

HISTORY OF METAPHYSICS: ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL, MODERN

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Edited by Dragos Calma and Evan King

# The Renewal of Medieval Metaphysics

*Berthold of Moosburg's Expositio  
on Proclus' Elements of Theology*



BRILL

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# History of Metaphysics: Ancient, Medieval, Modern

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VOLUME 2

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*Dragos Calma and Evan King*

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# Introduction

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## 1 The Elements of Theology in the Latin West (Revisited)\*

18 May 1268. An important medieval manuscript (Vat. Lat. 2419, f. 105va)<sup>1</sup> registers this date as the last day of William of Moerbeke's work on the first-ever Latin translation of Proclus' *Στοιχείωσις θεολογική* (*Elementatio theologica*).<sup>2</sup> Another important manuscript confirms both the date and the translator, and

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\* Dragos Calma was responsible for drafting section 1 and 3; Evan King for section 2. The section 4 was jointly written. This research was undertaken within the framework of the ERC research project CoG\_NeoplAT 771640.

1 MS Vat. lat. 2419, f. 105va: *Prochy dyadochy lycii platonici phylosophi Elementario (!) theologica explicit capitulum 21. Completa fuit translatio huius operis Viterbii a fratre G<u>illelmo> de Morbecca ordinis fratrum predicatorum XV Kalendis Iunii anno domini millesimo CC°LX°octavo*. The same colophon can be read in MS Cambridge, Peterhouse, 121, f. 202rb. Cf. L. Miolo, "Le *Liber de causis* et l'*Elementatio theologica* dans deux bibliothèques anglaises: Merton College (Oxford) et Peterhouse (Cambridge)", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Vol. 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), p. 120–150.

2 It is worth recalling that there are (at least) four other translations into Latin of the *Elements of Theology*: one by Franciscus Patricius (*Procli Lycii diadochi platonici philosophi eminentissimi Elementa theologica, et physica opus omnis admiratione prosequendum*, Ferrara, Apud Dominicum Mamarellum, 1583); one by Aemilius Portus, who published it together with the Greek text, preceded by the bilingual (Latin-Greek) texts of the *Theologia platonica* and *Marinus' Vita*, and followed by the 55 *Conclusiones* on the *Elements* by Pico della Mirandola (*Procli successoris platonici philosophi Institutio Theologica quae continet capita 211* [Hamburg: Apud Rulandios, 1618], p. 415–502). The bilingual edition and translation of Aemilius Portus is reprinted (with adjustments) and dedicated to Hegel by F. Creuzer in 1823 (Frankfurt a.M.: In officina Broenneriana). One should also consider that the *Elements* is extensively cited by Nicholas of Methone in his *Refutation*, which was translated into Latin twice: by an anonymous translator from the sixteenth century (MS Milan, Ambr. Lat., P 63) and by Bonaventura Vulcanius (d. ca. 1614), the autograph being preserved in MS Leiden, B.P.L., 47. Marsilio Ficino famously claimed that he translated the *Elements*, but there is no clear evidence for it. On this topic see D. Robichaud, "Fragments of Marsilio Ficino's Translations and Use of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* and *Elements of Physics*: Evidence and Study", in *Vivarium* 54/1(2016), p. 46–107; S.-A. Kiosoglou, "Notes on the Presence of the *Elements of Theology* in Ficino's Commentary on the *Philebus*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Vol. 2. Translations and Acculturations* (Leiden: Brill, 2020), p. 391–403.



adds: the fourth year of the Pontificate of Clement IV.<sup>3</sup> The manuscript, offered to the above-mentioned Pope, was copied in Moerbeke's inner circle most probably in the late 1270s.<sup>4</sup> It contains the *Book of Causes* and the *Elements of Theology*, copied one after the other, which shows that Aquinas' exquisite proof of the relationship between the two texts was already accepted, although it is not unusual to find that his arguments were often reduced to clichés: the medieval scribes either attributed the *Book of Causes* to Proclus or simply mistook it with the *Elements of Theology*.<sup>5</sup> And yet Aquinas shows, although rarely in explicit ways, that there are differences between the two texts.<sup>6</sup> For

3 MS Toledo, Biblioteca Catedral, Ms. 97-1, f. 93v: *Procli diadochi licii platonici philosophi Elementatio theologica. Explicit. Capitula CII (!) completa fuit translatio huius operis Viterbii a fratre G<uillelmo> de Morbecca ordinis fratrum predicatorum XV Kalendis Iunii anno Christi M<sup>o</sup>CC<sup>o</sup> sexagesimo octavo pontificatus domini Clementitis (!) Pape IIII Anno IIII.*

4 Dates confirmed by Patricia Stirnemann, to whom I am grateful.

5 The manuscript Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA 2<sup>o</sup> 331, transmits the commentary on the *Book of Causes* by Giles of Rome; on the guard-leaf, one reads: *commentum venerabilis Egidii Romani cum questionibus optimis super libro Aristotelis*, but on f. 3v: *Super De causis Procli Egidii Romanus* (by the hand who copied the text), and on f. 8v: *Egidius super De causis Procli* (by the rubricator). The unusual attributions of the *Elements of Theology* in Berlin, Staatsbibl., Ms. Lat. Fol. 568, f. 1r: *Iste liber potest vocari liber de Procli (!) Causis in loyca, in philosophia sive in sacra theologia vel in moralibus*; f. 38r: *Procli dyadochi Platonici philosophi Elementatio theologica explicit*; and Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA 2<sup>o</sup> 40<sup>o</sup>, f. 32a: *Incipit Proclus platonicus de causis*. Aquinas establishes the relationship between the two texts already in the prologue of his commentary. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002), *Prooemium*, p. 3, l. 7-10: *unde videtur ab aliquo philosophorum arabum ex praedicto libro Procli excerptus, praesertim quia omnia quae in hoc libro continentur, multo plenius et diffusius continentur in illo*. Giles of Rome, who often compares these two texts independently from Aquinas, is seduced by the idea, but uses the Neoplatonic concept of emanation in order to describe the relationship between them, and thus acknowledges Aquinas' proof: *In Greco autem habentur propositiones Procli a quibus hee propositiones emanaverunt et sunt acceptae; ut enim apparet scientibus, hic liber emanavit ab illo*. (MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16122, f. 2ra). The idea that the *Book of Causes* is nothing more than a shorter version of the *Elements of Theology* is still widespread in contemporary scholarship: R. Taylor deplors it in a recent paper. Cf. R. Taylor, "Contextualizing the *Kalām fī maḥd al-khair* / *Liber de causis*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes*. Vol. 2, p. 211-232, at p. 211. The Western reception of Aquinas' commentary on the *Book of Causes* needs to be studied in depth.

6 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, Prop. 7, p. 51, l. 9-13: *Et haec quidem est expositio huius propositionis [i.e. Prop. 7 Libri de causis] secundum quod ex verbis hic positae apparet. Sed sciendum est verba hic posita ex vitio translationis esse corrupta, ut patet per litteram Procli, quae talis est: 'Si enim est sine magnitudine [...]'. And also, Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, Prop. 12, p. 78, l. 27-79, l. 10: *Addit autem Proclus in sua propositione expositionem modi quo unum horum sit in alio, dicens: 'Sed alicubi quidem intellectualiter, alicubi autem vitaliter, alicubi vero enter' (id est per modum entis) 'entia omnia; quasi dicat quod omnia tria praedicta sunt in intellectu intellectualiter, in vita vitaliter, in esse**

Aquinas, the *Platonici*, to whom Proclus belongs, departed from the teaching of the Christian Fathers, whereas Aristotle often professes a consonant doctrine.<sup>7</sup> Dionysius the ps.-Areopagite, the faithful disciple of St. Paul, is called to correct Proclus, and at times is “followed” by the author of *Book of Causes*.<sup>8</sup>

Unlike the *Book of Causes* and the (authentic) Aristotelian works, there is no evidence that the *Elements of Theology* was part of the *curricula* of European universities. There might be evidence of its teaching in the second half of the 14th century in the German mendicant *studia*, with the purpose to introduce novices to philosophy, as one can deduce by studying the diffusion of John Krosbein’s commentaries, or rather paraphrases, on all the Aristotelian works, as well as on the *Book of Causes* and the *Elements of Theology*.<sup>9</sup> The anonymous

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*essentialiter. Sed hoc quod ponitur loco huius in hoc libro, videtur esse corruptum et malum intellectum habere. Sequitur enim: ‘Verumtamen esse et vita in intelligentia sunt duae intelligentiae’, debet enim intelligi quod ista duo, scilicet esse et vita, sunt in intelligentia intellectualiter (...). Si autem intelligatur secundum quod verba sonant, falsum continent intellectum. Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, Prop. 16, p. 93, l. 20–94, l. 3: Haec autem secunda propositionis pars in omnibus libris videtur esse corrupta; deberet enim singulariter dici: non quia ipsa sit acquisita, fixa, stans in rebus entibus, immo est virtus etc., ut referatur hoc ad ‘virtutem virtutum’. Et hoc patet ex libro Procli cuius propositio XCII talis est: ‘Omnis multitudo infinitarum potentiarum’ (...).*

- 7 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 12, l. 12–17: *Quaecumque igitur res cum indeficientia essendi habet immobilitatem et est absque temporali successione, potest dici aeterna, et secundum hunc modum substantias immateriales separatas Platonici et Peripatetici aeternas dicebant, superaddentes ad rationem aeternitatis quod semper esse habuit, quod fidei Christianae non est consonum.* Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, Prop. 10, p. 67, l. 19–68, l. 1: *Circa primum igitur considerandum est quod, sicut supra iam diximus, Platonici, ponentes formas rerum separatas, sub harum formarum ordine ponebant ordinem intellectuum. (...) Sed quia, secundum sententiam Aristotelis quae circa hoc est magis consona fidei Christianae, non ponimus alias formas separatas supra intellectuum ordinem, sed ipsum bonum separatum ad quod totum universum ordinatur sicut ad bonum extrinsecum, ut dicitur in XII Metaphysicae (...).*
- 8 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 20, l. 5–6: *Hanc autem positionem corrigit Dionysius quantum ad hoc quod ponebant ordinatim diversas formas separatas quas ‘deos’ dicebant (...).* Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, Prop. 4, p. 33, l. 5–12: *Circa primum considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, Platonici ponebant formas rerum separatas per quarum participationem intellectus fierent intelligentes actu, sicut per earum participationem materia corporalis constituitur in hac vel illa specie. Et idem sequitur si non ponamus plures formas separatas, sed, loco omnium illarum, ponamus unam primam formam ex qua omnia deriventur, sicut supra dictum est secundum sententiam Dionysii, quam videtur sequi auctor huius libri nullam distinctionem ponens in esse divino.*
- 9 F. Retucci, “Sententia Procli alti philosophi. Notes on an Anonymous Commentary on Proclus’ *Elementatio theologica*”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, II. New Commentaries on Liber de causis and Elementatio theologica (ca. 1350–1500)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), p. 99–180; D. Calma, “A Medieval Companion to Aristotle: John Krosbein’s Paraphrase on *Liber de causis*”, in Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, II*, p. 11–98.

commentary preserved in the ms Vat. lat. 4567<sup>10</sup> is also a paraphrase of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, chapter by chapter, which does not seem to have had a significant diffusion.

In 1936, Martin Grabmann, with his incomparable effort to unearth previously ignored texts, discussed a relatively short text,<sup>11</sup> certainly incomplete, preserved in the manuscript Paris, BnF, lat. 16096, f. 172va–174va. Although the manuscript is important and well known to scholars – it contains numerous important works and belonged to Godfrey of Fontaines, who bequeathed it to the library of the Collège de Sorbonne –,<sup>12</sup> this short text remained unpublished until 1991. Lambertus Maria De Rijk's editorial efforts<sup>13</sup> still did not attract enough consideration from scholars. Yet it might be one of the very first Latin commentaries on Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, composed (or at least copied) in Paris in the last quarter of the 13th century. Godfrey left numerous marginal notes in this manuscript, but not on the folios that interest us. It is certain that some parts of the manuscript have been copied by one of Godfrey's secretaries: one can recognize the same hand in BnF, lat. 16080 and in the famous BnF, lat. 16297. The short text edited by De Rijk bears in the margins the title *Questiones super librum Posteriorum*, and most catalogues and descriptions of the manuscript (with the notable exception of Concetta Luna)<sup>14</sup> refer to it with this title.

10 Evan King is currently preparing the critical edition of this text.

11 M. Grabmann, "Die Proklosübersetzungen des Wilhelm von Moerbeke und ihre Verwertung in der lateinischen Literatur", in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 30/1(1929/1930), p. 78–87 (repr. in M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik. Bd. II* [München: Hueber, 1936], p. 413–423).

12 MS Paris, BnF, lat. 16096 transmits notably Avicenna's *Liber de philosophia prima* (f. 1r–71rb), Algazel's *Logica* (f. 74rb–83va), *Metaphysica* (f. 83vb–107rb) and *Physica* (f. 108ra–120vb), an incomplete *Dux neutrorum* by Maimonides (f. 124ra–137v), the *Liber de fato* by Alexander of Aphrodisias (f. 138ra–149ra), Giles of Rome's commentaries on the *Liber de bona fortuna* (f. 122ra–123vb) and on *De generatione et corruptione* (incomplete, f. 162ra–172va), and fragments of Albert the Great's *Summa theologiae* (f. 237ra–252rb). It is known also for its supposed link with the condemnation of 1277; cf. R. Wielockx, "Le ms. Paris Nat. lat. 16096 et la condamnation du 7 mars 1277", in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 48(1981), p. 227–237. It also contains an anonymous commentary on the *De anima*; cf. D. Calma, "La connaissance réflexive de l'intellect agent. Dietrich de Freiberg et le 'premier averroïsme'", in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), p. 63–105.

13 L.M. de Rijk, "Two Short Questions on Proclean Metaphysics in Paris, B.N. lat. 16096", in *Vivarium* 29/1(1991), p. 1–12.

14 Giles of Rome, *Opera Omnia, I.1/3\*\**, *Catalogo dei manoscritti: Francia (Parigi)*, ed. C. Luna (Firenze: Olschki, 1988), p. 206–211.

The two short *questiones* edited by De Rijk following one another in the MS BnF, lat. 16096 are written by the same author and belong to one single, larger text (the copy preserved ends abruptly). The author himself refers to the *questiones* according to their specific topics: the first is *De ente ipso* and the second *De uno*. The first discusses the status of the first being according to Plato, the *Pitagoreici*, and Aristotle, and begins with: *queritur utrum sit aliquid sic ens quod sit ipsum esse solum et cuius ratio sit ratio essendi solum sine appositione*. The second *questio* has four explicit references to Proclus (to Prop. 1, 2, 18), and several references to Plato, the *Platonici*, and Aristotle. The *Book of Causes* and Dionysius are never mentioned, nor any other theological source. It is difficult to understand the institutional context and the purpose of this acephalous text, but it is clear that the anonymous author does not refer to the *Elements of Theology* as to an external authority; rather, he refers to it as the present treatise (*presens tractatus*) without naming it explicitly and with the intention to describe its metaphysical outline:

scimus igitur ex presenti tractatu duo. Primum est quod est prime Unum ab omni multitudine exemptum. Quod non est unum et non-unum nec Multitudine participat. Secundum est quod omne quod participat Uno, est unum et non-unum seu unum aliquantulum plurificatum.<sup>15</sup>

He also refers generally to the *probatio Procli* (p. 11) and alludes to the *propositio que dicit quod omne quod non est Unum ipsum est unum et non-unum non est usquam vera* (p. 10). These are manifest proofs that the reader (or the public?) already knows that the author comments on the *Elements of Theology*. The questions have arguments *pro* and *contra*, and solutions. It gives the impression of a commentary *per modum questionis*, typical of the late 13th-century Parisian fashion. Yet, the details of the composition of these two questions remain unclear: in what context were they written (*hec scripta*)? If it was for the students, under what circumstances? Or were they written in order to satisfy a circumstantial request? The author notes that he does not give too much weight to his considerations on Proclus, and pretends that his own text was written without much reflection.<sup>16</sup> If this is not a rhetorical expression either faking modesty or hiding incomprehension, we should trust him. However, we must note that these anonymous questions are soaked in typical Proclean concepts or syntagms (rarely identified in the *apparatus fontium*) such as *prime*

<sup>15</sup> De Rijk, "Two Short Questions", p. 12.

<sup>16</sup> De Rijk, "Two Short Questions", p. 12: *Hec scripta fuerunt leviter et sine multa consideratione. Credo tamen quod vera.*

*ens, maxime ens, prime Unum* (p. 4, 10, 11 – cf. *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 13, 22, 65, 73, 102, 127, etc.); *ens imparticipatum quod omnibus irradiat* (p. 4 and 7 – cf. *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 23, 24, 69, 162), which equally appears in the Moerbeke's translation of Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides*,<sup>17</sup> *primum deificatorum est ens* (p. 7 – cf. *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 138, 153); *Unum prime* (p. 8 – cf. *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 13); *neque Unum multum neque multitudo Unum* (p. 9 – cf. *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 5, 163, 164, 165); *divinus intellectus* (p. 9 – cf. *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 129, 182).

Despite his evident interest in Proclean metaphysics, the anonymous author is not persuaded by the arguments on Being and One. About the former he argues that it is impossible to conceive an absolutely simple being, without *quia*, *quantum* or *quale*.<sup>18</sup> About the latter he expresses his doubts about the distinction between *Ipsum Unum* and *prime Unum*.<sup>19</sup>

This anonymous text must be included in any updated narration about the Western reception of the *Elements of Theology*. It represents yet another proof that Proclus was read in Paris in the last quarter of the 13th century, in a time when not only Godfrey of Fontaines, who owned (and even requested the copy of?) these *questiones*, but also Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, and Dietrich of Freiberg were either students or masters of the same university.

A half century later, the Latin West would know the first complete and overwhelmingly positive reception of Proclus, which coincides with an original and still largely underestimated intellectual project arguing that Aristotle's metaphysics is limited in its objectives and methods. This was Berthold of Moosburg's daring project.

17 Proclus, *In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria* III, ed. C. Steel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), lib. VII, p. 284, l. 8–9.

18 De Rijk, "Two Short Questions", p. 5: *Dicendum est quod aliquid non est ens quod sit Esse ipsum solum et cuius ratio sit essendi ratio solum sine appositione et determinatione. Et hoc apparet dupliciter. Prima quia ratio essendi non est ratio preter esse 'quid', 'quantum', aut 'quale'. etc.*

19 De Rijk, "Two Short Questions", p. 12: *Et quod videtur dubium in predictis, esset qualiter ab ipso Uno seu Unius abstracta vel absoluta ratione sit differre non per non-unum admixtum. Hoc autem non est necesse, quia si Unum Ipsum solum est tale ratione, non quia sic existat, tunc differret prime Unum ab ipso per aliter intelligi 'unum existere', non quia prime Unum ad 'unius' rationem addat aliquam multitudinem. Bene tamen est verum quod illud quod non est Ipsum Unum, est aliquid aliud existens quam Unum Ipsum secundum ratione⟨m⟩, precipue supponendo ⟨utrumque⟩ unius esse generis seu substantie ⟨et⟩ secundum aliquem eius modum habere rationem 'unius'. Sed hec hactenus.*

## 2 Berthold of Moosburg

Berthold of Moosburg was born in Bavaria, probably before 1290.<sup>20</sup> This can be inferred from the earliest report of his activities in 1315, when the Dominican chapter meeting held in Friesach dispatched him to Oxford, presumably for his advanced theological studies in the *studium generale*.<sup>21</sup> If his education followed the protocols of the order, by that time he would have been trained in the Dominican schools of logic and natural philosophy for about five years, and perhaps had already lectured in the schools of logic for two to three years.

In Oxford, Berthold would have studied with scholars like the Dominican master of theology Nicholas Trevet (1257/65–c. 1334), whose commentaries on ancient literature, philosophy, and theology locate him in a group of writers now known as the “classifying” friars.<sup>22</sup> Oxford was a tumultuous place for the Dominicans at this time, due to a conflict between the mendicant and secular clergy that began in 1303 as to whether, among other things, a dispensation from the University was required in every case for a student to proceed directly to the theology doctorate after studying arts outside the University. Between 1312 and 1320 the fallout between the friars and the University had escalated so far that the regular stream of Dominican friars to the *studium* was often substantially interrupted.<sup>23</sup> In 1314, the English Dominicans appealed to King Edward II, and again in 1317 to Pope John XXII, requesting the repeal of the Statute of 1253 which resolved “the affair of Thomas of York”, a Franciscan whose exceptional case had set the precedent for the contested arrangement.<sup>24</sup>

20 For more literature on Berthold's life and the traces of his library, see L. Sturlese, “Introduzione”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. 184–211. De animabus*, ed. L. Sturlese (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), p. xv–lxxxiii; E. King, *Supersapientia. Berthold of Moosburg and the Divine Science of the Platonists* (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2021).

21 Th. Kaeppli, “Ein Fragment der Akten des in Friesach 1315 gefeierten Kapitels der Provinz Teutonia”, in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 48(1978), p. 71–75, at p. 72: [...] *guerrarum strepitum, quibus quasi tota ian<vensis> provincia affligitur et gravatur. Hoc anno intermissimus studia artium et philosophiae, volumus <tamen> et inponimus prioribus universis qui in suis conventibus habent aliquos juvenes ap<tos et> habiles ad profectum, quod ipsis aliquem fratrem proficiant qui eis aliquid de naturis <...>bus legere teneatur, quos etiam volumus a discursibus suportari. [...] Mictimus <in Ang>liam fr. Berchtoldum de Mospurg.*

22 B. Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960).

23 A.B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957–59), p. 95 and p. 987.

24 See the literature cited in F. Retucci, J. Goering, “The *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York, OFM. The Fortunes and Misfortunes of a Critical Edition”, in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 52(2010), p. 133–155.

Over these years Berthold mostly likely discovered the *Sapientiale* of the same Thomas of York (c. 1220–d. before 1269), a metaphysical summa which became for Berthold a sort of *vade mecum* of classical and Arabic philosophy.<sup>25</sup>

Brief glosses on Dietrich of Freiberg's *De iride et radialibus impressionibus* indicate that Berthold gave a commentary on Aristotle's *Meteorology* III.5 (on the pole of the rainbow) in 1318, while also relying on Dietrich's calculations.<sup>26</sup> Along with Berthold's own, more extensive glosses on Macrobius' *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, most of which can be dated to before 1323, these suggest that Berthold was tasked with teaching natural philosophy after leaving Oxford.<sup>27</sup> These glosses on Macrobius demonstrate Berthold's familiarity with texts on philosophical theology, astronomy, arithmetic, and harmonics, and above all with the *Elements of Theology*, which he cited ten times. Shortly after writing these glosses, Berthold made his first in-depth study of the *Tria opuscula* of Proclus.<sup>28</sup> These showed him a Platonic criticism of Aristotle's metaphysics that argued for a superior and more ancient anthropological theory ("the one of the soul" above intellect) that would be decisive for his understanding of the rationale and higher purpose of the *Elements of Theology*.

In 1327, Berthold appears as a lector in the Dominican convent in Regensburg, where he may have been teaching theology. Then, from 1335 to 1361, we find him named four times in the city records of Cologne, which identify him as an executor to the will of a beguine named Bela Hardevust. At some point in this period, perhaps nearer to 1335, he taught theology at the *studium generale* in Cologne. Berthold perhaps worked on his *Expositio super Elementationem*

25 For the most recent synthesis on Thomas' pervasive influence on the *Expositio*, see Fiorella Retucci's contribution to this volume.

26 MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.30, f. 56v–57r. See L. Sturlese, "Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P., scienziato e filosofo", in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32(1985), p. 249–259, at p. 250: *Descriptio figurae, in qua explicatur intentio Philosophi in III Meteororum, cum textus expositione inventa a fratre Bertoldo de Mosburch ordinis praedicatorum anno Christi 1318*.

27 MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 11r–44r. On this manuscript, see L. Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xxiv–xlii; L. Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen zu Leben und Werke Dietrichs von Freiberg* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 73–76; H. Boese, *Wilhelm von Moerbeke als Übersetzer der Stoicheiosis theologike des Proclus. Untersuchungen und Texte zur Überlieferung der Elementatio theologica* (Birkenau: Bitsch, 1985), p. 76–77.

28 Berthold's text of the *Tria opuscula* was later bound with his copy of Macrobius. See MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31: f. 46r–59r (*De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*); f. 59v–68v (*De providentia et fato*); f. 70r–82va (*De malorum subsistentia*). For a critical edition of these treatises, see Proclus, *Tria opuscula (De providentia, libertate, malo). Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeke vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta*, ed. H. Boese (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960).

*theologicam Procli* over this period, but it is equally possible that he began his project after reading the *Tria opuscula* in the early 1320s.

In 1348, we find Berthold in Nuremberg, where he is identified as a vicar to the province of Bavaria. This coincided with the expulsion of the Dominicans from Cologne (1346–1351). During this period, Berthold would have been in contact with the community of Dominican nuns in Engelthal, which was a major centre of vernacular spiritual literature in the 14th century. The writings from Engelthal contain at least one, possibly three, trace(s) of his pastoral activities there, and suggest that his relationship with this community in his home province antedated his vicariate.

Berthold resigned his executorship of Bela Hardevust's will in Cologne in 1361. Since the texts it seems he bequeathed to the Dominican library in Cologne began to disperse around the feast of Pentecost in 1363, we may assume that he died sometime between 1361–1363. Berthold of Moosburg's only extant work is his *Expositio*, which is now preserved in two 15th-century manuscripts (MSS Oxford, Balliol College Library, 224B; Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2192).

### 3 Worldly Philosophy

Berthold's rigorous and constant method of interpreting the *Elements*, with a *suppositum, propositum et commentum* applied to virtually all of its 211 propositions is unique and impressive. So too is the use of sources throughout the entire text: he never wearied of citing author after author, always choosing what seemed most appropriate for his own purposes. Each of Berthold's choices, to cite some authors and ignore others, was significant. One could argue that these can be explained by his context: the libraries in Cologne or Regensburg or wherever he worked on his text did not always have the same texts – that is a fact that nobody will contest. However, the *Expositio* gives the impression that Berthold went from Proclus to the sources and not from the sources to Proclus. His regularity in citing the same sources throughout the *Expositio* gives the impression that he carefully planned his commentary. One could assume that he had a good knowledge of the *Elements of Theology*, and that he prepared thematic files with citations for each of the 211 propositions. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that he discovered each of the propositions of the *Elements* while he was commenting on them or that he wrote such an extensive text without preliminary preparation. Being the first in the Latin world to undertake such a project, he did not have a model to copy: he came with a method, a structure, and a plan. There is also the Index of terms that he seems



to have produced himself in order facilitate a clearer and rapid access to the content of the *Expositio*.

One of the most fascinating and also complex ways to approach Berthold's *Expositio* is to unfold his understanding of *theologia*. Each of the three introductions to the *Expositio* (the *Prologus*, the *Expositio tituli*, and the *Praeambulum*) opens with a reflection on *theologia* or the *theologus*. Like a Platonic dialogue, the opening lines of the *Prologus* set the entire framework – and in this case, it is a line pronounced by St. Paul, the highest theologian of the divinizing wisdom, regarding the sages of worldly philosophy: “summus divinalis sapientiae theologus Paulus loquens de mundanae philosophiae sapientibus”. St. Paul, after acquiring *in raptu* the knowledge of God's mysteries, concedes (Rom. 1:19–20):

[Q]uia quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis: Deus enim illis manifestavit [Berthold: revelavit]. Invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque eius virtus et divinitas [...].

Immediately thereafter, Berthold introduces a choir of authorities – Christian (Western and Eastern), Jewish, and Muslim alike – that unfolds and supports Paul's verdict in a polyphonic orchestration: Ambrose, Gundissalinus, Dionysius the p.s.-Areopagite, Algazel, Maimonides, John of Damascus, Peter Lombard, the *Glossa ordinaria*, Hugh of St. Victor, Augustine, Alfarabi, Thomas Gallus, and Maximus the Confessor (rather: what Berthold believed to be Maximus the Confessor). Berthold's intention is to produce a *symphonia*, that is a concord of Hellenic philosophy with Christian revelation. And that is manifest not only in these opening lines, but throughout the entire text. This constant quest for concord is the key for interpreting the *Expositio*. Building bridges is the quintessence of Berthold's intellectual project, and justly could it be linked to a tradition originated in the 2nd century with Clement of Alexandria and even earlier with Justin Martyr of Neapolis, born in the city of Marinus, Proclus' disciple and biographer.

In the three introductory texts of the *Expositio*, Berthold sets a tension between theology and metaphysics, not (as a hasty reading might conclude) between theology and philosophy. *Theologia* for Berthold is a true science – that is nevertheless based on believed or trusted principles – about the *invisibilia Dei*, about beings beyond the senses and the intellect.

Cum enim Aristoteles [...] non ducat nos sursum in cognitivis et cognitionibus animae nostrae nisi usque ad intellectum et intellectualem operationem et nihil ultra hanc insinuet, Plato autem et ante Platonem

theologi laudant cognitionem supra intellectum, quam divulgant esse divinam maniam, et dicunt ipsam talem cognitionem esse unum animae.

*Praeambulum C*, p. 66

or

[E]x praedictis evidenter apparet scientiam istam in suorum principiorum certitudine ratione principii cognitivi, per quod circa divina versatur, non solum de omnibus particularibus scientiis, sed etiam metaphysicae Peripatetici, que est de ente in eo, quod ens, incomparabiliter eminere.

*Praeambulum*, p. 64–65

or

Ex dictis evidens est eminentia habitus supersapientialis scientiae Platonicae ad habitum sapientialem metaphysicae.

*Praeambulum*, p. 68

Aristotelian metaphysics offers, according to Berthold, a narrow understanding of reality. It limits objects to being as such (*ens inquantum ens*) and all knowledge to intellect. But principles beyond being as such are beyond sense, and therefore beyond the cogitative power, beyond the possible intellect, and beyond discourse.<sup>29</sup> The only language applicable to these invisible realities (*invisibilia*) is the language of *superiorities* used by St. Paul's "disciple" Dionysius the Areopagite (*scientia supersapientialis, excellentissima, divinis-sima, difficilima* etc.). And the only way to access these superior levels of reality is by ascending through reasoning, following Platonic principles, to intellect, and finally beyond intellect to the *unum animae*. To refrain from accessing this higher rung of realities, to refrain even from positing them, is to fail to fulfil the aim for which we have been created. That is not an intellectual option, one among others; it is a choice that goes beyond intellect and transforms the very nature of the human being.

Does Berthold oppose a *Plato Christianus* to an *Aristoteles Arabus*? One should resist the temptation to reduce Berthold's project to this simple equation. And one could immediately add: it is even irrelevant inasmuch as many of Berthold's borrowings from Peripatetic philosophy (Arabic or not) are already "altered" by the nuanced readings of Dietrich of Freiberg, Ulrich of Strassburg,

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29 Berthold's criticisms echo Proclus' own critical remarks against Aristotle (*De providentia et fato*, c. 8).

and Albert the Great. However, one must note that for Berthold, the *Book of Causes* is not a reasonable alternative. For him, unlike numerous other medieval authors (as previously mentioned), the *Book of Causes* is not a shorter or abridged version of the *Elements of Theology*. They are different in their method and in their object:

Ex praemissis summatim colligitur et forma seu modus procedendi in hoc libro et ratio nominis ipsius, quod a forma imponitur, scilicet elementationis theologicae, et quare non vocatur “prima philosophia” seu “metaphysica” aut “de pura bonitate” aut “de lumine luminum” vel “de causis causarum” aut “de floribus divinorum”, sicut quidam alii consimilem tractantes materiam, sed in excelsum dissimiliter a praesenti auctore suas editiones vocare curarunt.

*Expos. tit. K*, p. 48–49

The *Book of Causes* offers a science about superior causes analysed according to their functionality (that is, in relation to their effects); as such it is too remote from Proclus’ own interest which is to elevate the intellect toward the divine. Yet it is what is beyond the senses that one needs to understand, not the actuality or the act of being analysed in the *Book of Causes*, as Berthold expresses it clearly when discussing its famous fourth proposition (“the first of created things is being”):

[Q]uem quidam firmati in existentibus et non opinantibus aliquid esse super entia dicunt fore esse, sicut dicit auctor *De causis*: “prima rerum creaturarum est esse”. Esse autem est actus entis. Sed tales vocat Dionysius indoctos, in 1 cap. *De mystica theologia*, ubi dicit sic: “Istos autem dico (subaudi: indoctos), qui in existentibus sunt firmati nihil super existentia supersubstantialiter esse opinantes”.

*Expositio*, 71D, p. 35

It is an interesting interpretation of the fourth proposition, not only because he cites Dionysius (a reminiscence of Albert?) but because Berthold understands this first created thing as existence or the act of being. Interestingly, he does not comment on the links between Proclus’ Prop. 138 and the fourth proposition of the *Book of Causes*.

It is true that Berthold opposes Plato or Platonism (*Plato et ante Platonem theologi* – an expression taken for Proclus – or the *theologia divinalis Platoniorum*) to Aristotle or Aristotelianism. Nevertheless, he copies massively from and refers explicitly to Aristotelian texts: for example, he copies,

wittingly or not, Albert's commentary on the *De causis* through Ulrich of Strassburg; he also possessed and read Albert's autograph commentaries on Aristotelian texts, such as his commentary on *De animalibus*. He also reads and copies astrological texts from Peripatetic philosophers. Berthold's project is theological in the broad sense, it is about *invisibilia Dei transitive accepta* on which both Pagan and Christian authors have written, and which has all the characteristics of a science. It is a *scientia Platonica*, under every aspect superior to Aristotle's metaphysics, which nevertheless remains a *philosophia prima* or, as Ruedi Imbach puts it in a recent article,<sup>30</sup> an "Agatho-theology", given Berthold's tendency to accentuate the priority of Good over the One in his interpretation of Proclus.

#### 4 Retrieving Berthold of Moosburg

This volume and the three days of conference proceedings that preceded it<sup>31</sup> are equally a tribute to Loris Sturlese and to the team of researchers formed by him over the years who edited Berthold's lengthy commentary. Loris Sturlese's work began with his PhD thesis, published in 1974, consisting in an analysis of the manuscripts, the historical context, and a partial edition of Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio*. Gradually connecting Bochum and Lecce, he joined the editorial project around the work of Dietrich of Freiberg, formed collaborators, and coordinated the publication of the entire commentary within the series *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevii*, now comprising thirty-eight volumes. The entire text of Berthold's *Expositio* is now published, but the last volume, comprising the index of sources, is still in preparation. We considered that it was important, indeed necessary, to celebrate this work of over forty years and to encourage further studies on Berthold.

Paul Hellmeier provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of Berthold's use of biblical authorities in the *Expositio*, and argues that these citations have a profound significance for understanding Berthold on the relation between pagan philosophy and Christian revelation. Hellmeier first establishes the precise number of references to Scripture in the *Expositio* (194 citations). He finds

30 R. Imbach, "Au-delà de la métaphysique. Notule sur l'importance du Commentaire de Berthold de Moosburg OP sur les *Éléments de théologie*", in Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes*. Vol. 1, p. 376–393.

31 Conference organized by D. Calma and E. King at University College Dublin, on October 23–25, 2019, with the support of the ERC NeoplAT CoG Grant (771640), the School of Philosophy (UCD) and the Museum of Literature Ireland, Dublin.

that the biblical texts most frequently cited by Berthold were, from the Old Testament, the book of Wisdom and the Psalms, and, from the New Testament, the Pauline Epistles. The distribution of biblical citations in the *Expositio* is uneven. Almost half in the entire commentary occur in the *Prologue* (73 citations). Almost all of these, as Hellmeier's appendix to his study shows, were Berthold's additions to the text and were not incorporated from other direct sources. It was otherwise for the Scriptural citations in the main body of the commentary itself, where most of the biblical citations in the *Expositio* were taken over indirectly and through another source (mostly Honorius Augustodunensis, Dionysius, Thomas of York, or Augustine). These citations cluster around the propositions of the *Elements of Theology* devoted to the gods (Propositions 115–159) and those concerning the soul, contemplation, and the spiritual body (Propositions 184–211).

All these citations are considered by Hellmeier in his thematic case studies of Berthold's use of the Bible on the transcendence of the One, the primordial causes, the Trinity, contemplation, and the Resurrection. The way Berthold used Scripture for these central doctrines in the *Expositio*, Hellmeier argues, indicates that we should not speak of "an equal coexistence of pagan wisdom and the Christian concept of revelation" in the *Expositio*, but rather a synthesis of pagan and Christian wisdom "formed under the clear auspices of Christian doctrine" (p. 47).

Alessandra Beccarisi unveils the importance of Avicbron's *Fons vitae* for Berthold's theory of essential causality. Beccarisi emphasizes that Berthold's *Expositio* represents not only the most extensive medieval reception of Eriugena (as King and Ludueña have shown elsewhere), but also of Avicbron (p. 62).

Berthold's lengthy discussions of essential causality while commenting on Propositions 18 and 172 show that he borrows three key features from Avicbron's metaphysics. (1) "God does not give himself, but what He has *apud se*, that is *forma universalis*", which acts by necessity (p. 63), an action that proceeds from the God through the mediation of God's Will. (2) "Only *radii et vires* [i.e. perfections] of the substances are communicated" (p. 64) to the inferior realities, not the substances themselves, otherwise one would have to admit that created substances can create from nothing. (3) God's Will, different from His Intellect, "is the link between God and creation, a first hypostasis of the divinity that is – at the same time – a hypostasis external to God (...) and an aspect of the divine essence" (p. 65). From Dietrich, Berthold borrows notably the idea that the agent intellect (*intellectus in actu*) is an essential cause and that it contains its own effects. He then distinguishes, like Dietrich, between essential and accidental causes, and between essential and substantial causes. However, unlike Dietrich, Berthold applies the definition of

essential cause exclusively to the agent intellect, excluding God and the celestial souls. It is, according to Beccarisi, a significant difference between the two authors, enabling us to understand the role of Avicbron. Berthold argues that God (*prime Deus*) is beyond the intellect, and we can know only His will (*voluntas Dei*) identified with Proclus' *prime bonum*. The creative flow pouring out of God's essence is neither an impersonal nor a necessary act, but the result of God's creative will. Through the essential chain of emanating forms, we can turn to the noblest intellectual object: *voluntas Dei*.

Fiorella Retucci's main goal is to show that both Berthold of Moosburg and Thomas of York "converge on two points: first, the attempt to recover the classical and ancient heritage, aimed at founding self-sufficient philosophical wisdom and, second, the emphasis on the continuity of the Platonic tradition" (p. 89). According to Thomas, the truth can manifest itself either through Scripture or through rational inquiry. The former allows a broader participation of human being in wisdom, whereas the latter is accessible to very few due to its inherent difficulty. However, Thomas establishes a hierarchy between these fields by attributing a greater value to rational investigation than to belief. Human beings can "emancipate themselves from bestiality and, by their own effort, obtain the dignity of humanity"; they "alone are responsible for the perfection of their own nature" (p. 92), and can ultimately be assimilated to God.

Berthold endorses Thomas' views and equally argues that "divine revelation is not necessarily needed for the well-exercised human intellect" (p. 94). The philosophers' specific way of attaining the knowledge of God is through an oblique vision (*per motum obliquum*), and this knowledge is partial. They can also enjoy a direct vision (*rectus motus*) which is not an alternative to philosophy, but it is given to those who have previously searched to obtain an oblique vision. "The idea of God is, in fact, naturally present in the human intellect", hence "no human being is (...) deprived of the knowledge of God" with all His particular qualities (i.e. unity, trinity etc.) (p. 95). Thomas and Berthold agree on this view, and they found in Platonism a confirmation of their intuition. Considered as such, as a "perfect and self-sufficient wisdom", philosophy, and more broadly pagan wisdom, is neither subordinated to theology nor integrated in a system of revelation. They legitimately coexist autonomously and independently of each other. More specifically, the Platonic tradition is for both Thomas and Berthold the only philosophical "valid science of the divine" (p. 101), in all aspects superior and closer to truth than the Aristotelian tradition. Retucci provides in the Appendix a list of all citations from Thomas' *Sapientiale* in the *Expositio*.

Henryk Anzulewicz argues that Albert the Great's thought is a key element in the understanding of Berthold's intellectual project. First Anzulewicz

reassesses the previous historiographical research on Berthold, observing a certain tendency in scholarship to underestimate the role of revealed theology in respect to natural or immanent philosophy. It is undisputable that the core of Berthold's work is the idea that Proclean metaphysics in particular, and Platonism in general, is the summum of philosophical theology. Yet one major question remained unanswered: is this philosophical theology a philosophical revelation? Anzulewicz argues that the solution lies in Berthold's theory of intellect, which depends extensively on Albert the Great (without denying the role of Dietrich). Anzulewicz argues that the influence of Albert is stronger than has been previously acknowledged, notably in respect to the Peripatetic doctrine of *intellectus adeptus* that represents the foundational layer for Berthold's views on the divinization of man, upon which the Proclean concept of *unum animae* is grafted.

The first aspect discussed is Berthold's tripartite typology of the divine intellect (*secundum causam, secundum existentiam, secundum participationem unitatis*). Albert used the same concept already in his early works, such as the *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, primarily on the basis of Dionysius the ps.-Areopagite and the *Book of Causes*, but it soon became part of his intellectual speculation used throughout his entire career. Berthold's twofold distinction between the *intellectus separatus simpliciter* and the *intellectus non-proprie separatus* depends on both Proclus and Dietrich, yet one must also note ideas and even passages tacitly copied from Albert's *Commentary on the Metaphysics*. A third aspect where one can recognise the influence of Albert's noetics is the description of the six intellects involved in any cognitive process (*intellectus speculativus / contemplativus, practicus / operativus, adeptus, possibilis, formalis, universaliter agens*). However, Berthold, unlike Albert, distinguishes between these intellects according to their theoretical or practical goal. These differences do not rule out that Berthold was inspired by Albert. On the contrary: as Anzulewicz points out, Albert the Great is for Berthold the model to interpret the *littera Procli*.

Ezequiel Ludueña brings to light new citations of Thomas Aquinas in the *Expositio* and argues for their importance in Berthold's metaphysics. At the present state of research, the quantitative presence of Aquinas seems limited. Ludueña identifies three new citations of Thomas in the *Expositio*, bringing the total to 15 citations. Nevertheless, Ludueña argues that Berthold drew upon Aquinas for two aspects of his distinctive interpretation of Proclus' gods (their ontological status and their causal function).

According to Berthold, there are six gods or unities, which are principles immediately subordinate to the One. These six gods, presupposing the absolute and creative influence of the One, are the origins of the universal formal

determinations of power, being, life, intellect, soul, and nature. Unlike every other entity created by the One, each god originates its own formal series and exists as determinate unity without being composite. In other words, each god, considered as a formal cause, is a “simple one” and is *per se* subsistent. Ludueña shows that Berthold used Aquinas’ commentary on the *Book of Causes* for “another, more developed, way of explaining how the *unitates* are an *unum per essentiam* even if they participate in the absolute One” (p. 187), even though Aquinas had rejected the Platonic doctrine of separate forms or gods. He also proposes that Berthold was inspired by Aquinas’ account of instrumental causality in his frequent descriptions of the gods as “instruments” of the One, and in his explanation of how the gods “cooperate” with the One through its causal power.

Ludueña suggests that there may be a lingering tension between these two aspects of Berthold’s interpretation of the gods, that is, between their status as self-constituted formal principles and as instruments of God’s efficient causality. Berthold’s recourse to Aquinas on the *Book of Causes* for these central metaphysical questions, he concludes, is proof that Berthold read the *Elements of Theology* through an interpretative tradition thoroughly formed by the *Book of Causes*.

Tommaso Ferro revisits the question concerning the extent of Berthold’s debt to his German Dominican predecessors. Scholars now take for granted that Albert the Great and Dietrich of Freiberg had an enormous influence on Berthold’s metaphysics, his theory of intellect, and his methods for establishing the relationship between pagan philosophy and Christian theology. Ferro argues that Berthold’s interpretation of the Augustinian distinction of natural providence (*providentia naturalis*) and voluntary providence (*providentia voluntaria*), which was fundamental to the *Expositio*, was inspired by Ulrich of Strassburg’s *De summo bono*.

Berthold’s primary concern with distinguishing the methods of “the philosophizing theologians or theologizing philosophers” and the theologians, rather than their aims or objects, Ferro maintains, has more in common with Ulrich, who frequently superimposes the objects of revealed theology and natural philosophy, than with Albert or Dietrich, for whom the separation is stricter. Proclus’ status in Berthold as a pagan touched by divine grace (*apud* I. Zavettero, p. 219) is more intelligible within the framework of the *De summo bono*, where philosophical and theological questions are considered (Trinitarian theology, grace, the sacraments, etc.). Ferro then examines certain overlooked passages in the *Expositio* devoted to the nature of the divine intellect, its causality, and providence (Propositions 114, 121, 141, 144). In all these cases, Berthold relied on Ulrich’s principles to explain why “Intellect” is



the most proper name for God and how the essential causality of the divine intellect – its providence – grounds the stability, order, and intelligibility of the cosmos. The doctrine of natural providence thus accounts for the possibility of knowing “the invisible things of God from the creation of the world” (Rom. 1:20). Berthold’s reliance on Ulrich for these pivotal doctrines is evidence, Ferro contends, that Martin Grabmann was correct to call Ulrich the “co-founder” of the Dominican school in Cologne.

Evan King’s aim is twofold: on the one hand, to provide an overview of the presence of Dietrich of Freiberg in Berthold’s *Expositio*; and on the other hand, to examine the similarities and differences between the two Dominicans. King emphasizes that, on average, Berthold cites Dietrich twice in each commented proposition. In the *Expositio*, there are only two explicit references to Dietrich, yet Berthold’s familiarity with the latter’s thought is astonishing, as it becomes clear from the very useful table presented by King: the *Expositio* contains, in 228 sections of the text, 464 citations from almost all of Dietrich’s known works.

King equally examines the doctrinal impact of Dietrich on Berthold’s theories of transcendentals, of time and eternity, of the doctrine of causality, and of theology as a science. The last is unexpected inasmuch as, according to King, it bares the traces of one of Dietrich’s lost works: the *De theologia, quod sit scientia secundum perfectam rationem scientiae*. A careful examination of the terminology and a patient reconstruction of the polemical context of the late 13th-century University of Paris, notably the debate between Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, enable King to conclude that one can see in the *Praeambulum* the reflection of Dietrich’s endorsement of Godfrey’s distinction between the certitude of evidence and the certitude of adhesion. The aim of Berthold’s own position is to show that “Platonic philosophy (...) both meets and exceeds the Aristotelian criteria for demonstrative scientific procedure” (p. 266), by substituting Platonic philosophy for Dietrich’s revealed theology. Platonic wisdom “has the same scientific structure, proportionately speaking, as the other genuine sciences, except the purely mathematical”. Berthold and Dietrich have different agendas, echoing their diverse understanding of the relation between pagan and Christian rational traditions. For Dietrich, the difference between these two traditions would only be overcome in the end of time, whereas for Berthold, they have already been overcome in the Golden Age of ancient Platonism.

Loris Sturlese analyzes Berthold’s theory of deification in its historical context. For Sturlese, Berthold’s discovery of the hierarchy of immutable causes in Proclus had a precise anthropological significance that addressed a debate concerning the dignity of the individual human soul, which occupied writers of Latin and German literature in the 14th century.

According to Berthold, following Thomas of York, the intellectual ascent to God occurs in three ways, corresponding to “the three movements” of angels and souls described by Dionysius. Sturlese finds that Berthold modified Dionysius to emphasize that the vision of God is a prerogative of the “oblique” movement, which corresponds to the soul’s ascent through discursive, philosophical reason. Berthold then focalized this theory on Proclus’ own perfect realization of all three intellectual movements. This not only makes Proclus a prototype of the divine man (*homo divinus*), it also makes his anthropology of the one of the soul (*unum animae*), with its concomitant metaphysics of the One and Good beyond Being, the benchmark for philosophical wisdom. Here Dionysius was being assimilated to Proclus: Berthold judged Proclus’ formulation of the *unum animae* “clearer” than Dionysius’, Sturlese proposes, because Proclus had rationally demonstrated that the soul’s sensible and intellectual activities depend on a principle that grounds the division of knower and known. If the human condition for Berthold is precisely “that of living in the unawareness of bearing within oneself a secret vestige of the One” (p. 295), then, in one sense, the rational awareness of this dignity is the fruit of the discursive reflection Berthold so valued in Proclus. Compared to Dietrich of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart, Berthold’s notion of a principle beyond intellect, and his citations of the *Mystical Theology* of Dionysius, placed a greater emphasis on the possibility (and difficulty) of experiencing a transitory union with God in this life. Berthold thus united the two orders of natural and voluntary providence, metaphysics and eschatological merit, in his theory of the *unum animae*. Sturlese concludes by asking whether there is still a lingering tension between these two sides of deification in Berthold, that is, between the soul’s natural, metaphysical condition as divine and its realization of union with God in becoming.

Wouter Goris compares the views of Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strassburg and Berthold of Moosburg on the first principle’s freedom (to act) in relation to its will (*voluntas*) and omnipotence (*omnipotentia*). Goris underlines that Aristotle’s definition of “the free” as *causa sui* inspired Plotinus’ *Enneads* VI.8, whereas Proclus, who does not mention it in the *Elements of Theology*, discusses the concepts of the self-sufficient (*autarkes*) and the self-constituted (*authupostaton*). The author of the *Book of Causes* does not want to cut the ties with the Aristotelian tradition and preserves the notion of *causa sui ipsius*.

Goris emphasizes the structural differences between Albert’s and Berthold’s views on freedom (which echo the more general aims of their intellectual projects): the former tries to harmonize the Platonic and the Aristotelian traditions, while the latter accentuates the contrast between them, clearly preferring one over the other. Albert, faithful to the Aristotelian concept of *causa sui*, “introduces necessity into the concept of freedom he attributes to the first

principle" (p. 311) yet argues in favor of a Platonic concept of absolute freedom, compatible with the freedom of choice. Ulrich of Strassburg transforms Albert's discussion by stressing the compatibility of freedom and necessity; hence, the Aristotelian concept of freedom, still very important in Albert, "is reduced to a mere afterthought" in Ulrich. This tendency becomes even more salient in Berthold who relies on the Proclean triad *imparticipatum – participatum – participans*, and who insists on the notion of freedom in relation to what acts *per esse* (which Goris calls "the essence of a Platonic concept of freedom"), whereas both Albert and Ulrich discussed it in relation to *agere et non agere*. In the *Expositio* there is no room for the Aristotelian concept and vocabulary of freedom: *causa sui*, a self-refuting and self-contradictory concept according to Berthold, is replaced by *gratia sui* or *sui ipsius existens*. The only acceptable meaning of this concept of *causa sui* is in terms of formal and essential causality: "freedom is essential self-constitution" (p. 317).

Theo Kobusch situates Berthold's view on double providence in relation to the major figures of the long tradition of Neoplatonism (both Latin and Hellenic). According to Berthold, natural or essential providence enables us to know, through philosophically grounded propositions, more than the Aristotelian *ens inquantum ens*: they enable us to know God. Voluntary providence speaks about God according to the principles of the Christian faith through the hierarchies (angelic and human) endowed with free will, in which the divine retribution of rewards and punishments is manifested. These two modes of theologizing are neither contradictory nor mutually complementary; rather, voluntary providence is a complement, an aid to natural reasoning, a part that renders the whole perfect. Kobusch claims that the real original contribution of both Berthold and Dietrich to the history of Western philosophy consists in their effort to reverse the relationship of servitude: revealed theology loses its primacy in respect to all domains pertaining to philosophical theology (a view that could find echoes among contemporary Catholic theologians).

The Hellenic origin of this problematic cannot be overlooked. The topic is present in Porphyry, Proclus, Hermias, Hierocles of Alexandria, Simplicius, and is transmitted to Philoponus and John of Damascus. Kobusch emphasizes that, for the Neoplatonists, divine providence in its broadest understanding, as governance of the entire universe, is the subject of first philosophy, and it pertains to the metaphysician (understood as a theologian) to discuss necessity and contingency, freedom, ethics, and education. However, the major difference between the Neoplatonic and Christian understanding of double providence is the concept of care: for the former, divine providence does not contain any

form of direct or personal relation to individuals, whereas for the latter, divine providence is essentially turned toward humans. For example, unlike the former, the latter consider that through free choice (i.e., repentance) anyone can obtain divine forgiveness, and thus modify the retributions for their moral misconducts.

Alessandro Palazzo focuses on the central theme of natural providence in the *Expositio*, and considers how it arose from Berthold's reflection on the theory of providence and fate he found in Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy* and, most importantly, Proclus' three works on providence (*Tria opuscula*). Palazzo argues that there are two complementary approaches to the notion of providence in Berthold, one that is naturalistic and *a posteriori*, and another that is metaphysical-theological and *a priori*. Regarding the first, he observes that the only time the crucial passage from Augustine on twofold providence is cited in the *Expositio* is in Proposition 141A, which the Index (*Tabula contentorum*) identifies as a discussion of the distinction between providence and fate. This reflects Augustine's description of natural providence as what presides over physical phenomena (celestial motions and terrestrial causes). Palazzo then shows how Berthold builds on Ulrich of Strassburg, first with Boethius, and then with Proclus, who provides the clearest account of the hierarchical relation of the realms (*regna*) of providence (the presence of all things in the divine mind) and fate (the unfolding of that content in time, space, and the chain of causes). For Berthold, Proclus' approach autonomized the realm of nature, which can be studied according to its own laws and without reference to a higher level of reality. The top-down view of natural providence emerges in Proposition 121, where Berthold uses Proclus' notion of an essential order to establish that providence exists in God "causally" and in the gods or primordial causes "essentially" and "participatively". Palazzo insists that the dynamic relation between fate and providence should not be overlooked when considering the meaning of natural providence in the *Expositio*: it explains the presence of the extensive discussions of nature (Proposition 34) and celestial phenomena (Proposition 198) in the commentary and, therefore, it provides a more complete picture of Berthold's understanding of how the soul ascends to share in God's "providential cognition" through philosophical reason.

Sylvain Roudaut considers Berthold's complex views on forms, arguing that he developed an original theory of formal causality by adjusting doctrines inherited from various sources to the *Elements of Theology*. Roudaut shows that in the *Expositio*, light is not a metaphor (for creation) but has a metaphysical meaning and it is defined as the first (emanated) form. Light is a theoretical model allowing one to understand the diffusion of essence from the

divine unity to created beings. Indeed, Berthold claims that all divine unities (in Proclean terms: the gods following the One) are essentially identical and can be called uniform. “The Gods are constituted by a single formal intention, just like light in the physical real is the purest form” (p. 409)

Berthold’s view on “universal essence” (as Roudaut calls the theory of an essence, emanating in the intellectual light, and capable of different modes of being) is fundamental for his “theory of generation of natural forms at the lowest level of matter”. Roudaut equally indicates that Berthold’s distinction between *essentia* (characterizing *entia secundum speciem*) and *substantia* (characterizing celestial bodies and beings from the sublunar world) is echoed in the distinction between *forma essentialis* and *forma substantialis*. The former “refers to a form that does not inhere in a subject (...), an intention that more truly informs a subject without becoming one with it”, and the latter “refers to a part of the compound substance (...) restricted to designate the part of the hylomorphic compound” (p. 406). A second major conceptual distinction, equally deriving from the dichotomy previously explained, underlines the difference between *species* and *forma* (or *idea*). *Species* refers to specific reasons “that express intelligible features possessing a universal mode of being devoid of individual character”, whereas *forma* / *idea* refer “to the model from which an individual entity comes to being” (p. 407). Berthold inherits key-concepts from his German Dominican predecessors, but equally finds inspiration in Avicbron. His extraordinary capacity to combine sources enables him to innovate and to extend this heritage to themes absent both in Proclus and in the Latin tradition.

Michael Dunne compares Peter of Ireland (and marginally Thomas Aquinas) with Berthold of Moosburg on the so-called noetic triad: Being-Life-Intellect. The content of Proclus’ Proposition 102 of the *Elements* was known to Aquinas’ first master of philosophy, Peter of Ireland, through chapter XVII (XVIII) of the *Book of Causes*, that Peter cites at length in the prologue of his commentary on the *De longitudine et brevitate vitae*. However, as Dunne observes, Peter of Ireland is selective in his use of the quotation: he excludes those passages in the secondary propositions of the chapter XVII (XVIII) that refer to *scientia* and *intelligentia*, and preserves only those presenting the dependence of beings upon the First Being and of life upon the First Life. Peter explains that being is given *per modum creationis* and life *per modum formae*, inasmuch as, firstly, “life is to be found in living things in the way of a form and not in the way of a created thing” and, secondly, “life does not become actual, does not go out into being, by means of creation but only [...] by infusion” as any form does (p. 443). Berthold, while commenting on Proposition 102 of the *Elements*, distinguishes between life and living, and introduces the example of intellects

which, although they live, are not properly life. Berthold distinguishes eight levels of life, from *vita essentialis* and *vita intellectualis* to *ultima vita* which presupposes only vital movement (of nutrition).

Stephen Gersh's comparison of Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino documents the subtle transformations that constitute medieval and Renaissance Platonism. These three great representatives of the Platonic tradition share a common philosophical method and goal: in various ways, each thinker held that doxography (a reflection on the history of philosophy) was integral to the pursuit of philosophy itself. They also strove to demonstrate the profound compatibility of Platonism and Christian doctrine by appealing to the authority of Augustine and invoking the example of Dionysius the Areopagite. To illustrate the numerous important differences in these Christian Platonisms, Gersh provides a wealth of information in a series of case-studies of the authors' attitudes toward Hermes Trismegistus, Pythagoras, Plato, the Latin Platonists, Proclus, and, finally with Ficino, Plotinus and the Greek Platonists. In most instances, Gersh finds a shift from "the medieval phase" of Platonism, which includes Berthold and Cusanus, to "the Renaissance phase", represented in Ficino. In the broadest sense, these terms denote an author's access to new sources, with Cusanus regarded as a "transitional" figure by his use of humanist translations of Plato and Proclus, and Ficino's translations of Plato (published in 1484) and Plotinus (completed in 1490) inaugurating a turning point in the Platonic tradition in the West. What emerges from Gersh's analysis is that Proclus, as the author of the axiomatic *Elements of Theology* (Berthold), is eclipsed by Proclus, the commentator on the dialectical *Parmenides* (Cusanus), and finally by Plotinus, as the pre-eminent interpreter of Plato (Ficino), inasmuch as Proclus' polytheism was subjected to increased criticism.



The studies reunited here are not meant to provide an exhaustive panorama of Berthold's thought. Nevertheless, singly and in concert with one another, these contributions open paths for further investigation. We now can better appreciate the importance of vital sources for the *Expositio*, such as the Scriptures for Berthold's conception of the relationship between paganism and Christianity, Avicbron on the doctrine of *fluxus* and essential causality, and Thomas Aquinas' analyses of Proclus in his *Super Librum de causis Expositio*. How does Berthold's interpretations of Avicbron on essential causality and the doctrine of forms compare to those of Thomas of York, whose massive influence on the *Expositio* we are now in a position to gauge? Does his positive reception of

the *Fons vitae*, which departs so strikingly from Albert the Great's rebuttal of Avicbron's metaphysics, mark an original synthesis between the Franciscan philosophies from Oxford and the Albertist traditions of Cologne? In his reading of Proclus and Dionysius on contemplative felicity and even deification, was Berthold inspired more by the *Sapientiale* or by Albert, by Ulrich of Strassburg or by Dietrich of Freiberg? Much more remains to be done to measure the extent of Berthold's debt to his Dominican predecessors. Berthold was certainly reliant upon Albert, Ulrich, and Dietrich in numerous fundamental ways – in his conception of freedom, in his noetics, in his understanding of theology itself. Nevertheless, his modifications of and departures from his sources is even more striking and decisive. Have the boundaries of the historiography of the “German Dominican school” been confirmed or undermined? The impact of other Dominicans was previously overlooked, but there are now good proofs that further studies should be undertaken on the influence of Aquinas on Berthold.

