, on the other hand, the migration of refugees during the civil wars in the Yugoslavian region, particularly between 1991 and 1995. This latter group, however, was not included in the TIES survey on the second generation.

The German TIES study was conducted in the capital, Berlin, and in Frankfurt am Main. Berlin, with 3.5 million inhabitants, is Germany's largest city, and Frankfurt its fifth-largest with more than 650,000 inhabitants. Both cities are the most important economic centres in their respective regions, with major infrastructure such as the Tegel and Schönefeld airports in Berlin and Europe's third-largest airport in Frankfurt. In both cities, the population of Turkish origin represents the most substantial minority group, with Berlin being renowned as hosting the world's largest Turkish community outside of Turkey.

In Berlin, the shares of inhabitants with a migrant background add up to around 23 per cent (Brenke 2008). However, the city's particular history means that the percentage in East Berlin is still much lower than that in West Berlin. During the Cold War, labour migration – especially from Southern Europe and Turkey – was the main factor slowing down West Berlin's population decline. In the post-Cold War era, immigration from Eastern Europe has been the main source of Berlin's newcomer population. But processes of de-industrialisation have also led to considerable emigration. This, in combination with a low birth rate, means that the city is facing a latent demographic decline (Ohliger & Raiser 2005). In Berlin, it is the non-German population that displays the youngest age structure and the highest reproduction rate.

In contrast to Berlin, Frankfurt has experienced a slight population increase in recent years due to a birth surplus and external and internal migration in response to positive economic trends.<sup>3</sup> After World War II, Frankfurt was one of the cities that attracted the most migrants in Germany. Constant growth of the non-German population reached its peak in the early 1990s against the backdrop of the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia. After the turn of the century, the foreign population decreased slightly due to a smaller, but still positive migration balance in combination with rising naturalisation rates. Furthermore, since the German citizenship reform of 2001, more and more non-German inhabitants of Frankfurt have chosen German citizenship for their newborn children (Halisch 2008). Currently, the percentage of inhabitants with a migrant background is roughly 37 per cent.<sup>4</sup>

### 2.3 The parents of the TIES respondents

The first thing to note is that the information offered here is of limited conclusiveness, as it refers to the accounts of the respondents and not information originating from the parents themselves. In several cases, more than one third of the interviewees were not capable of answering specific questions regarding their parents. For the TIES study, it was essential to find participants with at least one parent who had migrated to Germany: roughly 80 per cent of the respondents from migrant backgrounds have two parents with first-hand experience of migration, and of the remainder, almost all have one parent who experienced migration.

The majority of the first-generation men came in the course of labour migration, followed by family reunions and refugee migration (table 2.2). The first-generation women, on the other hand, mainly immigrated in the context of family reunions. While 22 per cent of the Turkish women came to West Germany in order to marry, this only applies to 11 per cent of the Yugoslavian women. The latter had a greater tendency to immigrate for reasons of work: this applies to 21.9 per cent of the Yugoslavian women but only 3.2 per cent of the Turkish women. Thus, the Turkish women mainly came in the context of family-dependent migration, while Yugoslavian women immigrated independently more often. These differences between the mothers of the TIES respondent groups point to the influence of different socio-cultural backgrounds.

3 FaM Statistik aktuell, Nr. 27/2008.

4 Statistisches Jahrbuch Frankfurt am Main 2007.

**Table 2.2** Parents' main reasons for immigration to FRG by group (in %)

| Reasons for immigration | 2nd generation |        |           |        |
|-------------------------|----------------|--------|-----------|--------|
|                         | Turks          |        | Yugoslavs |        |
|                         | Father         | Mother | Father    | Mother |
| Marriage                | 1.9            | 22.0   | 0.6       | 11.1   |
| Family reunion          | 13.2           | 24.1   | 10.8      | 21.0   |
| Reunion with spouse     | 1.4            | 35.1   | 1.2       | 32.7   |
| Work                    | 66.0           | 3.2    | 74.6      | 21.9   |
| Study                   | 1.0            | 0.5    | 0.6       | 1.2    |
| Refugee/asylum          | 6.5            | 3.8    | 4.8       | 3.1    |
| Don't know/other        | 10.0           | 11.3   | 7.5       | 9.0    |
| Total N                 | 418            | 373    | 334       | 293    |

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Only 11.5 per cent of the Turkish and 16 per cent of the Yugoslavian TIES parents who were not born in West Germany came from larger cities in their countries of origin. This is fairly typical of the first generation, who often came to Germany as part of a rural exodus from industrially underdeveloped regions with structural unemployment and underemployment (Bade 2003). As table 2.3 shows, the majority of the first generation was, according to their children, unemployed before they entered Germany. One conspicuous finding, however, is that the Yugoslavian TIES parents were roughly three times more likely than the Turkish parents to have been employed before emigration. One reason for this may be that several German companies explicitly recruited qualified employees, particularly from Yugoslavia in the

**Table 2.3** Parents' work status before immigration to FRG by group (in %)

| Work status before immigration | 2nd generation |        |           |        |
|--------------------------------|----------------|--------|-----------|--------|
|                                | Turks          |        | Yugoslavs |        |
|                                | Father         | Mother | Father    | Mother |
| Employed                       | 10.8           | 5.5    | 31.3      | 20.4   |
| Unemployed                     | 57.6           | 66.3   | 43.3      | 55.4   |
| Don't know                     | 31.6           | 28.2   | 25.4      | 24.2   |
| Total N                        | 453            | 415    | 335       | 314    |

Source: TIES Survey Germany

late 1960s and early 1970s (Dunkel 2000). For at least some of the Yugoslavs, then, the decision to leave the country was not motivated by unemployment and poor opportunities on the domestic labour market. We should of course bear in mind that the parents of both groups were on average only twenty years old when they came to West Germany.

The parents' arrival dates reflect the decreasing migration movements from Turkey and Yugoslavia following the start of the recruitment ban in 1973. Almost two thirds of the men entered West Germany before this date,<sup>5</sup> whereas for the women, who mainly immigrated in the context of family reunions, this turning point is hardly noticeable. One notable finding is the large number of Yugoslavs (roughly one quarter) who, according to their children, arrived in the Federal Republic before 1968, i.e. before the recruitment agreement. This is indirectly corroborated by the census of the decade before, which reported an increasing Yugoslavian population in West Germany. In 1967 there were 95,700 Yugoslavs in West Germany, as compared to a mere 2,500 Turks living there in 1960 (see Herbert 1986).

Most of the parents of the TIES respondents had lived in Germany for more than 25 years, and therefore had a legal claim to German citizenship. Some 65.5 per cent of the Yugoslavian immigrants, but only 44.8 per cent of the Turkish immigrants, had been naturalised at the time of the survey. This difference might already hint at a stronger potential identification with Germany on the part of the second-generation Yugoslavs. It also suggests that the first-generation Yugoslavs are more receptive towards the possible advantages of German citizenship than their Turkish counterparts. Of the TIES parents without German citizenship, 59.2 per cent of the Turks and 56.6 per cent of the Yugoslavs had never applied for naturalisation, while 16.5 per cent of the first-generation Turks and 21 per cent of the first-generation Yugoslavs were engaged in naturalisation proceedings at the time of the survey.<sup>6</sup> In both groups, spouses usually had the same citizenship (first-generation Turks: 88.6%; first-generation Yugoslavs: 91.2%). Once again, of course, many respondents were not able to provide information on their parents' citizenship status.

Bearing in mind the above provisos, it can generally be stated that the integration of the first generation into the labour market was successful. Unemployment rates in this group are, according to the respondents,

5 The figures can mostly be explained by the fact that the possible years of arrival of the parents of the TIES respondents (who were born in Germany) are the years before 1989.

6 A very small number was denied naturalisation in the course of the proceedings.

noticeably lower than the German average.<sup>7</sup> However, as the figures are calculated based on the children's assessments, the 'unemployment' rates of the first generation might not reflect official definitions, but the respondents' understanding of the issue. We can tentatively suggest that a low unemployment rate among the first generation could be due to the fact that the parents of the TIES respondents came to Germany with the promise of a workplace or with employment contracts. They therefore had the opportunity to consolidate their status, to work their way up in their firms, and to establish supportive networks and collegial relationships that they could fall back on in the face of an imminent or actual job loss (see Bommes 2004b). On the other hand, a considerable proportion were already receiving a pension, which obviously could have been preceded by unemployment.

Table 2.4 displays the work status of the TIES respondents' parents at the time of the survey. Although the majority of the first generation presumably came to West Germany in the context of salaried employment, there is a noteworthy tendency towards self-employment in today's work statuses, indicating a re-orientation at some point in their working lives. Such re-orientations may be at least partly associated with the increasing instability of the labour market, particularly for unqualified workers and after the period of guest-worker recruitment. But we should also take into account the fact that the earnings of self-employed migrants in Germany regularly match those of the majority population, and often even exceed them. Often incomes from self-employment are also higher than those that can be gained in the equivalent labour market segment of unskilled/semiskilled work (Constant, Shachmurove & Zimmermann 2003). Self-employment, even if it only involves a small enterprise, can therefore be deemed advancement. Among the first-generation men, this applies to almost twice as many Turks (18%) as Yugoslavs (9.4%), who are closer to the control group (11.6%). Another reason for this may be that Turks have more difficulty accessing the German labour market (*ibid.*).

The figures in table 2.4 also point to a more traditional way of life among the Turkish women. While the Yugoslavian and German mothers of the TIES respondents often pursued a paid profession, the Turkish mothers were more than twice as likely to be doing family work as their counterparts from the other two groups. Here it should be borne in mind that many more Yugoslavian than Turkish women originally came to West Germany as migrant workers.

7 At the time of the survey, the German unemployment rate was about 8%.



**Table 2.4** Parents' current work status by group (in %)

| Parents' work status           | 2nd generation |        |           |        | CG     |        |
|--------------------------------|----------------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|--------|
|                                | Turks          |        | Yugoslavs |        | Father | Mother |
|                                | Father         | Mother | Father    | Mother |        |        |
| One or more jobs               | 49.5           | 23.3   | 64.3      | 40.4   | 63.6   | 49.2   |
| Unpaid work in family business | 0.0            | 4.9    | 0.0       | 2.6    | 0.0    | 1.9    |
| Retired                        | 21.7           | 3.4    | 18.4      | 12.1   | 17.1   | 9.7    |
| Care of children/household     | 0.0            | 59.1   | 0.0       | 29.3   | 0.0    | 24.4   |
| Own business/self-employed     | 18.0           | 1.4    | 9.4       | 4.4    | 11.6   | 4.3    |
| Unemployed                     | 5.4            | 2.6    | 3.1       | 5.1    | 4.9    | 5.0    |
| Other                          | 5.4            | 5.3    | 4.7       | 6.2    | 2.8    | 5.6    |
| Total N                        | 483            | 494    | 381       | 389    | 467    | 484    |


Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

The majority of the TIES respondents' parents spent their childhood at least until the age of fifteen in their country of origin (88.6% of the first-generation Turks and 84.8% of the first-generation Yugoslavs). Most arrived in the new country after completing compulsory education.<sup>8</sup> Correspondingly, only 20 per cent of either group completed the last part of their schooling in Germany. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 display the highest educational qualification of the men and women of the first generation. Despite the fact that the first-generation Turks and Yugoslavs have similar unemployment rates, the figures show substantial differences in terms of utilisable educational qualifications. These are at much lower levels among the Turkish men and women than among the two other groups. According to their children, more than 85 per cent of the Turkish men and more than 90 per cent of the Turkish women of the first generation had not completed any vocational training, meaning that they could only be employed as unskilled or semi-skilled workers in the German labour market. This was true for only 48.9 per cent of the Yugoslavs and only 25.2 per cent of the parents of respondents in the control group. The contrast between the first generation and the majority population is certainly to be expected, considering that the former came to West Germany from rural areas at an age when they were no longer required to attend school. As they were immediately integrated into either the labour market or family

8 Until 1997, it was compulsory to attend school for five years in Turkey; in the former Yugoslavia the period of compulsory education was eight years.

**Figure 2.1 First generation, men: Highest educational qualifications according to ISCED levels per group**




ISCED level 0 = TIES category 'no school attendance'; ISCED level 1 = TIES category 'primary school'; ISCED level 2 = TIES categories 'special education', 'lower secondary, vocational branch', 'lower secondary, academic branch'; ISCED level 3 = TIES categories 'vocational training', 'higher vocational school branch'; ISCED level 4 = TIES categories 'academic orientation', 'vocational and higher secondary'; ISCED level 5 = TIES category 'university'; ISCED level 6 = TIES category 'doctoral and post-doctoral degrees'

Source: TIES Survey Germany

work, there was probably no question of further education. On the other hand, the clear educational disadvantages of the Turks as compared to the Yugoslavs must also be attributed to the educational situation in Turkey itself, which had no nationwide education system until the 1980s. In the 1970s (when the majority of the first-generation Turks were of school age), half the population was illiterate and more than half had no school-leaving qualification at all (Delhaes-Günther 1976). By contrast, national reforms to the education system in Yugoslavia between 1950 and 1970 (including extending the period of compulsory education to eight years) led to a considerable reduction in illiteracy rates, to under 10 per cent (Rehder 1992). Moreover, migrant workers from Yugoslavia were much more likely than those from Turkey to be skilled employees with correspondingly higher educational qualifications.

**Figure 2.2 First generation, women: highest educational qualifications according to ISCED levels\* per group**



\* ISCED levels: see Figure 1.1

Source: TIES Survey Germany

The impacts of these country-specific circumstances were indirectly reflected in the TIES respondents' statements regarding their parents' literacy skills. According to their children, 61 per cent of the Turkish first generation knew how to read and write, albeit with a conspicuous gap between the men (80%) and the women (49%). In contrast, 95 per cent of the Yugoslavian parents were reported to be literate, without noteworthy differences between the mothers and the fathers. However, it has to be taken into account that self-evaluations and second-hand evaluations of linguistic skills, though common in quantitative surveys, are unreliable and carry a very high risk of inconsistency (see Maas 2008).<sup>9</sup> Bearing this in mind, 54.1 per cent of the second-generation Turks ascribed good German skills to their fathers, but only 27 per cent to their mothers. Of the

9 For example, only 54.1% of the Turkish fathers are said to have generally good German language skills. And yet 80.7% are said to be able to read and write in German, which one might consider to be the definition of 'good language skills'. This indicates inconsistent perceptions among respondents and uncertainty as to what constitutes 'good German language skills', especially with regard to literacy skills.

second-generation Yugoslavs, 70.9 per cent reported that their fathers had a good knowledge of German, and 68.8 per cent said this about their mothers. These findings may, among other things, point to divergent perspectives on the parental generation, specifically a more critical attitude on the part of second-generation Turks. A comparable attitude is also expressed in public opinion.<sup>10</sup>

In sum, the integration of the first generation as a whole can be regarded as fairly successful, although the Yugoslavian immigrants came to Germany as skilled employees more often than Turkish ones did. In general, the women tended to come to West Germany in the course of family formation and reunion, and the men tended to come for paid employment. But in terms of labour market participation, traditional role distributions are more obvious among the Turkish than the Yugoslavian first-generation migrants: compared to the Yugoslavian women, the Turkish women immigrated less often in the context of labour migration. With regard to educational backgrounds, there are huge gender differences between the better-educated Turkish men and the poorly-educated Turkish women of the first generation, whereas such differences do not exist among the Yugoslavian migrants. But the educational levels of the Turkish first generation are in general far below those of the Yugoslavs, who can be classified as having a medium level of education in comparison to the majority population.

We will need to bear in mind these different family backgrounds of the two groups of second-generation migrants when dealing with the various areas of integration.

10 Consider the frequently recurring 'integration debate' in German politics and media, with the most recent peak in the debate provoked by the publications of Thilo Sarrazin in October 2009.



# 3 Educational careers and educational outcomes

## 3.1 Introduction

Education is the resource responsible for shaping the lives of children and adolescents.<sup>1</sup> The education system sets the course for future training prospects and professional careers, and successful completion of vocational training or a course of tertiary study gives young people the qualifications they need to take up achievement roles on the labour market. In addition to economic capital (income, real estate, etc.) and social capital (social relationships, networks), education, the resource described by Bourdieu (1983) as 'cultural capital', plays a crucial role when it comes to subsequent career patterns.<sup>2</sup> Having a high school-leaving qualification enables adolescents to cope more easily with the transition from school to vocational training, and go on to find suitable positions on the labour market.

Education and the labour market are therefore primarily important 'because the success or failure of integration in these areas also has a clear, profound effect on integration opportunities in other areas, and hence very much determines migrants' overall prospects' (Bommes 2004b: 39, own translation).<sup>3</sup> Conversely, if individuals are poorly qualified, or have no qualifications at all, they are at greater risk of failing to become integrated into the labour market and may face social consequences such as long-term unemployment or dependence on welfare. This is especially the case in modern economies that are becoming less reliant on unskilled and semi-skilled labourers, and increasingly dependent on expert knowledge and highly skilled workers. There is considerable demand in Germany for highly qualified people (i.e. graduates) and trained craftspeople. Yet there

1 A summary of the essential findings and an alignment with the results of the international comparison has already been published in Wilmes, Schneider & Crul (2011).

2 Regarding details of this and the various forms of cultural capital, see Bourdieu (1983).

3 In highly differentiated societies, qualifications can only be acquired in the education system, which is compulsory. The education system sets the conditions that are crucial for the realisation of long-term opportunities in life. Only the resource of education enables people to access the formal labour market and, by acquiring income, the housing market. Only education gives people the prospect of being able to start a family, as well as access to other areas of life (assumption of the role of customer, etc.).

are fewer jobs, for example in production,<sup>4</sup> for people without a school diploma or vocational training. Such school-leavers are now at greater risk of becoming unemployed.

As many recent studies (PISA, IGLU, etc.) show, the academic success of children depends to a great extent on their parents' level of education and social class. The higher the educational level of a child's parents, the more highly qualified the child is likely to be. It is difficult for children from 'uneducated' families to achieve at a level comparable to counterparts with a higher educational attainment background, even if they have a similar level of capability and performance.

In this respect, children of immigrants face particular challenges. These arise from their individual migration history or that of their family, and related disruptions in their linguistic, social and cultural development. Such challenges are often the result of the socio-structural position of migrant families, who may lack the financial, social, and cultural resources to support their children's educational ambitions. Thus, the school careers of children and adolescents from migrant backgrounds often reflect two different sorts of challenge: that of migration and integration, on the one hand, and that of social advancement, on the other hand.

Parents' capital resources may therefore affect how second-generation immigrants fare at school. Based on the TIES data regarding parents' socio-demographic situations, it can be assumed that the children of immigrants face special challenges at school. The first generation, who came to West Germany in the context of the 'guest worker' recruitment in the 1960s and 1970s,<sup>5</sup> had only limited financial and social resources, making it more difficult for their children to move up the social ladder by achieving higher educational and vocational qualifications.

Schools, and the way they function as organizations, present institutional educational barriers for second-generation immigrants. One aspect is teachers' decision-making behaviour when it comes to making pupils repeat a year or go down a level, and recommending which school children should attend after primary school (*Grundschule*) (Gomolla & Radtke 2002). Another aspect is how the proportion of immigrants in school classes contributes to their learning outcomes and the continuation or abandonment of their

4 In the 1960s, the unqualified parent generation, the so-called 'guest workers', were given access to the German labour market due to their willingness to perform unskilled or semi-skilled work in production.

5 This mainly concerns men with low educational qualifications or none at all, who were employed as unskilled or semi-skilled workers (see Introduction).

education. These factors must be seen against the backdrop of a highly differentiated tripartite German education system. Here school-leaving certificates from *Hauptschulen* (secondary modern schools) are regarded as less and less valuable, and key decisions are taken at all school transition points that can have a major impact on a person's further educational or occupational career.

Individual and institutional barriers can have a cumulative effect in the course of educational careers. These barriers pose major challenges to migrant children, especially when it comes to indicators of academic success such as educational participation and educational outcomes (i.e. qualifications).

In the following sections we will attempt to trace the educational careers of the second-generation Turkish and Yugoslavian respondents, and to determine how they differ from the control group.<sup>6</sup> Educational careers begin with kindergarten and primary school. They are particularly influenced by the way pupils cope with the major school transitions, firstly to the *Sekundarstufe I* (lower secondary schools) and secondly to the *Sekundarstufe II* (upper secondary schools), and hence the qualifications gained. It is not always helpful, however, to compare these findings with other education-related statistics. This is because the citizenship of children or their parents is often used to define the populations of pupils from immigrant families,<sup>7</sup> without differentiating between pupils who were born in Germany and those who immigrated later in their lives. Furthermore, a variety of indicators are used to determine their success in school.<sup>8</sup>

The two cities of the TIES study – Berlin as a federal city state, and Frankfurt as part of the *Bundesland* Hessen – have different educational systems. An overview of the main characteristics is provided in table 3.1, which presents the number of years typically spent in each phase of schooling.<sup>9</sup> The main difference between the two cities is the number of years spent in primary school: in Berlin it is six years, in Frankfurt only four. The duration of lower secondary education is correspondingly shorter in Berlin (four years) than in Frankfurt (six years). The duration of upper secondary school is the same in both cities.

6 For an international comparison, see also Pásztor (2008).

7 See the contemporary survey on the educational and occupational success of young migrants based on figures from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), classified according to citizenship, in Siminovskaia (2008).

8 For further details, see Diefenbach (2008), and also Crul & Schneider (2009).

9 For information on the German school system in general, see Konsortium Bildungsberichterstattung (2008).



**Table 3.1 The school system in Berlin and Frankfurt**

|                                    | <b>Berlin</b>   | <b>Frankfurt</b>  |
|------------------------------------|---|---|
| Kindergarten                       | Legal entitlement to a place in kindergarten from the age of 3  |   |
| Years of primary school            | 6   | 4   |
| Years of lower secondary education | 4   | 6   |
| Lower secondary: types of school   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hauptschule</i> (lower level of secondary education)</li> <li>• <i>Verbundene Haupt- und Realschule</i> (combined <i>Hauptschule</i> and <i>Realschule</i>)</li> <li>• <i>Realschule</i> (mid-level of secondary education)</li> <li>• <i>Gesamtschule</i> (comprehensive school)</li> <li>• <i>Gymnasium</i> (higher level of secondary education)</li> <li>• <i>Förderschule</i> (special education)</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Hauptschule</i></li> <li>• <i>Verbundene Haupt- und Realschule</i> (combined <i>Hauptschule</i> and <i>Realschule</i>)</li> <li>• <i>Realschule</i></li> <li>• <i>Gesamtschule</i> (comprehensive school)</li> <li>• <i>Gymnasium</i></li> <li>• <i>Förderschule</i></li> </ul> |
| Years of upper secondary education | 2-3   | 2-3   |
| Upper secondary: types of school   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Berufliches Gymnasium</i> (vocational grammar school/technical colleges)</li> <li>• <i>Oberstufe der Gesamtschule</i> (senior years of comprehensive school)</li> <li>• <i>Oberstufe Gymnasium</i> (senior years of grammar school)</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Berufliches Gymnasium</i> (vocational grammar school/technical colleges)</li> <li>• <i>Oberstufe der Gesamtschule</i> (senior years of comprehensive school)</li> <li>• <i>Oberstufe Gymnasium</i> (senior years of grammar school)</li> </ul>                                  |

### 3.2 Kindergarten and primary school

The importance of early childhood education before entering primary school is undisputed. This is where the foundations for children's language development are laid, and where the earliest education processes outside primary socialisation in the family take place.<sup>10</sup>

In Germany, every child from the age of three is entitled to a place in kindergarten. Attending kindergarten has become a self-evident part of all children's educational biographies. In spite of their legal entitlement,

<sup>10</sup> See also Lanfranchi (2002).

however, children of immigrants continue to be less represented in kindergarten than children of German origin. Figures from the micro-census show that, although kindergarten attendance rates for German and foreign children grew closer in the course of the 1990s, rates for the children of foreigners are still lower. Thus, the figures for 1991 and 1994 (the years in which many of the TIES respondents attended kindergarten) are 60 and 53 per cent, respectively, for three-year-old German children, but only 44 and 36 per cent for three-year-old foreign children. A huge increase can be seen for four-year-olds, with approximately 88 per cent of German children and around 75 per cent of foreign children of this age attending kindergarten in the two years studied (Konsortium Bildungsberichterstattung 2006). Figures are only available, however, for foreign children in general, and no information is available on their specific migration backgrounds.

The findings of the TIES survey show that this can be confirmed for the second-generation migrant groups under investigation. Altogether, 80.1 per cent (N = 403) of the respondents with a Turkish background and 86.5 per cent (N = 351) of those with a Yugoslavian migration background attended kindergarten, compared to 89.9 per cent (N = 452) of the control group. In other words, more than four out of five respondents from both migrant groups experienced education in a German kindergarten before starting school. Some 80 per cent attended kindergarten for more than one year.

The respondents from a migrant background started kindergarten and thus embarked on their educational careers later than the control group (second-generation Turks: 3.66 years of age; second-generation Yugoslavs: 3.82; control group: 3.55). The average age of kindergarten entry for the second generation was lower in Frankfurt than in Berlin. The female respondents of Turkish origin started kindergarten earlier (3.57 years of age) than the male ones (3.75), while the opposite applies to the German respondents: here female respondents began later than their male counterparts. There were no noteworthy gender differences between respondents with a Yugoslavian background. The tendency displayed in education statistics is reflected with regard to the differences between age groups. The second generation is catching up: while there are still considerable differences among the 25- to 35-year-olds, the kindergarten attendance of 18- to 25-year-olds is similar to that of the control group. Overall, the second-generation Yugoslavs started kindergarten later than the respondents with a Turkish migration background. Approximately 70 per cent of all respondents from all three groups investigated attended kindergarten by age four at the latest. They therefore had at least two, if not three, years of kindergarten experience (depending on age of school entry) before starting primary school (table 3.2).

**Table 3.2 Age of entry to education system by group (in %)**

| Age in years | 2nd generation |            |            |
|--------------|----------------|------------|------------|
|              | Turks          | Yugoslavs  | CG         |
| 2            | 0.0            | 0.3 (1)    | 2.3 (11)   |
| 3            | 40.2 (196)     | 36.7 (145) | 41.2 (217) |
| 4            | 29.1 (142)     | 28.9 (114) | 29.9 (150) |
| 5            | 10.2 (50)      | 19.5 (77)  | 12.7 (45)  |
| 6            | 8.8 (43)       | 10.9 (43)  | 9.3 (40)   |
| 7            | 11.7 (57)      | 3.8 (15)   | 6.0 (10)   |
| Total N      | 488            | 395        | 473        |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

The regulations governing the transition from kindergarten to primary school vary considerably from one *Bundesland* to the next. In Berlin, there is no obligation to establish a catchment area. Once such an area is established, however, parents more or less have to send their child to one of the schools within that area.<sup>11</sup> The selection regulations are stricter in Hessen. Here, each school is assigned to a catchment area,<sup>12</sup> i.e. parents have no real choice with regard to state primary schools.

It therefore comes as no surprise that the majority of respondents in the TIES survey attended the closest school in their neighbourhood. The reasons respondents gave for choosing a certain primary school were relatively equally distributed in all three groups. Around 80 per cent state that they attended the primary school which was geographically closest to their home. This finding is to be expected given that from the 1980s to the 1990s, and even today in a slightly weakened form, the choice of primary school in Berlin and Frankfurt is regulated by division into school districts, meaning that parents have few options open to them.

Around 30 per cent of each group said that their parents chose the primary school they were to attend. In the respondent group with a Turkish background, the primary school attended by siblings played an important role; one in five respondents stated that siblings had already

11 § 4 (2) of the regulations on the phase of primary education in the federal city state of Berlin stipulates the choice of school in case of the establishment of catchment areas. A different school choice is, however, possible on request.

12 § 60 (4) of the school law of Hessen regulates compulsory education by means of primary school attendance in the catchment area of residence. § 1 of the regulations on the organisation of schooling stipulates the free choice of school after primary school.

attended the same school. This does not seem as important a factor for the other two groups (roughly 15% each). The school's reputation was relevant to very few people's choice of school, and special curricula or particular religious or pedagogical orientations (e.g. Waldorf schools) were also of little importance.

A closer inspection of the types of school also reveals a very consistent picture: approximately 95 per cent of respondents from all groups attended a state school. Only 3.2 per cent of the second-generation Turks and 1.6 per cent of the control group attended a private primary school, and these had no religious or special pedagogical orientation.

School districts are usually set up to ensure that schoolchildren do not have far to go to school, and to establish a social balance between schools. If parents are able to choose schools freely, it is feared, the gap between privileged schools and 'problem schools' (those with a high proportion of immigrants and/or children from socially disadvantaged families) will continue to widen, and a small number of schools may bear the brunt of this. It is assumed, for example, that classes with a high proportion of immigrants place greater strain on staff, and that such classes do not provide an environment conducive to learning, especially for children of immigrants. In large cities such as Berlin and Frankfurt, however, it is inevitable that children growing up in a catchment area with a high proportion of immigrants will also go to school with a disproportionately large number of immigrants. Such catchment areas can then have the opposite effect to that intended, leading to school classes with a high concentration of children of immigrants.

Looking at the replies given by respondents in the TIES survey about the proportion of immigrants in primary school, differences can be identified between the two second-generation groups and the control group. Only 4.9 per cent of the second-generation Turks and 7.5 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs had virtually no other children with migrant origins in their classes. In the control group, however, this applied to more than one fifth of the respondents. In the second response category (i.e. 'around 25% of children were of immigrant origin') there are no major differences (second-generation Turks: 40.4%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 46.4%; control group: 38.9%). However, differences become more marked when the proportion of immigrants in class was estimated to be around 50 per cent or more. One clear difference can be discerned between the control group and, in particular, the group with a Turkish migration background. This is that 44.3 per cent of the second-generation Turks went to schools where

around 50 per cent of the children had a migration background,<sup>13</sup> while only 35 per cent of the control group were in this situation (second-generation Yugoslavs: 41.4%). Virtually no respondents went to schools where almost all the children had migrant backgrounds (0.2% of the control group and 1.9% of the second-generation Turks). There are no major differences between the age cohorts.


In migration and education research, there are intense debates about the effects a high proportion of immigrants has on the learning processes and educational experiences of immigrant children in primary school. It has not been established, however, how this proportion affects individual pupils' learning outcomes and acquisition of skills. These must always be viewed within the context of the school model and the teaching staff, as well as school-based and out-of-school forms of support. For the TIES respondents, differences are mainly visible between the respondents of Turkish origin and the control group. However, the data collection method used does not enable us to assess the extent to which these differences affect pupils' further educational careers.<sup>14</sup>

Repeating a year of schooling can be considered a crucial problem in terms of delays in one's educational career. In the case of the TIES groups, respondents with a Turkish background were affected by this problem much more often than the others. Figure 3.1 reveals significant differences, particularly between the Turkish migrant group and the control group. Some 14.6 per cent of the male respondents with a Turkish background repeated a year at primary school. This was only the case for 3.1 per cent of the male respondents in the control group. Similar tendencies can also be seen among the female respondents, albeit to a lesser extent. Although the second-generation Yugoslavs repeated a year more frequently than the control group, these differences are minimal (among the female respondents) or very low (in the case of the male respondents). The high numbers in figure 3.1 for the second-generation Turks mainly come about due to high repetition rates in Frankfurt. While 8.3 per cent of respondents with a Turkish background in Berlin repeated a year of primary school, this affected

13 The categories were as follows: hardly any children were of immigrant origin; around 25% of the children were of immigrant origin; around half of the children were of immigrant origin; around 75% of the children were of immigrant origin; almost all the children were of immigrant origin.

14 For this question, we must consider that the respondents were being asked retrospectively about the proportion of migrants in their classes some 8 to 17 years after they went to primary school, depending on their age. The explicit request for an estimate such a long time after the event may well have led to inaccuracies in the responses.

**Figure 3.1 Repetition of grades in primary school per sex and group**



TR-CG  $X^2 = 26.592$   $p=.000$   
 YU-TR  $X^2 = 12.933$   $p=.000$   
 All other differences are statistically insignificant.  
 Source: TIES Survey Germany

more than twice as many (17.2%) in Frankfurt. Of the second-generation Yugoslavs, on the other hand, 5.9 per cent repeated a year of primary school in Berlin and 5.4 per cent in Frankfurt (control group: 3.8% in both cities).

The decision to have a child repeat a year is usually made by the teachers in formal staff meetings. It implies that the pupil has failed to meet certain expectations, which are mainly defined by performance at a certain point in time. Schools believe it is necessary for pupils to repeat years in order to ensure that classes are qualitatively homogeneous (see Gomolla & Radtke 2009). There are many ways of justifying this decision: weak academic performance, language deficits, delayed development or lack of parental support. With children of immigrants, these arguments are often linked to their cultural or ‘ethnic’ (i.e. national or regional) origin. We thus find patterns of argument enabling schools to require children – especially those from a migrant background – to repeat a year as soon as there is space for them in the receiving class. After all, schools have certain terms of membership, and children of immigrants are often unable to meet these due to their deviant pre-socialisation (ibid.).

Hence the decisions taken by schools as organisations, and their expectations of homogeneity, have different effects on their pupils. These differences created by the organisations are communicated externally

through features ascribed to the disadvantaged group. This usually includes collective features such as national origin or culture, which could explain why respondents in the control group were much less likely to have repeated a year.<sup>15</sup> Although all three groups investigated had several years of experience in kindergarten, this did not necessarily mean – at least in the case of the second-generation Turks – that they progressed through primary school without delays.

Comparing the international results of the TIES survey, we can see that this is a specific phenomenon affecting German-speaking countries and Belgium. The likelihood of repeating a school year in the Netherlands is lower, especially in primary school. In Sweden, repeating a year is not even an option, while in France, it is unlikely as a student's performance is evaluated only at the end of a completed stage, and the parents still have a chance to appeal (for more detail, see Crul et al. 2012).

### 3.3 The transition problem in the German school system

In the German education system, great importance is attached to the transitions from primary school to *Sekundarstufe I* (lower secondary, Secondary I), from *Sekundarstufe I* to *Sekundarstufe II* (upper secondary, Secondary II), and from vocational training or higher education to the labour market. In German-speaking countries, the ability to cope with these school transitions is considered essential to acquiring qualifications and finding a position on the labour market. Germany's tripartite school system is strongly influenced by the institutionalisation of vocational training and its specific connectivity to the labour market.

The first transition that has a decisive effect on children's future education is that from primary school to Secondary I.<sup>16</sup> This decision does not depend on a pupil's performance alone, but also on teachers' recommendations, parents' level of commitment and local education policy.

Studies show that the proportion of *Hauptschule* recommendations for migrant children is disproportionately higher than for their non-migrant fellow pupils (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2010; Kristen 2002). Children of immigrants are given recommendations for a lower type of school (usually *Hauptschule* or even special education) on the basis of supposed language difficulties or a presumed lack of parental interest in

15 Krohne, Meier & Tillmann (2004) also find similar results.

16 For details, see Kramer et al. (2009).

their children's academic performance. Furthermore, religious orientations or assumptions about the socio-cultural milieu of origin are commonly used to justify predictions of potential failure at secondary school, substantiating a recommendation for a lower type of school.

After completing general education, i.e. at the end of Secondary I, young people are led to believe that they have a wide range of learning and training options. Upon closer inspection, however, these options prove to be very limited. Basically, we can distinguish between three typical paths of transition (see Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2008):

- transition from school to the vocational training part of upper secondary education, i.e. dual training or the vocational school system. Some school-leavers take an indirect route to the labour market via vocational transition systems or general secondary education programmes;
- transition from school, after acquiring *Fachhochschulreife* (advanced technical certificate) or *allgemeine Hochschulreife* (general university entrance qualification), to a degree programme (at college or university) or to vocational training and then to the labour market;
- transition from school straight to the labour market, sometimes with an intermediate phase in the vocational transition system.

### **3.4 The transition from primary school to lower secondary: Recommendations for secondary schools and their ramifications**

After four or six years at primary school, pupils approach the first transition to lower secondary education. This transition is the central selection barrier in the German school system. It determines educational biographies and is usually irreversible. Moreover, it often predetermines the qualifications pupils are able to acquire, and whether subsequent options are open to them. The extent to which recommendations in primary school influence school registrations in lower secondary schools is examined by comparing the schools attended by respondents.

Depending on the receiving school, recommendations may or may not be a decisive criterion for admission. Recommendations usually take into account special requirement profiles, educational methods and the qualifications offered by the receiving school. In addition, the recommendations



made by primary schools are influenced by the categories<sup>17</sup> of pupils destined for the school, and by teachers' skills and knowledge<sup>18</sup> (see Gomolla & Radtke 2009).

The parents usually decide which school their child will attend, although the recommendations by primary school teachers are generally followed. These recommendations should be based mainly on pupils' performance. As studies have proven (e.g. Gomolla & Radtke 2009), however, teachers' recommendations are often influenced by schools' internal problem-solving strategies and local conditions.<sup>19</sup> These are connected with assumptions about a child's socio-cultural milieu or lack of potential support, and hence their divergence from 'normal pupils'.

In the TIES survey, respondents were asked what school recommendation(s) they received in their final year of primary school (table 3.3). The difference between school recommendations for the second-generation Turks and the control group is striking, particularly if we compare the recommendations for *Hauptschule* and *Gymnasium*.<sup>20</sup> In these two categories, there is an almost 20 per cent difference between the groups, a statistically highly significant finding. This confirms what the literature suggests (see, among others, Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2010; Gomolla & Radtke 2009; Kristen 2002): the likelihood of receiving a *Hauptschule* recommendation is higher for children of immigrants – especially Turkish children – than for non-migrant children with a comparable level of achievement.<sup>21</sup> A contemporary study by the German Ministry for Education and Research (2010) also shows that recommendations for *Hauptschule* and *Gymnasium* might vary, while recommendations for the *Realschule* are made for similar proportions of migrant and non-migrant children (around 30 per cent).

17 For instance, those with practical skills (mainly *Hauptschule* pupils) or an aptitude for languages and creative thinking (*Realschule* or *Gymnasium* pupils).

18 Socio-pedagogical skills of *Hauptschule* teachers and academic knowledge of *Gymnasium* teachers.

19 Capacity, availability of extra classes, etc.

20 There are also more recommendations for special education among the second-generation Turks, but the absolute numbers are very small. Similar tendencies are corroborated in the relevant literature. Kornmann (2006) finds that foreign pupils are twice as likely to be recommended for special education as non-migrant pupils.

21 Nevertheless, no assumptions can be made about the respondents' actual performance as this was not evaluated in the survey.

**Table 3.3 Recommendation for secondary school by group (in %)**

|  | 2nd generation |           | CG   |
|--|----------------|-----------|------|
|  | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |
| <i>Förderschule</i> (special education)  | 1.2            | 0.8       | 0.6  |
| <i>Hauptschule (HS)</i> (secondary modern school)  | 28.2           | 20.6      | 8.2  |
| <i>Realschule (RS)</i> (middle school)   | 30.5           | 41.6      | 31.2 |
| <i>Gesamtschule</i> (comprehensive school)/<br><i>Verbundene Real- und Hauptschule/</i> (combined<br><i>Hauptschule/Realschule</i> ) | 14.5           | 8.6       | 6.0  |
| <i>Gymnasium</i> (grammar school)  | 10.6           | 16.0      | 28.6 |
| Mixed school types   | 15.0           | 12.4      | 25.4 |
| Total N  | 331            | 257       | 352  |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Studies show that even with similar primary school performance, the chances of receiving a *Gymnasium* recommendation are lower for children from a migrant background than for those without (Bos et al. 2004; Radtke 2004). Depending on social class affiliation, a mediocre non-migrant pupil thus has a better chance of receiving a *Gymnasium* recommendation than a high-achieving pupil with Turkish parents (Bos et al. 2004).

Gomolla & Radtke (2009) point out that *Hauptschulen* are equipped to cope with a high degree of heterogeneity (e.g. linguistic heterogeneity and the special learning needs of pupils with German as a second language). This is defined as an explicit teaching task, which makes it easy for primary schools to adapt their secondary school recommendation behaviour accordingly. In addition, teachers cite a 'lack of cultural fit' between the Turkish parental home and the *Gymnasium*, language difficulties, and previous experience with failed Turkish children as reasons for not recommending that a child go to a *Gymnasium*.

Although the school system goes to great lengths to create the impression that its selection criteria are defined strictly according to considerations of merit, and that all are treated equally based on their performance, it becomes clear, time and time again, that other criteria impact on schools' decision-making processes. These criteria consequently become barriers for children of immigrants with regard to their school career. The TIES survey figures confirm this trend to a considerable extent for the group with a Turkish migration background, and to some extent for the second-generation Yugoslavs, in relation to the control group. Since, however, the survey did

not compile data on performance or final grades, it is impossible to check whether equal levels of attainment in fact led to different recommendations.

### 3.5 Subsequent educational careers: Lower secondary school

The above-mentioned recommendations for the transition from primary school to Secondary I strongly influenced the schools actually attended. This applies to all the groups investigated. Of the pupils with a clear *Hauptschule* recommendation, a minimum of 93 per cent attended a *Hauptschule* as their first secondary school, and just two to three per cent went to a *Realschule* in spite of the *Hauptschule* recommendation. Similar tendencies are apparent when there was a clear *Realschule* recommendation: in all three groups, more than 90 per cent of the respondents who received a *Realschule* recommendation did go on to attend this type of school.

If multiple recommendations for different types of school were given (comprehensive school and *Gymnasium*; *Realschule* and *Gymnasium*; comprehensive school and *Realschule* and *Gymnasium*), parents usually chose the highest type of school. Strikingly, this was particularly the case for the second-generation Turks: 91 per cent of pupils with a Turkish background, 84 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs, and only 73.5 per cent of the control group with multiple recommendations attended a *Gymnasium*. No child with multiple recommendations went to a *Hauptschule*. It seems that if Turkish parents have a choice, they tend to make use of it<sup>22</sup> and send their child to the highest recommended type of school. This indicates that Turkish<sup>23</sup> and Yugoslavian parents have high educational aspirations for their children.<sup>24</sup>

Table 3.4 shows the first type of school attended at the lower secondary level by all Berlin and Frankfurt respondents. The comparison of the two cities under study shows no major differences in the distribution among receiving schools after the transition from primary school to Secondary I. It is generally apparent that the proportion of *Hauptschule* pupils within

22 Here, however, the number of total respondents is relatively small.

23 See, for example, Schulz (2006) and Karakaşoğlu-Aydın (2000), who refer to the importance that parents attach to the educational advancement of their children.

24 A contemporary survey conducted by the Ministry of Education and Research shows that parents' wishes that their child attend the highest type of school do not differ substantially between migrant and non-migrant parents (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2010).

the groups is particularly high among respondents with a Turkish background. Of this group, 36.1 per cent in Berlin and 37.4 per cent in Frankfurt attended a *Hauptschule*, while of the control group, only 18.9 per cent in Berlin and 19 per cent in Frankfurt attended this school type. In both cities, the pupils with a Yugoslavian background were better represented at the higher-level schools than the second-generation Turks. Again, it is striking how few respondents with a Turkish migration background attended a *Gymnasium* (14.2% in Berlin and 10.8% in Frankfurt) and how many in comparison from the control group did so (32.1% in Berlin and 29.4% in Frankfurt).<sup>25</sup> The city comparison reveals how differently the second-generation Yugoslavs were positioned: only 14.9 per cent of the respondents in Berlin attended a *Gymnasium*, while the figure in Frankfurt is 22.7 per cent.

The group investigated in the TIES study first attended secondary school between 1984 and 2006, i.e. over a very wide time span. Migration status, however, has only been included in school attendance statistics since the beginning of the 2000s (e.g. SOEP, PISA) so official figures on migration status cannot necessarily be compared to those for the TIES respondents. Education statistics from the 1980s and 1990s differentiate between nationalities, i.e. many of the second-generation respondents (with a migration background and German citizenship) would be classified as Germans.<sup>26</sup>

The internal differentiation of the tripartite school system means that attendance at a particular type of school does not necessarily indicate the qualifications actually obtained. For this reason, respondents were asked whether they left school with the highest qualification or a lower certificate, or whether they left school without any qualifications at all.

25 Kristen & Dollmann (2010) also ascertain notably lower chances for children from migrant backgrounds to transfer to a *Gymnasium*; however, the authors were able to relate this to poorer school performance and the lower socio-economic and cultural status of the families. Controlling for these contextual conditions, origin was found to have a positive secondary effect. This, again, underlines the parents' educational aspirations for their children. Similar results were generated in the survey conducted by the German Ministry of Education and Research (Ministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2010).

26 In line with this, Siminova (2008) does distinguish between Turks, Greeks, Italians, Spaniards and Yugoslavs, but based on the SOEP, does so only with reference to citizenship and not to migration background. Many Germans with Turkish, Greek, Italian, Spanish or Yugoslavian backgrounds are therefore not considered in this analysis or merge into the German group, although they attended school under similar migration-shaped conditions to the group of foreigners (e.g. immigrated before the first year of school, both parents born abroad).

**Table 3.4** First secondary school by sex, group and city (in %)

|   | 2nd generation |      |       |           |      |       | CG   |      |       |
|---|----------------|------|-------|-----------|------|-------|------|------|-------|
|   | Turks          |      |       | Yugoslavs |      |       | M    | F    | Total |
| <b>Berlin</b>                                     | M              | F    | Total | M         | F    | Total |      |      |       |
| <i>Hauptschule (HS)</i> (secondary modern school) | 42.6           | 32.0 | 37.4  | 34.4      | 21.0 | 27.4  | 16.4 | 21.3 | 18.8  |
| <i>Realschule (RS)</i> (middle school)            | 23.3           | 36.0 | 29.5  | 30.2      | 49.5 | 40.3  | 37.5 | 28.7 | 33.2  |
| <i>Gesamtschule</i> (comprehensive school)        | 14.7           | 13.6 | 14.2  | 17.7      | 9.5  | 13.4  | 13.3 | 8.2  | 10.8  |
| <i>Verbundene HS/RS</i> (combined HS/RS)          | 3.1            | 3.2  | 3.1   | 2.1       | 3.8  | 3.0   | 1.6  | 6.6  | 4.0   |
| <i>Gymnasium</i> (grammar school)                 | 15.5           | 12.8 | 14.2  | 13.5      | 16.2 | 14.9  | 29.7 | 34.4 | 32.0  |
| <i>Förderschule</i> (special education)           | 0.8            | 2.4  | 1.6   | 2.1       | 0.0  | 1.0   | 1.6  | 0.8  | 1.2   |
| Total N   | 129            | 125  | 254   | 96        | 105  | 201   | 128  | 122  | 250   |
| <b>Frankfurt</b>                                  |                |      |       |           |      |       |      |      |       |
| <i>Hauptschule (HS)</i> (secondary modern school) | 41.1           | 31.2 | 36.1  | 22.0      | 20.4 | 21.2  | 18.0 | 20.8 | 19.4  |
| <i>Realschule (RS)</i> (middle school)            | 31.5           | 36.8 | 34.1  | 45.0      | 34.0 | 39.4  | 35.2 | 37.6 | 36.4  |
| <i>Gesamtschule</i> (comprehensive school)        | 17.7           | 14.4 | 16.1  | 11.0      | 10.7 | 10.8  | 13.3 | 10.4 | 11.9  |
| <i>Verbundene HS/RS</i> (combined HS/RS)          | 2.4            | 2.4  | 2.4   | 5.0       | 6.8  | 5.9   | 3.1  | 2.4  | 2.8   |
| <i>Gymnasium</i> (grammar school)                 | 6.5            | 15.2 | 10.8  | 17.0      | 28.2 | 22.7  | 28.9 | 28.8 | 28.9  |
| <i>Förderschule</i> (special education)           | 0.8            | 0.0  | 0.4   | 0.0       | 0.0  | 0.0   | 1.6  | 0.0  | 0.8   |
| Total N   | 124            | 125  | 249   | 100       | 103  | 203   | 128  | 125  | 253   |

Note: CG = Control group; M = male, F = female

Source: TIES Survey Germany


The results show that in *Hauptschulen*, a significant number of pupils profited from the vertical permeability (Bellenberg 1999) of the school system and achieved higher qualifications than the simple school-leaving certificate (between 63% and 72%). A not inconsiderable proportion left school with a simple school-leaving certificate, and 10 to 14 per cent left

school without any qualification. The situation is completely different at the *Realschule* and the lower secondary level of the *Gymnasium*. Here, over 90 per cent of the respondents from all three groups managed to leave school with the highest possible qualification (*Mittlere Reife*, equivalent to GCSEs). Of the respondents who attended a *Realschule*, those with a Turkish background were even more successful than the control group in terms of the proportion that left school without any qualifications (0%). The above-mentioned fears held by teachers (see Gomolla & Radtke 2009) that children from a migrant background are more likely to fail at the *Gymnasium* due to a lack of potential resources or presumed language deficits are not confirmed by the TIES study. Once children have managed to reach the *Gymnasium* or *Realschule*, they seem to be very likely to complete this school successfully. The problematic situation surrounding *Hauptschulen* is also confirmed here: this is the school type with the highest drop-out rates, with more than 10 per cent of all groups leaving without any qualifications at all.

The number of years repeated in secondary school is high for all of the groups investigated (figure 3.2). In all groups, more male than female respondents repeated one year or more. The differences between the second-generation Turks and the control group are particularly striking. So too are the differences between the second-generation groups: both male and female pupils with a Yugoslavian background appear to have managed their educational careers with less disruption than those with a Turkish background.

The distribution of the proportion of immigrants in school classes, already ascertained for primary school, is also reflected in secondary school. Four times as many respondents in the control group as in the second-generation groups stated that there were virtually no children with a migrant background in their year group (second-generation Turks: 5.5%; control group: 20.3%). However, 54.5 per cent of the respondents with a Turkish background went to schools in which 50 per cent of the pupils or more were the children of immigrants. Only 38 per cent of the control group and the second-generation Yugoslavs reported this experience. If respondents with 50 per cent or more immigrant classmates are differentiated according to schools, one can see that almost half of the second-generation respondents in this category went to a *Hauptschule*, and approximately one fourth to a *Realschule*. Respondents rarely reported a high proportion of immigrants in *Gymnasien* (7% of respondents of Turkish and Yugoslavian descent, and 15% of the control group).

**Figure 3.2** Respondents who repeated a grade at secondary school per sex, group, and city



Source: TIES Survey Germany

The TIES interviewees were also asked to what extent they were given homework supervision or remedial education at school, whether in class or alone, between years five and nine. The results concerning homework supervision and private tutoring show only minor differences. Substantial differences do emerge, however, with respect to remedial education at school: one in five second-generation respondents received this kind of help, compared to only 10.7 per cent of the control group. Remedial education is mainly offered at *Hauptschulen* and comprehensive schools for individual subjects (e.g. German, mathematics and English), or as language training either within the regular school hours or as an afternoon programme. As discussed above, it is this very provision, usually at *Hauptschulen*, that often justifies primary school teachers' recommendation of this type of school. This tendency is also reflected in the TIES figures: one in three second-generation respondents who attended a *Hauptschule* or comprehensive school received remedial education at school, while very few *Gymnasium* pupils received such assistance. It is also striking that in all schools, the respondents of the control group were less than half as likely to receive remedial education. It is not possible to determine, however, whether this is because remedial education is often related to German language skills, or

because teachers primarily tend to give pupils from a migrant background remedial education to fill their remedial classes.<sup>27</sup>

### 3.6 The first educational transition: From school to vocational training – general tendencies

Due to the high degree of selection in the German school system, it makes sense to investigate educational biographies according to the individual types of school attended. Theoretically, *Hauptschule* pupils with or without a school-leaving qualification have various options open to them. Those who leave the *Hauptschule* without a qualification can go straight into the labour market, although most jobs available to them involve unskilled and semi-skilled temporary work. Or they might study for a school-leaving certificate, perhaps at night school, take up one of the many options offered in the transition system, or start vocational training.

By way of comparison, approximately half of the school-leavers with a qualification from a *Realschule* manage to enter dual training, and one in four goes straight into the vocational school system. Here, too, however, 25 per cent of school-leavers have to make do with programmes within the transition system. Pupils who leave school with an advanced technical certificate (*Fachhochschulreife*) or a university entrance qualification (*Hochschulreife*) clearly have the best opportunities. Looking at the continuation rates in the three sectors of the vocational training system (transition system, vocational school system and dual training), approximately 67 per cent manage to take the step to vocational training and 28.5 per cent to the vocational school system (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2008).<sup>28</sup>

Against the backdrop of ever-deteriorating opportunities on the labour market, the large proportion of adolescents who go straight into the transition system after finishing school is problematic. Although the transition system aims to compensate for deficits, a high proportion of pupils, especially from *Realschulen* have difficulty moving on. This reinforces the impression that in many respects, the transition system is just a holding

27 Proportions of pupils receiving remedial education – second-generation Turks: *Hauptschule* 30.1%, *Realschule* 17.4%, comprehensive school 32.4%, *Gymnasium* 6.3%; second-generation Yugoslavs: *Hauptschule* 31.0%, *Realschule* 17.8%, comprehensive school 30.0%, *Gymnasium* 3.8%; control group: *Hauptschule* 19.6%, *Realschule* 10.3%, comprehensive school 1.4%, *Gymnasium* 3.2%.

28 The total group considered here excludes all school-leavers who go straight to university or a university of applied sciences after achieving their *Hochschulreife*.



pattern for those who have failed to get a place in the vocational training system. Many complete this holding pattern successfully and make the transition to vocational training. However, for the majority of pupils without a school-leaving certificate and for many *Hauptschule* pupils, the transition system is the end of the line for their educational career. They must try to enter the labour market straight after the transition system.

### *Hauptschule*, then what?

While *Hauptschulen* used to be the type of school that prepared pupils to take up vocational training in industrial or technical occupations, the *Hauptschule* school-leaving certificate has been severely devalued in recent years. On the one hand, apprentices are expected to be more knowledgeable; on the other hand, however, there has been a structural reduction in apprenticeships in the classic occupational areas for *Hauptschule* pupils (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2008). In addition, *Hauptschule* pupils face growing competition on the training market from school-leavers with higher qualifications. These developments mean there is a strong segmentation of jobs that require training according to previous levels of education. In light of the quantitative diminishment in importance of the *Hauptschule*, this type of school has become a highly homogeneous establishment where

‘children from blue-collar households – in particular those of unskilled labourers – are disproportionately represented; these pupils’ families are unable to offer them the cultural conditions required for success at school, nor can they support them with their homework. The children of foreign workers and immigrants are particularly affected in this respect’ (Leschinsky 2008: 395, own translation).

Following the educational biographies of the TIES respondents and examining how they cope with the second educational transition (from the lower secondary level to vocational training/upper secondary education), one can see that fewer than 50 per cent of *Hauptschule* pupils from all groups went straight into vocational training. This was achieved by 10 per cent fewer second-generation respondents with a Turkish migration background than the control group. Thus, the main goal pursued by *Hauptschulen* – to prepare all pupils for the option of an apprenticeship and to ease or actively shape this transition – was not achieved. A relatively large number of interviewees were obviously unable to find an apprenticeship position, and entered the ‘holding pattern’ – the so-called transition system. Within this transition system, 13.6

per cent of the second-generation Turks and 22.0 per cent of the control group initially took a *Berufsgrundschuljahr* (basic vocational education year, BGJ). The advantage of the BGJ over the *Berufsvorbereitungsjahr* (pre-vocational training year, BVJ) is that it can be recognised by future apprenticing companies as the first apprentice year. For this reason, the year is not 'wasted' if pupils do manage the transition from the BGJ to the dual system.

After leaving the *Hauptschule*, many respondents did not enter either dual training or the transition system. This was particularly the case for those of Turkish descent: 44.5 per cent did not attend any other school or receive vocational training, in contrast to roughly one in four of those in the other two groups. Although the subdivided secondary school system claims to offer a certain permeability and to allow pupils to change schools (horizontal permeability, Bellenberg 1999), downward movements are much more common in practice than upward movements (*ibid.*). *Hauptschule* pupils, in particular, rarely benefit from this permeability, as corroborated by the TIES data. Despite the various opportunities to achieve a *Realschule* qualification (GCSE equivalent), *Fachhochschulreife* (advanced technical certificate) or *Hochschulreife* (university entrance qualification) after *Hauptschule*, few respondents made use of these opportunities. Besides non-permeability, the age of the pupils is certainly an issue: because many have repeated years,<sup>29</sup> *Hauptschule* pupils are often 17 or 18 by the time they leave school, and are no longer legally required to remain in education. At the same time, some researchers (Bos, Müller & Stubbe 2010; Knigge 2009) suggest that *Hauptschule* pupils are stigmatised, which means that few of them are confident enough to make the transition to a higher school type. This is then further discouraged by some teachers, who view their pupils in terms of stereotypes and develop prejudices against them. Such processes are particularly evident in the case of migrant children (e.g. Schulze & Soja 2006; Karagaşoğlu-Aydın 2000).

All in all, the impression alluded to above is reinforced – that the *Hauptschule* represents the 'end of the line' for many pupils, i.e. they do not receive either further education or vocational training after leaving school. The reasons are, without doubt, the tremendous devaluation of the *Hauptschule*-leaving certificate on the training market and the large supply of pupils. Some *Hauptschule* school-leavers initially make a detour via the transition system. Others leave the education system altogether as soon as they come

29 Some 37.8% of the second-generation Turks stated that they had repeated a year of school. Among the respondents of Yugoslavian descent and the control group, the figures are much lower (24.5% and 26%, respectively).

of age, and must then attempt to enter the labour market without vocational training. Their chances of gaining secure, qualified jobs, however, are slim.

Finally, it is instructive to look at the highest qualification achieved by *Hauptschule* pupils who were no longer in education or training at the time of the survey (table 3.5). The figures verify the tendency mentioned above. Every second respondent with a Turkish background and more than one third of the second-generation Yugoslavs acquired only a *Hauptschule*-leaving certificate or no secondary school-leaving qualification at all. Moreover, even the majority of those who entered the transition system after *Hauptschule* failed to start vocational training afterwards. Just two to 3 per cent of all respondents who completed a BGJ or BVJ state that vocational training was their highest qualification (depending on the group, not shown in table 3.5).<sup>30</sup> This confirms the impression that for the majority of these pupils, the transition system is the 'end of the line', and is not very successful at getting them into vocational training.

**Table 3.5 Highest qualification for *Hauptschule* pupils by group (in %)**

|  | 2nd generation |           | CG   |
|--|----------------|-----------|------|
|  | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |
| Primary school   | 6.2            | 7.3       | 7.5  |
| <i>Hauptschule</i>   | 42.7           | 29.2      | 23.8 |
| BVJ  | 1.1            | 2.1       | 1.1  |
| BGJ  | 11.2           | 18.8      | 20.2 |
| <i>Lehre</i> (vocational training)/<br><i>Berufsfachschule</i> (technical college) | 38.8           | 42.6      | 46.3 |
| <i>Verwaltungsfachhochschule</i> (School<br>of Public Administration)              | 0.0            | 0.0       | 1.1  |
| Total N  | 178            | 96        | 93   |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Once second-generation pupils have coped with the transition to vocational training, they appear to complete their training as successfully as the control group. Approximately 95 per cent of the respondents in each group who embarked on vocational training after *Hauptschule* completed their training.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> These figures were generated by calculating only the highest qualification of those respondents who had already completed school and who entered the transition system after *Hauptschule*.

<sup>31</sup> These figures were generated by calculating only the highest qualification of those respondents who had already completed school and who started vocational training after *Hauptschule*.

### *Realschule*, then what?

The main objective of the *Realschule* is for pupils to obtain a *Mittlere Reife* (equivalent to GCSEs), providing them with numerous options. As with *Hauptschule* pupils, they can either start vocational training or continue their educational career, attending the *gymnasiale Oberstufe* (senior years of secondary school) and acquiring their *Hochschulreife* (university entrance qualification). The vast majority of all three groups reported starting training after *Realschule* (about 75%), so its pupils were more successful than *Hauptschule* pupils at entering dual training straight after school.<sup>32</sup> If the second-generation interviewees had managed to go to a *Realschule* and complete their education there, their chances of finding a place in the vocational training system were as high as those of the control group.

As opposed to the *Hauptschule* pupils, continuing education was a real option for several of the *Realschule* pupils, and roughly 9 per cent of the second-generation Turks and almost 13 per cent of the control group took this path. Compared to the *Hauptschule* pupils, the number of respondents who left the educational system for good after *Realschule* is two thirds lower. For respondents of Turkish descent, the number is just one quarter of the figure for *Hauptschule* pupils (11.8%, and 8% for the control group).

Slightly more pupils from *Realschulen* than from *Hauptschulen* received a recommendation for further education after finishing the school. The figures here range from 25 per cent for the second-generation Turks to 38 per cent for the second-generation Yugoslavs. Compared to the *Hauptschule*, the number of respondents who had to repeat a year is lower. Twenty-five per cent of the respondents of Turkish descent repeated a year at the *Realschule* (10 per cent less than those at the *Hauptschule*), compared to 18 per cent of respondents of Yugoslavian descent, and 11.9 per cent of the control group.

The poor position of *Hauptschule* pupils after leaving school and the major differences between the groups are thus not discernible for *Realschule* pupils. In fact, it is quite the opposite: the *Realschule* enables all pupils to go their different ways, and largely eliminates the differences between the second generation and the control group. The rates for the transition to vocational education are almost identical, which is also corroborated when we look at the highest qualifications achieved (table 3.6). Approximately 80 per cent of respondents from each group received vocational training, and some of those who went through the transition system also managed to

32 This also confirms the assumption that employers now require their apprentices to have a certificate from a *Realschule* rather than from a *Hauptschule*.

get an apprenticeship. Here, too, one can see that once school-leavers have managed the transition to vocational training, 96 per cent of the second-generation Turks and the control group (not shown in the table) and 100 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs (not shown in the table) actually completed it.<sup>33</sup> In addition, many pupils who 'detoured' from the *Realschule* to the upper secondary level to obtain their *Fachhochschulreife* (advanced technical certificate) or *Hochschulreife* (university entrance qualification) also underwent training after receiving their school-leaving certificate.

**Table 3.6 Highest qualification for *Realschule* pupils by group (in %)**

|   | 2nd generation |           | CG   |
|---|----------------|-----------|------|
|   | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |
| <i>Hauptschule</i>  | 1.4            | 0.0       | 1.2  |
| <i>Realschule</i>   | 15.8           | 6.1       | 9.7  |
| BVJ   | 0.0            | 0.7       | 0.0  |
| BGJ   | 0.7            | 2.7       | 4.2  |
| <i>Lehre</i> (vocational training)/<br><i>Berufsfachschule</i> (technical college)  | 80.2           | 85.0      | 79.3 |
| <i>Oberstufe</i> (senior years)/ <i>FOS</i> (higher<br>secondary vocational school) | 1.4            | 1.4       | 2.4  |
| University/ <i>Fachhochschule</i><br>(university of applied sciences)               | 0.7            | 4.1       | 3.0  |
| Total N   | 146            | 147       | 165  |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

This tends to confirm the previous findings regarding the whereabouts of the respondents after *Realschule*. This type of school gave all three groups similar opportunities to cope successfully with the educational transition, and increased their probability of gaining a training qualification. Unlike the situation for *Hauptschule* pupils, there is a relatively equal distribution among the groups with regard to vocational training, as well as fewer dropouts. Although the highest qualification gained by 15 per cent of the Turkish respondents is only *Mittlere Reife* (GCSE equivalent), this figure seems low compared to the 42 per cent of all *Hauptschule* pupils who ended up with only a *Hauptschule*-leaving certificate.

33 These figures were generated by calculating only the highest qualification of those respondents who had already completed school at the time of the survey and who started vocational training after *Realschule*.

### Comprehensive school/combined *Hauptschule* and *Realschule*

Comprehensive school (*Gesamtschule*) is the only school that cannot be assigned to a specific type, as pupils are taught together from either the fifth or the seventh grade onwards. Depending on the town and the situation of the school, comprehensive school is often seen as an alternative for pupils who wish to avoid attending a *Hauptschule* because of its negative connotations. For this reason, comprehensive school sometimes has the reputation of being a *Hauptschule* 'in disguise'. While pupils are in later years grouped together according to performance in some main subjects, comprehensive school on the whole remains a joint establishment for all pupils. Transition to the senior grades (*gymnasiale Oberstufe*) is easier because these are offered within the comprehensive school. As with *Realschule* pupils, comprehensive school pupils have a wide range of options after finishing year ten. Among the TIES respondents, fewer comprehensive than *Realschule* pupils entered vocational training. Nonetheless, one fifth of the second-generation respondents and one third of the control group did manage the transition to the senior school years or higher secondary vocational school (*Fachoberschule*). Compared to *Realschule* pupils, however, the number of second-generation Turkish dropouts was high, with the comprehensive school being the last school for over one quarter of the respondents. The small number of *Realschule* pupils who continued their education in the transition system is also replicated among comprehensive school pupils. For the second-generation Turks this figure is very low, probably because of the larger number of dropouts compared to the other two groups.<sup>34</sup>

Comprehensive school pupils coped differently from *Realschule* pupils with the second educational transition, in two main respects. Firstly, of those who went to comprehensive school, one third fewer second-generation respondents than control-group respondents continued their education in the upper secondary level (*gymnasiale Oberstufe/Fachoberschule*). Secondly, the respondents with a Turkish background had higher dropout rates than the other two groups and were also less successful at finding vocational training positions after school. In addition, more second-generation Turks had to repeat a year at comprehensive school than at *Realschule*. This figure differs significantly from group to group: while 40 per cent of the respondents with a Turkish background repeated a year, only 23 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs and 19 per cent of the control group did so.

34 A city comparison is not conclusive for this school type due to the low basic population.

While the figure is lower than for *Realschule* pupils, table 3.7 shows that almost half of all comprehensive school pupils went on to vocational training. For the second-generation Yugoslavs, the figure is 61 per cent. It generally seems that the respondents with a Yugoslavian background coped better with comprehensive school and their subsequent options than the second-generation Turks. Here, too, the findings tend to be similar to those for the *Hauptschule*. The group of second-generation Yugoslavs apparently tend to choose the option of entering and completing the transition system, while the group of respondents with a Turkish background tend to drop out of the education system altogether. With regard to vocational training, we find similar tendencies to those at the *Realschule* and *Hauptschule*: once pupils managed the transition to dual training, over 95 per cent of them completed their training successfully.<sup>35</sup>

**Table 3.7 Highest qualification for comprehensive school pupils by group (in %)**

|   | 2nd generation |           | CG   |
|---|----------------|-----------|------|
|   | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |
| Primary school  | 1.3            | 1.6       | 1.4  |
| <i>Hauptschule</i>  | 17.7           | 4.7       | 7.2  |
| <i>Realschule</i>   | 12.7           | 6.3       | 5.8  |
| BVJ   | 1.3            | 4.7       | 0.0  |
| BGJ   | 1.3            | 6.3       | 5.8  |
| <i>Lehre</i> (vocational training)/<br><i>Berufsfachschule</i> (technical college)  | 48.1           | 61.0      | 55.0 |
| <i>Oberstufe</i> (senior years)/ <i>FOS</i> (higher<br>secondary vocational school) | 12.7           | 9.4       | 7.2  |
| University/ <i>Fachhochschule</i> (senior<br>technical college)                     | 5.0            | 6.2       | 17.4 |
| Total N   | 79             | 64        | 69   |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

The difference between the second-generation respondents and the control group can clearly be seen in tertiary education. Unlike the second generation, most members of the control group who gained their university entrance qualification (*Hochschulreife*) subsequently managed to complete a tertiary degree.

<sup>35</sup> These figures were generated by calculating only the highest qualification of those respondents who had already completed school at the time of the survey and started vocational training after comprehensive school.

### University entrance qualification = university degree?

The *Gymnasium* is the highest type of school at the lower secondary level in the German education system, and aims mainly to prepare pupils for university. After year ten, pupils are awarded the *Mittlere Reife* (GCSE equivalent). After year twelve or thirteen, depending on the *Bundesland*, they receive the *Fachhochschulreife* (an advanced technical certificate) or *Hochschulreife* (university entrance qualification, also known as *Abitur*). Looking at where the TIES survey groups went after year ten at the *Gymnasium*, the majority opted for the senior years (*gymnasiale Oberstufe*). This applies to slightly more of the second-generation Turks (87%) than the respondents with a Yugoslavian background (82%).<sup>36</sup> Dropping out of school or the transition system were rare occurrences in the educational biographies of *Gymnasium* pupils. Roughly one in ten second-generation migrants started vocational training after the *Gymnasium*, compared to just 3 per cent of respondents from the control group.

Measured by the shares of respondents who had advanced to the upper secondary level, the *Gymnasium* is quite successful in performing the role given to this type of school in the tripartite school system, namely, to prepare pupils for university. How many interviewees who achieved the university entrance qualification (*Hochschulreife*) actually go on to study will be discussed shortly. The figures show, however, that preparing for *Hochschulreife* was also a viable option for second-generation migrants who attended a *Gymnasium*.

Pupils at *Gymnasien* repeated years less frequently than in all other types of school. Only 4.8 per cent of the second-generation Turks, 5.2 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs, and 8.4 per cent of the control group repeated a year at the *Gymnasium*. It is impossible, however, to determine whether this was due to the pupils' actual performance or to the general style of decision-making processes at *Gymnasien*.

Looking at the qualifications gained by *Gymnasium* pupils (table 3.8), around 95 per cent either completed vocational training, gained their *Hochschulreife* or achieved a university degree. Forty-three per cent of the respondents with a Turkish migration background went down the path of vocational training despite having the university entrance qualification, as compared to 37 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs and 32 per cent of the control group. Conversely, the number of those from the control group who pursued and completed tertiary education after acquiring the

<sup>36</sup> However, the group sizes are so different that one can only identify tendencies among the second generation.



university entrance qualification was considerably higher: 58 per cent, as compared to 47.5 per cent of the respondents with a Yugoslavian and only 32 per cent of those with a Turkish background.<sup>37</sup>

**Table 3.8 Highest qualification of *Gymnasium* pupils by group (in %)**

|  | 2nd generation |           | CG   |
|--|----------------|-----------|------|
|  | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |
| <i>Realschule</i>  | 6.3            | 4.0       | 2.8  |
| BGJ  | 0.0            | 2.0       | 0.0  |
| <i>Lehre</i> (vocational training)/<br><i>Berufsfachschule</i> (technical college) | 50.0           | 44.0      | 33.1 |
| <i>Oberstufe/FOS</i> / senior years/ higher<br>secondary vocational school         | 15.6           | 12.0      | 8.3  |
| University/ <i>Fachhochschule</i> (senior<br>technical college)                    | 28.1           | 38.0      | 55.9 |
| Total N*   | 32             | 50        | 109  |

Note: CG = Control group. \* The figures are low compared to table 2.14 because many of the respondents were still in training, and therefore do not appear in this itemisation

Source: TIES Survey Germany

As for further educational biographies, different strategies can be identified not only between the second-generation migrants and the control group, but also within the second-generation groups, despite starting out with the same qualification. The second-generation interviewees were more likely than the control group to see vocational training as a sensible alternative to studying. This appears to apply particularly to the interviewees of Turkish origin: compared to the second-generation Yugoslavs, a higher proportion gave vocational training as their highest qualification, and fewer indicated having gone to university.

### Highest school-leaving qualifications overall

Finally, table 3.9 shows the highest qualification obtained by those participants who were no longer in education at the time of the survey. It is striking that in both cities, the proportion of second-generation Turks with a simple *Hauptschule*-leaving certificate is twice as high as that for the second-generation Yugoslavs. In the city comparison, however, the

<sup>37</sup> The remaining respondents gave *gymnasiale Oberstufe* (the senior level of school) as their highest qualification.

second generation generally comes off much better in Frankfurt than in Berlin. In Frankfurt, 74 per cent of respondents with a Yugoslavian background completed vocational training or a university degree; in Berlin, this figure is 10 per cent lower. The same pattern applies to the second-generation Turks: 63.4 per cent in Frankfurt and only 52.6 per cent in Berlin received vocational training or a higher qualification. In the case of the control group, the gap between the cities is even greater: in Berlin almost 20 per cent fewer completed vocational training or a higher qualification compared to Frankfurt. With regard to the usefulness of their qualifications on the labour market and the prospects of finding a stable, long-term job commensurate with the qualifications gained, the respondents of Yugoslavian descent in Frankfurt had a relatively good starting position.

**Table 3.9** Highest level of education by group and city (in %)

|  | Berlin         |           |      | Frankfurt      |           |      |
|--|----------------|-----------|------|----------------|-----------|------|
|  | 2nd generation |           | CG   | 2nd generation |           | CG   |
|  | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |
| Primary school   | 3.9            | 4.2       | 2.8  | 1.4            | 1.2       | 2.7  |
| Special education  | 1.3            | 0.6       | 0.0  | 0.5            | 0.0       | 0.0  |
| <i>Hauptschule</i>   | 22.4           | 12.5      | 8.4  | 19.0           | 6.9       | 6.2  |
| <i>Realschule</i>  | 7.0            | 4.2       | 8.8  | 9.0            | 5.2       | 2.2  |
| <i>Gymnasiale Oberstufe</i>  | 4.8            | 5.0       | 5.1  | 3.4            | 2.3       | 2.6  |
| (senior years)/ <i>FOS</i><br>(higher secondary vocational school)                       |                |           |      |                |           |      |
| BVJ  | 1.3            | 1.2       | 0.5  | 0.0            | 2.3       | 0.0  |
| BGJ  | 6.6            | 7.7       | 11.6 | 3.3            | 8.1       | 3.1  |
| Vocational education (vocational training, technical school, technical secondary school) | 49.1           | 58.9      | 41.8 | 60.5           | 63.0      | 67.3 |
| University/ <i>Fachhochschule</i> (senior technical college)                             | 3.5            | 4.8       | 20.1 | 2.9            | 11.0      | 15.6 |
| Total N  | 228            | 168       | 215  | 210            | 173       | 226  |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

### 3.7 Parents' educational background and academic support from family

For pupils with a migrant background, any disadvantages that may result from their migration history are combined with those arising from social class affiliation. This appears to characterise the situation of the second- and often even third-generation descendants of the 'guest workers' from the 1960s and 1970s. Information on respondents' family backgrounds helps to clarify some of the conditions and contexts in which the respondents embarked on their educational careers. On the one hand, these conditions include a family history of migration, with the linguistic, cultural and social divisions this may entail. The respondents' parents have had to cope with a new language and familiarise themselves with often previously unknown social systems and matters of everyday life. This is likely to have consequences, not only for communications with teachers, but also for the importance parents ascribe to education, qualifications, and educational transitions. On the other hand, the socio-structural positioning of migrant families in the migration context and the parents' position on the labour market are particularly important. The conditions surrounding work, family and the housing situation, for instance, form the context for performance at school. The economic resources available, and hence the family's ability to shape their circumstances materially, depend on conditions such as consumer choices, the utilisation of cultural services, and participation in sports and cultural events.

As described earlier, in section 2.3, the parents of the TIES respondents have very diverse educational backgrounds. More than 70 per cent of the mothers of the second-generation Turks never attended school or went only briefly. These mothers can be located at level 1 or 2 of the ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) scale. The mothers of the second-generation Yugoslavs, on the other hand, were mainly (more than 60%) at ISCED level 2, having had at least a basic education. Roughly one in four was at ISCED level 3, i.e. having completed upper secondary education. The situation of the mothers of the control group is similar; about 55 per cent had a basic education, and roughly 45 per cent had an upper secondary level qualification or even a university degree. Thus the differences between the respondents' mothers are striking. As the numbers in the different ISCED levels vary greatly from group to group, however, it is difficult to formulate descriptive statements on the importance of the mothers' educational backgrounds for the educational biographies of their children. The following characterisations therefore provide only a general impression.

With regard to the first secondary school attended by the interviewees with a Turkish background, differences relate mainly to the choice between *Hauptschule* and *Gymnasium*. Children of uneducated Turkish mothers (ISCED 0-1) were more likely to attend a *Hauptschule* (40%) than a *Gymnasium* (9%). In contrast, one third of the children of better-educated Turkish mothers attended a *Gymnasium* rather than a *Hauptschule* (ISCED 2: 21%; ISCED 3: 5%). Only minor differences were found for *Realschulen*; regardless of mothers' educational backgrounds, almost one third of the second-generation Turks attended this type of secondary school.

The proportion of respondents who attended *Realschulen* is higher in the group with a Yugoslavian background: more than 40 per cent of the interviewees whose mothers were classified as ISCED levels 2 or 3 went to this school type. The findings also corroborate the general assumption that children of parents with higher educational qualifications are more likely to pursue higher qualifications themselves. The higher the mother's ISCED level, the fewer second-generation Yugoslavs attended a *Hauptschule* (ISCED 2: 26%; ISCED 3: 20%; ISCED 4-6: 6%). A contrasting tendency can be identified with regard to the *Gymnasium*. This was the school attended by roughly 17 per cent of the respondents with mothers at ISCED level 2, and by just under 20 per cent of those with mothers at ISCED level 3, but by more than half of those with mothers at ISCED levels 4-6.

Within the control group, differences were even more pronounced. Respondents whose mothers were at a fairly low educational level (ISCED 2) were relatively evenly distributed over the various school types (*Hauptschule*, *Realschule* and *Gymnasium*). In contrast, roughly half of the interviewees whose mothers were at a medium educational level (ISCED 3) went to a *Realschule*, but only around 8 per cent went to a *Hauptschule* and roughly 28 per cent to a *Gymnasium*. For the control-group respondents with highly educated mothers (ISCED 4 and over), attending a *Gymnasium* was the norm, with nearly 70 per cent attending this school type and the remainder evenly divided between *Hauptschule*, *Realschule* and comprehensive school.

Due to the considerable quantitative differences in the educational groupings of the mothers, it is difficult to make correlating statements on school-leaving qualifications. One tendency is that second-generation Turks with mothers at ISCED level 2 were more likely to have gained a qualification higher than vocational training (5.7% of those with mothers at ISCED levels 1-2; 14.2% of those with mothers at ISCED level 2). Those whose mothers were at levels 0-1 were more likely to have only a *Hauptschule* certificate (22% of those with mothers at ISCED levels 0-1; 9% of those with mothers at ISCED level 2). Findings are similar among the second-generation

Yugoslavs. Although the number of those who completed vocational training is the same (around 55%) whether the mothers are at ISCED level 2 or 3, respondents with highly educated mothers were more likely to have a university degree than those in the other two groups (ISCED 2: 6.4%; ISCED 3: 8.5%; ISCED 4-6: 18.2%). As for the control group, it appears that the mother's level of education might actually determine the highest school-leaving qualification of the child. Respondents whose mothers had basic or medium-level education were more likely to have pursued vocational education (ISCED 2: 46%; ISCED 3: 60%), while 60 per cent of the interviewees with highly educated mothers (ISCED 4-6) had a degree from a university, senior technical college (i.e. university of applied sciences), art college, or music college (ISCED 2: 11%; ISCED 3: 13.1%).

In addition to the school, the family provides a central 'accompanying context' that helps children and adolescents cope with school and thus with individual and institutional challenges (Bommès 2004b). Parents share their children's everyday school life by helping them with homework and by familiarising themselves with the school's concerns, expectations, and assessments of their children, for example, by attending parent-teacher conferences. By taking an interest in the day-to-day activities of the school and in their children's educational development, parents express practical support for their children's motivations and orientations. It can be assumed that parents manage to do this more easily and more competently if they, too, have had extensive experience of education. Conversely, their attempts to help will be more formal and strained if they cannot substantially fulfil the role assigned to them by the school because of their own lack of educational experience (see Bommès, Grünheid & Wilmes 2008). The specific cultural capital gained through education in the country of origin may undergo severe devaluation in the immigration context. Nonetheless, a long formal experience of education allows parents to access the structures of the education system in the country of immigration and find relevant training courses for their children, or to encourage children to seek these out themselves. Elements of the parents' everyday lifestyle are also important (e.g. the presence of the written word and literature and appreciation of activities such as painting and reading). These teach children from an early age that it is important to gain education, to access symbolic capital, the written word and the knowledge generated from it. Parents with extensive educational experience can also help their children cope with learning crises, and can communicate directly or indirectly with school staff, rather than evading them. In contrast, children of immigrants with restricted social and cultural capital have limited access to specific support, even if

they have high educational aspirations. They usually have to cope with the demands of school alone or with the help of siblings or friends, receiving at best highly generalised emotional support from their parents.

A number of questions on the importance of education in the family home were asked in the TIES survey. Although the responses do not offer differentiated insight, they still reveal a number of tendencies. For instance, the respondents were asked whether they had a quiet place at home where they could do their homework, and more than 70 per cent from each group stated that this was not a problem. Nonetheless, one can still determine differences between the groups, in particular between the respondents of Turkish descent and the other two groups. Twenty-eight per cent of the second-generation Turks, and only around 13 per cent of the other two groups, did not have a quiet place in the family home where they could do their homework. There are multiple possible explanations for this, such as the family's lack of willingness or ability to provide quiet spaces, the absence of a desk due to a lack of space in the home, or a relatively large number of people living in the home, making it more difficult to work in peace and quiet.