The doctrine of natural and voluntary providence has received considerable attention in this volume. This is not, however, disproportionate to its weight in the *Expositio*. While not pretending to achieve unanimity on a subject that permeates every facet of the commentary, each study has nevertheless brought to light new aspects of the theory. We see how Berthold's project responded to a perennial question of the Neoplatonic tradition relating to divine care and the place of the human within the universal order. Moreover, Berthold's conception of natural providence served not only to demarcate the domain of philosophical inquiry relative to Christian theology, but also to lay the foundation for Berthold's philosophy of nature. Key influences on Berthold's interpretation of Augustine's notion of “twin providence” have also been reassessed (Proclus' *De providentia et fato*, Albert the Great, Dietrich of Freiberg) or highlighted for the first time (Ulrich of Strassburg). Berthold's endorsement of Proclean Platonism was unprecedented in the Middle Ages and, undoubtedly, scholars will continue to weigh the precise balance between pagan philosophy and Christianity in the *Expositio*, as we come to a clearer sense of how this remarkable synthesis of these traditions arose within its context.

Understanding Berthold's Christian Platonism also requires us to move from the *Expositio*'s immediate context, and the problematics it answered, to comparing it with other great syntheses of Platonism and Christian doctrine. The “medieval” features of Berthold's reception of Proclus come into much sharper relief when they are compared to the Platonisms of Nicholas of Cusa and Masilio Ficino. Further comparisons of Berthold's *Expositio* with the major receptions of Proclus in the Georgian commentary on the *Elements* by Ioane Petritsi (12th c.) and the Greek *Anaptyxis (Refutation)* of the *Elements* by

Nicholas of Methone (d. c. 1166) may yet help us to appreciate the distinctive features of these branches of the Platonic tradition.

Can one consider Berthold's project in terms of a renewal of medieval metaphysics? We would firmly respond with the affirmative, not because we need to justify the choice of the title of this volume but because the *Expositio* sets the plan of a different metaphysics, outside universities, outside the stream of the Aristotelian tradition, in a context and with a purpose that still remain to be explored. These papers bring forth numerous and solid arguments that Berthold's *Expositio* should not be ignored by any serious history of Western metaphysics.





**PART 1**

*Sources*





# The Meaning of the Biblical Citations in the *Expositio* of Berthold of Moosburg

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## 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Although for Berthold of Moosburg, as for any medieval Christian thinker, Scripture functions as a crucial source of doctrine, no one has yet looked in detail at the biblical citations in Berthold's *Expositio*. Perhaps this is because Berthold quotes other works and authors much more frequently and in more detail than the Bible. Nevertheless, the passages where Berthold quotes the Bible or alludes to it should not be overlooked.<sup>2</sup>

About a third of these quotations can already be found in the texts that Berthold takes over from other authors. These are a total of 14 authors, of whom Honorius Augustodunensis (with 23 citations), Dionysius the Areopagite (13 citations), and Thomas of York (9 citations) are the most important. In about two-thirds of the cases, however, Berthold himself inserts these biblical quotations into his commentary. Berthold's scriptural quotations are always short passages, usually only single verses or parts of verses. These quotations vary in their character, ranging from exact citations to somewhat modified citations, references, and allusions. The vast majority, however, are exact or slightly changed citations. In more than a third of these cases, Berthold shows through different formulations that he is consciously quoting the Bible. These quotations appear as single quotations or in small groups. In the latter case, they form a kind of network of mutual relationships – a technique found in many medieval biblical commentaries, e.g. in those of Albert the Great.<sup>3</sup> Often, these clusters of quotations appear in texts that Berthold has taken over from other

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1 I am grateful to Innocent Smith OP for his critical remarks.

2 For detailed documentation of the following statistics, see the Appendix.

3 For overviews of medieval exegesis and biblical hermeneutics see the classic studies of B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984<sup>3</sup>) and H. de Lubac, *Exégèse médiévale. Les quatre sens de l'Écriture*, 4 vols (Paris: Aubier, 1959–1964). For more recent studies, see *La Bibbia nel Medio Evo*, eds G. Cremascoli, C. Leonardi (Bologna: EDB, 1996); G. Dahan, *L'exégèse chrétienne de la Bible en Occident médiéval. XII<sup>e</sup>–XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle*

authors. These clusters tend to indicate that particularly important issues are being addressed, such as the Trinity, the resurrected body, beatitude, the primordial causes, etc. Berthold rarely offers interpretations of these biblical citations, but rather uses them to interpret the philosophical context in which they appear, or to contextualize the philosophical content of his commentary in a Christian frame.

These quotations are frequently found in volumes one, four, five, and eight of the critical edition. If we add up all the quotations indicated by the *Index auctoritatum* of this edition, we get the number 159. In addition, there are at least 38 other quotations and allusions overlooked by the editors,<sup>4</sup> which add up to 197 biblical references. However, since the *Index auctoritatum* contains several mistakes, the real number of biblical references is 194.<sup>5</sup> In other words, nineteen percent of Berthold's biblical citations have been overlooked. Here is the list of the omitted biblical citations, arranged according to the volume of the critical edition. This list shows that Berthold quotes some passages of the Bible particularly often, for example Romans 11:36 or passages from the Book of Wisdom.

Volume 1:<sup>6</sup>

Sapientia 9:15	p. 7, l. 56
Liber Proverbiorum 25:27	p. 7, l. 68–69
Psalmus 49(50):1	p. 12, l. 243–244
Ad Timotheum 1 6:15	p. 16, l. 349–350
Proverbia 9:1	p. 18, l. 420
Daniel 3:54	p. 18, l. 434

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(Paris: Cerf, 1999); id., *Lire la Bible au Moyen Âge. Essais d'herméneutique médiévale* (Genève: Librairie Droz, 2009).

- 4 By "overlooked citations" I mean citations, allusions, or references which are not mentioned in the footnotes of the text or in the *Index auctoritatum*.
- 5 For further details on these passages, see the Appendix. In a few cases, the index of the critical edition gives incorrect information about biblical citations present in Berthold's text. In one case the index refers to a biblical passage which does not exist in Berthold's text. Three times the editors list several biblical parallels in the apparatus corresponding to only one citation in Berthold's text. These parallels also appear in the indices, but without any indication that they are merely parallels. On rare occasions, Berthold quotes the same biblical passage twice on the same page of the critical text, which is mentioned by the editors in the footnotes, but is not indicated in the index. Also on rare occasions, the editors omitted biblical passages from the index which were indicated in the footnotes of the text.
- 6 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984).

Psalmus 144:3	p. 18, l. 435
Psalmus 144(145):13	p. 16, l. 360–361
Ad Timotheum I 6:16	p. 18, l. 432
Daniel 3:54	p. 18, l. 434
Canticum Cant. 2:9	p. 34, l. 944–945

Volume 2:<sup>7</sup>

Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:3	p. 196, l. 201–202
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Volume 3:<sup>8</sup>

Psalmus 94(95):3	p. 173, l. 98–99
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Volume 4:<sup>9</sup>

Psalmus 95(96):4	p. 208, l. 171
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Volume 5:<sup>10</sup>

Ad Romanos 11:36	p. 84, l. 36
Ad Romanos 9:5	p. 134, l. 321
Sapientia 11:21	p. 168, l. 79–80
Psalmus 35(36):9	p. 179, l. 191
Ad Corinthios I 15:28	p. 179, l. 194
Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:16	p. 191, l. 55–p. 192, l. 56
Ad Romanos 11:36	p. 211, l. 164

Volume 6:<sup>11</sup>

Ad Romanos 11:36	p. 9, l. 178; p. 40, l. 88; p. 136, l. 132
Evang. sec. Lucam 1:79	p. 70, l. 357
Ad Ephesios 3:15	p. 136, l. 137
Epist. Ioannis I 1:5	p. 171, l. 69

7 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986).

8 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 35–65*, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001).

9 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003).

10 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108–135*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011).

11 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007).

Sapientia 11:21	p. 199, l. 311
Volume 7: <sup>12</sup>	
Ad Timotheum I 6:16	p. 20, l. 151–152
Ad Romanos 11:36	p. 196, l. 259–260
Volume 8: <sup>13</sup>	
Cf. Evang. sec. Matth. 17:1	p. 25, l. 360–361; p. 185, l. 131–132
Cf. Sapientia 11:21	p. 77, l. 37
Cf. Ad Corinthios I 15:54	p. 130, l. 244
Psalmus 17(18):12	p. 188, l. 225–226
Psalmus 94(95):3	p. 188, l. 226–227
Isaias 12:4	p. 190, l. 22
Ad Romanos 8:21	p. 249, l. 87–88
Ad Corinthios II 4:18	p. 249, l. 93–94

One could object that the number 194 is not large (e.g. compared to the hundreds of citations of Aristotle or Augustine), and that these places are almost always single verses or even only partial verses that seem to get lost in the sea of the *Expositio*. However, the mere number is not decisive in this case, since, among all his other sources, the Bible has an authoritative status as revealed truth. This truth is unquestionable for him, as Berthold confirms on the last pages of his *Expositio* with a quotation from Honorius Augustodunensis:

Discipulus: De causarum omnium incommutabili perseverantia in ipsa divina substantia, quod est verbum Dei patris, in quo et per quod facta sunt et subsistunt, nullo modo dubitarim: Illud siquidem et divina Scriptura et sanctorum Patrum traditio incunctanter assertit.<sup>14</sup>

The prominent position that Berthold assigns to the Bible is also made clear by the fact that the *Expositio* begins with a citation from Rom 1:19–20:

12 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 160–183*, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003).

13 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 184–211*, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014).

14 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 211D, p. 262, l. 152–155 (“Disciple: In no way do I doubt the unchanging constancy of all causes in the divine substance itself, which is the word of the Father in and through which they are and exist. This both divine Scripture and the tradition of the fathers declare without hesitation.”).

INVISIBILIA ENIM DEI [Vulg. "ipsius"] A CREATURA MUNDI PER EA, QUAE FACTA SUNT, INTELLECTA CONSPICIUNTUR, Ad Rom., 1 cap.

Summus divinalis sapientiae theologus Paulus secretorum Dei consocius utpote in tertium caelum raptus loquens de mundanae philosophiae sapientibus, postquam dixerat: 'Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis: Deus enim illis revelavit', subiungit: 'Invisibilia Dei' etc.<sup>15</sup>

Since the final volume of the critical edition shows a substantial accumulation of quotations from St. Paul (there are fourteen quotations, six of which can be found in the last two propositions), one can perhaps even speak of a Pauline frame that encloses the entire *Expositio*. This can be seen in the following table of all biblical citations in the *Expositio*.

Volume	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total
<i>Propositiones</i>	1-13	14-34	35-65	66-107	108-135	136-159	160-183	184-211	
Pentateuch	5	1	-	-	4	1	-	4	15
Wisdom Books	47	2	1	1	11	10	1	5	78
Wisdom	(29)	(-)	(1)	(1)	(5)	(-)	(1)	(2)	(39)
Psalms	(8)	(2)	(-)	(-)	(6)	(10)	(-)	(2)	(28)
Prophets	5	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	8
									<i>O.T.</i> 101
Gospel	1	1	-	-	6	2	-	6	16
St. Paul	18	2	-	2	14	13	3	14	66
Cath. Epistles	2	2	-	-	1	6	-	-	11
									<i>N.T.</i> 93
<b>Total</b>	78	8	1	3	36	33	5	30	194

15 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 1, p. 5, l. 2-8 ("The invisible realities of God are perceived as recognized from the creation of the world through that which is created. Rom, ch. 1.

The greatest theologian of divinely inspired wisdom, Paul, knowing the secrets of God, having been raptured into the third heaven, thus spoke of the wise men of worldly philosophy. Before he had said: 'What is known of God is manifest to them, for God has revealed it to them.' Then he adds 'The invisible realities', etc.").



## 2 A First Analysis

Let us now take a closer look at the table indicating how the biblical quotations are distributed among the individual volumes of the critical edition and from which books and groups of books of Holy Scripture they come. What does this show? And what questions arise in view of this distribution?

First of all, there is a very uneven distribution of quotations: as already mentioned, most are found in volumes one, five, six, and eight. In addition, 73 of the 78 quotations of the first volume can be found in the *Prologus*, with only two in the *Expositio tituli* and three in Propositions 1–13.

A partial explanation for this distribution can be given for volumes five, six, and eight. In Berthold's view, the movement of ascent to the One begins in Proposition 108 (the opening proposition of volume five of the critical edition). Berthold explicitly mentions this turning point.<sup>16</sup> The remainder of the commentary concerns the gods or henads, the separate intelligences, and souls, and their relationship to the One and Good. However, Berthold interprets the henads as primordial causes and the One as the Trinitarian God. These two interpretations are very often supported and further explained by quotations from the Bible (see below). Berthold then discusses the major topics of contemplation and eschatology in volume eight (Propositions 184–211). These topics are also extensively treated in Holy Scripture and Christian theology, which can explain why Berthold repeatedly refers to the Bible here.

The table also illustrates the distribution of quotations from the Old and New Testament. We see here that quotations from the Old Testament slightly predominate, which is mainly due to the frequent quotations from the Wisdom Books. This frequency may be due to the fact that statements from the Wisdom Books are particularly suitable for philosophical representations. Incidentally, Meister Eckhart showed a strong interest in this group of writings for the same reason. Within the Wisdom Books, the Psalms are most prominent in the *Expositio*. After all, Berthold prayed the Psalms daily and probably knew them by heart from the time of his novitiate.

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16 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 108, p. 3, l. 7–11: *Postquam superius descensum est a causis seu unitatibus primordialibus et amethectis ad causata participantia per derivationem proprietatum, investigationem et ipsorum ordinum et distinctionem et ad se invicem connexionem, nunc auctor in isto elemento incipit ostendere reductionem quorundam causatorum in suas prime causas per duplicem participationem dicens: OMNE etc.*

Among the quotations from the New Testament, those from the Pauline epistles form the largest group.<sup>17</sup> I have already suggested above that St. Paul plays an important role for Berthold.<sup>18</sup> This central role is related to the fact that the tradition regarded St. Paul as the master of Dionysius – an identification emphasized by several statements of Pseudo-Dionysius himself.<sup>19</sup> However, in Berthold's view, Proclus had received fundamental impulses from Dionysius! This connection explains why for Berthold St. Paul is the *summus divinalis sapientiae theologus* and a *secretorum Dei conscius*.

### 3 More General Questions

In view of the 194 biblical citations in the *Expositio* more general questions also arise: What kind of citations are these and how does Berthold use them? Does he use them as authorities, or as evidence, or are they just decorative accessories? What is their purpose? Why do they even appear in a commentary on a philosophical work? For comparison: the Bible is never quoted in Albert's commentary on the *Liber de causis* (at least not explicitly). Do Berthold's biblical citations serve only to protect him against possible accusations of heterodoxy? Or do they have a deeper meaning for the whole *Expositio*?

This last question leads to another one, that is, the significance of Christian theology for the *Expositio*. In previous research, opinions differ on this issue. Willehad Paul Eckert said that Berthold wrote the *Expositio* as a theologian.<sup>20</sup> According to Kurt Flasch, Berthold did not want to become a "theologian of revelation"; instead he stuck to the "immanent philosophical character of his interpretations".<sup>21</sup> According to Loris Sturlese, the theme of grace plays a very subordinate role in the *Expositio*, and "there is no mention of sacraments, church, revelation, good works and faith".<sup>22</sup> In the eyes of Fiorella Retucci,

17 According to the medieval view I count Hebrews among the Pauline epistles.

18 See p. 33 of this contribution.

19 B.R. Suchla, *Dionysius Areopagita. Leben –Werk – Wirkung* (Freiburg: Herder, 2008), p. 15–17. Dionysius ps.-Areopagita, *De divinis nominibus*, ed. Ph. Chevallier, *Dionysiaca*, vol. 1 (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937), c. 2, 649D–652A, p. 117–118; c. 3, 681A–B, p. 130; c. 7, 865B–C, p. 381–382.

20 W.P. Eckert, *Berthold von Moosburg O.P. und sein Kommentar zur Elementatio Theologica des Proklos*, PhD diss. (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 1956), p. 51; id., "Berthold von Moosburg O.P. Ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik im Spätmittelalter", in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 65(1957), p. 131.

21 K. Flasch, "Einleitung", in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, vol. 1, p. xiv; p. xxxii.

22 L. Sturlese, *Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 2007), p. 146.

Berthold interpreted “the relationship between revealed religion and rational knowledge not in the sense of an integration of pagan wisdom into the Judeo-Christian concept of revelation, but rather as an equal coexistence.”<sup>23</sup> For Ezequiel Ludueña, on the other hand, Berthold wanted to “offer a Christian interpretation of Proclean thought”.<sup>24</sup> However, this strong assessment is immediately weakened by the statement that Berthold wanted to establish a dialogue between Dionysius and Proclus.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, for Ludueña, Berthold had tried to show a philosophical agreement of Christian, pagan, and Arabic thinking. Philosophy serves as a means of dialogue between Islam, Christianity, and pagan philosophy.<sup>26</sup>

#### 4 Five Thematic Groups

But let us now return to the question of the meaning of the biblical citations within the *Expositio*. A more detailed analysis of the citations is necessary to answer this. First of all, such an examination shows that almost all citations can be assigned to one of five thematic groups that often overlap, especially in the *Prologus*. The first group deals with the absolute position of the One and Good and its relationship to creation. The second group deals with the primordial causes, the third with the Trinity, the fourth with contemplation, and the fifth with eschatology and the Resurrection. Berthold presents all five themes in the *Prologus*, and thus uses many biblical quotations in the *Prologus* (73 in 35 pages) except in the case of eschatology and the Resurrection.<sup>27</sup> The following are some examples for each thematic group, first from the *Prologus* and then from the commentary itself.

23 F. Retucci, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, vol. 5, p. xvii.

24 E. Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela de Colonia*, (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013), p. 15; see also p. 94.

25 Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena*, p. 15.

26 E. Ludueña, “Eriúgena en el siglo XIV. Su presencia en la *Expositio* de Bertoldo de Moosburg”, in *Scintilla* 10(2013), p. 131.

27 For comparison, some examples of how often Berthold quotes other important authors (or works) in the *Prologus*: Dionysius ps.-Areopagita: 51; Augustine: 16; Proclus: 15; Albertus Magnus: 14; *Asclepius*: 12; Cicero: 4; Aristotle: 3; Dietrich of Freiberg: 2; Thomas Aquinas: 1; Averroes: 0.

#### 4.1 *The Absolute Position of the First One and Good and Its Relationship to Creation*

In *Prologus* 4 there is a passage that is typical for Berthold in its combination of quotations from the Psalms and from St. Paul. It reads:

De istis dis, super quod Deus ‘magnus, dominus et rex magnus’ <Ps 94:3>, ‘princeps Deus et superdeus supersubstantialiter unus Deus’, ‘nimis exaltatus’ <Ps 96:9> est, utpote ‘Deus deorum dominus’ <Ps 49:1>, sic dicit Dionysius ex verbis Apostoli <1 Cor. 8:5–6>: ‘Etenim si sunt di sive in caelo sive in terra, sicut quidem sunt di et domini multi, sed nobis quidem unus Deus Pater, ex quo omnia et nos in ipso, et unus dominus Iesus Christus, per quem omnia et nos per ipsum.’<sup>28</sup>

Here, through quotations from the Psalms and from Dionysius, the absolute superiority of the one God over the many gods is emphasized. Since Berthold understands these gods to be the primordial causes, the subsequent reference to St. Paul takes on a new meaning, since in the original Pauline context it is about the gods of the pagan religion and not about primordial causes. On the other hand, the quotation of St. Paul, who here is explicitly considered to be the source of Dionysius, also contributes further information: the one God who brings forth and sustains everything is the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.

In *Prologus* 9, Berthold first emphasizes the absolute superiority of God over the primordial causes with the same quotations from Psalms 94(95) and 96(97). Because of this superiority, God’s work and domain are also superior to those of the primordial causes. According to Berthold’s interpretation of Proclus, the primordial causes rule over only a portion of the universe. Thus their domains fall short of the perfection of God’s works. Berthold then describes the work of God as an eternal kingdom, using several verses from the Psalms (144[145]:13 and 148:6).<sup>29</sup> These biblical verses appear to function

28 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prologus* 4, p. 12, l. 218–223 (“About those gods, over which ‘the great God, the Lord and great king’ <Ps. 94(95):3>, the ‘first God and super-god, the super-substantial one God’ ‘is far exalted’ <Ps. 96(97):9> because he is ‘God, the Lord of gods’ <Ps. 49(50):1>, Dionysius says the following using the words of the Apostle <1 Cor. 8:5–6>: ‘Indeed, even though there are gods in heaven and on earth, to be sure, many “gods” and many “lords”, yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom all things are and toward whom we return, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom all things are and through whom we exist.’”).

29 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prologus* 9, p. 16, l. 353–362: *Cum igitur primordiales causae sint super totum universum principalissimae, ipsae sunt reges et domini et di, super quas et earum regna et dominia est Deus magnus, dominus et rex magnus super omnes deos* <Ps. 94(95):3>, *super quos etiam nimis exaltatus est* <Ps. 96(97):9>. *Unde et operi suo non*

as authoritative affirmations of the preceding argument, which is based on a statement of Proclus. The fluent and natural transition from philosophical principles to biblical quotations suggests a deep synthesis of philosophical and biblical reasoning.

A good example of Berthold using the Bible as an authority can be found in the commentary on Proposition 133. Here Berthold proves the opinion that in nature all things take the position that is best for them with the statement *Dei perfecta sunt opera*. This could be read simply as a philosophical argument. However, the formulation comes from Deuteronomy 32:4.<sup>30</sup> Berthold's argument is thus ultimately based on a statement that is taken directly from the Bible.

#### 4.2 *The Primordial Causes*

Since the primordial causes are also part of creation, they have already been dealt with in the first thematic group, insofar as they are inferior to God. In the second group, the primordial causes are considered in themselves. In this regard, too, Berthold applies statements from Scripture to the primordial causes. He does this almost exclusively by interpreting biblical images, especially from the Psalms, as metaphors and symbols for the primordial causes. One of the many examples of this can be found in *Prologus* 9, where Berthold writes:

Dicuntur autem primordiales causae 'caeli' <Ps. 148:4> [...], id est summi Dei domus, qui inhabitat caliginem et 'lucem inaccessibilem' <1 Tim. 6:16>, et 'posuit tenebras latibulum suum' <Ps. 17(18):12>; quae omnia significant ipsas primordiales causas.<sup>31</sup>

With such identifications Berthold apparently wants to show the concordance of biblical and Platonic wisdom. In this way new meanings are opened up for the biblical statements. However, Berthold also interprets the Platonic

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*est simile in omnibus regnis deorum, qui licet regnent et principentur in regnis suis secundum Proclum De malorum existentia, tamen quia regna sua sunt partiales universitates, partes scilicet totius universitatis, ideo deficiunt a perfectione eius, quae simpliciter omnia summi Dei opera est complexa, quae est regnum omnium saeculorum* <Ps. 144:13>; *cuius gloriam etiam ipsi di dicent, dicentes ipsum esse opus altissimi Dei, qui 'statuit ipsum in aeternum et in saeculum saeculi'* <Ps. 148:6>.

30 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 133H, p. 211, l. 175–p. 212, l. 183.

31 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 9, p. 14, l. 309–313 ("The primordial causes are called 'heavens' <Ps. 148:4> [...], i.e. house of the highest God, who dwells in darkness and in 'inaccessible light' <1 Tim. 6:16>, and who 'made darkness his hiding place' <Ps. 17(18):12>; which all means the primordial causes.")

understanding of the world in the light of revelation. This second consequence can also be seen in the continuation of the passage just discussed. Referring to Honorius, Berthold interprets the primordial causes as the water above which the Spirit hovered in the beginning (Genesis 1:2), which leads Berthold to explicate the creation of the primordial causes as the common work of the three divine Persons.<sup>32</sup>

On several occasions Berthold also makes use of Scripture by analogously applying to the higher causes statements that originally referred to the believer or to divine wisdom. He states in the *Prologus* that the primordial causes are built up in the Holy Spirit into a dwelling place of God (Ephesians 2:21–22).<sup>33</sup> In the commentary on Proposition 143, Berthold applies the words “the mirror of eternal light” and “image of his goodness” (Wisdom 7:26) to all higher causes.<sup>34</sup> In doing so, he does not reinterpret the meaning of Scripture, but he does extend its scope – as was usual for medieval authors.<sup>35</sup>

#### 4.3 *Trinity*

The Trinity is mentioned very early in the *Prologus*, since for Berthold it constitutes the first and most important component of the *Invisibilia Dei* (intransitively understood), which are explored in the *Expositio*. In *Prologus* 3, Berthold uses the three-part verse 1 Timothy 1:17 containing the keyword “invisible” and its Trinitarian interpretation by the *Glossa* to open his discussion of the Trinity. Then he makes several very clear dogmatic statements by contradicting the error of the Arians with quotations from Augustine and rejecting a false understanding of Colossians 1:15 (*qui est imago Dei invisibilis*). The Son is *homousion, id est coessentialis Patri*.<sup>36</sup> Later, Berthold talks again about the Son when,

32 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 9, p. 14, l. 313–p. 15, l. 320: *Sunt et ‘aquae,’ quae super caelos sunt, secundum expositionem Theodori in Clave, ubi exponit illud Gen. 1: ‘Spiritus domini ferebatur super aquas’ id est ‘super conditas causas cognitionis excellentia supereminet’. Ipse enim Deus deorum, scilicet Deus Pater, ‘dixit,’ id est Filium genuit, in quo ista divinissima ‘facta sunt’; ipse ‘mandavit’ istis divinissimis, scilicet primordialibus causis, ‘et creata sunt’ omnia in ipsis, id est per ipsas, per Spiritum sanctum, qui eas in effectus suos dividit et multiplicat.*

33 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 11, p. 19, l. 473–p. 20, l. 476.

34 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 143L, p. 70, l. 351–352. Berthold can apply those words to the higher causes since these causes can be understood as existing within the eternal Wisdom or Word of God. I am grateful to Evan King for making this suggestion.

35 See note 3, above.

36 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 3, p. 7, l. 77–p. 8, l. 91: *Circa primum sciendum, quod li INVISIBILIA DEI potest accipi dupliciter, vel intransitive, vel transitive. Primo modo, ut sit sensus: invisibilia Dei, id est quae sunt Deus, iuxta illud I Ad Tim. 1 cap.: ‘Regi saeculorum immortalis’ (Glossa: ‘immutabili’), ‘invisibili’ (Glossa: ‘incomprehensibili’), ‘regi saeculorum’ (Glossa: ‘Trinitati’). Augustinus libro De videndo Deo cap. 2 tractans verba Ambrosii sic*

following Hebrews 11:3, he states that we know by faith that the world was created by the Word of God.<sup>37</sup>

In *Prologus* 19, Berthold identifies the One and Good itself, which he presents here as the Beautiful itself, with the Trinity. In his introduction to the first volume of the critical edition Kurt Flasch observes the following: “Berthold pretended that the ‘One’ of Proclus was the Christian Trinity; without transition he also called the *prime pulchrum* the *superbenedicta Trinitas*.”<sup>38</sup> Now it is undoubtedly true that such identification was unthinkable for Proclus. But Berthold by no means makes this identification without transition; rather, he prepares it by the keyword *fontana pulchritudo* and then interprets that identification further using three quotations of the Bible. All three quotations deal with splendour and brightness and illustrate the admirable, even frightening beauty of the Son and the Holy Spirit that emerge from the paternal origin.<sup>39</sup>

It is well known that in the *Expositio*, Berthold twice explores the question of whether the existence of the Trinity can be recognized by the philosophers’ arguments (Propositions 40 and 131). Previous research has focused exclusively on Berthold’s affirmation of this question, but not on the role of the Trinity in his work.<sup>40</sup> I will not analyse this role here either, as it is not the subject of this contribution. But I would like to make two notes for now. First, the *Expositio* is interspersed with shorter remarks or longer elaborations on the Trinity. Secondly, these statements on the Trinity are very often introduced,

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*dicit: ‘Deus natura est invisibilis’. Et infra: ‘Arianorum procul dubio error astruitur, si Patris natura invisibilis, Fili vero visibilis creditur, utriusque unam pariterque invisibilem asseruit esse naturam adiungens et Spiritum sanctum’. Et infra: ‘Invisibilis igitur Deus natura, non tantum Pater, sed et ipsa Trinitas unus Deus.’ Haec Augustinus. Non solus Pater, sicut quidam exponunt illud Apostoli Ad Col. 1 cap., ubi loquitur de Filio, ‘qui est imago Dei invisibilis’ homousion, id est coessentialis Patri, et sic est invisibilis sicut et Pater.*

37 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prolog.* 3, p. 8, l. 115–116: Ad Hebr. 11: “Fide intelligimus aptata esse saecula Verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent.”

38 Flasch, “Einleitung”, p. xxi: “er tat so, als sei das ‘Eine’ des Proklos die christliche Trinität; übergangslos nannte er das ‘prime pulchrum’ auch ‘superbenedicta Trinitas’ [...]”

39 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prolog.* 19, p. 29, l. 776–788: *Aut secundum causam, puta primum: et enim pulchrum illud propter traditam ab ipso iuxta cuiuslibet proprietatem pulchritudinem, cum sit causa consonantiae et claritatis universorum et ad seipsum omnia vocans et tota in totis congregans ad idem. Et haec est fontana pulchritudo omne pulchrum in semetipso excedenter prae habens, ut dictum est, et hoc est prime pulchrum, superbenedicta Trinitas, ut de ea intelligatur illud: ‘Pulchritudinem candoris eius admirabitur oculus, et super imbrem expavescit cor’ <Eccl. 43:20>. Ecce candor lucis aeternae <cf. Sap. 7:26> et splendor gloriae paternae et figura substantiae eius <cf. Hebr. 1:3>, id est character substantialis et imago bonitatis illius; pulchritudinem, inquam, superpulcherrimam et candoris, scilicet Filii, et lucis paternae admirabitur oculus contemplantis, et super imbrem Spiritus sancti expavescit cor virorum gloriosorum deditum in virtute pulchritudinis studium habentium [...].*

40 The exception to this is Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena*, p. 146–154.

illustrated, or supported by biblical quotations. A typical example of this is the quotation from Romans 11:36 (*ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia*) in the commentary on Proposition 126, which initiates a highly speculative explanation of the relationship between *Trinitas* and *Unum*.<sup>41</sup> In the same proposition, a quotation from Genesis 1:2 introduces an analysis of the creative work of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.<sup>42</sup> Elsewhere, in Proposition 151, referring the paternal quality to God, which for Proclus belongs to the highest henad, Berthold cites three passages from the letters of St. Paul, and he even quotes extensively from the Nicene Creed.<sup>43</sup>

#### 4.4 *Contemplation*

I now turn to the last two topics, namely the theory of contemplation and the doctrines of eschatology and the Resurrection. Berthold repeatedly quotes the Bible in the *Prologus* when he addresses the ground and principle of the highest human contemplation. In this context he quotes Genesis 1:27 three times: *Fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam*.<sup>44</sup> Being made in the image of God makes man *capax Dei* and enables him to turn to God and to receive from God the beautiful ideas (*pulchritudines*) that are free from space and time.<sup>45</sup> Berthold defines the image of God in man more precisely as the *unum* of man, which is brighter than the simple intellect, and describes the way in which the *unum* is imprinted on man with the image of the seal mentioned in Psalm 4:7. Then, with an allusion to 1 Corinthians 13:12, he says that in the present, God is imperfectly seen by this image, but in the future he will be seen face to face.<sup>46</sup> This is the first reference in the commentary to the eschatological expectation that is understood in personal categories, since the beatific vision is not conceived as a vision of cosmological structures, but as a vision of God's face. Thus the eschatological perfection of man is presented here as a personal encounter with God face to face. This personal concept coincides with two other passages in the *Prologus* where Berthold, referring to other verses of the Bible, articulates the goal of contemplation as the vision

41 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 126A–B, p. 154, l. 10–p. 157, l. 97.

42 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 126B, p. 156, l. 77–p. 157, l. 91.

43 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 151A, p. 133, l. 33–40.

44 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 12, p. 21, l. 516–517; *Prol.* 18, p. 27, l. 730–731; *Prol.* 19, p. 32, l. 877–878.

45 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 18, p. 27, l. 729–734: *Sic ergo homo subnexus Deo vero et indicibili uni per suum unum, hoc est per divinam similitudinem – uno enim suo, quod est imago ipsius Dei, qua homo est capax Dei et connexus Deo, habet similitudinem Dei, immo est similitudo Dei et deus participatione –, est accipiens secundum Trismegistum pulchritudines non immersas mundo, hoc est continuo et tempore.*

46 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 19, p. 31, l. 858–p. 32, l. 878.



of the Son or Word,<sup>47</sup> who, of course, also includes the noetic structures of the cosmos. Like his master Dionysius, Berthold also refers to Philippians 4:7 when describing the ecstatic union of man with God: *Pax Dei, quae exsuperat omnem intellectum*.<sup>48</sup> The penultimate page of the *Prologus*, where Berthold discusses the soul's contemplative ascent to God, reads like a Psalm commentary. In fact, Berthold draws on the commentary of Peter Lombard on Psalm 41(42) (*Sicut cervus*).<sup>49</sup>

#### 4.5 *Eschatology and the Resurrection*

The subject of the Resurrection appears only once in the *Prologus*, when Berthold includes the blessed with their glorified bodies among the *invisibilia Dei* (transitively understood).<sup>50</sup> Even though this reference to the Resurrection is singular in the *Prologus*, nevertheless it should make us sit up and take notice. Resurrection is not a theme found in Proclus, and does not belong to *providentia naturalis* but to *providentia voluntaria*. Kurt Flasch's assessment thus appears highly problematic: "In the course of his investigation Berthold recorded the immanent philosophical character of the theories of Proclus' and his own interpretation with the formula *in ordine providentiae naturalis*."<sup>51</sup> The accuracy of this assessment seems even more doubtful when we consider how often Berthold deals with the glorified bodies of the resurrected in the actual commentary on the *Elementatio theologica*.

Berthold does this prominently and with explicit reference to *providentia voluntaria* in the commentary on Proposition 129. He first gives extensive quotations from Dietrich of Freiberg's arguments about the status of glorified bodies, "the bosom of Abraham" (Luke 16:22), purgatory, and hell. These are the places where the souls who have left their bodies will accept their bodies again in the future Resurrection.<sup>52</sup> But this is not all that Berthold has to say about the Resurrection. He wants to explain, using the example of man, what Proclus means in Proposition 129 about the top-down process of deification. According to Proclus, this process starts with the henads and, through mediation of the intellects and souls, extends to bodies. Analogous to this, for Berthold, drawing on Dionysius and Proclus, the deification of man begins with the union of the "one in us" with the divine One. Because of the connection of the "one in us"

47 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 19, p. 29, l. 785–786; *Prol.* 21, p. 34, l. 968–973.

48 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 17, p. 26, l. 683–684.

49 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 20, p. 33, l. 939–p. 34, l. 967.

50 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 6, p. 13, l. 279–280.

51 Flasch, "Einleitung", p. xxxii: "Mit der Formel 'in ordine providentiae naturalis' hielt Berthold im Laufe seiner Untersuchung den immanent-philosophischen Charakter der Theorien des Proklos und seiner, Bertholds, Auslegung fest."

52 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129A, p. 176, l. 94–p. 177, l. 130.

with the human intellect, which in turn is connected with the soul, deification finally reaches the body.<sup>53</sup> Berthold thus expresses the result:

Et sic participatio divinitatis transit per omnia media usque ad deificationem corporis. Et sic, ut dicit Bernardus, totus homo perget in Deum et deinceps adhaerens ei unus cum eo spiritus erit <1 Cor. 6:16>. ‘Quomodo stilla aquae modica multo infusa vino deficere a se tota videtur, dum et saporem vini induit et colorem’, ‘sic omnem tunc in sanctis (scilicet quando quasi ebrii ab ubertate domus Domini <Ps. 35(36):9> quodammodo obliti sui ipsorum fuerint) humanam affectionem quodam ineffabili modo necesse erit a semet ipsa liquescere atque in Dei penitus transfundi voluntatem. Alioquin, quomodo erit Deus omnia in omnibus <1 Cor. 15: 28>, si in homine de homine quidquam supererit? Manebit quidem substantia, sed in alia forma, alia gloria aliaque potentia’. Haec Bernardus. Sic enim implebitur homo ‘in omnem plenitudinem Dei’ <Eph. 3:19>.<sup>54</sup>

Eugenio Massa comments on this important passage:

A faint sense of the Bible is enough to recognize an echo of the eschatology of St. Paul: *ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus*. [...] In other words, up to the first part of section B, the *Expositio* filters Neoplatonism into a Christian ethical and soteriological context. Patristic tradition illuminates the watermark that appears for Berthold on the page of Proclus: the breath of a living and experiential theory breathes in an archaeological park. Even for the Dominican philosopher, in the garden of the archetypes burns the pure love of St. Bernard: *et sic, ut dicit Bernhardus, ‘totus homo perget in Deum ...’* [...].<sup>55</sup>

53 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129B, p. 178, l. 155–p. 179, l. 186.

54 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129B, p. 179, l. 187–197 (“And thus the participation in deity reaches through all levels down to the deification of the body. And thus, as Bernard says, the whole human being advances to God and finally, attached to him, becomes one spirit with him <1 Cor 6:16>. ‘As a small drop of water, when poured into much wine, seems to pass away completely when it takes on the taste and colour of the wine’, ‘so in the case of the saints every human aspiration is necessarily inexpressibly liquefied by itself and poured entirely into the will of God (that is, when drunk of the riches of the Lord’s house <Ps. 35(36):9> they have in some way forgotten themselves). For how else could God be all in all <1 Cor. 15:28>, if there were anything left in man of man? Of course the substance remains, but in a different form, in another glory and in another power.’ This is what Bernard says. For in this way man is filled with all the fullness of God <Eph. 3:19>.”).

55 E. Massa, “La deificazione nel commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg a Proclo, *Elementatio theologica*, 129. Edizione del testo e prime analisi”, in R. Lievens, E. Van Mingroot,

Another place where the *Expositio* expresses a connection between the unitive knowledge of God and the Resurrection can be found in the commentary on Proposition 185. Berthold presents here a quotation from *On the Divine Names*. According to Dionysius, having become immortal we will receive a Christ-like form and will always be with the Lord (1 Thessalonians 4:17). We will see him like the apostles at the Transfiguration on the mountain and participate in his radiance in an incomprehensible union. According to Luke 20:56 we will then be sons of God and sons of the Resurrection.<sup>56</sup>

A very important section for the *Expositio* is the commentary on Proposition 202, in which Berthold gives a detailed commentary on the subject of contemplation. Quite naturally, he bases his statements on the Christian distinction *contemplatio in via* – *contemplatio in patria*. At the end of his discussion, Berthold says that the human soul does not always recognize reality because its *essentia intellectualis*, that is, its *intellectus agens*, is not always united to the soul as its form. But then Berthold explains:

[...] tamen dono Dei aliquando etiam in hac mortali vita, non iam suo intellectuali, sed etiam suo uniali seu uno altitudine contemplationis elevantur in visionem non solum deorum, quos posuit prime Deus suum latibulum <Ps. 17(18):12>, sed etiam eius, qui est Deus magnus dominus et rex magnus super omnes deos <Ps. 95(96):3>. Sed post hanc vitam bene meritaе animae Dei gratia (scilicet lumine gloriae) habebunt sibi proprios intellectus formaliter unitos, et sic complebitur eorum visio

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W. Verbeke (eds), *Pascua Mediaevalia. Studies voor Prof. Dr. J.M. De Smet* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983), p. 550: “Un fioco senso della Bibbia basta a ravvisarvi una reminiscenza della escatologia paolina: ‘ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus’. [...] In altre parole, fino alla prima parte della sezione B, l’*Expositio* filtra il neoplatonismo in un contesto etico e soteriologico cristiano. La tradizione patristica illumina la filigrana che traspare a Bertoldo dalla pagina di Proclo: il soffio d’una teoria viva ed esperimentale alita in un parco archeologico. Anche per il filosofo domenicano, nel giardino degli architipi arde l’amor puro di s. Bernardo: ‘et sic, ut dicit Bernhardus, totus homo perget in Deum ...’ [...]”

56 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 185H, p. 25, l. 356–365: *Hae enim secundum Dionysium, immo nos toti, 1 cap. De divinis nominibus, ‘tunc, quando incorruptibiles et immortales erimus, christiformem et beatissimum consequemur finem, semper cum Domino secundum Eloquium erimus visibili ipsius Dei apparitione in castissimis contemplationibus adimpleti, manifestissimis circa nos splendoribus refulgente, sicut circa discipulos in illa divinis transformatione; intelligibili autem luminis datione ipsius impassibili et immateriali mente participantes et super mentem unitone in ignotis et beatis inmissionibus superclarorum radiorum in diviniore imitatione supercaelestium mentium. Nam aequales erimus angelis, ut veritas dicit Eloquiorum, et filii Dei resurrectionis filii existentes’.*

beata, in quantum videbunt Deum deorum dominum facie ad faciem  
<1 Cor. 13:12> specula in aeterna.<sup>57</sup>

Not only does Berthold here quote Scripture three times, but he also speaks quite naturally of God's gift, of grace and merit, and – what for Dietrich of Freiberg would be *horribile dictu* – of the *lumen gloriae*.<sup>58</sup>

Finally, it should be mentioned that Berthold's statements at the end of the *Expositio* on the resurrected body are not the typical expressions of the Church's orthodox faith, even though he repeatedly quotes St. Paul. Following Honorius (who draws on Eriugena), Berthold understands the resurrected body as a purely spiritual substance.<sup>59</sup>

## 5 Conclusion

Berthold uses biblical citations for five crucial topics for the *Expositio*: first, the absolute position of the first One and Good (*prime unum et prime bonum*) and its relationship to creation; second, the primordial causes; third, the Trinity; fourth, contemplation; and, fifth, eschatology and the Resurrection. Among these themes, the last two are particularly important, since they deal with

57 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202F, p. 188, l. 223–231 (“Nevertheless, through a gift from God they are sometimes also raised in this life, not only with their intellectual principle, but also with their unifying principle, or with their one, through the height of contemplation, not only to the vision of the gods, which the first God has made his hiding place <Ps. 17(18):12>, but also to the vision of him who is God, the great Lord and the great King over all gods <Ps. 95(96):3>. But after this life the meritorious souls by the grace of God (namely by the light of glory) will possess their own intellects as formally united to them, and so their blissful vision will be completed insofar as they will see the God of gods and the Lord face to face <1 Cor. 13:12>, [the souls] being mirrors for all eternity.”). I translate *intellectuale* with “intellectual principle” and *uniale* with “unifying principle”, for it seems that for Berthold the *uniale* is much more than just a power or a faculty. He understands it as the core of man's being. My translation of the difficult phrase *specula in aeterna* interprets *specula* as a nominative plural of *speculum*. *Specula* would then be in apposition to *animae*. In *aeterna* I interpret as a temporal determination. Another possible translation is: “from the eternal height”. According to this translation we would assume a “poetical” word order, in which the preposition *in* and the adjective *aeterna* refer to the ablative singular *specula* (watchtower or height).

58 Berthold's notion of *lumen gloriae*, however, is not clear. For Dietrich's rejection of the concept of *lumen gloriae* see Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, ed. B. Mojsisch, *Opera omnia*, vol. 1. *Schriften zur Intellekttheorie* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), 3.2.3, p. 72, l. 40–p. 73, l. 64.

59 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 196F, p. 128, l. 171–177; p. 129, l. 223–p. 130, l. 245; 210C, p. 249, l. 83–103; 210E, p. 252, l. 185–p. 253, l. 227.

the perfection of man, which for Berthold is the ultimate goal of the whole *Elementatio theologica* and therefore also of his *Expositio*. After examining many of these citations, we can now answer our initial question about how Berthold uses the Bible. It is apparent that he does not merely use the Bible as superfluous decoration. Instead, his biblical citations fulfil various important functions depending on the context. In some places Berthold uses them as authorities or even as evidence on which a further thought is based. By this usage, Berthold shows the concordance of Proclean philosophy and Scriptural revelation. Several times this opens up a new meaning for the biblical passage itself. However, we also find in Berthold the integration of statements from Proclus into the coordinate system of revelation. His biblical quotations often contribute new points of view and contents that are not found in the text of Proclus. For example, the one God is presented as Father and as Lord Jesus Christ. Furthermore, the eschatological vision of God is conceived in personal categories as a face-to-face vision, that is, not only as a vision of cosmological structures, but above all as the vision of God's face. In the context of the passages in which Berthold quotes the Bible, it is also noticeable how often he brings up Christian concepts and contents such as *in patria*, *fides*, *meritum*, *gratia*, *donum Dei*, *lumen gloriae* and *resurrectio*. While citing the Bible, Berthold sometimes also refers to dogmatic concepts and doctrines.

Incidentally, the determining influence of Christian doctrine is even more evident in other passages in which there are no quotations from the Bible. Thus Berthold explains in the commentary on Proposition 106 that a certain theory applies even if the movement of heaven and time are not eternal and then adds: *ut veritas est fidei Christianae*.<sup>60</sup> When Proclus explicitly denies in Proposition 28 that a producer and its product can be equal in their power, Berthold contradicts this in his commentary, speaking in detail about the Trinity, where there is precisely such equality.<sup>61</sup> Without explicit reference to the faith, but in keeping with it, Berthold also rejects the Proclean ideas of the eternal descent and ascent of human souls<sup>62</sup> and the transmigration of souls.<sup>63</sup> In the commentary on Proposition 204, Berthold reaches a determination on the question of human animation with a quotation from Thomas Aquinas.<sup>64</sup> Aquinas there argues for the creation of the soul at the very moment of its

60 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 106B, p. 241, l. 34.

61 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 28A, p. 173, l. 77–81; 28B, p. 174, l. 123–p. 175, l. 141; 28D, p. 176, l. 171–173.

62 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206F, p. 223, l. 262–268.

63 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 199E, p. 160, l. 300–p. 161, l. 321.

64 Unlike Dietrich, Berthold does not avoid naming Thomas Aquinas. This is probably due to the canonization of Thomas Aquinas in 1323. Accordingly, Berthold calls him *Sanctus Thomas*.

infusion into the body and names traducianism and the pre-existence of the soul as condemned heresies.<sup>65</sup> In addition, in the commentary on Proposition 154, Berthold gives a quotation from Dionysius that alludes to the sacrament of the Eucharist.<sup>66</sup>

Taken together, this indicates that we cannot consider an equal coexistence of pagan wisdom and the Christian concept of revelation in Berthold's *Expositio*. Instead, Berthold establishes a synthesis of pagan and Christian wisdom. This synthesis is formed under the clear auspices of Christian doctrine. It is in this sense that the 73 Biblical citations in the *Prologus* should be understood, for they indicate from the very beginning the auspices under which everything else is to be found. Thus, far from being merely a literal commentary on a philosophical text, the *Expositio* is in fact a Christian interpretation of Proclean thought.

Finally, I would like to say something very briefly about the distinction between *providentia naturalis* and *providentia voluntaria* in Berthold's *Expositio*. It has often been claimed, for example by Kurt Flasch, that Berthold understood (Proclean) philosophy as an area of *providentia naturalis* and Christian theology as an area of *providentia voluntaria*.<sup>67</sup> But this is inaccurate, because Berthold knows very well that Proclus in his *Opuscula* deals with *providentia voluntaria*, as the following text shows (important words in bold):

Ista sunt invisibilia Dei transitive accepta, de quibus **in ista elementatione theologica** subtilissime pertractatur, **quantum pertinet ad providentiam naturalem**. Sunt praeterea invisibilia Dei **providentiae voluntariae**, puta angeli, qui, **ut dicit Proclus** *De malorum existentia* 3 cap., sunt 'genus interpretativum deorum continuum existens dis'.<sup>68</sup>

65 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 204A, p. 203, l. 100–116.

66 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 154A, p. 159, l. 34–44.

67 Flasch, "Einleitung", p. xiv and p. xxxii. This assessment seems to be confirmed by the following lines in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, p. 116, l. 104–112: *Sed dices, quod Dionysius loquitur ut theologus, qui solum considerat processum rerum a Deo secundum ordinem providentiae voluntariae, et ideo aliter est de processu rerum a Deo secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, ubi proceditur ab uno in multitudinem ordinate, de quo loquuntur philosophi theologizantes sive theologi philosophantes. Quare, ut videtur, adhuc manet eorum principium inconcussum, scilicet quod ab uno solo singulariter existenti non debeat procedere nisi unum, et idem eodem modo manens semper natum est facere idem. Igitur positio Peripateticorum videtur adhuc esse firma*. However, it should be noted that Berthold is here presenting the objection (*Sed dices*) of an imaginary opponent, who supports the opinion of the Peripatetics (!). Moreover, the solution of this objection shows that the *positio Platonicae philosophiae* (p. 116, l. 130) falls into line with Dionysius.

68 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prologus*, 5–6, p. 13, l. 264–269 ("These are the invisible realities of God taken transitively, about which **this Elementatio theologica** deals with in a very subtle way, as far as it belongs to the *providentia naturalis*. There are also invisible

Berthold also never claims in his *Expositio* that he only wants to talk about the area of *providentia naturalis* and not also about *providentia voluntaria*. Rather, in the prologue he merely excludes the angels, about whom Proclus also wrote in his *Opuscula*, as a topic for his *Expositio*. What Berthold really says is this (important words in bold):

Et quia **totus iste liber** tractat de rerum divinarum universitate secundum processum eius a summo bono et regressum in ipsum, et hoc secundum dispositionem et proprios modos earum inditos ipsis rebus divinis ab eo, quod est divinum principaliformiter sive secundum causam, **et hoc secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, non iam proprie voluntariae**, iuxta distinctionem Augustini VIII *Super Genesim ad litteram*, necesse est omnia convenire, de quibus **hic** tractatur, in una ratione subiecti, propter quam etiam **ista philosophia** est una scientia.<sup>69</sup>

Thus, according to Berthold, Proclus in his book *Elementatio theologica* deals only with the area of *providentia naturalis*.<sup>70</sup> What is said in Proclus' book forms a part of philosophy and is therefore called "this philosophy" (*ista philosophia*) by Berthold. However, Berthold admits that even in the *Elementatio theologica* there are some hints and remarks on the area of *providentia voluntaria* (*non iam proprie voluntaria*). In accordance with the *Elementatio theologica*, Berthold wants to write in his own Commentary mainly about the area of *providentia naturalis*. In doing so, he very often and at important points brings

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realities of God that belong to the *providentia voluntaria*, such as the angels who, as Proclus says in the third chapter of *De malorum existentia*, are a 'genus of interpreters of the gods, which is close to the gods'").

69 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. I*, p. 46, l. 319–326 ("And since **this whole book** deals with the totality of the divine things according to the procession from the supreme good and the return to it, and this according to the disposition and the proper modes, which are given to these divine things by that which is Divine in the principal or causative way, **and this according to the order of providentia naturalis, and not yet actually according to providentia voluntaria** (according to the distinction of Augustine in the eighth book of the *Literal Commentary on Genesis*), therefore it is necessary that everything that is dealt with **here** falls under one subject, which is why **this philosophy** is also a single science."). Note that Berthold here deliberately inserted the words *non iam proprie voluntariae* into the text, which is mainly a quotation of Dietrich of Freiberg's *De subiecto theologiae*. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, eds J.-D. Cavigioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 3-5, p. 281, l. 69–77.

70 See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120E, p. 100, l. 303–304: *Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, qui in hoc volumine exprimitur [...]*.

in Christian teachings that extend or correct Proclus. However, Berthold also wants to say something about *providentia voluntaria*, about which Proclus in the *Elementatio theologica*, according to its purpose, is largely silent. For this purpose he draws frequently on the Proclean *Opuscula* and above all, however, on Christian doctrine. And again it is Christian doctrine – whether the Bible, the Fathers and other theologians, or dogma – that extends and corrects Proclus. Through this approach Berthold neither completely separates the areas of *providentia naturalis* and *providentia voluntaria* from each other, nor does he keep pagan philosophy and Christian theology apart.<sup>71</sup> Like the Church Fathers and the earlier Scholastics before him, in both cases Berthold wants to integrate the two. The integration of pagan thinking into the Christian model of thought has important consequences for the Christian theology of revelation. As already with the Church Fathers, with Eriugena and Honorius or with Meister Eckhart, there are influences of pagan philosophy which are not unproblematic from the point of view of Christian theology.<sup>72</sup> An example with Berthold is his Eriugenistic conception of the resurrected body.

In the end, Berthold's *Expositio* is, of course, not simply a work of Christian theology. The *Expositio* remains principally a philosophical work. Like the Church Fathers, however, Berthold's philosophy is illuminated by Christian theology. Thus, the *Expositio* is best understood as a Christian interpretation of the *Elementatio theologica*.

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71 This is also the opinion of Alain de Libera. See A. de Libera, "Philosophie et théologie chez Albert le Grand et dans l'école dominicaine allemande", in A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter. Geistige Wurzeln und soziale Wirklichkeit* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1989), p. 60: "Chez Berthold, *sapientia nostra* ne s'oppose plus, comme chez Dietrich, à la *scientia divina philosophorum*. C'est que, de Dietrich à Berthold, les données du problème ont encore changé. La grande affaire de Berthold n'est plus de distinguer, voire d'opposer, théologie philosophique et théologie chrétienne, mais bien, et plus simplement, théologie et métaphysique, science divine et science de l'être en tant qu'être, platonisme et péripatétisme. D'un mot: Berthold reçoit la distinction des deux Providences: la naturelle et la volontaire; mais c'est ne plus pour y marquer la différence entre une philosophie, quelle qu'elle soit, et une théologie eschatologique. Chaque Providence a son porte-parole, et si l'on me passe l'expression, chacun d'eux parle la même langue: la Providence naturelle a Proclus, la Providence volontaire a le Pseudo-Denys; tous deux parlent le langage du surséant, du Bien suprême et de l'Un." De Libera is right that Berthold is not interested in an opposition and separation of philosophy and Christian theology. Yet Berthold does make a distinction between them. What is also wrong with De Libera's assessment is the clear assignment of *providentia naturalis* to Proclus and of *providentia voluntaria* to Dionysius.

72 Moses Maimonides deals with similar issues in a Jewish context.



## Appendix

### *Legend*

The first and second columns indicate the location and scriptural source of Berthold's biblical citations and allusions. In many cases, Berthold explicitly indicates that he is drawing on a scriptural source, for instance by writing *Ad Hebr. 11, illud Mosis, Audi Apostolum, Quod autem Scriptura dicit, sicut ipsa [sapientia] dicit*, etc. An **asterisk** at the end of the first column indicates citations or allusions where Berthold does not explicitly acknowledge that he is using a biblical text.

If the third column contains the **name of an author**, the citation or allusion was already found in the text that Berthold has taken over from that author. When there is no such name, the citation or allusion is introduced by Berthold himself.

The fourth column indicates the **specific way in which Berthold makes use of the Bible**.

The category "exact" means that Berthold quotes the biblical passage in its exact wording or with very minor changes (e.g. a slight change in the word order, insertion of words like *enim*, or a modification of the grammatical person of the verb).

The category "cf." (which the editors of Berthold also use in their footnotes) stands for all biblical passages that are quoted with major changes (such as omission of words, significant change of word order, insertion of other words). E.g. *Sapientia 9:15: corpus quod corrumpitur adgravat animam* (original) vs. *corpus corruptibile, quod adgravat animam* (see below A., nr. 6).

The category "allusion" includes all passages in which one can no longer speak of a quotation in the strict sense, since Berthold (or the author he uses) significantly adapts the text of the Bible or mentions only a few words that are characteristic of the biblical passage. A small subset of these "allusions" is formed by "vague allusions", in which the identified biblical passage is hardly recognizable. Both types of "allusions" are classified in the footnotes of the critical edition as "cf."

The last category is "references". Here Berthold only refers to a biblical passage without quoting it.

#### A. Berthold of Moosburg 1984, vol. VI,1, *Expositio. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*

1.	Prol. 1 (5,2–4)	Ad Romanos 1:19		exact
2.	Prol. 1 (5,7–8)	Ad Romanos 1:20		cf.
3.	Prol. 1 (6,39f.)	Ad Romanos 1:19		exact
4.	Prol. 1 (6,43f.)	Sapientia 13:1–4		allusion
5.	Prol. 1 (6,44f.)	Sapientia 13:5		exact
6.	Prol. 2 (7,56)*	Sapientia 9:15	Augustinus	allusion
7.	Prol. 2 (7,68f.)*	Proverbia 25:27		exact
8.	Prol. 3 (7,80–82)	Ad Timotheum I 1:17		exact

9. Prol. 3 (8,90)	Ad Colosenses 1:15	exact
10. Prol. 3 (8,115)	Ad Hebraeos 11:13	exact
11. Prol. 4 (12,218)*	Psalmus 94:3	exact
12. Prol. 4 (12,219)*	Psalmus 96:9	exact
13. Prol. 4 (12,220)*	Psalmus 49:1	exact
14. Prol. 4 (12,221–223)	Ad Corinthios I 8:5–6	exact
15. Prol. 4 (12,243f.)*	Psalmus 49:1	exact
16. Prol. 9 (14,308)*	Psalmus 148:4	exact
17. Prol. 9 (14,309)	Psalmus 148:5	exact
18. Prol. 9 (14,309)	Psalmus 32:9	exact
19. Prol. 9 (14,311f.)*	Ad Timotheum 6:16	cf.
20. Prol. 9 (14,312)	Psalmus 17:12	cf.
21. Prol. 9 (15,315)	Genesis 1:2	Honorius exact
22. Prol. 9 (15,341)*	Sapientia 8:1	cf.
23. Prol. 9 (15,341f.)*	Sapientia 11:21	cf.
24. Prol. 10 (16,349f.)*	Ad Timotheum 6:15	exact
25. Prol. 10 (16,355)*	Psalmus 94:3	exact <sup>73</sup>
26. Prol. 10 (16, 355f.)*	Psalmus 96:9	cf.
27. Prol. 10 (16,360f.)*	Psalmus 144:13	cf.
28. Prol. 10 (16,362)*	Psalmus 148:6	cf.
29. Prol. 10 (17,386)*	Ecclesiasticus 42:16	exact
30. Prol. 10 (17,395)*	Psalmus 144:5	cf.
31. Prol. 10 (17,396)*	Isaias 12:5	exact
32. Prol. 10 (17,397f.)*	Daniel 3:56	exact
33. Prol. 11 (18,420)*	Proverbia 9:1	exact
34. Prol. 11 (18,421f.)	Baruch 3:24–25	exact
35. Prol. 11 (18,428)	Psalmus 25:8	exact
36. Prol. 11 (18,432)*	Ad Timotheum I 6:16	cf.
37. Prol. 11 (18,434)*	Daniel 3:54	exact
38. Prol. 11 (18,435)*	Psalmus 144:3	cf.
39. Prol. 11 (18,437f.)*	Proverbia 9:1	exact
40. Prol. 11 (19,453)*	Ad Psalmos 103:5	cf.
41. Prol. 11 (19,460)	Ecclesiasticus 24:7	exact
42. Prol. 11 (19,462f.)	Iob 26:11	exact
43. Prol. 11 (19,472f.)	Psalmus 47:4	exact
44. Prol. 11 (19,473)*	Psalmus 86:3	exact
45. Prol. 11 (20,111f.)*	Ad Ephesios 2:21–22	allusion
46. Prol. 12 (20,501f.)*	Genesis 15:5	cf.

73 This citation is mentioned in the footnotes, but not in the Index.

47. Prol. 12 (20,502)*	Ecclesiasticus 43:10	cf.
48. Prol. 12 (21,516f.)	Genesis 1:27	cf.
49. Prol. 13 (22,559f.)	Psalmus 73:16	cf.
50. Prol. 13 (22,561)*	Sapientia 7:21	cf.
51. Prol. 13 (22,561)*	Sapientia 7:23	exact
52. Prol. 13 (22,564–566)	Psalmus 91:6–7	exact
53. Prol. 13 (22,566)	Psalmus 91:5	exact
54. Prol. 17 (26,683f.)*	Ad Philippenses 4:7	cf.
55. Prol. 18 (27,735f.)*	Genesis 1:27	cf.
56. Prol. 19 (29,781–783)	Ecclesiasticus 43:20	exact
57. Prol. 19 (29,783)	Sapientia 7:26	cf.
58. Prol. 19 (29,783f.)	Ad Hebraeos 1:3	cf.
59. Prol. 19 (29,800–802)	Psalmus 95:6	exact
60. Prol. 19 (29,802f.)	Psalmus 103:1–2	exact
61. Prol. 19 (30,804f.)	Psalmus 96:6	exact
62. Prol. 19 (30,805f.)	Psalmus 104:1–2	exact
63. Prol. 19 (30,813f.)	Ieremias 32:23	exact
64. Prol. 19 (30,822)*	Psalmus 49:11	exact
65. Prol. 19 (31,859)*	Epistula Ioannis I 1:5	exact <sup>74</sup>
66. Prol. 19 (31,868f.)	Psalmus 4:7	exact
67. Prol. 19 (31,870f.)*	Ad Corinthios I 13:12	cf.
68. Prol. 19 (32,877f.)	Genesis 1:27	cf.
69. Prol. 20 (33,909f.)	Ad Romanos 1:19–20	reference
70. Prol. 20 (33,939–34,943)	Psalmus 41:2–5	exact
71. Prol. 20 (34,944)*	Cantica 2:9	allusion
72. Prol. 21 (34,970)*	Ad Hebraeos 1:3	allusion
73. Prol. 21 (34,970f.)*	Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:9	exact
74. Expos. tit. E (411,63f.)	Ecclesiasticus 1:5	exact
75. Expos. tit. L (51,489f.)*	Ad Timotheum I 2:5	cf.
76. Prop. 3B (94,77f.)*	Ad Romanos 11:36	cf.
77. Prop. 12E (202,173f.)*	Psalmus 71:17	cf.
78. Prop. 12E (202,191)*	Epistula Iacobi 1:17	exact

74 Here the footnote in the text and the Index mistakenly refer to the Gospel of John instead of the First Epistle of John.

- B. Berthold of Moosburg 1986, vol. VI,2, *Expositio. Propositiones 14–34*<sup>75</sup>
1. Prop. 15F (22,262)\* Ad Romanos 1:25 cf.
  2. Prop. 16D (27,111f.)\* Ad Romanos 1:25 cf.
  3. Prop. 18B (46,98) Genesis 1:1 Honorius exact
  4. Prop. 18C (50,244)\* Epistula Iacobi 1:17 Dionysius exact
  5. Prop. 26H (158,177f.)\* Sapientia 8:1 cf.
  6. Prop. 30D (196,200) Evang. sec. Ioannem Ioannes Scotus exact
  7. Prop. 32D (209,116) Epistula Ioannis I 3:1–2 reference
  8. Prop. 32F (212, 223)\* Sapientia 11:21 exact
- C. Berthold of Moosburg 2001, vol. VI,3, *Expositio. Propositiones 35–65*
1. Prop. 60D (173,98f.)\* Psalmus 94:3 exact
- D. Berthold of Moosburg 2003, vol. VI,4, *Expositio. Propositiones 66–107*
1. Prop. 69F (23,122)\* Ad Corinthios I 8:6 Dionysius exact
  2. Prop. 69F (23,123)\* Ad Corinthios I 12:11 Dionysius exact<sup>76</sup>
  3. Prop. 100I (208,171)\* Psalmus 94:3 exact
- E. Berthold of Moosburg 2011, vol. VI,5, *Expositio. Propositiones 108–135*
1. Prop. 114A (41,28f.)\* Psalmus 94:3 Thomas of York exact
  2. Prop. 115E (54,144)\* Deuteronomium 32:4 cf.
  3. Prop. 115E (54,146f.)\* Psalmus 17:12 exact
  4. Prop. 115E (54,147)\* Ad Timotheum I 6:16 exact
  5. Prop. 117F (72,163) Sapientia 11:21 Augustinus cf.
  6. Prop. 117F (73,174f.) Sapientia 11:21 Augustinus exact
  7. Prop. 118A (76,42) Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:3–4 Augustinus exact
  8. Prop. 119C (84,36)\* Ad Romanos 11:36 cf.
  9. Prop. 120D (98,262f.)\* Ad Corinthios I 12:11 Honorius cf.
  10. Prop. 122B (116,69f.)\* Sapientia 8:1 exact
  11. Prop. 123B (126,55)\* Ad Romanos 11:36 Bonaventura exact
  12. Prop. 123K (133,278)\* Sapientia 11:21 exact
  13. Prop. 123K (133,283) Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:3 vague allusion
  14. Prop. 123L (134,312) Ad Romanos 9:5 Dionysius exact
  15. Prop. 123L (135,339)\* Psalmus 17:12 exact

75 I could not identify the reference for Sapientia 8:1 indicated in the critical edition for Prop. 32F (212, 222).

76 Here I omit the two parallel references (Ad Ephesios 4:6 and Ad Ephesios 4:4) indicated by the editor for Prop. 69F (23,122) and Prop. 69F (23,123).

16. Prop. 126B (154,20f.)	Ad Romanos 11:36		exact
17. Prop. 126B (155,44–46)*	Epistula Iacobi 1:17		exact
18. Prop. 126B (156,77)*	Genesis 1:2		cf.
19. Prop. 126B (157,88)	Genesis 1:2	Honorius	exact
20. Prop. 128A (167,31f.)*	Psalmus 94:3	Honorius	exact
21. Prop. 128B (168,79)*	Sapientia 11:21		cf.
22. Prop. 129A (176,114)*	Evang. sec. Lucam 16:22		allusion
23. Prop. 129A (177,130)*	Ad Corinthios I 15:44	Dietrich of Freiberg	cf.
24. Prop. 129B (179,189)*	Ad Corinthios I 6:16	Bernardus	cf.
25. Prop. 129B (179,191)*	Psalmus 35:9	Bernardus	cf.
26. Prop. 129B (179,194)*	Ad Corinthios I 15:28	Bernardus	cf.
27. Prop. 129B (179,197)*	Ad Ephesios 3:19		exact
28. Prop. 131A (191,40)*	Ad Romanos 1:19	Thomas of York	exact
29. Prop. 131B (191,52f.)	Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:16	Thomas of York/August.	cf
30. Prop. 131B (191,55–192,56)	Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:16	Thomas of York/August.	exact
31. Prop. 131B (192,56)	Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:16	Thomas of York/August.	allusion
32. Prop. 131B (192,56f.)	Ad Philippenses 2:6–11	Thomas of York/August.	exact
33. Prop. 132B (201,30)*	Ad Romanos 13:1		exact
34. Prop. 132C (201,41)*	Sapientia 11:21		cf. <sup>77</sup>
35. Prop. 133H (211,164)*	Ad Romanos 11:36		cf.
36. Prop. 133H (212,183)*	Deuteronomium 32:4		exact
F. Berthold of Moosburg 2007, vol. VI,6, <i>Expositio. Propositiones 136–159</i>			
1. Prop. 136E (9,178)*	Ad Romanos 11:36		cf.
2. Prop. 140C (39,63)*	Sapientia 8:1		exact
3. Prop. 140D (40,81f.)*	Epistula Iacobi 1:17	Honorius	exact
4. Prop. 140D (40,88)*	Ad Romanos 11:36	Honorius	cf.
5. Prop. 140E (42,153)*	Ad Corinthios I 15:28	Honorius	exact
6. Prop. 140E (42,161)*	Ad Corinthios I 15:28	Honorius	exact <sup>78</sup>
7. Prop. 141A (45,14)	Genesis 2:15		exact
8. Prop. 142B (55,103)*	Sapientia 8:1		exact
9. Prop. 143F (66,217)*	Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:5	Honorius	cf.

77 Here the footnote in the text and the Index refer mistakenly to Sapientia 8:20.

78 The citations are indicated twice in the footnotes, but only once in the Index for page 42.

- |  |                         |                               |                         |                   |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| 10.  | Prop. 143K (68,291)*    | Epistula Ioannis I 1:5        |                         | exact             |
| 11.  | Prop. 143 L (70,351f.)* | Sapientia 7:26                |                         | exact             |
| 12.  | Prop. 143 M (70,357)*   | Evang. sec. Lucam 1:79        |                         | cf.               |
| 13.  | Prop. 144B (75,25)*     | Sapientia 8:1                 |                         | exact             |
| 14.  | Prop. 144B (75,27f.)    | Sapientia 11:21               |                         | exact             |
| 15.  | Prop. 144B (76,32)      | Sapientia 11:21               | Ulrich of<br>Strassburg | cf.               |
| 16.  | Prop. 144B (76,40)*     | Ad Colosenses 1:16            | Glossa ord.             | exact             |
| 17.  | Prop. 144B (76,41)      | Ad Colosenses 1:16            | Glossa ord.             | exact             |
| 18.  | Prop. 144B (76,49)      | Sapientia 7:17                | Ulrich of<br>Strassburg | exact             |
| 19.  | Prop. 144B (76,52)      | Sapientia 8:1                 | Ulrich of<br>Strassburg | exact             |
| 20.  | Prop. 144C (77,76)*     | Sapientia 11:21               |                         | cf.               |
| 21.  | Prop. 146I (96,204)*    | Epistula Ioannis I 3:1–2      | Thomas of<br>York       | vague<br>allusion |
| 22.  | Prop. 147A (100,16)*    | Isaias 61:10                  |                         | allusion          |
| 23.  | Prop. 147B (102,56)*    | Ad Romanos 11:36              | Dionysius               | exact             |
| 24.  | Prop. 151 A (133,38)*   | Ad Hebraeos 1:3               | Damascenus              | exact             |
| 25.  | Prop. 151A (133,39)*    | Ad Corinthios I 1:24          | Damascenus              | cf.               |
| 26.  | Prop. 151A (133,40)*    | Ad Colosenses 1:15            | Damascenus              | exact             |
| 27.  | Prop. 151A (133,51f.)*  | Epistula Iacobi 1:17          | Dionysius               | exact             |
| 28.  | Prop. 151A (135,100)*   | Epistula Iacobi 1:17          | Dionysius               | allusion          |
| 29.  | Prop. 151B (136,132)*   | Ad Romanos 11:36              |                         | cf.               |
| 30.  | Prop. 151B (136,137)*   | Ad Ephesios 3:14–15           |                         | exact             |
| 31.  | Prop. 152B (140,27f.)   | Ad Ephesios 3:14–15           | Damascenus              | exact             |
| 32.  | Prop. 156B (171,69)     | Epistula Ioannis I 1:5        |                         | cf.               |
| 33.  | Prop. 159I (199,311)    | Sapientia 11:21               |                         | cf.               |
| G. Berthold of Moosburg 2003, vol. VI,7, <i>Expositio. Propositiones 160–183</i> |                         |                               |                         |                   |
| 1.   | Prop. 162E (20,142)*    | Psalmus 17:12                 |                         | exact             |
| 2.   | Prop. 162E (20,151f.)*  | Ad Timotheum I 6:16           | Dionysius               | cf.               |
| 3.   | Prop. 177D (177,133f.)* | Isaias 6:3                    |                         | cf.               |
| 4.   | Prop. 178E (196,261)*   | Ad Romanos 11:36              |                         | cf.               |
| 5.   | Prop. 179B (205,178)*   | Sapientia 11:21               |                         | cf.               |
| H. Berthold of Moosburg 2014, vol. VI,8, <i>Expositio. Propositiones 184–211</i> |                         |                               |                         |                   |
| 1.   | Prop. 185I (25,358)     | Ad Thessalonicenses I<br>4:17 | Dionysius               | exact             |
| 2.   | Prop. 185I (25,361f.)   | Evang. sec Matthaicum<br>17:1 | Dionysius               | allusion          |

3. Prop. 185I (25,364f.)	Evang. sec. Lucam 20:36	Dionysius	cf.
4. Prop. 190A (77,37)*	Sapientia 11:21	Augustinus	cf.
5. Prop. 190A (77,51f.)*	Sapientia 8:1	Thomas of York	cf.
6. Prop. 190A (77,53)	Ecclesiastes 7:26	Thomas of York	cf.
7. Prop. 196F (128,174)*	Ad Romanos 5:12	Honorius	cf.
8. Prop. 196F (128,183)*	Genesis 2:7	Honorius	cf.
9. Prop. 196F (128,186)	Genesis 2:7	Honorius	cf.
10. Prop. 196F (128,193)*	Ad Corinthios I 15:53	Honorius	cf.
11. Prop. 196F (128,194)	Ad Corinthios I 15:44	Honorius	cf.
12. Prop. 196F (129,207)	Genesis 1:26	Gregorius Nyss.	exact
13. Prop. 196F (130,243)*	Ad Philippenses 2:7	Honorius	cf.
14. Prop. 196F (130,244)*	Ad Corinthios 15:54	Honorius	cf.
15. Prop. 202B (185,131f.)	Evang. sec Matthaem 17:1	Dionysius	allusion
16. Prop. 202B (185,135f.)	Evang. sec. Lucam 20:36	Dionysius	cf.
17. Prop. 202F (188,225f.)*	Psalmus 17:12		cf.
18. Prop. 202F (188,226)*	Psalmus 94:3		exact
19. Prop. 202F (188,230)*	Ad Corinthios I 13:12		cf.
20. Prop. 203A (190,22)*	Isaias 12:4	Avengebrol	cf.
21. Prop. 204A (202,73)	Genesis 2:2 <sup>79</sup>	Nemesius Emes.	cf.
22. Prop. 204A (202,74)	Evang. sec. Ioannem 5:17	Nemesius Emes.	exact
23. Prop. 208A (232,27f.)*	Ad Corinthios I 15:44	Dietrich of Freiberg	cf.
24. Prop. 210C (249, 87f.)	Ad Romanos 8:21	Honorius	exact
25. Prop. 210C (249,88f.)	Ad Corinthios II 5:1	Honorius	exact
26. Prop. 210C (249,94)	Ad Corinthios II 4:2	Honorius	exact
27. Prop. 210C (249,99f.)	Ad Corinthios I 2:9	Honorius	exact
28. Prop. 210E (252,192f.)	Evang. sec. Marcum 12:25 par. <sup>80</sup>	Honorius	exact
29. Prop. 210M (255,320)*	Ad Romanos 8:19	Honorius	cf.
30. Prop. 211A (259,43)*	Ad Romanos 11:36		cf.

79 Here I omit the two parallel references from the book Exodus indicated by the editor.

80 Here I omit the two parallel references from the Synoptic Gospels indicated by the editor.

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## Avicebron (Solomon Ibn Gabirol) and Berthold of Moosburg on Essential Causality

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As is well known, the theory of essential causality plays a central role in Berthold of Moosburg's commentary on Proclus' *Elementatio theologica*. Scholars have reconstructed its doctrinal genesis, seeing the dependencies on Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strassburg, and above all Dietrich of Freiberg.<sup>1</sup> In the resulting picture, however, one piece is missing, which deserves to be considered, namely, the contribution of Avicebron's *Fons vitae* to the elaboration of the theory of essential causality. It is a contribution which, in quality and quantity, has no precedent amongst the philosophers traditionally considered to be Berthold of Moosburg's main sources and this influence, for reasons that will become clear shortly, can be considered unique to the Dominican philosopher.

It is Berthold who emphasizes the centrality of Avicebron, who not only appears among the *philosophi famosi* listed at the beginning of the commentary, but also three times in the *Tabula contentorum*<sup>2</sup> that Berthold

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- 1 E. King, *Supersapientia. A Study of the Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli of Berthold von Moosburg*, PhD diss. (University of Cambridge, 2016); M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, "A propos du néoplatonisme d'Albert le Grand: Aventures et mésaventures de quelques textes d'Albert dans le Commentaire sur Proclus de Berthold de Moosburg", in *Archives de Philosophie* 43(1980), p. 635–654; I. Zavattero, "Berthold of Moosburg", in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011); A. de Libera, "Résumés des conférences", in *École Pratique des Hautes Études – Section des sciences religieuses. Annuaire* 94(1985–1986), 1985, p. 499–519. I would like warmly thank Katie Reid for correcting this text and Evan King for his precious suggestions.
  - 2 The *Tabula contentorum in Expositione super Elementationem theologicam Procli* is an index of 580 entries arranged in alphabetical order from *Abditum mentis* up to *Zoegenā*. It is preserved in two 15th-century codices, copied a few years apart in the Cologne area. The substantial agreement of the two codices in their structural elements makes it certain that the structure of the *Tabula* was already defined in their common exemplar and therefore comes from Berthold's project. A first edition of the *Tabula* was published by A. Beccarisi, Berthold of Moosburg, *Tabula contentorum in Expositione super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, ed. A. Beccarisi (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2000). The critical edition of the *Elementatio theologica Procli* is now complete: Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, 8 vols. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984–2014).

adds to his work. The name of Avicebron appears under the letter A as follows:<sup>3</sup>

AVENCEBROL

Liber Fons vite frequenter allegatur

De unitione secundum eum 4 (A). Item condiciones unius.

Conditiones derivantis esse aliis secundum eundem 18.

AVICULA

199 Quod sicut avicula in aere et navicula in mari sic terra in universo secundum Avencebrol libro Fons vite.

The contribution of Avicebron in Prop. 18 is indeed remarkable for better defining the characteristics and conditions of what gives being to lower entities, a topic explicitly linked to that of essential causality (“De primo sciendum quod derivans esse aliis quodcumque, quod etiam necessario est causa essentialis [...]”).<sup>4</sup> Berthold deals specifically with this doctrine in Prop. 172, as declared programmatically in the *Tabula*.<sup>5</sup>

CAUSA

[...] Cause essentialis triplex condicio 172. Triplex effectum prehabito. Quod omnis intellectus in actu habet rationem cause essentialis. Cause efficientes sunt in triplici differentia.

CAUSA ESSENTIALIS

De hac et eius multiplici condicione 172.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in Prop. 172 one also finds an extensive use of Avicebron's *Fons vitae* which Berthold quotes next to Dietrich's *De cognitione entium separatorum*.<sup>6</sup> In my view, it is significant that, among Dietrich's many works, Berthold chooses the *De cognitione entium separatorum* to explain this point. As is well known, this is a late work, which can be considered a *summa*

3 Berthold of Moosburg, *Tabula*, p. 23, 507–515.

4 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18D, p. 52, l. 291–292.

5 Berthold of Moosburg, *Tabula*, p. 31, l. 100–p. 32, l. 106.

6 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitionum entium separatorum et maxime animarum separatorum*, ed. H. Steffan, in Dietrich of Freiberg, *Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, eds J.-D. Caviglioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), p. 151–260.

of Dietrich's theory of essential causality.<sup>7</sup> It is a work, however, which does not emphasize the agent intellect as an essential cause and in which Dietrich is somewhat cautious about the existence of celestial souls.

It is also important to note that in none of these contexts is Avicbron's contribution transmitted to Berthold through Thomas of York's *Sapientiale*, which also uses the *Fons vitae* extensively.<sup>8</sup>

In order to understand how Berthold combines Dietrich's authority with Avicbron's on the question of essential causality, I will proceed as follows: in the first part I will present Avicbron's doctrine on the relationship between God and creatures, and then move on in the second section to describe the essential points of Dietrich's *De cognitione entium separatorum*. Finally, in the third part I will present the synthesis offered by Berthold of Moosburg, focusing on his commentary on Propositions 18 and 172 of Proclus' *Elementatio theologica*.

My aim is to show the consonance between the metaphysics of *fluxus* developed by Avicbron based on the overflowing of forms, and the doctrine of essential causality theorised by Dietrich of Freiberg.

## 1 Avicbron on the Notions of *fluxus* and Will

In the medieval Latin West, the name Avicbron was not known before the middle of the 12th century. Around 1150, in Toledo, Dominicus Gundissalinus and Johannes Hispanus translated the *Fons vitae* into Latin from an Arabic original that is now lost.<sup>9</sup> Avicbron or Avencebrol, as he was known to Christian authors, is the author of a philosophical *summa* in five books, published at

7 K. Flasch, "Einleitung", in Dietrich of Freiberg, *Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, p. xv–xxxI, in particular p. xxvi; T. Suarez-Nani, "Substances séparées, intelligences et anges chez Thierry de Freiberg", in K.-H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, F.-B. Stammkötter (eds), *Dietrich von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven seiner Philosophie, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft* (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1999), p. 49–67, in particular p. 52–57; B. Mojsisch, "Causa essentialis bei Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart", in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (Hamburg: Meiner 1984), p. 106–114.

8 Thanks to the excellent work of Fiorella Retucci, who in a recent article highlighted Berthold's considerable debts to the *Sapientiale*, it is possible "to isolate" the original interventions of the Dominican. Cf. F. Retucci, "Magister Thomas Anglicus minor: Tommaso di York fonte della *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli*", in *Quaderni di Noctua* 5(2020), p. 1–41.

9 S. Pessin, *Solomon Ibn Gabirol (Avicbron)*, in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-gabirol/>. [accessed October 26, 2020]

the end of the 19th century by Clemens Baeumker.<sup>10</sup> This work is a dialogue between a teacher and a pupil, aiming to teach the way human beings can realize their nature and fulfil their purpose, i.e. achieve their happiness. The aim of a human being, as it emerges at the end of the fifth book, is to know the external world and, going back from the most “contracted” determinations to the simplest, to bring the human back to the unity of its origin, which is the source of life. Studying the essence of simple substances, the disciple is led into the *amoenitatibus floridis*<sup>11</sup> of the intelligible reality, and therefore has a chance to rise from the visible to the invisible, from the composite to the simple, from the effect to the cause.

Even if the *Fons vitae* completely lacks explicit quotations (with the exception of those linked to Sacred Scripture), scholars now agree that it is a grandiose synthesis, attempting to harmonize Neoplatonic metaphysics with the creationist belief common to Jews, Christians, and Muslims.<sup>12</sup> In Latin Scholasticism, Avicbron’s thought was often reduced to a few key issues: the hylomorphic conception of the totality of reality, the doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms, the existence of *rationes seminales* in matter, and the question of intelligible matter. There are, however, two important exceptions: Thomas of York, who in his *Sapientiale* abundantly cites the *Fons vitae*, and Berthold of Moosburg. Berthold’s *magnum opus* is perhaps the most Gabirolean of all scholastic works.<sup>13</sup> In his commentary on Proclus’ *Elementatio theologica*, not only does Berthold show that he knows the *Fons vitae* firsthand, but also that he greatly appreciates Avicbron’s synthesis, which stands in sharp contrast to the absolutely negative attitude of Albert the Great.<sup>14</sup> In this respect, Berthold follows in the footsteps of Meister Eckhart, who also shows great

10 Avicbron (Ibn Gabirol), *Fons vitae. Translationem ex Arabico in Latinum*, ed. C. Baeumker (Münster: Aschendorff, 1892–1895).

11 Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, lib. v, c. 57, p. 205, l. 8.

12 B. McGinn, “*Sapientia Judaeorum*: the Role of Jewish Philosophers in Some Scholastic Thinkers”, in R.J. Bast, A.C. Gow (eds), *Continuity and Change. The Harvest of Late Medieval and Reformation History* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 206–228, in particular p. 221–225; M. Benedetto, *Saggio introduttivo*, in Avicbron, *Fonte della vita*, ed. M. Benedetto (Milano: Bompiani, 2007), p. 11–197, in particular p. 29–68; N. Bray, “Eckhart e la riforma filosofica dell’umiltà cristiana”, in *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana*, forthcoming. I would like to thank her for having made unpublished materials available to me.

13 McGinn, “*Sapientia iudeorum*”, p. 226; Benedetto, *Saggio*, p. 193–197; King, *Supersapientia*, p. 189.

14 Bray, “*Magis videtur fuisse Stoicus*. La ricezione di Avicbron in Alberto il Grande”, in A. Beccarisi, A. Palazzo (eds), *Flumen Sapientiae, Studi sul pensiero medievale* (Roma: Aracne Editrice, 2019), p. 69–87; McGinn, “*Sapientia iudeorum*”, p. 216–217; Benedetto, *Saggio*, p. 173–175.

interest in Avicbron.<sup>15</sup> Among the many themes that attract Berthold's attention, two in particular are considered relevant, so much so that they are mentioned in his *Tabula*: the theme of the derivation of entities from others and the associated theme of essential causality. In the first case, Berthold uses the concepts of *largitas* and *desiderium*, in the second that of the flow of *radii et vires* from the simple substances. Let us look at these in detail, before moving onto Berthold's use of them.

Avicbron conceives of God in tripartite terms: as First Essence (which is inaccessible), Will (understood as an intermediary between God and Creation, but also as the productive aspect of God) and active and manifest Wisdom. In this way we can know God only through the manifestation of his Will and Wisdom in the ordained structure of entities in the universe (that is, through the things he does and sustains, and in particular, through the wisdom revealed by them). These entities are called by Avicbron *simplices substantiae*, by which he means the Neoplatonic Universal Intellect and the Soul (or Souls). These simple substances (exemplified in the simple substance of the Intellect, that is the highest created manifestation of God's creative Will and Wisdom) are theorized as intermediaries between God and the lowest substance.<sup>16</sup> In this way Avicbron takes up the Neoplatonic formula of the self-diffusive Good – which in the *Fons vitae* coincides with the *voluntas Dei* – while preserving at the same time God's absolute transcendence, because, according to Avicbron, God does not give Himself, but what He has *apud se*, that is, His *forma universalis*, which is an *agens necessario*:

Factor primus excelsus et sanctus largus est ex eo, quod habet apud se, ideo omne, quod est ab eo, effluens est. Et quia fons esse primus largitor est formae, quae est apud se, idcirco non est prohibens, quin effluat; et hic fons est coercens omne, quod est, ambiens et comprehendens. Unde necesse est, ut quaecumque substantiae sunt, sint oboedientes actioni eius et sequentes eum in dando suas formas et largiendo suas vires, quamdiu invenerint materiam paratam ad recipiendum haec. Fluxus

15 N. Bray, "Eckhart e la riforma filosofica dell'umiltà"; A. Palazzo, "Eckhart's Islamic and Jewish Sources: Avicenna, Avicbron, and Averroes", in J.M. Hackett (ed.), *A Companion to Meister Eckhart* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 253–298, in particular p. 271–281; F. Brunner, "Maître Eckhart et Avicébron", in J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, A. de Libera (eds), *Lectionum Varietates. Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904–1987)* (Paris: Vrin, 1991), p. 133–154, in particular p. 150; B. McGinn, "Ibn Gabirol: The Sage among the Schoolmen", in L.E. Goodman (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992), p. 77–109, in particular 96–97.

16 Cf. Pessin, *Solomon Ibn Gabirol (Avicbron)* [accessed October 26, 2020].

autem substantiarum intelligitur motus et desiderium earum circa dandi actionem, in quo imitantur factorem primum. Sed sunt diversae in hoc secundum perfectionem earum et imperfectionem, quia earum aliae fluunt in non tempore, aliae fluunt in tempore, et proportio quarumlibet altiorum substantiarum ad inferiores in dando fluxum talis est, qualis proportio primi factoris ad altiores substantias et inferiores ad influendum super illas, quamvis fluxus earum in unoquoque modo est diversus. Similiter etiam comparatio altiorum substantiarum ad factorem primum in recipiendo ab ipso talis est, qualis est inferiorum ad altiores in recipiendo ab ipsis. Et omnino prima influxio, quae est complectens omnes substantias, ipsa fecit necesse, ut aliae substantiarum influerent aliis.<sup>17</sup>

This action, which proceeds from the first Creator through the mediation of the Will, is transmitted to the inferior entities that wish to imitate the perfection of the first Creator. This connection of generosity and desire constitutes the flow which, according to Avicbron, holds the whole universe together, making it intelligible and comprehensible (*Fons vitae*, III.25, p. 413). The simple substance, which receives the universal form from the Creator, cannot imprint on what is composite anything that is not already in its essence. Otherwise, a created substance would create from nothing, and thus would appropriate what is proper to the Creator. The problem, then, is to relate the multiplicity and extension of sensitive forms to the purity and simplicity of that from which they derive. Therefore, Avicbron argues, it is not the substance that flows (because in that case we would have an identity of essence at every level of reality, without hierarchical order); rather, only the *radii et vires* of the substances are communicated.

Just as the first Creator gives only what is *apud se*, likewise spiritual substances give to inferior realities only what is near them. As is clearly stated in *Fons vitae* III.52, this means that they do not give their essences, but their perfections, their *radii* and *vires*:

Essentiae substantiarum simplicium non sunt defluxae, sed vires earum et radii haec sunt, quae defluunt et effunduntur eo, quod essentiae uniuscuiusque harum substantiarum finitae sunt et terminatae et non extensae usque in infinitum, sed radii earum fluunt ab illis et excedunt terminos suos et limites propter continentiam earum sub primo fluxu, qui effluit a voluntate, scilicet prime boni, sicut lumen, quod effluit a sole in aerem, quia hoc lumen excedit terminos solis et extenditur per aerem,

<sup>17</sup> Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, lib. III, c. 13, p. 107, l. 11–p. 108, l. 10.

et sicut vis animalis effluit a virtute rationali, cuius sedes est cerebrum, et in nervos et lacertos, quia haec virtus est penetrans et diffusa per omnes partes corporis, et substantia animae in se non est diffusa neque extensa, similiter quaelibet substantiarum simplicium extendit radium et lumen suum et diffundit in id, quod est inferius eo, et tamen substantia in hoc retinet ordinem suum et non excedit finem suum.<sup>18</sup>

According to Fernand Brunner,<sup>19</sup> the emanation of creatures is as it is precisely because it has a relationship of identity and otherness with respect to its first Cause. All things differ from the Cause since they are not the Cause, and yet all things are identical to the Cause because they depend on it. The first Creator never degrades into its effect, because it never comes out of itself; insofar as it remains in itself, it affirms itself, projecting its image (the Will) which is not itself but which is nevertheless from itself.

Another important element involved in the process of emanation is undoubtedly the Will, whose role is clarified especially in the fifth book of the *Fons vitae*,<sup>20</sup> but which Avicbron also mentions in previous books. The Will is the link between God and creation, a first hypostasis of the divinity that is – at the same time – a hypostasis external to God (but other than the Intellect) and an aspect of the divine essence. The Will *secundum essentiam* coincides with God and as God is infinite and indefinable, but *secundum effectum* is different from him, because it is made finite and accessible by his action. The Will is responsible for the order of reality: its being *fortior apud deum quam est longius ab eo* proceeds in parallel with the gradual passage from the purity to corporeality of entities, although degradation is a function of the essence of what receives it, that is, of the matter in which it is placed. The light of the Will spreads everywhere with the same intensity; it is matter which then determines the greater or lesser opacity of the various substances that receive it.<sup>21</sup> Although Avicbron does not provide a thematic discussion of the Will of God, the role assigned to it within *Fons vitae* is far from marginal: in addition to being the limit of human knowledge, the Will functions as a connecting element between God and creation, transmitting to the latter what it receives from the former. Yet this conception of the Will takes hold only to a limited extent in Latin culture, which is attracted more than anything else by the doctrine of

18 Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, lib. III, c. 52, p. 196, l. 5–20.

19 F. Brunner, “Création et emanation. Fragment de philosophie comparée”, in F. Brunner, *Métaphysique d’Ibn Gabirol et de la tradition platonicienne* (Aldershot: Ashgate / Variorum, 1997), p. 39–40.

20 Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, lib. v, c. 37, p. 663.

21 Benedetto, *Saggio*, p. 116.



universal hylomorphism, although there are rare occasions in which the name of Avicbron is connected with the theme of the Will. One of the exceptions is precisely that of Berthold, as we shall see shortly.

To summarise so far: the purpose of the human being is to achieve happiness, that is, to know the universe in which he is inserted as a substance. As a substance, the human being is also subject to the law of flow, which transmits the divine *vis* from the first Cause to the lower realities. This process of emanation occurs thanks to the *largitas* of the first Creator and the desire of simple substances to imitate the *factor primus*. Between God and his creation, however, there is an intermediary, the Will of God, which, while coinciding with him, is at the same time his productive side, so to speak, and therefore other than him. In this way, a dynamic of identity and difference is established in all degrees of being: identity is guaranteed by the flowing of *radii et vires* that are communicated by the Will to the inferior realities, and difference is guaranteed because what flows is not the same essence, but rather the qualities of it. It is therefore not surprising that Berthold shows great interest in Avicbron's solution to the problem of the One and many, as we shall see in the third section of this paper. For now, I will proceed to a quick overview of the other source used by Berthold in connection with the concept of essential causality: the treatise *De cognitione entium separatorum* by Dietrich of Freiberg.

## 2 Dietrich of Freiberg and Essential Causality

Much has been written about essential causality in Dietrich of Freiberg.<sup>22</sup> This section will not, therefore, add anything to what has already been effectively demonstrated. Its purpose is merely a general presentation of what Dietrich says about essential causality in *De cognitione entium separatorum*. The choice of this treatise is determined by the fact that Berthold himself in Prop.

22 B. Mojsisch, "Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Berthold von Moosburg. Zur Proklosrezeption im Mittelalter", in Th. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, O. Summerell (eds), *Selbst – Singularität – Subjektivität: Vom Neuplatonismus zum Deutschen Idealismus* (Amsterdam: Grüner, 2002), p. 175–184; B. Mojsisch, "Causa essentialis bei Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart", in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 106–114; M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, "Filosofia della natura e filosofia dell'intelletto in Teodorico di Freiberg e Bertoldo di Moosburg", in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 115–127; M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, "À propos du néoplatonisme d'Albert le Grand: Aventures et mésaventures de quelques textes d'Albert dans le Commentaire sur Proclus de Berthold de Moosburg", in *Archives de Philosophie* 43(1980), p. 635–654; K. Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg. Philosophie, Theologie, Naturforschung um 1300* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2007), p. 201, 534.

172 – explicitly dedicated to the theme of essential causality – extensively quotes this treatise.

According to the schema provided by Proclus' *Elementatio theologica*, Dietrich of Freiberg states that the structure of reality is organized in four hierarchical orders, four *maneries entium*. Although Dietrich addresses this issue in many of his works, it is specifically at the beginning of *De cognitione entium separatorum* that one finds a complete formulation of this structure: God represents the summit of reality, followed by the intelligences and then the celestial souls; then come the angels and lastly human souls. God occupies the summit of the hierarchy of reality. He is indeed the first cause of the totality of things by the mode of creation, and his perfection exceeds all other perfection. God is intellect in essence; he is perfect unity and simplicity.

The second degree of being proceeds immediately from God. These are the intelligences, purely intellectual substances or intellects by essence – because of their proximity to the first principle, in each of them the totality of the created universe is reflected and shines forth. Each intelligence proceeds from another through a mode of essential causality conferred upon it by God, but is a mode of production inferior to creation, for it presupposes the creative activity of the first principle. Dietrich makes an important remark regarding these intellectual substances; their existence is posited in relation to the order of nature and according to the opinion of the philosophers, which can be accepted or rejected as long as the existence of such substances is not enshrined in Sacred Scripture, where no mention is made of them (“[...] si admittatur positio philosophorum eo, quod Scriptura sancta de eis non loquitur [...]”).<sup>23</sup>

The same consideration also applies to the third degree of realities posited by the philosophers in the order of nature, the celestial souls (“Ex his tertio loco secundum philosophos procedunt quaedam substantiae intellectuales, quas animas caelorum dicunt”).<sup>24</sup> Just like the intelligences, celestial souls are purely intellectual substances, that is to say, intellects by essence, but of a perfection inferior to those that precede them: firstly, because they are produced by the intelligences and therefore do not proceed directly from the first principle, and secondly, because they are ordered to bodies, that is to say, to the celestial bodies whose act and form they are. At the fourth level of the hierarchy are the angels: although they are purely immaterial realities, the angels are spiritual substances and are no longer *intellectus per essentiam*. In Dietrich's conception this means that angels are not pure and simple essences, because

23 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione*, 1.1–3, p. 168, l. 34–51.

24 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione*, 1.4, p. 168, l. 52–p. 169, l. 63.

their faculties and operations differ from their substances: therefore, angels are composed, individualized realities, and their action is no longer essential.

Finally, in the fifth and last degree, there are human souls, whether they are considered according to their union with the body that they animate or according to their separation from it. As with angels, so also with human souls, but to a still greater extent, their faculties and operations differ from their substances. The criterion of this hierarchy is action through a thing's own essence and therefore the exercise of an essential causality. Only this kind of causality is capable of ensuring continuity between the different levels of reality, in order to guarantee its homogeneity and unity. But what is an essential cause? First of all, according to Dietrich, the essential cause contains in itself more eminently its caused and the being of its effect ("necessarium est ipsam habere causatum suum et esse causatum suum nobiliore et eminentiore et perfectiore modo, quam ipsum causatum sit in se ipso secundum propriam naturam").<sup>25</sup> He then enumerates five properties that are required for a cause to be defined as essential: it must be 1) *substantia*, 2) *substantia viva*, 3) *substantia viva essentialiter*. The life which the essential cause lives is 4) *vita intellectualis* and therefore is proper to 5) *intellectus in actu per essentiam*.

Dietrich clearly states that, of the five levels of reality listed above, only three can be said to be essential causes: God, intelligences, and celestial souls ("Et ista quinque conveniunt substantiis separatis, scilicet Deo et intelligentiis et his, quasi animas caelorum vocant").<sup>26</sup> Three elements should be kept in mind. Firstly, according to Dietrich, God and celestial souls are essential causes. Secondly, throughout the treatise, Dietrich keeps a prudent distance from the *vexata quaestio* of the animation of the heavens. He presents it as an idea of the philosophers, which can be rejected or accepted.<sup>27</sup> Thirdly, essential causality is explained by Dietrich as an inner activity, which institutes a homogeneous unity that communicates the divine creative activity, which is the essential cause *par excellence*. In Dietrich's universe the essential causes are therefore necessary mediations: they exert an intermediate causality that ensures continuity, homogeneity, order in the totality of reality and, therefore, guarantees intelligibility. *Causae essentialiales* exclusively concern intellects by essence, which are the only entities free of all composition and are *vivae per se*.

25 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione*, 22.5, p. 186, l. 84–90.

26 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione*, 23.1–6, p. 186, l. 93–p. 187, l. 110.

27 On this topic cf. L. Sturlese, "Il *De animatione caeli* di Teodorico di Freiberg", in R. Creyten, P. Künzle (eds), *Xenia medii aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppli O.P.* (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1978), p. 175–247; Suarez-Nani, *Substances séparées*, p. 52.

Now, what is living is distinguished from what is not living by the fact that living being contains its principle of motion within itself, according to which each part moves another. In *De intellectu et intellegibili* Dietrich interprets this purely experimental datum as a *transfusio* of one part on the other, which causes an overflow to the outside. Thus, all overflow presupposes an inner activity.

Sicut autem dictum est de corporibus, ita se habet de animabus seu animatis, videlicet quod necessarium est inveniri in eis quoad suas partes quandam transfusionem, qua una pars fluat in aliam, quo redundet in extra. Quod non solum per experientiam patet tam in vivis perfectis, videlicet in motu cordis, arteriarum, pulmonis et pectoris et ceteris talibus, verum etiam in imperfectis ut in plantis et conchyliis, ut in ostreis et ceteris talibus, non solum, inquam, hoc habetur per experientiam, sed etiam ex propria ratione vivi in quantum vivum, quia vivum differt a non vivo in habendo in se principium sui motus, quo una pars movet aliam.<sup>28</sup>

The essential order so described, which links the different orders of reality, is thus the result of a model that Dietrich derives from the observations of the structure of physical and living beings. The *intellectus in actu per essentiam* are therefore entities living intellectually because of an *interiorem transfusionem*:

Sed hoc video inquirendum, quomodo in istis intellectibus inveniatur aliqua interior transfusio, quo aliquid fluat in aliud, quo etiam in eis inveniuntur principia activa, et praecipue in eis, qui sunt intellectus per essentiam semper in actu.<sup>29</sup>

This is why the rationality of the universe rests on its unity: this unity is not that of a disordered mass but results from the links that join the different components of the universe to each other. Essential causes are thus necessary for the cohesion of the universe according to Dietrich's view, and this causality can only be exercised by intellects essentially in act, that is, by intelligences of the Neoplatonic type. Dietrich thus identifies with Proclus and the *Liber de causis*<sup>30</sup> the One and the Good, which refers to the relationship between the

28 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intellegibili* in Dietrich of Freiberg, *Schriften zur Intellekttheorie*, ed. B. Mojsich (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), p. 131–210, here I.6.1, p. 139, l. 88–p. 140, l. 10.

29 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu*, I.8.1, p. 141, l. 46–49.

30 Cf. D. Calma, *Le poids de la citation: Étude sur les sources arabes et grecques dans l'œuvre de Dietrich de Freiberg* (Freiburg: Academic Press, 2011).

origin and the originated. Being moves from the One as origin to the Good as destination in a cycle that shows origin and destination to be identical. In all of the levels of being mentioned above, being necessarily flows into something outside of itself, because otherwise it would be redundant and futile in nature, as Dietrich claims in *De intellectu*.<sup>31</sup>

Dietrich's doctrine on essential causality does however have a limit: it seems to establish a relationship of identity and difference between the various parts that make up the structure of the universe (the famous formula "identical in essence, but different in being"), but in fact it does not explain how this happens – what the process is that grounds essential causality.

Two important issues remain to be clarified: In what sense must the statement "the cause contains its caused in a more eminent and noble way" be understood? Could this not lead to an identity of the levels of being, which would thereby nullify the hierarchical order?

### 3 Berthold of Moosburg on Essential Causality: Prop. 18

As recently summed up by Irene Zavattero,<sup>32</sup> Berthold explains the structure of the Proclean cosmos by means of "the *fluxus*-doctrine" of Albert the Great and Ulrich of Strassburg.<sup>33</sup> In order to explain how this *fluxus* takes place, Berthold resorts to Dietrich of Freiberg's theory of essential causality. As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, however, Berthold quotes another authority to support his interpretation of the essential cause, namely the *Fons vitae* of Avicbron, whose use goes far beyond the merely doxographical. This clearly emerges from his *Tabula contentorum* where, under the entry "Avengebrol", he recalls the theme of the bestowal of being and the ontological status of the giver of being relative to lower realities – a theme that he explicitly connects to essential causality. The proposition to which Berthold is referring in his *Tabula*

31 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu*, 1.10.2, p. 143, l. 6–11: *Ex praemissis colligitur substantiam illam, et hoc omnem talem, quae est intellectus per essentiam semper in actu, habere in se virtutem principii activi, qua agit aliquid extra se in aliud. Alioquin esset frustra in natura. Frustra enim est, quod destituitur proprio fine secundum Philosophum in II Physicorum. Natura autem nihil agit frustra, quia, sicut non deficit in necessariis, ita non abundat in superfluis.*

32 I. Zavattero, "Berthold of Moosburg", in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), p. 163–165.

33 Tommaso Ferro is dedicating his doctoral work to the theme of essential causality in Ulrich of Strassburg under my supervision and that of Prof. Andreas Speer. Cf. also King, *Supersapientia*, p. 155, 168–169.

is Prop. 18, which states: “Omne derivans esse aliis ipsum prime est hoc, quod tradit recipientibus derivationem”.<sup>34</sup> By invoking many authorities Berthold demonstrates in his commentary the primacy of what *gives* being over what *receives* it. He cites Avicbron verbatim and extensively to demonstrate the conditions (the status) of the giver of being, the necessity of simple substances between the first cause and lower realities, and the nature of the action performed by the different levels of reality on each other. Berthold interprets the connection of each *derivans esse* in terms of essential causality, carried out by simple substances, which, as we have seen, share the divine *virtus* with lower, composite realities.

Berthold first enumerates the features of every *derivans esse*: it must be (*necessarium est*) “bonum, unum, perfectum, plenum, simplex, forte sive potens, subtile, spirituale, luminosum et quodammodo infinitus seu interminabilis essentiae”. For the first four *condiciones*, Berthold summons the authorities of Dionysius, Proclus, and Macrobius, while to describe the remaining attributes he quotes a very long passage from the third book of the *Fons vitae*, in which Avicbron provides a demonstration of the existence of the simple substances according to the action performed by these substances on each other. We have seen, indeed, that simple substances share their forms both out of the desire to imitate the *largitas* of the primary cause and from their intrinsic constitution (nature), because the stronger and more subtle the agent is, the more incisive and penetrating its action. Avicbron’s demonstration is based on the observation that composed substances such as *quantitas et figura* do not have the capacity to “influence” because of their weakness and coarseness. It can be deduced, therefore, that simple substances have the capacity to communicate their forms precisely because they are simpler and more luminous than composite entities. If this is true, how much subtler and stronger must be the *virtus Dei* that spreads and penetrates everywhere. Berthold therefore fully agrees with Avicbron, who believes, as we have seen in the first part, that it is not God himself who flows, but rather, his *virtus*, or universal form.

This dynamic, described bottom-up as a progressive simplification of entities, implies that everything is simpler, more subtle and luminous in itself than in the composite entities to which it is communicated. Simple substances, therefore, accept the forms (which they then transmit to what is below) in a purer way than they are in composite substances.

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34 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18, p. 44, l. 2–3.

Quinta condicio cum sequentibus patet per Avencebrol libro III cap. 15, ubi dicit: “[...] Effluxio enim est ex impulsu, impulsus autem ex vi; signum autem, quod vis et subtilitas faciunt influxum, est hoc, quod quantitas et figura non imprimunt suum simile in obstans, cum potens fuerit recipere; et hoc non est nisi propter debilitatem quantitatis et grossitudinem eius ad penetrandum. Similiter dicendum de accidente, quia, quo fuerit fortius, subtilius et luminosius, erit penetrabilius. Conficiemus ergo ex his sex propositionibus hoc, scilicet quod substantiae simplices necesse est, ut dent se ipsas et conferant suas formas. Et etiam quia hoc, quod vires et radii, qui effluunt de corpore, sunt spirituales, signum est, quoniam effluere debent etiam substantiae spirituales. Et etiam quia, cum nos invenimus substantiam corpoream prohibitam ad conferendum se propter crassitatem quantitatis et tenebrositatem eius, et tamen quantitas confert umbram suam corporibus, quae opposita sunt, adeo quod, cum invenerit corpus lucidum ut speculum, dat ei formam suam, quanto magis necessarium est secundum hanc considerationem, ut substantia spiritualis, quae est immunis a quantitate, sit effluens suam essentiam et virtutem et lumen suum? ... Quanto enim fuerint subtiliores, fortiores et meliores, tanto magis aptae sunt ad agendum et conferendum se et sua”. Et infra: “Et cum attenderis, quod essentia substantiae simplicis non habet finem, et attenderis vim eius, et cogitaveris penetrabilitatem eius in rem contra positam, quae parata est recipere eam, et comparaveris inter eam et substantiam corpoream, invenies substantiam corpoream non potentem esse ubique et debilem ad penetrandum res, et invenies substantiam simplicem, hoc est substantiam animae universalis, diffusam per totum mundum et sustinentem illum in se propter subtilitatem et simplicitatem suam; et sic invenies substantiam intelligentiae universalis diffusam per totum mundum et penetrantem illum. Causa autem huius est subtilitas substantiarum ambarum et vis et lumen earum; et propter hoc fuit substantia intelligentiae infusa et penetrans interiora rerum. Quanto magis ergo secundum hanc considerationem debet esse virtus Dei sancti penetrans omnia, existens in omnibus, agens in omnibus sine tempore!”

Ex dictis Avencebrol colligitur evidenter omne derivans esse aliis esse simplex, forte, subtile, spirituale, luminosum et quodammodo infinitum et interminabilis essentiae.<sup>35</sup>

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35 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18A, p. 45, l. 44–p. 46, l. 84.

From the passage from the *Fons vitae*, which Berthold quotes literally and extensively, it is clear that he shares two of Avicbron's aforementioned positions: 1) both the simple substances and the first Creator share only what is *apud se*, namely, the *virtus*, *radii* and *vires*, and not the same essence. 2) The activity of God and of the simple substances, however, extends throughout the universe (*penetrans omnia, existens in omnibus, agens in omnibus*) due to their subtlety and simplicity, which explains the mechanics of essential causality.

Once the conditions of each *derivans esse aliis* have been defined, it necessarily follows that it is an essential cause, as Berthold clearly states in section 18D: "De primo sciendum, quod derivans esse aliis quodcumque, quod etiam necessario est causa essentialis [...]". As such, it spreads a univocal intention through all its participants. But although this intention exists in the determined entity, that entity does not lose its intrinsic nature. It remains identical in its determinations, varying only in the mode of being of the various realities that constitute the universe. This, as is well known, is the law of essential causality formulated by Dietrich of Freiberg in the treatise *De intellectu et intelligibili*, where he establishes a difference between the relationship of cause-caused and that of determinable-determined. Unlike a cause in the caused (effect), which "recedes from its proper intelligibility":

Non sic se habent ad invicem determinabile et id, in quod fit determinatio, quia talia non habent se ad invicem ex additione secundum essentiam, quamvis numerentur secundum esse, nec ipsum determinabile existens in determinato recedit et cadit a sua propria ratione, sed idem et eiusdem rationis et proprietatis per essentiam manet in tali determinatione, sed solum variatur secundum esse, et idem et eiusdem rationis per essentiam manet sub diverso modo essendi.<sup>36</sup>

Because of essential causality, every order of reality is always immediately intelligible, in that the essence is present in the determined, which guarantees the unity and intelligibility of the entire universe and, at the same time, ensures the possibility for the human being to return, through knowledge, to its origin.

In support of Dietrich's position, Berthold cites, once again, long passages from the *Fons vitae*, in order to demonstrate the following points: intellectual apprehension occurs by similarity, and every *derivans esse aliis* knows the spirituality of things (their essence); every *derivans esse aliis* has knowledge of all

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<sup>36</sup> Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu*, III.21.3, p. 194, l. 111–117. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18D, p. 53, l. 342–354.



things that derive from it, and knowledge is nothing more than the subsistence of known forms in the knower; all forms that flow are united in that from which they derive; everything that derives from some origin, is united in that origin. Berthold's elegant mosaic certainly reveals a strong affinity of the metaphysics of *fluxus* developed by Avicbron, based on the overflowing of forms, with the essential causality theorised by Dietrich of Freiberg. Compared to Dietrich's formulation, however, Avicbron seems to explicate more clearly the relationship between identity and difference established across the various ranks of reality, precisely because, according to Avicbron's doctrine, what flows is not the same essence, but rather, as we have seen, the *virtus Dei* and *radii et vires* of simple substances, which thus avoids the theoretical possibility of "a night in which all cows are black".<sup>37</sup> Berthold himself explicitly links the dialectic of identity-difference with the doctrine of essential causality when tracing the structure of the last part of his commentary in Prop. 18:

Circa propositum tria faciam, quia primo ponam omnis aliis esse derivantis duplicem considerationem et ex hoc identitatis et diversitatis eius ad ea, quae tradit derivationem recipientibus, rationem, secundo addam praedictis multiplicem probationem, tertio ex praemissis ostendam propositi intentionem.<sup>38</sup>

It is therefore worthwhile exploring Avicbron's contribution to the doctrine of the essential cause, which seems to be linked to the metaphysics of the flow, that is, to clarify what is communicated from the first Creator to the lowest realities. This theme is taken up in Prop. 172, to which we now turn.

#### 4 Berthold of Moosburg on Essential Causality: Prop. 172

As previously shown, according to the intention expressed by Berthold in the *Tabula contentorum*, his commentary on Prop. 172 is dedicated to the definition of an essential cause. He skillfully interweaves large excerpts from chapters 6, 22, 23, and 24 of Dietrich's *De cognitione entium separatorum* and Avicbron's *Fons vitae*. The result is a presentation of the theory of essential causation that is apparently faithful to Dietrich's intentions, but in fact turns out to be an original interpretation of it. Let us discuss this in detail.

<sup>37</sup> Georg W.F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 4, 16.

<sup>38</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18D, p. 52, l. 287–290.

Berthold aims at three objectives: to demonstrate that each *intellectus in actu* is an essential cause, to describe its conditions, and to show that each essential cause contains its own effects. In doing this, Berthold constructs an argument taken from chapter 6 of *De cognitione entium separatorum*, in which Dietrich intends to demonstrate that angels (one of the levels of the universe described in section 2 of this article) are not essential causes. Dietrich states that each active substance acts in a manner corresponding to its own nature: therefore, some will act intellectually, others spiritually, and still others bodily. Among these, intellectual substances are those that act more eminently than the others because they are intellects by essence and, accordingly, their action is their essence (*intelligendo agunt*). As shown in section 2, to act according to the essence itself is the criterion that determines the hierarchical order of the four *maneries* and, therefore, distinguishes, Dietrich writes, the essential cause from the accidental cause: “est autem proprium et per se causae essentialis per suam essentiam causare. Et in hoc distinguitur a causa accidentali.”<sup>39</sup>

“Omnis autem substantia activa elicit suam propriam actionem modo sibi proprio, id est secundum modum ipsius substantiae; unde aliter exerunt suas actiones intellectualia, aliter spiritualia et aliter corporalia, inter quae tria intellectualia, quae sunt intellectus per essentiam, altissimo modo agunt, quia intelligendo agunt,” ut inferius apparebit, “et sic non agunt nisi per suas essentias,” “et in hoc distinguuntur a causis” substantialibus, quales sunt animae caelorum cum suis corporibus, et “a causis accidentalibus, sive tales sint removens prohibens sive sint accidentales, quod vestiantur aliquibus accidentibus, quae sint sibi ratio agendi, ut calor igni.”<sup>40</sup>

Thanks to the precise editorial work of Jeck and Tautz, it is possible to reconstruct Berthold’s intervention in this passage. In the midst of a literal quotation from Dietrich’s text, Berthold introduces a significant variation: intellects by essence, which are essential causes, are distinguished not only from accidental causes (as Dietrich remarks), but also from substantial causes, which – Berthold explicitly states – are the celestial souls with their own bodies (“et in hoc distinguuntur a causis’ substantialibus, quales sunt animae caelorum cum suis corporibus”). This is a relevant statement, because according to Dietrich, even celestial souls are essential causes. Dietrich himself makes a difference between essential causes, substantial causes, and accidental causes (see for example chapter 75 of *De cognitione*), and Berthold himself is fully aware of

39 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione*, 6.2, p. 172, l. 88–89.

40 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 172A, p. 120, l. 20–28.

this (see for example his comment on Prop. 7C). But the point is that here Berthold does not quote chapter 75 of *De cognitione*, although he knows it, but the chapter in which Dietrich speaks about the status of angels. Berthold's intervention is clearly deliberate and, in my opinion, has only one meaning: heavenly souls are *not intellectus in actu per essentiam* and consequently are *not* essential causes.

As for accidental causes, Berthold adds that their manner of action is in a sense similar to the motion or power to cause essentially, which is (following Dietrich again) nothing other than a “flow of essential power flowing essentially into something else”:

Dico autem “ratio agendi” non tantum “continuandi virtutem causae” ad “suum passum, qualia sunt accidentia” “corporis caelestis,” quibus “virtus eius continuatur ad passa, puta motus et lumen, quibus mediantibus” virtus caeli continuatur inferioribus passivis; cui quasi consimilis est motus seu “causandi virtus essentialis, qui non est nisi defluxio virtutis essentialis essentialiter fluentis in aliud.”<sup>41</sup>

At this point, Berthold attaches a long passage from Avicbron's *Fons vitae*, already quoted above in section 1, which states again that it is not the essences that flow, but rather their rays that spread *usque infinitum* because of their containment (*continentia*) in the first *fluxus*, which flows from the Will, that is – Berthold explains – the *prime bonum*:

Et hoc est, quod dicit Avencebrol libro III, cap. 52: “Essentiae substantiarum simplicium non sunt defluxae, sed vires earum et radii haec sunt, quae defluunt et effunduntur eo, quod essentiae uniuscuiusque harum substantiarum finitae sunt et terminatae” et “non extensae usque in infinitum, sed radii earum fluunt ab illis et excedunt terminos suos et limites propter continentiam earum sub primo fluxu, qui effluit a voluntate,” scilicet prime boni, “sicut lumen, quod effluit a sole in aerem, quia hoc lumen excedit terminos solis et extenditur per aerem.”<sup>42</sup>

Then Berthold refers back to Dietrich's *De cognitione* and lists the five characteristics of an essential cause, already analysed above in section 2. Here

41 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 172A, p. 121, l. 29–34, citing Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione*, 6.3, p. 173, l. 98–105.

42 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 172A, p. 121, l. 35–41, citing Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, lib. III, c. 52, p. 196, l. 5–12.

once again he introduces a slight but important modification to the Dietrich's text. While Dietrich affirms that the five characteristics listed are proper (*conveniunt*) to the separate substances, i.e. God and intelligences, in addition to heavenly souls, and, *incidenter*, also to the agent intellect,<sup>43</sup> Berthold limits the range of the entities that merit the status of an essential cause by restricting it to *omni intellectui*, and thus excluding de facto God and heavenly souls.<sup>44</sup>

As previously shown, according to Berthold, God (*prime Deus*) is beyond the intellect.<sup>45</sup> In agreement with Avicebron, Berthold argues that what is truly knowable by human beings is rather the *voluntas Dei*, which he identifies with Proclus' *prime bonum*. *Voluntas* in the *Fons vitae* represents not only the connection between the (unknowable) God and universe, but it is also the last level of reality that can be known, precisely because of its effects that are spread throughout the universe, all the way to composite realities, which include the human being.

As argued in section 1, Avicebron interprets the activity of simple substances (intellects) as the result of their desire to imitate the action of the *primus factor*, which bestows (*largitur*) the forms close to it (*apud se*) through the *voluntas*, its manifestation. This means that the *factor primus* is always beyond all its manifestation and that it is the *voluntas* that constitutes the primary outflowing, from which the outflow of the intelligences derives.

In the context of Berthold's commentary, Avicebron's theory of flux is easily assimilated to Dionysius' idea of the superessential Good, which is separated from all things (*ab omnibus segregatum*), but also at the same time is in all things (*in omnibus*).<sup>46</sup> According to Dionysius, God moves out of himself to establish his effects because of his amorous goodness (*bonitas amativa*). In the same way, Berthold states in his commentary on Prop. 175, every essential cause redounds outside itself and is in a certain sense outside itself. In this process "every intellectual nature is elevated above nature properly speaking and reaches the likeness of the primarily Good" ("omnis intellectualis natura elevatur super naturam proprie dictam et accedit ad similitudinem prime boni"). *Amor* (love) is thus an act of will, which is the perfection of every intellectual

43 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cognitione*, 23.6, p. 187, l. 108–109.

44 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 172B, p. 122, l. 76–77.