Parents' interest in supporting their children's education, and the ways they choose to do so, are mainly visible in how they support homework. In many studies, this is an important indicator of the extent to which children and adolescents receive help from the family environment in coping with school tasks. Findings show that the educational background of the parents, in particular, is a major indicator of the potential degree of support. For this reason, the TIES survey explicitly investigated the role of various persons and how important they were in supporting the respondents with their homework between the ages of 10 and 15.

In comparison to the respondents with a Yugoslavian background and the control group, the group with a Turkish background received relatively little support with homework. More than half of the respondents in this group stated that parents played no role here. If a parent was important, it was the mother in all three groups. However, the second-generation migrants attempted to compensate for the lack of possible support from parents by involving older siblings and friends. Just under 40 per cent of the second-generation Turks and over half of the second-generation Yugoslavs received help from siblings with their homework. Peers played a similar role for these groups, albeit more so for the second-generation Yugoslavs than for the second-generation Turks. Few sought contact with teachers – unlike the control group. Still, these figures reveal nothing about the extent to which support was requested by the respondents in the first place, so no final conclusions can be drawn.

Separate questions were asked about the role played by parents in supporting school performance and the interest parents took in their children's educational situation (table 3.10). In contrast to the results regarding homework, the response categories with clearly negative statements on parental support were dominant. Looking at homework supervision, in particular, the group with a Turkish background, as already determined, received considerably less support from parents than the other two groups. Over half of the second-generation Turks received little or no support from parents. In contrast, the second-generation Yugoslavs fared considerably better, but were still worse off than the control group.

**Table 3.10** Forms of parental school support by sex and group (in %)

|   | 2nd generation |        |           |        | CG   |        |
|---|----------------|--------|-----------|--------|------|--------|
|   | Turks          |        | Yugoslavs |        | Male | Female |
|   | Male           | Female | Male      | Female |      |        |
| Did your parents monitor how much time you spent on homework?                       |                |        |           |        |      |        |
| Quite often   | 21.7           | 25.3   | 34.0      | 41.1   | 43.7 | 47.8   |
| Neutral   | 22.8           | 27.7   | 32.5      | 31.1   | 28.7 | 34.0   |
| Quite seldom  | 55.5           | 47.0   | 33.5      | 27.8   | 27.5 | 18.2   |
| Did your parents help you with your homework?                                       |                |        |           |        |      |        |
| Quite often   | 11.5           | 14.5   | 25.5      | 24.4   | 26.1 | 37.1   |
| Neutral   | 26.9           | 26.6   | 32.1      | 37.8   | 40.2 | 37.6   |
| Quite seldom  | 61.7           | 58.9   | 42.3      | 37.8   | 33.7 | 25.3   |
| Did your parents ask you to help with the housework or to look after your siblings? |                |        |           |        |      |        |
| Quite often   | 24.3           | 41.2   | 21.7      | 22.6   | 22.3 | 21.8   |
| Neutral   | 41.4           | 39.7   | 40.1      | 40.9   | 33.5 | 38.0   |
| Quite seldom  | 34.2           | 19.1   | 38.2      | 36.5   | 44.1 | 40.2   |
| Did your parents talk to you about school or your studies?                          |                |        |           |        |      |        |
| Quite often   | 16.1           | 20.9   | 27.6      | 34.9   | 25.8 | 40.7   |
| Neutral   | 32.7           | 27.7   | 42.3      | 45.0   | 44.4 | 39.8   |
| Quite seldom  | 51.2           | 51.4   | 30.1      | 20.1   | 29.8 | 19.5   |
| Did your parents meet your teachers or speak to them?                               |                |        |           |        |      |        |
| Quite often   | 3.5            | 8.5    | 9.6       | 12.6   | 15.1 | 18.0   |
| Neutral   | 23.6           | 25.5   | 40.6      | 35.7   | 15.8 | 43.3   |
| Quite seldom  | 72.8           | 66.0   | 49.7      | 51.7   | 39.0 | 38.8   |
| Total N   | 254            | 249    | 196       | 209    | 252  | 246    |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Only one in five respondents were assigned tasks in the family home, with the exception of the women of Turkish origin, whose parents involved them in the housework twice as frequently as parents in the other groups. This reflects the traditional role allocation in Turkish families, which was also found for the parents' generation (section 2.3): many Turkish mothers migrated to Germany to marry and were described by their children as housewives. The mothers implicitly passed on this role to their daughters, giving them tasks in the parental home twice as frequently as their sons. In contrast, an equal role allocation for daughters and sons was found for the second-generation Yugoslavs and the control group. In these groups, approximately 20 per cent of both male and female respondents said they were given tasks to do around the home (see also chapter 8 on family formation and partner relationships).


A crucial element for children's further educational careers is parents' willingness to talk to their children about this matter, and to seek discussions with school representatives about their children's performance and situation at school. Pupils can be shown prospects and paths beyond lower secondary education, and can be made aware of the importance of qualifications and continuing education for later positions on the labour market. Here, parents of the second generation sought direct discussions less frequently than parents of the control group – though in absolute terms such discussions were rare for all groups. As for gender differences, the parents of female respondents appear to have sought talks with teachers more often, signalling a greater interest in their daughters' school performance. The same applies to discussions with their children about their further educational careers; again, more female respondents reported having discussed this topic with their parents.

Alongside the findings from section 2.3 on the parents' socio-structural position, the poorer education of Turkish parents is also reflected in the possible and actual level of support given for homework and the discussion of education and continuing education. Many respondents from this group never discussed the subject with their parents or received any academic support from their families.

### 3.8 Sense of well-being at school

School is not just about the acquisition of qualifications. Social relationships with fellow pupils and teachers also influence how pupils perceive school. By asking how accepted respondents felt at school as compared to their



**Figure 3.3** Sense of well-being at school per city and group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

fellow pupils of German origin ('less', 'equally', or 'more accepted') between the ages of 10 and 15, we can gain an impression of the social relationships established by the second generation at school (figure 3.3).

In Berlin, one in three respondents with a Turkish background did not feel accepted at school at this age. This also applies to one in five second-generation Yugoslavs. The differences are greater in Frankfurt, where 43 per cent of the second-generation Turks, but only 15 per cent of the respondents of Yugoslavian descent report that they did not feel accepted at school. In combination with the respondents' statements on the migration backgrounds of their fellow pupils, it can be established that the more pupils from a migrant background were in the same class, the less accepted the TIES interviewees felt in their midst. Around 45 per cent of the second-generation Turks from classes with 50 per cent migrants stated that they did not feel accepted at school, compared with 85 per cent from classes with more than 75 per cent migrants. Similar but less distinctive patterns can be found for the second-generation Yugoslavs surveyed. There seems, then, to be a significant connection between the share of pupils with a migrant background in a class and the feeling of being accepted at school.

Similarly, the second-generation Turks felt discriminated against at school more often than respondents from the other two groups. The differences between the two groups of second-generation migrants are particularly

conspicuous. In Berlin, 10 per cent more interviewees of Turkish descent than of Yugoslavian descent remember being 'often' or 'sometimes' exposed to hostility or unfair treatment ('often'/'sometimes': 15.4%/54.2% of second-generation Turks; 4.5%/44.6% of second-generation Yugoslavs; 4.4%/31.6% of the control group). In Frankfurt, the discrepancies were even more pronounced. Here, around 12 per cent more respondents with a Turkish than with a Yugoslavian background stated that they were discriminated against at school 'often' or 'sometimes' ('often'/'sometimes': 18.4%/60.0% of the second-generation Turks; 9.9%/49.5% of the second-generation Yugoslavs; 9.9%/30.5% of the control group). With regard to the distribution of pupils with a migrant background in secondary schools, it is striking that roughly 90 per cent of the second-generation Turks who reported being treated unfairly on a regular basis had been in classes in which half or more of the pupils were of foreign origin. Comparing these numbers hostility was not necessarily ethnically<sup>38</sup> motivated: one third of the interviewees with a German background also experienced social rejection at school (see also chapter 7 on social relations).

Negative experiences at school were predominantly initiated by the respondents' classmates.<sup>39</sup> Ninety-five per cent of the second-generation Turks named their fellow pupils as the main initiators of hostility, but only 75 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs did so. Comparable differences were found in terms of the role of the teachers: 43 per cent of the respondents with a Yugoslavian background identified their teachers as the source of unfair treatment, but only one fifth of the second-generation Turks did so.

In general, it has to be borne in mind that the question was answered retrospectively. The interviewees' recollections may have been partly influenced by factors such as poor school performance.

### 3.9 Conclusions

Pupils' educational participation and success in the German school system are dependent on many factors that are determinative only in unison. Clearly, the TIES results cannot fully elucidate what circumstances made children most likely to pass successfully through the German education system and to accomplish a smooth transition into the labour market.

<sup>38</sup> That is, based on perceived affiliation with an 'ethnic' group.

<sup>39</sup> Note that only those interviewees who had been confronted with hostility and unfair treatment were asked this question.

Pupils with migrant backgrounds have a particular position here due to their migration history and the related challenges, accumulating several factors that in sum might be disadvantageous to their educational success.

In this chapter on the educational biographies of the second generation of Turkish and Yugoslavian immigrants, we have attempted to define these factors and to contextualise them with the educational participation of both the second generation and the control group. Besides the actual grades, the main factors examined were the repetition of school years in primary and lower secondary school; primary school recommendations for the secondary school type; shares of pupils with a migrant background in the individual classes; flaws in the permeability of the German school system in terms of lower and upper secondary levels; the existence of a transition system between school and vocational training; the socio-structural positioning of the parental generation; and parental school support.

In this context, factors prolonging pupils' stay in the system and limiting permeability are particularly relevant for the respondents with a Turkish background. Here we find, compared to the control group, a higher school-year repetition rate in primary school in combination with more recommendations for lower school types. This greatly constrains pupils' chances of attending a *Gymnasium* and gaining a university entrance qualification, not least because *Hauptschulen* offer much less vertical permeability than *Realschulen* or *Gymnasien*. Second-generation Turks were also more likely to be affected by school-year repetition in secondary school. Differences were found, however, between the two cities under study, Berlin and Frankfurt.

Focusing on educational biographies according to school types, the possibilities of continuing education and entering the labour market vary considerably depending on the school attended. For the *Hauptschule*, our findings confirm the impression that it is the 'end of the line' for many educational careers. Respondents from the Turkish second generation were especially unlikely to start and complete vocational training after *Hauptschule*, and almost half of them had a *Hauptschule*-leaving certificate as their highest achieved qualification. This means that they were unable to benefit from the alleged permeability of the school system, for example by continuing school to get a *Realschule*-leaving certificate or a comparable or higher qualification. In contrast, differences between the respondents who went to *Realschule* were only marginal, and the permeability of the school system was more obvious here. Many interviewees started vocational education after *Realschule*, while several even continued their schooling and achieved a higher school-leaving qualification. However, discrepancies between the two cities under study were more prominent for this school

type than for *Hauptschulen*. Finally, only minor differences were found between the three groups of respondents with regard to the *Gymnasium*. The majority did not leave this school type without attaining the university entrance qualification, and only a small number of respondents left the *Gymnasium* after year ten without continuing their school education or starting vocational training. Differences were found in terms of further education, with more interviewees of the second generation than of the control group choosing vocational training over university. However, *Gymnasium* pupils hardly ever remained without relevant qualifications facilitating access to the labour market. In summary, if second-generation respondents did attend a *Realschule* or *Gymnasium*, they passed through school education with similar success to the control group and were thus able to improve their chances on the labour market considerably. This finding corroborates the crucial importance of the transition between primary and lower secondary school.

The effects of the socio-structural position of the parental generation were briefly outlined, but only further statistical analyses can show how significant the differences really are. One tendency identified is that, particularly in the case of the second-generation Turks, a low-level educational background on the part of the mother does seem to affect individual educational biographies. This also affects the parental academic support available within families. In general, schools do not seem successful in sufficiently compensating for pupils' possible home disadvantages.



## 4 Labour market positions

### 4.1 Introduction

Work, or in other words integration into the German labour market, is defined in migration research as the main path to inclusion by which migrants become integrated into the host society. Qualifications gained in the receiving country undoubtedly play a crucial role here, but ultimately, successful integration is mainly measured by the individual migrant's success on the labour market. Here, 'integration' primarily means integration into the regular labour market. It goes without saying that the significance of education must not be underestimated. Vocational qualifications and university degrees set the course for potential entry to the regular labour market, easing access to it, while those who leave school without qualifications tend to end up in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. In the event of economic fluctuations, however, these kinds of jobs tend to be affected by redundancies more frequently and more severely than skilled jobs that require qualifications.

In the following, in line with Bommers & Kolb (2004: 3), the economic integration mentioned above will be defined in broad terms as the 'general ability to pay and the effort to gain this ability by either selling services or goods'. Based on this definition, 'economic integration' addresses the issue of whether, and to what extent, an individual can show this ability. This goes beyond fundamental integration in the labour market, that is, the provision of labour in exchange for wages. Although earnings and self-employment are certainly the most relevant activities for obtaining this ability, other functional equivalents to earnings, such as social transfers and welfare state arrangements, can also reasonably be included in this framework. They are, after all, another way of ensuring an individual's 'ability to pay'. Nonetheless, 'work' is doubtlessly 'the most relevant strategy in the past and the future for individuals to secure their "economic integration"' (Bommers & Kolb 2004: 4). It therefore seems reasonable to orientate individual educational careers towards integration into the labour market. This also underlines how important the transition from education and training to the labour market is for economic integration.

When it comes to economic integration, as defined above, two aspects are doubtlessly relevant – the structures of the labour market on the one hand, and the integration of individuals with all their resources and capital

on the other. The following discussion, however, deals only with the latter aspect. Here we consider to what extent the TIES respondents are integrated into the German labour market, and what differences can be determined between the individual groups. We also investigate the extent to which functional equivalents to income, such as social benefits, do play a role in securing the general 'ability to pay'.

Seen in this light, education is a crucial precondition of success on the labour market. We will therefore explore the extent to which a respondent's position on the labour market is linked to his or her level of education and training. We will also examine the importance ascribed to 'education' when it comes to coping with the transition from the education and training system to the labour market.

Finally, the first and second generation, i.e. the TIES respondents and their parents, will be compared as far as possible. It can be assumed that intergenerational mobility takes place, that is, that the education received by the second-generation respondents in Germany enables them to surpass their parents' positions on the labour market. Since the areas in which the parents work are gradually disappearing, it can also be assumed that the second generation is more likely to work in the tertiary sector and not in the manufacturing industry. Based on this, we can assume that their educational careers are geared towards this sector.

## 4.2 Labour force participation and current work status

The work status of the second generation can be described by means of two main indicators: economically active and economically inactive persons. Respondents with an economically active work status (labour force participation) are those who are in employment or unemployed and actively seeking work (i.e., registered as job-seeking). The inactive ones, on the other hand, represent respondents who were without employment and not looking for a job at the time of the survey, be it because they were doing unpaid family work, looking after children, in ill health or occupied in full-time education.

The groups of respondents show quite different rates of economic activity. Only just below 73 per cent of the second-generation Turks and just below 81 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs were actively available on the labour market. Differences between the groups regarding unemployment rate (unemployed but looking for a job) are apparent here, in particular, between the second-generation Turks and the other two groups. However,

only the difference between respondents of Turkish and Yugoslavian descent is statistically significant.

In general, the comparability of the numbers found in the TIES survey and the average unemployment and employment rates for Germany in the year 2008 is rather limited. The TIES respondents belong to a group of young adults who are usually more active on the labour market than older people (above the age of 55). Moreover, we are talking about a group with specific education and work biographies that are not representative of the total German population. Besides, the TIES respondents only represent an 18- to 35-year-old segment of the entire group of persons with a migration background in Germany (see chapter 1). Accordingly, the following comparisons must be interpreted against the backdrop of these limitations.

The employment rate (economically active persons and not counting job-seekers) is 61.3 per cent for the second-generation Turks surveyed. Compared with the general employment rate for migrants of Turkish origin aged between 18 and 65, as calculated in Germany in 2008 (49.6%; Sauer 2009), 10 per cent more of the TIES respondents were employed. On the other hand, the unemployment rates (of the economically active respondents) of all survey groups were not very different from the average unemployment rate for Germany in 2008, which was 7.8% (registered unemployed persons as a percentage of all economically active civilians, in the classification by the Federal Employment Office, Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2009). The TIES survey found an unemployment rate of 8.5 (11.6% of 72.9%) for the economically active Turks. The figure for migrants with a Yugoslavian background was 6.8% (8.4% of 80.9%, table 4.1) Using the 2005 micro-census, Fincke (2009) calculated the employment rate for second-generation migrants,<sup>1</sup> finding that Turkish and Yugoslavian migrants fare relatively poorly compared to migrants of Spanish/Portuguese (81%), Greek (73%) and Italian (72%) origin. Fincke (*ibid.*: 143) cites an employment rate of 69 per cent for migrants with a Yugoslavian background (TIES: 72.5%), and only 59 per cent for migrants of Turkish origin (TIES: 61.3%).<sup>2</sup> One of the explanations for the differences between the groups of migrants is that the gender distribution of labour participation greatly differs. The

1 Second generation is defined by Fincke (2009: 83f) as children born in Germany or abroad to two migrant parents who moved to Germany before having children or when the children were under the age of six. Only subjects born between 1960 and 1985 were investigated.

2 Based on the 2005 micro-census, Woellert et al. (2009) calculate that 58% of the Turkish second generation is economically active, while this figure is 75% for both the Yugoslavian second generation and the control group.



labour participation of second-generation Turkish women, for instance, is considerably lower than that of second-generation Yugoslavian women (*ibid.*). The figures for the economically inactive population (in Fincke 2009: 143, these are housewives, pensioners, etc.), offer similar findings. Fincke (*ibid.*) gives a rate of 22 per cent for the Turkish second generation (TIES: 22.2%) and 15 per cent for the Yugoslavian second generation (TIES: 15.5%).

The unemployment rate cited by Fincke (*ibid.*) is very similar to that found for the TIES respondents. Based on the micro-census, Fincke (*ibid.*: 143) calculates 19 per cent for the Turkish and 16 per cent for the Yugoslavian second generation. In the TIES study, the overall unemployment rate (calculated in Fincke, i.e. economically active and inactive persons who are unemployed) amounts to 16.6 per cent for the second-generation Turks and 11.9 per cent for the second-generation Yugoslavs. As far as the labour-market situation is concerned, the TIES respondents thus show figures quite similar to the 2005 micro-census.

Nevertheless, the work status does not initially shed light on individuals' actual position on the labour market. It is therefore considered pertinent to explore the status of the economically active and inactive populations, and to investigate the interviewees' specific positions on the labour market. There are several differences between the TIES respondents, in particular between the second-generation Turks and the other two groups (table 4.1). The comparatively low labour force participation rate among the second-generation Turks in the survey is reflected in their current employment status. Fewer persons with a Turkish than with a Yugoslavian background are currently in employment, and the percentage of job-seekers is also higher in the former group than in the other two. At the same time, virtually no differences can be determined between the second-generation Yugoslavs and the control group. This suggests that the second-generation Turks are comparatively less successful at positioning themselves on the labour market.

Self-employment is much more prevalent in the control group than among the second-generation immigrants. Overall, however, the TIES respondents demonstrated very low rates of self-employment. In contrast to the high rates of self-employment in the parental generation, especially among the Turkish population (see section 2.3), only very few of the TIES respondents had resorted to entrepreneurship as a strategy to obtain the 'ability to pay'. The reasons for this are probably mainly the respondents' age group and the increased economic risk involved in becoming self-employed in recent years.

**Table 4.1 Work status by group (in %)**

|                                   | 2nd generation |           | CG   |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|-----------|------|
|                                   | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |
| One or more jobs                  | 53.9           | 63.1      | 66.2 |
| Self-employed/own business        | 1.8            | 2.7       | 3.8  |
| Working and studying              | 1.6            | 2.2       | 3.2  |
| Apprenticeship                    | 3.8            | 4.0       | 3.0  |
| Unemployed, looking for a job     | 11.6           | 8.4       | 9.7  |
| Civil/military service            | 0.2            | 0.5       | 0.4  |
| Total active                      | 72.9           | 80.9      | 86.3 |
| Unpaid work in family business    | 1.8            | 0.7       | 0.2  |
| Unemployed, not looking for a job | 5.0            | 3.5       | 2.4  |
| Family work                       | 13.6           | 7.4       | 5.2  |
| Sick or disabled                  | 0.2            | 0.7       | 0.2  |
| Full-time student                 | 6.6            | 6.7       | 5.6  |
| Total inactive                    | 27.2           | 19.0      | 13.6 |
| Total N                           | 501            | 404       | 497  |

Note: CG = Control group  
 Source: TIES Survey Germany

The number of economically inactive persons among the interviewees with a Turkish background was derived from the labour force participation rate. Only minor differences were found between the categories ‘full-time student’ and ‘sick or disabled’, with the high percentage of economically inactive persons in this group being primarily due to the individuals who care for children or perform housework without pay, and are therefore unavailable to the labour market. Yet, the proportion of unemployed persons and persons not seeking work were also higher in the Turkish second generation than in the group of respondents of Yugoslavian descent, and twice as high as in the control group.

Table 4.2 shows the economically active and inactive groups, differentiated according to gender and age. Gender differences within the groups between economically inactive and active persons are statistically significant, though this is most certainly a consequence of very different factors. The major differences in the structure of the employment rate are probably mainly due to gender differences among respondents of Turkish descent. The percentages of individuals who care for children or perform housework, for instance, are primarily composed of women. In the Yugoslavian group and the control group, all the individuals performing

these tasks are women, while the Turkish group contains one man looking after the home.<sup>3</sup> In compliance with traditional roles, then, family work in the form of child care and household chores seems to be seen as women's work and a legitimate alternative to making oneself available on the labour market (see also chapter 8 on family formation and partner relationships). This particularly applies to the women of Turkish origin, of whom almost 30 per cent care for children or are housewives. This is the case for only just under 15 per cent of the female second-generation Yugoslavs and 11 per cent of the female control-group interviewees. On the other hand, the percentage has halved in all three groups compared to their mothers' generation (compare with section 2.3). This suggests that many women whose mothers worked solely as housewives are now disengaging from traditional gender roles and attempting to gain a position on the wider labour market, establishing their own employment biography outside of the home. Nonetheless, the proportion of employees is higher among men than among women in all groups. Self-employment also tends to be a more male domain; none of the female second-generation Turks and only a very small fraction of the female respondents in the other two groups were self-employed.

Those respondents who worked and studied or who were in an apprenticeship are distributed similarly in all three groups; gender or age differences are virtually indiscernible. As expected, the proportion of students in the group of respondents aged between 18 and 24 is high; in particular, one in five of the second-generation Yugoslavs was a full-time student. In this group and in the control group, the percentage of female students is almost twice as high as that of the male students. Males are only represented more strongly in this category among respondents of Turkish descent.

The majority of unemployed economically active persons, i.e. job-seekers, are male and under the age of 25, though the gender and age differences are greater among the second-generation immigrants than in the control group. The age structure of the unemployed respondents is particularly striking. Among the respondents of Turkish descent, there is a youth unemployment rate of 17.6 per cent; among the second-generation Yugoslavs and the control group, however, it is 12.5 per cent and 14.3 per cent, respectively. The rate in all three groups is therefore higher than the average unemployment rate, confirming the general youth unemployment statistics in Germany (see below). In fact, both the migrant groups in the TIES survey are below the

3 See Sauer (2009). Housewives make up 34.9% of all economically inactive persons of Turkish origin here, 19.4% are retirees, 27.3% are unemployed and 10.5% are school pupils/students.

**Table 4.2 Work status by group, sex and age group (in %)**

|                                   | 2nd generation |      |      |      |           |      |      |      | CG   |      |      |      |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|------|------|------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                                   | Turks          |      |      |      | Yugoslavs |      |      |      | M    | F    | ≤ 24 | ≥ 25 |
|                                   | M              | F    | ≤ 24 | ≥ 25 | M         | F    | ≤ 24 | ≥ 25 |      |      |      |      |
| One or more jobs                  | 60.6           | 47.0 | 39.0 | 62.7 | 66.5      | 60.4 | 33.0 | 72.3 | 68.9 | 63.1 | 42.9 | 73.7 |
| Self-employed/ own business       | 3.6            | 0.0  | 0.5  | 2.5  | 4.0       | 1.4  | 0.0  | 3.5  | 4.7  | 2.9  | 0.8  | 4.9  |
| Working and studying              | 2.0            | 1.2  | 3.8  | 0.3  | 3.0       | 1.4  | 3.4  | 1.6  | 2.4  | 4.1  | 8.7  | 1.3  |
| Apprenticeship                    | 3.9            | 3.6  | 9.9  | 0.3  | 3.6       | 4.3  | 18.2 | 0    | 3.5  | 2.5  | 11.9 | 0.0  |
| Unemployed, looking for a job     | 13.8           | 8.9  | 17.6 | 8.2  | 11.2      | 5.8  | 12.5 | 7.0  | 11.8 | 7.8  | 14.3 | 8.3  |
| Civil/military service            | 0.4            | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.3  | 1.0       | 0.0  | 1.1  | 0.3  | 0.8  | 0.0  | 1.6  | 0.3  |
| Total active                      | 84.3           | 60.7 | 70.8 | 74.3 | 89.3      | 73.3 | 68.2 | 84.7 | 92.1 | 80.4 | 80.2 | 88.5 |
| Unpaid work in family business    | 2.0            | 1.6  | 3.8  | 0.6  | 1.0       | 0.5  | 2.3  | 0.3  | 0.0  | 0.4  | 0.0  | 0.3  |
| Unemployed, not looking for a job | 5.9            | 4.0  | 6.0  | 4.4  | 4.1       | 2.4  | 3.4  | 3.2  | 3.1  | 1.6  | 1.6  | 2.4  |
| Family work                       | 0.4            | 27.1 | 6.0  | 17.6 | 0.0       | 14.5 | 3.4  | 8.6  | 0.0  | 10.7 | 1.6  | 6.7  |
| Sick or disabled                  | 0.0            | 0.4  | 0.0  | 0.3  | 1.5       | 0.0  | 0.0  | 1.0  | 0.4  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.3  |
| Full-time student                 | 7.5            | 6.1  | 13.2 | 2.8  | 4.1       | 9.2  | 22.7 | 2.2  | 4.3  | 7.0  | 16.7 | 1.9  |
| Total inactive                    | 15.8           | 39.2 | 29.0 | 25.7 | 10.7      | 26.6 | 31.8 | 15.3 | 7.8  | 19.7 | 19.9 | 11.6 |
| Total N                           | 254            | 247  | 182  | 319  | 197       | 207  | 88   | 314  | 254  | 244  | 126  | 373  |

Note: CG = Control group; M = male, F = female

TR (men vs. women)  $X^2 = 33.842$   $p = .000$

YU (age groups)  $X^2 = 11.770$   $p = .008$

YU (men vs. women)  $X^2 = 17.389$   $p = .000$

CG (age groups)  $X^2 = 5.910$   $p = .015$

CG (men vs. women)  $X^2 = 15.887$   $p = .000$

TR age groups not statistically significant

Source: TIES Survey Germany

youth unemployment rate calculated by Woellert et al. (2009) for Turkish and Yugoslavian second-generation adolescents (27% and 18%, respectively, compared to 14% for adolescents of German origin). Nonetheless, the youth unemployment figures here are high. It appears to be difficult for adolescents to manage the transition from school or training to the labour market, or to gain long-term, stable employment after completing their

schooling or training, thus securing a permanent income and opening up prospects for the future.<sup>4</sup>

### 4.3 Transition from the education system to the labour market

After completing training within the framework of a vocational apprenticeship or a university education, or after leaving the education system with a basic school-leaving certificate, individuals make the transition to the labour market. Regarding this transition, the respondents in the TIES project were asked how long it took them to find their first job.

The respondents with a Yugoslavian background were more successful than the other two groups at finding a job on the labour market promptly after leaving school. The respondents of Turkish descent took an average of 6.73 months, almost 1.5 months longer than the control group, and almost 2.5 months longer than the second-generation Yugoslavs. It thus appears to have been most difficult for the interviewees with a Turkish background to gain access to the labour market. In the gender comparison, the TIES data show it was easier for women to make the transition to the labour market straight after leaving school, but here too, the women with a Yugoslavian background (3.6 months) were more successful than those of the other two groups. The difference between this group and the other second-generation group, the Turkish women (5.84 months), is more than two months. In all groups, the difference between genders is 1 to 1.5 months (second-generation Turkish men: 7.35 months; second-generation Yugoslav men: 4.88 months), which supports the assumption that it is easier for women to manage the

4 An important development on the labour market that is unfolding to the detriment of adolescents is the fact that 'the general unemployment rate (15- to 64-year-olds) and the youth unemployment rate (15- to 24-year-olds) have been changing since 2000, to the effect that the youth unemployment rate is higher than the general rate, and that the gap between the two continued to widen until 2005', (translation) *Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2008*: 181. This trend has continued to develop in the recent past. In 2008, the unemployment rate for under-25-year-olds was 9.8%, compared to 6.9% for over-25-year-olds (Federal Statistical Office, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 2009*: 86; online at: <http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Shared-Content/Oeffentlich/AI/IC/Publikationen/Jahrbuch/Arbeitsmarkt,property=file.pdf>. Definition of unemployment rate: unemployed persons as a percentage of the whole economically active population according to the European classification, i.e. gainfully employed persons and unemployed persons in private households aged between 15 and 74 years, excluding conscripts and those carrying out civilian service).

transition to the labour market. This could be due to labour market conditions or to the career choices of the female respondents.<sup>5</sup>

In the city comparison, the findings show that the average transition period was longer in Berlin, where respondents required between six and seven months to gain access to the labour market. Here, contrary to the trends discussed so far, the respondents with a Turkish background managed on average to find a job slightly earlier. The second-generation Yugoslavs and the respondents from the control group entered the labour market relatively quickly in Frankfurt, finding a job in less than four months on average. In contrast, the respondents of Turkish descent took more than seven months. Based on the TIES data, then, the speed and success with which individuals manage to make the transition from school and training to the labour market appears to be highly dependent on local labour market conditions (vacant positions, labour market sectors, special development programmes, possibilities for support, etc.).

Taking a closer look at the time after leaving school and prior to starting the first job, we can observe that the longer transition phase of the second-generation Turks is also reflected here. More than one in three were looking for work at the time of the survey, and only 27 per cent found a job straight after leaving school. In contrast, 35 per cent of the control group and almost half of the second-generation Yugoslavs found work immediately. This shows, again, that the respondents of Yugoslavian descent were relatively successful in becoming integrated into the labour market straight after schooling/training. In the group comparison, many respondents of Turkish descent said they helped out in the family business, whether for payment or not (total: 7.7%).

Frictional unemployment in Germany among those who have just completed training in the dual system has risen considerably since 2000. In 2005, this affected approximately 36 per cent of all adolescents who had completed dual training. It took six months for the unemployment rate to fall, and even then it remained fairly high (16%) (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2008). Here the difference between adolescent foreign nationals or migrants and German youths is relatively minor compared to the differences between these groups when it comes to coping with the transition from school to an apprenticeship. 'Once foreign nationals have cleared the hurdle of training, their transition to the labour market appears

5 Note, however, the frequently high standard deviations of mean values. These qualify the average values and represent very heterogeneous transition processes among the TIES respondents.

to be easier and more or less in line with that of German nationals' (*ibid.*, own translation).

Seibert (2008) detects greater differences in labour market integration after completion of an apprenticeship. According to investigations carried out in the context of the 2005 micro-census, it appears to be more difficult for young adults from a migrant background to keep up with peers from a non-migrant background. Seibert does also emphasise the significance of an apprenticeship for gaining easier access to the labour market, and does point out that the employment figures for both groups are gradually converging. Nonetheless, these findings confirm the tendencies of the TIES results outlined above, which show that second-generation Turks have particular difficulties in positioning themselves on the labour market after leaving school.

#### **4.4 Significance of the highest qualification for labour market position**

In the introduction above, emphasis was placed on the importance of human capital in the form of training qualifications (vocational apprenticeship or university degree) for one's future position on the German labour market (see also Granato 2003; Granato & Kalter 2001; Kalter 2006). It sets the course for integration into the labour market, where patterns of demand are closely geared towards the dual training system. Thus, school-leavers without vocational training or a university degree generally have relatively poor prospects of finding skilled work. In the following, the labour-market integration of those respondents who had already left school at the time of the survey will be scrutinised in relation to their highest qualification. To begin with, it will be helpful to summarise the school-leaving certificates available in terms of the relevant ISCED<sup>6</sup> categories, and to correlate them with labour force participation rates (table 4.3).

Although the group sizes of the ISCED levels differ considerably, various tendencies can be discerned from these interrelations that highlight the significance of qualifications for integration into the labour market. In particular, the differences between the respondents who only have a school-leaving certificate (ISCED 2) and those who have completed vocational training or schooling (ISCED 3) are immediately apparent. For example, 86.6 per cent of the second-generation Turks on ISCED level 3, but only 57.8 per cent of those on level 2, actively participate in the labour market.

6 International Standard Classification of Education; see section 1.6.

The unemployment figures are correspondingly high: only 8.7 per cent of the respondents of Turkish descent with ISCED level 3 are unemployed, as opposed to 23.4 per cent of those with an ISCED level 2 qualification. Similar findings are reflected in the group of second-generation Yugoslavs, and it is only in the control group that the difference is less pronounced.

A much lower labour force participation rate can be ascertained among the second-generation respondents with an ISCED level 2 qualification than among the control group on the same level. In other words, access to the labour market is relatively difficult for this group, and they often perform other activities (such as housework and family work). By contrast, the poorly qualified members of the control group are more successful at becoming integrated into the labour market. This could be because individuals from a non-migrant background may have better network structures, or are even preferred to migrants with the same qualifications by employers. This might help them to get a job of some sort despite not having a vocational qualification.

Among the ISCED level 3 respondents we find relative parity between the groups, with the differences being far less substantial than in the ISCED 2 cases. The differences between the two groups of second-generation migrants are also very small. Completion of vocational training or schooling thus appears to be relatively successful in raising the prospects of labour market integration and lowering the risks of unemployment. The labour force participation rate increases further among the ISCED level 5/6 respondents. Here, however, the number of second-generation respondents is considerably lower than that of the control group, so the differences between this and the ISCED 3 group only emerge as a tendency.

If we look at how the economically active and inactive populations are distributed among the various categories of labour market integration, the picture outlined above is continued and confirmed (table 4.3). Of the second-generation Turks with an ISCED 2 qualification, a high proportion is economically inactive. Of this population, more than 70 per cent is made up of individuals – primarily women, as seen above – who care for children or perform work in the home. This share is much lower for the respondents with higher qualifications. Similar results are found for the second-generation Yugoslavs, with more than 70 per cent of the poorly qualified respondents opting out of active labour market participation, and instead caring for children or performing work in the home. Hence the groups that have not had vocational training appear to compensate for their poorer prospects on the labour market by caring for children or performing household chores – or are virtually pushed into such work because they have no way of connecting with the labour market. For women in particular, this route constitutes a



legitimate alternative to unemployment and the constant search for work associated with it. Of course, these respondents might also have deliberately decided against vocational training or further education because they saw their future in family work rather than labour force participation.

**Table 4.3** Position on the labour market by group and ISCED level (in %)

|                                   | 2nd generation |      |      |           |      |      | CG   |      |      |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|------|------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                                   | Turks          |      |      | Yugoslavs |      |      |      |      |      |
| ISCED level                       | 2              | 3    | 5-6  | 2         | 3    | 5-6  | 2    | 3    | 5-6  |
| One or more jobs                  | 30.7           | 76.5 | 92.9 | 43.1      | 77.7 | 82.8 | 49.0 | 79.3 | 83.5 |
| Self-employed/own business        | 3.7            | 1.4  | 0.0  | 5.9       | 1.5  | 13.7 | 2.0  | 2.7  | 11.4 |
| Unemployed, looking for a job     | 23.4           | 8.7  | 0.0  | 17.6      | 8.7  | 3.4  | 35.3 | 9.2  | 1.3  |
| Civil/military service            | 0.0            | 0.4  | 0.0  | 0.0       | 0.8  | 0.0  | 2.0  | 0.7  | 0.0  |
| Total active                      | 57.8           | 86.6 | 92.2 | 66.6      | 88.7 | 99.9 | 86.3 | 91.2 | 96.2 |
| Unpaid work in family business    | 2.9            | 0.7  | 0.0  | 2.0       | 0.4  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.3  | 0.0  |
| Unemployed, not looking for a job | 8.8            | 3.2  | 0.0  | 2.0       | 4.2  | 0.0  | 3.9  | 2.4  | 1.3  |
| Family work                       | 30.7           | 8.7  | 7.1  | 23.5      | 6.8  | 0.0  | 7.8  | 5.4  | 2.5  |
| Sick or disabled                  | 0.0            | 0.4  | 0.0  | 5.9       | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 0.0  |
| Total inactive                    | 42.4           | 13.0 | 7.1  | 33.4      | 11.4 | 0.0  | 11.7 | 8.1  | 3.8  |
| Total N                           | 137            | 277  | 14   | 51        | 265  | 29   | 51   | 295  | 79   |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

In the group of interviewees who were actively available for the labour market, the probability of having employment increases with the level of qualifications. It can also be seen, however, that the members of the control group manage to find employment more successfully than the second-generation respondents, despite their lack of qualifications. Again, the respondents of Turkish descent have a higher rate of unemployment and a lower level of employment than the other two groups. The second-generation Yugoslavs, on the other hand, have similar labour force participation rates to the control group. The differences between these and the second-generation Turks are greater than between the respondents of Yugoslavian descent and the control group.

When only the group of respondents with an ISCED level 3 qualification is considered, however, it turns out that there is virtually no difference

between the second generation and the control group. As soon as the respondents of Turkish descent are able to produce a training qualification, they manage almost as successfully as the other two groups to gain access to the labour market and to find employment. Here the differences between the second-generation Turks and the control group are minimal. A training qualification therefore balances out inequalities with regard to employment and unemployment relatively well, and considerably reduces the probability that individuals will withdraw from the labour market.

Table 4.4 reflects the significance of educational qualifications for income levels. However, the figures lose some of their informative value due to the typically high proportion of interviewees who refused to answer these questions. This is particularly the case with second-generation interviewees with higher qualifications. It can generally be seen, though, that the higher the qualification, the more likely the individual respondent is to earn more than €1,000 per month.

**Table 4.4** Income according to ISCED levels by group (in %)

| ISCED level | 2nd generation |      |      |           |      |      | CG   |      |      |
|-------------|----------------|------|------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|
|             | Turks          |      |      | Yugoslavs |      |      | 2    | 3    | 5-6  |
| < € 550     | 6.4            | 1.9  | 0.0  | 0.0       | 0.5  | 0.0  | 0.0  | 1.2  | 0.0  |
| € 550-999   | 21.3           | 10.6 | 21.4 | 24.0      | 9.1  | 0.0  | 28.0 | 7.9  | 1.4  |
| € 1000-1499 | 42.6           | 54.6 | 7.1  | 36.0      | 32.1 | 14.3 | 32.0 | 54.1 | 14.9 |
| € 1500-1999 | 17.0           | 14.8 | 21.4 | 20.0      | 26.3 | 14.3 | 12.0 | 22.7 | 28.4 |
| > € 2000    | 4.2            | 2.3  | 28.5 | 0.0       | 4.8  | 17.8 | 4.0  | 6.6  | 37.9 |
| Refused     | 8.5            | 15.7 | 21.4 | 20.0      | 27.3 | 53.6 | 24.0 | 7.4  | 17.6 |
| Total N     | 47             | 216  | 14   | 25        | 209  | 28   | 25   | 242  | 74   |

Note: CG = Control group  
 Source: TIES Survey Germany

### 4.5 Occupational groups

Using the ISCO 88 classification,<sup>7</sup> the occupations given by the respondents can be allocated to the individual ISCO categories. These are designed to put occupations in a hierarchical order, harmonising them within the European

7 International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO); for details, see: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/index.htm>.

framework. Individual activities are aggregated into occupational groups according to the similarity of the tasks they involve. To be able to classify occupations even more accurately, skill levels are introduced. These, against the backdrop of the international ISCED categories, classify the scope of functions of various professions and trades into different hierarchy levels, making individual professions and trades comparable. The 'service and sales workers', for instance, include housekeeping and restaurant services workers, such as housekeepers, cooks and waiters; personal care workers, such as geriatric and child-care workers; and other service workers, such as hairdressers and beauticians.