45 See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 115E, p. 55, l. 175–177: *Haec Dionysius. Ex his satis apparet de prime Dei supersubstantialitate. Cum ergo sit superens et ens sit super vitam et haec super intellectum per 101, patet prime Deum simpliciter esse supersubstantialem, supervitalem et superintellectum.*

46 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 175A, p. 146, l. 17.

nature. It follows that Berthold calls the will of the separate intelligences “the communication of divine goodness”, which is “intrinsic to their essence”.<sup>47</sup>

Evidently influenced by Avicbron’s theory on *voluntas*, Berthold emphasizes the role of the will in the process of emanation, deducing 1) that the *bonum* desires and loves intellectually and 2) that in the communication of the divine good, one acts neither for *necessitatem coactionis* nor for *necessitatem naturae*, but rather for an act of freedom.<sup>48</sup>

This assumption becomes clearer when Berthold compares two models of emanation in 175B:<sup>49</sup> one attributed to Avicenna and Algazel (*imitator eius*), the other to Avicbron and Plato.

According to the authority of the former, the *intellectus universaliter agens* acts by actively understanding (*active intelligendo*), that is, by emitting lower separate intelligences (*intelligentias emittendo*) as well as the various orders of intelligences that exist within the souls and celestial bodies.

According to the authority of Avicbron and Plato, instead, the *intellectus in actu per essentiam* produces entities not only by thinking (*intelligendo*), but rather (*sed magis*) by willing (*volendo*).<sup>50</sup> This means that the activity of intellect derives *ex intuitu voluntatis* and it is therefore subjected to the superessential Will.<sup>51</sup> As for Avicbron also for Berthold the submission of intelligences to the first cause is the result of the desire to imitate the voluntary activity of the divine will. For both thinkers, therefore, “the cosmic process is not a necessary and impersonal flow or radiation of all things from the First Principle” (as stated by Avicenna), but rather the outcome “of God’s creative will.”<sup>52</sup>

47 E. King, “Berthold of Moosburg on Intellect and the One of the Soul”, in *Dionysius* 36(2018), p. 184–199, in particular p. 199.

48 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 175A, p. 147, l. 33–37: *Ex hoc enim duo consequuntur ipsam voluntatem, unum in se, scilicet quod bonum proprium et eius communionem desiderat et amat amore intellectuali, secundum, quod in talis boni redundantis communiōe non agit necessitate coactionis, sed nec proprie necessitate naturae, sed voluntatis libertate, quae bene stat cum immutabilitatis necessitate.*

49 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 175B, p. 147, l. 60–p. 149, l. 115.

50 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 175B, p. 149, l. 110–115: *Hucusque positio Avicennae. Alii vero sunt, qui dicunt intellectum in actu per essentiam non solum ‘intelligendo, sed magis volendo instituire ea, quae sunt’. Cui positioni videtur consentire Plato in Timaeo libro I, ubi dicit: “Voluntatem Dei originem certissimam rerum si quis ponat, recte” “consentiam”, et Avencebrol libro V cap. 17, ubi dicit: “Plato consideravit, quod formae fiunt in intelligentia ex intuitu voluntatis, et fiunt in anima universali ex intuitu intelligentiae universalis”. Sicut igitur simpliciter prima causa agit et creat omnia volendo, ita etiam omnis alia causa essentialis et praecipue intellectus per essentiam in causando primo se nititur conformare.*

51 Cf. King, “Berthold of Moosburg”, p. 199.

52 J.A. Weisheipl, “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicbron. A Note on Thirteenth-Century Augustinianism”, in *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 10/3 (1979), p. 239–260, at p. 249.

In my view, the existence of celestial souls and bodies as essential causes is proven by the model of Avicenna and Algazel, but not by Avicebron's model, which seems to be the one closest to Berthold's intentions. This may be the reason for Berthold's significant silence on the question of heavenly souls in Prop. 172, a silence that cannot be attributed to a mere synthesis of Dietrich's theory, but rather to Berthold's specific interpretation of essential causality. His clear preference for Avicebron's emanative model seems also to be confirmed by the overlap between the *voluntas* and *prime bonum*, which emphasizes the role of the Dionysian notion of *bonitas amativa*, to the detriment of Avicennian intellectualism.

One can thus conclude that, combining Dietrich's authority with that of Avicebron, Berthold proposes his own interpretation of essential causality, according to which only *intellectus in actu per essentiam* are *causae essentiales*.

At the same time, however, the metaphysics of the flow outlined by Avicebron seems to diverge from what Proclus affirms in Propositions 72, 7 and 18, namely, that every *intellectus in actu per essentiam* presupposes the subject in which it acts and that it touches (*tangit*) substantially (*substantialiter*), which suggests an almost 'physical' contact between the various hierarchical orders.

Omnis intellectus in actu per essentiam et praesupponit subiectum suum, in quod agit, praelaboratum ab omnibus causalioribus se principiis agentibus, per 72, et est simul cum eo et tangit ipsum substantialiter, quia, quidquid in eo est, totum est substantia simplex intellectualis, et per consequens similem substantiam sibi causat, cum omne agens agat sibi simile, licet effectus deficiat in esse a sua per se causa, per 7 et 18 et omnis talis coexistentia per essentiam sit causalis active et passive, ut inferius apparebit.<sup>53</sup>

How can this be possible if it is not the substances that flow, but rather their rays and forces, i.e. their qualities? To solve this apparent contradiction Berthold turns again to the authority of Avicebron to show that, if it is true that *radii et vires* are what flow, they nevertheless emanate from a substantial cause, and thus they transmit the same substantiality from higher to lower. It can therefore be said, briefly, that these *radii et vires* of *intellectus in actu per essentiam* are of the same essence as this intellect that diffuses itself intentionally. They therefore have a connection both with the essence of the intellect from which they come, and with the essences of the things caused, which are of the same essence as the emanating intellect, but differ according to the mode of being,

53 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 172E, p. 124, l. 139–46.

as shown in the commentary to Prop. 18. This explanation, Berthold emphasizes, derives from the text of Avicbron, which seems therefore perfectly consonant with Dietrich's theory, even if with some correction or clarification.

## 5 Conclusion

Even after an analysis only of Berthold's commentary on Propositions 18 and 172, some conclusions can be drawn:

- 1) The pivotal role of the *Fons vitae* in Berthold's *Expositio* is confirmed. Berthold extensively quotes Avicbron at first hand and without the mediation of Thomas of York's *Sapientiale*.
- 2) Without diminishing the contribution of Albert the Great and Ulrich of Strassburg, Avicbron's contribution is particularly significant in relation to the theory of essential causality, as documented by Berthold's *Tabula contentorum*.
- 3) Berthold uses Avicbron to resolve some ambiguities in the formulation of Dietrich's theory of essential causality: on the one hand, to safeguard God's perfect transcendence and, on the other, to ensure the perfect unity and intelligibility of the created universe.
- 4) Berthold restricts the status of essential cause to the *intellectus in actu per esentiam*, excluding God and the celestial souls, and fully shares Avicbron's theory that it is *radii et vires* of simple substances that overflow and not their essences.
- 5) To this end Berthold associates the *voluntas* of the *Fons vitae* to the Proclean *prime bonum* as the source of the flow of forms spreading through all the universe as far as contracted and determined entities. In this way he emphasizes the voluntary activity of God and of the intelligences, to detriment of Avicennian intellectualism.
- 7) Thanks to this chain of forms, the human being is able to go back from composite substances to the first source, which however is not God himself, but rather the *voluntas Dei*.

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# Between Cologne and Oxford: Berthold of Moosburg and Thomas of York's *Sapientiale*

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## 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Berthold of Moosburg left us a monumental commentary on the *Elements of Theology* of Proclus, which represents a unique writing of medieval times. Berthold's commentary evolves into a philosophical odyssey, at the end of which the human being, solely with the aid of the natural light of the intellect (*ductu luminis naturalis intellectus*),<sup>2</sup> reaches his final perfection and becomes not only blessed, but also god. Berthold realized his project concerning the divinization of the human being by drafting a *summa*, a broad encyclopedia of ancient and modern Platonism, thanks to which the metaphysical and impersonal principles to which Proclus had reduced the Homeric gods acquire a new, all-human face.

Little is known about Berthold's biography, but there is enough to place him and his activity in a precise historical and cultural context: Berthold was an active member of the German Dominican order and he succeeded Eckhart as the head of the Dominican general *studium* in Cologne; he was, in short, part of the circle of thinkers who continued the philosophical tradition that was initiated, in Cologne, by Albert the Great.

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1 This paper is a reworked version of a paper published in 2019 under the title “*Magister Thomas Anglicus Minor*. Tommaso di York fonte dell’*Expositio* di Bertoldo di Moosburg,” in *Tra antichità e modernità. Studi di storia della filosofia medievale e rinascimentale, Quaderni di Noctua* 5(2019), p. 1–41. The *Appendix* has been particularly revised and considerably increased, especially thanks to the valuable suggestions of Dr. Evan King, whom I would like to thank very much here. I am also grateful to Giovanni Lasorella, who studied the relationship between Thomas and Berthold as part of his master’s thesis.

2 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), *Exp. tit. A*, p. 38, l. 33.

The preservation of the philosophical heritage of the so-called *Deutsche Dominikaner Schule*<sup>3</sup> and the continuity of the Platonic tradition are both distinctive features that Berthold almost flaunts in the course of his work. It is therefore not a coincidence that he opens his work with a detailed *Tabula auctoritatum* and declares that his *Expositio* is actually a compilation made on the basis of two distinct groups of authors: the *doctores ecclesiae*, on the one hand, and the *philosophi famosi*, on the other.<sup>4</sup>

The list of the *doctores ecclesiae* begins with Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite, Augustine, Boethius, Eustratius of Nicaea, John Scotus Eriugena, and Calcidius, and ends with six authors chronologically closer to Berthold. The first of these six names is that of Thomas Aquinas. Thomas is followed by – in order – Albert the Great, who founded the Dominican *studium generale* of Cologne in 1248, Dietrich of Freiberg, a German Dominican active in Cologne in the second half of the thirteenth century, and Ulrich of Strassburg, a Dominican also linked to the *studium* of the preachers at Cologne. These are all more or less well-known thinkers studied by specialists in medieval philosophy. And they are, above all, Dominican authors, all in some way linked to the *studium generale* of Cologne.

The penultimate name on the list is that of a *Frater Arnoldus Luscus*. Berthold provides some further details about him in the course of his work: Arnold is a Dominican (*ordinis Praedicatorum*) who composed a treatise *De periodis motuum et mobilium caelestium*; he was a diligent observer and calculator of the movement of celestial bodies and author of a sophisticated table on the motion of the stars, which Berthold attached to and with which he

3 Cf. M. Grabmann, "Der Einfluss Alberts des Grossen auf das mittelalterliche Geistesleben," in *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, vol. 2 (München: Max Hueber Verlag, 1936), p. 325–412; G.M. Löhr, *Die Kölner Dominikanerschule vom 14 bis zum 16. Jahrhundert* (Freiburg / Schweiz: Verl. der Paulusdr., 1946), p. 29–42; L. Sturlese, "Albert der Grosse und die deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters," in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 28(1981), p. 133–147 (reprinted in: L. Sturlese, *Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse* [Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007], p. 1–13); N. Largier, "Die deutsche Dominikanerschule. Zur Problematik eines historiographischen Konzepts," in J.A. Aertsen, A. Speer (eds), *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2000), p. 202–213; J.A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 315–316; H. Anzulewicz, "Albertus Magnus und seine Schüler. Versuch einer Verhältnisbestimmung," in A. Speer, Th. Jeschke (eds), *Schüler und Meister* (Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2016), p. 159–203, esp. p. 176–177.

4 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, p. 3–4.

concluded his commentary on Proposition 198 of the *Elementatio theologica*.<sup>5</sup> The historical identity of Brother Arnold is still unknown. Isabelle Draelants suggested that he should be identified with Arnold of Saxony, a Dominican active in Cologne, Erfurt, and Paris in the thirteenth century and author of a well-known medieval encyclopedia entitled *De floribus rerum naturalium*, preserved in a single manuscript of the Amplonian collection in Erfurt. Further, a work of astrological content, transmitted anonymously in a manuscript preserved in Basel (Universitätsbibliothek, O.VI.4), is also attributed to Arnold of Saxony.<sup>6</sup> Thus, if the identity of *Frater Arnoldus* was confirmed accordingly, he would also be a German Dominican linked to the *studium generale* of Cologne, where Berthold of Moosburg was active as *lector generalis*.

It is therefore not without reason that scholarly interest has been focused on these two aspects of Berthold's commentary: the reception of the Neoplatonic heritage and the continuity of the philosophical tradition of Albert the Great.

The last name on the list of *doctores ecclesiae* had not been identified with any historical figure for a long time. Berthold does not provide any further information about him, but provides only a rather generic name. Thus, the editors of the text have mostly hesitated to give a face and an identity to the *Magister Thomas Anglicus Minor*, who is the last authority expressly mentioned by Berthold in the *Tabula auctoritatum*.

Only in 1997, Françoise Hudry found some parallel passages in Berthold's text and the incomplete commentary on the *Liber XXIV philosophorum* by the English Franciscan Thomas of York.<sup>7</sup> However, after a careful analysis, carried out in the context of more recent studies within the editorial project on the *Sapientiale*,<sup>8</sup> Berthold's dependence on Thomas of York proved to be much stronger and more consequential than Hudry had indicated at the beginning.

The identification of the *Sapientiale* as a very important source of the *Expositio* added an important volume to Berthold's library. An interpretative

5 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 184–211*, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014), 198F, p. 147–148, l. 151–182.

6 I. Draelants, "La transmission du *De animalibus* d'Aristote dans le *De floribus rerum naturalium* d'Arnoldus Saxo," in C. Steel, G. Guldentops, P. Beullens (eds), *Aristotle's Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), p. 126–158, at p. 131–132.

7 *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum*, ed. F. Hudry (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997).

8 Cf. especially F. Retucci, "Magister Thomas Anglicus Minor. Eine neue Quelle der *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli* Bertholds von Moosburg – das ungedruckte *Sapientiale* des Franziskaners Thomas von York," in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prop. 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), p. XXIII–XXXIX.

evaluation of Berthold's reliance on Thomas of York, however, has not yet been attempted. There are four good reasons for this: first, Berthold's commentary on Proclus is a monumental work, and Thomas of York's work is even longer and more complex; second, Berthold only tacitly copies large excerpts from the *Sapientiale*, without even indicating that he is quoting from another text; third – and this is highly important –, the text of the *Sapientiale* is still almost entirely unpublished and studies devoted to the work of the English Franciscan are very rare.

Finally, Thomas' work was evaluated almost unanimously by scholars: the *Sapientiale* fits perfectly within the Franciscan tradition, and shows very few points of contact with the German Dominican one. This influential historiographical idea was introduced by Martin Grabmann, an eminent expert of the German Dominican school. According to him, the great historical significance of the *Sapientiale* is due to the fact that it was elaborated not by a Peripatetic but by an authentic Augustinian.<sup>9</sup> Longpré was more or less of the same opinion, so much so that he defined the philosophical system of Thomas of York as a form of "Augustinisme authentique".<sup>10</sup>

In an article with a rather unequivocal title ("Great Fighters against Averroism"), published in 1930, Cristoforo Krzanic speaks of Thomas' explicit anti-Averroistic and anti-philosophical attitude:

Quando Tommaso di York si accinse a sintetizzare il sapere filosofico del mondo antico nella cornice delle idee evangeliche, dovette decidersi: assorbire o l'aristotelismo ellenico e arabo razionaleggiante, o il neoplatonismo nel tradizionalismo di Sant'Agostino, di Anselmo, di San Bernardo e dei Vittorini, che fino al secolo XIII avevano impresso le loro idee su tutte le questioni. [...] Tommaso di York per il primo – e lo seguirono tutti i maestri francescani – scelse, assorbì la filosofia tradizionale per non toccare la santità dei dommi con l'accettare l'aristotelismo. Tommaso fu francescano e non poteva scegliere diversamente, non poteva preferire Aristotele ad Agostino. [...] È sempre la teologia che fa capolino in ogni affermazione del pensiero francescano.<sup>11</sup>

9 M. Grabmann, "Die Metaphysik des Thomas von York," in *Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Festgabe zum 60. Geburtstag Clemens Baeumker* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1913), p. 181–193, at p. 191–192.

10 E. Longpré, "Fr. Thomas d'York, O.F.M. La première somme métaphysique du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle," in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 19(1926), p. 875–930, at p. 893.

11 C. Krzanic, "Grandi lottatori contro l'Averroismo," in *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 22(1930), p. 161–207, at p. 167–168.

Giulio Bonafede, in his *Il pensiero francescano* (published in 1952), was convinced that there is no difference between Bonaventure's philosophical system and that of Thomas of York. Thus, Bonafede preferred to describe Thomas' arguments by quoting Saint Bonaventure, who, in his opinion, provided clearer expositions than his English confrère.<sup>12</sup>

Edgar Scully also concluded that

for Thomas of York the Augustinian tradition, after Sacred Scripture itself, is, and remains, the very embodiment of Christian wisdom to such a degree that Aristotle, or any other philosopher, could not essentially alter the time-honoured doctrines of Augustine, Boethius and Anselm.<sup>13</sup>

As Scully also maintained, the doctrinal content of the *Sapientiale* was nothing more than a re-presentation of the Augustinianism that was prevalent at the time.<sup>14</sup>

According to the scholarly literature, Thomas of York, a radical Augustinian, was, together with Bonaventure and Alexander of Hales, the founder of a uniform Franciscan tradition that was later inherited by William de la Mare, John Peckam, Peter John Olivi, Peter of Trabibus, and Richard of Middleton.<sup>15</sup> It was thus a tradition far away from the "deutscher Sonderweg" meticulously reconstructed by Loris Sturlese in his history of German medieval philosophy.<sup>16</sup>

More than a century after its publication was first announced, the text of the *Sapientiale* is only recently starting to become available in a modern edition of an international editorial project: the third book has just been published;<sup>17</sup> the first is in print. Some observations about this text and the history of its

12 G. Bonafede, *Il pensiero francescano nel secolo XIII* (Palermo: Mori e Figli, 1952), p. 187–189.

13 E. Scully, "Thomas of York and his Use of Aristotle. An Early Moment in the History of British Philosophy," in *Culture* 20(1959), p. 420–436, at p. 422–423. Scully, however, also acknowledged Thomas' philosophical attitude: "His display of worldly wisdom is, on the one hand, a continuation of the spirit of Grosseteste, who was engaged in the work of translating and commenting on Aristotle, and whose study of Arabic treatises in optics helped to engender and promote his metaphysics of light, all in support of Divinely revealed truth. On the other hand, it is in marked contrast to the attitude of some of his Franciscan successors on the continent, who, like John Peter Olivy, tend to disparage the role of philosophy in the conduct of Christian thought."

14 Scully, "Thomas of York," p. 436.

15 Krzanic, "Grandi lottatori," p. 164.

16 L. Sturlese, *Die deutsche Philosophie im Mittelalter. Von Bonifatius bis zu Albert dem Großen (784–1280)* (München: Beck, 1993), p. 388.

17 Cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, ed. A. Punzi (Firenze: SISMEL-Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2020).

reception in the work of the Dominican from Moosburg can therefore begin to be made on the basis of textual evidence.

The aim of this study is to provide an initial tool for analyzing the relationship between the German Dominican and the English Franciscan, while being aware that the list of citations in the Appendix is only a starting point for future research. I hope that the laborious work of philology may encourage the work of the history of philosophy to answer some questions that still remain. Why does Berthold of Moosburg, a Dominican from the Teutonian Province who grew up at the school of Albert the Great in Cologne, constantly and literally refer to the work of Thomas of York, an English Franciscan active in Oxford in the mid-13th century? What makes the *Sapientiale* so interesting in the eyes of the Dominican of Moosburg?

In my opinion, the *Sapientiale* and the *Expositio* converge on two points: first, the attempt to recover the classical and ancient heritage, aimed at founding self-sufficient philosophical wisdom and, second, the emphasis on the continuity of the Platonic tradition.

## 2 The Revival of the Philosophical Heritage

Written between 1250 and 1260, the *Sapientiale* is a complete treatise on metaphysics, which Martin Grabmann had already recognized in 1913 as “die einzige große Darstellung des Systems der Metaphysik aus der Ära der Hochscholastik”.<sup>18</sup>

The work is composed of three parts of different length. The subjects of the individual parts are theology, ontology, and a special part of metaphysics concerning the world and the soul. Thomas never explicitly uses the expressions *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis* to define the internal division of his metaphysics, even though a division conveniently signified by these terms is evident in the work.

Thomas constructs his “incomparable monument du savoir philosophique au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle”<sup>19</sup> by collecting a massive number of theological and philosophical sources, elaborating a true synthesis of Greek-Arab wisdom and Christian wisdom. His familiarity with classical authors prefigures the Oxonian medieval attitude towards antiquity, which characterized the so-called “classicizing group” of friars presented in the pioneering, well-documented study *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century*, published in 1960 by Beryl

18 Grabmann, “Die Metaphysik,” p. 191.

19 Longpré, “Fr. Thomas d’York,” p. 891.



Smalley.<sup>20</sup> In the *Sapientiale*, Apuleius, Hermes, Cicero, Pliny the Elder, Seneca Rhetor, Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Valerius Maximus, and Macrobius – all called *sapientes mundi* – join Arabic, Jewish, and Patristic authors – called *sapientes Dei* – in a clear attempt to synthesize Christian and philosophical wisdom.

An unpublished study by Virginia Brown<sup>21</sup> allows us to quantify the use that Thomas made of the Latin classics in composing his work. In the *Sapientiale*, Cicero is mentioned by name 356 times. Although most of the quotations concern Ciceronian works that were well-known in the Middle Ages, Thomas of York also shows that he was familiar with minor works (he quotes *De divinatione* 28 times and the *Paradoxa* 17 times). Of the 315 mentions of Seneca, 275 quotations are explicitly derived from the *Epistulae*.

Now, with very rare exceptions, all quotations from the Latin classics reach Berthold's *Expositio* only through the *Sapientiale* by Thomas of York, as the analysis of parallel passages in the *Sapientiale* and the *Expositio* has shown.

Besides the Latin classics, the *Sapientiale* is deeply influenced by other sources, which we may divide into three distinct groups: Greek philosophers, called *sapientes mundi*; Fathers and medieval Latin authors, called *sapientes Dei*; Arabic and Jewish sources, also defined by Thomas as *sapientes mundi*.<sup>22</sup>

The philosophical sources of the *Sapientiale* by no means have a merely decorative function. This is already evident from the number of times they appear in the work. The investigation of the explicit sources of the entire first book is quite significant: in the first book, which deals with the existence, nature, and properties of God, the relation between the *sapientes mundi* and the *sapientes Dei* is clearly uneven. The *sapientes mundi*, among whom Thomas includes Aristotle, Plato, Averroes, Avicenna, Hermes, Avicbron, Maimonides, and Algazel are mentioned by name 1267 times. The *sapientes Dei*, represented above all by Augustine, Boethius, Dionysius the Areopagite, Gregory the Great, Anselm, John Damascene, and Bernard of Clairvaux, are mentioned explicitly only 397 times.<sup>23</sup>

20 B. Smalley, *English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), esp. p. 45–65.

21 V. Brown, "Latin Classical authors in the *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York." The study, kindly made available by Prof. James Hankins, is now preserved in the archival material collected in the *Archivum fratris Thomae Eboracensis* at the Thomas-Institut of the University of Cologne.

22 For an exhaustive overview of Thomas's sources, cf. D.E. Sharp, *Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford* (New York: Russell, 1964), p. 53–55.

23 The philosophical authorities explicitly mentioned in the first book are: Aristotle (421 quotations); Plato (211); Averroes (156); Avicenna (144); Hermes Trismegistus (106); Algazel (89); Maimonides (60); Avicbron (46); Themistius (34). The theological authorities explicitly mentioned in the first book are: Augustine (236); Boethius (81); Dionysius

These figures alone might be sufficient to prove Thomas' deep interest in the Hellenic and Arabic philosophy. These data become even more interesting if we try to understand the true nature of the *Sapientiale*.

The method and purpose of the work are openly declared by the author in the first four introductory chapters: first and foremost, the *Sapientiale* is a work written by a theologian for the purpose of coherently systematizing the doctrines of the philosophers in the clear attempt to realize a synthesis of Christian and philosophical wisdom.

Has autem utilitates et causas advertens ego minorum minimus elegero opus sudore plenum, et propter intellectus nostri imbecillitatem et ipsius operis difficultatem, de libris philosophicis congregare aliqua, que dixerunt de creatore et creaturis, quod estimo difficile propter eam, que paucis facta est, philosophicam communicationem, verorum cum falsis confusionem, scientie sub verbis absconsionem.<sup>24</sup>

In the dense interweaving of sources that constitutes his work, Thomas proceeds evenly towards a specific goal. His intention is to demonstrate that, even though the source of all knowledge is one, the truth can manifest itself in two ways: in an authoritative way, that is, through the Holy Scripture, and in a rational way, that is, through philosophical inquiry. There is, however, a distinction between theological, authoritative wisdom and philosophical, rational wisdom, since theology and philosophy are separate and distinct in their methodology. And if authoritative knowledge *secundum traditionem auctoritatis* allows a broad participation of human beings in wisdom, so much so that many may be wise and know the contents of revelation, rational knowledge is a difficult task: only few may have access to and acquire this wisdom *secundum probationem rationis*. That is why it is said that there are not many who are wise:

Nempe, cum sint due species sapientie, sicut dicit Rabbi Moses cap. 89, una, que est secundum traditionem auctoritatis, et hec dicitur legis, alia secundum probationem rationis, possibile est, quod multi sunt sapientes

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Ps Areopagita (41); Gregory the Great (16); Anselm (13); John Damascene (7); Bernard of Clairvaux (3). The prevalence of philosophical sources over theological sources has already been noted by Sharp, *Franciscan Philosophy*, p. 50.

24 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 3, Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437 (F), f. 4rb; Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301 (V), f. 4va; Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 6771 (R), f. 16va.

priori modo et pauci vero posteriori modo, et propter hoc dictum est, quod non multi sapientes.<sup>25</sup>

The English Franciscan does not at all content himself with delimiting the fields of investigation and fixing precise rules for the non-interference of theology and philosophy. Rather, he establishes a real hierarchy, in which greater value is attributed to rational investigation than to pure and simple belief in the precepts of faith. Human beings are like the servants described by Moses Maimonides in the third book of his *Dux neutrorum*: some servants are so distant from the king's palace that they cannot see the walls; others not only enter the king's palace, but may also look directly into the king's face. The latter are those who are advanced in philosophical studies and perfect in every science. The approach to the creator is achieved only through perfection in the sciences, so that only those who perfectly master the sciences may address the king and see his face:

Tertia causa liquet per parabolam, quam super hoc ponit Rabbi Moyses cap. 82 comparans Deum regi sedenti in sua munitione, servorum cuius quidam sunt extra civitatem, quidam intra, et horum, qui sunt intra, quidam vertunt dorsum ad palatium regis et quidam faciem et ad ipsum tendunt, ut possint regi appropinquare et ei assistere, et horum quidam numquam viderunt murum [...]. Nam quamdiu studueris in disciplinalibus et dialectica, circuis portam; cum intellexeris naturalia, intrasti munitionem et ambulas per atrium; cum autem intellexeris spiritualia, intrasti domum, sed nondum vidisti regem, quousque in hiis omnibus perfectus per omnes cogitationes et actus intenderis in creatorem et omnibus aliis postpositis posueris omnia opera intellectus tui ad intelligendum essentiam creatoris, quod, cum feceris, videbis faciem regis, hoc est regem in decore suo, sicut dixit Ysaïas: 'regem in decore suo videbunt'. Vide igitur, qualiter per scientiarum perfectionem maior est appropinquatio ad creatorem, ut soli perfecto liceat alloqui regem et videre faciem eius.<sup>26</sup>

There is, therefore, no need for a divine intervention into human life. Thanks to their own intellectual faculty, human beings alone are responsible for the perfection of their own nature. Human beings can emancipate themselves from bestiality and, by their own effort, obtain the dignity of humanity (*dignitatis humane adeptio*). The dignity and the superiority of the human beings over

25 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 3, F, f. 3va; v, f. 3vb; R, f. 15vb.

26 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 3, F, f. 4ra; v, f. 4rb; R, f. 16rb.

other animals depends exclusively on their wisdom and cognition, which is an instrument of reason.

Utilitas omnium scientiarum est acquisitio perfectionis humane preparantis eam in effectu ad futuram felicitatem. [...] Et hec perfectio tribus modis declarari potest esse per sapientiam. Nam per sapientiam est humane creationis consummatio, ab animalitate elongatio et dignitatis humane adeptio. [...] Nam sicut dicit Albumasar 1 tract. diff. 5, 'dignitas hominis super cetera animalia non est nisi per sapientiam et cognitionem, que est instrumentum rationis, per cognitionem quidem rerum, que fuerunt et que future sunt'. Unde nisi esset sapientia, non esset homini hec dignitas et ideo, 'quanto magis auxerit homo scientiam, tanto magis augebit prolongationem a ceteris animalibus', 'et quanto plus minuitur sapientia, tanto magis augebit ceteris animalibus propinquitatem'. Et 'inter homines, qui fuerit maior sapientia et ratione, ipse erit ceteris dignior humanitate'.<sup>27</sup>

Beatitude, through which the human being becomes god by means of participation,<sup>28</sup> is not the consequence of a divine illumination or of a divine gift, but the result of an intellectual human act, as Thomas argues in a long quotation from the Prologue to Book VIII of Averroes' *Commentary on the Physics*, a text that remained almost unknown throughout the Middle Ages:<sup>29</sup>

27 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 1, F, f. 1va–b; v, f. 2va; R f. 13va–b.

28 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 10, F, f. 10vb; v, f. 9rb; R, f. 24va: *Beatitudo vero est ipsa divinitas, unde beatitudinis adeptio beatos deos fieri manifestum est, sed sicut iustitie adeptione iusti, ita divinitatem adeptos deos fieri simili ratione necesse est. Omnis igitur beatus deus, sed natura quidem unus, participatione vero nihil prohibet esse quam plurimos.*

29 The Prologue to Book VIII of Averroes' commentary on the *Physics* had a very limited circulation in the Middle Ages. For the transmission of this text, see M. Grignaschi, "Indagine sui passi del «Commento» suscettibili di aver promosso la formazione di un averroismo politico," in *L'averroismo in Italia* (Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1979), p. 237–288, esp. 258–262; H. Schmieja, "Drei Prologen im grossen Physikkommentar des Averroes," in A. Zimmermann (ed.), *Aristotelisches Erbe im arabisch-lateinischen Mittelalter* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1986), p. 175–189. The quotation from the prologue to the VIII Book of the *Physics* with explicit reference to the ambiguity of the word *homo* is worthy of note. As Luca Bianchi has already noted (L. Bianchi, "Filosofi, uomini e bruti. Note per la storia di un'antropologia 'averroista,'" in *Studi sull'Aristotelismo del Rinascimento* [Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2003], p. 41–61, esp. p. 50–52), few medievals followed Averroes on this point. The only traces of the presence of this passage in the Latin Middle Ages can be found in: (1) *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse (Louvain-la-Neuve / Paris: Publications universitaires / Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974), 3, 229, p. 159, l. 72–74; (2) Alberich of Reims, *Philosophia*, ed. R.-A. Gauthier, in R.-A. Gauthier, "Notes sur Siger de Brabant. II. Siger

Amplius beatitudo secundum Tullium libro I est in completa visione veritatis, cum totos nos ponemus in contemplandis perspicendisque rebus. Visio autem veritatis sapientia est, quare in ipsa est beatitudinis adimpletio. Hec est enim ultima fortunitas, videlicet esse perfectum ultima perfectione per scientias speculativas secundum Averroem super principium VIII *Physicorum*. Et ideo dicit quod homo dicitur quasi equivoce de tali homine et de aliis hominibus, et hanc fortunitatem dicit esse vitam eternam.<sup>30</sup>

Thomas thus also concurred with Averroes concerning a point that only few medieval theologians agreed to: through an intellectual act, the human being can join and be assimilated to God.<sup>31</sup> The perfection in the speculative sciences leads the human beings to fully realize their humanity and to obtain eternal life, Thomas maintains following Averroes. Instead of being the point of departure of an anti-Averroist struggle within the Franciscan Order, which had Bonaventure as a protagonist, Thomas of York seems to embrace the 40th thesis of the list condemned at Paris in 1277: there is no better way to live than philosophically (“Quod non est excellentior status quam vacare philosophiae”).

It is therefore not surprising that Berthold of Moosburg – interested in investigating the natural potential of the human intellect rather than in knowing its limits – has relied on Thomas to support the philosophical structure of his own work.

Thomas and Berthold agree on one thing: every divine revelation is not necessarily needed for the well-exercised human intellect. Philosophers, in the absence of any revelation or grace, are able not only to reach a partial

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en 1272–1275, Aubry de Reims et la scission des Normands,” in *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 68/1(1984), p. 3–49, esp. p. 29, l. 12–17; (3) Oliver Brito, MS. Oxford, Corpus Christi College 283, f. 151vb (see Gauthier, “Notes sur Siger de Brabant,” p. 29); (4) Henry Bate, *Speculum divinarum et quorundam naturalium. Parts VI–VII: On the Unity of Intellect. On the Platonic doctrine of the ideas*, ed. C. Steel, E. Van der Vyver (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1994), VI, c. 8, p. 27, l. 93–96. For Henry Bate, cf. G. Guldentops, “Henry Bate’s Aristocratic Eudaemonism,” in J.A. Aertsen, K. Emery, A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts: Studien und Texte* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 657–681, esp. p. 673.

30 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 1, F, f. 1vb; v, f. 2va; R, f. 13va.

31 Far from being a great opponent of Averroism, Thomas of York constantly refers to Averroes’ authority in his work. Averroes’ name appears more than 1000 times in the *Sapientiale*. Very many literal, but implicit quotations can be found in addition to this. Except for the doctrine of the eternity of the world, Averroes is invoked by Thomas only to support his own doctrines. Thomas defends Averroes even when it seems that he denies that God knows singular things. On this point, see n. 35.

knowledge of God through an oblique vision, but they can also enjoy a direct and perfect vision of the divine substance.

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Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 6, F, f. 6vb; V, f. 6va; R, f. 19va      Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Exp. tit. D*, p. 40, l. 111–115

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In priori acceptione ascendit anima per laboriosam investigationem dividendo, definiendo, communibus principiis utendo, a notis ad ignota per ratiocinationem progrediendo, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia transcendendo, et inter intelligibilia ab uno ad aliud ascendendo, quousque perveniat ad ultimum, quod dicit Deum.

Primus autem istorum motuum precipue fuit in philosophis.

Verum, quod per motum obliquum, qui proprius erat philosophorum et erat per laboriosam investigationem primi omnium existentium principii dividendo, definiendo, communibus principiis utendo, a notis ad ignota per ratiocinationem progrediendo, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia ascendendo et inter intelligibilia ab uno in aliud tendendo, quousque ad simpliciter ultimum perveniat, ascenderit ipse Proclus in summi boni notitiam, apparet in praesenti libro, ubi in excelsum maximum ascendit per operum conditionem, conditorum gubernationem et contrariorum conciliationem.

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The *directa Dei visio* does not constitute an alternative to the *laboriosa investigatio* of the philosophers. Quite the contrary, the philosophical pursuit makes the direct insight into God's essence possible:

Secundus autem motus [scilicet rectus – n.n.] paucis datus est, qui fuerunt preter donum fidei. Et si quibus datum est hoc tenuiter propter hoc, quod ille motus non est datus multis in sui excellentia nisi per gratiam specialem aut non nisi propter precedentem obliquam in Deum animi motionem et hic perfectam, quod paucissimis datum est.<sup>32</sup>

On the basis of a purely rational investigation, it is not only possible to prove God's existence, but also God's unity and trinity. No human being is, indeed, deprived of the knowledge of God. The idea of God is, in fact, naturally present

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32 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 6, F, f. 6vb; v, f. 6vb; R, f. 19vb.

in the human intellect. This is one of the doctrines of Thomas of York that interested the Dominican of Moosburg most.

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Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 5, F, f. 6ra, v, f. 6ra; R, f. 18vb

Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 116C, p. 63, l. 125–131

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Et ex hiis liquet, quod superius dictum est nullum hominum penitus scientia Dei privatum, sed ipsum esse in consensione omnium. Ex quo etiam sequitur ipsum esse naturaliter omni homini impressum ratione, qua dixi tibi: quod enim non est foris acceptum, est intus formatum. Constat autem, quod non, nisi a nature humane formatore, quo formata est ad imaginem Dei secundum intellectum, secundum quod dicit Aristoteles x *Ethicorum* capitulo 10, quod intellectus est Deo cognatissimus.

Ex quo sequitur necessario ipsum esse, et quod nullus hominum est penitus scientia eius privatus, sed ipsum esse in consensione omnium. Ex quo etiam sequitur ipsum esse naturaliter homini impressum ex ea parte, qua est ad imaginem Dei, sive tale sit unum animae secundum Platonem vel unitio vel unitas secundum Dionysium sive abditum mentis secundum Augustinum sive intellectus secundum Aristotelem x *Ethicorum* 10 cap., ubi dicit, quod intellectus est Deo cognatissimus.

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The very existence of God can be proven on the basis of exclusively rational arguments: “quod igitur Deus sit declaraverunt mundi sapientes multipliciter, videlicet per universalem hominum consensionem, naturalem impressionem, legis nature dictationem.”<sup>33</sup>

For Thomas, whom Berthold follows in this, the cognitive faculties of philosophical reason are not limited to the pure and simple demonstration of God’s existence, but also extend to the knowledge of God’s particular qualities, such as his uniqueness. And if some false philosophers (*philosophantes*) state the contrary, Plato’s followers maintain the right position: their error consists only in an improper use of terminology (*non superstitionis nisi nomine solum*):

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33 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 5, F, f. 5vb; v, f. 5va; R, f. 18rb. Parallel text in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, ed. F. Retucci, 116C, p. 61, l. 71–73.

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Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114A, c. 10, F, f. 10va–b; V, f. 9ra; R, f. 24rb p. 40, l. 10–p. 41, l. 27

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Nam quorundam positio de diis erat superstitiosa et impietate plena, quorundam autem nonnisi nomine solum. Superstitiosorum positio erat, qua ponebant illa corpora visibilia esse deos et hoc multipliciter, quia quidam ponebant corpora artificialia, quidam naturalia esse deos. Et item ponentes corpora artificialia ut ydola esse deos, quidam ponebant per solam humanam fictionem, et hoc vel per poetica figmenta, contra quod agit Plinius *De naturali historia* II capitulo 7 – nam poetica figmenta humana transferebant ad deos, idest divina, cum tamen melius fuisset, si divina transtulissent ad humana, sicut dicit Tullius *De Tusculanis questionibus* I y – vel per hominum merita, secundum quod dicit Plinius in eodem, quod deorum nomina ex hominum meritis nata sunt, ad cuius fictionem allexit vel amicorum dilectio vel carorum recordatio vel artificium adinventio vel per hominum merita.

Hee autem omnes positiones superstitiosae erant et dampnatae apud omnes vere philosophantes, sicut manifestabitur in sermone *De quidditate Dei*. Positio deorum non superstitiosa nisi nomine solum erat Platonis et Platoniam philosophiam veraciter sectantium, quippe secundum Hermetem multi dicti sunt dii participatione eius, qui omnium maximus est <deus> deorum.

De primo notandum, quod positio quorundam de diis, hoc est, quod plures essent dii, erat superstitiosa, quorundam vero non superstitiosa nisi solo nomine. Superstitiosorum positio erat, qua ponebant illa visibilia esse deos, et hoc multipliciter, quia quidam ponebant corpora naturalia, quidam artificialia esse deos. Et item ponentes corpora artificialia ut idola esse deos, quidam ponebant per solam humanam fictionem, et hoc per poetica figmenta, contra quos agit Plinius *De naturali historia* libro II cap. 7 et est summa rationis suae, quia transferebant humana ad divina, cum deberet fieri econverso. [...]

Hae omnes opiniones superstitiosae erant et damnatae apud omnes vere philosophantes. Positio deorum non superstitiosa nisi nomine solum erat Platonis et Platoniam philosophiam veraciter sectantium, quippe secundum Hermetem multi dicti sunt dii participatione eius, qui omnium est maximus, scilicet deus deorum.



Finally, philosophical reason is able to access the Trinitarian mysteries. It is not by chance that Berthold, in commenting on Proclus' Proposition 131 ("Omnis deus a se ipso propriam operationem orditur") reports the well-known passage from the *Logos teleios* that Thomas of York had used in his *Sapientiale* as an authoritative testimony to the fact that the philosophers succeeded, without any revelation, in grasping the truths of the Trinitarian relationships and the Son's generation:<sup>34</sup> Plato spoke of the second Person of the Trinity, and Hermes and the Sybil agreed with him. They have also understood that the distinction between the Father and the Son lies not in their essence, but in their person (*hec alietas potius in persona quam in essentia*).

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**Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 14, f. f. 14ra–b; V, f. 11va–b; R, f. 27va**      **Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131B, p. 192, l. 61–p. 193, l. 79**

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Ex quibus liquet, quod secundum Platonem due persone invente sunt, Pater videlicet et Filius. Huic autem concordat Hermes, qui Mercurius dicitur, in libro, qui *Logosilinus*, hoc est verbum perfectum, appellatur. [...]

Hec autem Hermetis verba recitat Augustinus in libro suo *Contra quinque Hereses*, in quo et sermones Sibille recitat sermonibus supradictis concordantes. Alium – inquit – deum dedit hominibus fidelibus colendum. Et ne intelligas alium in essentia, sed potius in persona, subdit: 'Ipsum tuum cognosce dominum Dei filium esse', quem quidem filium 'alio loco symbolon appellat, idest consilium vel consiliarium', secundum quod nominat eum Ysaïas consiliarium Deum fortem, et

Ex quibus liquet, quod secundum Platonem duae personae inventae sunt, Pater et Filius. Huic autem concordat Hermes in libro, qui dicitur *Logostileos*, id est verbum perfectum. [...]

Haec autem Hermetis verba recitat Augustinus in libro suo *Contra quinque haereses*, in quo et sermones Sibyllae recitat sermonibus praedictis concordantes. Alium, inquit, deum dedit hominibus fidelibus colendum. Et ne intelligatur alius in essentia, sed potius in persona, subdit: 'Ipsum tuum cognosce dominum Dei filium esse', quem quidem filium 'alio loco symbolon appellat, id est consilium vel consiliarium'. Et prout dicit Trismegistus

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34 For the interpretation of this text from the *Asclepius*, cf. A. Palazzo, "La ricezione di un passo ermetico (*Asclepius* 8) nel tardo medioevo. Ulrico di Strasburgo, Pietro di Tarantasia, Riccardo di Mediavilla, Bertoldo di Moosburg e Dionigi il Certosino," in T. Iremadze, T. Tskhadadze, G. Kheoshvili (eds), *Philosophy Theology Culture. Problems and Perspectives. Jubilee Volume Dedicated to the 75th Anniversary of Guram Tevzadze* (Tbilisi: Neker-Arche, 2007), p. 104–125.

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Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 14, F, f. 14ra–b; V, f. 11va–b; R, f. 27va  
 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131B, p. 192, l. 61–p. 193, l. 79

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prout dicit Trismegistus *Ad Asclepium*, quod ‘Dei natura consilium est voluntatis et bonitas summa consilium’. Ex quibus manifestum est, quod hec alietas potius in persona quam in essentia intelligenda est.

*Ad Asclepium*, quod ‘Dei natura consilium est voluntatis et bonitas summa consilium’. Ex quibus manifestum est, quod haec alietas potius in persona quam in essentia intelligenda est.

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And again, Thomas continues, and is in this once more quoted literally by Berthold, philosophers do not limit themselves to talking about the generation of the Son, but also permeate the mysteries with regard to the Holy Spirit. Hermes not only mentioned the third Person, but called it by the correct name. Aethicus Ister described the Trinity in a perfect way (*luculenter*). Seneca and Cicero treated the operations of the third Person in detail. Averroes also understood and described the Trinity of the divine Persons.

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Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 14, F, f. 14va; V, ff. 11vb–12ra; R, ff. 27vb–28ra  
 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131B, p. 193, l. 81–p. 194, l. 117

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De tertia persona locuti sunt, licet non adeo manifeste. [...] Istam autem personam tertiam, quam nominavit mediam Porphyrius, nominat nomine proprio Trismegistus, videlicet nomine ‘Spiritus’, cum dicit *Ad Asclepium*: ‘Fuit, inquit, deus et hyle, quem Grece mundum credimus et mundo concomitabatur spiritus vel inerat mundo spiritus’ [...]. Quis autem spiritus est iste animas nutriens nisi Spiritus Sanctus, qui tranfert se in animas sanctas, secundum quod dicit Seneca in *Epistula* 42a? Ex quibus omnibus liquet, quod predicta non possunt

De tertia vero non sunt locuti adeo manifeste. [...] Istam autem tertiam personam, quam Porphyrius nominat mediam, Trismegistus *Ad Asclepium* exprimit nomine proprio, scilicet Spiritu, cum dicit: ‘Fuit, inquit, deus et hyle et mundo concomitabatur spiritus vel inerat mundo spiritus, sed non similiter inerat spiritus mundo ut deo’ etc. [...] Quis autem spiritus iste est animas nutriens, nisi Spiritus Sanctus, qui transfert se in animas sanctas, secundum quod dicit

(cont.)

Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 14, f. 14va; V, ff. 11vb–12ra; R, ff. 27vb–28ra

Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131B, p. 193, l. 81–p. 194, l. 117

intelligi de spiritu creato, quia nullus gubernat, implet et vivificat omnia, nisi divinus spiritus, secundum quod premitit Cicero *De natura deorum* II capitulo 15 de operationibus huius spiritus [...]. Ethicus philosophus Cosmographus in sua *Cosmografia*, quam transtulit beatus Ieronimus, luculenter exprimit personas tres. [...] Unde et Trinitatem per hanc viam insinuans Porphirius [...] Habes igitur ex hoc sermone Patrem et Filium et voluntatem, quam superius dixit amborum medium, sicut manifestum est ex Augustino *De civitate Dei* X. Huic autem appropriationi, per quam ostenditur Trinitas personarum in summo Spiritu, attestatur Averroes *Super XI Philosophie prime* capitulo 15.

Seneca *Epistula* 42: ‘Sacer’, inquit, ‘inter nos spiritus sedet malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos; hic prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos tractat’. Ex quibus omnibus liquet, quod praedicta non possunt intelligi de spiritu creato, quia nullus gubernat, implet et vivificat omnia nisi Spiritus Sanctus sive spiritus divinus, secundum quod praemittit Cicero *De natura deorum* libro II cap. 15 de operationibus huius spiritus [...]. Aethicus etiam Cosmographus in sua *Cosmographia*, quam transtulit beatus Hieronymus, luculenter exprimit tres personas. [...]

In the words of Thomas of York, the myth of ancient wisdom and philosophical revelation live again. Thomas’ complete trust in the potentiality of the human intellect and particularly his doctrine of beatitude, considered as the result of an intellectual act, became the characteristic feature of Berthold’s *Expositio*.

In the *Sapientiale*, Berthold of Moosburg had no difficulty in finding a new definition of philosophy: no longer a science subordinate to theology, but perfect and self-sufficient wisdom. In the recovery of the sapiential tradition of antiquity undertaken by Thomas of York, Berthold traced the conditions to establish the concordance between revelation and philosophy. He does so not by integrating pagan wisdom into the Judaeo-Christian system of revelation, but rather with the purpose of legitimizing the autonomous and independent coexistence of both. In the *Sapientiale*, Berthold discovered a well-documented history of philosophy written by a theologian in order to legitimize the claims

of philosophy to be not only an all-encompassing science of reality, but also a valid science of the divine.

### 3 The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition

Thomas of York dedicates his lengthy and sophisticated work to the restoration of the dignity of philosophical wisdom and to the founding of its complete legitimacy. Thanks to his profound analytical abilities, his historical reading is characterized by the awareness that two fundamentally different alternatives characterize the philosophical tradition: Plato, Augustine, Eustratius, and the *De causis* represent the right option; Aristotle's position is often the wrong one.

Thomas of York corrects Aristotle especially relative to one point: the doctrine of Ideas.

The dissent between Plato and Aristotle on the Ideas is mentioned twice in the course of Thomas' work. In the first book of the *Sapientiale*, with reference to divine exemplarism, Thomas replies point by point to the arguments that Aristotle had advanced against Plato's doctrine in the *Metaphysics*. In the third book, this time especially referring to the theme of the homonymy of the term "good", he takes the criticism that Aristotle had leveled against Plato in the *Nicomachean Ethics* into consideration.

The doctrinal background is, in the first case, well defined: it is a matter of determining precisely how God's knowledge of the creatures can be defined. The problem is not a small one: denying the existence of Ideas either means completely denying God's providence over individual entities or granting God only a universal knowledge and not a particular one. According to Thomas of York, Cicero had fallen prey to the first error in his *De divinatione*. Averroes, on the contrary, was taken in by the second mistake in his commentary on the eleventh book of the *Metaphysics*.<sup>35</sup> Platonic Ideas hence constitute the necessary metaphysical condition for God's particular and not merely universal knowledge and for God's providence concerning individual creatures.

Thomas of York dedicates four dense chapters of his work to Plato's doctrine of Ideas (chapters 27–30 of the first book). In chapter 27, Thomas demonstrates the existence of Ideas (*quod idea sit*) and deals with their essence or quiddity

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35 According to Thomas, Averroes' conclusion concerning the divine knowledge of individuals is fallacious, but only from a formal and linguistic point of view, and not in substance (*non tantum in re, sed sermone*): cf. Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 25, F, f. 30vb; v, f. 24va; R, f. 43ra: *Vide ex his sermonibus quomodo non tantum in re, sed sermone expressus est sermo Averrois, quomodo sciat singularia.*

(*quid sit idea*). In chapter 28, he focuses on the multiplicity of Ideas and analyzes the relationships between the Idea and sensible being in terms of similarity, causality, essence, and denomination. In chapters 29 and 30, Thomas scrutinizes the arguments put forward by Aristotle against Plato's doctrine of Ideas in Books I and VII of the *Metaphysics*.

The in-depth analysis of Aristotle's objections by Thomas is clearly subordinate to the clear intention of tracing and neutralizing the reasons for the dissent between Plato and Aristotle.

The arguments Aristotle used to challenge Plato's doctrine of Ideas are manifold. In Thomas' view, however, they can be reduced to a single criticism: according to Aristotle, by assuming the existence of Ideas, Plato has destroyed definition, demonstration and, with them, science, since he considered the Idea to be a singular form and denied the existence of any universal form. It is indeed altogether impossible to consider the Platonic Idea to be universal, as Aristotle points out in his *Metaphysics*.<sup>36</sup> On this specific point, however, the reconstruction of Plato's doctrine that Aristotle had offered in his *Metaphysics* must have seemed inaccurate and misleading to Thomas of York. According to Thomas, Aristotle had actually misunderstood Plato at least on one point, as is confirmed by Eustratius in his commentary on the first and sixth books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle had considered the universal as something exclusively posterior, that is, as subsequent to the existence of any particular thing: according to Aristotle, the universal is obtained only through abstraction from each particular thing. But Plato, according to the more truthful testimony of his theory offered by Eustratius of Nicaea, had first distinguished three modes of existence for all things:

Oportet te scire in principio sententiam Platonis memoria dignam, quam recitat Commentator super I *Ethicorum* cap. 7 et VI *Ethicorum* cap. 8, consonam per omnia sententie sapientis Augustini *Super Genesim* lib. II cap. <7>, cum dicit triplex esse rei, in verbo scilicet increato, in

36 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F. 34va; v, ff. 27va–b; R, f. 46rb. For the edition of this text, cf. F. Retucci, "Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone," in A. Beccarisi, P. Porro, R. Imbach (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), p. 79–110, here p. 105, l. 73–83: *Scias igitur, quod Aristoteles multis viis contradicit ideis, quarum numerum recolligere est difficile et non multum utile. [...] Igitur de hoc non multum curans dico, quod una de radicibus primis, quas ponit Aristoteles contra ideas, fuit, quod positio idearum negat formam universalem et per consequens scientiam, sicut habetur de hoc ab Aristotele I Metaphysice. Igitur in hoc, quod Plato visus est ponere ideas formas sive intentiones singulares, negavit omnem formam universalem. Quare non erit definitio nec demonstratio, et ita nec scientia, sicut sensui est manifestum, quia species communis definitur, similiter nec demonstratio, cum non sit de singularibus.*

intellectuali natura creata et in materia sive in proprio esse, et quod esse primum est prius duobus sequentibus et esse secundum tertio.<sup>37</sup>

This text is literally quoted by Berthold of Moosburg in the section *De ideis* of his commentary on Proclus:

De secundo sciendum, quod Eustratius super I *Ethicorum* cap. 7 et super VI cap. 8 dicit sententiam Platonis de speciebus sive ideis memoria dignam, cum sit consona per omnia sapientiae Augustini, qui in II *Super Genesim ad litteram* ponit triplex esse rei, in verbo scilicet increato, quod est ars plena omnium rationum viventium et incommutabilium, in intellectuali natura creata et in materia sive in proprio esse. Et dicit, quod esse primum est prius natura duobus sequentibus et esse secundum est prius tertio.<sup>38</sup>

For Plato, and Augustine entirely agreed with him on this, the *esse rei* exists not only in matter, but also in the uncreated Word (*in verbo increato*) and in created intellectual nature (*in intellectuali natura creata*). The doctrine of the triple *esse rei*, mentioned in this quotation taken from Eustratius, is nothing but a doctrine of Neoplatonic derivation.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, as recent studies have shown, Eustratius' doctrine of the universal follows a Byzantine tradition that was deeply influenced by the Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle.<sup>40</sup>

According to Thomas, who quotes Eustratius on this issue, Aristotle's mistake consists in having considered the universal as the result of a logical-abstractive process and posterior to the *esse rei extra in materia*, and therefore as produced by abstraction from matter. Plato, and Augustine with him, instead describes the forms contained in the intellect as something prior and more

37 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F, ff. 34vb–35ra; V, f. 27vb; R, f. 46va. For the edition of this text, cf. Retucci, "Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone", p. 107, l. 130–135.

38 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 160–183*, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 178B, p. 190, l. 56–63.

39 For the Neoplatonic influences on the doctrine of the threefold state of the universal in Eustratius, cf. L. Benakis, "The Problem of General Concepts in Neoplatonism and Byzantine Thought," in D.J. O'Meara (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), p. 75–86; K. Giocarinis, "Eustratios of Nicea's Defense of the Doctrine of the Ideas," in *Franciscan Studies* 24(1964), p. 159–204; K. Ierodiakonou, "Metaphysics in the Byzantine Tradition. Eustratios of Nicea on Universals," in *Quaestio* 5(2005), p. 67–82.

40 Ierodiakonou, "Metaphysics in the Byzantine Tradition," p. 70.

noble than the forms contained in matter.<sup>41</sup> The universality that Plato speaks of has nothing to do with the universality considered in *logicis speculationibus*, as in Aristotle. The universal of Plato is not a logical universal, but an intellectual universal, that is, something substantial that supports other things, which are made according to it: “non intelligibiliter, ut universale logicum, sed intellectualiter”. The same text is found in Berthold, who does not limit himself to passively copying the sources cited by Thomas, but reads them first-hand, checks them and completes them, as can be seen with a view to the quotation from Eustratius.

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Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 177I, c. 29, p. 109–110, l. 215–223                      p. 183–184, l. 335–349

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Praeterea scire debes, quod quando Plato dicit ideas universalis et tota, non intelligit, quod idea sit universale sicut ‘universale’ sumitur ‘in logicis speculationibus’; prout dicit Commentator super I *Ethicorum* cap. 7, quia ‘illic’ est sermo de universali, quod ‘de multis dicitur et est posterius generatione, hic autem, quod ante multa velut praesubsistens eis et illis ad ipsum recipientibus subsistentiam’.

Ex praemissis elicitur tertium, scilicet quod, quando species dicuntur universales, non intenditur de universalitate, prout universale sumitur in logicis speculationibus, secundum quod dicit Eustratius *Super I Ethicorum* cap. 7: Illud ‘quidem enim, de multis dicitur et est posterius generatione, hoc autem, quod ante multa velut praesubsistens eis et illis ad ipsum recipientibus subsistentiam. Ita enim qui circa Platonem rationes quasdam inducentes enhypostatatas, id est per se subsistentes divinas intellectuales, ad quas dicebant omnia materialia esse et fieri, quas et species et ideas vocabant et tota et universalis, praesubsistentes quidem his, quae in corporibus sunt, speciebus, separatas autem ab his omnibus, in conditoris’ ‘mente existentes, altera quaedam secundum ipsas

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41 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F, f. 34vb; v, f. 27vb; R, f. 46va (cf. Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 107, l. 146–154: *Nam Aristoteles estimavit esse rei in anima aut intellectu posterius esse rei extra in materia utpote generatum ex ipsa, et esse illud in mente esse universale. [...] Plato vero e contrario credit quod species rei in anima est prior ea que est in re extra, quia que fiunt ex ablatione, id est abstractione, posteriora sunt et per consequens deteriora naturalibus et sensibilibus uptote generationem ex ipsis habentia.*)

(cont.)

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Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 177I, c. 29, p. 109–110, l. 215–223                      p. 183–184, l. 335–349

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Ideo igitur ideae ‘dicebantur universalialia et tota, quia unumquodque illorum unum ens habet multa ex illo et secundum illud facta sunt’; ‘universale quidem et totum non intelligibiliter ut universale logicum, sed intellectualiter. Universale quidem subsistens multis separabiliter, quae secundum illud facta sunt’.

in materia figurantes. Universalialia autem et tota haec dicebantur, quoniam unumquodque illorum unum ens habet multa ex illo et secundum illud facta in corpore et materialia, ad quae illud universale et totum dicebatur non intelligibiliter ut universale logicum, sed intellectualiter, universale quidem velut praesubsistens multis separabiliter, quae secundum ipsum ‘facta sunt’. Haec Eustratius.

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According to Thomas (and, consequently, for Berthold), the reason for the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle is thus only Aristotle’s coarse misunderstanding of Plato’s doctrine of Ideas.

Aristotle’s misreading is neutralized by Thomas – and Berthold follows him in this –, once again by appealing to the authority of Eustratius, who opposed the Neoplatonic doctrine that establishes the existence of innate universal forms in the soul to Aristotle’s arguments. Eustratius’ direct source concerning this point is Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s *Parmenides*:<sup>42</sup>

Unde cum secundum Platonem anima est multo melior natura et singularibus et sensibilibus, inconveniens est ipsam habere in se ipsa rationes sive species subsistentes et non habere ipsas ante sensibilia inherentes sibi, rationabiliter et animaliter, hoc est secundum rationem naturalem ipsius anime, cum necesse est ipsam habere eas meliores et natura priores.<sup>43</sup>

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42 M. Trizio, “*Dissensio philosophorum*. Il disaccordo tra Platone e Aristotele nei commenti filosofici di Eustrazio di Nicea († ca. 1120),” in A. Palazzo (ed.), *L’antichità classica nel pensiero medievale* (Porto: Fédérations Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2011), p. 17–37.

43 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. 1, c. 29, p. 107, l. 155–159. Cf. also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 178B, p. 191, l. 84–88: *Unde cum secundum Platonem anima sit multo melior natura et singularibus et sensibilibus, inconveniens est ipsam habere in se ipsa rationes sive species subsistentes et non habere ipsas ante sensibilia inhaerentes sibi rationabiliter*



The consequences of such an interweaving of sources are very clear: quoting Eustratius, who in turn quotes Proclus, Thomas of York unconsciously defends a form of Neoplatonism that heavily relies on Proclean philosophy. It is therefore no coincidence that the defense of Plato's doctrine of Ideas, as elaborated in the *Sapientiale*, found, more than seventy years after its composition, a careful reader in Berthold of Moosburg, the commentator of Proclus. Berthold's commentary on propositions 176 and 178, dedicated to the doctrine of Ideas, is neither an implicit reference to Dietrich's doctrine of universals nor an allusion to Avicenna's doctrine mediated by Albert the Great, as Burkhard Mojsisch believed.<sup>44</sup> Propositions 176 and 178 of the *Expositio* consist of long literal quotations from the *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York (see Appendix, VII, 13–32).