Table 4.5 shows the ISCO categories for the TIES respondents, aggregated according to group and gender. In the group of second-generation Turks and in the control group, it is particularly men who occupy the highest positions on the job market (ISCO category 1). The second ISCO category combines engineers, architects, scientists, doctors, teachers and similar professions that require a university degree and involve professional activities. Here, a clear difference can be seen between the second-generation respondents and the control group. In particular, the difference between the respondents of Turkish descent and the control group is striking: the non-migrant Germans are represented in this group five times as strongly as the second-generation Turks. The percentage of second-generation Yugoslavs in this category is twice as high as that of Turks, but less than half that of the control group. While the gender distribution in the group of Turkish origin is equal, a higher percentage of male employees can be found among the second-generation Yugoslavs and the control group in this category. With regard to content, the differences between the groups can be attributed mainly to the higher percentage of lawyers, teachers and tax consultants/auditors in the control group. This shows that there are still a number of sectors of the labour market containing very few people from a migrant background. Reasons for this phenomenon could be high access barriers (e.g. the average *Abitur*/A-level grade required to study law; the requirement of German citizenship), the positive or negative image associated with the professions, or difficulties in accessing these sectors of the labour market due to a lack of networks. It is generally known that few individuals from a migrant background aspire to become teachers. It is only in recent years that attempts have been made to arouse migrants' interest in this profession by means of special incentive programmes.

**Table 4.5 Occupational categories by sex and group of respondents whose main category is work (in %)**

| ISCO occupational category                 | 2nd generation |      |      |           |      |      | CG    |      |      |
|--|----------------|------|------|-----------|------|------|-------|------|------|
|  | Turks          |      |      | Yugoslavs |      |      | Total | M    | F    |
|  | Total          | M    | F    | Total     | M    | F    |       |      |      |
| 1 Senior officials and managers            | 2.9            | 3.7  | 1.7  | 3.0       | 2.9  | 3.1  | 4.3   | 5.3  | 3.1  |
| 2 Professionals/ teachers                  | 3.6            | 3.7  | 3.4  | 7.2       | 8.6  | 5.5  | 16.4  | 17.6 | 14.8 |
| 3 Technicians and associate professionals  | 12.5           | 8.6  | 18.1 | 18.1      | 12.9 | 24.4 | 21.0  | 19.3 | 22.8 |
| 4 Clerks                                   | 9.3            | 4.9  | 16.4 | 15.5      | 12.2 | 18.1 | 16.1  | 15.5 | 16.7 |
| 5 Service and sales workers                | 30.4           | 20.4 | 44.0 | 26.4      | 17.3 | 37.0 | 20.5  | 12.8 | 29.6 |
| 6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers | 3.9            | 6.2  | 0.9  | 2.6       | 3.6  | 1.6  | 1.4   | 0.0  | 3.1  |
| 7 Craft and related trades workers         | 18.2           | 27.2 | 5.2  | 14.7      | 25.9 | 2.4  | 12.7  | 19.8 | 4.3  |
| 8 Plant and machine operators              | 6.4            | 9.3  | 1.7  | 1.9       | 3.6  | 0.0  | 1.2   | 2.1  | 0.0  |
| 9 Elementary occupations                   | 12.9           | 16.0 | 8.6  | 10.6      | 12.9 | 7.9  | 6.3   | 7.5  | 5.6  |
| Total N                                    | 278            | 162  | 116  | 266       | 139  | 127  | 349   | 187  | 162  |

Note: CG = Control group; M = male, F = female. One problematic aspect of these classifications is that almost all occupational groups within categories 3 to 7 require a vocational apprenticeship, but ISCO 88 introduces grades here: the qualification required for category 3 is assigned to ISCED level 3 (i.e. corresponding to a vocational apprenticeship in Germany), and from category 4 on, only ISCED level 2 is given as a prerequisite. This, however, is not equivalent to the German occupational groups and their requirements in these categories.

Source: TIES Survey Germany

The third category comprises professions that usually require a relatively high school-leaving certificate (*Mittlere Reife, Abitur*) and vocational training, thereby covering the middle qualification level. Respondents in this category work as technical specialists (e.g. chemical lab assistant), industrial and office clerks, legal or administrative clerks, or in the field of medicine as medical assistants, nurses, medical laboratory assistants and pharmaceutical assistants. As in the first two categories, the control group is again represented most strongly in this category, but one out of five second-generation Yugoslavs also work in this ISCO field. Here the control group is just ahead of the second-generation Yugoslavs (21% and 18.1%, respectively), with the second-generation Turks lagging behind

(12.5%). A high proportion of female employees can be found in this area in all of the groups, particularly due to the administrative positions and the occupations in the field of medical work, which tend to be considered the domain of women. However, the differences between genders vary considerably from one group to the next. In the second-generation groups, women are represented twice as strongly as men in this category, suggesting that traditionally female occupations play an important role for the second generation. The difference is not as marked in the control group, where only 3.5 per cent more women than men work in this category.

Junior administrative and commercial clerks (for example, secretaries, travel consultants, telephonists and materials administrators) are combined in the next ISCO category. As can be seen from table 4.5, the employees from the group of Turkish origin are least represented in this category too, while the figures for the second-generation Yugoslavs and the control group are similar. In all three groups, there are fewer employees in this category than in the third category (technicians). The female dominance in the previous category is also reflected here, although it is more pronounced among the second-generation migrants, and more so among the second-generation Turks than the second-generation Yugoslavs.

The category comprising service workers primarily contains waiters, hairdressers, child-care workers and other care workers and salespersons. This list of occupations raises the expectation that this category will be primarily occupied by women, and this is confirmed by the figures in table 4.5. In all three groups, more than twice as many women as men work in this area. In particular, women of Turkish origin can be found here: 44 per cent of all female second-generation Turks work in this category. In the group of second-generation Yugoslavs, it is more than one third, and also almost 30 per cent in the control group. Due to the high contingent of women among the second-generation Turks surveyed, a total of around 30 per cent of all the respondents of Turkish descent work in this field. In contrast to the other categories, the TIES sample contains virtually no employees in the agricultural sector or the 'plant and machine operators' category. What is striking about the latter category is that almost exclusively male employees from the group of second-generation Turks work here. This is a category where semi-skilled tasks are required, which can usually be performed without vocational training. This might explain the high proportion of employees with a Turkish background in this category.

The main occupations covered in the category of craft and related trades workers are bricklayers, carpenters, painters and building trades workers. This category thus covers a classic male domain, with the high numbers

of male employees causing no surprises. The highest figures here are in the group of male second-generation Turks, nearly one third of whom (27.2%) work in this area. Similar tendencies are also evident in the other two groups, albeit with lower total figures. The group of employees with elementary occupations is strongly represented by respondents with a Turkish background: almost 13 per cent can be found in this area, with twice as many men as women. In the control group, it is just half of this figure (6.3%).

To summarise, it is apparent that low qualifications, especially those of the Turkish second generation, are reflected in their positions on the labour market. This is evident not just in these individuals' employment rate, but also in their actual position in terms of the work performed and occupational groups. The second-generation Turks work mainly in those sectors of the labour market that can be assigned to the lowest levels in the international framework of the ISCO categorisation. This is of course inevitable, since the ISCO categories are particularly oriented towards qualifications, and individuals with lower qualifications are therefore automatically found in the lower area. Nonetheless, this shows very clearly that the second-generation Turks are predominantly found in occupational groups that coincide with a low salary and low status, and are hence positioned more poorly on the labour market than the interviewees of the control group. It is also very apparent that the second-generation Yugoslavs are considerably better positioned than the respondents of Turkish descent, and that they have managed more successfully to gain access to occupational groups that require higher qualifications.

#### 4.6 The respondents' financial situation

If economic integration is understood as the 'ability to pay', it can be equated with the monthly net salary paid by an employer to an employee. It can also, however, include other forms of financial support, particularly if a person does not earn a monthly salary.<sup>8</sup> For instance, social benefits paid by the state to a person who has been employed but is now unemployed (unemployment benefit I or II)<sup>9</sup> also constitute monthly income. The only difference

8 The large number of interviewees who refused to disclose their financial circumstances makes it difficult to offer clear statements on their income situation. Thus only a brief overview is given in the following.

9 In the German social security system, unemployment benefits (*Arbeitslosengeld*) are divided into two phases. Phase one, *Arbeitslosengeld I*, amounts to 60% of the last weekly income subject to social insurance contributions, with the duration of payment depending on the duration of

is that the social benefits are not achieved through gainful employment but through joblessness, and therefore need. Other financial support can include maintenance payments for divorced spouses and children by the other spouse/parent, scholarships from foundations and state grants to students. Social benefits are therefore just another form of income that ensures the recipients are 'able to pay'.

Table 4.6 gives a brief overview of the net incomes earned by the respondents through having one or more jobs or through self-employment. All in all, the female respondents from all three groups earn less than the men. This is particularly visible in the category between €550 and €999, where the women are represented much more frequently than the men. Differences are also apparent, however, in the category of the higher-income earners, particularly between the second generation and the control group. For instance, almost 10 per cent fewer women than men of Turkish origin earn more than €1,500. The gender difference is similarly large in the group of respondents with a Yugoslavian background, at approximately 12 per cent. It is only in the control group that almost the same number of women as men earn over €1,500. Put in figures, relatively few women with a Turkish background are represented in the two highest salary brackets (13.2%). There are rather more women in these brackets among the second-generation Yugoslavs (22.3%), and considerably more in the control group (35.3%). While the female members of the different groups are represented in similar numbers in the lowest income categories, the women in the control group who belong to the higher categories manage to position themselves on the labour market more successfully than the second-generation women.

If we look at the overall figures for the three groups investigated, we can see that here, too, the difference is relatively small with regard to very low incomes (up to €999), but considerable in the area of the higher salary brackets (€1,500 and above). Only 18.6 per cent of the respondents of Turkish origin earn more than €1,500, compared to 28.3 per cent of the respondents of Yugoslavian descent and 36 per cent of the control group.

the previous employment. Phase two, *Arbeitslosengeld II* or 'Hartz IV' (named after one of the initiators of the social reform to which the concept belongs) becomes effective when a person has no legal claim to *Arbeitslosengeld I*. This is either because the period of unemployment has now exceeded the previous period of employment on which the claim was dependent, or because the person was never entitled to this benefit because they did not previously have a job subject to social insurance contributions. As a flat-rate benefit, in the year of the TIES survey, *Arbeitslosengeld II* amounted to €364 per month, with social services additionally covering basic housing costs (rent, heating).

**Table 4.6** Income by sex and group of all respondents who have completed their education and are now in paid work (in %)

| Income<br>(in €) | 2nd generation |      |      |           |      |      | CG    |      |      |
|------------------|----------------|------|------|-----------|------|------|-------|------|------|
|                  | Turks          |      |      | Yugoslavs |      |      | Total | M    | F    |
|                  | Total          | M    | F    | Total     | M    | F    |       |      |      |
| < 550            | 2.2            | 1.9  | 2.5  | 0.4       | 0.0  | 0.8  | 0.9   | 0.0  | 1.8  |
| 550-999          | 13.4           | 11.0 | 16.5 | 10.8      | 6.2  | 15.7 | 9.5   | 6.6  | 12.4 |
| 1000-1499        | 50.0           | 47.1 | 53.7 | 33.1      | 30.8 | 35.5 | 41.7  | 44.6 | 38.8 |
| 1500-1999        | 14.9           | 17.4 | 11.6 | 23.1      | 24.6 | 21.5 | 22.3  | 24.1 | 20.6 |
| > 2000           | 3.7            | 5.1  | 1.6  | 5.2       | 9.3  | 0.8  | 13.7  | 12.6 | 14.7 |
| Refused          | 15.9           | 17.4 | 14.0 | 27.3      | 25.6 | 27.5 | 11.9  | 12.0 | 11.8 |
| Total N          | 276            | 155  | 121  | 251       | 130  | 121  | 336   | 166  | 170  |

Note: CG = Control group; M = male, F = female

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Table 4.7 shows the percentage of all those who receive social benefits within the different categories. In the event of low salaries, this could, for example, be housing allowance or subsistence payments. As is to be expected, the percentage of unemployed persons who receive social benefits, probably in the form of unemployment benefit I or II, is high. All in all, only approximately one in five respondents in each group receive social benefits, so the differences between the groups are minimal.

**Table 4.7** Recipients of social benefits by occupational status and group (in %, N)

|                                   | 2nd generation |           | CG        |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|-----------|-----------|
|                                   | Turks          | Yugoslavs |           |
| One or more jobs                  | 2.2 (6)        | 2.5 (6)   | 1.9 (6)   |
| Self-employed/own business        | 0.0 (0)        | 0.0 (0)   | 7.1 (1)   |
| Working and studying              | 11.1 (1)       | 30.0 (3)  | 18.8 (3)  |
| Apprenticeship                    | 0.0 (0)        | 0.0 (0)   | 0.0 (0)   |
| Unpaid work in family business    | 11.1 (1)       | 50.0 (2)  | 0.0 (0)   |
| Unemployed, looking for a job     | 85.5 (47)      | 88.6 (31) | 88.2 (45) |
| Unemployed, not looking for a job | 60.0 (15)      | 92.9 (13) | 84.6 (11) |
| Family work                       | 15.7 (11)      | 44.8 (13) | 35.5 (11) |
| Full-time student                 | 23.5 (8)       | 24.2 (8)  | 35.7 (10) |
| Total                             | 18.0 (90)      | 19.4 (78) | 17.6 (88) |

Note: Percentages refer to share in the respective category and group; CG = control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany




It has already been suggested several times that the success of labour market integration depends on the level of education, and that having a higher qualification increases the probability of gaining a successful position on the labour market – measured by the monthly net salary. It follows from this that the probability of becoming a recipient of social benefits increases with a low level of education. In the group of interviewees with a Turkish background, almost one in five with an ISCED 2 qualification, but only 13.1 per cent with an ISCED 3 qualification, receive social benefits. This is similar in the group of second-generation Yugoslavs, with 27.7 per cent and 16.8 per cent, respectively. The differences are even greater in the control group, where 34.9 per cent of the respondents with ISCED level 2 and only 16.3 per cent of those with ISCED level 3 qualifications receive social benefits (figures not included in the table).

The TIES interviewees were also asked what kind of social benefits they received. With the exception of the relatively major differences with regard to unemployment benefit I, virtually no differences are discernible. However, almost one third of both the second-generation Yugoslavs and the control group did not specify the type of social benefits they receive, making it difficult to present compelling results in this case. What is certainly significant is that the number of unemployment benefit II recipients (around 60%) is roughly the same in all groups. Given the conditions of payment of unemployment benefit I, the high proportion of second-generation Turks receiving this benefit indicates the short duration of their unemployment, and this group's rapid entry into the benefits structure.

Of course the mere fact that a person is receiving social benefits does not offer conclusive evidence of their subjective feelings about their financial situation. The TIES respondents were therefore asked to describe their financial situation, considering all sources of income. They could choose between 'comfortable' or 'acceptable' living, 'getting by' or other levels of difficulty which, due to the low percentages involved, have been combined in figure 4.1. The difficulties refer to the ability to pay bills or to make purchases, etc. Roughly half of the respondents of all groups assess their financial situation as acceptable. Though there are no striking differences, there is still a slight gradation between the numbers in each group who describe their financial condition as 'comfortable' and those who describe it as 'difficult'. Here, the second-generation Turks are the least often 'comfortable' and suffer the most often from 'difficult' conditions, followed by the second-generation Yugoslavs and the non-migrant Germans. The figures reflect the situation previously mentioned in the context of salary brackets:

**Figure 4.1 Appraisal of current financial situation per sex and group**



TR-CG  $\chi^2 = 21.087$   $p = .000$   
 All other interrelations between the groups are not statistically significant.  
 Source: TIES Survey Germany

respondents of Turkish descent tend to earn less and therefore seem to cope slightly less well financially.

With regard to gender differences within the groups, it can be established that the female respondents generally assess their current situation more positively than the male respondents. This is evident in the proportion of respondents assessing their financial situation as ‘comfortable’, but also in the very different proportions of men and women appraising their financial situation as ‘difficult’. However, as determined above, the actual income situation is poorer for women than for men. The reason for this contradictory finding is presumably that total family incomes, which were not included in the questionnaire, encourage women to make more positive assessments.

**4.7 Current work status in Berlin and Frankfurt**

The cities of Berlin and Frankfurt are positioned very differently with regard to their labour market situations, and differ in particular in their labour force participation and unemployment rates. On the basis of the 2005 micro-census, Brenke (2008) calculates that people from a migrant

background have a labour force participation rate of 75.6 per cent in Berlin and 74.6 per cent in Frankfurt. Although these figures are very similar, the unemployment rates in the two cities show very different tendencies. In Berlin, 33.2 per cent of this group is unemployed, whereas less than half this number, i.e. only 14.2 per cent, are jobless in Frankfurt. This is also shown in the following section, in the figures on the main source of income. These differ considerably for the two cities, particularly with regard to their populations from a migrant background. In Berlin, gainful employment is the main source of income for 53.1 per cent of individuals from a migrant background; in Frankfurt, this is the case for more than two thirds of this group (69.7%). The population without a migrant background is more similar in the city comparison: in Berlin, gainful employment is the main source of income for 55.1 per cent, while the figure for Frankfurt is 60.2 per cent. Once again, the figures for residents from a migrant background drastically underline the general tendency in the two cities. Compared to Frankfurt (and other large cities in Germany), Berlin's chronically weak economic development means less gainful employment and higher unemployment. This hits the population without qualifications the hardest, and therefore particularly individuals from a migrant background. As a consequence, Berlin has more residents from migrant (and non-migrant) backgrounds who are dependent on transfer payments such as unemployment benefit I and II.

The type of work performed differs only marginally in Berlin and Frankfurt. In Berlin, 39.3 per cent of individuals from a migrant background perform basic work, whereas this is the case for 40.7 per cent in Frankfurt. Similar findings apply to jobs requiring qualifications (Berlin: 50.2%; Frankfurt: 48.4%). While these general figures reflect the labour market position for the whole population between 15 and 64 years of age (Brenke 2008), TIES focuses exclusively on 18- to 35-year-olds (table 4.8). When differentiating between current employment statuses, it is striking that, depending on the category, there are either major differences or none at all. For instance, the figures for second-generation Turkish respondents in employment are similar for both cities, while those for Yugoslavs show greater discrepancies, and the control group displays even greater inter-city differences. The opposite picture emerges for respondents currently in an apprenticeship. Within the group of second-generation Turks, these are more numerous in Berlin; in the other two groups, they make up a similar proportion of respondents in both cities.

**Table 4.8 Work status by group and city (in %)**

|                                    | 2nd generation |           |           |           | CG     |           |
|------------------------------------|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------|
|                                    | Turks          |           | Yugoslavs |           | Berlin | Frankfurt |
|                                    | Berlin         | Frankfurt | Berlin    | Frankfurt |        |           |
| One or more jobs                   | 53.1           | 54.2      | 60.7      | 65.2      | 61.7   | 70.4      |
| Self-employed/own business         | 1.6            | 2.0       | 1.5       | 3.9       | 3.2    | 4.0       |
| Working and studying               | 1.6            | 1.6       | 2.0       | 2.5       | 4.0    | 2.4       |
| Apprenticeship                     | 0.8            | 6.8       | 4.5       | 3.9       | 3.2    | 3.2       |
| Unemployed, looking for a job      | 14.2           | 8.8       | 7.5       | 9.3       | 12.5   | 6.8       |
| Civil/military service             | 0.4            | 0.0       | 0.5       | 0.5       | 0.8    | 0.4       |
| Total active                       | 71.7           | 73.4      | 76.7      | 85.3      | 85.4   | 87.2      |
| Unpaid family work                 | 0.0            | 3.6       | 1.5       | 0.0       | 0.0    | 0.4       |
| Unemployed, not looking for a job  | 6.7            | 3.6       | 3.0       | 3.9       | 1.6    | 3.2       |
| Looking after children/family/home | 13.8           | 13.3      | 11.4      | 3.4       | 4.8    | 5.6       |
| Sick or disabled                   | 0.4            | 0.0       | 1.5       | 0.0       | 0.4    | 0.0       |
| Full-time student                  | 7.5            | 6.0       | 6.0       | 7.4       | 7.7    | 3.6       |
| Total inactive                     | 28.4           | 26.5      | 23.4      | 14.7      | 14.5   | 12.8      |
| Total N                            | 254            | 249       | 201       | 204       | 248    | 250       |

Note: YU (Berlin vs. Frankfurt),  $X^2 = 5.063$ ,  $p = .024$ . All others are not statistically significant; CG = control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

A major difference can be observed in the unemployment rates of the economically active population. Overall, the unemployment rate is considerably higher in Berlin than in Frankfurt among the respondents with a Turkish background and control-group respondents. In Berlin, almost one in five second-generation Turks (19.8%), and 14.7 per cent of the control group are unemployed, while in Frankfurt the figure is 12.0 per cent for the Turkish group and 7.8 per cent for the control group. The unemployment rate for respondents with a Yugoslavian background is similar (around 10%) in both cities (the figures are not shown in the table).

Compared to the general data on the population of migrant origin in both cities, this means that the second-generation Turks and Yugoslavs are not much more economically active than the immigrant population as a whole, but less affected by unemployment. Here too, however, the disadvantage experienced by the population with a Turkish migration

background, compared with the respondents of Yugoslavian descent, is greater in Berlin than in Frankfurt. This is a tendency that Brenke (2008) has already identified for the Turkish population in Berlin.

In table 4.9, the respondents' occupational groups are aligned with the ISCO 88 classifications, according to the two cities under study. Several differences between the cities are discernible within each group. The group of Turkish origin, for example, has more 'technicians' and craftsmen in Frankfurt than Berlin. Other occupational categories, particularly those for which no vocational training is required, are represented more strongly in Berlin, for example plant and machine operators and employees in elementary occupations. In addition, more second-generation Turks work in the service sector in Berlin than in Frankfurt.

**Table 4.9 Occupational categories of respondents whose main category is work, by group and city (in %)**

|  | 2nd generation |      |      |           |      |      | CG    |      |      |
|--|----------------|------|------|-----------|------|------|-------|------|------|
|  | Turks          |      |      | Yugoslavs |      |      | Total | B    | F    |
|  | Total          | B    | F    | Total     | B    | F    |       |      |      |
| 1 Senior officials and managers            | 3.2            | 3.6  | 2.9  | 3.0       | 2.4  | 3.5  | 4.3   | 4.3  | 4.3  |
| 2 Professionals/ teachers                  | 3.2            | 3.6  | 2.9  | 7.1       | 4.0  | 9.9  | 16.6  | 19.1 | 14.4 |
| 3 Technicians and associate professionals  | 12.5           | 8.6  | 16.4 | 18.3      | 16.7 | 19.7 | 20.9  | 18.5 | 23.0 |
| 4 Clerks                                   | 9.6            | 10.7 | 8.6  | 15.3      | 12.7 | 17.6 | 16.0  | 13.6 | 18.2 |
| 5 Service and sales workers                | 30.0           | 32.1 | 27.9 | 26.1      | 32.5 | 20.4 | 20.3  | 24.7 | 16.6 |
| 6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers | 3.9            | 5.0  | 2.9  | 2.6       | 2.4  | 2.8  | 1.7   | 1.9  | 1.6  |
| 7 Craft and related trades workers         | 18.2           | 13.6 | 22.9 | 14.6      | 15.1 | 14.1 | 12.6  | 8.6  | 16.0 |
| 8 Plant and machine operators              | 6.4            | 7.9  | 5.0  | 2.2       | 2.4  | 2.1  | 1.1   | 0.0  | 2.1  |
| 9 Elementary occupations                   | 12.9           | 15.0 | 10.7 | 10.8      | 11.9 | 9.9  | 6.3   | 9.3  | 3.7  |
| Total N                                    | 280            | 140  | 140  | 268       | 126  | 142  | 349   | 162  | 187  |

Note: Cities are B = Berlin, F = Frankfurt; CG = control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Similar tendencies exist for the second-generation Yugoslavs: more individuals in this group can be assigned to the higher ISCO categories in Frankfurt than in Berlin. In particular, this group comprises more scientists/teachers and technicians, but fewer service and sales workers in Frankfurt.

A comparison between the two cities thus shows very heterogeneous levels of labour market integration (in terms of employment rate and unemployment) for the second-generation Turks. In Frankfurt, both the interviewees of Turkish origin and those in the control group manage to position themselves more successfully on the labour market; in Berlin, the respondents with a Yugoslavian background manage better. As measured by the ISCO classifications, then, second-generation respondents in Frankfurt are more successful than those in Berlin, managing to gain better occupations and to achieve better prospects on the labour market.

It becomes apparent from the comparison between the cities that the respondents in Berlin generally earn slightly less than the respondents in Frankfurt. Due to the highly unequal distribution of non-response rates among the second-generation Turks and in the control group, however, it is difficult to discern actual differences in income between the groups in the two cities.

#### 4.8 Working conditions

The information on working conditions refers to all of the respondents who were in employment or self-employed at the time of the TIES survey. Table 4.10 gives a brief overview of the type of company/organisation in which the respondents work: private company, public institution, non-governmental organisation or non-profit-making organisation. As is to be expected, employees in private firms and companies dominate the figures; only a small percentage work in a non-governmental or non-profit organisation. The proportion of respondents from all three groups who work in public institutions is relatively high. It ranges from 15.8 per cent in the group of interviewees with a Yugoslavian background to 20.6 per cent in the control group. Women in particular seem to find jobs in this labour market sector. Thirty per cent of all employed women of Turkish origin work in this type of organisation, 20 per cent of the female second-generation Yugoslavs, and 25 per cent of the women from the control group. In contrast, the male second-generation Turks are under-represented in this field compared to the other groups. The numbers of those working for private companies differ accordingly: since so many women work in public

institutions, they are less likely than men (in all groups) to be employed in private companies. In comparison, 90 per cent of all male employees with a Turkish migration background and 82 per cent of those in the control group work for private companies. Thus women appear to be more successful at entering the public sector than their male counterparts. One reason for this could be the female-dominated occupations (for example, care work) that are located here.

**Table 4.10** Kind of company in which respondents are employed, by sex and group (in %)

|                         | 2nd generation |      |      |           |      |      | CG    |      |      |
|-------------------------|----------------|------|------|-----------|------|------|-------|------|------|
|                         | Turks          |      |      | Yugoslavs |      |      | Total | M    | F    |
|                         | Total          | M    | F    | Total     | M    | F    |       |      |      |
| Private firm/business   | 81.7           | 90.0 | 70.2 | 81.9      | 87.5 | 76.6 | 78.8  | 81.9 | 75   |
| Public institution      | 17.6           | 9.4  | 29.2 | 15.8      | 11.8 | 19.5 | 20.6  | 17.0 | 24.4 |
| Non-profit organisation | 0.7            | 0.6  | 0.8  | 2.3       | 0.7  | 3.9  | 0.6   | 1.1  | 0.6  |
| Total N                 | 279            | 160  | 120  | 265       | 136  | 128  | 345   | 182  | 164  |

Note: CG = Control group; M = male, F = female

Source: TIES Survey Germany

An objective factor for measuring working conditions is whether the respondents have temporary or permanent employment contracts, and full-time or part-time jobs. The proportion of part-time employees is somewhat lower among second-generation migrants (7.6%) than the control group (9.5%). As is to be expected, the percentage of female part-time employees is higher than that of males; part-time employment tends to be a female domain, since it makes it easier to reconcile family life, the household and work. The result of this is that the average working hours among the female respondents are lower than those of the male respondents in all three groups.

The second-generation Turks generally have longer working hours than the other two groups. On average, the other two groups work roughly the same hours, namely just under 40 hours per week, while the second-generation Turks work approximately 1.5 hours longer. A high standard deviation in the group of second-generation Turks suggests that the range of working hours within the group is very wide, which explains the disparity between the groups. For instance, only 17.6 per cent of the control group


work for longer than 40 hours per week (between 41 and 70 altogether), as opposed to 27.5 per cent of the respondents of Turkish origin (between 41 and 80 hours altogether). The proportion of part-time employees in public organisations and private companies is roughly equal.

An important basic condition, in particular for the security, stability and consistency of employment, is the type of employment contract; in other words, whether employees have temporary or permanent contracts. The majority of the second-generation respondents have permanent contracts (over 80%) and are therefore in relatively crisis-proof and stable employment. On the other hand, the proportion of temporary employment contracts in the control group (24.4%) is well above that of the second-generation respondents (second-generation Turks: 13.8%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 12.7%). It can be assumed that this is connected to the type of employment, since highly qualified jobs are more often subject to temporary contracts than jobs with lower qualification requirements (e.g. labourer).

In the gender comparison, a very mixed picture emerges with regard to temporary work contracts. Among the second-generation Turks, the proportion of women in temporary employment is lower (9.1%) than that of men (17.4%). The opposite tendency can be identified among the second-generation Yugoslavs, where more women (17.4%) than men (8.5%) have temporary contracts. In the control group, both sexes are represented with roughly the same percentages.

The type of position often also gives an indication of the level of responsibility employees have in their jobs. The more responsibility they have, the more probable it is that they occupy a high position and earn a good salary (figure 4.2). Figure 4.2 shows that the Turkish second generation differs from the other two groups in this respect. Only 16.5 per cent of the respondents with a Turkish background are responsible for other employees or have to supervise their work. In contrast, significantly more respondents in the other groups bear such responsibility (second-generation Yugoslavs: 23.8%; control group: 27.5%). Among the respondents of Turkish descent, it is more often the women than the men who have positions of responsibility. This proportion is reversed in the other two groups, where fewer women than men say that they are responsible for other employees. The figures reflect the tendency already identified in relation to the types of position held: respondents with a Yugoslavian background and from the control group more often have higher-ranking jobs, and therefore by implication more responsibility for co-workers.



**Figure 4.2 Responsibility for co-workers in the context of the job per sex and group**

TR-CG  $X^2 = 8.112$   $p = .004$

All other interrelations are not statistically significant.

Source: TIES Survey Germany

#### 4.9 Career conditions and discrimination at work

To round off the information about their occupational biographies, the respondents were asked to self-assess their career biographies by stating whether their current position corresponds to their qualifications. This question touches upon the issue of being over-qualified for certain areas of work. The problem of migrants carrying out lower-skilled jobs than non-migrant Germans, despite having the same qualifications, is addressed in the literature. Seibert & Solga (2005), for example, observe that even if one controls for educational qualifications (schooling and, above all, vocational training), young Turkish migrants are disadvantaged when it comes to positioning themselves on the labour market. The reason the authors suggest for this is discrimination on the part of employers. Other researchers (such as Kalter 2006) assume instead that young Turkish migrants lack relevant resources when it comes to accessing higher-skilled jobs. These are resources relevant to the labour market, such as social networks (measured by the number of German friends they have among their best friends, see chapter 7 on social relations) and German language skills. The scholarly debate also addresses institutional discrimination by enterprises (Imdorf 2007).

The majority of the more highly qualified respondents (ISCED 3) of the TIES study are satisfied with their position on the labour market, and state that their working position corresponds to their qualifications. The less well-qualified respondents (ISCED 2), however, are not as satisfied. Particularly among the second-generation Yugoslavs and in the control group, almost one third of the respondents state that their labour market position is below their level of qualifications. The second-generation Turks are slightly more satisfied with the positions they hold (74% express satisfaction).

The results emphasise that those who have not completed a training qualification and only have a basic school-leaving certificate (*Hauptschule* or *Realschule*) are more likely to perceive themselves as being overqualified than those with a training qualification or a higher school-leaving certificate. This appears to be the case not only for the second-generation respondents, but also for the control group. No major differences are discernible between the under-24-year-olds and the over-25-year-olds, showing that the subjective perception of being overqualified is not an age-related problem, but one associated with education. The difficulties that adolescents with a Turkish migration background face in finding a suitable job, as mentioned above, mainly appear to affect those with low qualifications. Those with higher qualifications do not seem to have this particular problem.

Success in the work place is not only dependent on structural conditions (contract, working hours, etc.), work content and responsibilities. It is also affected by subjective feelings of being the target of ethnically, culturally, or socially motivated discrimination. In the TIES study, experiences of discrimination were investigated with reference to different situational contexts. As is to be expected, there are striking gender differences among the second-generation Turks. Fewer than a third of the male respondents with a Turkish background state that they have 'never' been affected by hostilities while looking for a job, whereas almost 12 per cent report that this has happened regularly. The women of Turkish origin, in contrast, are only half as likely to have had such experiences. Table 4.11 also shows that the second-generation Yugoslavs are less likely to perceive themselves as the targets of hostile treatment than the second-generation Turks. The two second-generation groups differ most significantly with regard to the category 'sometimes'. Overall, both second-generation groups claim to have experienced discrimination while looking for a job rather than at the workplace itself. Insofar as discrimination was experienced in the actual workplace, it tends to be the male respondents, again, who have

felt confronted with ethnically motivated hostilities. According to the respondents, such hostility was predominantly initiated by co-workers and colleagues. The second-generation Turks also increasingly reported experiencing discrimination from customers.

**Table 4.11 Experiences of discrimination in the workplace by sex and group (in %)**

|   | 2nd generation |        |       |           |        |       |
|---|----------------|--------|-------|-----------|--------|-------|
|   | Turks          |        |       | Yugoslavs |        |       |
|   | Male           | Female | Total | Male      | Female | Total |
| Hostility while looking for a job   |                |        |       |           |        |       |
| Never   | 30.5           | 43.1   | 35.7  | 50.4      | 60.6   | 55.3  |
| Sometimes   | 57.3           | 51.7   | 55.0  | 45.3      | 37.0   | 41.4  |
| Regularly   | 12.2           | 5.2    | 9.3   | 4.3       | 2.4    | 3.4   |
| Total N   | 164            | 116    | 280   | 139       | 127    | 266   |
| Hostility in the workplace  |                |        |       |           |        |       |
| Never   | 41.7           | 54.3   | 47.0  | 57.6      | 74.2   | 65.5  |
| Sometimes   | 42.8           | 40.5   | 47.6  | 38.9      | 23.4   | 31.4  |
| Regularly   | 5.5            | 5.2    | 5.4   | 3.6       | 2.3    | 2.6   |
| Total N   | 164            | 116    | 280   | 139       | 127    | 266   |
| Persons manifesting hostility in the workplace on the basis of ethnic origin* |                |        |       |           |        |       |
| Co-workers or colleagues  | 63.6           | 48.1   | 58.1  | 57.6      | 59.4   | 58.2  |
| Foreman or supervisors  | 30.5           | 14.8   | 24.8  | 25.4      | 31.3   | 27.5  |
| Manager or director   | 24.2           | 14.8   | 20.8  | 32.2      | 42.4   | 35.9  |
| Clients   | 54.7           | 66.7   | 59.1  | 27.1      | 48.5   | 34.8  |
| Other   | 10.5           | 22.6   | 14.9  | 15.3      | 18.2   | 16.3  |
| Total N   | 95             | 53     | 148   | 59        | 33     | 92    |

Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 because multiple responses were possible

Source: TIES Survey Germany

It does not come as a surprise that co-workers are identified as the main actors in conflicts perceived as involving discrimination. After all, everyday working life with colleagues is bound to provide more occasions for such conflicts than contact with superiors or chief executives, which probably occur less often. It is, however, conspicuous that the second-generation Turks are much less likely to name their superiors as the source of discrimination than the second-generation Yugoslavs – even though the higher-ranking jobs of the latter might in fact mean more frequent contact with chief executives (see chapter 7 on social relations for more detailed information).

#### 4.10 Conclusions

Linked with their poorer positioning in the education system, the respondents with a Turkish migration background were also found to have lower rates of labour force participation and higher unemployment rates than the other two groups. Compared to the other groups, the second-generation Turks are more often part of the inactive population, and are in many cases not looking for a job despite being unemployed. They have a higher rate of youth unemployment, longer time gaps between completing education and first-time employment, and lower incomes. Almost one third of the women of Turkish origin – predominantly with low qualifications – occupy themselves with unpaid activities that can broadly be described as family work.

In sum, it can be established that most of the respondents who are not part of the active labour force possess only low educational qualifications and therefore have few options on the labour market. Furthermore, the unemployment rate correlates with educational status: the lower the educational level, the higher the rate. Conversely, higher qualifications mean higher incomes and better positions on the labour market according to the ISCO categories. However, even a mid-level educational qualification enables respondents to position themselves quite successfully on the labour market. This is in line with the statements on rates of apprenticeship made in the previous chapter. Here, the differences between the second-generation respondents and the control group are only marginal.



# 5 Segregation and housing

## 5.1 Introduction

Residential segregation describes the degree of urban social dissimilarity as it is reproduced in the physical city space. This is based on the assumption that residential dissimilarity is not random, but the result of the allocation of social groups to specific segments of the housing market along the lines of social disparities (Dangschat 1998). The main factors influencing a population's distribution within a city's space are income (often dependent on educational levels, as discussed in the previous chapters) and the actual differentiation of the housing market. This is particularly evident in the proportion of social housing projects in different areas, leading to an unequal spatial distribution of accommodation options. Since migrant groups in Germany often have lower levels of education and income than the majority population (see also the preceding chapters), they are disproportionately represented in underprivileged neighbourhoods. Affiliations with people from the same country of origin can also become important as a factor shaping segregation. This occurs when a neighbourhood's concentration of one group of the same national origin grows dense enough to facilitate considerable 'ethnic entrepreneurship' and organisation-building. As a result, residents' day-to-day interactions are largely limited to members of their own group of origin, thus restricting social mobility and increasing the likelihood that social inequality will be reproduced (Friedrichs & Triemer 2009). However, this does not apply to German cities to the same extent as it does to other parts of Europe or North America. In Germany, even neighbourhoods with high ratios of migrants display a 'multinational'<sup>1</sup> composition, and it is rare for a single group to constitute more than half of the population of an urban district (Häußermann & Kapphahn 2008). In terms of segregation indices, then, most of Germany's big cities remain on a low to moderate level regarding both social and ethnic segregation. In cities with greater dissimilarities, ethnic segregation indices systematically exceed those of social segregation, and in cities with lower dissimilarity indices the opposite applies (Friedrichs & Triemer 2009). Table 5.1 displays Germany's three most and three least segregated big cities.

<sup>1</sup> Referring to the residents' own country of origin, that of their parents, or even that of their grandparents.

**Table 5.1** Indices of segregation: Germany's most and least segregated big cities, 2005

|           | Most segregated |         |        | Least segregated |           |         |
|-----------|-----------------|---------|--------|------------------|-----------|---------|
|           | Dortmund        | Dresden | Berlin | Frankfurt        | Stuttgart | Munich  |
| IS ethnic | 30.6**          | 30.3    | 30.2   | 11.7             | 11.2**    | 8.3**   |
| IS social | 26.8**          | 26.6*   | 19.2*  | 16.2             | 12.0**    | 12.5*** |

Note: \* In 2000; \*\* at municipality level

Source: Friedrichs & Triemer (2009)

Communal policies aiming at the integration and de-ghettoisation of 'ethnic' minorities are a relatively new phenomenon in Germany. For many years, after all, no one envisaged that 'guest workers' would become permanent residents (Häußermann & Kapphan 2008). By implication, this also means that the settlement of immigrants in German cities went on uncontrolled by local politics and thus mainly depended (and still depends) on the pricing and social structures of the relevant housing markets. Thus the quality of housing with regard to space, facilities and neighbourhood is mainly determined by household income (Häußermann & Siebel 2001).

This chapter examines the characteristics of spatial segregation and the housing conditions of the second generation of Turkish and Yugoslavian migrants in Berlin and Frankfurt, based on the TIES survey data. Since the two cities display different aspects of the issue, they are first presented separately and then compared at the end of the chapter.

## 5.2 Second-generation Turks and Yugoslavs in Berlin

Berlin is one of the few big German cities where the foreign population is still increasing, especially in districts which already have high ratios of foreigners (Friedrichs & Triemer 2009). At the same time, in terms of the dissimilarity index, the city ranks among the three most segregated cities in Germany (see table 5.1). It is divided into twelve districts (*Bezirke*) with 95 sub-districts (*Ortsteile*) in total. In three of the twelve city districts, the percentage of residents without German citizenship exceeds 20 per cent: Berlin-Mitte (28.8%), Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (23.2%) and Berlin-Neukölln (22.5%). Since there are no consistent data available on the distribution of foreign residents in Berlin's sub-districts, an overview of the city districts can only give a general orientation (table 5.2). The fact

that not all immigrants from the former Yugoslavia are recorded in official statistics makes this all the more imprecise.