The threefold distinction of the *esse rei* and, moreover, the distinction between *logicalia* and *intellectualia* established by Berthold are not, as Alain de Libera maintained, the most characteristic doctrines of the so-called "school of Cologne", which Berthold inherited from Dietrich and Albert.<sup>45</sup> Instead, it is a doctrine that Berthold discovered in the *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York, in which, through Eustratius, Proclean philosophy is tacitly revived.<sup>46</sup>

In reconstructing the continuity of the Platonic tradition, Thomas went far beyond his contemporaries. According to him, there is a *fil rouge* that runs through the history of philosophy and links Plato, Augustine, and the *Liber de causis*. This is particularly evident relative to the doctrine of Ideas: Plato and Augustine explicitly agree on the existence of this type of universal form in the soul; both Plato and Augustine then stand in open contrast to Aristotle. The Platonic-Augustinian doctrine is, however, confirmed by the *Liber de causis*, in which the existence of universal forms in the intellect is clearly established:

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*et animealiter, hoc est secundum rationem naturalem ipsius animae, cum necesse sit, ut inferius apparebit, ipsam habere eas meliores et natura priores.*

44 B. Mojsisch, "Aristoteles' Kritik an Platons Theorie der Ideen und die Dietrich von Freiberg berücksichtigende Kritik dieser Kritik seitens Bertholds von Moosburg," in K.-H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, F.B. Stammkötter (eds), *Dietrich von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven seiner Philosophie, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft* (Amsterdam / Philadelphia: Grüner, 1999), p. 267–281.

45 A. de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand* (Paris: Vrin, 2005), p. 226–227; A. de Libera, "Théorie des universaux et réalisme logique chez Albert le Grand," in *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 65(1981), p. 55–74; A. de Libera, "Albert le Grand et le Platonisme. De la doctrines des Idées à la théorie des trois états de l'Universel," in E.P. Bos, P.A. Meijer (eds), *On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy* (Leiden / New York / Köln: Brill, 1992), p. 89–119.

46 On this point see I. Zavattero, "Proclus, Eustrate de Nicée et leur réception aux XIII<sup>e</sup>–XIV<sup>e</sup> siècles," in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), p. 327–351, esp. p. 335–347.

Dico igitur tibi secundum sententiam Augustini et Platonis, quod triplex est esse rei, videlicet in mente divina, in intellectuali natura, in propria existentia; et quod esse eius in natura intellectiva, anima videlicet et intelligentia, medium est inter esse primum et tertium; et quod omnes forme, que exprimuntur in materia, prius naturaliter sunt concreate in intelligentia sive anima, quoniam natura pares sint. Et hoc est consonum propositioni *De causis*, que dicit quod omnis intelligentia plena est formis.<sup>47</sup>

Following the *fil rouge* of the Platonic tradition, Thomas went also far beyond the texts that were at his disposal. In his defense of the intelligible world, which links Plato to Augustine, Thomas of York explicitly quotes Eustratius of Nicaea, who silently borrows the doctrine of the existence of a *triplex esse rei* from Proposition 67 of the *Elementatio theologica*.<sup>48</sup> The result of this maze of quotations is evident: Thomas – by quoting Eustratius and by revealing his proximity to Plato, Augustine, and the *De causis* – concludes by unconsciously assimilating the *De causis* to its original source, namely, the *Elementatio theologica*.<sup>49</sup>

Thanks to the new material made available in translation from Greek into Latin, especially by his mentor Robert Grosseteste, and thanks to his profound analytical attitude, Thomas of York succeeds in reconstructing the contours of the Platonic tradition – a tradition he vigorously counterposes to the Aristotelian one.

Concerning many points, Thomas of York criticizes and corrects Aristotle's thought and contrasts it with a Platonic option that has been reconstructed on the basis of an indirect tradition: the *De causis*, Augustine, and the Byzantine commentators. The very same intention led Berthold of Moosburg, a few decades later, to compose his Platonic enterprise. He wanted to trace the points of divergence between the Platonic and the Aristotelian tradition and demonstrate the clear superiority of the former over the latter. Not by chance is the *Expositio* aimed at recovering Platonism as a unified current of thought that

47 Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 26, F, f. 205va; v, f. 166ra; R, f. 216ra. Concerning the influence of the *De causis* on the *Sapientiale*, cf. F. Retucci, "The *De causis* in Thomas of York," in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), p. 70–119.

48 On this point, cf. C. Steel, "Neoplatonic Sources in the Commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics* by Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus," in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 44(2002), p. 51–57, at p. 53–54; S. Gersh, "Universals, Wholes, Logoi: Eustratios of Nicaea's Response to Proclus' Elements of Theology," in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 2* (Leiden: Brill, 2020), p. 40–55.

49 Cf. Retucci, "The *De causis* in Thomas of York," p. 89–92.

includes Dionysius, Proclus, the *De causis*, and Eustratius of Nicaea, among others. This unified Platonic tradition is proposed, in Berthold's work, as a triumphant antagonist to a form of eclectic Aristotelianism. Berthold often realizes his project of writing a comprehensive and erudite encyclopedia of Platonism simply by integrating Proclean material into the long excerpts he takes from the *Sapientiale*.<sup>50</sup>

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Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, lib. III, c. 13, p. 167–168, l. 28–51

Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 151D, p. 137, l. 184–p. 138, 193

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Hii enim agentes quatuor operationem habent, communem et specialem. Communem, quoniam in singulis operibus nature concurrunt omnium actiones, sicut supra dictum est, quomodo omnis forma inducitur in materia per omnes causas medias usque ad primam, et sic per ipsam plus effluentem (*cf. De causis, 1*)  
[...]

Habent et specialem, sicut superior respectu inferioris. Nichil enim habet inferior quod non superior instar ordinum angelicorum, sicut ponit Sapientia Christianorum; habet tamen superior proprium, quod non habet inferior vel ad minus non in eadem plenitudine; igitur actio virtutis elementi aut elementati actio est virtutum omnium superiorum.

De primo sciendum, quod ipsorum quaedam operationes sunt communes, quaedam speciales.

Communes, in quantum in singulis operibus naturae concurrunt omnium actiones. Omnis enim forma inducitur in materia per omnes causas medias essentialiter sibi subordinatas usque ad prime bonum inclusive. 'Omne enim, quod a secundis producitur, et a prioribus et causalioribus producitur eminentius' per 56.

Speciales vero sive proprie operationes sunt, quas habent superiora respectu inferiorum, quidquid enim operatur inferius haec et operatur superius, sed non e converso. Et de istis operationibus dicitur, quod 'omnis deus a se ipso orditur propriam operationem' per 131.

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Although little is known about Berthold's biography, as has been said at the beginning of this study, it is clear that he was active within the context of the German Dominican order. The first certain biographical data on his life, however, places Berthold in a milieu far away from Cologne. In the proceedings of

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<sup>50</sup> Cf. Retucci, "The *De causis* in Thomas of York" p. 86.

the General Chapter of the Teutonic Province held in Friesach in 1315, the decision to send Berthold to Oxford is stated: “Mictimus in Angliam fr. Berchtoldum de Mospurg”.<sup>51</sup> At Oxford, Berthold discovered how thoroughly the German Dominican tradition, initiated by Albert, and the English Franciscan tradition, introduced by Robert Grosseteste, converged. With a view to the revival of the ancient sapiential heritage and the defense of the Platonic tradition, both of which would come to characterize his commentary on Proclus’ *Elements of Theology*, Berthold could therefore not only be considered the spokesman for the main features of the so-called *Deutsche Dominikanerschule*, that is, the school of Albert the Great, Dietrich of Freiberg, and Ulrich of Strassburg. With regard to the harsh criticism of Aristotle, the defense of the unitary position offered by Christianity and Platonism and, at the same time, the recovery of ancient pagan wisdom, the Dominican of Moosburg had found a constant point of reference in another work: the *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York.

## Appendix

### Thomas of York’s *Sapientiale* in Berthold’s Commentary

Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437 (= F).

Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301 (= V).

Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 6771 (= R).

1. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984).

1. Prolog. 1 (p. 5, l. 13–16): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 7, F, f. 7va<sup>52</sup>
2. Prolog. 1 (p. 5, l. 16–19): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 4, F, f. 5rb
3. Prolog. 1 (p. 5, l. 19–22): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 3, F, f. 3va
4. Prolog. 1 (p. 6, l. 34–36): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 5, F, f. 5vb
5. Prolog. 8 (p. 14, l. 296–299): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1, F, f. 212rb

51 Cf. Th. Kaeppli, “Ein Fragment der Akten des in Friesach 1315 gefeierten Kapitels des Provinz Teutonia,” in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 48(1978), p. 71–75.

52 All references to the *Sapientiale* are to the manuscript: Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437 (F). Starting from Book II the manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301 has a different book numbering (cf. F. Retucci, “The *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York: The Fortunes and Misfortunes of a Critical Edition”, in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 52 (2010), p. 133–160, esp. p. 140–142. In this appendix these differences have been indicated in brackets.

6. *Prol.* 9 (p. 15, l. 324–327): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
7. *Prol.* 9 (p. 15, l. 328–332): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 2, F, f. 212vb
8. *Prol.* 9 (p. 15, l. 338–339): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
9. *Prol.* 9 (p. 15, l. 342–p. 16, l. 348): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 37, F, 42rb; II, 2, F, f. 51ra
10. *Prol.* 10 (p. 16, l. 364–375): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
11. *Prol.* 11 (p. 17, l. 402–p. 18, l. 406): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
12. *Exp. tit.* C (p. 39, l. 73–78). Cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 6, F, f. 6vb
13. *Tit.* D (p. 40, l. 111–115): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 6, F, f. 6vb
14. *Tit.* D (p. 40, l. 119–123): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 7, F, f. 7va
15. *Tit.* D (p. 40, l. 126–p. 41, l. 144): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 7, F, f. 8ra–b
16. *Tit.* E (p. 41, l. 163–166): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 1, F, ff. 1rb
17. *Tit.* E (p. 42, l. 175–180): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 1, F, ff. 1rb
18. *Tit.* E (p. 42, l. 181–195): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 1, F, ff. 1rb–va
19. *Tit.* F (p. 43, l. 208–211): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 3, F, f. 3ra–b
20. *Tit.* K (p. 47, l. 368–p. 48, l. 383): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 5, F, f. 5va
21. *Tit.* L (p. 49, l. 415–419): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 9, F, f. 10vb
22. *Tit.* L (p. 49, l. 431–439): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 5, F, f. 5va
23. *Tit.* L (p. 50, l. 463–468): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 1, F, f. 1va–b
24. *Praeamb.* A (p. 54, l. 32–p. 56, l. 100): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 23 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 23), F, ff. 166vb–167rb
25. *Praeamb.* B (p. 57, l. 140–157): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 23 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 23), F, f. 167vb
26. *Praeamb.* B (p. 59, l. 205–108): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 24 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 24), F, f. 168vb
27. *Praeamb.* B (p. 61, l. 297–303): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 25 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 23), F, f. 170ra
28. *Praeamb.* C (p. 63, l. 355–370): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 24 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 24), F, f. 169ra–b
29. *Praeamb.* C (p. 66, l. 462–480): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 23 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 23), F, f. 168ra–b
30. *Praeamb.* C (p. 67, l. 504–513): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 23 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 23), F, f. 168rb
31. *Praeamb.* C (p. 68, l. 541–548): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 23 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 23), F, f. 168rb
32. *Prop.* 1E (p. 78, l. 253–p. 79, l. 271): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 1 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 1), F, f. 138ra; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 5, l. 47–49; p. 6, l. 59–68
33. *Prop.* 3C (p. 96, l. 148–151): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. II, c. 30 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. II, c. 29), F, f. 87vb
34. *Prop.* 4A (p. 102, l. 48–57): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. II, c. 11 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. II, c. 10), F, f. 69rb

35. Prop. 4A (p. 102, l. 58–p. 103, l. 87): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. II, c. 20 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. II, c. 19), F, ff. 77ra–va
36. Prop. 4E (p. 109, l. 298–p. 110, l. 339): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 1 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 1), F, f. 138ra
37. Prop. 5D (p. 120, l. 264–270): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. II, c. 17, F, f. 75va
38. Prop. 6A (p. 127, l. 11–20): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. II, c. 2, F, f. 51va
39. Prop. 6A (p. 127, l. 21–p. 128, l. 33): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 2, F, f. 57rb
40. Prop. 6A (p. 128, l. 38–p. 129, l. 72): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 2, F, f. 57va
41. Prop. 6B (p. 129, l. 95–102): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 2, F, f. 57va
42. Prop. 6B (p. 130, l. 104–111): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 3, F, f. 58rb
43. Prop. 6D (p. 131, l. 144–148): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 2, F, f. 57vb
44. Prop. 6E (p. 131, l. 150–160): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 6, F, f. 62rb
45. Prop. 6E (p. 131, l. 162–169): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 6, F, f. 62ra
46. Prop. 6E (p. 132, l. 171–173): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 6, F, f. 62ra
47. Prop. 6E (p. 132, l. 179–p. 133, l. 231): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 6, F, ff. 62rb–va
48. Prop. 6E (p. 132, l. 202–p. 133, l. 208): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 14, F, f. 14va
49. Prop. 7E (p. 152, l. 493–p. 154, l. 554): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 8 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 8), F, ff. 145va–146ra; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 94, l. 27–p. 100, l. 160
50. Prop. 8B (p. 158, l. 50–56): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 9, F, f. 9va
51. Prop. 9B (p. 170, l. 114–120): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 6, F, f. 6va
52. Prop. 10D (p. 182, l. 208–213): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 31, F, ff. 37vb–38ra
53. Prop. 10E (p. 183, l. 217–226): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 31, F, f. 38rb
54. Prop. 11F (p. 192, l. 261–p. 194, l. 331): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 8 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 8), F, ff. 146rb–va; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 101, l. 179–p. 105, l. 270
55. Prop. 12A (p. 197, l. 25–p. 198, l. 30): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 21 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 21), F, f. 164ra
56. Prop. 12C (p. 200, l. 122–p. 201, l. 156): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 21 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 21), F, f. 164ra
57. Prop. 12D (p. 201, l. 163–170): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 25 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 25), F, f. 169vb
58. Prop. 12E (p. 202, l. 175–p. 205, l. 283): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 25 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 25), F, ff. 170ra–va

II. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986).

1. Prop. 15D (p. 19, l. 163–p. 20, l. 189): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. III, c. 31 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. IV, c. 31), F, f. 126vb
2. Prop. 16B (p. 26, l. 71–87): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 17, F, f. 22rb

3. Prop. 18B (p. 48, l. 157–161): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 9, F, f. gva
4. Prop. 21B (p. 79, l. 138–p. 80, l. 163): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. II, c. 2, F, ff. 51rb–va
5. Prop. 21K (p. 91, l. 554–p. 93, l. 601): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 14 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 14), F, f. 153ra; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 180, l. 9–p. 181, l. 38
6. Prop. 21M (p. 94, l. 636–645): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 16 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 16), F, f. 158ra; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 222, l. 144–154
7. Prop. 22D (p. 105, l. 250–260): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 10, F, f. 11vb
8. Prop. 22D (p. 105, l. 275–p. 106, l. 280): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 10, F, f. 11ra
9. Prop. 22D (p. 106, l. 281–313): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 10, F, f. 11rb
10. Prop. 22D (p. 107, l. 321–326): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 10, F, f. 11va
11. Prop. 22D (p. 107, l. 330–343): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 10, F, f. 11va
12. Prop. 22E (p. 107, l. 347–p. 108, l. 374): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 10, F, f. 11vb
13. Prop. 22F (p. 108, l. 381–p. 109, l. 387): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 10, F, f. 11ra
14. Prop. 23D (p. 116, l. 145–150): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 31, F, f. 37rb
15. Prop. 23D (p. 116, l. 172–p. 117, l. 186): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 31, F, f. 37rb
16. Prop. 23E (p. 117, l. 200–p. 118, l. 223): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 20, F, f. 27rb
17. Prop. 23E (p. 118, l. 243–p. 119, l. 253): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 20, F, f. 27rb
18. Prop. 23E (p. 119, l. 257–268): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 20, F, f. 27rb
19. Prop. 23I (p. 120, l. 315–p. 121, l. 324): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 14 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 14), F, f. 153ra; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 180, l. 17–p. 181, l. 31
20. Prop. 23I (p. 121, l. 325–340): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 16 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 16), F, f. 157va–b; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 218, l. 53–59
21. Prop. 25A (p. 137, l. 23–27): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 6, F, f. 6va
22. Prop. 25A (p. 137, l. 28–p. 139, l. 81): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 26 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 26), F, f. 171ra–b
23. Prop. 25G (p. 146, l. 328–p. 148, l. 387): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 15 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 15), F, f. 156va–b; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 206, l. 305–p. 209, l. 365
24. Prop. 25H (p. 148, l. 395–p. 149, l. 415): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 15 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 15), F, f. 157ra; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 210, l. 396–403
25. Prop. 25I (p. 150, l. 448–453): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 15 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 15), F, ff. 157rb–va; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 214, l. 499–p. 215, l. 508
26. Prop. 26A (p. 153, l. 13–19): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 9 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 9), F, f. 147rb; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 116, l. 145–151

27. Prop. 26A (p. 154, l. 32–41): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 9 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 9), F, f. 147va; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 118, l. 191–p. 119, l. 215
28. Prop. 27A (p. 162, l. 51–67): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 12 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 12), F, f. 151va; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 163, l. 173–p. 164, l. 207
29. Prop. 28A (p. 171, l. 13–p. 173, l. 76): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 42, F, ff. 46va–47rb
30. Prop. 28B (p. 173, l. 95–p. 174, l. 112): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 42, F, ff. 46vb–47ra
31. Prop. 28B (p. 174, l. 122–124): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 42, F, f. 47ra
32. Prop. 34A (p. 221, l. 42–63): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 21 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 21), F, f. 165ra
33. Prop. 34A (p. 221, l. 64–p. 223, l. 110): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 13 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 13), F, f. 245ra–b
34. Prop. 34A (p. 223, l. 114–126): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 13 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 13), F, f. 245rb
35. Prop. 34B (p. 224, l. 134–p. 227, l. 247): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 15 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 15), F, ff. 245rb–246vb

III. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 35–65*, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001).

1. Prop. 35B (p. 4, l. 50–59): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 8 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 8), F, f. 145va–b; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 94, l. 35–p. 95, l. 60
2. Prop. 35C (p. 5, l. 106–p. 7, l. 155): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 17 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 17), F, ff. 247rb–va
3. Prop. 35D (p. 7, l. 164–p. 8, l. 171): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 17 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 17), F, f. 247va
4. Prop. 36C (p. 18, l. 112–114): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 7, F, f. 24vb
5. Prop. 38F (p. 29, l. 98–p. 30, l. 101): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 6, F, f. 6rb
6. Prop. 59A (p. 163, l. 11–p. 164, l. 47): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 28 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 28), F, ff. 173rb–174ra
7. Prop. 59B (p. 164, l. 51–57): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 28 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 28), F, f. 174rb

IV. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003).

1. Prop. 67C (p. 9, l. 60–p. 10, l. 89): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F, f. 35rb; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 91, l. 66–p. 93, l. 153



v. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prop. 108–135*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011).

1. Prop. 114A (p. 40, l. 10–p. 41, l. 39): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 10, F, f. 10va–b
2. Prop. 116C (p. 61, l. 69–p. 63, l. 128): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 5, F, ff. 5vb–6ra
3. Prop. 120A (p. 90, l. 11–20): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 5, F, f. 6ra–b
4. Prop. 120A (p. 90, l. 21–p. 91, l. 42): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 6, F, f. 6rb
5. Prop. 120A (p. 91, l. 43–50): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 10, F, f. 10va
6. Prop. 120D (p. 93, l. 113–p. 97, l. 204): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, cc. 35–36, F, ff. 40va–42rb
7. Prop. 122A (p. 114, l. 13–p. 115, l. 52): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 7, F, f. 8ra–b
8. Prop. 131A (p. 190, l. 10–p. 191, l. 44): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 6, F, ff. 6rb–vb
9. Prop. 131B (p. 191, l. 46–p. 194, l. 115): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 14, F, ff. 14ra–va
10. Prop. 132B (p. 200, l. 23–p. 201, l. 38): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 10, F, f. 224va–b
11. Prop. 132D (p. 201, l. 50–53): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 10, F, f. 224vb
12. Prop. 132D (p. 202, l. 56–62): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 10, F, f. 224vb
13. Prop. 132D (p. 201, l. 50–p. 202, l. 62): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 10, F, f. 224vb
14. Prop. 133A (p. 206, l. 18–27): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 2 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 2), F, ff. 184vb–185ra
15. Prop. 133B (p. 207, l. 50–55): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 32, F, f. 37vb
16. Prop. 133B (p. 208, l. 66–82): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 32, F, ff. 37vb–38rb
17. Prop. 133D (p. 209, l. 112–113): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 16, F, f. 17vb
18. Prop. 133D (p. 210, l. 116–117): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 16, F, f. 17vb
19. Prop. 133H (p. 211, l. 166–174): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 32, F, f. 37vb
20. Prop. 135A (p. 220, l. 12–23): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 2 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 2), F, ff. 184vb–185ra
21. Prop. 135A (p. 221, l. 33–p. 223, l. 80): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 2 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 2), F, f. 185ra–b

vi. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007).

1. Prop. 136A (p. 3, l. 13–p. 5, l. 56): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 18; *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum*, p. 94, l. 205–p. 96, l. 261
2. Prop. 136B (p. 5, l. 58–p. 6, l. 87): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 8, F, f. 9ra
3. Prop. 136E (p. 6, l. 109–p. 7, l. 138): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. III, c. 10 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. IV, c. 10), F, f. 104rb
4. Prop. 136E (p. 8, l. 143–168): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. III, c. 11 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. IV, c. 11), F, ff. 104vb–105ra
5. Prop. 137E (p. 19, l. 145–p. 21, l. 201): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 11 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 11), F, f. 149va–b; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 143, l. 65–p. 146, l. 136

6. Prop. 137E (p. 21, l. 202–205): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 11 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 11), F, f. 150rb; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 151, l. 260–265
7. Prop. 137E (p. 21, l. 206–211): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 11 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 11), F, f. 150va; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 153, l. 305–312
8. Prop. 142A (p. 52, l. 18–p. 54, l. 65): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 16, F, ff. 17ra–19rb; 11, 30 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. II, 29), F, f. 87vb
9. Prop. 143N (p. 71, l. 401–p. 72, l. 426): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 26 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 26), F, f. 171ra
10. Prop. 146D (p. 91, l. 58–p. 92, l. 71): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 5 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 5), F, f. 188rb
11. Prop. 146E (p. 92, l. 73–p. 93, l. 93): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 5 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 5), F, f. 188rb
12. Prop. 146G (p. 93, l. 106–p. 94, l. 124): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 18; *Liber viginti quatuor philosophorum*, p. 90, l. 73–p. 91, l. 107
13. Prop. 146H (p. 94, l. 144–p. 96, l. 182): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 17, F, f. 22rb
14. Prop. 146I (p. 96, l. 198–p. 97, l. 209): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 5 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 5), F, f. 188rb–va
15. Prop. 146L (p. 97, l. 232–p. 98, l. 249): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 21 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 21), F, f. 164ra–b
16. Prop. 147E (p. 103, l. 94–108): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. II, c. 2, F, f. 51rb
17. Prop. 149D (p. 114, l. 91–p. 115, l. 130): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. III, cc. 24–26 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. IV, cc. 24–26), F, ff. 119ra–121rb
18. Prop. 150D (p. 121, l. 70–p. 125, l. 193): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 8 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 8), F, ff. 145va–146ra; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 94, l. 27–p. 95, l. 64
19. Prop. 151A (p. 134, l. 70–81): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 14, F, f. 14rb
20. Prop. 151D (p. 137, l. 184–p. 138, l. 193): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 13 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 13), F, f. 151vb; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 167, l. 28–p. 168, l. 51
21. Prop. 153A (p. 148, l. 12–p. 149, l. 40): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 26 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 26), F, f. 171ra
22. Prop. 153E (p. 153, l. 181–p. 154, l. 210): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 26 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 26), F, f. 171vb
23. Prop. 157D (p. 179, l. 67–79): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 16, F, ff. 19rb–20va; lib. I, c. 17, F, f. 23vb

24. Prop. 159A (p. 189, l. 14–p. 191, l. 73): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 21 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 21), F, ff. 164vb–165rb
25. Prop. 159B (p. 191, l. 75–p. 193, l. 137): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. II, c. 11, F, ff. 68vb–69ra
26. Prop. 159D (p. 194, l. 177–p. 195, l. 182): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 29 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 29), F, f. 175ra
27. Prop. 159D (p. 196, l. 215–227): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. II, c. 11, F, f. 69ra

VII. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160–183*, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003).

1. Prop. 160G (p. 7, l. 126–137): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 26 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 26), F, f. 172ra
2. Prop. 162D (p. 19, l. 95–p. 20, l. 135): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 15, F, ff. 15rb–va
3. Prop. 164D (p. 33, l. 66–71): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
4. Prop. 164D (p. 33, l. 81–87): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
5. Prop. 164E (p. 34, l. 101–p. 35, l. 131): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1, F, f. 212ra
6. Prop. 165D (p. 40, l. 79–p. 41, l. 107): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 5, F, f. 60vb
7. Prop. 166B (p. 48, l. 70–p. 49, l. 99): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 11, F, f. 227rb
8. Prop. 166B (p. 49, l. 102–p. 50, l. 124): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 12, F, f. 227rb–va
9. Prop. 166G (p. 52, l. 206–p. 55, l. 266): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 12, F, f. 63vb–64va
10. Prop. 166H (p. 55, l. 267–276): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 12, F, f. 64va
11. Prop. 171D (p. 114, l. 158–p. 115, l. 210): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 17, F, ff. 220vb–221rb
12. Prop. 174G (p. 142, l. 197–205): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. v, c. 13 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 13), F, ff. 152ra–vb; *Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20*, p. 175, l. 240–243; p. 166, l. 9–19
13. Prop. 176A (p. 157, l. 15–p. 160, l. 87): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 27, F, ff. 32va–33ra; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 91, l. 66–p. 93, l. 153
14. Prop. 176B (p. 160, l. 90–93): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 27, F, f. 33ra; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 93, l. 154–157
15. Prop. 176B (p. 160, l. 102–p. 161, l. 120): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 27, F, f. 33ra; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 94, l. 158–177
16. Prop. 176B (p. 161, l. 121–124): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 28, F, f. 33va; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 98, l. 85–88
17. Prop. 176B (p. 161, l. 132–133): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 27, F, f. 33ra; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 94, l. 178–179
18. Prop. 176C (p. 161, l. 137–142): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 28, F, f. 33rb; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 96, l. 12–24
19. Prop. 176C (p. 162, l. 147–161): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 28, F, f. 33rb; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 96, l. 25–38
20. Prop. 176C (p. 162, l. 162–p. 163, l. 175): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 28, F, f. 33va; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 97, l. 48–64

21. Prop. 176C (p. 163, l. 176–181): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 28, F, f. 33rb; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 98, l. 72–80
22. Prop. 176C (p. 164, l. 214–p. 165, l. 239): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 28, F, ff. 33va–b; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 98, l. 95–p. 99, l. 120
23. Prop. 176D (p. 165, l. 244–263): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F, ff. 34rb–va; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 103, l. 18–p. 104, l. 37
24. Prop. 176D (p. 165, l. 265–p. 166, l. 270): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F, f. 34va; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 104, l. 52–58
25. Prop. 176D (p. 166, l. 272–279): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F, f. 34va; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 104, l. 62–p. 105, l. 68
26. Prop. 177I (p. 183, l. 335–p. 184, l. 349): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F, f. 35rb; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 109, l. 215–p. 110, l. 223
27. Prop. 178A (p. 188, l. 12–p. 190, l. 54): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F, f. 34va–b; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 105, l. 73–p. 106, l. 129
28. Prop. 178B (p. 190, l. 56–p. 191, l. 111): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F, f. 34vb; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 107, l. 130–p. 108, l. 178
29. Prop. 178B (p. 192, l. 114–120): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F, f. 35rb; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 108, l. 190–p. 109, l. 196
30. Prop. 178B (p. 192, l. 137–139): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F, f. 35rb; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 109, l. 197–199
31. Prop. 178C (p. 193, l. 148–p. 194, l. 193): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 30, F, ff. 35vb–36ra
32. Prop. 178E (p. 196, l. 258–p. 197, l. 283): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 27, F, f. 33ra–b; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 95, l. 184–204
33. Prop. 179A (p. 200, l. 12–27): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. V, c. 1 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. IV, c. 33), F, f. 128ra
34. Prop. 180D (p. 213, l. 53–p. 214, l. 79): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 19 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. V, c. 19), F, f. 194ra–b
35. Prop. 180E (p. 214, l. 81–p. 216, l. 122): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VI, c. 19 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. V, c. 19), F, ff. 194rb–vb

VIII. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli Propositiones 184–211*, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014).

1. Prop. 184A (p. 3, l. 13–p. 5, l. 83): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 15, F, ff. 212vb–213rb
2. Prop. 184C (p. 6, l. 101–116): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 16, F, f. 213va–b

3. Prop. 186A (p. 30, l. 11–p. 31, l. 44): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 17, F, ff. 214vb–215rb
4. Prop. 186B (p. 31, l. 55–p. 32, l. 71): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 18, F, ff. 215vb–216va
5. Prop. 186D (p. 34, l. 153–p. 35, l. 178): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 19, F, f. 217ra–vb
6. Prop. 187A (p. 43, l. 37–p. 44, l. 68): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 23, F, ff. 222rb–va
7. Prop. 187A (p. 44, l. 81–83): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 23, F, f. 222rb
8. Prop. 187C (p. 47, l. 180–p. 48, l. 212): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 24, F, f. 223ra
9. Prop. 190A (p. 76, l. 15–22): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 18, F, f. 216ra
10. Prop. 190A (p. 77, l. 43–57): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 18, F, f. 216ra
11. Prop. 190A (p. 79, l. 103–106): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 18, F, f. 216ra–b
12. Prop. 190A (p. 80, l. 138–p. 81, l. 193): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 18, F, ff. 216rb–va
13. Prop. 190A (p. 82, l. 212–223): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 18, F, f. 216va
14. Prop. 190B (p. 82, l. 215–217): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 18, F, f. 216va
15. Prop. 199A (p. 151, l. 12–p. 153, l. 64): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 1, F, f. 212ra–b
16. Prop. 199B (p. 153, l. 72–p. 155, l. 131): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 6, F, f. 62ra–b
17. Prop. 199C (p. 156, l. 158–178): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 6, F, f. 61vb
18. Prop. 207C (p. 227, l. 94–p. 228, l. 104): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. I, c. 29, F, f. 35ra–b; Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 108, l. 179–190
19. Prop. 208D (p. 235, l. 128–139): cf. *Sapientiale*, lib. VII, c. 24, F, f. 223ra

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# Die Kontinuität der intellektuellen Tradition des Albertus Magnus: Berthold von Moosburgs Theorie des Intellekts

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## 1 Einführung

In der heute nur in zwei Handschriften aus dem 15. Jahrhundert erhaltenen *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, dem ersten von den insgesamt drei bisher bekannten mittelalterlichen Kommentaren zu der Στοιχειώσις θεολογική des spätantiken Neuplatonikers Proclus (412–485), behandelt Berthold von Moosburg in seiner Exegese der Propositionen 160–183 hauptsächlich die Intellektlehre.<sup>1</sup> Die 24 Propositionen mit den sie begleitenden

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1 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160–183*, hg.v. U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz. Prolegomena und Indices hg.v. N. Bray (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003). Zu Person und Werk Bertholds cf. S. Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy“, in J.A. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (Hgg.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), S.493–503. M. Führer, S. Gersh, „Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg“, in S. Gersh (Hg.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), S.305–317. Die lateinische Kommentartradition zu der *Elementatio theologica* des Proclus und zum *Liber de causis*, das Neuland der Mittelalterforschung, hat neuerlich D. Calma mit seinen Mitarbeitern im großen Umfang aufgearbeitet. Calma hat damit die Grundlagen für die weitergehenden, von ihm koordinierten Forschungs- und Editionsprojekte auf diesem Gebiet geschaffen. Mehrere Studien aus diesen Projekten weisen punktuelle Überschneidungen mit den Themen dieses Beitrags auf; zu nennen sind folgenden Publikationen: A. Baneu, D. Calma, „Notes sur un commentaire inédit au *Liber de causis* (Augsburg, Staats- und Stadtbibliothek, 4° Cod. 68)“, in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 54(2012), S.286–293, 295–296. D. Calma, „The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism. Considerations on a Recently Discovered Corpus of Texts“, in D. Calma (Hg.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. I. New Commentaries on Liber de causis (ca. 1250–1350)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), S.30. D. Calma, „A Medieval Companion to Aristotle: John Krosbein’s Paraphrases on *Liber de causis*“, in D. Calma (Hg.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. II. New Commentaries on Liber de causis and Elementatio theologica (ca. 1350–1500)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), S.11–97. F. Retucci, „*Sententia Procli alti philosophi*. Notes on Anonymous Commentary on Proclus’ *Elementatio theologica*“, in Calma (Hg.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. II*, S.99–179. D. Calma, „Reading Proclus and the *Book of Causes*: Notes on the Western Scholarly Networks and Debates“, in D. Calma (Hg.), *Reading*

*commenta Procli* bilden insofern zwei ungleiche Vorlagen für Bertholds Kommentar, als die konzisen Propositionen sowohl den eigentlichen Bezug der Exegese als auch die Grundlage für die Entfaltung von Bertholds eigener Lehren darstellen, während die Kommentare des Proclus zu den einzelnen Propositionen einer gesonderten, viel kürzeren Auslegung unterzogen werden. Beides organisiert Berthold nach einem feststehenden Muster, indem er bei der Auslegung der Propositionen, die er als das *elementum* bezeichnet,<sup>2</sup> zuerst den in ihnen enthaltenen Lehrgehalt (*suppositum*) erschließt und in einem zweiten Schritt auf dieser Basis sein eigenes Lehrgebäude (*propositum*) aufbaut. Seine Auslegung der Proklischen *commenta* zu den einzelnen Propositionen eröffnet er mit einem syllogistischen Beweis der jeweiligen Proposition (*probatio elementi*) und geht anschließend zu einer nach Lemmata strukturierten Erklärung des Textes über. Bertholds Hermeneutik der inhaltlichen Erschließung der Propositionen und ihrer Beweise im Anschluss an die *commenta* des Proclus hat S. Gersh als einen dialektischen Dreischritt rekonstruiert. Dieser wird durch eine Erweiterung ('expansion'), eine Einschränkung ('restriktion') und eine Transformation ('alteration') der Lehrinhalte der Vorlage bei einer integralen, die Auslegung sämtlicher Propositionen einbeziehenden Lektüre des Werkes vollzogen.<sup>3</sup> Der dritte Schritt, die Transformation, ist insofern besonders aufschlussreich, wie Gersh unterstreicht, als er Bertholds Verständnis des Platonismus und sein Verhältnis zur aristotelischen Philosophie widerspiegelt. Er verdeutlicht auch, fügen wir hinzu, die Bedeutung der durch Albert den Großen begründeten, an Pseudo-Dionysius anschließenden intellektuellen Tradition für Bertholds Auffassung der *divinissima philosophia*, wie sie im Einklang mit Proclus und in der Differenz zu Proclus entfaltet wird.<sup>4</sup>

Die Bindung des Kommentars an eine Textvorlage gibt naturgemäß den Rahmen für seine inhaltliche Ausgestaltung vor. Dies gilt auch für Bertholds Intellektlehre, die er in seiner *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli* entwickelt und die im Fokus der nachfolgenden Ausführungen steht. Eine systematische Erarbeitung eines geschlossenen intellekttheoretischen Lehrstücks hat der Verfasser der weitschweifigen *Expositio* nicht angestrebt,

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*Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1: Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2019), S.1–13.

- 2 Für die etymologische Erklärung des Begriffs *elementum* und des Werktitels sowie des Namens des Autors siehe Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy“, S.498.
- 3 Berthold's Hermeneutik hat S. Gersh in seiner Analyse der Proposition 174 rekonstruiert, siehe Führer, Gersh, „Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg“, S.310–316, insbes. S.310–311. Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content“, S.500.
- 4 Cf. unter Anm. 28.

da sich ihm seitens der Textvorlage ein hierfür geeigneter Ansatz offenbar nicht bot. Aus diesem Grund bildet seine Intellekttheorie auf das Ganze gesehen ein untereinander zwar vernetztes, aber auch deshalb fast nicht mehr zu durchschauendes Konglomerat verschiedener, durch die Vorlage und die verwendeten Quellen vorgegebener Elemente. Ihre Erschließung, genetische Bestimmung und Systematisierung, wie sie hier angestrebt und nur partiell durchgeführt werden kann, verlangen unter diesen Vorzeichen viel Aufwand, werfen aber einen geringen Ertrag ab, so dass ihre vollständige Aufarbeitung weiterhin ein Forschungsdesiderat bleibt. Diese Einschränkungen in Kauf nehmend wird mit Blick auf die auffälligsten Gemeinsamkeiten der Intellektlehre und der Erkenntnistheorie von Berthold und Albertus Magnus auf einen Bereich in einigen Punkten einzugehen sein, der bislang nicht erforscht wurde. Hierbei wird es primär um die Klassifikation der Intellekte und ihre Erklärungen gehen, um den erkenntnis-metaphysisch und existenziell aufgefassten intellektiven Aufstieg des Menschen, um Lehrinhalte, die bei Berthold einerseits systematisch konsistenter elaboriert und andererseits in der Tradition des Albertus Magnus entweder direkt oder vermittelt durch Ulrich von Straßburg und Dietrich von Freiberg verankert sind.

Die nachfolgenden Analysen der lehrinhaltlichen Koinzidenz und der suggerierten Einflüsse Alberts auf Bertholds Typologie und Interpretation der Intellekte konzentrieren sich auf seine Auslegung der Propositionen 160, 163, 167, 174 und 181 der *Elementatio theologica* des Proclus. Eine erste Durchsicht des Kommentars zu den Propositionen 160–183 hat gezeigt, dass in den genannten fünf Texteinheiten Berthold sich bei seiner Proclus-Exegese und seinen intellekttheoretisch zentralen Aussagen auch der von Albert eingeführten und entfaltenen Typologie und des Verständnisses der Intellekte bzw. deren Vollendungsstufen und der darauf gestützten Theorie der intellektiven Selbstüberschreitung des Menschen bedient und sie weiterentwickelt. Eine genetische Retrospektive von Bertholds Intellektlehre aus wirft Licht auf sein Verständnis der Lehre des *unum animae* und die epistemologische Fundierung der Mystik. Sie lässt eine nicht-reduktionistische Interpretation der Berthold'schen *divinissima philosophia* als eine „theologische Philosophie“ alternativlos werden, welche die gegenwärtige theologie- und philosophiehistorische Forschung, um ihre Konfundierung mit der Mystik und 'einer »Philosophie«' zu vermeiden, unter ebendiesem Namen, d.h. der „theologischen Philosophie“, zu entdecken und systematisch wiederzugewinnen begonnen hat.<sup>5</sup>

5 Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content“, S.499–500, und unten Anm. 30.

Die zu erwägenden Fragestellungen veranlassen zunächst einen Rückblick auf die allgemeine und aktuelle Forschungslage in Bezug auf Bertholds Intellektlehre. Diskussionswürdig sind manche in der neueren Forschung prononciert vertretenen Auffassungen in Bezug auf Bertholds Grundeinstellung gegenüber der Theologie und der biblisch-christlichen Offenbarung im Besonderen, sein Selbstverständnis als Philosoph, sein Verhältnis zum kirchlichen Lehramt und zu dem sogenannten „Schularistotelismus“ einschließlich der aristotelischen Erkenntnismetaphysik. Nicht zuletzt sind die als exklusiv dargestellte Rolle Dietrich von Freibergs Philosophie, insbesondere ihre intellekttheoretischen und ethischen Ansätze zu hinterfragen, sowie die These, dass sie „als ein Fundament für jeden Interpretationsversuch des Bertholdschen Werkes betrachtet werden muß“.<sup>6</sup>

## 2 Ein Rückblick auf die Forschungen zu Berthold von Moosburg

### 2.1 *Die Wiederentdeckung der Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*

Der zwischen 1327 und 1361 von Berthold von Moosburg verfasste Kommentar zu der *Elementatio theologica Procli* geriet im Verlauf der Jahrhunderte, sofern er nicht von vornherein gemäß dem Willen des Verfassers ein verborgenes Dasein führte, in Vergessenheit und wurde erst im Jahr 1900 durch W. Rubczyński im Kodex *Vat. lat. 2192* wiederentdeckt.<sup>7</sup> Im Jahr 1926 erfolgte die Edition eines Teils des Prologs durch Raymond Klibansky, nachdem er eine zweite Handschrift von Bertholds Werk im Kodex *Oxford, Balliol Coll. 224B*

6 L. Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds von Moosburg und die Probleme der nacheckhartschen Zeit“, in K. Ruh (Hg.), *Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposion Kloster Engelbert 1984* (Stuttgart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1986), S.147; repr.: „Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds von Moosburg und die philosophischen Probleme der nacheckhartschen Zeit“, in L. Sturlese, *Homo divinus: Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), S.139.

7 W. Rubczyński, „*Studia neoplatoniskie*“, in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 3(1900), S.41–69. H. Struve, „Die polnische Philosophie der letzten zehn Jahre (1894–1904)“, in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 18(1905), S.568–571. Da Rubczyński Anknüpfungen an die von ihm wiederaufgefundene, in der Handschrift Berthold explizit zugeschriebene *Expositio* bei Cusanus findet und ihren Verfasser für einen Vorläufer des Cusanus hält, gibt er den Verfassernamen der *Expositio* in der von Cusanus überlieferten, irrtümlichen Variante mit 'Johann Mosbach' wieder.

entdeckt hatte.<sup>8</sup> Mit den beiden Funden und der Teilveröffentlichung, auf die im Jahr 1971 die Edition des Kommentars zu den Propositionen 49–54, die B. Faes de Mottoni ins Werk setzte, und im Jahr 1974 der erste, von L. Sturlese herausgegebene Band der historisch-kritischen Edition des Kommentars zu den Propositionen 184–211 folgten, begann die Forschung zu Berthold von Moosburg und seinem Werk.<sup>9</sup> Sie gewann rasch an Fahrt, nachdem K. Flasch die kritische Edition des Gesamtwerkes Dietrich von Freibergs in Bochum initiiert und hierfür sowie für weitere Editionsprojekte das Projekt eines *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi* begründet und ein internationales Forscher- und Editorenteam zur kritischen Herausgabe der Werke von Autoren, die der „Deutschen Dominikanerschule“ des 14. Jahrhunderts zugerechnet werden, gebildet hatte. Nach der Fertigstellung der kritischen Ausgabe des Gesamtwerkes Dietrich von Freibergs nahm das ursprünglich durch K. Flasch und L. Sturlese, später auch durch R. Imbach und B. Mojsisch koordinierte Editorenteam die Arbeit an der kritischen Edition Berthold von Moosburgs *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli* auf.<sup>10</sup> Die Edition wurde in acht Teilbänden der Bochumer *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi*-Reihe (und einem bereits 1974 in der römischen Serie *Temi et Testi, Edizioni di Storia e letteratura* veröffentlichten 18. Band) im Jahr 2014 vollendet.

Ein Überblick über die zurückliegende und aktuelle Forschung zu Berthold von Moosburg muss an dieser Stelle selektiv auf einige für die Fragestellung dieses Beitrags einschlägigen Untersuchungen beschränkt bleiben. Vorgestellt und im Hauptteil der Darstellung punktuell berücksichtigt werden die Pionierarbeit von W. Eckert,<sup>11</sup> die für das Editionsprojekt und die Werkinterpretation

8 R. Klibansky, *Ein Proklos-Fund und seine Bedeutung*. Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1928/1929, 5. Abhandlung (Heidelberg: Winter, 1929).

9 B. Faes de Mottoni, „Il commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg all'*Elementatio theologica* di Proclo. Edizione delle proposizioni riguardanti il tempo e l'eternità“, in *Studi medievali* Ser. 3, 12(1971), S.417–461. Cf. R. Imbach, „Chronique de Philosophie: Le (néo-)platonisme médiéval, Proclus latin et l'école dominicaine allemande“, in *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* 110(1978), S.437–438, 448; repr.: R. Imbach, *Quodlibeta. Ausgewählte Artikel / Articles choisis*, hg.v. F. Cheneval et al. (Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag, 1996), S.149–151.

10 Cf. K. Flasch, L. Sturlese, „Vorwort“, in Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1–13*, hg.v. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), S.IX–X.

11 W. Eckert, „Berthold von Moosburg O.P. Ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik im Spätmittelalter“, in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 65(1957), S.120–133.

richtungsweisende „Einleitung“ von K. Flasch<sup>12</sup> und die sie vertiefende und weiterführende Studie von L. Sturlese.<sup>13</sup> Thematisch zentral für die nachfolgenden Rekonstruktionen sind zwei Untersuchungen aus der Bochumer Schule, weshalb sie besondere Aufmerksamkeit auf sich ziehen. Die Erstere, bei der es sich um die Dissertation der Mitherausgeberin des intellekttheoretischen Teils der Bertholdschen *Expositio*, I.J. Tautz, handelt, analysiert Bertholds Intellektlehre anhand seines Kommentars zu den Propositionen 168–183.<sup>14</sup> Die zweite Studie, ein Beitrag von B. Mojsisch zu einer Essaysammlung, bietet eine konzise Charakteristik der Intellekttheorie Bertholds und ihre Einordnung in den Gesamtkontext seines philosophischen Denkens.<sup>15</sup> Wichtig sind ebenfalls Untersuchungen von T. Iremadze zur Erkenntnislehre und der Intellekttheorie Bertholds sowie die Studien von M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese und A. de Libera zum Einfluss Alberts des Großen auf dessen Intellektlehre.<sup>16</sup> Diese hier genannten einschlägigen Arbeiten und die schon herangezogenen Untersuchungen von S. Gersh werden im Hauptteil dieser Studie berücksichtigt.

## 2.2 Der Beitrag von Willehad P. Eckert

Die bedeutendsten Untersuchungen aus der frühen Phase der Berthold-Forschung sind die ungedruckte Dissertation von W. Eckert und sein im *Philosophischen Jahrbuch* unter der Überschrift „Berthold von Moosburg O.P. Ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik im Spätmittelalter“ veröffentlichter

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- 12 K. Flasch, „Einleitung“, in Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, hg.v. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), S.XI–XXXVIII.
- 13 Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.145–161 (repr. S.137–154).
- 14 I.J. Tautz, *Erst-Eines, Intellekte, Intellektualität. Eine Studie zu Berthold von Moosburg* (Hamburg: Kovač, 2002).
- 15 B. Mojsisch, „Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Berthold von Moosburg. Zur Proklosrezeption im Mittelalter“, in Th. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, O.F. Summerell (Hgg.), *Selbst – Singularität – Subjektivität. Vom Neuplatonismus zum deutschen Idealismus* (Amsterdam / Philadelphia: Grüner, 2002), S.175–184.
- 16 T. Iremadze, „Der intellekttheoretische Ansatz der Selbstreflexivität des Denkens gemäß Kapitel 168 der *Elementatio theologica* des Proklos und seine Deutung sowie Entfaltung im *Proklos-Kommentar* Bertholds von Moosburg“, in W. Geerlings, C. Schulze (Hgg.), *Der Kommentar in Antike und Mittelalter, Bd. 2: Neue Beiträge zu seiner Erforschung* (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2004), S.237–253; T. Iremadze, *Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der Proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter: Dietrich von Freiberg – Berthold von Moosburg – Joane Petrizi* (Amsterdam / Philadelphia: Grüner, 2004). M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, „À propos du néoplatonisme d'Albert le Grand. Aventures et mésaventures de quelques textes d'Albert dans le Commentaire sur Proclus de Berthold de Moosburg“, in *Archives de Philosophie* 43(1980), S.635–654. A. de Libera, *La Mystique rhénane. D'Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994), S.326–384.

Aufsatz, in dem der Verfasser die wichtigsten Ergebnisse seiner in der Dissertation dargelegten Forschungen zusammenfasst.<sup>17</sup> Er stellt den Moosburger als einen Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik dar und unterstreicht seine enge Beziehung zu Albert dem Großen. Diese manifestierte sich in der *Expositio* durch weitläufige Anleihen aus Alberts *Summa theologiae*, in der die *Elementatio theologica* des Proclus nach der lateinischen, am 12. Mai 1268 in Viterbo vollendeten Übersetzung des Wilhelm von Moerbeke erstmalig rezipiert und zitiert werde.<sup>18</sup> Hinsichtlich der Intellektlehre beschränkt sich Eckert auf die Feststellung, Berthold habe Dietrichs Lehre vom Seelengrund übernommen. Diese wird als eine Verbindung des augustinischen Konzepts des *abditum mentis* mit der aristotelischen *intellectus agens*-Lehre begriffen.<sup>19</sup>

Mit Blick auf die später entfachte Polemik gegen Eckert's Auffassung, Berthold sei ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik, und die Verneinung des Befunds, dass Berthold's christliche Glaubensüberzeugung das hermeneutische Prinzip seines Werkverständnisses darstellt, sind zwei Aspekte hervorzuheben: Erstens, Berthold bekennt sich zur (neu-)platonischen Einheitsmetaphysik, indem er wie Platon und im Unterscheid zu Aristoteles die Priorität des Einen und/oder des Guten vor dem Sein annimmt. Am Prinzipiencharakter dieses Sein und Erkennen transzendierenden Einen bzw. des Guten ändert die Methode eines diskursiv-aufsteigenden oder eines intuitiven Zuganges nichts.<sup>20</sup> Ob Berthold sich in dieser Hinsicht von den Positionen des Meister Eckhart wesentlich unterscheidet und konsequenter als Eckhart ist, sofern das System des Letzteren sich als ein Versuch verstehen lässt, das Seinsprinzip und das Einheitsprinzip miteinander zu verbinden, wie Eckert

17 W. Eckert, *Berthold von Moosburg O.P. und sein Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des Proklos*, PhD Diss. (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 1956); Eckert, „Berthold von Moosburg O.P.“, S.120–133.

18 Eckert, „Berthold von Moosburg O.P.“, S.127: „Die *Summa theologiae* Alberts des Großen schreibt er [sc. Berthold] seitenweise mitsamt ihren Zitaten aus“. Zur Rezeption der *Elementatio theologica* des Proclus durch Albert in seiner *Summa theologiae* siehe D. Siedler, P. Simon, „Prolegomena“, in Albertus Magnus, *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia dei, libri primi pars I, quaestiones 1–50A*, hg.v. D. Siedler, W. Kübel, H.-J. Vogels (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), S.XVI–XVII. Für die Datierung und den Ort der lateinischen, von Moerbeke angefertigten Übersetzung der *Elementatio theologica* siehe H. Boese, „Einleitung“, in Proclus, *Elementatio theologica, translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca*, hg.v. H. Boese (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), S.IX.

19 Eckert, „Berthold von Moosburg O.P.“, S.127. Cf. A. Colli, „*Intellectus agens* als *abditum mentis*. Die Rezeption Augustins in der Intellekttheorie Dietrichs von Freiberg“, in *Theologie und Philosophie* 86(2011), S.360–371. E. Krebs, *Meister Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). Sein Leben, seine Werke, Seine Wissenschaft* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1906), S.100.

20 Cf. Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content“, S.499.

annimmt, kann man wie bisher geteilter Ansicht sein.<sup>21</sup> Zweitens, Berthold bekennt sich unmissverständlich zur biblisch-christlichen Offenbarung, indem er deren Lehrinhalte, darunter die innertrinitarischen Hervorgänge und Relationen sowie die Schöpfung im Rückgriff auf die pseudo-dionysische Emanationslehre und die von Proclus und von Pseudo-Dionysius inspirierte, von Albert erläuterte und von Dietrich von Freiberg entfaltete Providenzlehre zu erklären sucht und nicht zuletzt auf das Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie im Sinne der Auffassung von Albert und Dietrich reflektiert.<sup>22</sup> Eine willkürliche Einwendung, Berthold wollte unter keinen Umständen ein Offenbarungstheologe sein (der er als Predigermonch *ex professo* war), eine Einwendung, die einen von mehreren Kritikpunkten an Eckert's Lektüre der *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli* darstellt, erweist sich aus dieser Perspektive und aufgrund der Rolle, welche die theologischen Quellen, in erster Linie die biblischen Bücher, erfüllen, als unzutreffend.<sup>23</sup>

### 2.3 *Hermeneutische Neuausrichtung durch K. Flasch*

Die acht Teilbände umfassende kritische Ausgabe des Werkes Berthold von Moosburgs wird im ersten Teilband, der den Prolog und die Auslegung der Propositionen 1–13 enthält, doktrinell durch K. Flasch eingeleitet.<sup>24</sup> Flasch beleuchtet die in Dunkel gehüllte Geschichte des Werkes von seiner Abfassung um die Mitte des 14. Jahrhundert bis zum Erscheinen der ersten Bände der kritischen Edition und revidiert die von Eckert vorgenommene philosophiesystematische Einordnung des Kommentars in die Tradition. Er bietet eine neue Interpretation der neuplatonischen Leitideen und Grundsätze dar, die das Denken des Autors bestimmen. Bertholds Hauptquellen, darunter die Rolle des Averroes, stellt er ebenso wie seine Sicht auf das Verhältnis des Autors

21 Eckert, „Berthold von Moosburg O.P.“, S.129–131.

22 Eckert, „Berthold von Moosburg O.P.“, S.132–133; cf. Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita, *De divinis nominibus*, hg.v. B.R. Suchla (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1990), c. 4 n. 33, S.178 L.8–17; die lateinische Übersetzung des Johannes Sarracenus in *Dionysiaca*. Recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l'Aréopage, hg.v. Ph. Chevallier, vol. 1 (Brugge: de Brouwer, 1937), c. 4, S.311–313. Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, hg.v. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff 1972), c. 4 n. 224, S.298, L.4–37, S.297, L.78–84. Dietrich von Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae (fragmentum)*, hg.v. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), S.279–282, bes. 3 (9), S.281, L.100–S.282, L.109. Albertus Magnus, *Commentarii in III Sententiarum*, hg.v. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1894), d. 24, a. 3, S.468a: *fides et scientia sunt de eodem, non secundum idem*. H. Anzulewicz, *Die theologische Relevanz des Bildbegriffs und des Spiegelbildmodells in den Frühwerken des Albertus Magnus* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1999), S.159. M. Roesner, *Logik des Ursprungs. Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Meister Eckhart* (Freiburg / München: Alber, 2017), S.101–103.

23 Siehe unten Anm. 26 und insbesondere den Beitrag von P.D. Hellmeier in diesem Band.

24 Hierzu und zum Folgenden: Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.XI–XXXVIII.



der *Expositio* zur ihrer Proklischen Vorlage und zur biblisch-christlichen Offenbarungstheologie vor. Die Kritik, Korrekturen und Präzisierungen früherer Interpretationen von Bertholds Werk und philosophischem Denken bilden den Haupttenor der Einleitung.<sup>25</sup> Zu den darin dargelegten, einen bemerkenswerten Erkenntnisfortschritt markierenden Einsichten, die mit der Edition der ersten Teilbände des Kommentars und mit der doktrinen Erschließung des Prologs erzielt und in der Einleitung präsentiert wurden, seien einige kritische Bemerkungen angebracht. Sie beziehen sich vornehmlich auf die hermeneutisch relevanten Deutungen, die auch mit den Kritikpunkten an den von Eckert gewonnenen Erkenntnissen zusammenhängen und die für sich eine historisch mögliche, bisweilen ausschließliche, die Werkinterpretation maßgeblich bestimmende Valenz beanspruchen.

An erster Stelle seien das Ausschließen offenbarungstheologischer Elemente und Motive im Denken von Berthold und die Verneinung seines Selbstverständnisses als Theologe zu erwähnen, die selbst bei seinem Rekurs auf die biblische Überlieferung reklamiert werden, wobei ihm auch eine dem kirchlichen Lehramt und dem „Schularistotelismus“ gegenüber kritische Attitüde attestiert wird.<sup>26</sup> Vor dem Hintergrund von Bertholds Bezugnahmen auf die biblische und die ps.-dionysische „Epistemologie“ der Gotteserkenntnis und in Anbetracht seiner Heranziehung theologischer Autoritäten wie Ambrosius, Augustinus, Johannes von Damaskus, Maximus Confessor und Eriugena sowie philosophischer Erörterung dezidiert theologischer Fragen wie die Trinität und Schöpfung, überzeugt eine die Theologie gänzlich ausschließende Interpretation nicht. Werden indes offenbarungstheologische und philosophische Gründe und Erklärungsmuster nicht als Gegensätze sondern als korrelative, sich modal unterscheidende Interpretationen derselben Sachgehalte aufgefasst, lassen sich die dem Anschein nach unüberbrückbaren Divergenzen

25 Cf. Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.XI–XII, XIV–XV, XIX–XXI, XXV.

26 Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.XIV, insbesondere Section 3; „Es gibt weitere Selbstinterpretationen Bertholds, die zu nutzen sind. Ohne darüber zum Offenbarungstheologen werden zu wollen, intendierte er, die Invisibilia Dei durch das Geschaffene zu erkennen (Römerbrief 1,20), und interpretierte diese Erkenntnis als den intellektuellen Weg vom Abbild zum Urbild (*Expos. prol.* 1 Sturlese 5,5–12 u.ö.).“ Andere Akzente setzt bei der Interpretation dieser Stelle Sturlese, der auf die ‚propria‘ Gottes, d.h. die Trinität“, verweist und trotz seiner tendenziellen Enttheologisierung des Werkes Berthold unwillkürlich als Theologen ausweist; er gibt auch zu, dass Bertholds „divinissima philosophia“ als „Mystik“ bezeichnet werden kann, und charakterisiert sie als eine „deutsche Mystik“, hält aber letztlich an der Bestimmung „Philosophie“ und an der in diesem Sinne verstandenen Formel „divinissima philosophia“ fest. Schließlich räumt er ein, dass Bertholds Bestimmung dieser „göttlichsten Philosophie“ als „sancta religio“ sie als „Theologie“ zu bezeichnen erlaubt; cf. Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.153–154, 155 (repr. S.147–148, 150–151).

auflösen.<sup>27</sup> Gleichwohl besteht kein Zweifel, dass bei der Kommentierung dieser philosophischen Schrift ein Theologe mit einem zuhöchst philosophischen Anspruch am Werk ist, der die Gegenstände seiner Vorlage in ihrer doktrinell ursprünglichen Verankerung methodisch gerecht, d.h. ausschließlich philosophisch, sachlich jedoch nicht ohne Transformationen, Erweiterungen und Indienstnahme im Sinne seines spezifischen, in der biblisch-christlichen Offenbarungstheologie gründenden Gott- und Weltverständnisses auslegt. Er entfaltet im Anschluss an Proclus eine neue Art der „göttlichsten Philosophie“ (*divinissima philosophia*), die sich von jener der *theologi philosophantes* aus der Vorgeschichte der griechischen Philosophie wesentlich unterscheidet und, wie S. Gersh gezeigt hat, sich nicht allein auf die Proklische Theologie ohne die Berücksichtigung der sie voraussetzenden Rolle des Pseudo-Dionysius zurückführen lässt.<sup>28</sup> Seine „theologische Philosophie“ des biblisch-christlichen Zuschnitts reiht sich in die platonische Tradition von Augustinus und Boethius über Pseudo-Dionysius, Eriugena und Honorius Augustodunensis bis hin zur Albert-Schule ein, wobei neben den Dominikanern Albert dem Großen, Ulrich von Straßburg, Meister Eckhart und Dietrich von Freiberg auch der Franziskaner Thomas von York mit dem Werk *Sapientiale* zu den einschlägigen Quellen von Berthold's *Expositio* zählt.<sup>29</sup> Es sei angemerkt, dass die

27 Cf. Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.149–151 (repr. S.143–145).

28 Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy“, S.493–503. Cf. I. Zavattero, „La figura e il pensiero di Proclo in Bertoldo die Moosburg“, in *Arkete. Rivista distudifilosofici*1(2005), S.52. H. Anzulewicz, „Albertus Magnus über die *philosophi theologizantes* und die natürlichen Voraussetzungen postmortaler Glückseligkeit: Versuch einer Bestandsaufnahme“, in C. Steel, J. Marenbon, W. Verbeke (Hgg.), *Paganism in the Middle Ages: Threat and Fascination* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2012), S.60–76, 80–83. Führer, Gersh, „Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg“, S.306–317. Andere Akzente setzt in dieser Frage Sturlese, indem er die vermittelnde Rolle des Pseudo-Dionysius (dessen Werk Berthold als die Grundlage der *Elementatio theologica* des Proclus betrachtet haben muss) und die synthetisierende Eigenleistung des Berthold, welche die Gestalt der *nostra divinalis philosophia* im Sinne der christianisierten theologischen Philosophie annimmt, wenig zu beachten scheint und sich darauf konzentriert, die Rolle des Proclus und der 'Proklischen Theologie' in der Sicht Bertholds zu verabsolutisieren; cf. Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.150–151 (repr. S.144–145). Speziell zu der chronologischen Priorität des Pseudo-Dionysius gegenüber Proclus und dem *corpus Dionysiacum* als Voraussetzung, Maßstab und Garant der 'Orthodoxie' der *Elementatio theologica* des Proclus aus der Sicht Bertholds cf. Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content“, S.501–502; Führer, Gersh, „Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg“, S.309.