**Table 5.2 Berlin: Distribution of residents without German citizenship in city districts**

|             | <b>City district<br/>(Bezirk)</b> | <b>Total<br/>residents</b> | <b>Residents<br/>without<br/>German<br/>citizenship</b> | <b>Turks</b>                 | <b>Serbs &amp;<br/>stateless<br/>ex-Yugoslavs</b> |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|---|------------------------------|---|
| West Berlin | Mitte                             | 329,078                    | 28.8%   | Total: 8.6%<br>Share*: 30.7% | Total: 1.4%<br>Share*: 4.9%                       |
|             | Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg          | 268,323                    | 23.2%   | Total: 8.3%<br>Share*: 36.5% | Total: 0.7%<br>Share*: 3.1%                       |
|             | Neukölln                          | 307,395                    | 22.5%   | Total: 8.3%<br>Share*: 37.1% | Total: 1.8%<br>Share*: 8.4%                       |
|             | Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf        | 317,190                    | 18.4%   | Total: 2.3%<br>Share*: 12.4% | Total: 0.8%<br>Share*: 4.3%                       |
|             | Tempelhof-Schöneberg              | 331,764                    | 15.5%   | Total: 4.0%<br>Share*: 26.1% | Total: 0.8%<br>Share*: 5.5%                       |
|             | Steglitz-Zehlendorf               | 290,506                    | 10.3%   | Total: 1.2%<br>Share*: 11.4% | Total: 0.4%<br>Share*: 3.6%                       |
|             | Spandau                           | 223,862                    | 10.2%   | Total: 3.1%<br>Share*: 30.8% | Total: 0.6%<br>Share*: 5.9%                       |
|             | Reinickendorf                     | 241,746                    | 9.5%  | Total: 2.8%<br>Share*: 29.1% | Total: 0.5%<br>Share*: 6.1%                       |
|             | Lichtenberg                       | 258,473                    | 7.7%  | Total: 0.2%<br>Share*: 2.9%  | Total: 0.5%<br>Share*: 6.7%                       |
|             | Pankow                            | 365,019                    | 6.8%  | Total: 0.2%<br>Share*: 3.5%  | Total: 0.1%<br>Share*: 1.9%                       |
| East Berlin | Marzahn-Hellersdorf               | 249,140                    | 3.5%  | Total: 0.1%<br>Share*: 4.2%  | Total: 0.1%<br>Share*: 5.0%                       |
|             | Treptow-Köpenick                  | 238,290                    | 3.3%  | Total: 0.3%<br>Share*: 9.2%  | Total: 0.2%<br>Share*: 6.0%                       |

Note: \* Share of the population without German citizenship

Source: Statistischer Bericht A I 6 – Halbjahr 2/07: Melderechtlich registrierte Ausländer im Land Berlin am 31. Dezember 2007, Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg (2007); own calculations

In all West Berlin city districts, the percentage of residents without German citizenship exceeds the German national average of 8.9 per cent. Figures in East Berlin, on the other hand, are well below the national average throughout. This, of course, is due to the city's history of division and the different immigration policies in West and East Germany before reunification. The lasting effect of the structures thus created is obvious, and the distribution



of Turks in particular shows a fairly unaltered residential pattern almost twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Turks are known to be Berlin's largest immigrant group, making up 26.8 per cent of the total foreign population of West Berlin and 5 per cent of the foreign population of East Berlin. By contrast, Serbs and stateless persons from the former Yugoslavia display relatively similar group sizes on both sides of the city, constituting 5.2 per cent of the foreign population in West Berlin and 4.9 per cent in East Berlin.

Regarding social segregation, the sub-districts with the highest ratio of persons with a net income below the poverty line are all located in the Western part of the city, in districts with a high percentage of non-citizens: Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain (Kreuzberg), Mitte (Wedding, Tiergarten), Neukölln (Neukölln), and Tempelhof-Schöneberg (Schöneberg). The development of the dissimilarity indices (table 5.3) shows that from 1991 to 2005, ethnic segregation tended to decrease, whereas social segregation was fairly stable.


**Table 5.3 Berlin: Development of the indices of segregation, 1991-2005**

|           | 1991 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|
| IS ethnic | 33.5 | 26.3 | 28.2 | 30.2 |
| IS social | 19.7 | 19.9 | 19.2 | —    |

Source: Friedrichs & Triemer (2009)

In a sense the TIES questionnaire implied the existence of 'social segregation' by inquiring about neighbourhoods along the lines of 'working-class', 'middle-class', and 'upper-class'. And yet at first glance such divisions do not seem to be reflected in Berlin's generally low dissimilarity index. On the one hand, this means that the respondents' rating of their neighbourhoods (figure 5.1) can be understood as an appraisal of the actual living conditions. Neighbourhoods identified as 'working-class', for example, are much more often associated with rubbish, vandalism, and crime (see below). On the other hand, the neighbourhood rating might also shed light on the respondents' current positions within the social class system, as it is felt to be represented by residential patterns. Since very few of the respondents were unable to answer the question, it can be assumed that the evaluation of neighbourhoods is also influenced by well-established common perceptions of the respective sub-districts.

**Figure 5.1 Berlin: Rating of neighbourhoods per group**



Source: TIES Survey Germany

Figure 5.1 shows that whereas more than half of the second-generation Turks identify the neighbourhoods they live in as working-class, the majority of both second-generation Yugoslavs and the control group situate themselves in middle-class neighbourhoods. The number of persons living in an upper-class environment is generally low (3.5% in total), with no interviewees of Turkish origin characterising their neighbourhoods as upper-class. Moreover, there appears to be a systematic social gradation between the three groups, with the second-generation Turks being located at the lower end of the socio-residential hierarchy, the respondents of Yugoslavian descent in the middle and the Germans from non-migrant backgrounds at the upper end.

When aligning the neighbourhood ratings with monthly net income, one has to bear in mind that almost half of the respondents refused to answer the question about their financial situation. Validity is also limited by the fact that roughly one fifth of the interviewees were still at school, at university or in vocational training at the time of the survey, and still lived in their parental homes (see below). Thus their potentially low monthly income does not necessarily determine their housing situation. Factoring in these limitations, table 5.4 shows, for the respondents of Yugoslavian descent, a general tendency towards socio-residential advancement with increasing

income. This does not hold true for the second-generation Turks, for whom the figures are rather inconclusive, suggesting that here, income is not the main determinant of individuals' positioning in the socio-residential hierarchy. Other possible factors might be individual preferences or structurally limited access to better housing. We should recall here that the relative majorities of all three groups surveyed have a net income between €1,000 and €1,499 (second-generation Turks: 53.5%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 38.5%; control group: 48.1%). In this income category, more than two thirds of the respondents of Turkish descent see themselves as living in working-class neighbourhoods. In the same income bracket, only about one third of the second-generation Yugoslavs and one in five respondents from the control group classify their neighbourhoods in this way. On the other hand, of those persons who refused to divulge their finances, the majority rate their neighbourhood as middle-class (second-generation Turks: 65.6%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 66.7%; control group: 57.7%; not shown in the table).

**Table 5.4 Berlin: Monthly net income and socio-residential hierarchy by group (in %)**

|                | Net income<br>(in €) | Rating of neighbourhood |                  |                 |               | Total N |    |
|----------------|----------------------|-------------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------|----|
|                |                      | Working-<br>class       | Middle-<br>class | Upper-<br>class | Don't<br>know |         |    |
| 2nd generation | Turks                | < 550                   | 42.9             | 57.1            | 0.0           | 0.0     | 7  |
|                |                      | 550 – 999               | 55.0             | 40.0            | 0.0           | 5.0     | 20 |
|                |                      | 1000 – 1499             | 70.5             | 26.2            | 0.0           | 3.3     | 61 |
|                |                      | 1500 – 1999             | 52.4             | 47.6            | 0.0           | 0.0     | 21 |
|                |                      | 2000 – 2499             | 0.0              | 100.0           | 0.0           | 0.0     | 2  |
|                |                      | > 2500                  | 100.0            | 0.0             | 0.0           | 0.0     | 3  |
|                | Yugoslavs            | < 550                   | 20.0             | 60.0            | 20.0          | 0.0     | 5  |
|                |                      | 550 – 999               | 21.7             | 56.5            | 4.3           | 17.8    | 23 |
|                |                      | 1000 – 1499             | 32.5             | 45.0            | 10.0          | 12.5    | 40 |
|                |                      | 1500 – 1999             | 19.2             | 76.9            | 0.0           | 3.8     | 26 |
|                |                      | 2000 – 2499             | 77.8             | 22.2            | 0.0           | 0.0     | 9  |
|                |                      | > 2500                  | 100.0            | 0.0             | 0.0           | 0.0     | 1  |
| CG             | < 550                | 12.5                    | 75.0             | 0.0             | 12.5          | 8       |    |
|                | 550 – 999            | 23.1                    | 69.2             | 0.0             | 7.7           | 13      |    |
|                | 1000 – 1499          | 18.4                    | 67.1             | 10.5            | 3.9           | 76      |    |
|                | 1500 – 1999          | 24.4                    | 53.7             | 17.1            | 4.9           | 41      |    |
|                | 2000 – 2499          | 45.5                    | 54.4             | 0.0             | 0.0           | 11      |    |
|                | > 2500               | 11.1                    | 66.7             | 11.1            | 11.1          | 11      |    |

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Considering the absolute size of the individual groups in Berlin, it is not surprising that only a minority (9.5%) of the non-migrant control group claim to live in neighbourhoods where they do not outnumber all migrant groups. This makes non-migrant Germans the respondent group most segregated with regard to national origin (table 5.5). In contrast, 46.2 per cent of the second-generation Turks and 75.6 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs say that they live in neighbourhoods where 50 per cent of the residents or fewer are of their own national origin.<sup>2</sup> As mentioned before, however, this does not mean that the rest of their neighbours are non-migrant Germans. The figures therefore give no conclusive evidence about ethnic segregation in terms of the ratio of 'non-Germans' to 'Germans'. The relative majorities of both the second-generation Turks and the control group (both 34%) claim to reside in neighbourhoods with 'roughly 50 per cent of [their] own national origin'. Of course, it has to be kept in mind here that such estimations are based on the individual impressions of the respondents. Thus the perceived origin-related<sup>3</sup> composition of the neighbourhood might not reflect the actual size of the different national groups. This might also explain why 9.4 per cent of all respondents did not feel able to describe the origin-related composition of their neighbourhoods at all. This also points to a certain unfamiliarity with the issue, either because respondents have only minor contact with members of their own group on a neighbourhood basis, or because they lack knowledge about their sub-district. Of course, respondents might also reject the general idea of 'ethnic' rating.

When comparing the neighbourhood ratings with the statements on origin-related composition (table 5.5), the focus is on working-class and middle-class neighbourhoods. This is because only 1.4 per cent of all the second-generation respondents in Berlin claim to live in upper-class neighbourhoods, which are uniformly classified by their inhabitants as homogeneously 'German'. As mentioned above, the degree of own-group concentration identified by the second-generation respondents in their working-class and middle-class neighbourhoods does not indicate the ratio of 'foreigners' to 'native Germans'. Second-generation Turks (see table 5.5) are three times more likely to estimate a high concentration of their own group (50% and more) in working-class subdistricts than in middle-class ones, while second-generation Yugoslavs are four times more likely to do so. In total, 74 per cent of the respondents with a Turkish background and 19.7

2 In the TIES questionnaire, items in this category refer to the 'country of origin'.

3 Note here that the 'country of origin' obviously is not equivalent to 'ethnic origin'.

**Table 5.5 Berlin: Appraisal of the origin-related composition of working-class and middle-class neighbourhoods by group (in %)**

| Appraisal of neighbourhood's origin-related composition |  | 2nd generation |           | CG   | Total |
|---|--|----------------|-----------|------|-------|
|   |  | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |       |
| Working-class neighbourhood                             | Almost everyone of own national origin | 7.9            | 2.8       | 3.0  | 5.4   |
|   | Roughly 75% of own national origin     | 16.5           | 1.4       | 14.9 | 12.3  |
|   | Roughly 50% of own national origin     | 49.6           | 15.5      | 37.3 | 37.9  |
|   | Roughly 25% of own national origin     | 20.1           | 46.5      | 23.9 | 27.8  |
|   | Almost nobody of own national origin   | 1.4            | 22.5      | 1.5  | 6.9   |
|   | Don't know                             | 4.3            | 11.3      | 19.4 | 9.7   |
|   | Total N                                | 139            | 71        | 67   | 277   |
| Middle-class neighbourhood                              | Almost everyone of own national origin | 2.0            | 0.0       | 12.1 | 5.7   |
|   | Roughly 75% of own national origin     | 0.0            | 0.0       | 35.0 | 14.9  |
|   | Roughly 50% of own national origin     | 21.2           | 4.4       | 41.4 | 24.7  |
|   | Roughly 25% of own national origin     | 55.6           | 45.1      | 3.2  | 30.1  |
|   | Almost nobody of own national origin   | 10.1           | 38.1      | 0.0  | 14.4  |
|   | Don't know                             | 11.1           | 12.4      | 8.3  | 10.3  |
|   | Total N                                | 99             | 112       | 151  | 362   |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

per cent of those with a Yugoslavian background report a high proportion of their own group in working-class neighbourhoods. In middle-class areas, this applies to only 23.2 per cent of the second-generation Turks and 7.1 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs. For the second generation, socio-residential advancement thus seems to be systematically associated with ethnic desegregation. As is to be expected, the opposite holds true for the control group (52.2% of the working-class neighbourhoods, but 86.8% of the middle-class neighbourhoods are assessed as homogeneous in terms of the inhabitants' country of origin). Thus it can be assumed that non-migrant Germans constitute the majority of the population of middle-class areas. In general, the rather small absolute group size of the Yugoslavians in Berlin might technically impede pronounced ethnic segregation. Nonetheless, this does not change the fact that this group shows the lowest tendency to live in areas with a high own-group population density.

As already pointed out, a considerable share of the respondents – roughly 10 per cent in total – were not able to make statements on the origin-related composition of their neighbourhoods at all. Here it is striking that almost one out of five interviewees from the control group (19.4%) who describe their neighbourhood as ‘working-class’ did not answer the question. In comparison, 4.3 per cent of the second-generation Turks and 11.3 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs who see themselves as living in working-class areas did not answer. It can only be speculated here that working-class neighbourhoods with greater origin-related heterogeneity might cause Germans from a non-migrant background more uncertainty regarding categorisations based on national origin. Significantly, there are no differences in responsiveness between the groups when it comes to middle-class areas.

In the context of the social and origin-related classifications of neighbourhoods, tables 5.6 and 5.7 deal with respondents’ individual well-being in their areas in Berlin. Obviously, these data only allows tentative generalisations due to the very uneven numbers of respondents in some of the categories. Nonetheless, it appears to hold true for all three groups that their general sense of well-being is greater in middle-class environments than in working-class neighbourhoods. Looking at the second-generation Turks, a universal trend seems to emerge. In working-class neighbourhoods, this group’s sense of well-being diminishes slightly as the perceived concentration of their own group decreases. In middle-class neighbourhoods, however, the degree of well-being tends to rise as this perceived concentration falls. As far as working-class neighbourhoods are concerned, the same applies to the control group, albeit with a much sharper downward gradient. In middle-class areas, on the other hand, only pronounced under-representation seems to affect this group’s sense of well-being. One explanation might be that for many migrants, a smaller share of neighbours of their own national origin generally means a higher level in the socio-residential hierarchy. For migrants, then, a lower density of inhabitants from a similar background may be associated with social advancement, while the opposite applies for non-migrant Germans. As for the second-generation Yugoslavs, who are more scattered than the other groups, the figures are not especially conclusive. As most of them live in neighbourhoods where they feel they are in a minority, the density of the population with a similar migration background might not be a significant variable for their sense of well-being.

**Table 5.6 Berlin: Appraisal of neighbourhood's origin-related composition and sense of well-being, in working-class neighbourhoods by group (in %)**

| Appraisal of neighbourhood's origin-related composition | 2nd generation and CG | Sense of well-being in working-class neighbourhood |         |                      |         |
|---|-----------------------|--|---------|----------------------|---------|
|   |                       | Quite comfortable                                  | Neutral | Rather uncomfortable | Total N |
| 75% or more of own national origin                      | Turks                 | 73.4   | 26.7    | 0.0                  | 34      |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 16.7   | 66.7    | 16.7                 | 4       |
|   | CG                    | 88.9   | 11.1    | 0.0                  | 11      |
| Roughly 50% of own national origin                      | Turks                 | 68.1   | 18.8    | 13.0                 | 69      |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 66.6   | 0.0     | 33.4                 | 12      |
|   | CG                    | 50.0   | 33.3    | 16.7                 | 24      |
| 25% or less of own national origin                      | Turks                 | 60.8   | 37.5    | 1.8                  | 30      |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 61.3   | 27.8    | 11.0                 | 47      |
|   | CG                    | 20.6   | 14.7    | 64.7                 | 18      |
| Don't know  | Turks                 | 83.4   | 16.7    | 0.0                  | 6       |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 33.3   | 44.4    | 22.2                 | 9       |
|   | CG                    | 21.4   | 21.4    | 57.1                 | 14      |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Respondents were also asked about what type of environment they would prefer to live in, in terms of the national origins of the population. Regardless of the connection between the origin-related composition of neighbourhoods and the socio-residential hierarchy, many Berlin respondents stated a preference for a similar environment to their present one. However, a relative majority of the second-generation migrants reported that they did 'not care' about origin-related compositions or that they did 'not know' which kind of origin-related structure they preferred (second-generation Turks: 49%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 63.3%). In contrast, 59.2 per cent of the non-migrant control group would prefer to live in neighbourhoods where they are in the majority.

**Table 5.7 Berlin: Appraisal of neighbourhood’s origin-related composition and sense of well-being, in middle-class neighbourhoods by group (in %)**

| Appraisal of neighbourhood’s origin-related composition | 2nd generation and CG | Sense of well-being in middle-class neighbourhood |         |                       | Total N |
|---|-----------------------|---|---------|-----------------------|---------|
|   |                       | Quite comfortable                                 | Neutral | Rather un-comfortable |         |
| 75% or more of own national origin                      | Turks                 | 0.0   | 0.0     | 100.0                 | 2       |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 0.0   | 0.0     | 0.0                   | 0       |
|   | CG                    | 72.7  | 25.1    | 2.3                   | 73      |
| Roughly 50% of own national origin                      | Turks                 | 81.8  | 13.6    | 4.5                   | 22      |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 100.0   | 0.0     | 0.0                   | 8       |
|   | CG                    | 74.5  | 20.3    | 5.1                   | 65      |
| 25% or less of own national origin                      | Turks                 | 93.8  | 6.3     | 0.0                   | 66      |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 91.0  | 6.1     | 2.9                   | 90      |
|   | CG                    | 33.4  | 50.0    | 16.7                  | 6       |
| Don’t know  | Turks                 | 54.6  | 27.3    | 18.2                  | 11      |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 100.0   | 0.0     | 0.0                   | 14      |
|   | CG                    | 53.4  | 33.3    | 13.3                  | 15      |

Note: CG = Control group  
 Source: TIES Survey Germany

The individual feeling of well-being in a certain neighbourhood depends on many factors, some of which are also indicators of the general quality of life. As is to be expected, when asked about basic issues like pollution, vandalism, and crime, respondents from working-class neighbourhoods identified these as significantly more acute problems than residents of middle-class and upper-class environments. Yet the loading of the individual factors is somewhat different among the second-generation migrants and the members of the control group. While the latter most often name crime as a severe problem in working-class neighbourhoods, the second-generation Turks and Yugoslavs are more concerned with vandalism and rubbish. Given that the proportion of residents with non-German roots is greater in under-privileged areas than in other neighbourhoods, one possible interpretation



of these figures is that people from a migrant background feel more secure in these surroundings. They might therefore feel less threatened by crime, leaving them more time to worry about other things. Interestingly, when correlating the factors 'crime', 'vandalism', and 'pollution' with the perceived origin-related composition of the neighbourhoods, we find that all three groups consistently view these problems as being more severe in areas where non-migrant Germans do not constitute the majority.

It can also be established in this context that the individual well-being of Berlin respondents in their neighbourhoods is not connected to the available housing space. In the context of the Berlin rent index of €5.58 (per square metre per month) at the time of the survey,<sup>4</sup> and the negative net migration, the TIES data show that the number of available rooms is adequate for the number of household members for all three groups surveyed. The number of rooms increases regularly and proportionally with the number of household members. At the time of the survey, the majority of the respondents had lived in their current residence for less than ten years, and one third for less than five years. This sort of fluctuation is fairly typical considering the geographic and social mobility of the age group. When looking at respondents' individual housing situations in Berlin, it is important to keep in mind that the definition of the 'second generation' refers to a specific age group in this survey. At the time of the TIES survey, almost half of the individuals surveyed were twenty-seven or younger, roughly one fifth still lived with their parents, and one third did not (yet) have an income of their own. Many others were still at the beginning of their professional careers and starting families. This means that in the majority of cases, the data on household composition (table 5.8) reflect temporary stages rather than final states. This applies, for example, to those respondents who can be expected to leave their parental home eventually after completing their education.

In Berlin as a whole, roughly half of all households contain only one person.<sup>5</sup> In table 5.8 this is reflected by the control group, but not by the second-generation respondents, who are much less likely to live in single households. At the same time, the proportion of second-generation Turks in our sample who live in one-person households significantly exceeds the 16.7 per cent determined for all Turkish migrants in the German micro-census (Friedrichs 2008). The effects that have to be considered here are

4 Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin: Mietspiegel 2007: [www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.wohnen/mietspiegel/](http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de.wohnen/mietspiegel/).

5 Statistisches Jahrbuch Berlin 2007, Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg.

**Table 5.8 Berlin: Household composition by group (in %)**

| Household composition            | 2nd generation |           | CG   | Total |
|----------------------------------|----------------|-----------|------|-------|
|                                  | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |       |
| One-person household             | 24.9           | 27.7      | 46.8 | 33.5  |
| Couple                           | 10.7           | 18.3      | 25.6 | 18.2  |
| Couple with 1-2 children         | 27.7           | 30.2      | 6.0  | 20.7  |
| Couple with more than 2 children | 2.4            | 2.0       | 0.4  | 1.6   |
| Single in parental household     | 24.1           | 17.8      | 13.2 | 18.6  |
| Others                           | 10.2           | 4.0       | 8.0  | 7.7   |
| Total N                          | 252            | 202       | 250  | 704   |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

probably the generational impact (second generation as opposed to all Turkish migrants), but perhaps also the metropolitan factor (city residents of the age group as opposed to all residents). After all, the survey also found a higher number of non-migrant Germans in single households in Berlin than the national average of 32 per cent of all households.<sup>6</sup> The gender factor appears to be consequential only for the second-generation Turks: among this group, roughly two thirds of the single households are made up by male residents. In the other two groups, the gender proportions of single households are fairly balanced (not shown in the table).

Of the three respondent groups, interviewees from the control group most often live as couples without children (25.6%), 67.7 per cent of whom are unmarried. In contrast, only 10.7 per cent of the respondents with a Turkish background live as couples without children, and only 21.5 per cent of these are not married. The second-generation Yugoslavs constitute the mid-field: 18.3 per cent live as couples without children, and 52.8 per cent of these are unmarried. Thus constellations where interviewees live with a partner, without children, and without a marriage certificate are somewhat rarer among respondents from a migrant background. Such differences might be due to more conservative family structures and attitudes on the part of the migrants, particularly those from a Turkish background. In comparison to the control group, the marriages of the parents of the second generation are more stable. The divorce rate is 4 per cent for the first-generation Turks, 3.2 per cent for the first-generation Yugoslavs, but 17.3 per cent for the parents of the respondents in the non-migrant control

6 Statistisches Jahrbuch 2008 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, DeStatis.

group. On the other hand, families with more than two children are very rare among all three respondent groups. Again this might be due to the relatively young age of the individuals surveyed, but it might also hint at a tendency towards smaller families in general. (This question will be addressed in more detail in chapter 8 on family formation and partner relationships.) Multigenerational households, in which the interviewees live with their parents, their spouses, and, as the case may be, their children, are very uncommon among all the groups surveyed. No such households exist among the second-generation Yugoslavs or in the control group, and fewer than 2 per cent of the respondents of Turkish descent live under such conditions.

The vast majority of the interviewees in Berlin reside in 'multi-family houses' (blocks of flats), regardless of the socio-residential hierarchy. This is mainly due to the city's housing market, where neighbourhoods with predominantly detached or terraced houses are mostly limited to suburban or upper-class areas. These multi-family houses are often classic two- to six-floor buildings; only 15.5 per cent of the individuals surveyed live in modern tower blocks. Multi-family housing becomes slightly less common as one moves up the socio-residential hierarchy. It is only in upper-class neighbourhoods, however, that detached housing really becomes an option (for the very few respondents, 28 in total, who live in such neighbourhoods). Roughly 91 per cent of the detached houses occupied by the respondents in Berlin are owned by themselves or by their parents or in-laws; all other types of residences are mostly rented. Given the age group surveyed, the share of home-owners (14.3%) is quite considerable, but the second-generation migrants do not attain the same ownership rates as the control group. Most of the individuals surveyed are tenants (second-generation Turks: 75.9%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 76.7%; control group: 68%), and the vast majority rent their residences from private owners. Even 47.4 per cent of the flats in multi-family houses are privately let. Only a relatively small proportion of respondents live in rent-controlled social housing projects (18.4% in total). This might be related to the fact that in Germany, blocks of flats owned by the municipality usually require a *Wohnberechtigungsschein*, a certificate of entitlement based on low income, which is only granted under certain conditions. Moreover, social housing projects in Berlin are steadily decreasing in number (Friedrichs & Triemer 2009), so tenants are increasingly dependent on the private housing market. If we look at the proportion of respondents living in social housing as a possible indicator of segregation, we find that the second-generation Turks live in housing projects slightly more often than the other two groups. The difference is

not significant enough, however, to indicate social segregation along the lines of origin-based groups.

Finally, the assessments of the standard of living in Berlin yield the most unfavourable ratings for working-class neighbourhoods. Roughly 39 per cent of the residents surveyed have experienced a decline in their quality of life in recent years, and 36.4 per cent expect further deterioration in the future. In middle-class areas, 16.8 per cent state that their quality of life has deteriorated in recent years, and 17.1 per cent predict further deterioration.

### 5.3 Second-generation Turks and Yugoslavs in Frankfurt

Frankfurt is one of the many German cities with a declining foreign population. Dissimilarity indices are low, right at the bottom end of the German city ranking of ethnic and social residential segregation (Friedrichs & Triemer 2009). The city displays a relatively balanced distribution of non-Germans. In 32 of the 47 city districts (*Stadtteile*), the percentage of persons without German citizenship exceeds 20 per cent. In eight of these 32 (see table 5.9), more than 30 per cent of the residents are not German citizens (Statistisches Jahrbuch Frankfurt am Main 2007).<sup>7</sup>

More than half of Frankfurt's city districts are affected by high rates of unemployment and welfare use. Of these, only two have a percentage of non-citizens under 20 per cent. Of the eight city districts with the highest percentage of non-citizens displayed in table 5.9, six (all but *Altstadt* and *Innenstadt*) have been labelled as deprived areas in the city's social report.<sup>8</sup> The development of the dissimilarity indices (table 5.10) shows that from 1991 to 2005, ethnic segregation tended to decrease, whereas social segregation seems to have risen slightly since 1995. For the TIES respondents in Frankfurt, social segregation tendencies can initially be approached via their own appraisals of their neighbourhoods. While the majority of the second-generation Yugoslavs and the control group claim to live in middle-class areas, the second-generation Turks describe their neighbourhoods as 'working-class' slightly more often than 'middle class' (Figure 5.2). The socio-residential hierarchy ranges from the respondents of Turkish descent at the bottom to the second-generation Yugoslavs in the middle and the non-migrant Germans at the upper end of the scale. However, it is striking

7 [www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=3877&\\_ffmpar\[\\_id\\_eltern\]=2811#a1911411](http://www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=3877&_ffmpar[_id_eltern]=2811#a1911411).

8 Frankfurter Sozialbericht 2002, Teil V: Segregation und Wohngebiete mit verdichteten sozialen Problemlagen, Dezernat für Soziales und Jugend der Stadt Frankfurt.

that 15.1 per cent of the respondents with a Yugoslavian background were not able to answer this question, in contrast to 7.6 per cent of the control group and only 4.4 per cent of the second-generation Turks. One reason for this might be that individuals of Turkish origin more often live in districts that are socially labelled to a greater degree, so classification is less difficult. A very small proportion of the second-generation migrants state that they live in upper-class areas (1.5% on average), whereas more than five times as many non-migrant Germans identify their neighbourhoods as upper-class.

**Table 5.9** Distribution of residents without German citizenship to selected districts in Frankfurt

| District<br>(Stadtteil) | Total residents | Residents without German citizenship | Turks                        | Yugoslavs/<br>SSYU           |
|-------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Gallus                  | 25,810          | 41.4%                                | Total: 8.8%<br>Share*: 21.3% | Total: 9.2%<br>Share*: 21.4% |
| Bahnhofsviertel         | 1,952           | 40.4%                                | Total: 8.5%<br>Share*: 13.4% | Total: 5.7%<br>Share*: 8.7%  |
| Innenstadt              | 6,537           | 39.8%                                | Total: 6.0%<br>Share*: 14.6% | Total: 8.9%<br>Share*: 21.9% |
| Höchst                  | 13,505          | 38.9%                                | Total: 7.4%<br>Share*: 19.6% | Total: 7.2%<br>Share*: 19.2% |
| Gutleutviertel          | 5,423           | 37.5%                                | Total: 5.6%<br>Share*: 12.5% | Total: 8.7%<br>Share*: 19.6% |
| Fechenheim              | 15,969          | 34.5%                                | Total: 9.9%<br>Share*: 30.1% | Total: 5.7%<br>Share*: 17.3% |
| Griesheim               | 21,979          | 34.0%                                | Total: 7.5%<br>Share*: 22.6% | Total: 5.2%<br>Share*: 15.7% |
| Altstadt                | 3,452           | 30.9%                                | Total: 4.1%<br>Share*: 13.3% | Total: 5.4%<br>Share*: 17.3% |

Note: \* Share of the population without German citizenship


Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch Frankfurt am Main 2007, Bürgeramt, Statistik und Wahlen; own calculations

**Table 5.10** Frankfurt: Development of the indices of segregation, 1991-2005

|           | 1991 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|
| IS ethnic | 13.0 | 11.4 | 10.5 | 11.7 |
| IS social | 21.1 | 13.6 | 16.3 | 16.2 |

Source: Friedrichs & Triemer (2009)

**Figure 5.2 Frankfurt: Rating of neighbourhoods per group**



Source: TIES Survey Germany

When it comes to correlating neighbourhood ratings with monthly net incomes (table 5.11), the available figures must be considered to be skewed. One reason for this is the refusal of many respondents to divulge their finances (roughly half of the interviewees in total). Another is the fact that more than a third of the individuals surveyed still live in their parental homes (see below), which may of course be located in neighbourhoods that do not reflect their own income. All three groups tend to show upward socio-residential mobility with increasing income – or in any case it seems that the higher a respondent’s income, the less likely he or she is to live in a working-class neighbourhood. There is also some evidence suggesting that the financial barrier for upward residential mobility may be higher for the second-generation Turks than for the other groups. Respondents of Turkish descent with a net income between €1,000 and €1,499 predominantly live in working-class areas, while the non-migrant Germans and second-generation Yugoslavs in the same income bracket are very likely to live in middle-class neighbourhoods. Of course this tendency might also be influenced by individual preferences, especially given that those (very few) second-generation Turks with comparatively high monthly incomes do not generally live in privileged neighbourhoods either.

**Table 5.11 Frankfurt: Monthly net income and socio-residential hierarchy by group (in %)**

|                |           | Net income<br>(in €) | Rating of neighbourhood |                  |                 |               | Total N |
|----------------|-----------|----------------------|-------------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------|
|                |           |                      | Working-<br>class       | Middle-<br>class | Upper-<br>class | Don't<br>know |         |
| 2nd generation | Turks     | < 550                | 71.4                    | 14.3             | 0.0             | 14.3          | 7       |
|                |           | 550 – 999            | 46.7                    | 43.3             | 3.3             | 6.7           | 30      |
|                |           | 1000 – 1499          | 54.2                    | 42.2             | 2.4             | 1.2           | 83      |
|                |           | 1500 – 1999          | 22.7                    | 77.3             | 0.0             | 0.0           | 22      |
|                |           | 2000 – 2499          | 60.0                    | 40.0             | 0.0             | 0.0           | 5       |
|                |           | > 2500               | 100.0                   | 0.0              | 0.0             | 0.0           | 1       |
|                | Yugoslavs | < 550                | 0.0                     | 83.3             | 16.7            | 0.0           | 5       |
|                |           | 550 – 999            | 21.4                    | 57.1             | 0.0             | 21.4          | 14      |
|                |           | 1000 – 1499          | 22.2                    | 53.3             | 4.4             | 20.0          | 45      |
|                |           | 1500 – 1999          | 46.2                    | 53.8             | 0.0             | 0.0           | 39      |
|                |           | 2000 – 2499          | 0.0                     | 100.0            | 0.0             | 0.0           | 2       |
|                |           | > 2500               | 0.0                     | 33.3             | 16.7            | 0.0           | 3       |
|                | CG        | < 550                | 0.0                     | 50.0             | 0.0             | 50.0          | 2       |
|                |           | 550 – 999            | 4.2                     | 83.3             | 4.2             | 8.3           | 24      |
|                |           | 1000 – 1499          | 13.6                    | 71.6             | 11.1            | 3.7           | 81      |
| 1500 – 1999    |           | 17.1                 | 63.4                    | 12.2             | 7.3             | 41            |         |
| 2000 – 2499    |           | 17.6                 | 64.7                    | 0.0              | 17.6            | 17            |         |
|                | > 2500    | 17.6                 | 64.7                    | 0.0              | 17.6            | 17            |         |

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Table 5.12 aligns respondents' socio-residential classifications and their assessments of the origin-related composition of their neighbourhoods. Since the second-generation respondents only rarely live in upper-class areas, these are not included in the following discussion. As has been pointed out, Frankfurt is a city where most districts are not homogeneous as regards national origin. This is also reflected in the respondents' appraisals. In working-class surroundings, 68.6 per cent in total classify the origin-related composition of their neighbourhoods in the middle range of own-group concentration (25-50%), while extreme own-group concentrations hardly occur. All in all, the second-generation Yugoslavs display the weakest, and the non-migrant Germans the strongest tendency towards ethnic segregation. Again, the respondents with a Yugoslavian background had the greatest difficulty evaluating their neighbourhoods according to this schema. Twenty-one per cent of this group were unable to answer this question, as opposed to 5.6 per cent of the second-generation Turks

and 5.1 per cent of the control group. This suggests that the respondents of Yugoslavian descent may have rather limited contact with people of their own national origin in their area, and may be less familiar with their residential area in general.

**Table 5.12 Frankfurt: Appraisal of origin-related composition of working-class and middle-class neighbourhoods by group (in %)**

| Appraisal of neighbourhood's origin-related composition |  | 2nd generation |           | CG   | Total |
|---|--|----------------|-----------|------|-------|
|   |  | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |       |
| Working-class neighbourhood                             | Almost everyone of own national origin | 7.2            | 4.8       | 0.0  | 5.3   |
|   | Roughly 75% of own national origin     | 8.8            | 1.6       | 17.9 | 8.4   |
|   | Roughly 50% of own national origin     | 46.4           | 21.0      | 46.2 | 39.4  |
|   | Roughly 25% of own national origin     | 30.4           | 25.8      | 30.8 | 29.2  |
|   | Almost nobody of own national origin   | 1.6            | 25.8      | 0.0  | 8.0   |
|   | Don't know                             | 5.6            | 21.0      | 5.1  | 9.7   |
|   | Total N                                | 125            | 62        | 39   | 226   |
| Middle-class neighbourhood                              | Almost everyone of own national origin | 0.9            | 0.0       | 9.9  | 4.6   |
|   | Roughly 75% of own national origin     | 0.0            | 0.0       | 45.3 | 19.9  |
|   | Roughly 50% of own national origin     | 15.3           | 8.3       | 33.7 | 21.4  |
|   | Roughly 25% of own national origin     | 62.2           | 36.7      | 5.2  | 30.1  |
|   | Almost nobody of own national origin   | 16.2           | 48.6      | 0.0  | 18.1  |
|   | Don't know                             | 5.4            | 6.4       | 5.8  | 5.9   |
|   | Total N                                | 111            | 109       | 172  | 392   |

Note: CG = Control group  
 Source: TIES Survey Germany

The respondents' appraisals differ dramatically between working-class and middle-class areas. In the latter a large proportion of the second-generation migrants surveyed claim to live in surroundings where their own group represents 25 per cent of the population or less. This might be due to greater origin-related heterogeneity in these neighbourhoods, but could also be due to numeric dominance of non-migrant Germans. Far more than 50



per cent of the control group describe their middle-class neighbourhoods as homogeneous in terms of the national origin of the population. At the same time, fewer second-generation Yugoslavs in middle-class areas are uncertain about the origin-related composition of their neighbourhood, and only 6.4 per cent of the total respondents in such areas do not feel able to make this classification. Particularly for the respondents with a Yugoslavian background, this might mean that contacts within their own group are more extensive in middle-class areas.

Generally, the group whose members feel most comfortable in their neighbourhoods is that of the second-generation Turks. Of this group, only 7.2 per cent in working-class areas and 0.9 per cent in middle-class areas do not feel altogether comfortable in their neighbourhoods. They are followed, at a great distance, by the second-generation Yugoslavs, with 22.6 per cent not feeling quite comfortable in their working-class areas, but only 1.8 per cent in their middle-class areas. Similar tendencies can be found for the control group: 31.5 per cent do not feel comfortable in working-class surroundings, as opposed to 5.7 per cent in middle-class areas. Thus one might tentatively assume that both the respondents of Yugoslavian descent and the non-migrant Germans are less capable than the interviewees with a Turkish background of coping well with an underprivileged environment. This may be because they attribute more importance to their position in the socio-residential hierarchy.

Tables 5.13 and 5.14 display the sense of individual well-being in the context of the neighbourhoods' origin-related compositions, and in connection with the subjective social classification of the neighbourhoods. The comparison shows that the socio-residential ranking of the different neighbourhoods has no noteworthy impact on the well-being of the second-generation respondents in areas where the concentration of inhabitants with a similar migration background is felt to be fairly high. It is only in the case of the control group that the sense of discomfort increases as the concentration of their own group decreases, particularly in working-class neighbourhoods. This does not apply to the second-generation Turks, who do not display any such patterns, or to the second-generation Yugoslavs, who show no discernible differences. However, pronounced discomfort does increasingly occur in working-class areas among those second-generation respondents who were not able to assess the origin-related composition of their neighbourhood. Once more, this points to uncertainties in this respect. In middle-class neighbourhoods, on the other hand, most of the second-generation respondents reside in districts with a low concentration of their own group. This means that their general sense of well-being in these surroundings is not as dependent on ethnic semantics as it is in less privileged neighbourhoods. Fewer than one per

cent of the second-generation Turks and 2 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs are uncomfortable in middle-class areas, as compared to 7.2 per cent and 22.6 per cent of these groups in working-class neighbourhoods. In more privileged areas, greater discomfort is experienced in the control group if the concentration of their own group is felt to be lower than 25 per cent (44.4% of the non-migrant German respondents in middle-class areas). Increasingly, this is also the case among those respondents with a Yugoslavian background and those in the control group who could not describe the origin-related composition of their neighbourhoods.