29 Cf. Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content“, S.495; de Libera, *La Mystique rhénane*, S.319–325. Die Bedeutung des Thomas von York als Bertholds Quelle erörtern E. King im Beitrag „Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli*“, in Calma (Hg.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1*,

gegenwärtige theologie- und philosophiehistorische Forschung des christlichen und des arabisch-islamischen Kulturraumes begonnen hat, die *divinissima philosophia*, wie sie Berthold bezeichnete und entfaltete, unter ebendiesem Namen, d.h. der „theologischen Philosophie“, zu entdecken und systematisch wiederzugewinnen.<sup>30</sup>

Auf die kritisch gesicherte Textgrundlage des Kommentars zu den Propositionen 1–13 gestützt, lehnt Flasch die von J. Koch eingeführte Unterscheidung zwischen der neuplatonischen Einheitsmetaphysik und der aristotelischen Seinsmetaphysik sowie die Charakterisierung Bertholds als Vertreter der neuplatonischen Einheitsmetaphysik ab. Er wendet gegen diese auch durch Eckert übernommene und durch dessen eigene Forschungen bestätigte Auffassung ein und erläutert seine Position u. a. folgenderweise:

Berthold vertrat nicht eine immer schon vorhandene Einheitsmetaphysik, sondern er restaurierte um die Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts eine durch kirchenamtliche Interventionen und den konventionellen Schularistotelismus bedrohte Tradition, deren Inhalt Berthold präzise angab: Sie betrachtete die Welt nicht nur als bewirkt und teleologisch bestimmt durch das höchste Gute, sondern sie sah sie zu ihm im Verhältnis des Akzidens zur Substanz. Diese Metaphysik des höchsten Guten wußte sich im polemischen Gegensatz zum Schularistotelismus und erhielt von daher, besonders von der im Jahre 1323 erfolgten Kanonisation des Thomas von Aquino, ihre zeitgeschichtliche Prägnanz: Sie wollte eine immanent philosophische Deutung des Weltganzen geben, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seines dynamischen Charakters; processus und regressus der Welt wollte sie thematisieren als Ausdruck des ‘ersten Guten’ und der ontologischen Unselbständigkeit der ‘Substanz’ der Aristoteliker. Bertholds Traditionsbezug war reicher als man bisher sah;

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S.408–410, und F. Retucci in ihren früheren Arbeiten (siehe King, „Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg’s *Expositio*, S.408 Anm. 44) sowie im Aufsatz „Between Cologne and Oxford: Berthold of Moosburg and Thomas of York’s *Sapientiale*“ in diesem Band.

30 Dass Bertholds Begriff *divinissima philosophia*, d.h. „theologische Philosophie“, gegenwärtig keinen Anachronismus darstellt und eine Wiederbelebung erfährt, zeigen exemplarisch die Arbeiten, Lehrprogramme und Forschungsprojekte von L. Schumacher (King’s College London, Department of Theology and Religious Studies), darunter insbesondere ihre Studie *Theological Philosophy. Rethinking the Rationality of Christian Faith* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). Ähnliche Entwicklung ist neuerlich auf dem Gebiet der religionsphilosophischen Forschung des Islams zu beobachten, wie exemplarisch die Essays-Sammlung von A. Shihadeh, J. Thiele (Hgg.), *Philosophical Theology in Islam. Later Ash’arism East and West* (Leiden: Brill 2020) belegt.

er umfasste die averroistische Aristotelesdeutung und ihre Aktualisierung durch Dietrich ebenso wie das von Albertus Magnus genährte Interesse an Hermes Trismegistus.<sup>31</sup>

Bezüglich dieser Interpretation stellen sich einige Fragen, darunter insbesondere die, ob Berthold eine derart konsequente und gewissermaßen dialektische Vorgehensweise zuzuschreiben ist, dass er eine *nur* immanent philosophische Welterklärung im Ganzen geben will und kann, wenn er sich hierbei theologischer Quellen, Begriffe, Inhalte, Gründe und Muster bedient, zugleich die räumlichen Assoziationen der Aufstiegsmetapher, die als der Innbegriff der Kontingenz verstanden wird, aufhebt.<sup>32</sup> Weisen Bertholds explizite Bezüge auf die biblische Offenbarung und seine Anlehnungen an die theologischen Autoritäten einerseits und die hermeneutische Struktur einer im Sinne der theologischen Philosophie begriffenen Deutung des Weltganzen nicht auf eine christliche Adaption eines neuplatonischen Denkmodells seines Weltverständnisses hin? Bewegt sich Berthold auf einem offenbarungstheologisch absolut freien, „immanent philosophischen“ Weg des intellektuellen Aufstiegs des Menschen von seinem *göttlichen* Ursprung, an dem er teilhat, zu dem wesenhaft *Göttlichen* und dadurch zu dem erstursächlich Guten?<sup>33</sup>

31 Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.XIV.

32 Cf. Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.XV.

33 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus*, hg.v. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), *Expos. tit. L*, S.49 L.408–414: *Comprehenditur etiam ultimo per li ELEMENTATIO THEOLOGICA finale perfectivum sive causa finalis ita, ut elementatio theologica, id est divinae rationis, importet scalarem ascensum a divinis per participationem ad divina per essentiam et per hoc ad divinum principaliforme, quod est divinum secundum causam, contemplandum; cuius contemplatione contemplator non solum efficitur beatus in assequendo 'statum omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectum', sed etiam deus.* Cf. Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.XIV–XV: „Wenn man das Denken Bertholds als ‚Einheitsmetaphysik‘ kennzeichnet, dann muß man hinzufügen: ‚Einheitsmetaphysik‘ verstand Berthold mit Dionysius als Lehre vom höchsten Guten, mit Augustinus als Ideenlehre und Logospekulation, mit Eriugena und wiederum mit Dionysius als Theorie der causae primordiales. Dabei legen die hier erstmals edierten Texte zwei weitere Korrekturen an dem von Josef Koch und Willehad Eckert gezeichneten Bild des ‚Einheitsmetaphysikers‘ Berthold nahe. Beide Autoren erklärten, ‚Einheitsmetaphysik‘ sei ‚immer ‚Metaphysik von oben‘, d.h. sie geht von der absoluten Einheit als dem Erstgegebenen aus und steigt von da zum Verständnis der Welt herab. Abgesehen davon, daß kein entwickeltes philosophisches Denken sich in dieser vorstellungsorientierten Weise (Seinsmetaphysik = ‚Metaphysik von unten‘; Einheitsmetaphysik = ‚Metaphysik von oben‘) adäquat beschreiben lässt, so trifft diese Charakteristik auf den Text Bertholds faktisch nicht zu. Wie Proklos ging Berthold vom Vielen aus, um denkend zum Einen zu gelangen [...]. Das Urbild ist nicht das Erstgegebene, sondern wir müssen, wie Berthold gleich zu Beginn seines Kommentars (Sturlese 5, 18) erklärt, durch das Abbild

Wird dieser Weg, genauer: welcher Weg wird von Berthold konsequent durchschritten, und wird er sich für ihn am Ende, vergleichsweise wie für Albert den Großen gemäß dem Schluss seiner Schrift *De intellectu et intelligibili*, als zielführend erweisen? Widerspricht die Verkürzung der Metaphysik des Guten, die Berthold, Meister Eckhart und Albert entwickeln, und die Begrenzung des *processus* und *regressus* bzw. des *exitus*, der *perfectio* und der *reductio*, der hermeneutisch erschließenden Struktur der Seinswirklichkeit auf ein „immanent philosophisch“ begreifbares Problem nicht dem onto-theologischen Charakter und Ausmaß der hier in Rede stehenden Sachgehalte? Welche Signifikanz ist der hermetischen Tradition in Bertholds Intellektlehre beizumessen, in der sie keine explizite Erwähnung findet? Die Idee der Vergöttlichung des Menschen ist nicht ausschließlich und auch nicht genuin ein hermetischer Gedanke; sie wird bei Albert nicht weniger mit den Peripatetikern als mit Hermes Trismegistus verbunden.<sup>34</sup> Dabei ist die Tatsache zu unterstreichen, dass Berthold die Theorie der Welten und vor allem hermetische Doktrin des Menschen als Mikrokosmos wörtlich aus dem Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Großen übernimmt, obwohl er einen viel breiteren Zugang zu dieser

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zum Urbild kommen, in einer laboriosa investigatio, [...]. Doch tilgte Berthold die veräumlichenden Assoziationen dieser Metapher, indem er den Aufstieg und seine Stufen inhaltlich bestimmte als den Weg a divinis per participationem ad divina per essentiam et per hoc ad divinum principaliforme, quod est divinum secundum causam (*Expos. tit. L Sturlese 49, 410–412*).“

- 34 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, hg.v. C. Stroick (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1968), lib. 3, tr. 3, c. 11, S.221, L.93–S.222, L.9: *et cum sic acceperit [sc. intellectus possibilis] omnia intelligibilia, habet lumen agentis ut formam sibi adhaerentem, et cum ipse sit lumen suum, eo quod lumen suum est essentia sua et non est extra ipsum, tunc adhaeret intellectus agens possibili sicut forma materiae. Et hoc sic compositum vocatur a Peripateticis intellectus adeptus et divinus; et tunc homo perfectus est ad operandum opus illud quod est opus suum, inquantum est homo, et hoc est opus, quod operatur deus, et hoc est perfecte per seipsum contemplari et intelligere separata.* Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, lib. 3, tr. 3, c. 11, S.222, L.80–87: *Mirabilis autem et optimus est iste status intellectus sic adepti; per eum enim homo fit similis quodammodo deo, eo quod potest sic operari divina et largiri sibi et aliis intellectus divinos et accipere omnia intellecta quodammodo. Haec igitur dicta sunt ad praesens de solutione istius quaestionis. Aristoteles autem distulit eam usque ad x Ethicae suae ad solvendum.* Die Rolle des Hermes Trismegistus im Werk Albert dem Großen beurteilt D. Porreca wesentlich zurückhaltender und kritischer als Sturlese, cf. D. Porreca, „Albertus Magnus and Hermes Trismegistus: An Update“, in *Mediaeval Studies* 72(2010), S.245–81. Dem Urteil von D. Porreca schließt sich J.C. Lastra Sheridan, „La influencia de los principales tópicos filosóficos del *Asclepius* en la obra de Alberto Magno“, in V. Buffon, C. D'Amico (Hgg.), *Hermes Platonicus. Hermetismo y platonismo en el Medioevo y la Modernidad temprana* (Santa Fe: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 2016), S.127–146 an.

Tradition durch Thomas von York hatte.<sup>35</sup> Inwiefern aber trifft zu, dass Berthold wie Proclus nicht von Einem ausgeht, sondern von der Analyse des Vielen, welches gleichsam als Abbild begriffen wird, um zur Betrachtung des Einen, zu dem Urbild aufsteigend zu gelangen?<sup>36</sup> Legitimiert Bertholds Aussage, dass der stufenweise Aufstieg vom Göttlichen durch Teilhabe zum Göttlichen durch Wesenheit und durch dieses zum ursprünglich-formal Göttlichen, welches das Göttliche der Ursache nach ist, die bereits erwähnte Aufhebung der Aufstiegsmetapher und die totale Ablehnung der Einheitsmetaphysik, die Koch und Eckert als „Metaphysik von oben“ interpretieren?

Andere Themen aus der Forschung zu Berthold von Moosburg, die eine Neukonturierung seines individuellen philosophischen Profils bezwecken, hier aber nicht diskutiert werden können, sind für die Streitfrage des Charakters von Bertholds Metaphysik und für seine Intellekttheorie nur insofern relevant, als sie die beiden Extreme der onto-theologischen Struktur von Hervorgang und Rückkehr (*processus* und *regressus*) der Seinswirklichkeit und damit des Intellekts berühren. Albert bedient sich dieser Struktur, welche die theologische Philosophie des Neuplatonismus bereitstellt, und der peripatetischen Philosophie als des geeignetsten Werkzeugs für eine Fundierung und philosophische Explikation des Mittelstücks dieser Struktur, das ihre beiden Extreme verbindet, d.h. die raumzeitlich-materielle Ebene der Verwirklichung des Seienden. Berthold folgt Albert darin.<sup>37</sup> Der heuristische Nutzen aus der Anwendung dieser Struktur für die Intellektlehre, auf die Flasch nicht näher eingeht, die von Albert und Berthold im Modus der theologischen Philosophie mit einem „expansiven Optimismus“<sup>38</sup> in Ausrichtung auf die Erkenntnis alles Intelligiblen, auf Gott als das höchste Ziel des Wissens interpretiert wird, liegt auf der Hand. In analoger Weise zu dem biblisch-christlichen Verständnis von Gott, Welt und Mensch und im Einklang mit diesem Verständnis bindet sie den Ursprung und das Ziel der menschlichen Seele und alles Seienden, den Hervorgang und die Rückkehr, an den göttlichen Ursprung als das Ziel-Prinzip, das sie als das Eine (*unum*) bzw. das Erste (*primum*) begreift und bezeichnet. Diese durch Albert vor allem in den Kommentaren zum *corpus Dionysiacum*

35 Cf. Iremadze, *Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus*, S.133–134. E. Ludueña, „La recepción del *Asclepius* en Bertoldo de Moosburg“, in Buffon, D’Amico (Hgg.), *Hermes Platonicus*, S.165–181; und unten Anm. 41.

36 Siehe oben Anm. 33.

37 Cf. K. Flasch, „*Procedere ut imago*. Das Hervorgehen des Intellekts aus seinem göttlichen Grund bei Meister Dietrich, Meister Eckhart und Berthold von Moosburg“, in K. Ruh (Hg.), *Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposium Kloster Engelberg 1984* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), S.125, 132.

38 Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.XVIII, XIX.

und in *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa* elaborierte und für sein theologisches wie philosophisches Denken gleichermaßen gültige und sein Verständnis der Wirklichkeit ordnende Struktur samt ihrer inhaltlichen Ausgestaltung haben Dietrich von Freiberg und Berthold von Moosburg offensichtlich inspiriert.<sup>39</sup> Alberts Einfluss auf Berthold ist stärker als bislang angenommen und steht dem von Dietrich wenig nach, wie dies gleich verdeutlicht werden soll.

#### 2.4 *Ausführung Kurt Flaschs Vorgaben durch Loris Sturlese*

Die Neuausrichtung der Interpretation des Werkes Berthold von Moosburgs, die Flasch in seiner Einführung eingeleitet hat, wird in einer Studie von Sturlese thematisch erweitert, vertieft und konsequent umgesetzt.<sup>40</sup> In ihrem Fokus stehen das Verhältnis von Berthold, Proclus und Dietrich zueinander, das *unum animae* als die göttlichste, für Gott eigentümliche und für den Menschen mögliche Erkenntnisweise jenseits der diskursiven *ratio* und des Intellekts sowie die Vergöttlichung des Menschen im kontemplativem Aufstieg vom Göttlichen durch Teilhabe zum Göttlichen der Ursache nach einschließlicher hermetischen Motive der Divinisierung des Menschen, die Berthold offenkundig von Albert übernimmt.<sup>41</sup> Den doktrinellen Einfluss Dietrichs auf Berthold, insbe-

39 Cf. H. Anzulewicz, „Die Denkstruktur des Albertus Magnus. Ihre Dekodierung und ihre Relevanz für die Begrifflichkeit und Terminologie“, in J. Hamesse, C. Steel (Hgg.), *L'Élaboration du vocabulaire philosophiques au Moyen Âge* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), S.369–396; H. Anzulewicz, „Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita und das Strukturprinzip des Denkens von Albert dem Großen“, in T. Boiadjev, G. Kapriev, A. Speer (Hgg.), *Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter* (Turnhout: Brepols 2000), S.251–295; H. Anzulewicz, „Hervorgang – Verwirklichung – Rückkehr. Eine neuplatonische Struktur im Denken Alberts des Großen und Dietrichs von Freiberg“, in K.-H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, N. Pohl (Hgg.), *Die Gedankenwelt Dietrichs von Freiberg im Kontext seiner Zeitgenossen* (Freiberg: Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg, 2013), S.229–244, bes. S.237–244. Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.XV, XXIII. Flasch, „*Procedere ut imago*“, S.132.

40 Siehe oben Anm. 13.

41 Bertholds Inspiration durch das Werk Alberts des Großen kommt bereits im Prolog der *Expositio*, der ihre programmatische Outline darstellt, klar zur Geltung. Kennzeichnend und maßgeblich sind hierfür die Anleihen aus Alberts Metaphysikkommentar, welche zusammen mit den Entlehnungen aus der hermetischen Schrift des Ps.-Apuleius *Asclepius* – beide umrahmt durch Rm 1,20 – die hermeneutische und textuelle Grundlage (das Lemma) von Bertholds Interpretation der geschöpflichen Welt als Makrokosmos (Ps.-Apuleius) und des vergöttlichen Menschen als Mikrokosmos (Albert) bilden. Cf. Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli*, Prol. 14–19, S.23, L.570–S.32, L.19. Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, hg.v. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1960), lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 1, S.2, L.5–15. Ludueña, „La recepción del *Asclepius* en Bertoldo de Moosburg“, S.178–179. H. Anzulewicz, „*Solus homo est nexus Dei et mundi*. Albertus Magnus über den Menschen“, in S. Fernández, J. Noemi, R. Polanco (Hgg.),

sondere auf seine Auffassung der *visio beatifica* und auf die Intellektlehre, stellt Sturlese radikaler als dies Flasch tat, heraus. Er meint, wie in der Einführung dieses Beitrags gleichsam als eine unabgeschlossene Frage erwähnt wurde, dass die weitgehende Übereinstimmung von Bertholds Ansichten mit denen von Dietrich „als ein Fundament für jeden Interpretationsversuch des Bertholdschen Werkes betrachtet werden muß“.<sup>42</sup> Ohne dieser Annahme zu widersprechen, sei unterstrichen, dass die doktrinale Nähe zu Dietrich das Interesse Bertholds an den Schriften Alberts des Großen nicht schmälerte, sondern offenkundig steigerte, zumal ihr theologisch-philosophischer Skopus und Quellenfundus weit über das Werk Dietrichs hinausreicht. Dieses Interesse Bertholds wird u.a. dadurch eindrucksvoll bestätigt, dass er mehrere Handschriften der Werke Alberts, darunter einige seiner Autographa, zur persönlichen Verfügung hatte und sie bei der Abfassung seiner *Expositio* als einschlägige primäre Quelle sowie als Vermittler weiterer Quellenliteratur und Ideen nutzte, wie im Fall der hermetischen Tradition und des *corpus Dionysiacum* erwiesen werden kann.<sup>43</sup> Er rezipierte Alberts Gedankengut auch

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Multifariam. *Homenaje a los profesores A. Meis, A. Bentué, S. Silva* (Santiago de Chile: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2010), S.323, 330. Bei der Auslegung der Makrokosmos- und Mikrokosmos-Lemmata zieht Berthold weitere Texte des Doctor universalis vom Anfang des Metaphysikkomentars, aus der *Summa theologiae* und aus *De animalibus* heran. Die Art und Weise der Verwendung der Schriften des Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita als Quelle des Prologs setzt einen unmittelbaren Zugriff auf das *corpus Dionysiacum* voraus; eine Benutzung der Dionysius-Kommentare Alberts ist allerdings, wie sich im Folgenden zeigen wird, erwiesen.

42 Siehe oben Anm. 6. Cf. Flasch, „Einleitung“, S. xxx–xxxv.

43 In Bertholds Besitz befanden sich zwei Autographa-Handschriften Alberts mit seinen naturphilosophischen Schriften: (1) Köln, Hist. Archiv der Stadt, Codex W 258a, darin *De animalibus* einschließlich *De natura et origine animae* und *De principiis motus processivi*; der Codex enthält mehrere eigenhändige Vermerke von Bertholds Hand und seinen eigenhändigen Besitzvermerk, f. (1)r: „Liber fratris Bertholdi de Mosburch (darunter von einer anderen Hand: Verburch) ordinis predicatorum“. (2) Wien, ÖNB 273, darin *Physica* (Fragment: lib. 8 c. 2 – Ende: f. 65r–72v), *De caelo et mundo*, *De natura loci*, *De causis proprietatum elementorum*. Cf. W. Fauser, *Die Werke des Albertus Magnus in ihrer handschriftlichen Überlieferung. Teil I: Die echten Werke* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1982), S.26–27, 35, 39, 47, 143, 161, 167. E. Meyer, K. Jessen, „Appendices“, in Albertus Magnus, *De vegetabilibus libri VII*, hg.v. E. Meyer, K. Jessen (Berlin: Reimer, 1867), S.672–673; am Schluss des Bandes Abbildungen von *De animal.*, f. 132r und 390r. H. Ostlender, „Die Autographie Alberts des Großen“, in H. Ostlender (Hg.), *Studia Albertina. Festschrift für Bernhard Geyer zum 70. Geburtstag* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1952), S.11 und Tafel II–III am Schluss des Bandes. L. Sturlese, „Introduzione“, in Bertoldo di Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli: 184–211, De animalibus*, hg.v. L. Sturlese (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), S.XLVI–XLVII. H. Stehkämper, *Albertus Magnus. Ausstellung zum 700. Todestag* [Katalog] (Köln: Historisches Archiv der Stadt, 1980), S.229 Abb. 13 und



indirekt durch die Schriften des Dietrich und, wie M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese aufgezeigt hat, Ulrichs von Strassburg.<sup>44</sup> Seine besondere Wertschätzung für Albert und Dietrich kommt nicht nur durch die Nennung ihrer Namen im Verzeichnis der 'kirchlichen Gelehrten' (*doctores ecclesiae*) zum Ausdruck, deren Werke er bei seiner Auslegung der *Elementatio theologica* des Proclus benutzte. Die zweifache Erwähnung des Namens von Dietrich in der *Expositio* wurde unter dem Hinweis auf die seltene Praxis namentlicher Zitierung zeitgenössischer Autoren zu dieser Zeit als Ausdruck einer besonderen Ehrung und als solche als eine Ausnahme interpretiert.<sup>45</sup> Sie ist in Wirklichkeit jedoch keine Ausnahme, denn bei der Auslegung der Proposition 118 zitiert Berthold aus der *Summa theologiae* I Albert des Großen unter ausdrücklicher Nennung seines Namens.<sup>46</sup> Die Auffassung von der Sonderstellung Dietrichs erweist sich unter der genannten Hinsicht als überzeichnet und dürfte aus unserer Sicht nicht nur mit Blick auf Albert, sondern auf alle von Berthold verarbeiteten Quellen relativiert werden.

Sturlese stimmt mit Eckert hinsichtlich der Intellekttheorie des Dietrichs insofern überein, als er für Dietrich (wie Eckert für Berthold) die Vermittlung der augustinischen Auffassung des *abditum mentis* mit der aristotelischen *intellectus agens*-Lehre bescheinigt. Die Betonung, Dietrich habe „immer darauf verzichtet, in seiner Intellekttheorie die Übereinstimmung zwischen Augustin (*abditum mentis*) und den Aristotelikern (*intellectus agens*) auf die Platoniker auszudehnen“, wirft die Frage nach dem Grund dieses Verzichtes, die Dietrich nicht beantwortet. Sturlese lässt durchblicken, dass der Freiburger an der konstitutiven Funktion des Intellekts gemäß der Proposition 174 („*Omnis intellectus in intelligendo instituit que post ipsum, et factio in intelligere et intelligentia in facere*“) des Proclus konsequent festhält, die er kosmologisch und nicht vermögenspsychologisch auf jeden individuellen Menschen bezogen interpretiert.<sup>47</sup> Berthold geht indes weiter als Dietrich,

14. L. Sturlese, „Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P., scienziato e filosofo“, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32(1985), S.257–259.

44 Pagnoni-Sturlese, „À propos du néoplatonisme d'Albert le Grand“, S.635–654.

45 Cf. Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.146–147 (repr. S.139).

46 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 108–135*, hg.v. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011), 118A, S.76, L.38–55.

47 Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.148–149 (repr. S.142). Dietrich unternimmt offenbar keinen Versuch, die systemische Inkompatibilität kosmologischer und vermögenspsychologischer Interpretationen des Intellekts vor dem Hintergrund ihrer aristotelischen und platonischen Quellen zu überwinden, wie Sturlese nahelegt, und vertritt somit eine nicht reduktionistische Auffassung von Differenz und Einheit der beiden Interpretationen. Einig sind sich indes Dietrich und Berthold in der Auffassung der Konvenienz der Konzepte des *abditum mentis* und des

unterstreicht Sturlese, indem er die peripatetische *intellectus adeptus*-Lehre in die Erkenntnistheorie des Proclus integriert. Er unterscheidet außer einer zweifachen Sinneserkenntnis gemäß der äußeren und inneren Wahrnehmung und einer diskursiven sowie einer intuitiven Erkenntnis eine höhere, fünfte Stufe der menschlichen Erkenntnis, die er als die *cognitio providentiae* oder *cognitio unialis* bezeichnet. Ihren vermögenspsychologischen Grund sieht er im tätigen Intellekt (*intellectus agens*), sofern er zur Form des universalen Sinngehaltes des Verstandes (des *intellectus possibilis* gemäß der peripatetischen Begrifflichkeit) und folglich zum erworbenen Intellekt (*intellectus adeptus*) wird, der nach Proclus 'das Eine' (*unum*) unseres intellektiven Seelenteils genannt wird. Diese 'uniale Erkenntnis', der die Vereinigung des *intellectus agens* als Form mit dem *intellectus possibilis* gleichsam als die Materie zugrunde liegt, ist nach Berthold 'die göttlichste Art der Gotteserkenntnis, die qua Unwissenheit gemäß der Erkenntnis über dem Verstand gewonnen wird'.<sup>48</sup>

Dreierlei Schlüsse können aus diesen Aussagen gezogen werden: Erstens, Berthold begreift die Vereinigung des *intellectus agens* mit dem *intellectus possibilis* ähnlich wie Albert der Große ontologisch als ein Eines (*unum*). Albert interpretiert dieses Eine als ein Kompositum aus dem *intellectus agens* und dem *intellectus possibilis* analog einer Zusammensetzung aus Form und Materie. Zweitens, Albert und Berthold bezeichnen dieses *compositum* bzw. *unum* mit den Peripatetikern als den *intellectus adeptus* und verstehen darunter die vom Menschen erworbene intellektuelle Vollendung, welche Berthold als die göttlichste Erkenntnis über dem Intellekt, Albert als die Gottähnlichkeit und die Vollendung der menschlichen Natur in diesem Leben interpretieren. Drittens, Berthold identifiziert den *intellectus adeptus* mit dem Proklischen *unum animae*, genauer mit dem *unum ipsius partis nostrae intellectualis*, einem

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*intellectus agens*, die systemisch verschieden sind, sowie in der Zurückweisung der im Wesentlichen durch die islamisch-arabischen Philosophen vertretenen, kosmologischen Interpretation des getrennten *intellectus agens*. Auf diesen Konsens, auf den es im hier erörterten Zusammenhang ankommt, verweisen E. Krebs, W. Eckert und A. Colli, die eine Identifikation des *intellectus agens* mit dem 'Versteck' der Seele (Krebs) oder *abditum mentis* (Colli) für Dietrich und für Berthold (Eckert) bescheinigen; cf. oben Anm. 19. H. Anzulewicz, „De intellectu et intelligibili des Albertus Magnus: Eine Relektüre der Schrift im Licht ihrer peripatetischen Quellen“, in *Przegląd Tomistyczny* 25(2019), S.78.

48 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 121L, S.110, L.172–201; 123D, S.127, L.91–S.129, l.155, esp. p. 129, L.148–155; cf. Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli, Propositiones 184–211*, hg.v. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014), 197F–G, S.135, L.104–S.138, L.186. E. Massa, „La deificazione nel Commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg a Proclo, *Elementatio theologica*, 129. Edizione del testo e primi analisi“, in R. Lievens, E. Van Mingroot, W. Verbeke (Hgg.), *Pascua Mediaevalia: Studies voor Prof. Dr. J.M. De Smet* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983), S.559–562.

Konzept, das Albert zwar über Pseudo-Dionysius rezipiert, aber in seine peripatetische Intellektlehre dem exakten Begriff nach nicht integriert. Seine im Kommentarwerk *De anima*, lib. 3, tr. 3, c. 11, dargelegte Auffassung des *intellectus adeptus* nimmt Bertholds Theorie des *unum animae* vorweg und bildet ihre sachliche Vorlage.<sup>49</sup> Genetisch betrachtet indes, geht das von Berthold entfaltete Konzept auf das Opusculum des Proclus *De providentia* (cap. 8) zurück. Diese Frage haben Massa, Sturlese und de Libera sowie zuletzt E. King hinreichend beleuchtet.<sup>50</sup> Bertholds Kenntnis der Übernahme dieses Konzeptes durch Pseudo-Dionysius (*De divinis nominibus*, c. 7), die er in der Proposition 193E erläuterte, blieb offensichtlich nicht folgenlos für seine Proclus-Exegese und ihre Quellen.<sup>51</sup>

Albert der Große interpretiert in seinem Kommentar zu *De divinis nominibus* dieses epistemologische Konzept, welches mit den Termini *unitio* (gemäß der lateinischen Übersetzung des Johannes Sarracenus) bzw. *unitas* (nach der Übertragung des Johannes Scotus Eriugena) gekennzeichnet wird, als die aus allen Sinnen zu Einem gesammelte Kraft (*virtus*). Diese übersteigt die Natur des menschlichen Verstandes, vereint ihn in diesem Überstieg mit dem Göttlichen und macht den Menschen göttlich. Durch diese *unitio* soll der Mensch das Göttliche über seinem Verstand, der alles zurücklässt und sich selbst aufgibt, erkennen.<sup>52</sup> Die *uniale* Erkenntnis des Göttlichen

49 Siehe oben Anm. 34. Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.153–154 (repr. S.148–150); siehe auch die vorige Anm.

50 Massa, „La deificazione nel Commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg“, S.559–563, 570. Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.152–153 (repr. S.147). De Libera, *La Mystique rhénane*, S.331–332. E. King, „Berthold of Moosburg on Intellect and the One of the Soul“, in *Dionysius* 36(2018), S.184–199, hier bes. 184–186, 191–195, 198–199. Cf. Proclus, *De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis ad Theodorum Mechanicum*, hg.v. H. Boese, in *Procli Diadochi Tria Opuscula (De providentia, Libertate, Malo) Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeka vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta*, hg.v. H. Boese (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960), c. 8 (xxiv:31–32), S.139–140. W. Beierwaltes, „Der Begriff des ‘unum in nobis’ bei Proklos“, in P. Wilpert, W.P. Eckert (Hgg.), *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963), S.264–265.

51 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli*, 193E, S.103, L.121–S.104, L.134.

52 Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, c. 7. S.341, L.64–74: Autem, *idest sed*, virtutem istam dico unionem, prout scilicet in se colligitur in unum et a multis sensibus revocatur, excedentem naturam mentis nostrae, quae immixta est sensibilibus, per quam unionem coniungitur ad ea quae sunt supra ipsam. Igitur divina, quae sunt supra mentem, oportet intelligere secundum hanc unionem, non secundum nos, *idest non secundum proportionem et mensuram mentis nostrae*, sed oportet intelligere nos ipsos statutos extra nos ipsos, totos deificatos, *relinquentes ea quae sunt secundum nos, et immitentes nos divinis secundum modum ipsorum, quantum possibile est*. (Die nicht in Kursiv gesetzten Wörter entstammen der Kommentarvorlage Alberts).

bzw. die *unitio* mit dem Göttlichen gemäß der *littera Dionysii*, die Berthold als die Erkenntnis des Göttlichen *über* dem Verstand begreift, übernimmt Albert in seine aristotelisch-peripatetische Intellekttheorie nicht, sondern er belässt sie wie seine pseudo-dionysische Vorlage als den Gegenstand der mystischen Epistemologie, deren wissenschaftssystematischer Ort die mystischen Theologie ist.<sup>53</sup> Den fehlenden Zugriff auf die *Opuscula* des Proclus hat er durch das Werk des Pseudo-Dionysius sachlich weitestgehend rekompensiert. Eine Aufhebung der in erster Linie begrifflich und hinsichtlich der reflexiven Reichweite auffallenden Differenz zwischen der aristotelisch-peripatetischen und der Proklisch-pseudodionysischen, der philosophischen und der theologisch-mystischen Epistemologie hatte er, wie auch Berthold, nicht intendiert. Offensichtlich bestand für die beiden Denker insofern kein Widerspruch zwischen der *unialen* Auffassung der Erkenntnis und dem peripatetischen Verständnis der Intellektion qua *intellectus adeptus*, als die Erstere die Grundlage der Erkenntnis des Göttlichen *über* dem Verstand und der Vereinigung mit dem göttlichen Einen darstellte, die Letztere hingegen die diskursive Erkenntnis und die unter den Bedingungen der Kontingenz erworbene intellektive Vollendung des Menschen krönte. Mit seiner Interpretation des *unum animae* und der mystischen *unio* kommt Berthold der Auslegung derselben durch Albert nahe, wenn man die Letztere aus dem Blickwinkel des Kommentars zu *De mystica theologia* betrachtet. Da Ulrich von Straßburg Alberts Interpretation der mystischen Epistemologie des Pseudo-Dionysius qua *unitio* getreu wiedergibt und Meister Eckhart das 'Eine in uns' aus der Proklisch-pseudodionysischen Tradition als den 'einfaltig einen Grund der Seele' deutet, kann Sturlese schwerlich einer „Restauration der verlorenen und wiederaufgefundenen Wahrheit“ durch Berthold das Wort reden.<sup>54</sup> Tatsächlich nimmt Alberts Auffassung der intellektiven Vollendung des Menschen aufgrund der Überformung des *intellectus possibilis* durch den *intellectus agens*, die in der peripatetischer Tradition unter dem Namen des *intellectus adeptus* etabliert wurde, den für Meister Eckhart's und Berthold von Moosburg's zentralen Topos der Divinisierung des Menschen vorweg.<sup>55</sup>

Sturlese's Darstellung einer unmittelbaren Gottesschau, wie diese Berthold im Anschluss an seine Proklische Vorlage und an Pseudo-Dionysius

53 Cf. H. Anzulewicz, „*Scientia mystica sive theologia* – Alberts des Großen Begriff der Mystik“, in *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 63(2015), S.37–58.

54 Ulrich von Straßburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6*, hg.v. A. Beccarisi (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), lib. 2, tr. 5, c. 2, S.11, L.93–110; zu Meister Eckhart siehe Beierwaltes, „Der Begriff des 'unum in nobis' bei Proklos“, S.264–265. Cf. Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.152–153 (repr. S.147).

55 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, lib. 3, tr. 3, c. 11, S.222, L.4–5.

interpretiert, erscheint aus zwei Gründen als kritikwürdig. Zum einen gibt sie zwar allgemein einen Zusammenhang der *Expositio* des Berthold mit den Kommentaren Alberts des Großen zum *corpus Dionysiacum* zu, aber sie lässt deren Vorbildfunktion und Einfluss beinahe gänzlich außer Acht. Zum andern verneint sie apodiktisch, abgesehen von einer einzigen Ausnahme, die Präsenz jeglicher offenbarungstheologisch-christlichen Motive in der *Expositio*.<sup>56</sup> In Alberts Verständnis führt die analytische Methode der Wissenschaft über die Gottesnamen und dieselbe Methode der mystischen Theologie zu der Erkenntnis der Ursache, insofern diese ihren Effekt (*causatum*) auf univoke Weise hervorbringt bzw. aufgrund der Erhabenheit (*eminentia*) als Ursache unbekannt ist.<sup>57</sup> Sie liefert die Erkenntnis der Existenz Gottes (*quia*), aber keine begrifflich-definitivische Erkenntnis der Wesenheit Gottes (*quid* und *propter quia*).<sup>58</sup> Wird die unmittelbare Gottesschau als eine Gotteserkenntnis bezeichnet und in Verbindung mit der Intellektlehre reflektiert, wie dies insbesondere für Dietrich von Freiberg gilt, ist zu bedenken, dass diese 'Erkenntnis' nach Albert und Berthold (sowie auch nach Proclus) in strengem Sinne keine intellektive Tätigkeit mehr ist, sondern ihr Endziel, mit Bertholds Worten die *cognitio patriae*.<sup>59</sup> Albert beschreibt sie im Anschluss an Pseudo-Dionysius als die Verstandesnatur übersteigende Vereinigung mit Gott (*unitio excedens mentis naturam*), eine 'Erkenntnis, die ihren Ort über dem Verstand hat' (*cognitio, quae est supra intellectum*).<sup>60</sup> Berthold stimmt darin mit Albert unter Bezugnahme auf Pseudo-Dionysius vollkommen überein. Er instanziiert zwar die Mystik und die theologische Philosophie in ihrem Wechselbezug historisch,

56 Cf. Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.147 (repr. S.140): „Auch das Werk Alberts des Großen, das doch die Koordinaten zeichnete, zwischen denen sich ein großer Teil der deutschen Kultur bewegte, hatte keine vergleichbare Sprengkraft [wie die *visio beatifica* und die Intellektlehre Dietrichs, H.A.]“, ferner S.149–152, bes. S.152 (repr. S.143–146, bes. S.146): „Diese flüchtigen Redewendungen stellen allerdings den einzigen Hinweis zum Thema der »besonderen Gnade« dar, der in den über zweitausend Seiten des Kommentars aufzufinden ist. An keiner Stelle ist von Sakramenten, Kirche, Offenbarung, guten Werken und Glaube die Rede. Berthold leugnete nicht die Rolle der Gnade und die freie Intervention Gottes [...]“. In der dazugehörigen Fußnote 16 (repr. 30) sieht sich Sturlese in der Konfrontation mit dem gegenteiligen Tenor einiger Texte Bertholds zur Einschränkung oder vielmehr zur Rechtfertigung seiner Aussage gezwungen. Die angeblich im Werk nicht vorhandenen und dennoch durch Bertholds Texte ausgewiesenen Theologumena interpretiert er tendenziell gegen ihren für die theologische Philosophie eigentümlichen, zweifellos univoken Sinngehalt und damit gegen das Verständnis und die Intention des Autors.

57 Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, c. 1, S.3, L.1–15.

58 Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, c. 1, S.2, L.51–56.

59 Cf. Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202B, S.185, L.127–137.

60 Cf. oben Anm. 52 und 53.

wie Sturlese festhält, doch im Vordergrund steht letztendlich die Aufhebung der Historizität und die Andersheit der auf dem investigativen Weg erlangten Erkenntnis des Einen in seiner unmittelbaren Anschauung und in Vereinigung mit ihm. Er begreift sie wie Albert im Anschluss an Pseudo-Dionysius als „eine Erkenntnis durch Unwissenheit über dem Verstand, wenn er alles aufgibt und, sich selbst zurückgelassen, mit überstrahlender Herrlichkeit Gottes geeint, durch unergründliche Weisheit erleuchtet ist“<sup>61</sup> Als der Aufstiegsweg des menschlichen Verstandes vom Göttlichen durch Teilhabe durch Göttliches der Wesenheit nach zum Göttlichen gemäß der Ursache und zur Vergöttlichung des Menschen erhält die Theologie bzw. die theologische Philosophie des Proclus bei Albert durch die Vermittlung des Pseudo-Dionysius und bei Berthold in dessen Auslegung der Proklischen *Elementatio theologica* einen mystischen Charakterzug, der den heuristischen Horizont der aristotelischen Tradition transzendiert.<sup>62</sup>

Die Bestimmung der von Berthold aufgearbeiteten theologischen Philosophie des Proclus als eine philosophische Offenbarung und die Charakterisierung des Proclus als einen philosophischen Propheten bergen in sich gewisse Verständnisschwierigkeiten, die durch die bisherige Forschung offenbar nicht aufgelöst wurden. Wann und inwiefern ist ein philosophisches System als eine *philosophische* Offenbarung zu begreifen? Gründet die *theologische* Philosophie, die sich durch die *ratio* ausweist, in einer Offenbarung? Was macht einen philosophischen Propheten aus? Ist es nicht die besondere Gabe, theologisch gewendet Gnade Gottes, von denen Berthold in der Auslegung der Propositionen 129F und 202 spricht? Können die *Elementatio theologica* und die *Opuscula* des Proclus als eine Beschreibung eines philosophie-immanenten, systemisch im Neuplatonismus verankerten Lebensentwurfs als Hervorgang, Verwirklichung im Sinne einer existenziellen Vollendung und Rückkehr des Seienden zu jenem Einen, welches das Ursprungs- und Zielprinzip zugleich von allem ist, gelesen werden? Berthold las sie als die ‘Theorie des Einen’ und vermochte darin eine offenbarungstheologisch konforme, wesentlich auf die Intellekttheorie bis hin zu der „divinissima cognitio Dei, quae est per ignorantiam cognita secundum unionem super mentem“ gestützte theologische

61 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 123D, S.129, L.152–155: „Haec est ‘divinissima Dei cognitio, quae est per ignorantiam cognita secundum cognitionem super mentem, quando mens ab aliis omnibus recedens, postea et se ipsam dimittens unita est supersplendentibus radiis divinorum, inde et ibi non scrutabili profundo sapientiae illuminata“. Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, c. 7, S.359, L.42–56.75–78.

62 Cf. B. Mojsisch, „Dynamik der Vernunft bei Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart“, in K. Ruh (Hg.), *Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposion Kloster Engelbert 1984* (Stuttgart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1986), S.138–139.

Philosophie zu erkennen und sich zu ihr zu bekennen<sup>63</sup> – so viel kann man aus Sturleses tiefgründigen Ausführungen entnehmen. Die Antwort auf die vorausgeschickten Fragen bieten sie nicht. Sie findet sich bei Albert in seiner *Summa theologiae* I und, wie man ihr entnehmen kann, gibt sie der von Sturlese und Flasch vertretenen Auffassung, für die sie keine Begründung liefern, im Wesentlichen Recht:

dicendum, quod duo modi sunt revelationis. Unus modus est per lumen connaturale nobis. Et hoc modo revelatum est philosophis. Hoc enim lumen non potest esse nisi a primo lumine dei, ut dicit Augustinus in libro *De magistro*, et hoc optime probatum est in *Libro de causis*. Aliud lumen est ad supermundana contuenda, et hoc est elevatum super nos. Et hoc lumine revelata est haec scientia. Primum relucet in per se notis, secundum autem in fidei articulis.<sup>64</sup>

(man muss sagen, dass es zwei Arten der Offenbarung gibt. Die eine Art geschieht durch das uns natürliche Licht [des Verstandes]. Auf diese Weise ist es den Philosophen offenbart worden. Denn dieses Licht kann nur vom ersten Licht Gottes sein, wie Augustinus im Buch «Über den Lehrer» sagt; und den besten Beweis für dieses Licht bietet das «Buch von den Ursachen». Ein anderes Licht gibt es zur Betrachtung des Göttlichen; und dieses ist emporgehoben über uns. Durch dieses Licht ist diese Wissenschaft [Theologie] geoffenbart. Das erste [Licht] widerscheint in den Dingen, die durch sich selbst bekannt sind, das zweite indes in den Glaubensartikeln.)

Albert klärt auf, wie die im erörterten Zusammenhang verwendeten, aber in ihrer eigentlichen Bedeutung nicht erläuterten und daher missverständlichen Begriffe der „philosophischen Offenbarung“, des „philosophischen Propheten“ und der „Proklischen Theologie“ bzw. „Mystik“ aus seiner Sicht zu verstehen sind. Seine Unterscheidung und ihre Erklärung helfen dem Bertholdschen Verständnis der *divinissima philosophia* auf die Spur zu kommen. Die von Sturlese erwogene Möglichkeit, den mit diesem Begriff verknüpften

63 Cf. Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.154 (repr. S.149).

64 Albertus Magnus, *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia dei*, hg.v. D. Siedler, W. Kübel, H.-J. Vogels (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), lib. 1, tr. 1, q. 4, S.15, L.41–50. Cf. Anzulewicz, „Albertus Magnus über die *philosophi theologizantes*“, S.82. H. Jorissen, H. Anzulewicz, „Lumen naturale“, in W. Kasper et al. (Hgg.), *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, vol. VI (Freiburg / Basel / Roma / Wien: Herder, 1997), col. 1120–21.

Topos des *homo divinus* mit dem Begriff der Mystik zu kennzeichnen, löst das Problem genauso wenig wie ein willkürlicher, mit einem Verweis auf die Übereinstimmung mit Bertholds Wortwahl legitimierter Rückgriff auf einen Philosophiebegriff, der von der 'Schulphilosophie' unterschieden und dennoch „als »Philosophie«, wohl eine »divinissima philosophia«, zu bezeichnen wäre.<sup>65</sup>

### 3 Berthold von Moosburgs Theorie des Intellekts

#### 3.1 *Einleitende Vorbemerkungen*

Bausteine zu seiner Theorie des Intellekts hat Berthold an vielen Stellen in seiner *Expositio* zusammengetragen. Den eigentlichen intellekttheoretischen Teil seines Kommentarwerkes hat er, wie eingangs dargelegt und wie er selbst vermerkt, auf die Auslegung der Propositionen 160–183 konzentriert.<sup>66</sup> Im Folgenden sollen die Typologien des Intellekts, die sich aus seiner Kommentierung der Propositionen 160, 163, 167, 174 und 181 erheben lassen, vorgestellt und hinsichtlich ihrer Einbettung in die intellektuelle Tradition Alberts des Großen untersucht werden. Es sei angemerkt, dass die sekundären Quellen zu Bertholds Intellekttheorie, von denen die Untersuchungen von M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, A. de Libera, I.J. Tautz und B. Mojsisch zu nennen sind,<sup>67</sup> dieses Vorhaben nur marginal unterstützen, da sie sowohl den Grundbegriffen als auch der Systematisierung von Bertholds Intellektlehre nicht nachgehen. Die Studie von Tautz, die einem Superkommentar (d.h. einem Kommentar zum Kommentar) zu den Propositionen 168–183 gleichkommt, teilt mit dieser Untersuchung zwar partiell ihre Textgrundlage, aber sie weist eine relativ geringe inhaltliche Überschneidung mit der Zielsetzung dieses Beitrags auf. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese verdeutlicht an einem Fallbeispiel, dass der Einfluss Alberts des Großen auf Bertholds Auffassung des allgemein wirkenden Intellekts durch Ulrich von Straßburg vermittelt wird. Die von de Libera und Mojsisch gebotenen Darstellungen der Intellekttheorie Bertholds sind sehr allgemein und auf wenige zentrale Aussagen beschränkt, da sie aber gelegentlich auf Bertholds Verhältnis zu Albert reflektieren, sind sie unter dieser Rücksicht für den Ansatz dieser Untersuchung bedeutsam. Ähnliches gilt für eine neuere

65 Sturlese, „*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.155 (repr. S.150).

66 Cf. Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 111B, S.20, L.50.

67 Siehe oben Anm. 14–16.



Studie von R. Imbach, in welcher ihr Verfasser die Bedeutung von Bertholds Werk für die mittelalterliche Metaphysik herausarbeitet.<sup>68</sup>

### 3.2 *Rekonstruktion*

Mit der Auslegung der 160. Proposition, der ersten des intellekttheoretischen Teils seiner *Expositio*, beginnt Berthold eine durch die Proklische Vorlage vorgegebene, axiologisch aufgefasste und innerhalb der Kommentierung dieser Proposition entfaltete Typologie und Charakterisierung der «göttlichen Intellekte». Da sein Kommentar naturgemäß an die Abfolge und die Inhalte der einzelnen Propositionen gebunden ist, bleibt der eigentliche Kern seiner Erörterungen jeweils auf die Binnenstruktur der einzelnen Propositionen beschränkt. Diese wird zwar durch die Querverweise auf die thematisch einander ergänzende Propositionen und ihre Auslegung aufgebrochen, aber die Intellekttheorie Bertholds als Ganzes gewinnt dadurch keine organische Einheit und doktrinelles Geschlossenheit eines Lehrstücks. Ein solches wird offensichtlich nicht intendiert, wie sich auch beim Hinsehen auf die unterschiedlichen Typologien der Intellekte und ihre Quellen abzeichnet. Der Befund lässt jedoch keine Beliebigkeit in dieser Hinsicht erkennen, sondern vielmehr ein konsequentes Festhalten an dem Proklischen Einen als dem Konstitutionsprinzip der Differenz und Einheit, die im Ausgang von diesem und in der Rückwendung auf dieses Eine gedeutet und gleichsam als eine systemische *totalitas* begriffen werden.<sup>69</sup> Diesem Ziel sind die internen Querverweise auf die Inhalte des Gesamtwerkes untergeordnet, die es innerhalb der Kommentare zu den einzelnen Propositionen gibt, die Bertholds Ausführungen kartieren und ihre inhaltliche Verwobenheit bewirken, eine Einheit, die nicht selten auch durch inhaltliche Wiederholungen und Redundanzen erkauft wird.

i. Die 160. Proposition des Proclus definiert jeden «göttlichen Intellekt» als gleichförmig, vollkommen und als den «Erst-Intellekt», der aus sich andere Intellekte hervorbringt.<sup>70</sup> Die Definition gibt die Pluralität und Einförmigkeit göttlicher Intellekte an und grenzt sie von *einem* «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt» ab. In seinem Kommentar erläutert Berthold ausführlich die Einzigkeit des

68 R. Imbach, „Au-delà de la métaphysique: Notule sur l'importance du *Commentaire* de Berthold de Moosburg OP sur les *Éléments de théologie*“, in Calma (Hg.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes, Volume 1*, S.376–393.

69 Cf. Massa, „La deificazione nel Commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg a Proclo, *Elementatio theologica*, 129“, S.546.

70 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, 160, S.78, L.1–2: *Omnis divinus intellectus uniformis est et perfectus et prime intellectus, a se ipso alios intellectus producens*. Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 160, S.3, L.2–4. Zum Begriff des Erst-Intellekts cf. Iremadze, „Der intellekttheoretische Ansatz der Selbstreflexivität des Denkens“, S.241.

«göttlichen Erst-Intellekts» und die Unterordnung der auf ihn folgenden, der Gattung oder der Art nach bestimmten Intellekte, mit anderen Worten, die Subordination aller sekundär «göttlichen Intellekte» unter den «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt».

Beim «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt» setzt Berthold seine erste Typologisierung der Intellekte an, mit welcher er eine dreistufige Hierarchie des «göttlichen Intellekts» annimmt. Die oberste Stufe dieser Ordnungsstruktur weist er dem «göttlichen Intellekt» zu, dem er wie Proclus eine universale Ursächlichkeit in Bezug auf alles Seiende beimisst. Von diesem «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt» unterscheidet er zwei Arten: erstens, einen «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt», der sich zu aller Intellektualität und zu allen Intellekten als einziger in der Weise des Ursprungs verhält und seiner Wesenheit und Ursächlichkeit nach göttlich ist; zweitens, einen vom Ersteren verschiedenen «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt», der nur zu einer gattungsmäßig oder spezifisch bestimmten Reihe des Seienden im Ursprungsverhältnis steht.<sup>71</sup> Indem er den ersten «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt» mit Gott ausdrücklich identifiziert, seine Singularität und vollkommene Einheit hervorhebt, deutet er diesen zentralen Begriff der theologischen Philosophie seiner paganen Vorlage offenbarungstheologisch, genauer im Sinne der theologischen Philosophie der biblisch-christlichen Prägung um.<sup>72</sup> In der Charakterisierung des «göttlichen Erst-Intellekts» als die Erstursache allen Seins und in seiner Gleichsetzung mit Gott ist eine Nähe zu Ulrich von Straßburgs Auffassung des Intellekts als Gottesname und zur Darstellung seiner Eigenschaften erkennbar, die Berthold aus der Schrift *De summo bono*

71 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 160A, S.3, L.14–20: *triplex est divinus intellectus; ex quo enim omne, quod qualitercumque subsistit, aut secundum causam principaliformiter aut secundum existentiam aut secundum participationem subsistit per 65* [cf. Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 35–65*, hg.v. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001), 65, S.201, L.1–4: *Omne, quod qualitercumque subsistit, aut secundum causam principaliformiter aut secundum essentiam aut secundum participationem exemplariter*. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, 65, S.35, L.1–3: „*Omne quod qualitercumque subsistit aut secundum causam est principaliformiter aut secundum existentiam aut secundum participationem exemplariter*“]. *Ideo divinus intellectus potest accipi et pro eo, qui est prime ad totam seyræ intellectualitatis, qui etiam est singularis, cum sit monarcha omnium intellectuum principaliformiter subsistens in intellectualitate, licet sit divinus secundum essentiam*; 160L, S.9, L.187–190: *Ex iam dicitis apparet, quod divinum intellectum esse prime intellectum accipitur dupliciter, quia vel principaliformiter respectu totius seyræ intellectualitatis, et sic est divinus secundum essentiam et intellectus principaliformiter, scilicet secundum causam, et talis est unus tantum, vel respectu alicuius generis vel speciei determinatae intra totalitatem intellectualis seyræ conclusorum, et talis intellectus prime existens est intra ordinem intellectualium hypostasum*.

72 Cf. Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 160A, S.4, L.32: *qui est deus per essentiam et intellectus prime*.

des Albert-Schülers, einer seinen Quellen der *Expositio*, vertraut war. Ulrichs Position hingegen spiegelt auch in diesem Punkt die Lehre seines Meisters Alberts des Großen und ihre Quellen wider.<sup>73</sup>

Den «göttlichen Intellekt», dem die Intellektualität an sich eignet und der eine an der Göttlichkeit teilhabende und multiplizierbare Natur ist, ordnet Berthold der zweiten Hierarchiestufe zu. Mit Verweis auf seine parallele Unterscheidung der Intellektualität, die er bei der Auslegung der Proposition 111 vornahm, schränkt er ein, dass nicht jeder «göttliche Intellekt» dieser Ordnung wesentlich göttlich ist, obwohl er grundsätzlich zuerst und durch sich selbst seinem Wesen nach Intellekt schlechthin und göttlich gemäß der Teilhabe ist. Diesem Intellekt gilt seine Interpretation der 160. Proposition der Proklischen *Elementatio*.<sup>74</sup>

Der drittletzten Stufe in der Hierarchieskala des «göttlichen Intellekts» rechnet er einen «göttlichen Intellekt» zu, der seine «göttliche» Eigenschaft durch Teilhabe an der göttlichen Einheit erlange. Er habe keine eigenständige Subsistenz einer intellektiven Hypostase und bedürfe wie der höhere Teil der Seele einer Seinsgrundlage, deren Teil er sei. In der Rangordnung der

73 Cf. Ulrich von Straßburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 2, tr. 5, S.3–8. Das Werk Ulrichs, der zu den „begeistertsten und treuesten Schülern Alberts“ (Grabmann) zählte, gehört zu den von Berthold verzeichneten Quellen seiner *Expositio*. Außer dieser Nennung wird er, anders als im Fall von Dietrich von Freiberg und Albert dem Großen, im Werk namentlich nicht zitiert, und daher bleibt sein Anteil an der Lehre Bertholds unauffällig und in der kritischen Edition relativ selten nachgewiesen. Auf seinen Einfluss auf Berthold weisen hin: M. Grabmann, „Studien über Ulrich von Straßburg“, in M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* [vol. I] (München: Hueber, 1926), S.218; M. Grabmann, „Der Einfluss Alberts des Großen auf das mittelalterliche Geistesleben“, in M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, vol. II (München: Hueber, 1936), S.366; Imbach, „Chronique de Philosophie“, S.434–435 (repr. S.143–144). Pagnoni-Sturlese, „A propos du néoplatonisme d'Albert le Grand“, *passim*; L. Sturlese, „Proclo ed Ermete in Germania da Alberto Magno a Bertoldo di Moosburg“, in K. Flasch (Hg.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), S.28; A. Beccarisi, „Einleitung“, in Ulrich von Straßburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6*, hg.v. A. Beccarisi (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), S.VIII, XIX, XX; E. King, „Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procl'*“, S.401–403, 405, 407, 410.

74 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 160A, S.3, L.21–25: *Secundo accipitur divinus intellectus pro eo, qui est intellectus secundum existentiam, scilicet primo et per se habens intellectualitatem, sed participat divinitate, et talis est plurificabilis, licet non omnis intellectus per essentiam sit divinus: Omnis enim intellectualis seyrae hi quidem divini sunt intellectus deorum suscipientes posthabitationem, hi autem intellectus solum per m* [hg.v. Retucci, S.19, L.2–9. 27–29; hg.v. Boese, S.56, L.1–7]; S.4, L.34–36: *Secundus est intellectus primo et per se per essentiam absolute et divinus secundum participationem, omnis scilicet intellectus, qui est intra ordinem intellectualium hypostasum. Et de talibus intelligo elementum.*

«göttlichen Intellekte» folgt er auf die «göttlichen Seelen».<sup>75</sup> Diesen «göttlichen Intellekt» der drittletzten Hierarchiestufe und den erst-göttlichen Intellekt lässt Berthold bei seiner Analyse der Definition dieses Theorems aus.

Gemäß dieser ersten, sich aus dem Kommentar zu der Proposition 160 erschließenden Typologie des «göttlichen Intellekts» wird dieser durch Berthold dreifach hierarchisch unterschieden und wie folgt näher bestimmt:

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intellectus divinus	
1.	secundum causam principaliformiter
	– prime ad totam seyram intellectualitatis
	– singularis
	– deus per essentiam
2.	secundum existentiam
	– primo et per se habens intellectualitatem
	– participat divinitate
	– plurificabilis
	– omnis intellectus intra ordinem intellectualium hypostasum
3.	secundum participationem divinae unitatis
	– non habens fixationem subsistentiae suae se ipso
	– innitur quodammodo sicut suprema »portio residuae substantiae animae«, cuius est pars

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Was lässt sich in Bezug auf Bertholds Typologie und Interpretation des «göttlichen Intellekts», ihre Einordnung in die theologisch-philosophische Tradition und deren Verhältnis zu Albert genau ermitteln?

Es ist zunächst festzuhalten, dass der quellenkritisch auf den ersten Blick gut erschlossene Text des Kommentars in der kritischen Edition keinen Hinweis für die Existenz einer anderen Quelle der Typologie des «göttlichen Intellekts» als diese und andere Propositionen der *Elementatio theologica* des Proclus und Bertholds eigene Invention bei deren Auslegung gibt. Eine genetische Erschließung der Typologie leistet Berthold insofern selbst, als er bei ihrer Erläuterung auf seine identische Aufteilung und Interpretation des «göttlichen Intellekts» verweist, die er zuvor im Kommentar zur Proposition 134

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75 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 160A, S.3, L.26–30: *Tertio accipitur intellectus divinus pro eo, qui est «intellectus per essentiam», licet non primo modo, qualis est divinarum animarum sive totalium sive partialium, qui etiam est divinus participatione divinae unitatis. Omnis enim intellectus divinus est huiusmodi secundum participationem divinae unitatis per tertiam partem 129 [Omnis autem intellectus divinus secundum participationem divinae unitatis: hg.v. Retucci, S.173, L.4–5; hg.v. Boese, S.65, L.2–3].*

vornahm, welche die Erkenntnis- und Providenzweise des «göttlichen Intellekts» definiert.<sup>76</sup> Von dort verweist er auf die Proposition 65 der *Elementatio theologica* des Proclus zurück, die den eigentlichen Ursprung seiner Typologie des «göttlichen Intellekts» bildet. Sie gibt die im Kommentar zu der 160. Proposition angenommene Dreiteilung des «göttlichen Intellekts» wortwörtlich mit dem einen Unterschied wieder, dass sie formal dieselbe Unterscheidung auf die Seinsweise von allem, was auch immer existiert (*omne quod qualitercumque existit*), bezieht. Die eingehende und aus der Gesamtperspektive des Werkes betrachtete sich wiederholende Erläuterung der Seinsmodi der einzelnen Intellekte ist offenbar Bertholds eigene Leistung. Auf der Kommentierungsebene indes bot sich ein Raum für die Einbeziehung von Quellen und Inspirationen unterschiedlicher Traditionen und Herkunft. Diese narrativen Seiten seiner *Expositio* bergen in sich zumeist stillschweigende Auskünfte zu den Fragen, inwiefern er sich die intellektuelle Tradition des Albertus aneignete und schöpferisch fortführte.

Bertholds distinkter Begriff des «göttlichen Intellekts» und seine dreifache Unterscheidung rühren zwar unmittelbar aus der Proklischen Vorlage her, aber sie sind weder in Proclus' Schrift noch in der neuplatonischen Tradition exklusiv verankert. Wenn Berthold in seiner Interpretation dieses Begriffs der genuin neuplatonischen Tradition folgt, was durch die expliziten Rückverweise aus dem Kommentar zur 160. Proposition auf eine Reihe der Proklischen Propositionen und ihre Auslegung belegt ist,<sup>77</sup> schließt diese Tatsache nicht einen erweiterten Traditionsbezug des Kommentars aus, wie schon K. Flasch gesehen hat und wie es sich auch in diesem Fall zeigt. Dieser explizite und indirekte, in der Edition quellenkritisch nachgewiesene, erweiterte Traditionsbezug erstreckt sich im Kommentar zur Proposition 160 von Aristoteles über Ps.-Dionysius, Albertus Magnus und Dietrich von Freiberg bis hin zu den arabisch-islamischen Philosophen Avicenna und Averroes.

Will man nun Bertholds Verhältnis speziell zu Albert mit Bezug auf dessen Auffassung des «göttlichen Intellekts» charakterisieren, ist zu berücksichtigen, dass Albert sich dieses Begriffs bereits im Frühwerk bediente. Eine Strukturanalyse und Erklärung der drei unterschiedenen Intellekte hat er im *Metaphysikkommentar* unternommen. Im Unterschied zu Berthold gründete sein Begriffsverständnis vornehmlich im *corpus Dionysiacum* und im *Liber*

76 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 134B, S.214, L.21–S.215, L.45.

77 Berthold rekurriert bei der Auslegung der Proposition 160 explizit auf folgende Propositionen bzw. Kommentare des Proclus zu den Propositionen der *Elementatio* (in der Reihenfolge der Verweise): 134, 65(bis), 111, 129, 110, 122, 119, 52(bis), 26, 153, 34, 64, 114, 8, 22, 75, 11, 99(bis), 131, 134, 125, 28; bei der Auslegung des Proklischen Kommentars zur Proposition 160 nimmt Berthold Bezug auf die Propositionen 18 und 97.

*de causis*; die *Elementatio theologica* stand ihm vorerst nicht zur Verfügung. Das Bekanntwerden und die Aneignung der aristotelischen Intellektlehre einschließlich ihrer spätantiken griechischen und arabisch-islamischen Auslegung und Fortführung erweiterten sein Begriffsverständnis. Der genuin neuplatonische Begriff wurde folglich zum Bestandteil von Alberts Intellektspekulation, die unterschiedliche Traditionen amalgamierte. Diese Entwicklung nahm ihren Lauf im theologischen Frühwerk *De resurrectione* und *De quattuor coaequaevis*<sup>78</sup> und setzte sich in den Aristoteles-Kommentaren zu *De caelo et mundo*, zur *Physik* bei der Diskussion der Unendlichkeit, zu *De anima* bei der Erörterung der Natur der intellektiven Seele, zur *Nikomachischen Ethik* und *Metaphysik*, wo sich gewisse Anklänge an das Proklische Verständnis finden, fort.<sup>79</sup> In Alberts neuplatonisch inspirierten Werken *De natura et origine animae* und *De intellectu et intelligibili*, in *De causis et processu universitatis*

78 Albertus Magnus, *De resurrectione*, hg.v. W. Kübel (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1958), tr. 4 q. 2, a. 5, S.344, L.76–82; Albertus Magnus, *De quattuor coaequaevis* (*Summa de creaturis* pars I), hg.v. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1895), tr. 2, q. 3, a. 2, S.345b: *ideae sunt in intellectu divino*. Albertus Magnus, *De quattuor coaequaevis*, tr. 4, q. 34, a. 1, S.522a–b: *Dicit Dionysius in libro de Coelesti hierarchia, quod 'Archangeli Angelis communicant illuminationes, et Angeli nobis, secundum uniuscujusque illuminatorum analogiam'. Et ita videtur, quod dant nobis illuminationes, et ita faciunt in nobis intellectum divinum*. Albertus Magnus, *De quattuor coaequaevis*, tr. 4, q. 34, a. 2, S.524a: *Secundo quaeritur, Per quem modum faciunt in nobis Angeli intellectum divinum?* Albertus Magnus, *De quattuor coaequaevis*, tr. 4, q. 36, a. 2, part. 2, S.541b: *Et hoc patet iterum ex hoc quod intelligentia angelica non est nisi in triplici consideratione. Cum enim in ipsa sit medium inter intellectum divinum et humanum, potest accipi in se [...]*. Albertus Magnus, *De quattuor coaequaevis*, tr. 4 q. 53, S.593b: *Et quidem omnino in participatione sapientiae et scientiae esse commune est omnibus deiformibus intellectibus. Attente autem et primo aut secundo aut infra nequaquam commune, sed sicut unicuique ante propria diffinitur analogia. Haec autem et de omnibus divinis mentibus non fortassis quis errans diffiniet*. Albertus Magnus, *De quattuor coaequaevis*, tr. 4, q. 60, a. 2, S.635a: *Praeterea cum dicat Dionysius, quod intellectus divini per tria dividuntur, scilicet essentiam, virtutem, et operationem [...]*. Albertus Magnus, *De quattuor coaequaevis*, tr. 4, q. 60, a. 2, S.637b: *Dionysius secundum denominationem dividit intellectus divinos in tria: quia a tribus denominantur. Dicuntur enim coelestes essentiae, et coelestes virtutes, et coelestes nuntii sive Angeli*. Albertus Magnus, *De quattuor coaequaevis*, tr. 4, q. 67, a. 5, S.689b: *quilibet intellectus illustratur ex hoc quod conjungitur superiori. Intellectus enim hominis accipit illustrationem ab intellectu Angeli, et intellectus Angeli ab illuminatione intellectus divini*.

79 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Super Ethica. Commentum et quaestiones*, hg.v. W. Kübel (Münster i.W. 1987), lib. 10, lect. 3, S.719, L.23: *intellectualitas divina*. Albertus Magnus, *Super Ethica*, lib. 10, lect. 11, S.752, L.74–75: *quaestio de intellectu divino*. Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, lib. 1, tr. 2, c. 4, S.22 L.2–5. Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, hg.v. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1964), lib. 6, tr. 2, c. 6, S.311, L.70–71.86–87, S.312, L.20–21.25–26.44.53. Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, lib. 7, tr. 1, c. 4, S.320, L.38. Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, L.11, tr. 2, c. 32, S.524, L.14.

*a prima causa* sowie in den theologischen Schriften, darunter *De homine*, die Bibelkommentare, *Quaestio de prophetia*, der Sentenzenkommentar und *Summa theologiae*, ist der Begriff stets präsent. Albert verband ihn auch mit dem *Timaeus* des Platon, obwohl die Bestimmung „göttlich“ (*divinus*) dort fehlt.<sup>80</sup>

Berthold hat sich bei der Kommentierung der Proklischen Propositionen im intellekttheoretischen Teil seines Werkes mehrerer Schriften Alberts als Quelle bedient. Einen ersten Eindruck über seine Anleihen vermitteln die entsprechenden Nachweise im Quellenapparat der kritischen Edition der *Expositio*. Die Reihe der herangezogenen Werke Alberts ist vermutlich länger als die oben erwähnten Werktitel und der Umfang der verarbeiteten, vielfach durch Ulrich von Straßburg vermittelten Texte größer als er in der kritischen Edition ausgewiesen werden konnte.<sup>81</sup> Bezüglich der Typologie des «göttlichen Intellekts» und ihrer Erläuterung finden sich in Alberts Kommentierung der ps.-dionysischen Schrift *De caelesti hierarchia*, im Metaphysikkommentar und in der *Summa theologiae* Interpretationen, die mit denen Bertholds punktuell oder weitgehend, wenn nicht gänzlich übereinstimmen. Sie betreffen sowohl die Dreiteilung des Intellekts und seine Instanzierung<sup>82</sup> als auch die universale Kausalität des göttlichen, aus sich selbst die Allheit hervorbringenden Intellekts.<sup>83</sup> Als besonders auffällig ist eine große Ähnlichkeit zwischen Bertholds Auslegung der Dreiteilung des «göttlichen Intellekts» mit Alberts diesbezüglicher Auffassung hervorzuheben, die in seinem Metaphysikkommentar (Buch II, Kap. 2) vorliegt. Einen zwingenden Beweis, dass Berthold bei der Entfaltung seiner Lehrmeinung vom «göttlichen Intellekt» sich durch Werke Alberts leiten ließ oder sich ihrer als einer vermittelnden Quelle der Lehren

80 Albertus Magnus, *De quattuor coaequaevis*, tr. 4, q. 72, a. 1, S.735a: *generatio mundi sensibilis prima mixta erat, ex coetu quoque constitit necessitatis et intelligentiae, hoc est, materiae et idearum, quae fuerunt in intelligentia prima: et constitit postea formata dominante intellectu divino super materiam, et trahente ipsam materiam rigidam, hoc est, nulli formae inclinatum, ad optimos actus uniuscujusque formae substantialis*. Cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, transl. Calcidius, hg.v. J.H. Waszink (London / Leiden: Warburg Institute and Brill, 1962), 48E, S.45, L.11–13: *mixta siquidem mundi sensilis ex necessitatis intelligentiaeque coetu consistit generatio dominante intellectu et salubri persuasione rigorem necessitatis assidue trahente ad optimos actus*.

81 Cf. Pagnoni-Sturlese, „À propos du néoplatonisme d'Albert le Grand“, S.637ff.

82 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De quattuor coaequaevis* (*Summa de creaturis* 1), tr. 4, q. 60, a. 2, S.635a, S.637b; Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De caelesti hierarchia*, hg.v. P. Simon, W. Kübel (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), c. 11, S.174, L.38ff., L.82ff.; *Metaphysica*, lib. 2, c. 2, S.93, L.62ff.: *Triplex est autem Intellectus [...]*.

83 Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, lib. 1, tr. 2, c. 4, S.22, L.2–4; *Summa theologiae*, lib. 1, tr. 3, q. 13, c. 1, S.39, L.79–80.

des Ps.-Dionysius und des Aristoteles, des Avicenna und des Averroes bedient hat, liefert diese Auffälligkeit zwar nicht. Die hier angedeuteten und die im Quellenapparat der *Expositio* nachgewiesenen doktrinen und strukturellen Übereinstimmungen zwischen den beiden Autoren sowie die gemeinsamen Quellen legen dennoch eine tiefgreifende hermeneutische Koinzidenz nahe, welche in der neuplatonischen, onto-theologischen Reflexionsstruktur besteht. Sie ist für die beiden Autoren wie auch für Ulrich von Straßburg, Dietrich von Freiberg, Meister Eckhart, bis zu Heimericus de Campo der Schlüssel und das Ordnungsprinzip von Denken, Verstehen und Erklären der Seinswirklichkeit ausgehend vom „Erst-göttlichen Intellekt“ als ihrem transzendenten Grund.<sup>84</sup> Diese onto-theologische Struktur, die auf Proclus und Pseudo-Dionysius als ihr Vermittler an das Christentum und zugleich Garant ihrer Vereinbarkeit mit der Orthodoxie zurückgeht, öffnet Berthold wie Albert den Zugriff auf philosophische Traditionen, um mit deren heuristischem Instrumentarium die Wirklichkeit im Ganzen, soweit dies nur dem menschlichen Verstand möglich, zu erschließen.

ii. Weiterführende Einsichten in Bezug auf Bertholds doktrinelle Gemeinsamkeiten mit Albert und seine unmittelbaren Einflüsse auf die *Expositio* liefert der Kommentar zur Proposition 163. Das Proklische Theorem „Jede Viellheit von Einheiten, an welcher der Intellekt teilhat, der keine Teilhabe zulässt, ist eine intellektuale [Viellheit]“<sup>85</sup> veranlasst Berthold in einem ersten Schritt die Eigenschaften des Intellekts zu bestimmen, der keine Teilhabe zulässt. Im nächsten Schritt erläutert er zwei Typen einer intellektualen Teilhabe, eine tätige (*participatio activa*) und eine erleidende (*participatio passiva*), und geht in einem dritten Schritt der Aussageabsicht des Proklischen Theorems nach. Er unterscheidet und instanziiert das, was nicht-teilhaftig ist, bestimmt die Arten der Teilhabe, ihre Modi und ihren Gegenstand.<sup>86</sup> Es genügt unter dem Blickwinkel der Intellektlehre an dieser Stelle festzuhalten, dass Berthold in diesem Kontext das Erst-Eine und das Erst-Gute (*prime unum et bonum*) ausdrücklich als schlechthin nicht-teilhaftig (*simpliciter imparticipabile*) bestimmt. Hierzu zählt offenbar auch der Erst-Intellekt, sofern er als Erst- und Ursprünglich-Seiendes aus sich selbst im absoluten Sinne begriffen wird. Den Erst-Intellekt kennzeichnet er indessen wie jedes Erst- und

84 Cf. oben Anm. 39; ferner H. Anzulewicz, „Zum Einfluss des Albertus Magnus auf Heymericus de Campo im *Compendium divinorum*“, in K. Reinhardt, H. Schwaetzer, F.-B. Stammkötter (Hgg.), *Heymericus de Campo: Philosophie und Theologie im 15. Jahrhundert* (Regensburg: S. Roderer-Verlag, 2009), S.83–112.

85 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 163, S.24, L.2–4: *Omnis multitudo unitatum, quae participatur ab imparticipabili intellectu, intellectualis est.*

86 Hierzu und zum Folgenden: Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 163A, S.24, L.12–19.



Primär-Seiende einer Reihe von Seienden als nicht-teilhaftig unter gewisser Rücksicht (*imparticipabile in determinata intentione*). In diesem Sinne ist jeder Intellekt einer intellektualen Ordnung, der an sich vollkommen konstituiert ist, nicht-teilhaftig, resümiert Berthold.<sup>87</sup> Nicht-teilhaftig ist demnach alles, was getrennt und unvermischt ist, was keine Gemeinsamkeit und kein wesenhaftes Verhältnis zu einem anderen vorweist, mit dem es zwar wesentlich vereint ist, aber dennoch als von diesem in jeder Beziehung wesentlich getrennt besteht. Mit dieser Darstellung zielt Berthold unmissverständlich auf die Auffassung der *anima rationalis* des Aristoteles (*De anima* III, 4–5) ab, genauer auf den menschlichen Intellekt. Da die an Aristoteles' Schrift *De anima* angelehnten Versatzstücke seiner Theorie sich wörtlich in Alberts *De anima*-Kommentar, andere bei Dietrich von Freiberg de *De animatione caeli* finden und er keine Auskünfte hinsichtlich der Quellen macht, gilt es für Dietrich als bewiesen und für Albert als plausibel, dass ihre Schriften als eine unmittelbare Quelle bzw. als eine Brücke zu der *littera* des Aristoteles bei der Abfassung der *Expositio* fungiert haben.<sup>88</sup>

Auf die inhaltliche und formale Erschließung der Proposition 163 lässt Berthold in gewohnter Manier sein eigenes Lehrstück, sog. Propositum, folgen. Den Ausgangspunkt und inhaltlichen Kern bildet der Begriff der Intellektualität sowohl als Adjektivattribut (*intellectualis*), das Proklos zur Bestimmung einer Vielheit von Einheiten verwendete, welche am Intellekt teilhat, der selbst nicht-teilhaftig ist, als auch als Nomen (*intellectuale*). Wie Pseudo-Dionysius und Albert der Große verknüpft Berthold das Verständnis dieses Begriffs mit dem Begriff der Intelligibilität und der Klärung der Differenz zwischen den beiden Begriffen. Gemeinsam für sie ist, wie er darlegt, die Erkenntnisfähigkeit (*aptitudo ad intelligendum*) desjenigen, dem sie zukommen. Auf Seiten des «Intellektualen» sei sie eine aktive Fähigkeit, wem auch immer sie formal oder wesentlich oder ursächlich oder in herausragender Weise zukommt. Auf Seiten des «Intelligiblen», das seinem Sinngehalt nach abstrakter und herausragender als das Intellektuale begriffen wird, sei sie eine passive oder eine zuhöchst aktive Fähigkeit, entsprechend der Art und Weise seiner Konstituierung als Gegenstand des Intellekts. Ersteres ist gegeben, sofern das Intelligible unter Teilhabe an der Spezies eines anderen zum Gegenstand des Intellekts wird;

87 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 163A, S.24, L.19–22, S.25, L.39–40: *Et sic acceptum imparticipabile subdistinguitur in simpliciter imparticipabile, quod est prime unum et bonum, et imparticipabile in determinata intentione. Et sic omne prime et principaliter ens in quacumque seyra dicitur et est imparticipabile ut prime intellectus etc. [...] Et sic omnis intellectus intra ordinem intellectualem per se perfectum constitutus dicitur et est imparticipabilis.*

88 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 163A, S.24, L.23–27, S.25, L.37–38. Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, lib. 3, tr. 2, c. 17 und 18, S.201, L.63–65, 80 (Arist.), S.204, L.64–65, S.203, L.89 (Arist.).

Letzteres indessen, wenn das Intelligible teilhaftig des Intellektualen ist (diesen Satzteil gibt Berthold mit *participatur ad esse intelligibile* wieder und verändert dadurch den Sinngehalt seiner Vorlage, die diese Stelle, wie die nachfolgende Gegenüberstellung der Texte zeigt, mit *participatum ad esse intellectuale* überliefert).<sup>89</sup>

In diesem Lehrstück kommen wie in einem Brennglas Informationen zusammen, welche die Frage nach Bertholds Einbettung in die Tradition Alberts des Großen in einem wichtigen Punkt der Intellektlehre beantworten und die Kontinuitätsthese in Bezug auf diese Tradition nachdrücklich bestätigen. Das Lehrstück erlaubt die verborgene Originalität einer subtilen Distinktion aufzudecken, die Berthold sich ohne ihre tatsächliche Herkunft preiszugeben zu eigen machte, indem er sie in ihrer Detailliertheit und Ausführlichkeit wortwörtlich, sieht man von einigen geringen Abweichungen ab, aus Alberts Kommentar zu *De divinis nominibus* (c. 4) in sein Werk aufnahm.<sup>90</sup> Zur Verdeutlichung der Qualität, des Ausmaßes und der Art und Weise der Verarbeitung dieser Anleihe, die Berthold bei der Auslegung der Proposition 163 zur Erläuterung zweier Schlüsselbegriffe der Epistemologie und Intellektlehre aus dem Werk Alberts des Großen stillschweigend machte, seien nachfolgend der Quellentext in seiner Ursprungsform, wie er in der kritischen Edition von P. Simon vorliegt, und derselbe Text in der von Berthold in seiner *Expositio* überlieferten Gestalt gegenübergestellt:

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<p><b>Albertus Magnus, <i>Super Dionysium De div. nominibus</i>, c. 4, hg.v. Simon, S.121, L.20–56</b></p>	<p><b>Berthold von Moosburg, <i>Expositio super Elem. theol.</i>, 163D, hg.v. Jeck, Tautz, S.27, L.106–130</b></p>
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Dicendum, quod sicut duplex est visibile, quoddam quod est obiectum visus **sub<sup>a</sup>** specie aliena, qua informatur ad esse **visibile, sicut<sup>b</sup>** color, qui non potest esse obiectum visus, nisi perficiatur per lucem in esse spirituali et efficiatur

sciendum, quod, sicut est duplex visibile, quoddam, quod est obiectum visus **non sine** specie aliena, qua informatur ad esse, **et tale visibile est** color, qui non potest esse obiectum visus, nisi perficiatur per lucem in esse spirituali et efficiatur visibile

a sub *Alb.* non sine *Berth.*

b visibile, sicut *Alb.* et tale visibile est *Berth.*

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89 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 163C–D, S.26, L.88–S.28, L.134.

90 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 163D, S.26, L.91–92, S.27, L.104–130. Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, c. 4, S.120, L.2–3, S.121, L.20–56.

(cont.)

**Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De div. nominibus*, c. 4, hg.v. Simon, S.121, L.20–56**

**Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elem. theol.*, 163D, hg.v. Jeck, Tautz, S.27, L.106–130**

visibile actu, est etiam quoddam visibile quod participatur ad naturam visibilitatis, sicut lux, si poneremus, quod non posset **per se videri**,<sup>c</sup> sed videretur tantum, secundum quod est participata in hoc colore **vel illo**<sup>d</sup> quibus dat esse visibilitatis, quamvis quod **moveant**<sup>e</sup> secundum rationes **determinatas**,<sup>f</sup> non **habeant**<sup>g</sup> a luce, sed potius ab **esse**<sup>h</sup> quod **habent**<sup>i</sup> in materia: **ita**<sup>j</sup> est duplex intelligibile, quoddam quod est obiectum intellectus, secundum quod participat de specie aliena, sicut species intelligibilis non est intelligibilis, nisi in quantum participat de actu intellectus agentis, qui dat sibi esse spirituale et simplex, quod possit esse perfectio intellectus possibilis. Hoc enim non habet a re, quia lapis non est in anima, sicut dicit Philosophus, sed intentio lapidis constituta in esse intelligibili per actum intellectus agentis, quamvis ab ipso non habeat, quod determinet intellectum, sed potius ab ipsa re, cuius est intentio.

actu, est etiam quoddam visibile, quod participatur ad naturam visibilitatis, sicut lux, si poneremus, quod non posset **videri in se**, sed videretur tantum, secundum quod est participata in hoc **vel illo colore**, quibus dat esse visibilitatis, quamvis, quod **moveat** secundum rationes determinatas **ipsum visum**, non **habeat** a luce, sed potius ab **esse rei**, quod **habet** in materia, **ita proportionaliter** est duplex intelligibile: quoddam, quod est obiectum intellectus, secundum quod participat de specie aliena, sicut species intelligibilis non est intelligibilis, nisi quantum participat de actu intellectus agentis, qui dat sibi esse spirituale et simplex, quod possit esse perfectio intellectus possibilis. Hoc enim non est a re, cuius est species, quia lapis non est in anima, sed intentio lapidis constituta in esse tali intelligibili per actum intellectus agentis, quamvis ab ipso non habeat, quod determinet intellectum, sed potius a re ipsa vel phantasmate, cuius est intentio.

c per se videri *Alb.* videri in se *Berth.*

d colore vel illo *Alb.* vel illo colore *Berth.*

e moveant *Alb.* moveat *Berth.*

f determinatas *Alb.* ipsum visum *add. Berth.*

g habeant *Alb.* habeat *Berth.*

h esse *Alb.* rei *add. Berth.*

i habent *Alb.* habet *Berth.*

j ita *Alb.* proportionaliter *add. Berth.*

(cont.)

Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De div. nominibus*, c. 4, hg.v. Simon, S.121, L.20–56

Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elem. theol.*, 163D, hg.v. Jeck, Tautz, S.27, L.106–130

Quoddam vero est intelligibile sicut participatum<sup>k</sup> ad esse intellectuale,<sup>l</sup> sicut lumen intellectus agentis participatur in specie intelligibili et esse etiam intellectuale.<sup>m</sup>

Dicimus ergo,<sup>n</sup> quod intelligibile primo modo dictum dicit aptitudinem passivam, sed secundo modo dictum dicit maxime activam, et<sup>o</sup> hoc convenit semper superiori naturae respectu inferioris, quia lumen superioris simplicius est et formale respectu inferioris et movens illud, lumen vero inferioris est motum a lumine superioris et possibile et<sup>p</sup> oboediens sibi. Et secundum hoc lumen superioris intelligentiae<sup>q</sup> moventis secundum philosophos recipitur<sup>r</sup> in inferiori per omnes ordines decem, quos ponunt,<sup>s</sup> perficiens ipsum in esse intellectualitatis.

Quoddam vero intelligibile sic participatur ad esse intelligibile, sicut lumen intellectus agentis participatur in specie intelligibili, et est etiam esse intelligibile.

Dico igitur, quod intelligibile primo modo dictum dicit aptitudinem passivam, sed secundo modo dictum dicit maxime activam, et secundum hoc semper convenit naturae superiori respectu inferioris, quia lumen superioris simplex est et formale respectu inferioris et movens illud, lumen vero inferioris est motum a lumine superioris et oboediens sibi. Et secundum hoc lumen potentiae superioris moventis radicatur in inferiori perficiens ipsum in esse intellectualitatis.

k sicut participatum *Alb.* sic participatur *Berth.*

l intellectuale *Alb.* intelligibile *Berth.*

m intellectuale *Alb.* intelligibile *Berth.*

n Dicimus ergo *Alb.* Dico igitur *Berth.*

o et *Alb.* secundum *add. Berth.*

p possibile et *Alb. om. Berth.*

q superioris intelligentiae *Alb.* potentiae superioris *Berth.*

r secundum philosophos recipitur *Alb.* radicatur *Berth.*

s per – ponunt *Alb. om. Berth.*

Alb., *Super Dionysium De div. nominibus*, c. 4, S.119, L.76–S.120, L.1.9–11; 163D, hg.v. Jeck, Tautz, S.28, L.131–134 S.122, L.8–10

dicit (Dionysius) superiores substantias esse intelligibiles et intellectuales [...]. Item, dubitatur de differentia, quam ponit Commentator inter ista; dicit enim sic: Superiores dicit intelligibiles [...]. Et ideo dicuntur superiores intelligibiles, et inferiores intellectuales, quasi constituti in intellectualitate per lumen superiorum.

Et secundum hoc etiam distinguit Dionysius 4 cap. *De divinis nominibus* intelligibiles substantias ab intellectualibus intendens secundum Commentatorem, quod superiores sunt intelligibiles et inferiores intellectuales quasi constituti in intellectualitate per lumen superiorum.

Das aus Alberts Werk übernommene Material ergänzt Berthold mit einer Bemerkung über die natürliche Vorsehung und den genetischen Zusammenhang der Intention mit der Intellektualität und deren graduellen, dreistufigen Differenzierung. Diese umfasst intellektuale Hypostasen, die sich selbst gänzlich, wesenhaft und aktual erkennen und als Intelligenzen (*intelligentiae*) bezeichnet werden, ferner die göttlichen Seelen (*animae totales et divinae*) und Engel (*angeli*) einschließlich der Seelen, denen ein zweifaches Prinzip der Intellektualität, «der tätige Intellekt» als die Mitursache des ganzen niederen Seelenteils und der «mögliche Intellekt» als der innere Grund einer natürlichen Erkenntnis, eignet, weshalb sie als *animae partiales* bezeichnet werden. Die nachfolgende Erklärung der Intellektualität der letzten Hierarchiestufe, der Engel und der «partiellen Seelen», übernimmt Berthold wortwörtlich aus Alberts Kommentar zu *De divinis nominibus*.<sup>91</sup> Dass außer dem Begriffsverständnis von Intellektualität und Intelligibilität auch die Instanziierung dieser Begriffe eine – sieht man von geringfügigen Umformulierungen am Anfang und punktuellen Abänderungen resp. einzelnen Varianten – buchstäbliche stillschweigende Übernahme der Lehraussage Alberts darstellt, und dass sie den Kerngehalt seines gesamten Propositums bei der Auslegung der 163. Proposition der Proklischen *Elementatio* bildet, zeigt die nachfolgende Gegenüberstellung der entsprechenden Texte:

<sup>91</sup> Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 163E, S.29, L.157–170. Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, c. 4, S.122, L.40–63.

Albertus Magnus, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, c. 4, S.122, L.40–63

Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elem. theol.*, 163E, hg.v. Jeck, Tautz, S.28, L.153–S.29, L.170

*dicendum, quod eadem differentia non potest esse diversorum secundum speciem univoce reperta in eis; potest tamen utriusque esse differentia, si sit in eis secundum prius et posterius. Hoc enim verum est in omnibus totis potestativis, quod superius est aliquo modo in inferiori secundum modum possibilem sibi et per posterius; et secundum hoc intellectualitas per prius est in angelis, quorum natura accipit simplices quiditates rerum, in nobis vero est per posterius, **obumbrata**<sup>a</sup> per continuum et **tempus**<sup>b</sup> propter hoc quod accipit a sensu et phantasmate. Et **secundum**<sup>c</sup> hoc dicit Isaac, quod ratio **oritur**<sup>d</sup> in umbra intelligentiae; ex hoc enim quod non accipit simplicem quiditatem rei per propria principia, sed per quaedam consequentia, **sicut per accidentalialia**<sup>e</sup> et effectus, oportet, quod deveniat in **cognitionem**<sup>f</sup> **disquirendo**<sup>g</sup> et comparando unum ad alterum, et accidit in ea dubitatio, **quae non est in intelligentia, quae**<sup>h</sup>*

*In omnibus etiam enumeratis intellectualibus intellectualitas est per prius et per posterius. Primo enim invenitur in intellectualibus hypostasibus, quibus primo et per se competit, deinde in illis, quibus competit per se, sed non primo, post quae in illis, quibus competit nec per se nec primo, inter quae tamen prius est in angelis, quorum natura accipit simplices quiditates rerum, in nobis vero est per posterius, **obumbratum** per continuum et **tempus, et propter hoc quod accipit a sensu et phantasmate. Et propter hoc dicit Isaac, quod ratio creata est in umbra intelligentiae; ex hoc enim, quod non accipit simplicem quiditatem rei per propria principia, sed per quaedam consequentia **principia, accidentalialia** et effectus, oportet, quod deveniat in **cognitionem rerum discurrando** et comparando unum ad alterum, et accidit in ea dubitatio, **quod non est in angelo,*****

a obumbrata Alb. obumbratum Berth.

b tempus Alb. et add. Berth.

c secundum Alb. propter Berth.

d oritur Alb. creata est Berth.

e sicut per accidentalialia Alb. principia, accidentalialia Berth.

f cognitionem Alb. rerum add. Berth.

g disquirendo Alb. discurrando Berth.

h quae ... intelligentia, quae Alb. quod ... angelo, qui Berth.

(cont.)

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<b>Albertus Magnus, <i>Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus</i>, c. 4, S.122, L.40–63</b>	<b>Berthold von Moosburg, <i>Expositio super Elem. theol.</i>, 163E, hg.v. Jeck, Tautz, S.28, L.153–S.29, L.170</b>
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simplici actione accipit quiditatem rei. Unde etiam dicit <b>Commentator</b> <sup>i</sup> super VI <i>Ethnicorum</i> : Cave, ne animam aliquando simpliciter dicas intellectualem; sic enim non differret ab intelligentiis; sed dic eam rationalem, intellectualem vero per accidens; et hoc est: inquantum participat de luce naturae superioris.	qui simplici actione, ut dictum est, accipit quiditatem rei. Unde etiam <b>Eustratius</b> super VI <i>Ethnicorum</i> dicit: Cave ne animam aliquando simpliciter dicas intellectualem; sic enim non differret ab intelligentiis; sed dic eam rationabilem, intellectualem vero per accidens, hoc est: inquantum participat de luce naturae superioris.
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i Commentator *Alb.* Eustratius *Berth.*

Aus Bertholds wortwörtlichen Anleihen bei Albert, die aber als solche nicht gekennzeichnet werden, ist zu schließen, dass der Exeget des Proclus sich deren Lehrgehalt uneingeschränkt zu eigen macht und ihn als seine eigene Auffassung präsentiert. Diese Intention wird man Berthold auch bei weniger durch Worttreue auffallenden Anlehnungen an Alberts Intellektlere bei der Auslegung der Propositionen 167 und 174 der *Elementatio theologica* unterstellen dürfen. Die Kommentare zu den beiden Theoremen spiegeln seine in Entwicklung und Differenzierung begriffene Klassifikation der Intellekte wider, für die sich ihm bei Albert eine inhaltlich breitere Grundlage als bei Dietrich von Freiberg bot. Die systematisierenden Ansätze von Bertholds Intellektlehre sollen hier nur in groben Strichen umrissen und in ihrem Verhältnis zu Albert beleuchtet werden. Auf die Berücksichtigung seiner diesbezüglichen, an Dietrich von Freiberg, Aristoteles und Averroes angelehnten Erläuterungen muss verzichtet werden, da dies den Rahmen dieses Beitrags sprengen würde.

iii. Nach der Unterscheidung und Erläuterung der göttlichen Intellekte im Kommentar zur Proposition 160 und nach einer Differenzierung der Intellekte, die keine Teilhabe zulassen, im Kommentar zur Proposition 163 sowie nach der Erörterung der für alle Intellekte gemeinsamen Eigenschaften im Kommentar zur Proposition 166 unternimmt Berthold im Kommentar zur

Proposition 167<sup>92</sup> eine weitere, soweit wir sehen seine vorletzte Gliederung, Systematisierung und Charakterisierung der Intellekte. Ihren Ausgangspunkt, ihre Grundlage und Richtschnur bilden nicht nur die Inhalte dieser Proposition und des sie begleitenden *commentum* des Proclus, sondern auch und vor allem der weitere Kontext der *Expositio* und die Traditionen, in denen das Werk eingebettet ist. Der philosophiehistorisch und systematisch offene Horizont der Exegese und ihr Anschluss an die *Philosophy of Mind* seiner Protagonisten, Dietrich von Freiberg und Albert der Großen, wird zum theoriebildenden Faktor des Bertholdschen Denksystems. Der erste, „suppositionale“ Teil seiner Auslegung der Proposition 167, der eine Klassifikation der Intellekte, die Erläuterung der einzelnen Typen und ihrer jeweils unterschiedlichen Bestimmung beinhaltet, ist derart mit Versatzstücken aus der Intellektlehre Dietrichs durchsetzt, dass er stellenweise einer literarischen Collage aus dessen Schrift *De intellectu et intelligibili* nahekommmt. In Anlehnung an diese Schrift entwickelt Berthold eine generische, die bisherige Unterscheidung des göttlichen Intellekts erweiternde oder vielmehr nuancierende Typologie der Intellekte. Ohne eine ausdrückliche Bezugnahme auf die vorausliegende Typologie des göttlichen Intellekts – die Verknüpfung ist durch Analogie in struktureller und inhaltlicher Hinsicht offenkundig – geht er von der Unterscheidung eines schlechthin getrennten Intellekts (*intellectus separatus simpliciter*) und eines im uneigentlichen Sinne getrennten, gleichsam verbundenen und mit-geteilten Intellekts (*intellectus non proprie separatus, sed quasi coniunctus scilicet participatus*) aus. Die weitere Differenzierung und Bestimmung dieser beiden Intellekte soll im Folgenden kurz vorgestellt werden, um sie anschließend in ihrer Beziehung zur Intellektlehre Alberts zu beleuchten.

Beim schlechthin getrennten Intellekt unterscheidet Berthold zwischen dem Intellekt gemäß der Ursache in ihrer Ursprungsform (*secundum causam principaliformiter*) und dem Intellekt gemäß der Existenz in ihrer Wesensform (*secundum existentiam essentialiter*). Während der Erstere als ein einziger (*unus tantum*) und schlechthin getrennter Intellekt charakterisiert wird,

92 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 167, S.58, L.2–8: *Omnis intellectus se ipsum intelligit, sed primus quidem se ipsum solum, et unum secundum numerum in hoc intellectus et intelligibile. Unusquisque autem consequentium se ipsum simul et quae ante ipsum, et intelligibile est huic hoc quidem quod est, hoc autem a quo est.* [„Jeder Intellekt erkennt sich selbst, der erste aber nur sich selbst, und der Intellekt und das Intelligible (sind) darin numerisch Eines. Jeder einzelne der nachfolgenden Intellekte indessen (erkennt) sich selbst und zugleich das, was vor ihm ist, und das Intelligible ist für ihn das ‘was es ist’, dies aber ‘von was es ist’“]; S.75, L.518–533: *Commentum*.



wird der Letztere als ein durch intellektuale Hypostasen vervielfältigter begriffen. Den schlechthin getrennten Intellekt gemäß der Ursache in ihrer Ursprungsform bezeichnet Berthold in Analogie zur Bestimmung des «göttlichen Erst-Intellekts» als die sprudelnde Quelle aller Intellektualität (*fontana scaturigo omnis intellectualitatis*), die ursprüngliche und wesentliche Einheit und die «Erst-Intellektualität», welche keine Teilhabe zulässt, ein in ausgezeichneter Weise Erstes und ursprungsloses Prinzip. Der getrennte Intellekt gemäß der Existenz in ihrer Wesensform hingegen ist nach seiner Auffassung absolut frei von jeder Abhängigkeit, einfach und nicht zusammensetzbar, Akt durch sich selbst.<sup>93</sup>

Beim uneigentlich getrennten Intellekt, der mit-geteilt wird, unterscheidet Berthold wie die Peripatetiker einen tätigen Intellekt (*intellectus agens*) und einen möglichen Intellekt. Der tätige Intellekt ist und heißt seiner Interpretation zufolge insofern verbunden (*coniunctus*) bzw. mit-geteilt (*participatus*), als er jeweils einem Individuum, sei es Engel sei es Mensch, eignet und dadurch numerisch vervielfältigt wird. Diesen Intellekt fasst er als das intrinsische und eigentliche Prinzip auf, welches Erkennen, Leben und Sein, im (neu-)platonischen Sinne die Gutheiten der Erstsursache, zum individuellen Prinzip des Lebens als Erkennen eint, zum Prinzip, in dem Erkennen, Leben und Sein Eines sind. Dieser Intellekt besteht durch seine Wesenheit, da er aber ein intrinsisch-kausales Prinzip des mit ihm verbundenen Teils der Substanz ist, die er selbst ist, ist er in gewisser Weise abhängig, zusammensetzbar und nicht einfach; in seiner Substanz ist er die Tätigkeit.<sup>94</sup>

93 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 167, S.58, L.18–21, S.59, L.40–46: *Et iste est duplex, scilicet secundum causam principaliformiter et secundum existentiam essentialiter. Primus est unus tantum, et est simpliciter separatus, secundus autem multiplicatur intra ordinem intellectualem. [...] Verum primus intellectus, scilicet secundum causam, principaliformiter est fontana scaturigo omnis intellectualitatis, qui, licet primo et per se sit unitas, tamen est prime intellectualitas et simpliciter imparticipabilis et amethectus et per consequens, inquantum huiusmodi, principium et ingenitum per 99. Secundus autem est essentialiter intellectus stans per essentiam suam ab omni dependentia, ut dictum est, absolutus et sic simplex et incomponibilis se ipso actus. Cf. Iremadze, *Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus*, S.156–157.*

94 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 167, S.58, L.22–S.59, L.35.47–50: *Alius autem est intellectus non proprie separatus, sed quasi coniunctus, scilicet participatus. Et iste est duplex, scilicet agens et possibilis. Quorum primus, puta intellectus agens, est singulis singulorum et unus uniuscuiusque secundum singulos angelos et homines multiplicatus et numeratus. Supponimus enim intelligere esse vivere, sicut et vivere est esse, cum omnia sint in omnibus per 103. Vivum autem a non vivo differt in habendo in se principium sui motus. Istius autem vitae principium est intellectus agens, in quo est omnia facere secundum Aristotelem III De anima. Igitur intellectus agens est principium intrinsecum et proprium talis vitae. Non autem esset intrinsecum principium motus vitalis et per consequens nec proprium, si*

Der «mögliche Intellekt» hingegen ist „alles Seiende in Möglichkeit“ (*omne ens in potentia*), wie ihn Aristoteles in *De anima* III 5 mit der Formel „in ihm ist möglich, alles zu werden“ (*possibile est in eo omnia fieri*) definiert hat. Da er bei jedem Individuum, dessen Intellekt er ist, den vermögenspsychologischen Grund der Erkenntnis bildet, kann er seiner Verfasstheit nach als «möglicher» weder aus sich selbst bestehen noch ist er ein ursächliches Prinzip, sondern er ist abhängig von der Substanz, die er mit dem *intellectus agens* teilt und wird durch die intelligiblen Spezies in den Akt überführt.<sup>95</sup> Diese Typologie der getrennten Intellekte und die Kernpunkte ihrer Bestimmungen können überblicksweise wie folgt dargestellt werden:

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1. intellectus separatus simpliciter

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<p>1.1. secundum causam principaliformiter</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– unus tantum et per se unitas</li> <li>– prime intellectualitas</li> <li>– absolutus ab omni   dependentia ad aliud</li> <li>– imparticipabilis</li> <li>– principium et ingenitum</li> </ul>	<p>1.2. secundum existentiam essentialiter</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– multiplicatur intra ordinem   intellectualem</li> <li>– essentialiter intellectus</li> <li>– absolutus ab omni dependentia   ad aliud</li> <li>– incomponibilis</li> <li>– se ipso actus</li> </ul>
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*esset communis pluribus individuis, quia non esset intrinsecum secundum substantiam, sed solum secundum effectum, quod non sufficit ad hoc, quod aliquid dicatur et sit principium vitae [...] Tertius vero »intellectus, scilicet agens, et stat aliquantulum per essentiam suam, et nihilominus, cum sit principium intrinsecum causale residuae portiois substantiae, cuius est, est aliquo modo dependens. Et sic recedit a simplicitate, cum sit componibilis, et est cum hoc in sua substantia actio«.* Bertholds Auffassung der Eigenschaften des tätigen Intellekts rekonstruiert Iremadze, „Der intellekttheoretische Ansatz der Selbstreflexivität des Denkens“, S.246–250; dasselbe auch in: Iremadze, *Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus*, S.143–146, und vertiefend S.147–159.

- 95 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 167A–B, S.59, L.36–38.51–54: *Secundus etiam, puta intellectus possibilis, est universaliter omne ens in potentia, quod solum verum est quantum ad hoc, quod secundum Aristotelem III De anima possibile est in eo omnia fieri. [...] Quartus et ultimus intellectus, scilicet possibilis, cum sit ratio intelligendi coniuncto, in quo est, nec stat se ipso sicut agens nec est principium intrinsecum causale, cum sit possibilis, sed est dependens et speciebus intelligibilibus actatur.* Bertholds Verständnis des *intellectus possibilis*, seiner Wirksamkeit und sachlichen sowie nominellen Formhaftigkeit ist auch von Albert beeinflusst, cf. Iremadze, „Der intellekttheoretische Ansatz der Selbstreflexivität des Denkens“, S.241–245, und erneut Iremadze, *Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus*, S.140–142.

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 2. intellectus non-proprie separatus
 

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## 2.1. intellectus agens

- in quo est omnia facere
- participatus (quasi coniunctus)
- principium intrinsecum causale  
residuae portionis substantiae
- stans aliquo modo in essentia sua
- aliquo modo dependens

## 2.2. intellectus possibilis

- in quo possibile est omnia fieri
  - participatus (quasi coniunctus)
  - ratio intelligendi coniuncto, in  
quo est
  - actuatur speciebus intelligibilibus
  - dependens
- 

Was verbindet diese Typologie der Intellekte aus dem Kommentar Berthold von Moosburgs zur Proposition 167 der *Elementatio theologica* des Proclus mit Albertus Magnus? Ihre Grundstruktur, Begrifflichkeit und die Bestimmung der Intellekte sind von Dietrich von Freiberg inspiriert und teilweise wörtlich von ihm übernommen. Bertholds Verständnis des «tätigen» und des «möglichen Intellekts», entspricht zwar weitgehend der Auffassung Alberts, aber diese Übereinstimmung erklärt sich durch die gemeinsame für Berthold, Dietrich und Albert aristotelische Quellengrundlage. Andererseits ist nicht zu bezweifeln, dass Berthold sie auch durch die Brille Alberts liest. Eine Bestätigung dafür sind die signifikanten Übereinstimmungen mit seinen Lehransichten und wörtliche Anleihen aus seinem Werk im sogenannten *propositum*-Teil der *Expositio* Bertholds zur Proposition 167 bei der Charakterisierung des Intellekts im Akt. Seine Begründung der Immaterialität und der Getrenntheit des Intellekts entnimmt er dem Kommentar Alberts zum Buch Lambda der Metaphysik des Aristoteles; seine Quelle gibt er auch diesmal nicht preis. Wie getreu er seine Vorlage kopiert und sie nur um ein Geringes kürzt, zeigt die nachfolgende Gegenüberstellung der korrespondierenden Texte:

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Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, lib. 11  
tr. 2 c. 31, S.523, L.19-44

Berthold von Moosburg,  
*Expositio*, 167D, S.61, L.108–115,  
S.62, L.119-123

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De primo igitur, qualis sit intellectus  
substantiarum divinarum, determinando  
dicimus, quod intellectus nomine  
suo sonat substantiam separatam  
et immaterialem, quae nulli  
aliquid habet commune.  
Quidquid enim est illud quod formis,

Ex his apparet, quod intellectus  
nomine suo sonat substantiam  
seu essentiam immaterialem et  
separatam, quae nulli aliquid  
habet commune. Quidquid enim  
est illud quod formis, quae in ipso

(cont.)

Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, lib. 11  
tr. 2 c. 31, S.523, L.19–44

Berthold von Moosburg,  
*Expositio*, 167D, S.61, L.108–115,  
S.62, L.119–123

quae in ipso sunt vel ab ipso, ad nullum esse alicuius formae distinguitur, omnino est separatum a materia. Talis autem est omnis intellectus, et agens et possibilis et quocumque alio nomine significetur. Si enim formis distingueretur et determinaretur ad esse, oporteret, quod ipse omnia esset quae intelligeret; quod falsum est. Est autem materiae proprium, quod omni et soli convenit, formis, quas habet, ad esse determinari. Patet igitur omnem intellectum a materia esse absolutum.

Si autem alicui aliquid haberet commune, iam esset intellectivus eorum quae essent de natura illorum, sicut oculus non videt, nisi quae communicant cum natura perspicui, et auris non audit, nisi quae communicant cum aëre tremente, et oporteret, quod esset virtus harmonica et organica. Quae omnia impossibilia sunt et improbata a nobis in libro III De anima. Et quia non est virtus in corpore nec actus alicuius corporis, ideo omnia intelligit et universaliter est omnium et naturalium et mathematicorum et divinorum. Est igitur natura intellectualis talis ut dicta est.

sunt vel ab ipso, ad nullum esse alicuius distinguitur, omnino est separatum a materia. Talis autem est omnis intellectus.

Si enim formis distingueretur et determinaretur ad esse, oporteret, quod ipse esset omnia, quae intelligeret; quod falsum est. Est autem materiae proprium, quod omni et soli convenit, formis, quas habet, ad esse determinari. Patet igitur omnem intellectum esse a materia absolutum [...] si enim alicui aliquid haberet commune, iam esset intellectivus eorum, quae essent de natura illorum, sicut oculus non videt, nisi quae communicant cum natura perspicui,

et oporteret, quod esset virtus harmonica et organica, tum etiam

quia non est virtus in corpore nec alicuius corporis actus, ut superius est ostensum.

Trotz ihres begrenzten Umfangs fällt diese Anleihe bei Albert insofern ins Gewicht, als sie exemplarisch dokumentiert, dass und wie Berthold die intellektuelle Tradition Alberts des Großen fortführt, indem er aus seinem Werk

schöpft, die Inhalte seiner stillschweigend übernommenen Ausführungen sich zu eigen macht und diese als seine eigene Auffassung bis auf geringfügige Abweichungen mit Alberts Worten wiedergibt. Das Beispiel gewährt einerseits einen tiefen Einblick in seine Arbeitsweise und den Umgang mit seinen Quellen, andererseits gibt es Auskunft über seine Kenntnisse und Wertschätzung der Werke und der philosophischen Ansichten Alberts, mit denen er sich in solchen Fällen wie diesem offensichtlich uneingeschränkt identifiziert. Doktrinale Überschneidungen im großen Stil sind überdies auch durch die gemeinsamen Quellen erklärbar, insbesondere durch die Schriften des Aristoteles *De anima* und *Metaphysica*, aber auch durch die Vertrautheit und Benutzung der Kommentare Alberts zum *corpus Aristotelicum* einschließlich des *Liber de causis* sowie zu den Schriften des Pseudo-Dionysius.

iv. Die dritte und letzte Typologie der Intellekte, die aus dem intellekttheoretischen Teil der *Expositio* Bertholds gewonnen wird, bildet das heuristische Gerüst der Erschließung und Entfaltung der Annahme (*suppositum*) der 174. Proposition der *Elementatio theologica* des Proclus. Das Theorem „Jeder Intellekt setzt im Erkennen ein, was nach ihm ist, und sein Tun ist sein Erkennen und seine Erkenntnis ist sein Tun“<sup>96</sup> interpretiert Berthold dahingehend, dass er es zur Vorlage für eine sechsfache Unterscheidung der Intellekte macht, die im Vergleich mit seinen früheren Typologien am weitesten ausdifferenziert ist. Da sie weder die Eigenschaften des Intellekts wie seine Immaterialität und Getrenntheit noch seine Hierarchisierung und Instanzierung noch ein anderes Kriterium explizit zum Ausgangspunkt nimmt oder diese als Erweisziel verfolgt, erscheint sie zunächst als eine Aneinanderreihung der unterschiedlich spezifizierten Intellekte, die nur geringe oder gar keine Gemeinsamkeiten mit den früheren Typologien aufweist. Genetisch und systematisch erscheint sie als dissoziiert und inkonsistent, als eine Zusammenstellung, die von sich aus kein klares und einendes Ordnungsprinzip zu erkennen erlaubt. Es steht dennoch außer Frage, dass diese Reihe, die folgende sechs Unterscheidungen des Intellekts umfasst, nicht willkürlich zustande kommt und dass sie durch die Integration in das System Bertholds ihren eigentlichen Sinn und ihre Funktion erhält, in dem sie zu einem vorzugsweise epistemologisch orientierten und von diesem Ansatz her aristotelisch inspirierten Interpretament des Proklischen Theorems wird.<sup>97</sup>

96 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 174, S.136, L.2–3: *Omnis intellectus intelligendo instituit, quae post ipsum, et factio intelligere et intelligentia facere*; S.145, L.296–302 (*Commentum Procli*). Cf. Tautz, *Erst-Eines, Intellekte, Intellektualität*, S.35–40.

97 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 174A, S.136, L.10–12: *De primo sciendum, quod, ut sufficiat ad propositum, intellectus est multiplex: speculativus sive contemplativus, practicus sive operativus, adeptus, possibilis, formalis et universaliter agens*.

1. intellectus speculativus sive contemplativus
2. intellectus practicus sive operativus
3. intellectus adeptus
4. intellectus possibilis
5. intellectus formalis
6. intellectus universaliter agens

Durch diese Typologie und ihre Erklärung erschließt Berthold, wie erwähnt, die Aussageintention des Proklischen Theorems. Er führt sie auf den Kausalitätsmodus des Wissens, der jedem der angeführten Intellekte eigentümlich ist, und das Wissen oder die Wissenschaft, die durch den Intellekt generiert wird, zurück. Der Ausgangspunkt, das leitende Prinzip und das Ziel der Unterscheidung, der Anordnung und der Analyse der Intellekte ist also die Wissenschaft, deren Charakter die Intellekte bestimmen, nämlich ob sie eine allgemeine (*universalis*) oder partikuläre (*particularis*), in der Möglichkeit (*in potentia*) oder in Wirklichkeit (*in actu*) bzw. in Anwendung (*in agere*) ist. Dieser Typologie der Intellekte kann ein axiologischer Wesenszug insofern abgewonnen werden, als sie einem epistemologischen Finalitätsprinzip untergeordnet ist, das auf die Vollendung der Theorie selbst, nicht aber auf den Vollendungszustand der jeweiligen Stufe des Intellekts abzielt.<sup>98</sup> Mit diesem Ansatz schließt Berthold an die aristotelische Epistemologie der *Ersten Analytiken* an, wobei offen bleibt, ob der Zugriff auf die *Analytiken* direkt oder vermittelt durch Albert den Großen erfolgt.<sup>99</sup> Er setzt beim theoretischen bzw. betrachtenden Intellekt an, der über die Sinneswahrnehmung die Dinge betrachtend das Wissen von ihnen erzeugt. Die Charakterisierung der einzelnen, auf den theoretischen Intellekt folgenden Intellekte beschränkt er auf wenige Bemerkungen und Verweise auf seine im Kommentar zu der Proposition 171 zurückliegenden Erörterungen, die den möglichen Intellekt (*intellectus possibilis*) und den formalen Intellekt (*intellectus formalis*) betreffen. Bezüglich der Letzteren sei angemerkt, dass sie weitgehend die Auffassung

98 Bezüglich der Vollendungsstufen des Intellekts cf. Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, III, S.19–21.

99 Aristoteles, *Analytica priora*, lib. 2, c. 21 (67b3–5); transl. Boeth.: Aristoteles Latinus, III.1–4, hg.v. L. Minio-Paluello (Brugge / Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1962), S.131, L.18–19: *Nam scire dicitur tripliciter, aut in universali, aut ut propria aut ut agere*. Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Analytica priora*, lib. 2, tr. 6, c. 9, hg.v. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1890), S.781b. H. Anzulewicz, „Alberts Konzept der Bildung durch Wissenschaft“, in L. Honnefelder (Hg.), *Albertus Magnus und der Ursprung der Universitätsidee* (Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2011), S.395–396, 543–544.

des Dietrich von Freiberg, des Aristoteles und des Averroes widerspiegeln, eine Tradition, die man gelegentlich als den deutschen Sonderweg bezeichnet, der durch Albert den Großen maßgeblich vorbereitet wurde. Bertholds Bestimmungen des praktischen, des erworbenen und des allgemein tätigen Intellekts lassen sich kurz wie folgt zusammenfassen: Der praktische Intellekt empfängt keine Erkenntnisinhalte von den Dingen, sondern er prägt vielmehr, sich des Körpers bedienend, den Dingen seine Form ein; er wirkt durch sich selbst wie etwa die formende Kraft im Samen, oder akzidentell wie ein Handwerker, der gemäß einer angeeigneten Form ein Werk gestaltet, welches das Ziel des praktischen Intellekts sei. Der erworbene Intellekt (*intellectus adeptus*) ist indessen Intellekt im Akt, der diesen Zustand durch den tätigen Intellekt (*intellectus agens*) als Akt des eigenen, möglichen Intellekts erlangt hat. Der allgemein wirkende Intellekt (*intellectus universaliter agens*) ist, wie Aristoteles in *De anima* III 5 ihn beschreibt, das Prinzip, 'wodurch alles Tun ist und kein Aufnehmen'. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese hat minutiös aufgezeigt, dass Bertholds Darstellung des allgemein wirkenden Intellekts die von Ulrich von Straßburg vermittelte Auffassung Alberts des Großen widerspiegelt, wie diese in dessen Werk *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, lib. 1 tr. 2 c. 1 vorliegt.<sup>100</sup>

Wird Bertholds Typologie der Intellekte und ihre Erklärung mit den Einteilungen der Intellekte verglichen, die Albert in seinen Schriften vom Frühwerk *De homine* bis zu *De intellectu et intelligibili* entwickelte, sind die meisten Übereinstimmungen mit seinen Einteilungen in der letztgenannten Schrift feststellbar. Sie decken sich aber weder in der Anordnung der einzelnen Glieder noch in deren Zahl. Im Unterschied zu Berthold begreift und ordnet Albert die Intellekte nicht von ihren als theoretisch bzw. praktisch aufgefassten Ziel her, d.h. dem Wissen bzw. der Wissenschaft, sondern vom Subjekt her als dessen konstitutives Formprinzip und Vermögen, dessen Vollendungsstufen die einzelnen Intellekte verkörpern.<sup>101</sup> Die unterschiedlichen Ansätze der beiden Denker schließen dennoch nicht aus, dass Berthold sich von Alberts Auffassung inspirieren ließ und ähnlich wie Albert drei Vollendungsstufen des Intellekts annahm, wie dem kritischen Quellenapparat zum Kommentar der Proposition 174 und der Auslegung der Proposition III zu entnehmen ist, in der Ausgestaltung der Intellektlehre indes, deren Kernstück die Klassifikation der

100 Pagnoni-Sturlese, „À propos du néoplatonisme d'Albert le Grand“, S.638–644.

101 Cf. H. Anzulewicz, „Entwicklung und Stellung der Intellekttheorie im System des Albertus Magnus“, in *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 70(2003), S.165–218, esp. S.193–198.

Intellekte und ihre Kriterien bilden, einen durch Dietrich von Freiberg vorbereiteten, letztlich aber doch eigenen Weg gewählt hat.<sup>102</sup>

Bestimmen die Proklische Vorlage den inhaltlichen Fluss und Dietrich von Freibergs Doktrin Bertholds Exegese, gehört Albert mit seinen Schriften, von denen *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa* und die Kommentarwerke *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, *Metaphysica* und *Physica* hervorzuheben sind, zu den wichtigen Quellen der Intellekttheorie Bertholds. Es lag offenkundig nicht nur an punktuellen Übereinstimmungen in der Intellekttheorie dieser beiden Denker, sondern an deren weit größeren doktrinalen Nähe, die sich auf dem Gebiet der theologischen Philosophie fruchtbar erwies. Diese systemische Koinzidenz zeigt sich auch am Schluss des intellekttheoretischen Teils der *Expositio* Bertholds Exegese der 181. Proposition „Jeder mit-geteilte Intellekt ist entweder göttlich als einer, der mit den Göttern äußerlich verbunden ist, oder allein intellektual“.<sup>103</sup> Zur Erklärung der partizipatorisch aufgefassten Verbindung der göttlichen Intellekte mit den Göttern greift Berthold auf Alberts Interpretation der Emanationslehre aus dem ersten Buch der Schrift *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa* zurück. Sie bot sich insofern als hilfreich zur Erschließung der Sinngehalte des Proklischen Theorems an, als sie die Teilhabe emanatistisch interpretiert.<sup>104</sup> Ein derart leistungsfähiges, die Proclus-Exegese dieses Theorems wie auch der *Elementatio theologica* insgesamt unterstützendes Rüstzeug bot seitens der lateinischen Tradition in dieser Zeit außer Dietrich und Albert kaum ein anderer bedeutender Denker, auch nicht Thomas von Aquin.