**Table 5.13 Frankfurt: Appraisal of neighbourhood’s origin-related composition and sense of well-being, in working-class neighbourhoods by group (in %)**

| Appraisal of neighbourhood’s origin-related composition | 2nd generation and CG | Sense of well-being in working-class neighbourhood |         |                      | Total N |
|---|-----------------------|--|---------|----------------------|---------|
|   |                       | Quite comfortable                                  | Neutral | Rather uncomfortable |         |
| 75% or more of own national origin                      | Turks                 | 80.8   | 19.2    | 0.0                  | 20      |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 83.4   | 16.7    | 0.0                  | 4       |
|   | CG                    | 87.5   | 0.0     | 12.5                 | 8       |
| Roughly 50% of own national origin                      | Turks                 | 70.7   | 19.0    | 10.3                 | 58      |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 53.9   | 30.8    | 15.4                 | 13      |
|   | CG                    | 69.3   | 7.7     | 23.1                 | 13      |
| 25% or less of own national origin                      | Turks                 | 85.6   | 13.2    | 1.3                  | 40      |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 62.6   | 21.9    | 15.7                 | 32      |
|   | CG                    | 27.3   | 9.1     | 63.6                 | 11      |
| Don’t know  | Turks                 | 57.1   | 14.3    | 28.6                 | 7       |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 23.1   | 23.1    | 53.8                 | 13      |
|   | CG                    | 100.0  | 0.0     | 0.0                  | 1       |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Most of the second-generation respondents state that they do not know what degree of own-group concentration they would prefer in their residential areas, or that they do not care (second-generation Turks: 41.2%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 56.4%). In contrast, only 27.6 per cent of the control

**Table 5.14 Frankfurt: Appraisal of neighbourhood's origin-related composition and sense of well-being in middle-class neighbourhoods by group (in %)**

| Appraisal of neighbourhood's origin-related composition | 2nd generation and CG | Sense of well-being in middle-class neighbourhood |         |                      |         |
|---|-----------------------|---|---------|----------------------|---------|
|   |                       | Quite comfortable                                 | Neutral | Rather uncomfortable | Total N |
| 75% or more of own national origin                      | Turks                 | 100.0   | 0.0     | 0.0                  | 1       |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 0.0   | 0.0     | 0.0                  | 0       |
|   | CG                    | 85.4  | 14.1    | 0.7                  | 97      |
| Roughly 50% of own national origin                      | Turks                 | 64.7  | 35.3    | 0.0                  | 17      |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 100.0   | 0.0     | 0.0                  | 10      |
|   | CG                    | 69.0  | 25.9    | 5.2                  | 58      |
| 25% or less of own national origin                      | Turks                 | 83.7  | 13.5    | 2.8                  | 87      |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 85.5  | 13.6    | 1.0                  | 93      |
|   | CG                    | 44.4  | 11.1    | 44.4                 | 9       |
| Don't know  | Turks                 | 66.6  | 33.3    | 0.0                  | 6       |
|   | Yugoslavs             | 71.4  | 14.3    | 14.3                 | 7       |
|   | CG                    | 70.0  | 10.0    | 20.0                 | 10      |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

group give this answer, while almost two thirds of this group are in favour of homogeneously 'German' neighbourhoods. As far as the respondents of Yugoslavian descent are concerned, however, the declared non-preference does not seem to correspond entirely to their sense of well-being in their neighbourhoods, as discussed above. Thus 'political correctness' might be a factor when answering this question. Only just over 10 per cent of the second-generation Turks and a mere 3 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs would prefer to live in a neighbourhood dominated by their own group. This suggests that the majority of the second generation expect residential segregation to involve disadvantages rather than advantages for 'ethnic' minorities.

Generally, respondents from working-class neighbourhoods in Frankfurt are more concerned about issues like pollution, vandalism, and crime than respondents from middle-class areas. Although all three factors are seen

as problematic here, emphasis on the individual factors differs between the groups. While the interviewees with a Turkish background are most worried about rubbish (42.1%), the second-generation Yugoslavs most often rate crime (37.3%) and vandalism (35.6%) as severe problems. Respondents from the control group, on the other hand, are most anxious about pollution (58.3%) and crime (44.4%). In middle-class neighbourhoods, roughly 13 per cent of all respondents are concerned about both crime and vandalism, and 17.4 per cent consider rubbish to be a problematic issue. Aligning the factors 'crime', 'vandalism', and 'pollution' with perceptions of the origin-related composition of the neighbourhoods, we find that the second-generation Turks are less likely to see these factors as problematic the less concentrated their own group is in their district. The exact opposite is true for the second-generation Yugoslavs and the control group, as far as crime and rubbish are concerned – though comparability is limited because the respondents of Yugoslavian descent rarely live in areas with a high own-group concentration.

Measured by the average rent of €9.96 per square metre per month (rent index 2006),<sup>9</sup> Frankfurt is the second most expensive city in the country. However this does not appear to have a limiting effect on the distribution of available rooms per household member for the TIES survey groups. All three groups have an adequate number of rooms for the household size, increasing in proportion to the number of people in the household. Disparities are not statistically significant. This also goes for the length of time respondents have lived in the same residence, which is below five years for the relative majorities of all three respondent groups. Considering the age group surveyed, this finding is certainly plausible. Of all the respondents in Frankfurt, almost half were 27 or younger at the time of the survey, almost 18 per cent (still) lived with their parents, and roughly one third had no income of their own (yet). When looking at household composition (table 5.15), one has to bear in mind the potentially high mobility of the age group and therefore the somewhat limited conclusiveness of the figures displayed. Household composition can be an indicator not only of phases of life, but also of family bonds and the pursuit of independence, especially for the age group surveyed (18 to 36 years of age). The figures in table 5.15 suggest that the second-generation Turks are the group with the most conservative family structures. Here one in four (still) live in the parental household (second-generation Yugoslavs: 14.6%; control group: 13.0%), and 22.4 per cent

9 Stadt Frankfurt am Main, Amt für Wohnungswesen. Mietspiegel 2006: [www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/media.php/738/Mietspiegel\\_2006Auszug.pdf](http://www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/media.php/738/Mietspiegel_2006Auszug.pdf).

have their own family household with children (second-generation Yugoslavs: 14.6%; control group: 10.7%). Although families with more than two children are rare in all three groups (which also has to be seen in the light of the age group surveyed), respondents with a Turkish background are more often represented in this category, too. Additional differences appear in the numbers of couples living together without children, married or unmarried. Childless couples make up 13.3 per cent of the households of the second-generation Turks surveyed, 37.5 per cent of whom are unmarried. Eighteen per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs' households are couples without children, 60 per cent of them unmarried. Of the respondents in the control group, 32 per cent live as couples without children, and 57.2 per cent of these interviewees are not married. Thus the second-generation Turks are least likely to live as unmarried couples without children. While the proportion of second-generation Yugoslavs living as childless couples is not substantially higher, those who do are significantly less likely to be married. Thus the second-generation Turks are less inclined to live in 'common law marriages', perhaps as a result of the somewhat conservative attitudes towards family which this group is presumed to have. In line with this, respondents with a Turkish background have the smallest proportion of one-person households (29.2%, as opposed to 50.2% of the second-generation Yugoslavs and 38.3% of the control group). Among the second-generation Yugoslavs, men and women are equally likely to live in one-person households. In the other groups, however, women are less likely to live alone: women make up only 23.4 per cent of single households within the Turkish group, and only 38.4 per cent of such households in the control group. In Frankfurt as a whole, 53 per cent of households contain only one person, one third of whom are under the age of 35.<sup>10</sup> This is consistent with the data reported here, except for the comparatively large proportion of second-generation Yugoslavs in one-person households. (Further information on partnerships and family foundation is provided in chapter 8.)

Roughly three quarters of all individuals surveyed in Frankfurt live in multi-family houses or blocks of flats, 33.2 per cent of which have more than six storeys. Relatively few interviewees said that they live in other types of residence. Detached houses are the least common type (second-generation Turks: 4%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 6.8%; control group: 6.7%); in Frankfurt, such residences are most often to be found in the suburbs and in upper-class areas. As the likelihood of respondents' describing their neighbourhood as middle-class rather than working class increases, the

10 Bürgeramt, Statistik und Wahlen, Frankfurter Statistische Berichte 2/3'2007.

**Table 5.15 Frankfurt: Household composition by group (in %)**

| Household composition            | 2nd generation |           | CG   | Total |
|----------------------------------|----------------|-----------|------|-------|
|                                  | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |       |
| One-person household             | 29.2           | 50.2      | 38.3 | 38.5  |
| Couple                           | 13.2           | 18.0      | 32.0 | 21.3  |
| Couple with 1-2 children         | 16.0           | 12.2      | 10.3 | 12.8  |
| Couple with more than 2 children | 6.4            | 2.4       | 0.4  | 3.1   |
| Single in parental household     | 25.2           | 14.6      | 13.0 | 17.9  |
| Others                           | 10.0           | 2.6       | 6.0  | 6.4   |
| Total N                          | 250            | 205       | 253  | 708   |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey German

probability that they live in multi-family housing decreases. Detached housing, however, only features significantly in neighbourhoods described as upper-class, and only 27 interviewees in total (second-generation Yugoslavs and members of the control group) claim to reside in upper-class areas. In middle-class areas, terraced and semi-detached houses constitute an alternative for some of the respondents (second-generation Turks: 21.3%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 22.1%; control group: 20.1%). There are in fact no notable differences between the two groups of second-generation migrants, particularly if we consider that only a very small percentage claim to live in upper-class neighbourhoods. Even the respondents in the control group do not show substantial deviations here. All three respondent groups thus seem to make use of the housing market in Frankfurt in quite similar ways, and to have equal access to the different types of housing.

In this context, it is striking that roughly 90 per cent of the detached houses are owned by the respondents themselves or by their parents or parents-in-law, meaning that it is highly uncommon to rent this type of house. In contrast, 79.4 per cent of the flats in multi-family houses are rented, ownership therefore rather being the exception. In general, home ownership is neither the rule for the second-generation migrants (second-generation Turks: 14.8%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 13.7%) nor for the non-migrant Germans surveyed – though the latter have a slightly higher rate of ownership (19.4%). Most often, flats and houses are rented from a private owner (39.6% in total). The recourse to social housing projects is more common among those with migrant backgrounds (second-generation Turks: 19.2%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 21.1%; control group: 14.6%). It has to be borne in mind, however, that the overall availability of social

housing in Frankfurt decreased considerably between 1991 and 2005 (Friedrichs & Triemer 2009), so the private housing market has become increasingly important. All in all, there do not seem to be any notable differences between the second generation and the control group. This is probably not surprising in an expensive city like Frankfurt, considering the average financial means of the TIES respondents (see also chapter 4 on labour market positions). Of course, this also means that access to owning or renting property is not particularly dependent on ethnic classifications.

Regarding the evaluation of the quality of life in the different neighbourhoods, roughly one third of all individuals surveyed in working-class areas state that this quality has deteriorated in recent years and will further deteriorate in the future. The second-generation Turks are most dissatisfied in their assessment of the past, but most optimistic about the future, while the exact opposite applies to the control group. The second-generation Yugoslavs, on the other hand, show no significant differences in their evaluation of the quality of life in terms of the past and future. In middle-class neighbourhoods, a total of 15.4 per cent of the respondents have experienced a decline in the quality of life in recent years, and 19 per cent expect further deterioration in the future. Here, it is the respondents of Yugoslavian descent who are least concerned about both.

#### 5.4 Comparison Berlin – Frankfurt

When comparing the second-generation migrants in Berlin and Frankfurt, one has to keep in mind that although Frankfurt is the fifth-largest city in Germany, Berlin has more than five times as many residents. Moreover, it has to face very specific challenges connected to the reunification of East and West, and its reinstatement as the country's capital just twenty years ago. Among other things, Berlin is known as the 'gateway to the East', attracting particularly high numbers of immigrants from the regions of the former Warsaw Pact. In contrast, Frankfurt's foreign population is steadily decreasing. Frankfurt has Europe's third-largest airport and the country's largest banking sector, including the Frankfurt stock market, while Berlin is structurally weaker and experiences more poverty and unemployment. The conditions of spatial integration are therefore very different, as is reflected in the lower dissimilarity indices in Frankfurt.

Comparing the two cities under study, we can establish that consistencies between the cities seem to be more stable than extreme differences. In terms of the neighbourhood ratings, there are more, but not substantially

more respondents in Berlin (39.3%) than in Frankfurt (31.1%) who classify their area as 'working-class'. A correspondingly smaller proportion of Berliners describe their residential areas as 'middle-class' or 'upper-class' – which to a large extent is explained by the socio-economic situation of Berlin in general. What the two cities have in common is the systematic distribution of the surveyed groups within the socio-residential hierarchy, with the respondents of Turkish descent at the lower end, those from a Yugoslavian background in the middle, and non-migrant Germans at the upper end.

The descriptions of the origin-related compositions of neighbourhoods in the two cities are also fairly similar. The exception is the second-generation Yugoslavs, who are more scattered in Berlin than in Frankfurt, where they display higher own-group concentrations in some areas. In both cities, the 'felt' origin-related concentration in both second-generation migrant groups decreases as respondents' assessments of the area's socio-residential status rise. In both cities, too, the respondents from a migrant background generally do not care about the origin-related compositions of their neighbourhoods, with only a minority preferring to live in homogeneous areas. In both Berlin and Frankfurt, ethnic segregation seems to be more of an issue in less privileged parts of the city. This connection is corroborated by the fact that the second-generation respondents also appear to link socio-residential advancement with ethnic desegregation.

Looking at the total respondent groups, it is not surprising that the non-migrant Germans in the survey prove to be the most segregated and the second-generation Yugoslavs the least segregated group (according to their own appraisals of neighbourhood compositions). These figures do not entirely concur with the German micro-census. It found, nation wide, that 35.8 per cent of Turkish immigrant (TIES second generation: 11.9%) and 25.7 per cent of immigrants from the SSYU (Successor States of Yugoslavia) (TIES second generation: 1.7%) live in segregated neighbourhoods in which their own group is dominant. This indicates that the second generation's tendency towards ethnic segregation is significantly weaker than it is for these migrant groups as a whole. Still, the findings coincide with the general observation that the Turks are one of the most segregated minorities in Germany (Friedrichs & Triemer 2009). This also holds true for the second generation in both Berlin and Frankfurt.


Differences in degree between the two surveyed groups of second-generation migrants occur in terms of household composition (Figure 5.3). In both cities, the percentage of one-person households is high compared to the Germany-wide micro-census, especially for the respondents of Turkish descent, but is more or less average in the urban context. One particularly



striking figure, however, is the proportion of second-generation Yugoslavs in Frankfurt living in single households: 50.2 per cent. This is fifteen percentage points higher than the city average and almost twice as high as in Berlin. Since this phenomenon cannot be explained based on the TIES data sample, further investigations would be advisable. Another conspicuous difference is that the second generation in Berlin seems to be much more inclined to procreate than in Frankfurt. More than 30 per cent of both the second-generation Turks and Yugoslavs in Berlin have one or more children. In Frankfurt this only applies to just over 20 per cent of respondents of Turkish descent and roughly 15 per cent of those with a Yugoslavian background. There are no such pronounced inter-city differences in the control group. Perhaps Berlin's 'child-friendly' reputation (based on the provision of free kindergarten places, for example) has a particularly positive effect on migrants, regardless of how they actually use the respective facilities (see also chapter 8). Collating the total respondents of all three groups, figure 5.3 displays a considerable downward gradient for family-oriented household compositions from the second-generation Turks to the second-generation Yugoslavs to the control group.

With the surveyed age group being between 18 and 36 years old at the time of the TIES survey, household composition mostly reflects temporary


**Figure 5.3 Household composition per group**



Source: TIES Survey Germany

stages. In both cities, this means not staying in the same home for long periods. The housing types do not differ substantially for the second-generation Turks in Berlin and Frankfurt. An exception is the greater number of people living in terraced houses in Frankfurt, which is probably simply due to the availability of this type of housing. By contrast, the second-generation Yugoslavs show greater variations in middle-class neighbourhoods. Here fewer respondents in Frankfurt than in Berlin live in detached houses, and a correspondingly greater number live in multi-family or terraced houses. On the other hand, both second-generation groups are slightly more likely to own their home in Frankfurt than in Berlin. Still, comparing all the respondents, figure 5.4 shows only minor differences between the three groups surveyed. There are slight differences in the proportions of respondents living in social housing: the second-generation Turks have the highest proportion, those of Yugoslavian descent are second-highest, and the control group has the lowest share. However, such minimal differences cannot be regarded as significant enough to indicate social segregation along the lines of national origin. This is consistent with the fairly equal distribution of unemployment beneficiaries among the three groups surveyed (see chapter 4 on labour market positions). While 74.2 per cent of those respondents who receive unemployment benefit II do make use of municipal council housing, no prominent differences between the individual groups can be detected. So we can at least conclude that the socio-residential hierarchy as gathered from the respondents' own classifications is not reflected in a group-specific dependency on social housing projects. Even in working-class areas, homes are mostly rented from private owners – though this might of course simply be a matter of availability. As far as home ownership is concerned, one can assume that the main factor here is also the TIES age group. According to the German micro-census, the average rate of home ownership is 44.4 per cent for non-migrant Germans and 30.4 per cent for persons from a migrant background, with 24.2 per cent of Turkish immigrants and 20.9 per cent of the immigrants from the SSYU being home-owners (Friedrich 2008). The TIES second generation can probably be expected to catch up with these rates in the future.

It is an interesting finding of the city comparison that the perception of specific area-related problems turns out to be relatively balanced, with no significant deviations across all respondents' evaluations. When looking at table 5.16, however, it should be noted that the absolute crime rate in Berlin is actually considerably lower than in Frankfurt (Polizeiliche

**Figure 5.4 Owning and renting per group**

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Kriminalstatistik 2007),<sup>11</sup> which has the reputation of being Germany's 'most dangerous city'. This is not reflected in the appraisals of the TIES respondents, who are slightly more likely in Berlin than in Frankfurt to name crime as a neighbourhood-specific problem. Differentiating between the 'legal' and the 'social' dimension of the perceived problems (with pollution situated somewhere in between), it is striking that social problems are evoked slightly more often in both cases. In light of the above, it is noteworthy that, in both cities, the assessments of the quality of life are consistently most pessimistic in working-class neighbourhoods. In the middle-class areas of both Berlin and Frankfurt, on the other hand, the second-generation Turks are more discontented than those of Yugoslavian descent. In general, residents' prognoses for Berlin and Frankfurt are very similar.

## 5.5 Conclusions

The evaluation of the second generation's housing situation and attitudes towards social and ethnic segregation confirms the general findings from the analyses of educational biographies and labour-market positions in

11 Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2007, ed. by Bundeskriminalamt, Wiesbaden.

**Table 5.16 Identification of area-related problems by group and city (in %)**

|           |           | <b>2nd generation and CG</b> | <b>Crime</b> | <b>Vandalism</b> | <b>Pollution</b> | <b>Anonymity</b> | <b>No access to good schools</b> |
|-----------|-----------|------------------------------|--------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|
| Berlin    | Turks     |                              | 20.1         | 26.3             | 28.3             | 17.7             | 37.6                             |
|           | Yugoslavs |                              | 20.3         | 23.8             | 28.2             | 22.3             | 19.8                             |
|           | CG*       |                              | 20.9         | 22.0             | 24.1             | 26.0             | 27.2                             |
|           | Total     |                              | 20.4         | 24.0             | 26.8             | 22.0             | 28.9                             |
|           |           |                              | (N=144)      | (N=170)          | (N=189)          | (N=155)          | (N=203)                          |
| Frankfurt | Turks     |                              | 20.8         | 21.6             | 32.8             | 25.6             | 36.4                             |
|           | Yugoslavs |                              | 16.1         | 20.5             | 12.7             | 18.6             | 29.9                             |
|           | CG*       |                              | 18.7         | 16.3             | 25.8             | 25.8             | 25.7                             |
|           | Total     |                              | 18.7         | 19.4             | 24.5             | 23.7             | 30.7                             |
|           |           |                              | (N=132)      | (N=137)          | (N=173)          | (N=167)          | (N=211)                          |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

previous chapters. This is that the second-generation Turks fare worse than the second-generation Yugoslavs in the socio-residential hierarchy, and that neither group reaches the standard of the control group, though the respondents of Yugoslavian descent do come closer to it. Thus the socio-residential situation seems to reflect the educational and occupational situation of the second generation to some degree. It should be noted, though, that social and ethnic segregation was evaluated on the basis of the respondents' subjective impressions, not hard facts such as proportions of migrants, unemployment rates or rates of social welfare beneficiaries in the different districts. When measured solely by the group-specific reliance on social housing, differences decrease significantly, but since the German housing market is mostly privately owned, this factor is not conclusive in itself. The TIES respondents themselves, however, do seem to perceive social segregation along origin-related lines, at least insofar as they associate better residential areas with a lower concentration of inhabitants from migrant backgrounds.



## 6 Ethnic and cultural orientations

### 6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, the descendants of Turkish and Yugoslavian immigrants and the control group of Germans without a migration background a priori were treated as distinctive groups based on national origin. Focusing now on the ethnic and cultural orientations of the TIES respondents, definitions and declarations of identity will be scrutinised to discover the role played by ethnic and cultural categories in the self-descriptions of the second generation.

In general, the individual claim to 'identity', in terms of identification with social, ethnic, or cultural semantics, has to do with how one seeks to be treated. Individuals are judged in their social context by aspects of the identity they present, and have to bear the consequences of these judgments (Zimmermann 1993). Individual identity is to a great extent formed through identification with social, cultural, or ethnically defined groups, and relevant membership affiliations thus offer orientations towards a 'collective' identity (Peters 2003). In the TIES survey, it is the collective identities provided by affiliation with specific ethnic or religious groups that are of interest. It shall be assumed here that, despite a theoretical uncertainty regarding the pragmatic constitution and meaning of collective identities (*ibid.*), such affiliations provide orientation in modern multicultural society, facilitating definitions of the 'self' or the 'other'.

For the individual, sharing a group identity, whatever form it may take, provides categories with which social reality can be constructed. Moreover, the claim to distinction, be it based on internal or external descriptions, produces distinctiveness. Members and non-members can thus recognise each other by way of specific criteria valid for all members of a particular group (see Radtke 1998; Zimmermann 1993). Ethnic semantics thus not only offer a means of self-identification, but to the same degree provide a means of external ascription. At the same time, both objective and subjective 'ethnic' distinctiveness is practically meaningless if it is not made relevant in functional contexts. Yet ethnic semantics are primarily dysfunctional in daily interaction, if they create an idea of irreconcilable differences and thereby thwart successful communication (see Radtke 1996, 1998). In a multicultural environment, on the other hand, ethnic categorisation in the form of stigmatisation along the lines of social and economic interests (allocation of status, occupation etc.) leads to an institutionalised superiority

or inferiority of certain ethnically defined groups. This is commonly reproduced in terms of social and economic inequality between majority and minority groups (Zimmermann 1993, 2007). Since ethnic semantics only work on a comparative basis, differences that are declared relevant must lead to a qualitative distinction with consequences for the respective groups.

According to traditional perceptions, the claim to an ethnic identity is based on ancestry and – derived from this – the specific cultural characteristics of a descent group, such as shared history and language (see Roosen 1995). In the case of the second-generation migrants in the study, however, one can assume that besides such ‘inherited’ membership characteristics, their place of birth, country of socialisation, and actual citizenship will be important identity-establishing factors. Moreover, in a liberal society, the claim to a cultural identity is not categorically connected to national origin. Cultural self-ascription is in many ways a matter of choice based on human and civil rights, such as freedom of opinion, freedom of religion, equal rights, etc. A specific challenge for the second generation is therefore that they have choices regarding both cultural and ethnic identities that are not necessarily exclusive. Their practices of self-description are both a condition and a result of a multicultural, pluralistic, and tolerant society, and they do not have to be exclusive or even dependent on one another. This means that the degree of affiliation with one group is not a reliable indicator of the probability of identification with another group (see Zimmermann 2007).

## 6.2 Ethnic orientations

‘Ethnic orientations’ describe the current sense of belonging to specific, ethnically distinguished groups. In the case of the second-generation migrants, this concerns more than one group. These are, on the one hand, the ‘Germans’, who constitute the majority in the country in which the respondents were born and socialised, and whose citizenship most of them possess. On the other hand, there are the various ethnically and nationally defined groups in the countries in which their parents were born. Connections to these groups may be maintained in the old as well as in the new country. Possible affiliations are merely ‘orientations’, in the sense that their actual relevance cannot be evaluated here. They reflect the respondents’ willingness to be associated with different groups, but do not necessarily entail any particular practices or consequences related to membership.

In the TIES questionnaire, ethnic orientations were elicited by asking about the extent to which respondents 'feel' or 'see themselves as' German, European, Muslim, Christian, etc. In other words the respondents were not asked to formulate absolute self-descriptions, but to quantify their feelings of affiliation at the time of the survey. This shall be understood, with regard to table 6.1, as the individual dimension of identification with a particular ethnic concept. Here, unsurprisingly, identification with the ethnic concept 'German' is most easily accessible for the control group, closely followed by the interviewees with a Yugoslavian background. It is least accessible for the second-generation Turks, fewer than half of whom confessed to a strong feeling of being German. At the same time, only 3 per cent rejected the idea entirely.

**Table 6.1** Extent of feeling 'German' by group (in %)

| <b>2nd generation and CG</b> | <b>Quite strong</b> | <b>Moderate</b> | <b>Quite weak</b> | <b>Not at all</b> | <b>Total N</b> |
|------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Turks                        | 49.2                | 32.7            | 15.1              | 3.0               | 502            |
| Yugoslavs                    | 69.7                | 21.7            | 7.0               | 0.7               | 406            |
| CG                           | 79.4                | 17.6            | 3.0               | 0.0               | 504            |


Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

However, when comparing the identificatory potential of the 'German' concept with that of city and neighbourhood concepts, we see that both second-generation groups have the strongest affinity with their direct neighbourhood (see figure 6.1). It is noteworthy here that there are no city-specific differences between the three groups surveyed. Apparently, identification with one's home-town is not influenced by particular features of Berlin and Frankfurt. As far as the respondents with a Turkish background are concerned, it is striking that they seem to commit much more easily to a small-scale 'neighbourhood' concept than to the broader concepts offered by 'city' and 'Germany'. One explanation for this finding could be that 'neighbourhood' does not have an explicit connotation of 'predominantly German'. However, as discussed in chapter 5 on segregation and housing, the majority of the second-generation Turks do not live in areas which they perceive as dominated by their own group. Respondents of Yugoslavian origin, on the other hand, do not show particular preferences when it comes to defining their 'home' in terms of country, city, or neighbourhood.



**Figure 6.1** Strong identification with 'Germany', 'Berlin/Frankfurt' and 'neighbourhood' per group



Source: TIES Survey Germany

Since the 'ethnic identity' of the second-generation migrants is rarely exclusive, many interviewees from this group also have an emotional attachment to the nations they are associated with by their parents' origin. In general, it can be assumed that cultural assimilation does not inevitably result in the reduction of such ties, but often creates additional affiliations in the form of multiple identification (see Sauer, Halm & Stiftung Zentrum Türkeistudien 2009). As far as the second-generation Turks are concerned, a clear majority identify strongly with the 'Turkish' concept (though this is not quite as large as the proportion of the control group identifying strongly as German). But while a strong feeling of 'being Turkish' or 'being Kurdish' can coincide with a strong feeling of 'being German', the concepts 'Turkish' and 'Kurdish' seem to be regarded as mutually exclusive. This is different for the second-generation Yugoslavs. Here the nation states and peoples of the SSYU do not seem to claim exclusive affiliations on the part of the respondents. Instead, an individual respondent can feel a fairly strong sense of belonging to one group and a weaker affiliation with another one, or can feel fairly strong or fairly weak affiliations with several groups. Interestingly, only 38 per cent of the respondents do not identify at all with an ethnic concept of being 'Yugoslavian', this being the ethnic affiliation that is entirely rejected least of ten. In total, 6.6 per cent of the respondents

with a Yugoslavian background do not feel any attachment to SSYU nations. This is more or less the same as the proportion of second-generation Turks who do not feel ‘Turkish’ at all. It is, furthermore, the only figure that can usefully be compared, because of the otherwise very different starting situations of national versus regional identities, as the commitment to the concept ‘Yugoslavian’ shows. It is certainly possible that this is different for the Yugoslavian civil war refugees and their descendants.

An important factor in ethnic affiliation and ethnic membership identification is the language shared by a specific group. For most of the second-generation migrants, German is their second language. This means that they were raised in the first languages of their parents as family languages, and picked up German through interaction with older siblings, or, more often, at kindergarten (80.1% of the second-generation Turks and 86.5% of the second-generation Yugoslavs went to kindergarten; see chapter 3 on educational careers and educational outcomes). In line with this, table 6.2 shows that, as adults, the majority of the respondents with a Turkish background speak Turkish with their parents, but use it much less regularly with their friends. The respondents of Yugoslavian descent, on the other hand, more often speak German with their parents in their adult lives, and hardly ever use their parents’ first language when communicating with friends. This suggests that the second-generation Turks have a stronger affiliation with the language community of their parents, and are more inclined to maintain opportunities to speak Turkish on a regular basis. But it is also striking that considerable shares of both groups make equal use of their first and second

**Table 6.2 Spoken language use by second-generation group (in %)**

| <b>2nd generation</b> | <b>Language spoken with:</b> | <b>Mostly German</b> | <b>Mostly first language of parent</b> | <b>Other language</b> | <b>Both languages equally</b> | <b>Total N</b> |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|--|-----------------------|-------------------------------|----------------|
| Turks                 | Mother                       | 25.5                 | 72.8                                   | 0.9                   | 0.9                           | 470            |
|                       | Father                       | 21.0                 | 74.9                                   | 0.6                   | 3.3                           | 470            |
|                       | Friends                      | 76.0                 | 21.0                                   | 2.8                   | 0.2                           | 471            |
|                       | Partner                      | 42.3                 | 21.1                                   | 2.1                   | 34.5                          | 470            |
| Yugoslavs             | Mother                       | 57.9                 | 39.2                                   | 0.0                   | 3.0                           | 332            |
|                       | Father                       | 50.0                 | 44.0                                   | 0.3                   | 5.7                           | 332            |
|                       | Friends                      | 96.6                 | 1.5                                    | 0.0                   | 1.8                           | 332            |
|                       | Partner                      | 72.1                 | 7.5                                    | 0.6                   | 19.8                          | 333            |

Source: TIES Survey Germany

language, especially in their partnerships (second-generation Turks: 34.5%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 19.8%).

As mentioned in section 2.3 of this book, self-evaluations of language skills (e.g. those displayed for German in table 6.3) cannot be regarded as information on actual language proficiency. Instead they indicate the respondent's current status of feeling comfortable and confident about using the language. If we take self-evaluations as an indicator of the sense of belonging to the German language community, respondents with a Yugoslavian background regularly identify more strongly with this community than their Turkish counterparts. Moreover, bilingualism is a distinctive strategic and sometimes structural form of language competence. It is not to be confused with monolingualism, particularly regarding monolingual norms of 'proficiency', since different languages and registers are allocated to different social contexts (Maas 2008). As is to be expected, both groups of second-generation respondents show a systematic downward gradient from speaking to reading to writing in their self-attested German proficiency (table 6.3), indicating less confidence in written than spoken language. Both groups, however, assess their literacy skills in German as being better than in their respective first language (not shown in the table). This is also to be expected, since the immigrant languages are generally not extensively used in their written form in migration contexts. Apart from this, the second-generation Yugoslavs consistently judge their German knowledge more favourably than the second-generation Turks, who are significantly less confident, especially regarding their literacy skills. This indicates that the respondents of Yugoslavian descent have a greater sense of belonging to the German language community, which is, like that in most Western European countries, largely defined by the written culture. It is noteworthy, nonetheless, that in each of the three categories 'speaking', 'reading' and 'writing', the ratios of respondents who deem their German proficiency 'excellent' consistently remain below 50 per cent in both groups.

In sum, it can be established that the ethnic orientation of the second-generation Turks is less directed towards the German context than that of the second-generation Yugoslavs, despite the fact that all respondents were born and socialised in Germany. A common explanation for such a finding is that in the German immigration context, Turks are greater in numbers and therefore have more opportunities to band together and to preserve ethnic affiliations and language communities. However, we must also bear in mind that semantics of ethnicity are not solely based on self-description. They also reflect to a considerable extent external differentiations relevant

**Table 6.3** Self-evaluation of German language skills by second-generation group (in %)

|                    | Speaking       |           | Reading        |           | Writing        |           |
|--------------------|----------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|----------------|-----------|
|                    | 2nd generation |           | 2nd generation |           | 2nd generation |           |
|                    | Turks          | Yugoslavs | Turks          | Yugoslavs | Turks          | Yugoslavs |
| Bad to not so good | 0.2            | 0.0       | 3.2            | 0.4       | 6.2            | 2.2       |
| Moderate           | 4.0            | 2.2       | 11.7           | 4.4       | 16.5           | 8.4       |
| Good to very good  | 65.4           | 50.2      | 59.1           | 47.7      | 52.6           | 43.9      |
| Excellent          | 30.4           | 47.5      | 26.0           | 47.3      | 24.8           | 45.6      |
| Total N            | 503            | 406       | 503            | 406       | 504            | 406       |

Source: TIES Survey Germany

in the organisational practices of the majority society, with considerable social consequences. At present there is a political focus on the German language as one of the most important preconditions of successful integration. The immigrant group most commonly addressed as being linguistically ‘unwilling to integrate’ is the Turks, whereas immigrants from the successor states of Yugoslavia are hardly ever mentioned in this public debate. The effect of this negative perception of the Turks, particularly regarding their German proficiency, should not be underestimated when discussing ethnic orientations.

### 6.3 Attachment to the parents’ country of origin

The attachment of the second-generation respondents to their parents’ country of origin – demonstrated by regular visits, remittances, business relations, and thoughts of moving there in the future – does not necessarily translate into ‘ethnic orientation’. However, frequent contact with the parents’ country of origin is likely to become a factor in deficient social integration (Koopmans & Statham 2001), so it is worth looking into this issue.

Of the second-generation respondents, 68.4 per cent of those with a Turkish and 49.3 per cent of those with a Yugoslavian background have visited their parents’ country of origin at least once in the past five years. Within this time frame, roughly one fifth of both groups have travelled to their parents’ country of origin once a year or more often. However, the

frequency of visits to the old country decreases with advancing age. The eighteen- to twenty-year-olds travel to Turkey or the SSYU most frequently, probably because this is an age at which they still accompany their parents on holiday.

The purposes of visiting the parents' country of origin are holidays and family visits. Only 0.6 per cent of the respondents with a Turkish background and 1.5 per cent of the respondents of Yugoslavian descent have business contacts abroad, and the majority of both groups do not invest in business or real estate in the countries of origin (second-generation Turks: 95.2%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 98.3%). This finding might also be affected by the relatively young age of the respondents in general, however. Remittances do not play a significant role; only one tenth of the second-generation migrants (Turkish origin: 11.9%; Yugoslavian origin: 9.6%) made money transfers to Turkey or the SSYU in the past five years. Of these, roughly one third paid less than €500, and only a very few paid more than €2,000. Of course some refused to state the actual amount of money: this applied to 27.9 per cent of the respondents of Turkish descent who made remittances, as opposed to 5.1 per cent of the respondents with a Yugoslavian background.

These findings perhaps suggest that the second-generation Turks are only slightly more attached to the old country than the second-generation Yugoslavs. We find a larger gap between the groups, however, if we look at the intention to live in the parents' country of origin (table 6.4). Of course this also implies the intention to leave Germany (although the TIES questionnaire does not enquire about intentions to leave Germany for any country other than the one the parents came from). If we consider table 6.4 in this light, the second-generation Turks are notably more uncertain than the second-generation Yugoslavs about staying in Germany indefinitely. Again, this might have something to do with the publicly accepted notion of their 'unwillingness to integrate'. This might make them less likely to feel 'at home' and therefore more open to alternatives. Thus two out of five interviewees with a Turkish background do not entirely rule out the possibility of living in the old country sometime, as opposed to one out of six second-generation Yugoslavs. Of course, it is impossible to say how many of the respondents will actually move to their parents' country of origin. We should also bear in mind that mere consideration of the option can also be a way of claiming origin-related affiliation.

Nonetheless, it would be fair to say that the second generation's affiliations with their parents' countries of origin have few discernible, practically relevant consequences. Apart from the occasional vacation, neither second-generation group maintains substantial ties with these countries. This

indicates that self-description by means of ethnic concepts, as discussed above, does not give conclusive information about an individual's social reality.

**Table 6.4** Intention to emigrate to parents' country of origin by second-generation group (in %)

| Planning to emigrate to parents' country of origin: | 2nd generation |           | Total |
|---|----------------|-----------|-------|
|   | Turks          | Yugoslavs |       |
| Certainly not                                       | 58.7           | 77.3      | 67.0  |
| Perhaps   | 27.0           | 15.5      | 21.9  |
| Probably  | 4.8            | 1.7       | 3.4   |
| Certainly   | 1.2            | 0.0       | 0.7   |
| Don't know  | 8.3            | 5.4       | 7.0   |
| Total N   | 504            | 406       | 910   |

Source: TIES Survey Germany

## 6.4 Religious orientations

'Religious orientations' – as another important factor in individual and collective identity – do not refer to actual religious beliefs, but to the degree of identification with different religions. As a group-defining trait, religion is quite similar to ethnicity insofar as it generally spans all age groups, genders, professions, and social classes, and can also determine socialisation, values, norms, and customs. So despite being part of a broader cultural identity that is technically more negotiable than ethnic identity based on descent, religion is often a significant, group-spanning characteristic. It is also often associated with geographically confined concepts of ethnicity, such as Buddhism for South-East Asians, Islam for North Africans and Arabs, and Christianity for Europeans and Americans. In the case of Islam, it should be borne in mind that children of Muslims are considered to be Muslims by birth. This differs from most Christian denominations, where membership usually requires some sort of baptism. This makes Islam even more similar to an 'ethnic' group, all the more since there is no procedure for 'leaving' Islam except by converting to another religion (as opposed to the formal procedure for renouncing membership of Christian churches in Germany). Religion is, along with language, one of the issues most frequently addressed in the context of the integration debate (see Sauer,

Halm & Stiftung Zentrum Türkeistudien 2009). This section will therefore examine the religious orientations of the second-generation respondents with regard to the two most frequently represented religions, Islam and Christianity.

General identification with Islam or Christianity (regardless of actual religious membership) is much more exclusive than the general orientation towards ethnically distinguished groups (see above). It is possible and indeed not unusual to identify strongly as 'German', and at the same time feel a strong affiliation with another ethnically defined group. It is highly unlikely, however, that individuals will simultaneously identify strongly with both Islam and Christianity. Religious membership, in contrast to ethnic membership, is negotiable – since anyone can convert to, or at least confess any religion. And yet there is no 'trans-religiousness', allowing people to feel that they belong to more than one religious confession (not counting esoteric mixed religions). This seems to apply especially to Islam and Christianity. In the case of the TIES respondents, religion is therefore a much more distinctive feature than ethnicity. We have to keep in mind, though, that the second-generation Yugoslavs are not as religiously homogeneous as the other two groups, with 8.4 per cent of this group being raised as Muslims. This is contrasted with the 3 per cent of the second-generation Turks who were brought up as Christians and the 0.4 per cent of the control group raised as Muslims.

As table 6.5 shows, Islam offers much more identification potential for the respondents of Turkish descent than Christianity does for the respondents with a Yugoslavian background or those from the control group. Roughly one third of the control group do not feel 'Christian' at all, as opposed to only 5.8 per cent of the second-generation Turks who do not feel 'Muslim' at all. One major factor shaping this finding, consistent with the fact that Islam is acquired by birth, is that nine out of ten interviewees with a Turkish background were raised as Muslims. In contrast, 68.5 per cent of the respondents of Yugoslavian descent and only 55.1 per cent of the control group were raised as Christians. Here it is interesting to note that the proportion of second-generation Yugoslavs and non-migrant Germans who identify with Islam today is slightly higher than the proportion who were raised as Muslims (not shown in table). The opposite applies to the second-generation Turks and Christianity. This is consistent with the general observation that an increasing (albeit still low) number of people in Germany are converting to Islam, while the Christian denominations are losing members. However, religiousness seems to decrease slightly with advancing age among the second-generation migrants, in contrast to the

reference group where it increases slightly. At the time of the TIES survey, 67 per cent of the respondents of Turkish descent stated that they were devout Muslims. In comparison, 38.4 per cent of the respondents with a Yugoslavian background and 22.3 per cent of the control group claimed to be devout Christians.

**Table 6.5** Extent of religious identification by group (in %)

|                                  | <b>2nd generation and CG</b> | <b>Quite strong</b> | <b>Moderate</b> | <b>Quite weak</b> | <b>Not at all</b> | <b>Total N</b> |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Identification with Islam        | Turks                        | 67.1                | 17.0            | 10.1              | 5.8               | 501            |
|                                  | Yugoslavs                    | 8.9                 | 4.9             | 7.7               | 78.5              | 405            |
|                                  | CG*                          | 1.2                 | 11.7            | 8.2               | 78.9              | 503            |
| Identification with Christianity | Turks                        | 1.6                 | 3.4             | 7.3               | 87.7              | 505            |
|                                  | Yugoslavs                    | 27.8                | 27.6            | 12.3              | 32.3              | 406            |
|                                  | CG                           | 20.8                | 33.1            | 18.3              | 27.8              | 504            |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Focusing on those respondents who refer to themselves as religious or devout, the Turkish Muslims of the second generation seem to be more sensitive about this affiliation. Roughly 82 per cent of them state that they feel personally hurt when their religion is criticised, as opposed to 47 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavian Christians and 39.2 per cent of the Christians in the control group. Once more, this suggests that Islam has much more potential for individual identification than Christianity. It might also point to a certain defensiveness that comes with belonging to a minority religion that is often critically perceived in public. Actual religious practices, on the other hand, seem to be negotiable in both religions to some extent. The relative majorities of the second-generation Muslims and Christians do not visit a mosque or church on a regular basis (none of the religious second-generation Turks go more than twice a month, as compared to 0.8% of the devout second-generation Yugoslavs, and 5.4% of the control group). Furthermore, most of them only pray 'occasionally' (44.4% of the religious second-generation Turks, 30.7% of the religious second-generation Yugoslavs and 44.1% of the religious non-migrant Germans). Only 13.4 per cent of the religious Muslims with a Turkish background say their mandatory daily prayers on a regular basis. Thus there seems to be some discrepancy between symbolic identification



with a religion in general, and the practical extent of religiousness. This suggests that the value of religious identity is more strategic than practical (see Roosen 1995), and that people's actual lifestyles are becoming more secular (see Bommes 2004b).

Only a small number of the devout individuals surveyed disagree with the statement that religion should be dealt with as a private matter (respondents of Turkish descent: 4.8 per cent; respondents of Yugoslavian descent: 1.7%; control group: 3.0%). And yet 23.4 per cent of the second-generation Turkish Muslims are of the opinion that religion should be 'the only and ultimate political authority'. This is a view held by only 6.1 per cent of the Christians of Yugoslavian origin and 7.2 per cent of the Christians in the control group. Thus there is a certain ambiguity discernible among the Turkish Muslims, with a tendency towards conflict between a secularised and a theocratic world view. Still, the actual prevalence of religious practices suggests that strategic symbolism is at work here too – even though there is considerable political propaganda for theocracy in Islam.

When correlating religiousness with commitment to a 'German' identity, the second-generation Muslims state lesser degrees of attachment than the second-generation Christians, as can be seen in table 6.6. In fact, roughly one quarter of the devout second-generation Muslims feel only weak ties or no attachment at all to Germany. This is probably to be expected, considering that the German majority society is generally defined by its Judaeo-Christian history and tradition. We should also bear in mind that Islam has come under fire in Germany as well as in all other Western societies, at least since 9/11 (see Sauer, Halm & Stiftung Zentrum Türkeistudien 2009). Looking at the total respondent group (see table 6.1), it appears that the factor 'Islam' has somewhat less impact on the second-generation Turks' identification with Germany (which is less pronounced, anyway) than on that of the second-generation Yugoslavs (where the percentage of Muslims is, of course, quite small).

Thirty per cent of the interviewees with a Turkish background, 61.6 per cent of those of Yugoslavian descent, and 77.7 per cent of the control group state that they do not belong to any religious group. For the latter two, this means that a collective religious identity based on membership is generally not accessible and thus not part of their daily construction of social reality. However, in a public atmosphere of polarisation between Islam and non-Islam as 'colliding world views', it is worth considering the possibility that 'non-membership' of Islam might serve as a means of demarcation and thus a source of identification.

**Table 6.6** Religious orientation and identification with Germany by second-generation group (in %)

|                      |                   | Identification with Germany |          |      |            | Total N |
|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|----------|------|------------|---------|
|                      |                   | Strong                      | Moderate | Weak | Not at all |         |
| 2nd generation       | Religious Turks   | 41.5                        | 32.0     | 22.0 | 4.5        | 337     |
|                      | Muslims Yugoslavs | 54.1                        | 18.9     | 21.6 | 5.4        | 37      |
| Religious Christians | Yugoslavs         | 77.2                        | 18.4     | 2.6  | 1.8        | 114     |

Source: TIES Survey Germany

## 6.5 Intercultural orientations

'Intercultural orientations' do not describe the extent or shape of actual intercultural relations, which will be discussed in chapter 7 on social relations. Instead they are concerned with respondents' attitudes towards such relations within German multicultural society, as part of their conceptions of ethnic and cultural identity. Of course, this would imply that affiliation with collective group identities creates boundaries between one's own group and the 'other' group or groups, boundaries that constantly have to be overcome in 'intercultural' relations. In reality, however, interethnic or intercultural relations are the norm in Germany, not the exception. Moreover, social relations are not necessarily based on ethnic semantics in the sense that the differentiation can be functionally utilised. On the contrary, we can assume that ethnic semantics are broadly dysfunctional in everyday interethnic communication. This is because successful interaction depends on similar concerns and aims, and reference to ethnic connotations would only interfere with these.

Looking at the intercultural orientations of the second generation, the first thing that can be established is that respondents' attitudes are not significantly affected by ethnic or religious orientations, age or gender. Nor are there any striking differences between the groups in their appraisals of the respective 'others'. The vast majority of all three respondent groups describe themselves as being tolerant towards the lifestyles of different cultures both in private and in public.

Table 6.7 shows that in most cases, a relative majority of the respondent groups tend to rate the quality of the relationship between their own group and the 'Germans' as 'neutral'. This suggests that national origin is not consciously regarded as a defining factor in these relationships. Nonetheless, the second-generation Turks in both Berlin and Frankfurt

regularly appraise their relationship with Germans less favourably than the second-generation Yugoslavs. Nearly one in four second-generation Turks describe this relationship as 'rather unfriendly', as opposed to only one in ten second-generation Yugoslavs. Again, this might have something to do with the fact that Yugoslavs hardly feature in the integration debate and thus might have fewer reasons to give a critical evaluation. On the other hand, the non-migrant Germans surveyed regularly describe their relationship with immigrants from the SSYU as less friendly than the other way around. In contrast, they tend to assess their relationship with Turks more favourably than the respondents with a Turkish background appraise their relationship with Germans. Overall, discrepancies between the mutual perceptions of the groups are much less pronounced in Berlin than in Frankfurt. In Frankfurt the relationship between Turks and Germans is described as unfriendly by more than one out of four respondents in these groups. The German-Yugoslav relationship, in contrast, is deemed unfriendly by only one out of ten respondents from the groups concerned.

**Table 6.7 Appraisal of relationship between persons of German origin and those of Turkish/Yugoslavian origin by city and group (in %)**

|           | <b>Appraisal of relationship</b> | <b>2nd- generation Turks</b> | <b>CG</b> | <b>Total</b>    | <b>2nd- generation Yugoslavs</b> | <b>CG</b> | <b>Total</b>    |
|-----------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------|-----------------|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------------|
| Berlin    | Rather unfriendly                | 24.5                         | 19.2      | 21.9            | 10.4                             | 28.0      | 20.1            |
|           | Neutral                          | 39.1                         | 45.6      | 42.3            | 40.6                             | 38.4      | 39.4            |
|           | Quite friendly                   | 36.4                         | 35.2      | 35.8            | 49.0                             | 33.6      | 40.5            |
|           | Total N                          | 253                          | 250       | 100%<br>(N=503) | 202                              | 250       | 100%<br>(N=452) |
| Frankfurt | Rather unfriendly                | 29.1                         | 24.8      | 27.0            | 10.3                             | 11.9      | 11.2            |
|           | Neutral                          | 39.0                         | 44.1      | 41.6            | 32.8                             | 48.4      | 41.4            |
|           | Quite friendly                   | 31.9                         | 31.1      | 31.5            | 56.9                             | 39.7      | 47.4            |
|           | Total N                          | 251                          | 254       | 100%<br>(N=505) | 204                              | 252       | 100%<br>(N=456) |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

In contrast, the second generation – especially the second-generation Turks – evaluates the merits of the multicultural society in general more positively than their relationship with Germans in particular. The interviewees from the control group remain rather tentative here, and prove slightly less open to coexisting with other cultures, as is reflected in table 6.8. In this context

too, many respondents opt for a neutral attitude, with the second-generation Yugoslavs being most open towards a multicultural society, and the respondents of the control group least open. The city factor particularly influences the assessments of the respondents of Yugoslavian descent, who seem to be more guarded in Frankfurt than in Berlin. The overall tendency, however, is fairly positive. This also goes for appraisals of the multicultural effect on the economy of each city. In both Berlin and Frankfurt, only a minority of the respondents deem this 'rather threatening' (12.8% and 13%, respectively). However, this view is held by almost twice as many control-group respondents in Frankfurt (22.6%) as in Berlin (12.8%), and, conversely, by more second-generation migrants in Berlin (10.2%) than in Frankfurt (7.7%). Nonetheless, the differentiation between the general and the specifically economic impacts of multiculturalism makes no significant difference in Berlin, and only leads to slightly better assessments in Frankfurt. The reverse applies when it comes to evaluations of the multi-religious city (table 6.9). The religious issue seems to cause slightly more polarisation than the more general 'multicultural' theme. In Frankfurt in particular, both the respondents with a Yugoslavian background and those in the control group express negative opinions about religious diversity relatively often (twice as many in each group as in Berlin). Since both cities were experiencing heated debates about the construction of mosques at the time of the TIES survey, this short-term political factor does not seem to be of importance. However, the fact that membership in Christian churches is much less common in

**Table 6.8** Views on multicultural society by group and city (in %)

|           |                      | Appraisal of multicultural society |         |                 |         |
|-----------|----------------------|------------------------------------|---------|-----------------|---------|
|           |                      | Quite threatening                  | Neutral | Quite enriching | Total N |
| Berlin    | 2nd generation Turks | 13.4                               | 36.0    | 50.6            | 253     |
|           | and CG Yugoslavs     | 7.4                                | 30.5    | 62.1            | 203     |
|           | CG*                  | 18.4                               | 40.8    | 40.8            | 250     |
|           | Total                | 13.4                               | 36.1    | 50.5            | 706     |
| Frankfurt | Turks                | 9.2                                | 41.8    | 49.0            | 251     |
|           | Yugoslavs            | 7.3                                | 43.4    | 49.3            | 205     |
|           | CG*                  | 23.4                               | 38.7    | 37.9            | 253     |
|           | Total                | 13.7                               | 41.1    | 45.2            | 709     |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

**Table 6.9** Views on the multi-religious city by group and city (in %)

|           |                       | Appraisal of the multi-religious city |         |            |         |
|-----------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|---------|------------|---------|
|           |                       | Quite bad                             | Neutral | Quite good | Total N |
| Berlin    | 2nd generation and CG |                                       |         |            |         |
|           | Turks                 | 15.0                                  | 36.0    | 48.0       | 253     |
|           | Yugoslavs             | 11.4                                  | 37.1    | 51.5       | 202     |
|           | CG                    | 19.6                                  | 45.2    | 35.2       | 250     |
| Total     |                       | 15.6                                  | 39.6    | 44.8       | 705     |
| Frankfurt | 2nd generation and CG |                                       |         |            |         |
|           | Turks                 | 12.4                                  | 44.0    | 43.6       | 250     |
|           | Yugoslavs             | 21.6                                  | 39.2    | 39.2       | 204     |
|           | CG                    | 37.3                                  | 38.1    | 24.7       | 252     |
| Total     |                       | 24.0                                  | 40.5    | 35.5       | 706     |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Berlin than in Frankfurt (30% and 50% of the respective populations)<sup>1</sup> might perhaps tip the scales here.


The tendency to adopt a neutral position on ethnic and cultural-religious orientations is even more pronounced when it comes to evaluating one's affinity for the different ethnic and cultural concepts. Turning from assessments of the relationships between groups to more absolute attitudes towards these other groups, we find, as can be expected (see figure 6.2), high levels of affection for the respondents' own ethnic and cultural groups. We also find, on average, neutral attitudes towards everyone else. Overall, the respondents have the warmest attitudes towards 'Germans', and only the affection of the second-generation Turks for 'Yugoslavs', and that of the second-generation Yugoslavs for 'Muslims', fall slightly below '50 degrees Celsius'. Interestingly, in view of their answers on previous topics, it is the respondents in the control group who display the most positive attitudes.

## 6.6 Conclusions

The decision to enquire about ethnic self-description and cultural self-positioning presupposes that individuals commonly operate with such

<sup>1</sup> See *Tagesspiegel*, April 2009 ([www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/landespolitik/knapp-ein-drittel-der-berliner-gehört-einer-christlichen-kirche-an/1487294.html](http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/landespolitik/knapp-ein-drittel-der-berliner-gehört-einer-christlichen-kirche-an/1487294.html)) and *Humanistischer Pressedienst*, March 2007 ([hpd.de/node/1351](http://hpd.de/node/1351)).

Figure 6.2 Affection for different ethnic/cultural groups per group (in %)



Note: Rated by means of degrees Celsius  
Source: TIES Survey Germany

categories, and that these have appreciable effects on their social reality. One outcome of the TIES survey here is that such effects, as far as they are traceable in religious practices and ties to the parents' countries of origin, are not as substantial as the public integration debate might suggest. It is this debate, however, which determines the political climate in which individuals have to position themselves when asked to operate with ethnic or cultural semantics. It should therefore be stressed that more than one third of the respondents, on average, prefer to adopt neutral positions when it comes to such assessments. Moreover, a positive attitude towards one's own group or culture does not appear to coincide with a negative attitude towards 'the other'. Thus, at least as far as the second generation of the TIES survey is concerned, we should be asking to what degree the (scientific or political) observation of 'ethnicity' actually corresponds to the individual self-observations, how such self-observations are influenced by others' observations, and in what way ethnic and cultural self-ascription might be made relevant for the integration debate.



## 7 Social relations

### 7.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter on ethnic and cultural orientations, it was pointed out that self-descriptions in terms of ethnic and cultural affiliations are not necessarily connected with actual social practices. Social relations have to be negotiated on the basis of similarities as well as discrepancies, and the very nature of multicultural society dictates that minority groups in particular are unlikely to be completely limited to their own group. This section investigates social integration in terms of social relations such as friendships, social practices such as public participation, and the perception of a general social climate in terms of discriminatory tendencies. When it comes to immigrants, social integration is often associated with notions of assimilation. The assumption here is that the degree of social interaction with the majority population (interethnic contacts, public participation) is indicative of the degree of social integration. It is assumed that the stronger the social orientation of migrants towards their own group, the stronger the degree of 'ethnic' segmentation (see Esser 2001). At the same time, an understanding of 'assimilation' as the individual and collective orientation towards institutionalised social expectations risks overemphasising immigrants' obligations towards majority society. This then tends to lead to an underestimation of the importance of actual access to relevant social domains (see Bommes 2004b; Sauer, Halm & Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien 2009). Opportunities for public participation and forming social relations thus depend not only on the individual abilities and attitudes of both the majorities and the minorities, but also on the inherent uncertainties of complex social systems.

In this context, it is important to bear in mind that the TIES second generation in Germany was born and socialised in this country, and that most of them are German citizens. The mechanisms and dynamics of their inclusion can therefore be expected to differ substantially from those relevant for the parental generation. On the one hand, the second generation can make use of pre-established origin-related and cultural networks, including solidarity and support structures that were largely unavailable to their parents. On the other hand, growing up in Germany means an initial cultural assimilation, in terms of familiarity with the values and standards of the German democratic welfare state. Simply participating in the German school system provides opportunities which



the first generation never had, particularly regarding the establishment of social relations.

## 7.2 Friendships

Besides family ties, friendships are the most personal and immediate social relations that shape an individual's social reality. During adolescence, peers are even assumed to be more influential than any other group of people, including the nuclear family. A considerable part of identity-shaping and ethnic and cultural association is thus affected and reflected by the choice of friends and by friendly affiliations with other individuals. Moreover, the composition of one's group of friends might have a considerable impact on the closedness or openness of social milieus (Esser 2001), and on the creation of social networks and personal resources. This can in turn affect access to relevant social domains (Haug 2003). For this reason, multi-ethnic social networks which also span members of the majority population are thought to be indicative of social mobility (Weiss & Strodl 2007). At the same time, an immediate, definite connection between these factors has repeatedly been contested (see Sauer, Halm & Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien 2009).

The formation of friendships is always a question of opportunity and access. As explicated in chapter 5 on segregation and housing, homogeneous origin-based neighbourhoods in both Berlin and Frankfurt are only relevant for the non-migrant German majority. Other groups, particularly of Turkish origin, might constitute a majority in a particular district, but rarely to the point of own-group homogeneity. Thus most of the second-generation respondents in Berlin and Frankfurt grew up and live in neighbourhoods with immediate potential for making contact with people of other national origins. This is also reflected in the origin-related compositions of the schools the TIES respondents attended (see chapter 3). It is only in the control group that a considerable number of interviewees (roughly one fifth) attend 'ethnically' homogeneous primary and secondary schools. This means that during their childhood and especially their school years, most of the respondents were technically not confined to persons with a similar origin-related background when it came to opportunities for making friends.

Still, having the theoretical opportunity to make friends with people of different origin is clearly only a necessary precondition, not an imperative reason, to establish 'multinational' friendships, as table 7.1 shows. We can see here that the choice of friends in terms of origin-related affiliation with one's own group tends to correspond to the factor 'opportunity'. In

**Table 7.1 National origin of friends in secondary school by group (in %)**

|                    |                       | 2nd generation |           | CG   |
|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------|-----------|------|
|                    |                       | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |
| Best friend        | Own national origin   | 68.8           | 29.6      | 90.9 |
|                    | German                | 30.2           | 64.0      |      |
|                    | Other national origin | 1.0            | 6.4       | 9.1  |
| Second-best friend | Own national origin   | 65.2           | 31.3      | 74.8 |
|                    | German                | 27.4           | 52.7      |      |
|                    | Other national origin | 7.4            | 16.0      | 25.2 |
| Third-best friend  | Own national origin   | 53.3           | 31.0      | 77.1 |
|                    | German                | 28.4           | 48.8      |      |
|                    | Other national origin | 18.3           | 20.2      | 22.9 |
| Total N            |                       | 503            | 406       | 503  |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

secondary school, the non-migrant Germans in the control group, who had the numerically greatest chance of coming into contact with persons from their own group, were most likely to form same-group friendships. Eighty point nine per cent of respondents from this group say that their three best friends were also German. They are followed by the second-generation Turks, 62.4 per cent of whom had homogeneous groups of friends with a similar migration background. Among the second-generation Yugoslavs, in contrast, only 30.6 per cent of respondents had three best friends with a similar migration background. At first glance the findings seem to indicate greater openness on the part of the respondents of Yugoslavian descent towards affiliations with persons of different origin. However, one should also take into consideration that persons with a Yugoslavian background constitute the smallest cohort in the national age group of 20- to 35-year-olds. They make up only 2.2 per cent of the country-wide population, as opposed to more than twice as many persons with a Turkish background (4.6% of the age group). According to their own statements, the second-generation Yugoslavs also attended secondary schools with a very low percentage of their own group in both Berlin and Frankfurt. We can therefore conclude that for the respondents of Turkish descent, the composition of their groups of friends appears to approximate the stated origin-related compositions of their neighbourhoods and schools. The figures for the second-generation Yugoslavs, on the other hand, seem to exceed the actual opportunities for own-group affiliations. In relative terms, the latter appear to have at least as strong a tendency as the respondents from the other two groups to join

forces with friends with a similar migration background – within the limits of the given opportunities. Taking this finding as indicative of access to friendships, a connection can be assumed between potentially limited access to members of other origin-based groups and potentially easier access to members of one's own group. This is based on shared characteristics such as first language, migration history, and religion. Theoretical opportunities for friendship formation would then have to be aligned with actual access, which could explain the stronger orientation towards the same origin-based group even under conditions of numeric under-representation.

In this context, it is noteworthy that the self-evaluation of German-speaking skills does not systematically coincide with the national origin of friends. This means that the respondents of the second generation who had homogeneous groups of friends of a similar origin at secondary school classify their German proficiency as neither better nor worse than those with 'multinational' friendships. One factor which seems to make at least a slight difference, however, is 'religion'. The devout Muslims of Turkish origin state much more often (17.5%) that they do not have any German friends at the time of the TIES survey, either, as compared to the less devout Muslims (3.7%). As religion has a high identification potential among the second-generation Turks (see chapter 6 on ethnic and cultural orientations), friendships are very likely to develop among Muslims. This then makes friendships with the broad majority of Christian or atheist Germans less likely. With Islam being as perceived rather critically in Germany, restricted access to friendly relations with Germans might also be caused by higher inhibition thresholds on both sides.

Such inhibitions can also emerge in the context of experiences with discrimination, discussed in detail below. For both second-generation migrant groups investigated, more experience of ethnically motivated hostility and unequal treatment by Germans systematically coincides with smaller numbers of German friends, and vice versa. It is easy to imagine that increased experiences of discrimination lead to a tendency to retreat (see Sauer, Halm & Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien 2009). It can also be assumed that a lack of private, friendly contact with Germans leads to overemphasis of negative experiences, and thus a greater risk of interpreting social conflict as ethnically motivated. Moreover, particularly at school and in the workplace, ethnically motivated hostilities mostly occur among equals, i.e. between classmates and co-workers, and less often in the vertical hierarchy with teachers and superiors. This further restricts opportunities for friendly relations (see also chapter 3 on educational careers and educational outcomes and chapter 4 on labour market positions).

For all three groups surveyed, albeit to different degrees, easy access to their own group, regardless of actual numbers, was successfully utilised at secondary school in order to establish friendships. At the same time, only 11.1 per cent of the second-generation Turks and just 2.7 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs had no German friends at all during this time. This indicates a general trend towards friendships outside same-origin groups, and thus affiliations with persons of different national origin. It also contradicts a common assumption that adolescents of Turkish origin in particular prefer to stay in their own group (see Sauer, Halm & Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien 2009). However, looking at the two cities under scrutiny, we find a striking difference. Despite mandatory inclusion in the German school system, 17.7 per cent of the respondents with a Turkish background in Berlin had no German friends during their school years. The figure in Frankfurt is only 4.4 per cent. The disparity corresponds to the higher segregation index in Berlin (see chapters 3 and 5).

If we compare the respondents' friendships during their school days and at the time of the TIES survey, they differ by no more than 2.8 percentage points on average. This finding proves the sustainability of the attitudes towards friendship which are acquired during the influential period of schooling. Both second-generation groups have more German friends at the time of the survey than they had at secondary school. In their school days, 18.5 per cent of the respondents with a Turkish background and 51.1 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs had many or mostly Germans as their friends. Today, these figures are 24.6 per cent and 59.3 per cent, respectively.<sup>1</sup> The access to friendships with Germans thus appears to have increased to more or less the same extent in both groups since finishing secondary school. This might be due to the more limited access available at school, to the exclusiveness of peer groups, and to increased access gained by inclusion in tertiary education or the labour market. In any case, whatever this factor is, it does not cause extreme differences between 'now' and 'then'. The significant difference found between secondary school pupils of Turkish origin in the two cities also remains stable. At the time of the survey, respondents with a Turkish background are three times as likely in Berlin as in Frankfurt to have no friendships with Germans at all (18.5% in Berlin vs. 6.4% in Frankfurt). This means that there is a considerable risk of isolation in the context of the given opportunities, particularly for the respondents of Turkish origin in Berlin.

<sup>1</sup> No significant changes, however, can be recorded for the control group (9.8%/10.6% with many or mostly non-German friends in their school days/today).

It has already been mentioned that the actual relevance of the factor 'ethnicity' in friendly relations is not sufficiently explained in terms of social mobility. The orientation of friendships towards educational levels is potentially more conclusive. Table 7.2 reveals that for all three respondent groups, respondents with a low level of education tend to have friendships with people with similarly low educational qualifications. In this respect, the three respondent groups display quite similar patterns. On the lower educational levels, there seems to be a certain exclusiveness, with only limited upward orientation. On the middle and upper educational levels, however, there is a downward gradient, with respondents on the middle level often having less-educated friends (not shown in the table). Significant differences between the groups only occur for respondents with a higher level of education (ISCED 4-6). The greatest disparity is between the respondents of Turkish descent on the one hand and the second-generation Yugoslavs and the control group on the other. While the latter tend to have friendships with people on the same educational level (albeit to a lesser extent than on the lower level), the better-educated second-generation Turks are less likely to have close friends with similar qualifications. However, all highly educated respondents who have best friends outside their own educational class tend to orientate towards the next level down (not shown in the table). Of the highly educated respondents, only 9.4 per cent of the second-generation Turks, 7 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs, and 4.3 per cent of the control group have close friendships with people with low educational qualifications. Thus 'education' is a significantly more consistent factor than 'ethnicity' as far as personal relations are concerned.

In sum, the second generation's social relations in terms of friendships are shaped by opportunity as well as by access. The vast majority of both groups make use of the given opportunities for making friends with non-migrant Germans, within the limits of the specific access available. At the same time both groups have a tendency towards intra-group friendships based on shared historical and cultural backgrounds. Significant differences between the respondents of Turkish and Yugoslavian descent might at least partially be due to the lower degree of spatial segregation of the latter group. In Berlin in particular, where the Turks are more concentrated in their neighbourhoods, communities based on national origin seem to be more closed in terms of friendships. However, it has to be taken into account here that educational class seems to be a more consistent factor than ethnicity in close friendships. Overall, the respondents are more likely to make friends with a person from a different migration background than with a person from a different educational class.

**Table 7.2 Educational level of respondent and ratio of friends with similar educational qualification (average\* educational level of three best friends) by group (in %)**

| Educational level of respondent | Ratio of friends with similar educational qualification |           |      |
|---------------------------------|---|-----------|------|
|                                 | 2nd generation  |           | CG   |
|                                 | Turks   | Yugoslavs |      |
| ISCED 1-2                       | 82.7  | 86.0      | 84.3 |
| ISCED 3                         | 55.9  | 62.2      | 54.3 |
| ISCED 4-6                       | 51.1  | 68.2      | 73.1 |

Note: \* Most common ISCED level of friends; CG = Control group. Table not weighted  
 Source: TIES Survey Germany

### 7.3 Participation in public contexts

Whereas friendship groups describe the private dimension of social relations, participation in public social life addresses the non-private dimension. At the same time, such contexts are certainly a major source of friendly contacts and thus impact on the private dimension as well. As a ‘soft’ indicator of social integration, the evaluation of public participation is thought to provide information on the individual’s involvement in organised societal practices and thus on inclusion in communal life (see Esser 2001; Sauer, Halm & Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien 2009). Civic participation as a specific form of public participation is essential for the modern democratic state, and the involvement of migrants in democratic decision-making structures is deemed an important factor in integration. This includes the legal right to participate in political processes, culminating in the right to vote, as a precondition of political participation. At the same time it also concerns identification with constitutional norms and values and the acknowledgement of democratic political processes (Vogel & Cyrus 2008).

In general, the TIES respondents’ participation in public life during the twelve months before the interview was fairly low: just over half of the interviewees in total took part in no public events during the survey year. While no discrepancies can be found between Berlin and Frankfurt, there are gender differences among the second-generation migrants, where men were significantly more active than women in public life. In the control group, participation was gender-balanced. With an average participation rate of 30 per cent in total, the respondents were by far the most active

in the context of sports events (second-generation Turks: 24.7%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 30.8%; control group: 34.6%). Religious functions were only of interest for the second-generation Turks (17.3%, as opposed to second-generation Yugoslavs: 0.7%, and non-migrant Germans of the control group: 1.2%). The data do not indicate what kind of religious activities there included. Participation in events and functions in the context of arts, music or cultural activities was low in all three groups surveyed (5% on average), but female respondents took part in such events significantly more often than male respondents. Participation in political functions was also very low: 3.8 per cent of the second-generation Turks, 1.7 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs, and 3 per cent of the control group.

As political activity is virtually negligible in the three groups surveyed, active political participation is basically restricted to elections. Very few of the respondents were not of legal age at the last elections before the TIES survey, and not eligible to vote for this reason. However, elections are not open to residents without German or EU citizenship, even on the municipal level in Berlin and Frankfurt. This means that more than 5 per cent of the total respondents were not entitled to vote in the last municipal election (in 2006 in both cities). This affected roughly one tenth of the second-generation Turks and more than 6 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs. Twelve per cent of the total respondents refused to answer questions on their voting behaviour. Of the respondents with the right to vote who answered the question, 65 per cent of those of Yugoslavian descent and 68 per cent of the non-migrant Germans went to the polls. This voting behaviour is significantly above the average turnout in Berlin (municipal election 2006: 58%) and Frankfurt (municipal election 2006: 45.8%). The second-generation Turks, on the other hand, lag far behind, with only 44 per cent of this group having voted.

Differences between the electoral behaviour in the two cities under scrutiny point at a slightly lower turnout among second-generation migrants in Frankfurt (49.8%) than in Berlin (57.2%). As is to be expected, voter participation generally coincides with educational qualifications – the higher a respondent's educational level, the higher the probability that he or she will make use of the right to vote (see Hunger & Candan 2009). But while this trend is very pronounced in the case of the second-generation Yugoslavs (non-voters with lower education:<sup>2</sup> 76.2%; non-voters with higher education:<sup>3</sup> 0%), it is less extreme for the respondents with a

2 Equivalent to ISCED levels 1-2B.

3 Equivalent to ISCED level 5A.

Turkish background (non-voters with lower education: 66.4%; non-voters with higher education: 21.4%). Political orientation is not a decisive factor in terms of electoral behaviour here. Nor is the gender factor significant, except in the Yugoslavian group, in which more female than male respondents participated in the last election. The most conspicuous voting behaviour is that of the second-generation Turks, with more non-voters than voters (which is also consistent on the local level Berlin/Frankfurt). One tendency can be found in both second-generation groups to the same degree: the more German friends the respondents have, the more likely they are to vote. This suggests that increased personal contact with the majority population leads to a greater interest in national politics. Since the respondents with a Turkish migration background have significantly fewer German friends than the respondents of Yugoslavian descent, this specific factor might be one explanation for the lower voter participation rate. The extent of identification with Germany also plays a role for the second-generation Turks, whose willingness to participate in an election decreases sharply even when identification drops from strong to medium. This does not apply to the other two groups, as table 7.3 shows. Only those respondents with a Turkish background who strongly identify with a concept of 'feeling German' are as likely to vote (60.4%) as the equivalent group of second-generation Yugoslavs (64.2%) and the interviewees from the control group (69.7%). In the latter two groups, on the other hand, electoral behaviour does not alter noticeably as the degree of identification with Germany changes (bearing in mind that some of the numbers involved are quite small). Apparently, it is only among the second-generation Turks that there is a causal relationship between the extent to which they 'feel German' and their electoral behaviour. No plausible connection between willingness to vote and political participation on other levels (see Vogel & Cyrus 2008) can be found for the TIES respondents, most of whom are not politically active.

Giving migrants legal voting rights also means that they have to be taken seriously by the political sphere (Hunger & Candan 2009). In light of the above findings, we can conclude that the second-generation Turks largely forfeit this chance to be taken seriously by not making use of their voting rights. This, again, corresponds to what is generally expected of migrants (see Vogel & Cyrus 2008). The comparatively high voter participation of the second-generation Yugoslavs is therefore noteworthy. It indicates a high degree of social integration in terms of identification with democratic values, and willingness to take an active part in political decision-making processes on the election level.



**Table 7.3** Extent of 'feeling German' and electoral behaviour (only eligible voters answered the question) by group (in %)

| 2nd generation and CG | Voted in last election | Extent of 'feeling German' |         |            |
|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|---------|------------|
|                       |                        | Quite strong               | Neutral | Quite weak |
| Turks                 | Yes                    | 60.4                       | 33.1    | 6.0        |
|                       | No                     | 39.6                       | 66.9    | 94.0       |
|                       | Total N                | 197                        | 130     | 50         |
| Yugoslavs             | Yes                    | 64.2                       | 66.0    | 80.0       |
|                       | No                     | 35.8                       | 34.0    | 20.0       |
|                       | Total N                | 274                        | 50      | 5          |
| CG                    | Yes                    | 69.7                       | 58.0    | 62.5       |
|                       | No                     | 30.3                       | 42.0    | 37.5       |
|                       | Total N                | 337                        | 88      | 32         |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

## 7.4 Experiences of discrimination

Friendships and public participation are features of social relations that individuals can shape immediately and actively. At the same time, however, social relations develop in a social climate that can only be influenced by individual inclusion strategies to a limited extent. This means that successful social inclusion, i.e. the success of efforts to be involved and to participate, is at least partly dependent on the responsiveness of the social environment to such efforts. As elaborated above, easy access can be assumed to be a decisive factor when individuals tend to focus on members of their own group, particularly in personal friendships. In the context of experiences of discrimination, we are dealing with the other side of the coin, the potentially limited access to the German majority population. In general, xenophobic attitudes are not uncommon among Germans. Although the numbers have been declining in recent decades, it is estimated that 20 per cent of Germans still have severe racist tendencies (Decker & Brähler 2008). However, as discussed in chapter 6, ethnic semantics are basically dysfunctional when it comes to coping with everyday life, so prejudice cannot be expected to be translated into discriminatory action on a regular basis. Furthermore, there is no scientific consensus about whether ethnic discrimination, be it positive or negative, is actually the practical result of ethnic prejudice (positive or negative). Some argue instead that it is connected to processes of social differentiation and therefore retrospectively

caused by social inequality (see Hormel 2007). In brief, this would mean that ethnic discrimination can only occur on the precondition of social inequality, but is not itself a precondition of social inequality. Another approach to the issue, which was also cited in the introduction to this chapter, refers to the emergence and legitimation of social inequality by means of ethnically defined resource allocation.

But whatever the preferred concept, we must bear in mind that 'discrimination' is not an entirely objective observation. Instead it is determined by the individual's disposition to interpret a social conflict as ethnically or religiously motivated (note here that in the TIES survey, there was no question about experiences with sexism). In both second-generation migrant groups surveyed, sensitivity to ethnically motivated hostilities tends to rise with the strength of a respondent's identification as 'German'. The weaker the identification with a concept of being 'German', the fewer cases of discrimination are reported. This finding supports the assumption that the internalisation of egalitarianism and the increasing adaptation to the German majority causes greater sensitivity towards potentially discriminatory treatment (see Sauer, Halm & Stiftung Zentrum Türkeistudien 2009).

Despite the fact that the general attitudes of the three TIES groups towards other origin-based and religious groups are fairly neutral (see chapter 6), individual experiences of discrimination are not uncommon among the respondents. In this, men are faced with racism significantly more often than women. Table 7.4 shows that fewer than a quarter of the second-generation Turks and fewer than half of the second-generation Yugoslavs have never experienced ethnically motivated hostility. Clearly, the respondents with a Turkish migration background are by far most often faced with origin-related unequal treatment and hostility (occasionally to regularly: 31.6%, as opposed to 16.4% of the second-generation Yugoslavs and 7.2% of the control group). This finding coincides with a common expectation that ethnicity is more likely to become an issue in social conflicts where the feature 'Turk' is available to the potential offender than in conflicts involving respondents of Yugoslavian descent or Germans. This is because Turks are one of the most critically perceived migrant groups in Germany, and thus burdened with a variety of prejudices and stereotypes. Of course, the figures displayed in table 7.4 also confirm that it is unlikely that a member of an 'ethnic' minority in Germany will never encounter a situation that could be interpreted as 'discriminatory'. But even when only focusing on those respondents whose daily lives are affected by racism ('occasionally' to 'regularly'), the numbers remain conclusive. One third of the second-generation Turks (twice as many as respondents of Yugoslavian

descent) consider themselves to be living in a social environment which tends to be hostile. This has to be deemed a potential impediment to efforts at integration (see Sauer, Halm & Stiftung Zentrum Türkeistudien 2009).

**Table 7.4 Experiences of hostility or unequal treatment motivated by national/ethnic origin by group (in %)**

| Experiences of discrimination | 2nd generation |           | CG   |
|-------------------------------|----------------|-----------|------|
|                               | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |
| Never                         | 23.3           | 48.5      | 76.9 |
| Rarely                        | 45.1           | 35.0      | 15.9 |
| Occasionally                  | 22.3           | 12.3      | 5.0  |
| Often                         | 8.7            | 3.9       | 2.2  |
| Regularly                     | 0.6            | 0.2       | 0.0  |
| Total N                       | 503            | 406       | 503  |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

The comparatively worse situation of the Turks in general is indirectly corroborated by the respondents as a whole. Seventy-six per cent of all respondents expect Turks to be frequent victims of discrimination, whereas 60.9 per cent believe that Yugoslavs and immigrants from the SSYU are repeatedly exposed to hostilities. Just 21.5 per cent assume Germans to be frequent victims of ethnically motivated discrimination. The only other groups whom the respondents as whole expect to be treated unjustly to more or less the same degree as Turks are Muslims and dark-skinned persons (77.9% and 76.5%, respectively). At the same time, for all three groups surveyed, the expected rate of discrimination vastly exceeds the actual frequency of discrimination reported. Respondents from each group not only greatly overestimate the other groups' experiences of ethnically motivated hostility, but also those of their own group. Seventy-seven per cent of the second-generation Turks expect Turks to be severely affected by discrimination, more than twice as many as are actually affected. This tendency is even stronger among the second-generation Yugoslavs: 47.8 per cent expect Yugoslavs to be frequent victims of discrimination, almost three times the number who say they have experienced such incidents repeatedly. In the control group, 30.1 per cent expect Germans to be severely affected by discrimination – more than four times as many as are actually faced with ethnically motivated hostilities on a more or less regular basis. This shows that the social climate is frequently judged to be much worse

than the facts suggest. Factors other than personal experience must therefore be shaping respondents' attitudes; these might conceivably include media coverage, political zeitgeist, or mere projection. In this context, it is plausible that experiences of discrimination may influence the way the second-generation Turks evaluate their relationship with Germans in general. If such experiences become more frequent, this might systematically cause the respondents to assess the relationship as less friendly, and vice versa. As for the second-generation Yugoslavs, experiences of discrimination have – almost surprisingly – no significant effect on how they evaluate their relationship with Germans. The reason may be a greater willingness to abstract overall attitudes from personal experiences, or the specific nature of their experiences (which were not investigated in terms of severity). However, as indicated above, both groups show a connection between the frequency of discriminatory experiences and the number of German friends. The more German friends respondents have, the fewer ethnically motivated hostilities they report. Thus such experiences can be relativized if friendly contact occurs more frequently than unfriendly contact.

We now take a closer look at the actual individual attributes which the respondents identify as the immediate triggers or subjects of the discriminatory actions they have been confronted with. This reveals that the majority of the hostilities and unequal treatments experienced are construed as being addressed to the rather broad feature of 'national origin', not to specifics such as 'language/accent' or 'skin colour' (table 7.5). In the perception of the respondents, 'objectively' available characteristics are thus less decisive in the context of experienced discrimination than ascriptive generalisations of 'ethnicity' unrelated to actual attributes. Regarding the individual features that were addressed in this context, differences between the respondents with a Turkish and with a Yugoslavian background only appear in terms of 'religion'. As might be expected, the respondents of Turkish descent, most of whom are Muslims and thus members of a critically perceived religious group, name 'religion' as the reason for hostility and unfair treatment four times as often. Other than that, occurrences in the categories 'language/accent' and 'skin colour' show that these specific features are only relevant for the potentially 'visible and audible minorities', and not for the non-migrant Germans. 'National origin' and 'social class', however, are increasingly perceived as reasons for hostilities experienced by the control group as well. Significant differences between Berlin and Frankfurt only appear in the category 'other reasons for hostility', which are mentioned more often by respondents from Frankfurt.

**Table 7.5 Motivations for hostility experienced, by group (in %)**

| Hostility motivated by:      | 2nd generation |           | CG   |
|------------------------------|----------------|-----------|------|
|                              | Turks          | Yugoslavs |      |
| Ethnic origin or background  | 85.1           | 81.7      | 71.4 |
| Language or accent           | 32.7           | 33.0      | 6.4  |
| Skin colour                  | 24.7           | 25.6      | 2.3  |
| Religion                     | 43.2           | 10.8      | 13.7 |
| Social class or class origin | 40.2           | 36.9      | 44.9 |
| Other reasons for hostility  | 10.6           | 13.5      | 21.9 |
| Don't know                   | 3.4            | 7.1       | 4.2  |
| Total N                      | 375            | 198       | 110  |


Note: CG = Control group; percentages do not add up to 100 because multiple responses were possible

Source: TIES Survey Germany

No systematic connection can be detected for any of the three groups between the frequency of ethnically motivated hostility and the 'felt' origin-related compositions of the respondents' neighbourhoods. Nor can the ratings of the neighbourhoods in terms of working-class, middle-class or upper-class (see chapter 5 on segregation and housing) be related to experiences of discrimination. In general, neighbourhoods are one of the least likely contexts for the experience of hostility, as figure 7.1 shows. Looking at the actual social contexts in which hostility and unequal treatment occurred, it is interesting that the second-generation Turks experienced discrimination significantly more often than the second-generation Yugoslavs in the domains of school and the workplace (see also chapter 3 on educational careers and educational outcomes and chapter 4 on labour market positions). In contrast, no pronounced differences appear in the other domains. Of course school and work are particularly decisive areas of integration and isolation, where discrimination has sustained and far-reaching effects. So this might in part explain the generally more negative attitude of the second-generation Turks towards being German and their relationships with Germans (see above). In places like clubs, cafés or restaurants, the male TIES participants experience ethnically motivated hostility or unfair treatment significantly more often than female respondents. This also applies to contact with the police. In terms of the two cities under scrutiny, the frequency of hostility in the neighbourhood similar. However, differences between Berlin and Frankfurt – some of them substantial – exist in other domains, as can

be seen in table 7.6. Of the respondents who experienced discrimination in clubs and in contact with the police, the second-generation Turks are consistently more affected in Frankfurt than they are in Berlin. This shows that beyond the neighbourhood, the social climate in Frankfurt is perceived to be more hostile than in Berlin. However, one has to bear in mind here that the respondents of Turkish descent in Berlin also show a stronger tendency towards segregation, spatially as well as socially (see chapter 5 and above). This might include an increased preference for ‘own-ethnic’ clubs and so forth when going out. For the second-generation Yugoslavs, a discrepancy between Berlin and Frankfurt only exists in the context of contact with law enforcement officials. This suggests that the relationship between the police and the second-generation migrants surveyed is generally worse in Frankfurt than it is in Berlin, particularly since no such deviations can be established for the control group. The quota of migrants in law enforcement is very unlikely to be a decisive factor here, as it is extremely low in both cities. It is conceivable, however, that the way the respective police departments present themselves, and their different migrant-oriented programmes, play a role here. The issue is certainly worthy of further research.

**Figure 7.1 Social context of experienced hostility and unequal treatment per group**



Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 because multiple responses were possible  
 Source: TIES Survey Germany

**Table 7.6 Respondents who are strongly affected by discrimination, in specific areas, by group and city (in %)**

| 2nd generation and CG* | Strongly affected by hostility and unequal treatment ... |           |                                  |           |                            |           |
|------------------------|--|-----------|----------------------------------|-----------|----------------------------|-----------|
|                        | ... in the neighbourhood                                 |           | ... in clubs, cafés, restaurants |           | ... in contact with police |           |
|                        | Berlin   | Frankfurt | Berlin                           | Frankfurt | Berlin                     | Frankfurt |
| Turks                  | 22.2   | 25.2      | 43.8                             | 60.5      | 11.7                       | 21.8      |
| Yugoslavs              | 22.2   | 21.6      | 53.5                             | 50.4      | 14.3                       | 22.5      |
| CG                     | 29.5   | 25.9      | 44.2                             | 52.5      | 6.5                        | 5.6       |
| Total N                | 188  | 198       | 98                               | 111       | 62                         | 54        |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

In summary, it can be stated that experiences of discrimination are relevant for both second-generation migrant groups, and that sensitivity to ethnically motivated hostility increases with an increasing sense of belonging to the German majority. The second-generation Turks are more affected by discrimination than the second-generation Yugoslavs, and they are more likely to be influenced by such experiences when it comes to choosing their friends and evaluating their relationship with Germans. Local differences between the two cities in the TIES study indicate that the socially communicated perception of immigrants tends to be more negative in Frankfurt than in Berlin. Again, this coincides with greater social segregation in Berlin, at least among the respondents of Turkish descent.

## 7.5 Conclusions

The second generation's social relations are shaped by their opportunities to participate, which are technically the same for most of the respondents (except for those who are not entitled to vote). They are also shaped by individual access to these opportunities, which differs conspicuously in some areas. Overall, we have seen that the second-generation Yugoslavian respondents are far more likely than the second-generation Turks to be friends with Germans, and that they have significantly higher rates of civic participation in the form of voting in elections. At the same time, the respondents of Yugoslavian descent are fewer in number, much less segregated, and decidedly less affected by experiences of discrimination than

the respondents with a Turkish background. This leads to the assumption that for the second-generation Turkish respondents, comparatively limited access to friendly relations with the majority population is connected with higher inhibition thresholds. These may become even higher because it is so much easier to associate with their own ethnic group. As friendships are primarily oriented towards educational levels in all three groups surveyed, comparatively low average educational achievements among respondents with a Turkish background could exacerbate the reproduction of social conditions, and thus form an obstacle to social mobility. A further factor here is that the second-generation Turks also make relatively little use of their opportunities to influence political decision-making by exercising their right to vote.





# 8 Family formation and partner relationships

## 8.1 Introduction

As the TIES survey group consists of 18- to 35-year-olds, partner relationships<sup>1</sup> in the form of cohabitation and marriage only occur in 40 per cent of cases. Sixty per cent are either living alone or with their family of origin. The conclusions that can be drawn from the TIES survey in this context must therefore be regarded as assessments of the situation as it was at a specific moment, not applying to the majority of the respondents.

As an area of integration, the private sphere of partner relationships and family formation is considered to be of interest in terms of not only intra- and intercultural affiliations, but also gender relations and demographic trends. The main focus, however, is on the origin-related composition of partnerships. This is because migrants' marriages within their own group are often interpreted as evidence of distance from the majority population, while inter-group marriages are credited with more adaptive and integrative capacities (see Beck-Gernsheim 2006; Nauck 2004). In this line of argument, immigrants' access to a majority group in the country of immigration (through marriage and family) is understood as a yardstick of assimilation (see Esser 2006; Ohliger & Raiser 2005) and as an indicator of the openness or closedness of a society (Klein 2000). This is because structural socio-economic differences between population groups tend to be reproduced and consolidated by means of intra-group family formation, with far-reaching impacts on the next generation. A general tendency towards endogamy in several migrant groups is, besides individual preferences and socio-cultural factors, in large part dependent on demographic and social opportunity structures (see also chapter 6 on ethnic and cultural orientations). It also depends on actual access to certain population groups in socialising contexts such as school or the workplace (Straßburger 2003). Such contexts are also shaped by the attitudes of the majority population (Beck-Gernsheim 2006).

<sup>1</sup> The TIES respondents were not asked about their sexual orientations. Partnership can therefore also refer to homosexual relationships, with an average statistical probability of 2-4% (TNS Emnid, Presseunterlagen Eurogay-Studie 'Schwules Leben in Deutschland', Hamburg 2001).

## 8.2 Cohabitation, marriage, and procreation

In Germany a trend towards increasing marital age and declining interest in marriage has been in evidence since the 1970s. Marriage has lost its monopoly as the one legitimate form of partner relationship, and cohabitation has become a commonly practised alternative (Heß-Meining 2004; Lenz 2006). At the same time, birth rates in Germany have declined, and the average age of first-time childbirth is advancing. Late procreation or non-procreation seems to be strongly connected with increasingly unstable partner relationships, economic uncertainties, and long phases of education and career foundation. But it is the decreasing inclination to marry that plays a particularly large role here, since marriage has been proven to have an accelerating effect on the individual disposition to procreate (Pavetic 2009).

Looking at the TIES respondents as a whole, the first notable finding is that the ratio of living-together partner relationships is almost identical in the three groups surveyed (about 40% each) in both cities. This must be attributed to the age group as the sole determining factor; neither ethnicity nor religion nor gender have an influence on the general occurrence of such relationships. Significant differences only occur when the marital status of the cohabitants is considered. While 86.8 per cent of the second-generation Turks and 71.9 per cent of the respondents of Yugoslavian descent are married to their partners, this applies to only 45.5 per cent of the control group. The trend towards cohabitation of unmarried partners thus does not apply to the second-generation migrants. Among these groups, respondents with a Turkish background are least likely to live together with a partner without being married. This difference might be due to a generally lower acceptance of non-married cohabitation due to presumably more traditional attitudes towards family (see Haug 2002). In line with this, the second-generation Turks in the survey also tend to marry at a younger age than the other respondents. The greatest difference is between females with a Turkish migration background, who marry at 23 years of age on average, and females without a migration background, whose average age at marriage is 26. In any case, the average marital age of all surveyed women undercuts the German average by four years,<sup>2</sup> which is probably due to the disproportionately high quota of respondents under 30. The mean cohabitation age tends to be lower in all three groups than the mean marital age, suggesting – as might be expected – that the decision to live together involves a lower threshold

2 In 2006, the average age of first marriage was 29.6 for women and 32.6 for men (Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Statistisches Jahrbuch 2008, Wiesbaden).

than the decision to marry. Nonetheless, the interviewees of the second generation have shorter phases of cohabitation before marrying than their counterparts in the control group. This coincides with the findings of other studies (see Naderi 2008). In partner relationships in all three groups surveyed, women are on average two years younger than their male partners.

Of the TIES respondents who are living with a partner, 62.9 per cent of the second-generation Turks and 55.2 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs have children. The non-migrant Germans come a distant third, with only 27.9 per cent. This hints at a clear (and well-documented)<sup>3</sup> tendency for second-generation migrants to start their families at an earlier age than the corresponding generation of the majority population. It might even already suggest a general difference in procreation rates (which cannot be scrutinised here as the TIES interviewees could potentially continue to have children for many years after the survey). The vast majority of the total couples with children are married, which, again, corroborates the assumption that marriage is conducive to procreation. Marriage with children is twice as likely, however, for the respondents with a Turkish background as for those from the control group. This general tendency is also reflected in terms of the actual number of children: the TIES parents with a Turkish background have 1.8 children on average, those of Yugoslavian origin 1.5, and those in the control group 1.3.

Taking into account the potentially long phases of education and educational qualifications as a potential factor in procreation, table 8.1 shows the educational levels of the TIES respondents with children. In total, 27.2 per cent of these respondents have low educational qualifications, while the majority (64.2%) have completed education/training in the dual system (see chapter 3 on educational careers and educational outcomes). Just under 9 per cent have a higher level of education, and only 0.6 per cent are still in vocational or academic training. In alignment with the overall educational levels of the respondents with children, low educational levels are over-represented among the mothers with a Turkish background, while high educational levels are over-represented among the fathers from the control group. This could mean that for the female second-generation Turks, a solid education is not an especially vital factor in the decision to have children. Conversely, it does seem to be a prominent factor for the other respondents, particularly for the non-migrant German men. The latter are the only parents in the TIES group who are more likely to become fathers with high educational qualifications than with a low level of education. The control group is also the only one

3 Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Statistisches Jahrbuch 2010, Wiesbaden.

in which the mothers tend to be as well-educated as the fathers. It is in the Yugoslavian group, on the other hand, that parenthood is least likely to coincide with low educational levels in general.

**Table 8.1 Educational levels of respondents with children by sex and group (in %)**

| 2nd generation and CG |        | ISCED 1-2 | ISCED 3 | ISCED 4-6 | Total N |
|-----------------------|--------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|
| Turks                 | Male   | 25.4      | 69.8    | 4.8       | 63      |
|                       | Female | 42.4      | 55.3    | 2.4       | 85      |
| Yugoslavs             | Male   | 16.7      | 66.6    | 16.7      | 42      |
|                       | Female | 19.0      | 75.9    | 5.2       | 58      |
| CG                    | Male   | 23.8      | 47.6    | 28.6      | 21      |
|                       | Female | 22.7      | 63.6    | 13.6      | 44      |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

Among the parents interviewed, the unemployment rate<sup>4</sup> is 3.8 per cent, which is significantly below the TIES respondents' average of 12.5 per cent. This finding supports the assumption that a decision to procreate is closely connected with a stable income and financial security. This is also reflected in the monthly net incomes of the parents interviewed, as displayed in table 8.2. Since many respondents refused to answer the question about their financial situation, the table can only give a rough impression of the tendencies within the groups. Here it is striking that the parents from the control group make up the largest low-income group as well as the largest higher-income group, while the second-generation interviewees are far less often represented in the low-income bracket. Note that the number of cases is too low for a comparison involving the actual number of children.

**Table 8.2 Monthly net income of respondents with children by group (in %)**

| 2nd generation and CG | < € 1000 | < € 2000 | > € 2000 | Total N |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
| Turks                 | 13.2     | 79.4     | 7.4      | 68      |
| Yugoslavs             | 12.2     | 75.6     | 12.2     | 49      |
| CG                    | 21.9     | 50.0     | 28.1     | 32      |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

4 Only counting respondents who stated that they are looking for a job.

In sum, demographic trends in the family formation of the TIES respondents are basically in accordance with German population averages within the limits of the relevant age group. Common assumptions about the three groups surveyed are for the most part confirmed. As in the other areas of inquiry of the TIES survey, the greatest differences are between the second-generation Turks and the control group. In the context of marriage and procreation, however, the second-generation Yugoslavs come closer to their counterparts of Turkish origin than in other areas. It can also be established that the second-generation Turks, and particularly the women, deviate from the other two groups in that low levels of education do not seem to discourage them from having children. The respondents from the control group, on the other hand, differ from the other groups in that they are least likely to be prevented from having children because of a low income.

### **8.3 Ethnic, cultural, and socio-economic orientations in partner relationships**

As described in chapter 7 on social relations, ethnicity is regarded as having specific importance in the formation of personal social relations, but must be seen in the context of opportunities and access. For migrants, it is assumed that there are three different partnership markets to refer to when looking for a significant other. These are the majority population in the country of immigration, the community with a similar migration background in the country of immigration, and the population in the country of origin. Where the partner is actually found depends on various factors: family intervention, intra-group affiliations and preferences, and general potential for romantic contact within the individual's own group and other groups. Partner choices along the lines of ethnic orientation, whether inter- or intra-ethnic, can have far-reaching consequences for individual integration processes, but also for the children born in these partnerships (see Nauck 2004).

The differences found between the three TIES groups in terms of friendships appear to be replicated in the context of partner relationships. Here too, the second-generation Turks and the respondents from the control group focus on their own group to a considerable and comparable degree (both well above 80%). The respondents of Yugoslavian descent significantly deviate from this rule, with roughly 50 per cent intra-group partnerships, as

table 8.3 shows.<sup>5</sup> However, the proportion of second-generation Yugoslavs with intra-group partnerships clearly exceeds the proportion of those with friends from a similar migration background (30%). Intra- and inter-group orientations in partner choices can first of all be aligned with the opportunity structures provided by individual friendship groups. Roughly 39 per cent of the total respondents in relationships (second-generation Turks: 29.3%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 45.9%; control group: 40.8%) met their current partner 'through friends'. Since the respondents of Turkish descent and the control group have fairly homogeneous groups of friends as far as national origin is concerned, there is obviously also a high probability of meeting a partner of one's own national origin. The respondents with a Yugoslavian background, on the other hand, draw on friendship groups that include many Germans from non-migrant backgrounds.

**Table 8.3** Intra- and inter-group orientations in partner relationships by sex and group (in %)

| Partner is ...           | 2nd generation |        |           |        | CG   |        |
|--------------------------|----------------|--------|-----------|--------|------|--------|
|                          | Turks          |        | Yugoslavs |        | Male | Female |
|                          | Male           | Female | Male      | Female |      |        |
| German                   | 14.4           | 9.6    | 53.2      | 55.8   | 80.0 | 83.3   |
| Of own national origin   | 82.2           | 88.7   | 43.9      | 55.8   |      |        |
| Of other national origin | 3.3            | 1.7    | 3.9       | 9.5    | 20.0 | 16.7   |
| Total N                  | 205            |        | 172       |        | 202  |        |

Note: CG = Control group; no significance between sexes in groups

TR-YU  $\chi^2 = 92.226$   $p = .000$

TR-CG  $\chi^2 = 305.556$   $p = .000$

CG-YU  $\chi^2 = 96.432$   $p = .000$

All other differences are not statistically significant

Source: TIES Survey Germany

The second-generation Turks surveyed mostly met their current partner in the periphery of their family of origin (43.9%, as compared to 12.8% of the second-generation Yugoslavs and 3% of the control group), i.e. at a family celebration, through an introduction by their parents, or through their parents' friends. In this respect, it should be mentioned that the extent of contact with the family of origin does not significantly differ in the three groups surveyed. Thus the second-generation Turks' orientation towards

5 The findings almost entirely concur with those of Fincke (2009).

their families is not about numerical opportunities, but seems to arise from a greater inclination to base partner choices on familial contexts. Here it is particularly striking that almost three times as many women (15.7%) as men (5.5%) of Turkish origin were introduced to their partner by their parents. This suggests that women are more reliant on their parents' assistance in partner choice. In line with this, 35.6 per cent of the female respondents with a Turkish background state that they were actively encouraged to choose their current partner by their parents. In comparison, this applies to 27 per cent of the men in this group. This gender difference does not feature in the other two groups. However, while 15.5 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs had active parental support in their partner choice, this applies to only 5.4 per cent of the control group. Thus the non-migrant Germans are the only group for whom parental influence is not a noteworthy factor when it comes to choosing a partner. In this respect, a more traditional attitude seems to be present among the second-generation migrants, especially the respondents of Turkish descent. At the very least, parental approval of the partner seems to be of greater importance here, and partner choices tend to be considered a family issue (see Beck-Gernsheim 2006; Heß-Meining 2004). As for other opportunities to meet a partner, notable gender differences again only occur among the respondents with a Turkish background. Only 1.7 per cent of the female second-generation Turks met their current partner at work, as opposed to 7.1 per cent of the male respondents in this group. The women from the other two groups are far more likely to have met their partner at work (9.6% of the female respondents of Yugoslavian descent and 11.8% of the female non-migrant Germans). Presumably, the fact that the female respondents with a Turkish background generally participate less often in the labour market (see chapter 4 on labour market positions) is a factor here.

Opportunity structures, in the form of quantitative chances of meeting a partner in specific social surroundings, are certainly not independent of the qualitative socio-economic and cultural criteria that influence partner choice. One of the possible qualitative criteria of partner choice scrutinised in the TIES survey is religious orientation. As pointed out in chapter 6 on ethnic and cultural orientations, a general identification with Islam or Christianity (regardless of actual religious membership) is much more exclusive than the general orientation towards ethnically defined groups. It was also argued that religious orientation seems to be of more strategic than practical value, and often coexists with a secularisation of actual lifestyles. This secularisation, however, does not unfailingly extend into the respondents' partner choices. In fact, the absolute exclusiveness of religion is nowhere



as dramatic as in the context of partner relationships, where 97.2 per cent of the devoutly religious couples have the same religion (second-generation Turks: 96.8%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 98%; control group: 97.4%). It is therefore highly unlikely that a devoutly religious respondent will enter into a relationship with a devout partner from a different religion. In contrast, striking differences between the groups occur when at least one partner is not religious. Only 13.7 per cent of the second-generation Turks are in a relationship where only one of the partners is religious, in contrast to 32.2 per cent of the respondents of Yugoslavian descent and 34.2 per cent of the control group. Twenty-three point five per cent of the respondents with a Turkish background, 38.6 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs, and 46.5 per cent of the non-migrant Germans are in relationships where neither partner is religious. This finding basically coincides with the general religious affiliations of the three groups discussed in chapter 6. Thus the exclusiveness of religion in terms of partner choice is most consistently reflected in the case of the respondents with a Turkish background, most of whom are either in homogeneously religious, or homogeneously non-religious partnerships. For the second-generation Yugoslavs and non-migrant Germans, on the other hand, there is a much greater likelihood of religious individuals entering partnerships with non-believers. This again might point to Christianity's weaker potential for identification and commitment as far as the TIES respondents are concerned. It may also indicate that Christianity offers greater scope for negotiation in terms of partnership-related religious issues such as church weddings, infant baptism, and religious child-rearing.

Another important socio-economic criterion for partner choice is educational background, which was already identified as relevant with regard to friendships in chapter 7. For modern societies, numerous studies indicate an increasing trend towards educational homogamy, i.e. a preference for partners with a similar educational background (e.g. Klein & Lengerer 2001; Timm 2004). Table 8.4 shows the relative educational levels of the TIES respondents as compared to their partners, based on ISCED levels. As it turns out, only 46.9 per cent of the total respondents actually have a partner with a similar level of education (German average: 61%).<sup>6</sup> In all three groups, men are less likely than women to choose a more highly educated partner. While 30 per cent of men Germany-wide have a higher educational qualification than their partner,<sup>7</sup> this applies to more than 40 per cent of the men in the TIES survey. On the other hand, the proportion of female TIES

6 Statistisches Bundesamt 2010: Paare in Deutschland.

7 *ibid.*

respondents who have a higher level of education than their partners is 36 per cent, four times as high as the German average of 9 per cent.<sup>8</sup>

**Table 8.4** Educational levels of respondents' partners by sex and group (in %)

| 2nd generation and CG |        | ISCED level of partner is: |                      |                          | Total N |
|-----------------------|--------|----------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|---------|
|                       |        | Lower than respondent's    | Same as respondent's | Higher than respondent's |         |
| Turks                 | Male   | 43.8                       | 45.0                 | 11.2                     | 89      |
|                       | Female | 31.3                       | 24.9                 | 43.8                     | 115     |
| Yugoslavs             | Male   | 35.5                       | 59.2                 | 5.3                      | 76      |
|                       | Female | 37.0                       | 41.3                 | 21.7                     | 92      |
| CG                    | Male   | 45.5                       | 49.4                 | 5.1                      | 99      |
|                       | Female | 39.6                       | 40.6                 | 19.8                     | 101     |

Note: CG = Control group

Source: TIES Survey Germany

The majority of the interviewees are on ISCED level 3, which includes a school-leaving certificate from a *Hauptschule* or *Realschule*, plus completed vocational training. A closer look at the respondents with ISCED 3 reveals that they more often enter into partnerships with individuals on a lower educational level than with equally or better-educated partners. Well-qualified women with a Turkish background are least likely (34.7%) to choose a poorly educated partner, and the men in the control group with ISCED 3 are most likely (62.3%) to choose someone less qualified. On this educational level, the second-generation Yugoslavs are least inclined to 'marry up', i.e. to choose a more highly educated partner (9.9%, as opposed to 14.9% of second-generation Turks and 12.4% of the control group). Overall, as is to be expected, such a tendency to 'marry up' occurs much more seldom in the case of men (4.5%) than women (19.3%). Of the women, those with a Turkish background have the strongest tendency (24.6%) to choose a better-educated partner.

In sum, the findings should prove that, as far as the respective TIES respondents are concerned, educational homogamy is not a particularly decisive feature of partner relationships. The tendency to 'marry down' could be indicative of limited upward social mobility. Such a tendency was already identified in terms of the respondents' friendships (chapter 7). Since friendship groups play a major role as a matchmaking context, particularly

8 *ibid.*

for the respondents of Yugoslavian descent and the control group, there is certainly an increased probability that this pattern will also be reproduced in partner relationships. But despite the tendency to 'marry down' in terms of education, only 4.5 per cent of the total respondents in relationships report their partner to be unemployed. The lowest unemployment rate is among the partners of the second-generation Turks (2.0%), followed by the second-generation Yugoslavs (4.7%) and the control group (6.9%). It is not possible to determine here whether this is actually a criterion of partner choice.

Basically, ethnic and cultural orientations in partnerships correspond with the findings generated in other fields of the TIES survey. The second-generation Yugoslavs are most likely to marry outside their own group, while both the second-generation Turks and the respondents from the control group lean towards 'ethnic' homogamy. In the context of partner choice, the respondents of Turkish origin are more influenced by parental advice than the second-generation Yugoslavs, who in turn are more influenced by their parents than the non-migrant Germans. This pattern also seems to apply to the other areas investigated. Religion and religious affiliation are factors that are more exclusive for the second-generation Turks than for the other two groups, which coincides with their general tendency to identify with Islam. In all three groups surveyed, as far as partner choice is concerned, there is a tendency to 'marry down' in terms of educational backgrounds – something already encountered in the context of friendships.

#### 8.4 Family life

The organisation of family life with children is regarded as an interesting aspect of the integration issue, particularly in terms of gender roles. It should be mentioned here at the outset that in all of the respondents' families, fathers are extremely unlikely to be the main caregivers of their pre-school children. This applies on average to only 5.8 per cent of the fathers in the survey, indicating a fairly traditional role distribution in general. As for the male caregivers, the non-migrant German fathers are at the bottom of the scale (4.2%), followed by the fathers with a Turkish background (5.4%) and the fathers with a Yugoslavian background (7.8%). Differences between the three groups mainly concern the tendency to outsource child-care for pre-school children by means of nannies, nursery schools, and day-care centres. This is at least occasionally an option<sup>9</sup> for 25 per cent of the second-generation

9 Note that multiple answers were possible in this category.

Turks, 33.4 per cent of the respondents of Yugoslavian descent, and 43.7 per cent of the control group. In total, 87.2 per cent of the mothers with a Turkish background, 82.2 per cent of the mothers with a Yugoslavian background, and 73.2 per cent of the non-migrant German mothers are the main caregivers of their pre-school children. Child-care thus remains firmly in women's hands in this generation, and even in cases where the mother is not the main caregiver, this does not automatically mean that the task falls to the father.

As was already implied in chapter 4, the men in all three groups surveyed are more likely to pursue a paid profession, while the women more often do unpaid family work. The distance is greatest between the men and women with a Turkish background, and smallest between the men and women of the control group. As far as the total TIES respondents with children are concerned, it can be established that none of the men in either group gave up their job after their first child was born. Under the same circumstances, the employment situation of the female respondents changed drastically. Before the birth of their first child, 57.6 per cent of the mothers with a Turkish background had paid work; afterwards the number drops to 30.6 per cent. The rate of employment for the mothers with a Yugoslavian migration background is 89.5 per cent before their first child versus 45.6 per cent afterwards. For mothers without a migration background the figures are 81.4 per cent before and 48.8 per cent after having their first child. So while labour market participation before and after childbirth is lowest among the women with a Turkish background, it is the women of Yugoslavian origin who are most likely to stop working after their first child is born. This suggests that traditional role divisions, which are quite common among respondents with a Turkish background, become more pertinent for women with a Yugoslavian background once they enter motherhood. This tendency is less pronounced in the case of the women in the control group. At the same time, the women of Yugoslavian origin are most likely to continue with the same working hours as before their first child was born (21.2%). In contrast, only 8.2 per cent of the women of Turkish origin and 8.3 per cent of the control group kept their jobs without cutting back working hours. In comparison, only 2.1 per cent of all the fathers worked fewer hours after their first child was born. Instead, 19.9 per cent of the fathers worked more hours than before (male second-generation Turks: 23.2%; male second-generation Yugoslavs: 13.8%; male respondents of the control group: 20.6%), as opposed to only 2.9 per cent of the mothers.

In line with this, a rather traditional division of labour along gender lines also becomes apparent in the context of family tasks. In general, tasks are divided along traditional lines: women are mainly responsible


for household chores and cooking, and men for earning the household income. Here it is conspicuous that the men more often claim to be mainly responsible for household chores (11.3% in total) than the female respondents make this statement about their partners (1.6% in total). On the other hand, the women more often report that such chores are distributed equally between the partners (18.3% in total) than the male respondents (6.5% in total). This sort of bias can be found throughout the family tasks mentioned in the survey, with the women being much more inclined than the men to claim that such tasks are distributed equally. So we have to consider the possibility that the findings are at least partly shaped by respondents' wishes. On the other hand, when looking at the three groups separately, we can see that gender differences also vary from group to group. Evaluating the division of labour in their own families, it is the control group of non-migrant Germans which shows the least variation between the women's and the men's assessments. This also happens to be the group with the lowest index of gender-related labour division in total. Among the respondents of Yugoslavian descent, the women's and men's evaluations hardly diverge in the categories 'cooking' (mostly a woman's task) and 'financial and administrative matters' (either a man's job or shared equally by partners). Yet assessments of 'household chores' and 'income earning' differ noticeably. The second-generation Turks display the strongest disparities in all categories except 'cooking', which, according to both the female and male respondents, is clearly a woman's task. In the other categories, however, women are considerably more likely than men to claim an equal division of labour in terms of household chores and finance management. They are also likely to claim a greater share in income earning than the male interviewees ascribe to their partners. Of course, it has to be borne in mind here that the TIES respondents do not have partnerships with one another. Differences are thus not necessarily to be attributed to the origin-related level of comparison, particularly in the case of the second-generation Yugoslavs, half of whom have bicultural partnerships. Then again, it does not seem very likely that the male and female TIES respondents have entirely different relationships. It can therefore be established that the male respondents of the second generation, and especially the men of Turkish origin, tend to describe their partnerships along traditional lines. The women, on the other hand, are more inclined to underline aspects of an equal partnership.

Figure 8.1 shows the gender-related labour division for the three groups surveyed, in terms of the categories included in the survey. What we actually see in Figure 8.1, keeping in mind the strong gender biases discussed above,

is that traditional women’s tasks basically remain the women’s responsibility in this age group. Women have, to some degree, taken over traditional men’s tasks, but have not been substantially disburdened in their traditional domains. Especially in the case of the second-generation Yugoslavs, finance management and income earning are often equally distributed, but this seems to have little impact on the women’s responsibility for other family tasks. Emancipation is not necessarily a two-way street here, and the same applies, to a lesser degree, to the control group. It is only among the second-generation Turks that traditional labour division is generally consistent throughout the categories mentioned in the questionnaire, and that women are thus not systematically overburdened. This means that on the one hand, the TIES results confirm other findings that point to a more traditional way of life on the part of Turkish migrants (see Pupeter 2000), and a more emancipated attitude among women with a Yugoslavian background (see Boos-Nünning & Karakaşoğlu 2005). On the other hand, actual gender equality is far from being reached in either group, with women who have a more ‘emancipated’ relationship being at a clear disadvantage in terms of additional workload and responsibilities.

In keeping with this, when asked about their satisfaction with the current division of labour in their partnership, the women of Yugoslavian origin (13.5%) and from the control group (15.7%) are dissatisfied much more often than the women with a Turkish background (3.3%). By contrast, the

**Figure 8.1 Gender-related labour distribution of respondents in partnerships per group**



Source: TIES Survey Germany

men are extremely content with the situation regardless of their origin (second-generation Turks: 100%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 98.6%; control group: 99.2%).

## 8.5 Conclusions

Looking at family formations and partner relationships as a sphere of integration, the generation under scrutiny here does not deviate substantially from common expectations as far as marriage behaviour and patterns of procreation are concerned. Relevant differences between the three groups surveyed confirm that the greatest discrepancies are between the second-generation Turks (most likely to get married, most likely to procreate, highest procreation rate) and the control group (least likely to get married, least likely to procreate, lowest procreation rate). Once more, the second-generation Yugoslavs are somewhere in between. The latter differ from the other two groups in terms of their stronger tendency towards 'ethnic' heterogeneity in their partner relationships. They appear to be the group with the greatest openness towards populations with different migration backgrounds or non-migrant backgrounds, particularly Germans. This allows a better prognosis of their own and their children's ability to integrate. At the same time, all three groups surveyed have a tendency to 'marry down' as far as the educational backgrounds of their partners are concerned. This means that with regard to social mobility, possible impacts of ethnically distinguished homo- or heterogeneity might be masked by the general socio-economic homogeneity. This, in turn, can be assumed to result in the reproduction of differences between the groups. The reproduction of traditional gender differences in terms of the domestic division of labour, however, seems to prevail regardless of ethnicity or education.

## 9 Conclusions and international comparisons

Empirical access to the second generation of migrants in Germany is still hampered by the lack of official statistics recording both citizenship and migration background. It is only in recent years that research has become more extensive, for instance with the inclusion of migration background in information elicited in the German micro-censuses. Study projects such as TIES also contribute to increased data availability, allowing preliminary analyses of the integration processes of the German-born population of migrant origin.

The TIES questionnaire combines international research perspectives and disciplinary research interests to obtain as thorough a picture as possible of individual integration processes. Interviewing a fixed group of respondents on various aspects of social integration allowed reliable depictions to be created of these processes for the first time. In this context, issues often neglected in statistics were also taken into consideration, such as school transitions in educational biographies and paths from the educational system to the labour market.

This publication is an introductory contribution to the field of study concerned with the integration of the second generation. It has presented a wide-ranging portrait of important areas of integration. Its results are obviously only a first descriptive step in a long list of statistical analyses, many of which are already being pursued by several master's students and doctoral candidates, and which will be published soon.

In the preceding chapters it became clear that the integration of the second generation is a complex process, and that it therefore makes little sense to speak of integration into German society as if there were a single, uniform process of integration into a single, unified society. It can generally be established that, especially with regard to education and the labour market, the distance between second-generation Turks and the control group is greater than for the second-generation Yugoslavs. The former can thus be said to be less successfully integrated into these areas than the latter. At the same time, similar integrative successes and failures are generated under the same conditions. For example, fewer than half of the relevant respondents from all three investigated groups succeeded in proceeding directly to vocational training or higher secondary education after attaining a *Hauptschule*-leaving certificate. In contrast, after completing the



lower secondary level at a *Gymnasium*, the vast majority of respondents proceeded to the senior years of the upper secondary level or to higher secondary vocational schools (*Fachoberschulen*). It can therefore be stated that the employment rates of the respondents did not differ fundamentally if they achieved an ISCED level 3 educational qualification (school-leaving qualification plus vocational training or a comparable qualification).

In the context of the tripartite school system, this means that the impacts of selection are more or less the same for all three groups. Regardless of the migration background, those who succeeded in the educational system usually also managed to succeed subsequently. This was then reflected in other domains such as labour market participation, income, living conditions and political participation. The fact that the respondents of Turkish descent were on average less successful in all of these domains than the respondents with a Yugoslavian background, who were in turn somewhat less successful than the respondents from the control group, can be consistently explained by poorer school-leaving qualifications. The crucial question is how this comes about.

The second-generation Turks surveyed generally had worse starting conditions for school success than the respondents of Yugoslavian descent: lower educational qualifications of the parents, greater spatial segregation, more experiences of discrimination, affiliation with a critically perceived religious minority, more traditional lifestyles and a stronger orientation towards the family of origin. All of these are factors that have to be considered more emphatically in analyses of integration processes. After all, educational biographies determine the course of people's lives, and different starting conditions are unlikely to be compensated for at school, despite the formal equality of opportunities. Here the position of the second generation must also be seen as the result of the interplay between self-positioning and existing structures in the societal subsystems. The higher probability that second-generation Turks will repeat years and receive recommendations for lower school types is a result of the specific decision-making of the schools. This adapts to the current status quo and thus fosters its reproduction, aided by systematic tendencies towards educational homogamy and a tendency to choose less-educated partners.

At the same time, there is evidence of educational advancement between the first and the second generation of Turkish immigrants. However, the ongoing diversification of the labour market means that the second generation, despite higher educational qualifications, is not integrated into this market to the same extent as the parental generation. Here, the higher inactivity rate of the female second-generation Turks coincides with that

of their mothers, just as the higher activity rates of the female respondents of Yugoslavian descent match those of their mothers. In general, however, the women of the second generation were more likely to participate in the labour market than those of the first generation. Changing role models seem to be at hand. These also find expression in the involvement of the family of origin in decisions such as partner choice, in the tendency to start a family earlier or later, and in the labour division and role distribution in partnerships.

Finally, given that the integration of the second generation in Germany is the integration into a multicultural, pluralistic society, not every difference between the three groups surveyed is an indicator of successful or less successful integration. Differences often simply reflect the variety of choices in an individual lifestyle, especially when it comes to private matters such as the practice of religion or the choice of language when talking to parents or friends. While the marriages of the parental generation were, without exception, intra-group ones, the second-generation migrants grew up in a multicultural society and were thus more likely to enter into bicultural partnerships. This more often applied to the respondents of Yugoslavian than to those of Turkish descent. It becomes clear, however, that this is not simply a matter of individual preference, when we consider that the second-generation Yugoslavs tended to have different experiences with the majority society, especially in terms of segregation and discrimination.

Thus integration processes are shaped by social organisations and institutions, with their specific opportunity structures and decision-making processes. An equally crucial role, however, is played by individuals, with their own resources, biographies and migration histories. The TIES data sample offers detailed insights not only into the individual integrative achievements of the second generation, but also into the areas of society where integration takes place. Further analysis of the TIES results in this regard constitutes a promising avenue for further study, and subsequent research in this direction is bound to provide a wealth of valuable information.

As indicated in the introduction, the TIES study was carried out in fifteen cities in eight European countries. In almost all of the cities, three different groups were interviewed: two second-generation groups and one control group. The two second-generation groups were of Turkish and Moroccan origin in the Netherlands and Belgium, and of Turkish and Yugoslavian descent in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. In France and Sweden, the study included only the descendants of Turks and the control group, and in Spain, the second-generation group interviewed was of Moroccan origin. In

the following, some of the results of the international comparative analysis will be outlined based on Crul, Schneider and Lelie (2012).

Looking at the education system, we can see that although the position of the second generation differs from country to country, children of immigrants still find themselves at the lower end of the educational hierarchy. Crul et al. (2012: 149) conclude that 'more second generation youngsters are early school-leavers and fewer are able to access higher education'. In line with the German results, the majority of the second-generation respondents in all of the countries investigated followed the vocational, not the academic track. Only one in five children of immigrants had obtained or were working towards a higher education diploma. Interestingly, access to tertiary education is one of the areas where not only the country of residence, but also the city makes a difference. Generally, second-generation Turks were least likely to obtain a high educational qualification in Germany. Overall, the second-generation Turks in France were much more successful, yet their chances of obtaining an advanced degree were almost twice as high in Paris as in Strasbourg. This suggests that the metropolitan factor has a positive impact. Better educational outcomes in the Netherlands, on the other hand, can be at least partly attributed to second-chance tracks of education. These educational 'detours', which were taken by second-generation migrants comparatively often, actually seem able to compensate for disadvantages experienced in the regular course of education. Structural disadvantages often seem to be a product of the different education systems, particularly in the German-speaking countries. Here, the permeability between the different types of schools was very limited. In contrast, the school systems in Sweden and France (i.e. Paris) were characterised by substantial upward mobility (*ibid.*). In both these countries, the proportion of respondents with a high level of education exceeded 30 per cent. Moreover, the different school systems demand different levels of parental involvement. In the German and Austrian schools, there were far higher expectations of parental support than in other countries, such as Sweden and France: 'The Swedish system, especially, shows how the average pupil can succeed without much parental involvement' (*ibid.*: 152). The TIES study thus shows that the second generation can face very different challenges and opportunities when passing through the education systems in the various European countries.

The international comparison shows that differences in educational outcomes are not the only explanation for differences in labour market integration between the second generation and the comparison group. In general, higher education levels were associated with lower unemployment rates. With regard to second-generation Turks, however, areas can be

identified in which 'educational credentials are not sufficient for closing the gap between the second generation and the comparison group. As a matter of fact... some ethnic penalties remain when the labour market outcomes of the second generation are more closely analysed' (Lessard-Phillips, Fibbi & Wanner 2012: 204). 'Ethnic penalties' serve as a plausible explanation for differences in employment in Austrian, Belgian and Dutch cities, as well as in Zurich. In Switzerland and Germany, the main factor influencing employment opportunities seemed to be exclusion from citizenship. In addition, it was more difficult for second-generation men in the German cities and in Amsterdam to find a job appropriate to their level of education. They often entered the labour market in low-skilled positions despite having completed vocational training. Generally, however, the risk of unemployment was reduced in educational systems with extensive vocational tracks. Another fact emerging from the comparison is that second-generation Turks experienced upward intergenerational social mobility in all of the countries under study. It should be noted, though, that the parental generation was so poorly educated that the children could hardly experience downward mobility (*ibid.*).

A special focus of the international comparison was partner choice and union formation. A key finding here is that national and local contexts seem to influence patterns of union formation more than national origin. This even applies to the most 'traditional' interviewees of the Turkish second generation, who 'do not follow the dominant patterns of union formation in Turkey nor of the countries where they live' (Hamel et al. 2012: 272). In line with this, the age of marriage also tended to differ from country to country rather than from group to group. In Germany, individuals from all the groups investigated married fairly late (median age: 25.5 years), compared to Switzerland and Austria, where the mean age of first marriage was 23. Focusing on women in particular, Austria was the only country where the average age of first union was comparable to that in Turkey. In all other European countries, the female second-generation Turks married later (*ibid.*). On the other hand, in most of the countries investigated (the exception is Germany), respondents with a Turkish background were more likely than the other immigrant groups to choose a spouse born in the parents' country of origin. In this context, the international analysis also reveals that partners born in Turkey were often better educated than their spouses from the second generation (*ibid.*).

Finally, the international comparison of the TIES data underlines that the second-generation groups studied considered themselves, first and foremost, as part of the societies in which they lived. They grew up in Stockholm,

Paris, Berlin or Amsterdam, and they identified with these places. They had strong feelings of belonging to their country of birth and were often more attached to their respective cities and neighbourhoods than the members of the comparison group. Furthermore, for most respondents, 'feeling Turkish *and* Dutch or Moroccan *and* Belgian or Serbian *and* Swiss [was] not a contradiction' (Schneider et al. 2012: 332). In their neighbourhoods, a large majority of the second-generation respondents had mixed friendship groups and they participated in the majority society's political parties and civic associations. Most lived in 'ethnically' non-homogeneous districts. Members of the second generation might even be described as 'culturally adapted' (ibid.: 332), in the sense that they shared normative views on the relationship between state and religion, and they described their language skills as equal in their first and second languages. Possible differences, again, might be attributed to the different national integration models:

The German and Austrian model of non-distinction between national *demos* and *ethnos* and its subsequent non-admission of native-born children of immigrants into the 'national community' is reflected in comparatively high degrees of ambiguity in the contextual categories of belonging *here* (nation and, to a lesser extent, city) and their discursive juxtaposition to categories of belonging *there* ('ethnicity' and religion) (ibid.: 333).

In the supposedly multiculturalist integration models of Sweden and the Netherlands, in contrast, the second generation seems to had many more opportunities to experience bilateral modes of belonging.

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