#### 4 Schlussbemerkungen

Berthold von Moosburg vertritt mit seinem Kommentar zur *Elementatio theologica* des Proclus zwar die neuplatonische Tradition in ihrer genuinen Verankerung, aber nicht in ihrer absolut reinen Form, wie sich an seiner Intellektlehre u. a. an der drittletzten Typologie der Intellekte und durchgängig an seinen Quellen ablesen lässt. Seine Intellektlehre, ihre neuplatonischen, durch die Theoreme des Proclus fixierten und um aristotelische

102 Cf. Quellen- und Similia-Nachweise in Bertholds *Expositio*, 174, S.136–144. Tautz, *Erst-Eines, Intellekte, Intellektualität*, S.97; oben Anm. 98.

103 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 181, S.221, L.2–4: *Omnis participatus intellectus aut divinus est tanquam diis extra iunctus aut intellectualis solum*. Cf. E. Ludueña, „El politeísmo de Proclo en la *Expositio* de Bertoldo de Moosburg“, in S. Filippi, M. Coria (Hgg.), *La Identidad propia del Pensamiento Patristico y Medieval: ¿Unidad y Pluralidad?* (Rosario: Paideia Publicaciones, 2014), S.393–403.

104 Cf. De Libera, *La Mystique rhénane*, S.352ff.



Grundannahmen ergänzten Positionen sowie sein Verständnis der Metaphysik des Einen und des Guten weisen ihn als einen konsequenten Vertreter der „theologischen Philosophie“ aus. Sein onto-theologisch fundiertes, in der (neu-)platonischen und biblisch-christlichen Tradition verankertes Denken lässt sich weder mit einem „absoluten philosophischen Immanentismus“ ausweisen, noch durch angebliche innere Zerrissenheit in seiner Konsistenz in Frage stellen.<sup>105</sup> Es wäre aber auch ein reduktionistischer Fehlschluss, seine *Expositio super Elementationem* des Proclus *nur* als einen Versuch der Neukonstituierung des Verhältnisses von Platonismus und Aristotelismus unter den veränderten Einsichten bezüglich der pseudo-aristotelischen Autorschaft des *Liber de causis* und des vermeintlich endgültigen Scheiterns der Harmonisierung der heterogenen Traditionen auf dem Gebiet der Metaphysik resp. des paganen (Neu-)Platonismus und des Christentum zu sehen.<sup>106</sup> Die Bertholds Denken und Werk kennzeichnende Permeabilität von Philosophie und Theologie, von (Neu-)Platonismus und Aristotelismus bricht aus dem systemisch geschlossenen und historisch gefestigten Denkraster, will man das Werk als dessen Projektionsfläche betrachten und beurteilen, statt dem Autor selbst und seiner «theologischen Philosophie» das Wort reden lassen. Albert der Große dürfte für Berthold der Prototyp seines an die *littera Procli* gebundenen Philosophierens sein. Obwohl ihm, dem ersten Proclus-Kommentator im lateinischen Westen kaum gelungen ist, diese neuplatonische Tradition in der Lateinischen Welt nachhaltig zu festigen, ist er mit seinem Vorhaben, die Kontinuität der Platonischen Tradition im Mittelalter und über das Mittelalter hinaus zu sichern, nicht gescheitert, denn sein Text spricht auch zu uns heute und ruft ein „Gezänk seiner Ausleger“<sup>107</sup> hervor.

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105 Cf. Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.XIII–XIV, XVI, XXVIII, XXX.

106 Cf. W. Goris, „Metaphysik und Einheitswissenschaft bei Berthold von Moosburg“, in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 85(2018), S.239–258, bes. 256–258. E. Ludueña, „Dioses, inteligencias y ángeles de Alberto Magno a Bertoldo de Moosburg“, in *Cuadernos de filosofía* 66(2016), S.54–55.

107 Cf. K. Flasch, „Von Dietrich zu Albert“, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32(1985), S.7. Der Schlusssatz drückt eine Gegenteilige Auffassung zum Urteil von B. Mojsisch, dessen Ansicht nach Bertholds Projekt letztlich missglückt ist; cf. Mojsisch, „Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Berthold von Moosburg“, S.176.

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# The Gods and Causality. On Aquinas' Presence in Berthold's *Expositio*

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## 1 Introduction

Almost ten years ago, I decided to dedicate my attention to Berthold's massive commentary on Proclus' *Elementatio theologica*, a text considered to be a philosophical alternative to Thomism, a *summa ad mentem Platoniorum*, as Imbach wrote in the 1970s.<sup>1</sup> But, as I began my readings, I must confess I felt a little disappointed, for at that time I had the rather dismal impression that the myriad of quotations composing the *Expositio* would diminish its philosophical value. I was particularly interested in Berthold's interpretation of Proclus' henads, how he managed to present that concept to a Christian audience. And one day I noted a specific paragraph: it was compelling, coherent, brief, and best of all, it was not indicated by the editors as a quotation. Apparently, it was something Berthold himself had written. It became my favorite passage in the *Expositio*, at least until a few months later, when, while reading Aquinas' commentary on the *Liber de causis*, I came across the same paragraph: it was another fragment copied by Berthold, yet it had not been identified. This study is, somehow, a consequence of that rather painful incident.

Of course, Aquinas's citations in the *Expositio* are not many. And yet, I would argue that in regard to certain aspects some of them are quite important to Berthold. Here is a preliminary, surely imperfect, table of citations from Aquinas in Berthold's *Expositio*:

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1 R. Imbach, "Le (néo-)platonisme medieval. Proclus latin et l'école dominicaine allemande", in *Revue de théologie et philosophie* 110(1978), p. 427–448, at p. 438. I am grateful to E. Butler and E. King for kindly helping me with my English writing. Also, I thank D. Calma and E. King for their extremely useful comments on the paper.

## Thomas Aquinas

*Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli*<sup>a</sup>

<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 26 / p. 128, l. 1–12	43D / p. 70, l. 165–173 [citation, modified]*
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 2 / p. 12, l. 1–6	52A / p. 117, l. 21–31 [citation, modified]
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 19 / p. 105, l. 16–19	111C / p. 21, l. 64–67 [reformulation]*
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 19 / p. 106, l. 21–24	111C / p. 21, l. 67–69 [citation, modified]
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 19 / p. 107, l. 2–3	111C / p. 21, l. 69–71 [reformulation]
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 19 / p. 107, l. 3–11	111C / p. 21, l. 71–77 [citation, modified]
<i>Contra errores Graecorum</i> , c. 23 / p. 84a, l. 11–13	137E / p. 21, l. 216–217 [citation]
<i>Contra errores Graecorum</i> , c. 23 / p. 84a, l. 16–23	137E / p. 22, l. 222–226 [citation, modified]
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 24 / p. 122, l. 19–p. 123, l. 4	142B / p. 55, l. 105–p. 56, l. 115 [citation, modified]
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 24 / p. 122, l. 13–15	149A / p. 112, l. 41–43 [reformulation]
<i>Super Librum de causis Expositio</i> , lect. 24 / p. 122, l. 24–25	149A / p. 112, l. 45–46 [reformulation]*
<i>In De divinis nominibus</i> IV, lect. 18, §524 / p. 188	156A / p. 170, l. 33–38 [citation, modified]

a All citations of Berthold refer to the critical edition: Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 35–65*, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 108–135*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 160–183*, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); id., *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 184–211*, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014). Citations of Aquinas marked with an asterisk are not listed in the *apparatus fontium* of the critical edition.

(cont.)

Thomas Aquinas	<i>Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli</i>
<i>Super librum De causis Expositio</i> , lect. 18 / p. 102, l. 19–27	155A / p. 164, l. 33–39 [citation, modified]
<i>Quaestiones disputatae de veritate</i> , q. 1, a. 1 / ed. H.-F. Dondaine: p. 6, l. 186–187 <sup>b</sup>	179A / p. 204, l. 150–151 [reformulation?]
<i>Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei</i> , q. 3, a. 9 / ed. P.M. Pession: p. 65a–b	204A / p. 203, l. 100–116 [citation, modified]

- b The text in the *Expositio* reads: *Verum etiam circa intellectum idem patet, cum veritas sit adaequatio rei ad intellectum secundum Isaac*. In *De veritate*, a. 1, q. 1 (the source listed in the apparatus of the *Expositio*), Aquinas writes: *sic dicit Isaac quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*. Admittedly, we are dealing with a Thomistic commonplace (the definition of truth with the misattribution to Isaac Israeli), and the context of the passage in 179A offers no clues about Berthold's precise source. However, I think the following sentence of the anonymous *Summa totius logicae*, which was circulated with a misattribution to Aquinas, is a likely source since the phrasing is much closer to Berthold's: *Quantum ad primum sciendum, quod ut communiter dicitur, veritas est adaequatio rei ad intellectum, secundum Isaac, verum dicitur adaequatum, falsum vero non adaequatum* (tr. 6, c. 4, accessed online at [corpusthomisticum.org](http://corpusthomisticum.org)).

If I am correct, between citations and reformulations we can count, for the moment, at least 15 instances of Aquinas' presence in the *Expositio*. In this chapter, I will focus my attention on two moments in the *Expositio* when Berthold has recourse to Aquinas' texts. Both cases relate to topics that, in my view, are central to Berthold's commentary project: the nature of Proclus' gods or *unitates* (what Berthold calls the *unum secundum essentiam*), and the relation between the causality of the *unitates* and the causality of the absolute One (*unum secundum causam*).

First of all, I offer a very brief presentation of Berthold's metaphysical scheme. Then, I will present Berthold's main concern regarding the Proclean gods, namely, to show that they are *per se subsistentes* not because they are uncreated, but on account of their simplicity. Here I consider a text by Aquinas that Berthold uses to make this point, and how he modifies it. Afterwards, I show how Berthold understands the way that the One's causality relates to the causality of the *unitates* or primordial causes in light of a text by Aquinas that Berthold cites precisely to explain how those modes of causation work

together. Also, in this same section, I consider the possibility that Berthold could have used, while not explicitly citing, another text by Aquinas on instrumental causality. Finally, I will share some concluding remarks.

## 2 The Three Ones

In the beginning of his *Expositio*, Berthold presents his interpretation of Proclus' metaphysical universe. The supreme Principle of reality is the One. The One, says Berthold, is an *unum quod non est in multis sive multitudine*. In a strict sense, is not unity but excess of unity. It is not an *unum* among others, but an *unum ante omne unum et multitudinem*,<sup>2</sup> an *unum non plurificabile*. And it is *omnium productivum*:<sup>3</sup> it creates everything. It is not possible to know what it is in itself. But its product is unity. And for this reason, Berthold calls it the *unum secundum causam*. The One pre-contains every unity<sup>4</sup> and every unity presupposes the One, but the One does not have its unity from another, but from itself. It is, then, *prime unum*. It is one in a way that is most simple, absolute, and limitless.<sup>5</sup> According to Berthold, the One, and only the One, creates. Then there is a second one – an *unum quod est in multitudine sicut ab ea participatum*.<sup>6</sup> This *unum* is *simplex*, but not *simpliciter simplex* (as is the

2 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1D, p. 77, l. 232–233.

3 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2E, p. 88, ll. 244, 241.

4 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 65D, p. 203, l. 82–84: [...] *et sic praehabet omnia, in quibus ipsa eadem intentio contracta est vel contrahibilis, nobiliori, quia absolutiori modo, quam sint in se ipsis, et sic etiam dicitur prime* [...].

5 In this sense, the One is not one. It transcends unity because is limitless unity. See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 160K, p. 8, l. 168–181: *De primo sciendum, quod [...] prime adverbium, quod secundum grammaticos est vi verbi adiectivum, modificat terminum, cui addicitur ad standum pro simplicissimo, absolutissimo et sic illimitatissimo intentionis seu proprietatis per terminum denotatae, verbi gratia prime intellectus stat pro simplicissimo, absolutissimo et illimitatissimo intellectu, qui non est aliud quam quod dicitur, cum sit monarcha totius intellectualis seyrae, et per consequens est unus solus [...] et extra omnem effectum [...]. Est autem duplex prime, vel simpliciter vel in determinata entium manerie. Primum est unum tantum, scilicet prime unum, quod solum et simpliciter est monarcha non unius maneriei entium, sed simpliciter totius universi [...]. Prime autem secundo modo acceptum adhuc est duplex, quia vel simpliciter principaliforme respectu alicuius determinatae maneriei entium totaliter vel respectu alicuius generis vel speciei entium intra determinatam maneriem conclusorum. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 136B, p. 5, l. 73–74: [...] *quod est per se, est limitatum et contractum in ipsa intentione, prime autem est illimitatum et incontractum et sic dignius limitato et contracto*. Cf. K. Flasch, "Einleitung", in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. xi–xxxviii, at p. xvii.*

6 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1D, p. 77, l. 229–230.

One);<sup>7</sup> it is a *quoddam unum*.<sup>8</sup> Considered in itself, its essence is unity, and so Berthold calls it *unum secundum essentiam*. No composition, no division, no multiplicity can be found in it.<sup>9</sup> Like the One, it is a cause, but it does not create: it determines. And, for this reason, because he understands it as a cause of determination, Berthold discerns in it six different principles. For he thinks that every determination can be ultimately reduced to six primordial determinations: possibility, being, life, intellect, soul, and corporality. And he identifies these six causes with Proclus' henads. Following William of Moerbeke's translation of the *Elementatio theologica*, Berthold calls them *unitates* or *bonitates*, and also "primordial causes".

In regard to their essence, the *unitates* are pure unity, in respect to multiplicity, they are principles of determination.<sup>10</sup> From this point of view, they constitute a plurality of causes, the very first and supreme multiplicity *immediata ad ipsum prime unum*.<sup>11</sup> These the six *unitates* that originate all determination are:

- |   |   |                                |
|---|---|--------------------------------|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>prime virtus</i> (or <i>infinitas</i>)</li> <li>2. <i>prime entitas</i></li> <li>3. <i>prime vita</i></li> <li>4. <i>prime intellectualitas</i></li> <li>5. <i>prime animealitas</i></li> <li>6. <i>prime naturalitas</i></li> </ol> | } | <i>unum secundum essentiam</i> |
|---|---|--------------------------------|

7 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 59B, p. 165, l. 65–74: *Simplex primi [...] modi est simpliciter et absolute simplex, cuius simplicitas est omnimoda, in qua nulla est plica diversitatis secundum esse aliquo modo. Et hoc non convenit nisi prime bono, quod nulla plica habitudinis ad aliquid intra vel extra dependet secundum esse diversum a se ipso. Et hoc est simplex omnino et omnimode in fine simplicitatis, cuius simplicitas nulli causato convenire potest. Est et alia simplicitas, quae non habet plicam habitudinis secundum esse ad compositiones intra, cum non constet ex diversis intentionibus, licet habeat dependentiam ad causam extra, a qua accipit id, quod est. Et hoc non est omnino simplex, sed contractum ad determinatum modum et ex hoc conclusum intra ordinem partialem, scilicet unialem, et intra totalem ordinem universi.*

8 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2E, p. 88, l. 245–247: *Unum autem secundum essentiam est quoddam unum eo, quod deficit a superplenitudine simpliciter unius: tum quia est contractum, illud vero illimitatum, tum quia licet sit simplex, tamen non est simpliciter simplex [...].*

9 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1D, p. 78, l. 236–237.

10 On determination, cf. E. King, *Supersapientia. A Study of the Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli of Berthold von Moosburg*, PhD diss. (University of Cambridge, 2016), part II, ch. 3.

11 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, p. 116, l. 134–135.

The use of the adverb *prime* indicates that the *unitates* are, with regard to multiplicity, what the *prime unum* is with regard to everything else (including the *unitates*). They transcend the properties or intentions they confer, for they *are* those determinations in a most simple, absolute, and limitless way.<sup>12</sup> They mediate between the One and the multiplicity of differently determined things. Their causal action presupposes that of the One, i.e., it presupposes creation.

Finally, each determined thing (everything besides the One and the *unitates*) is one *secundum participationem*. This third one is found *in omni unito et multitudine* and is a one *ab alio sive per aliud*.<sup>13</sup> That “other” (*aliud*) is the *unum secundum essentiam*, which is an *unum tantum*; whereas this third one is one – because everything created is one – but is not *unum tantum*. It is one and possible; or one, possible, and existing; or one, possible, existent, and alive, etc. In other words, it is the result of composition.

Thus, Berthold’s metaphysical scheme is as follows: an absolutely simple *unum*, a simple (but not absolutely simple) *unum*, and an *unum* by participation (and this means composition).

### 3 The *unitates* as *per se subsistentes*

While explaining the Proclean doctrine of self-constituted principles, Berthold says that there are two ways in which an intellectual nature can be called *per se subsistens* or *antipostatton*. An intellectual nature converts upon itself *intentionaliter* or *essentialiter*.<sup>14</sup> The first case is that of the possible intellect.<sup>15</sup> The second is the case of many substances (like the *animae totales*, the agent intellect, the intellectual hypostases), but the main examples of them are the *prime unum* and the *unitates*. They convert upon themselves *se totis totaliter* because they subsist in just one intention, the *intentio unius*. They represent the supreme instances of the *antipostata* – according to Berthold, the absolute One is also *antipostatton*.<sup>16</sup>

Now a question that occurs here and there in the *Expositio* is what it means to be *per se subsistens* in the case of the *unitates*. It is obvious that the absolute One is *per se subsistens* because its existence is not the effect of some

12 See note 7, above.

13 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1D, p. 77, l. 229–230 and 234.

14 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43A, p. 66, l. 14–20; 43C, p. 69, l. 132–p. 70, l. 141.

15 On this point, see Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43B, p. 67, l. 57–p. 69, l. 133.

16 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43C, p. 70, l. 142–153.

external, superior cause. But are the *unitates per se subsistentes* for the same reason? Berthold's answer is that they, like everything else besides the absolute One, participate in the One, but their mode of participation is peculiar. He addresses the question while commenting on the second proposition of the *Elementatio*. He explains that the mode in which the *unitates* participate in the One is unique: each *unitas* is one with what it essentially participates, both *in re* and *in intentione*.<sup>17</sup> To illustrate this, he has recourse to the *Clavis physicae*, where it is said that the primordial causes are *per se* because they participate in the *causa omnium* by themselves, not through something else, whereas everything else participates in the *causa omnium* through them:

Summae ac verae naturae est prima consideratio, qua intelligitur summa ac vera bonitas, quae nullius particeps per se bonitas est, cuius prima donatione et participatione est per se ipsam bonitas, cuius item participatione bona sunt, quaecumque bona sunt. Quae ideo per se ipsam bonitas dicitur, quia per se ipsam summum bonum participat, cetera autem bona non per se ipsa summum et substantiale bonum participant, sed per eam, quae est per se ipsam summi boni participatio. Similiter dicendum de reliquis primordialibus causis, quod sint principales eo, quod per se ipsas sunt participantibus unius omnium causae, quae Deus est, alia autem omnia illarum participatione sunt, quod sunt.<sup>18</sup>

The primordial causes, which Berthold identifies with Proclus' *unitates*, occupy the highest metaphysical position after the first principle. Their relation to it is immediate, and so they participate in it immediately, by themselves. And yet,

17 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2B, p. 84, l. 97–9.

18 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2B, p. 82, l. 16–25. Cf. Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, ed. P. Lucentini (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), c. 118, p. 88, l. 4–14: *Summe ac vere nature prima consideratio est qua intelligitur summa ac vera bonitas, quae nullius particeps per se ipsam bonitas est, cuius prima donatione et participatione est per se ipsam bonitas, cuius item participatione bona sunt quaecumque bona sunt. Quae ideo per se ipsam bonitas dicitur quia per se ipsam summum bonum participat, cetera autem bona non per se ipsa summum substantiale bonum participant, sed per eam quae est per se ipsam summi boni participatio. Similiter dicendum de reliquis primordialibus causis quod sint principales eo quod per se ipsas sunt participantibus unius omnium cause quae Deus est, alia autem omnia illarum participatione sunt quod sunt.* For an analysis of this passage, see S. Gersh, "Remarks on the Method and Content of the *Clavis physicae*", in W. Beierwaltes (ed.), *Eriugena redivivus* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1987), p. 162–173, at p. 167. Cf. also S. Gersh, "Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy", in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 493–503, at p. 497.

Berthold understands that each *unitas*, each primordial cause, is one *secundum essentiam*, not *secundum participationem*. A few pages later he deals with this issue directly:

Nec obstat, quod supra dixi tale unum esse participans uno et modo dico ipsum esse unum per essentiam seu per se, quia alio respectu dicitur participare, alio vero per essentiam esse unum. Cum enim deficiat a superplenitudine et superexcessu simpliciter unius, ideo dicitur ipso quasi extrinseco participare [...]. Sed quia unum, quod est sua propria essentia, non est per aliud unum formaliter, sed se ipso, ideo dicitur per essentiam esse unum, cum ratione suae simplicitatis non sit distinguere in ipso inter participans et participatum, sicut distinguitur in omni unito [...].<sup>19</sup>

There is no contradiction in saying that each *unitas* is an *unum secundum essentiam* and that it participates in the One. Because the *unum secundum essentiam* is not the One, given that it cannot match its *superplenitudo*, it participates in the One *quasi extrinseco*. However, when Berthold says that each *unitas* is an *unum secundum essentiam* he means that *formaliter* an *unitas* is not an *unum per aliud* other than itself. It is its essence; it is simple.

To formulate this point, Berthold quotes a text from Albert's *Summa theologiae* which makes a reference to the Boethian distinction between *quo est* and *quod est*. As we see in the next citation, according to Albert, only of God it is possible to say that there is no such distinction, for only God is simple. But for Berthold, the simplicity expressed by the refusal of any distinction between *quo est* and *quod est* also characterizes the primordial causes. As we saw, for him, the absolute One is *supersimplex*, while each *unitas*, i.e., each primordial cause, is *simplex*. This means that in the case of the *unitates* too there is no distinction between *quo est* and *quod est*. This explains the following modification of Albert's text introduced by Berthold:<sup>20</sup>

19 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2E, p. 89, l. 253–261. See also *Expositio, Prologus* 4, p. 12, l. 243–p. 13, l. 250. I owe this reference to E. King.

20 A similar modification occurs in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 149A, p. 112, l. 41–43 with Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002), lect. 24, p. 122, l. 13–15.



Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae* Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*

Et hoc etiam dicit Boethius in libro *De Trinitate*, quod ‘vere unum est, in quo nullus est numerus, nullum in eo aliud praeter id quod est’. In omni autem quod est citra primum, aliud est id ‘quod est’, et aliud ‘quo est’, et propter hoc non vere simplex est [...].<sup>21</sup>

[...] nullum secundorum est vere simplex. In omnibus enim, quae sunt citra primordiales causas, aliud est id, quod est, et aliud, quo est, et propter hoc nullum eorum vere simplex est [...].<sup>22</sup>

The distinction between *quod est* and *quo est* does not apply to the *unitates* or primordial causes. On account of its simplicity, therefore, each *unitas* is one *secundum essentiam*, not *secundum participationem*. Elsewhere, Berthold explains the nature of the *unum secundum essentiam* by making a distinction between two manners of speaking: *efficienter* and *formaliter*. Each *unitas* is one *secundum* or *per essentiam*, not *efficienter* but *formaliter*:

non dicitur per se unum, quod careat simpliciter efficiente, sed quia non est unum per participationem, sed per essentiam se ipso, scilicet formaliter.<sup>23</sup>

The *unitates* exist by themselves:

formaliter, non efficienter, quia causaliter effective nihil gignit se ipsum [...] licet formaliter et procedat a se ipso et convertatur ad se ipsum.<sup>24</sup>

Berthold clarifies the exact meaning of the adverb *formaliter* when he deals with Proclus’ propositions about the *antipostata*. There, he avails himself of the concept of *forma*. To illuminate the sense of Proposition 43, he explains what an *antipostatton* (i.e., something *per se subsistens*) is, and he observes:

21 Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei. Libri I, pars I, quaestiones 1–50A*, ed. D. Siedler (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), pars I, tr. 4, q. 20, c. 2, p. 101, l. 61–65.

22 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 127B, p. 162, l. 49–51.

23 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 4F, p. 111, l. 362–364.

24 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 9B, p. 170, l. 108–112. *Unum [...] secundum essentiam [...] licet nulli innitatur formaliter, innitatur tamen prime uni causaliter, quod solum est unum universaliter*. See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2D, p. 87, l. 183–188.

[...] cum haec praepositio 'per' denotet causam, illud dicitur per se stare sive subsistere, quod non habet causam essendi aliam nisi se ipsum. Est autem duplex causa essendi, scilicet forma, per quam aliquid actu est, et agens, quod facit actu esse. Si igitur dicatur stans per se ipsum, quod non dependet ab agente superiori, sic stare per se ipsum convenit solum prime bono et uni, ut inferior apparebit. Si autem dicatur per se stans illud, quod non formatur per aliquid aliud, sed ipsummet est sibi forma, sic esse stans per se ipsum convenit omnibus rebus immaterialibus. Substantia enim composita ex materia et forma non est stans per se ipsam nisi ratione partium.<sup>25</sup>

The preposition *per* designates two kinds of *causa essendi*: agent (*quod facit actu esse*) and formal (*per quam aliquid actu est*). The absolute One is *per se subsistens* because its being does not depend on a superior agent. But all immaterial things can also be called *per se subsistentes* because they are their form. This means that they are simple.

If I am correct, this is another, more developed, way of explaining how the *unitates* are an *unum per essentiam* even if they participate in the absolute One. The notion of *forma* plays a key role in this analysis: *ipsummet est sibi forma*. Now, the text mentioned above is in fact a quotation from Aquinas' commentary on the *Liber de causis*:

Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis*  
*Expositio*

Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*

[...] considerandum est quod cum praepositio 'per' denotet causam, illud dicitur «per se» stare sive subsistere quod non habet aliam causam essendi nisi seipsum. Est autem duplex causa essendi, scilicet: forma per quam aliquid actu est et agens quod facit actu esse. Si ergo dicatur stans per seipsum quod non dependet a superiori agente, sic stare per seipsum convenit **solī Deo qui est prima causa agens a qua omnes secundae causae dependent**, ut ex superioribus patet.

Sed cum haec praepositio 'per' denotet causam, illud dicitur per se stare sive subsistere, quod non habet causam essendi aliam nisi se ipsum. Est autem duplex causa essendi, scilicet forma, per quam aliquid actu est, et agens, quod facit actu esse. Si igitur dicatur stans per se ipsum, quod non dependet ab agente superiori, sic stare per se ipsum convenit **solum prime bono et uni**, ut inferior apparebit.

<sup>25</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43D, p. 70, l. 165–173.

Si autem dicatur «per se» stans illud quod non formatur per aliquid aliud, sed ipsummet est forma, sic esse stans per seipsum convenit omnibus **substantiis** immaterialibus. Substantia enim, composita ex materia et forma, non est ‘stans per seipsam’ nisi ratione partium [...].<sup>26</sup>

Si autem dicatur per se stans illud, quod non formatur per aliquid aliud, sed ipsummet est **sibi** forma, sic esse stans per se ipsum convenit omnibus **rebus** immaterialibus. Substantia enim composita ex materia et forma non est stans per se ipsam nisi ratione partium.<sup>27</sup>

The formula *per se*, Aquinas says, can be predicated of all immaterial substances because their form is independent from matter.<sup>28</sup> An immaterial substance does not need anything else *ad sui formationem*; it is its own form.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, what is *per se* is a *substantia stans per essentiam suam*,<sup>30</sup> although this does not mean its being is uncaused – *quasi non dependeat ex alia causa superiori*.<sup>31</sup>

In his commentary on the *De divinis nominibus*, in order to explain Dionysius’ critique of the separate hypostasis of the pagans, Aquinas mentions the *Platonici philosophi* and their doctrine of separate forms,<sup>32</sup> which they considered “dii existentium et creatores, quasi per se operantes ad rerum productionem”.<sup>33</sup> He affirms that Dionysius did not think of, for example, “Life itself” as a certain deity that causes life (*quamdam deitatem causativam vitae*), as if it were something different from the life of the supreme God. Only God’s

26 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 26, p. 128, l. 1–12.

27 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43D, p. 70, l. 165–173.

28 On this topic, cf. Th. Scarpelli Cory, “*Reditio completa, reditio incompleta*. Aquinas and the *Liber de causis*, prop. 15, on Reflexivity and Incorporeality”, in A. Fidora, N. Polloni (eds), *Appropriation, Interpretation and Criticism. Philosophical and Theological Exchanges between the Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Intellectual Traditions* (Barcelona / Roma: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2017), p. 185–229.

29 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 25, p. 126, l. 2–4.

30 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 25, p. 124, l. 28–p. 125, l. 2.

31 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 25, p. 126, l. 14.

32 Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, ed. C. Pera (Torino / Roma: Marietti, 1950), c. 11, lect. 4, §931, p. 346: *Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod Platonici, ponentes ideas rerum separatas, omnia quae sic in abstracto dicuntur, posuerunt in abstracto subsistere causas secundum ordinem quemdam; ita scilicet quod primum rerum principium dicebant esse per se bonitatem et per se unitatem et hoc primum principium, quod est essentialiter bonum et unum, dicebant esse summum Deum*. Cf. L. Sturlese, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli Propositiones 136–159*, p. ix–xv, at p. ix–x.

33 Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, c. 11, lect. 4, §933, p. 346.

life is the cause of everything that is alive (*causa omnium quae vivunt*).<sup>34</sup> There are no separated essences or hypostases that are “creative” principles of beings: “non dicimus esse aliquas essentias et hypostases separatas quae sint principia rerum et creatrices earum.”<sup>35</sup> Now, in the *Liber de causis*, intelligences are said to be substances *stantes per seipsas*. Thus Aquinas, in his commentary on the *Liber*, through his double interpretation of the formula *per se*, tried to show that the doctrine of the *Liber* is not that of the *Platonici*.

When Berthold cites Aquinas’ text, however, he makes several changes to fit the explanation to his own terminology and his own metaphysical scheme. The formula *per se subsistens* indicates, first of all, something whose being does not depend on a superior agent. According to this meaning, only the *prime bonum et unum* can be said to be *per se subsistens*. But *per se subsistens* can also designate something whose constitution does not depend on something else because it itself is form for itself: *ipsa est sibi forma*, and *forma* is that *per quam aliquid actu est*. When a thing’s simplicity lies in an identity of form and being, it can also be called *per se subsistens*. So not only the *prime unum* is *per se subsistens*: every immaterial thing (*res*) can be said to be *per se subsistens*.

Of all things that are *per se subsistentes*, Berthold affirms, the *prime unum* and the *unitates* (or *bonitates*) merit the name most of all.<sup>36</sup>

[...] sciendum, quod rerum [...] separatarum quaedam stant in una intentione tantum. Et hoc dupliciter, sive simpliciter, ut prime unum, sive contracte, ut bonitates. Et istae cum prime uno proprie et principaliter dicuntur antipostatim sicut stantes se ipsis totis et totaliter sub absoluta formali independentia ad omnem aliam intentionem.<sup>37</sup>

Like the *prime unum*, the *unitates* return to or reflect on themselves *se ipsis totis et totaliter*, determining themselves *sub absoluta formali independentia*. Even if they depend on the *prime unum*, formally they subsist by themselves.<sup>38</sup>

34 Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, c. 11, lect. 4, §932, p. 346.

35 Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, c. 11, lect. 4, §933, p. 346.

36 Unlike Proclus, Berthold thinks that the *prime unum* is self-constituted. Its triadic structure is the expression of its reflexivity. Cf. E. Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela de Colonia* (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013), p. 150–154.

37 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43E, p. 71, l. 177–181.

38 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 9B, p. 170, l. 108–113.

Therefore, Berthold applies the notion of *per se subsistens* as Aquinas understood it to a realm Aquinas rejects, that of Proclus' gods.<sup>39</sup> For, according to Aquinas, the *Platonici* postulated an *ordinem formarum separatarum*. He indicates that they called these forms "gods", and that they posited them above the domain of separate intellects and below the supreme God.<sup>40</sup> But Christians, says Aquinas, "non ponimus alias formas separatas supra intellectuum ordinem, sed ipsum bonum separatum ad quod totum universum ordinatur sicut ad bonum extrinsecum".<sup>41</sup> In other words, he accepts the domain of separate intellects, which he identifies with the angels, but rejects the existence of a plurality of gods. As de Libera observed: "Thomas substitue au rapport formes-intellects la structure Dieu-anges".<sup>42</sup> This means that Aquinas accepts the Proclean notion of *per se subsistens*, but used it only to describe God or the angelic intellectual nature, whereas for Berthold it applies *proprie et principaliter* to God and to the *unitates*, i.e., to those Platonic gods Aquinas rejects.<sup>43</sup>

The idea expressed in Aquinas' commentary plays an important role in the *Expositio*. As we have seen, Berthold has two ways to introduce the Proclean gods to his readers. The first is to identify them with the *causae primordiales* of Eriugena (*quas Pater in Filio fecit*, according to the Irish thinker). He takes this path already in the *Prologus*.<sup>44</sup> The second is to establish their simplicity. He does this through Boethius and through Aquinas' interpretation of the formula *per se subsistens*. Because of their simplicity, one cannot distinguish in the gods between participant and participated, whereas one can in the case of what is *unum secundum participationem*.<sup>45</sup> A principle "perfect by itself" possesses its unity and goodness eternally in virtue of its own nature, even if it has its nature by virtue of being produced by something prior to it.

39 Indeed, Aquinas rejects the existence of a realm of gods if they are understood as something else than an erroneous interpretation of Christian angels, i.e. as a sphere beyond being and intellect. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis*, c. 1.

40 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 3, p. 18, l. 8–p. 20, l. 4.

41 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 10, p. 67, l. 27–29.

42 A. de Libera, "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin interprètes du *Liber de causis*", in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 74(1990), p. 347–378, at p. 370.

43 Furthermore, Aquinas understands that these Platonic gods are *secundum se intelligibiles*. See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 3, p. 18, l. 24. Even if Berthold speaks once about the intellectual nature of the *unitates* (cf. 43A and C), he does it in the broadest sense possible (*generalissime*), as when he predicates *ens* of the *primo unum*. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 14A, p. 3, l. 20–21, and E. Ludueña, "Eriúgena en el siglo XIV. Su presencia en la *Expositio* de Bertoldo de Moosburg", in *Scintilla* 10(2013), p. 99–154, at p. 124–125.

44 Cf. Ludueña, "Eriúgena en el siglo XIV".

45 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 2E, p. 89, l. 253–262.

Finally, we should note that Berthold could have quoted Albert the Great's clarification of the formula *per se*. In his commentary on chapter 11 of *De divinis nominibus*, Albert seeks to determine if there is some *per se* Life made by God. He indicates that *per se* can be understood in two ways: as opposed to *per accidens* or as opposed to *per aliud*. In the first case, it is the opposite of *illud praedicatum quod ponitur in diffinitione*. In the second, Albert makes a further distinction: *per aliud* can mean either (a) that something proceeds from another as from a cause or (b) that something occurs through another thing.<sup>46</sup> Albert writes that, understood as the opposite to this last sense of *per aliud*, there is a *per-se-vita*.

Albert's interpretation of the meaning of *per se*, we may note, coincides with that expressed in the *Clavis physicae*: the *causae primordiales* are *per se* because they participate in the *causa omnium* immediately, "not through another thing". Berthold knew Albert's text. He could have used it, but he had already stated the same idea by quoting the *Clavis*. It seems Aquinas offered him another point of view by bringing the concept of form into the discussion.

#### 4 The *prime unum*, the *unitates*, and Their Modes of Causation

Another recurring issue concerning the gods is their mode of causation, namely: (1) the nature of their causal action and (2) how their causation relates to that of the absolute One.

Berthold reads the *Elementatio* through the *Liber de causis*. As I have said, the *prime unum*, the First Cause of the *Liber*, creates, while the *unitates* or gods cause *per modum formae*. They determine or inform the product of creation: the *unum tantum*. Now, Berthold adopts Albert the Great's reading of the *Liber*, according to which, "si secundum ulterius fluat vel influat [...] non fluit nisi virtute primi".<sup>47</sup> In other words, the creative act is exclusive to the One, and the gods do not create; furthermore, even their activity (to determine or to inform) is only possible because of the *virtus* granted to them by the One. The One, like the First Cause of the *Liber*, does everything the gods do in a more eminent way (*eminentiori modo*). Berthold affirms this by quoting a passage by Ulrich

46 Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1972), c. 11, §26, p. 424, l. 15–28.

47 Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, lib. 1, tr. 4, c. 2, p. 44, l. 37–48: *Si quaeritur vero, cum dicitur 'influere', in qua sit continentia importata, per praepositionem, dicendum quod in possibilitate rei, cui fit influxus. Quae possibilitas rei est ex seipsa. [...] Ex quo patet, quod si secundum ulterius fluat vel influat, quod non fluit nisi virtute primi.*

of Strassburg, which is itself a paraphrase from Albert's *De causis*.<sup>48</sup> Berthold modifies the text he quotes, as he prefers the verb *derivare* to *fluere*.

<p>Albert the Great, <i>De causis et processu universitatis</i>  <i>Si quaeritur vero, cum dicitur 'influere', in qua sit continentia importata, per praepositionem, dicendum quod in possibilitate rei, cui fit influxus. Quae possibilitas rei est ex seipsa. [...]</i></p>	<p>Ulrich of Strassburg, <i>De summo bono</i>  <i>[...] cum secundum ex se nihil habeat nisi receptionem, si ipsum virtute primi.</i><sup>49</sup></p>	<p>Berthold of Moosburg, <i>Expositio</i>  <i>[...] cum secundum ex se nihil habeat nisi receptionem, si ipsum est derivans esse aliis, hoc non facit nisi virtute primi.</i><sup>50</sup></p>
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Modified in this way, the text suits the terminology of the *Elementatio*, because William of Moerbeke used *derivo* to render the Greek  $\chi\omicron\rho\eta\gamma\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\omega$  – thus, proposition 18 reads: “omne derivans esse aliis ipsum prime est hoc, quod tradit recipientibus derivationem”. Berthold links Ulrich’s (and, by extension, Albert’s) theory of *fluxus* with Proclus’ text, but also, simultaneously, to the Eriugenian doctrine of theophany. Even if their modes of causation differ, both the action of the *prime unum* and that of the *unitates* are some kind of *derivatio*.<sup>51</sup> Because of this, and based on the way Berthold edits his materials, we can say that, within the *Expositio*, the Eriugenian doctrine of *theophania* is equivalent to the doctrine of the *Liber*’s first Proposition on the *virtus* of the first cause. Berthold himself suggests this equivalency, since to explain Proposition 18 he cites the following text from the *Clavis physicae*:

48 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4. Tractatus 1–2,7*, ed. S. Pieperhoff (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), lib. IV, tr. 1, c. 5, §8, p. 30, l. 88–90.

49 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. IV, tr. 1, c. 5, §8, p. 30, l. 88–90.

50 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18C, p. 51, l. 273–275.

51 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18F, p. 55, l. 411–416: [...] *omne derivans esse aliis est prime hoc, quod tradit. Cum enim sit fontale seu primordiale principium, et hoc sive simpliciter et absolute sive respectu determinatae maneriei entium, et sit causa sive superessentialis sive essentialis omnium sub universalitate intentionis suae contentorum, necessarium est ipsum absolutius et eminentius esse omnibus suis effectibus et esse fontaliter et originaliter hoc, quod tradit.*

'Nihil ergo est participatio nisi ex superiori essentia secundae post eam essentiae **derivatio** et ab ea, quae primum habet esse, secundae, ut sit, distributio. Sicut ex fonte totum flumen principaliter manat et per eius alveum aqua, quae primum surgit in fonte, in quantamcumque longitudinem protendatur, semper ac sine ulla intermissione diffunditur, sic divina bonitas et essentia et vita et sapientia et omnia, quae in fonte omnium sunt, primo in primordiales causas defluunt et eas esse faciunt, deinde per primordiales causas in earum effectus ineffabili modo per convenientes sibi universitatis ordines decurrunt per superiora semper ad inferiora profluentia iterumque per secretissimos naturae poros occultissimo meatu ad fontem suum redeunt. Inde enim omne bonum, omnis essentia, omnis vita, omnis sensus, omnis ratio, omnis sapientia, omne genus, omnis species, omnis plenitudo, omnis ordo, omnis unitas, omnis aequalitas, omnis differentia, omne tempus, omnis locus et omne, quod est, et omne, quod non est, et omne, quod intelligitur, et omne, quod sentitur, et omne, quod superat sensum et intellectum'. Haec Theodorus.<sup>52</sup>

In a certain way, the *prime unum* has an immediate relation with every effect in every sense, precisely because all the subordinate causes act *in sua virtute* – or, in Eriugenian terms, because God is not only the beginning and end of all things but is also the *medium*, for he flows through everything. The *prime unum* can claim the authorship of the causal operation of every subordinate cause, just like the artificer is responsible for what the instrument does. In fact, in several places, Berthold speaks of the *unitates* or *causae primordiales* as an instrument. He affirms, for example, that:

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52 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 18B, p. 47, 107–122, citing Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis physicae*, c. 126–127, p. 93, l. 7–p. 94, l. 7. The last part (not identified as such by the editor) is quoted once again in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 119B, p. 84, l. 45–57: *Gaudium ergo etc., quia omne gaudium, quod est diffusio rei, in conceptione boni est. Si vero est a summo bono et potissimum est, potissimum autem est in ratione omnium causalium rationum omnis seyrae sive ordinis totorum et, sicut dictum est, ambit omne bonum. 'Inde enim est omne bonum, omnis essentia, omnis vita', omne intellectus, 'omne genus, omnis species, omnis plenitudo, omnis ordo, omnis unitas, omnis aequalitas, omnis differentia' 'et omne, quod est, et omne, quod non est, et omne, quod intelligitur, et omne, quod sentitur, et omne, quod superat sensum et intellectum'. Sic ergo gaudium veritatis, non vanitatis, omnis essentiae est sua vita, quam habet a bono et uno. Et quia omnis vita stat in unione sicut et mors in separatione, necessarium est, quod omnis vita est ab unitate. Haec quidem enim est ab interiori indivisione. Quanto igitur aliquid est magis unum, magis vivit, ergo, quod est sua unitas, est summa vita. Cum itaque bonum prime sit simpliciter sine omni divisione, ipsum erit infinitas virtutum, qua nihil potest melius cogitari.*



omnis unitas constituit cum prime uno determinatam maneriem boni compositi cooperatrix et instrumentum ipsius prime unius simpliciter omnia producentis.<sup>53</sup>

Similarly, we read that:

omne inferius est quasi instrumentum superioris causae, quanto enim aliquid est altius, tanto intimius ingreditur in effectum, et per consequens inferius non propria virtute, sed magis virtute principalis agentis pertingit ad effectum.<sup>54</sup>

This allows Berthold to say that the *prime unum* not only creates, but even determines its effects in and through the *unitates* or *causae primordiales*: “the *prime deus* determines his own causality in and through them, using them like an instrument of his own operation.”<sup>55</sup> The absolute God brings order to everything, even if *per medias causas*, as it is said in the following text:

Prime autem Deus [...] existens causa simpliciter omnium omnia ordinat per se ipsum, licet **per causas medias**, in quibus et cum quibus operatur per 57, exequatur. Et in ipsa executione quodammodo immediate se habet ad omnes effectus, inquantum omnes **causae mediae** sibi subordinatae agunt in sua virtute, ut quodammodo ipsum primum in omnibus agere videatur et omnia opera secundarum causarum ei possunt attribui eminentius per 56, sicut artifici attribuitur opus instrumenti. Item etiam habet se immediate ad omnes res, inquantum ipsum solum per se est causa boni sive secundum essentiam sive secundum participationem. Item, quia omnia ab ipso conservantur seu continentur in sua existentia.<sup>56</sup>

53 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 137F, p. 22, l. 243–245.

54 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 75A, p. 59, l. 16–18.

55 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 176C, p. 164, l. 211–212.

56 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 142B, p. 55, l. 83–94. See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 103F, p. 225, l. 103–p. 226, l. 108: [...] *ergo prime bonum est causa immediata non solum creationis et conservationis rerum, sed etiam cuiuslibet operis creaturae, et cum hoc etiam est causa mediata, quia illa una numero operatio causatur a natura creata operante virtute prime causae, qualiter prime bonum est eius causa mediata, sicut efficiens per instrumentum, et nihilominus ipsa operatio causatur a prime bono per se operante, qualiter ipsum est causa immediata*. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 103F, p. 226, l. 125–134: [...] *duplitter dicitur aliquid operari per aliud sive mediante alio. Uno modo sicut mediante instrumento cooperante, et sic tam prime bonum quam etiam primordiales causae immediate operantur quaelibet suo modo, inquantum sua praesentia sunt in effectibus, ut iam dictum est; unde sic operans est principale, et medium est secundarium. Alio modo operator aliquid*

Several times in his paraphrase of the *De causis*, Albert the Great employs the example of the artificer and the instrument through which he accomplishes his work. The *forma* in the mind of the artificer preserves its essential identity all through the process of production – flowing from the mind to the *spiritus*, from it to the *organa membrorum*, and then to the *instrumenta*, to flow finally into the *materia exterioris*. It flows through all these instances without losing its identity; only its mode of being changes.<sup>57</sup> However, the point Albert is trying to make regards the identity maintained throughout the causal process, not the problem of immediacy or mediation. At this stage of my research, it seems to me that, whenever Berthold speaks of the primordial causes as instruments, he rather has in mind a distinction made by Aquinas in his commentary on the first proposition of the *Liber*. There Thomas says that a series of causes can be ordered (*ordinari*) in either of two ways: *per se* or *per accidens*.

Per se quidem quando intentio primae causae respicit usque ad ultimum effectum **per omnes medias causas**, sicut cum ars fabrilis movet manum, manus martellum qui ferrum percussura extendit, ad quod fertur intentio artis. Per accidens autem quando intentio causae non procedit nisi ad proximum effectum; quod autem ab illo effectu efficiatur iterum aliud, est praeter intentionem primi efficientis, sicut cum aliquis accendit candelam, praeter intentionem eius est quod iterum accensa candela accendat aliam et illa aliam; quod autem praeter intentionem est, dicimus esse per accidens. In causis igitur per se ordinatis haec propositio habet veritatem, in quibus causa prima movet **omnes causas medias** ad effectum; in causis autem ordinatis per accidens est e converso, nam effectus qui per se producitur a causa proxima, per accidens producitur a causa prima, praeter intentionem eius existens. Quod autem est per se potius est eo quod est per accidens, et propter hoc signanter dicit: causa universalis, quae est causa per se.<sup>58</sup>

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*per aliud, scilicet mediante virtute alterius, et sic in quolibet ordine causarum sola prima causa est causa immediata, quia propria virtute causat et non per alicuius alterius virtutem sibi communicatam per 99 et 100, et omnes sequentes causae sunt causae mediatæ causantes mediante virtute causae primæ ab eis omnibus participata.*

57 Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, lib. 1, tr. 4, c. 6, p. 50, l. 2–11: *Et forma, qua fluit primum, magis et magis determinatur et coarctatur, secundum quod fluit in secundo vel tertio vel deinceps. Sicut in exemplo diximus de arte, quae a mente artificis fluit in spiritum, de spiritu in organa membrorum, de organis in instrumenta et de instrumentis in materiam exteriorem. In omnibus enim his idem est quod fluit, licet secundum aliud esse sit in primo, et secundum aliud in secundo et secundum aliud in tertio et sic deinceps.*

58 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 1, p. 9, l. 29–p. 10, l. 15.

In fact, it seems possible that Berthold often has this text in mind while commenting on other topics of the *Elementatio*. In two places (commenting on Propositions 129 and 201), for example, he has recourse to the distinction between *per se* and *per accidens* regarding the concepts of part and whole.<sup>59</sup> And while dealing with the content of Proposition 199, he observes: “Artifex enim, puta faber, nec esse nec actum artis habet a martello, sed tamen per martellum inducit formam artis in materiam artificiatum”.<sup>60</sup> My sense is that in those passages Berthold is following Aquinas’ observations.<sup>61</sup> I would not consider this a citation of Aquinas, but rather a utilization of a certain line of thought or, better, a genuine appropriation by Berthold – something, perhaps, even more important than a citation. However, be that as it may, it is certain that Berthold cites at least one text by Aquinas to deal with the articulation of the causation of the *prime unum* and the *unitates*.

The commentary on Proposition 137 of the *Elementatio* shows “omnem unitatem productam in producendo praesupponere causalitatem prime unius, cui cooperatur in suum causatum constituendo”. In the second point of the *propositum*, Berthold refers to “primarii in omnibus secundariis operationem et nihilominus secundariorum primario comparationem”. To this end, he brings in a passage from Aquinas’ *Contra errores Graecorum*:

59 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129F, p. 181, l. 259–270: *Qualiter autem divinae animae deficiente per suspensionem earum ad proprios intellectus, considerandum. Et ut exemplariter deducatur, sciendum, quod intellectus substantialis in anima partiali habet modum partis, pars autem, quia habet quodammodo modum substantiae completae, potest agere vel pati. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo per modum instrumenti, et sic agere et pati convenit toti per se, parti autem per accidens, ut si dicatur: ‘oculus videt’. Alio modo potest intelligi aliqua pars totius agere vel pati per se. Et hoc dupliciter: uno modo, ut tantum ipsa pars agat vel patiat, ita videlicet, quod talis actio et passio partis non communicetur toti. Et secundum hoc convenit agere et pati toti per accidens et parti per se. Alio modo, ut talis actio et passio partis communicetur toti, et tunc primo et per se convenit talis actio vel passio parti, per se autem, sed non primo modo, convenit ipsi toti. See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 201E, p. 178, l. 196–204: [...] *pars dicitur operari dupliciter: uno modo per modum instrumenti – et sic operari convenit toti per se, parti vero per accidens, sicut visio est oculi sicut instrumenti et per accidens, hominis autem per se –, alio modo intelligitur pars operari per se, et hoc dupliciter: uno modo, ut tantum ipsa pars agat sive operetur, ita videlicet, ut talis operatio non communicetur toti, et sic ipsa operatio convenit parti per se, toti vero per accidens, sicut manus infrigidata infrigidans aliquid, cui apponitur; alio modo, ut talis operatio partis communicetur toti, et tunc primo et per se convenit talis operatio parti, per se autem, sed non primo convenit ipsi toti.**

60 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 199D, p. 159, l. 254–267.

61 Moreover, for Aquinas, an instrumental cause cannot create, it can only inform (or determine). See J.-L. Solère, “Duns Scotus versus Thomas Aquinas on Instrumental Causality”, in *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy* 7(2019), p. 147–185, at p. 158. This is exactly the case for the *unitates* in Berthold’s *Expositio*.

Thomas Aquinas, *Contra errores Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio Graecorum*

... **sciendum**, quod aliquid dicitur cooperari alicui dupliciter. Uno modo, quia operatur ad eundem effectum, sed per aliam virtutem; **sicut minister cooperatur domino, dum eius praeceptis obedit, et instrumentum artifici, a quo movetur.**

Alio modo dicitur aliquid cooperari alicui, inquantum operatur eandem operationem cum ipso: sicut si diceretur de duobus **portantibus aliquod pondus, vel de pluribus trahentibus navem**, quod unus alteri cooperetur.

Secundum ergo primum modum creatura potest dici creatori cooperari quantum ad aliquos effectus, qui fiunt mediante creatura ...<sup>62</sup>

[...] licet prime unum solum perfecte operetur in omnibus, tamen per hoc non excludit subordinata sibi principia activa rerum constitutiva, quorum nullum aspirat ad puritatem actionis cum prime uno, cum omnis causa et ante causatum operetur et cum ipso et post ipsum plurimum sit substitutiva per 57. **Unde notandum**, quod aliquid dicitur alicui cooperari dupliciter. Uno modo, quia operatur ad effectum eundem, sed per aliam virtutem. **Et hoc est dupliciter, vel inquantum superius operatur ad effectum inferioris virtute eminentiori, et sic prime unum cooperatur omnibus nec actio eius excluditur in cuiuscumque operantis operatione vel inquantum inferius per virtutem, quam habet a superiori, cooperatur ipsi superiori, et sic divinissimum operum est esse cooperatorem Dei secundum Dionysium.** Alio modo dicitur aliquid cooperari alicui, inquantum operatur eandem operationem cum ipso, sicut si diceretur de duobus **trahentibus navim**, quod unus alteri cooperetur, **et sic nulla creatura cuiuscumque eminentiae cooperatur prime uni, sed solum** secundum primum modum creatura dicitur cooperari prime uni quantum ad illos effectus, qui fiunt mediante creatura.<sup>63</sup>

62 Thomas Aquinas, *Contra errores Graecorum*, ed. Commissio Leonina, vol. 40A (Roma: Santa Sabina, 1967), pars I, c. 23, p. 84, l. 11–23.

63 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 137E, p. 21, l. 212–p. 22, l. 226.

According to Aquinas, a creature can cooperate with God only if it does so with regard to the same effect but through another *virtus*. Berthold copies the passage but makes a further distinction. He adds that cooperation can happen in two ways: either (a) when something superior cooperates *virtute eminentiori* with something inferior, or (b) when something inferior cooperates with something superior. In the first case (a), the *prime unum* can be said to cooperate with everything – “nec actio eius excluditur in cuiuscumque operantis operatione”. In the second case (b), the inferior cooperates with the superior through the *virtus* conferred upon it by the superior.

Berthold expands Aquinas’s distinction by making room for the affirmation that the absolute One can cooperate with the *unitates*. Interestingly, he does not retain the example of the artificer and his instrument. Instead, he indicates that the *unitates* cooperate with the absolute One through the *virtus* the One itself gave them. In this regard, he is consistent with the idea expressed elsewhere in the *Expositio*: the *unitates* are used by the One as an instrument. The additions made by Berthold redefine or even correct the idea expressed by Aquinas. For Berthold focuses on an expression used by Aquinas, namely, *per aliam virtutem*, and he warns us that such a *virtus* is not exactly *alia*. The One grants the *unitates* their *virtus agendi*.<sup>64</sup>

64 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 75A, p. 58, l. 13–18: *Item sciendum, quod in essentialiter ordinatis priora et ex hoc causaliora agunt in submissis, tum quia dant eis esse et virtutem agendi, tum quia datam conservant, tum quia applicant virtutes secundorum ad agendum, tum etiam quia omne inferius est quasi instrumentum superioris causae, quanto enim aliquid est altius, tanto intimius ingreditur in effectum, et per consequens inferius non propria virtute, sed magis virtute principalis agentis pertingit ad effectum*. See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 57F, p. 153, l. 180–188: *Et quia omne, quod a secundis seu causatis producitur, eminentius producitur a prime causa per praemissis, necessarium est etiam prime bonum operari cum omni et in omni suo causato, si tale causatum fuerit etiam causa, tum quia causaliora agunt in submissis, ut dictum est, tum quia dant eis et quod sunt et per consequens agendi virtutem, tum quia datam virtutem conservant, tum quia applicant virtutes secundorum ad agendum, tum etiam quia omne inferius est quasi instrumentum superioris, quia, quanto agens est altius et actualius, tanto intimius ingreditur in effectum. Instrumentum autem non propria virtute, sed virtute principalis agentis pertingit ad effectum ipsius agentis*. It is worth noting that the verb *applico* appears also in Aquinas’ treatments of instrumental causality. See Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7: *sequitur de necessitate quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum*; id., *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. III, c. 67: *quicquid applicat virtutem activam ad agendum, dicitur esse causa illius actionis: artifex enim applicans virtutem rei naturalis ad aliquam actionem, dicitur esse causa illius actionis, sicut coquus decoctionis, quae est per ignem. Sed omnis applicatio virtutis ad operationem est principaliter et primo a Deo. Applicantur enim virtutes operativae ad proprias operationes per aliquem motum vel corporis, vel animae. Primum autem principium utriusque motus est Deus. Est enim primum*

One cannot but help noting a certain friction between the idea of the self-constitution of the *unitates*, their metaphysical excellence, and their being reduced to mere instruments of the action of the *prime unum*. One can say, with Eugenia Paschetto, that “per Bertoldo solo la causa prima e veramente tale: le altre al contrario non sono che mezzi attraverso cui si esplica, sotto altre forme, l'azione della causa prima; tanto e vero che Bertoldo alluderà ad esse come *instrumenta nature*”.<sup>65</sup>

## 5 Concluding Remarks

I have shown that Berthold used at least two texts by Aquinas to address two important issues regarding the presentation of Proclus' gods: their simple self-constituted nature, and their mode of causation and its relation to the creative causality of the One. I also suggested that he may have relied as well on yet another text by Aquinas, which helped him to define the role played by the *unitates* in the process of determination of the *tantum unum*, which is the product of creation: they do not create, they determine, and, in doing so, they cooperate with the absolute One like an instrument cooperates with an artificer. In this sense, Berthold can say the One creates and *determinat suam causalitatem*.

Thirty-seven years ago, in order to draw a clear line between the teachings of Aquinas and Berthold, Kurt Flasch pointed out that for Thomas admitting *creaturas per se subsistentes* would be a blasphemy.<sup>66</sup> I think the relation between Berthold and Aquinas might be more complex than this.

Furthermore, there are other aspects of Aquinas' influence in the *Expositio*, which I have not focused on. For example, there is a passage from Aquinas' commentary on Dionysius quoted in the *Expositio*, in which Aquinas explains how angels participate in intellectual light. Berthold uses it to show that what happens in the case of the angels (which come immediately after the Creator according to the order of voluntary providence) happens *a fortiori* in the case

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*movens omnino immobile, ut supra ostensum est.* I take these references from Solère, “Duns Scotus versus Thomas Aquinas”, p. 157, n. 20, and p. 162.

65 E. Paschetto, “L'*Elementatio theologica* di Proclo e il commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg. Alcuni aspetti della nozione de causa”, in *Filosofia* 27(1976), p. 353–378, at p. 367.

66 K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, p. xvii–xviii: “Das Autarke ist nach Berthold per se subsistens (Expos. prop. 9E Pagnoni-Sturlese 173,240; vgl. prop. 3B Sturlese 94,74–75: creaturae per se subsistentes!), was, auf Geschaffenes bezogen, im Sinne der thomistischen Terminologie eine Blasphemie wäre, bei Berthold aber die Transzendenz des höchsten Gutes nicht antastet, gleichwohl einen Wertzuwachs kreatürlicher Instanzen zum Ausdruck bringt.”

of the *unitates* (which immediately follow the *prime unum* according to the order of natural providence).<sup>67</sup>

Another interesting case concerns a passage from Aquinas' *Expositio*, which Berthold uses at least twice. On Proposition XXIII (XXIV) of the *Liber de causis* ("causa prima existit in rebus omnibus secundum dispositionem unam"), Aquinas explains that divine action is double: God creates and God governs creation. In the first case, God is the efficient cause of all diversity. Otherwise, there would be things not created by God. But in the second case, diversity arises entirely from the recipients, not from God. Berthold endorses this statement in 142B, and he has recourse to it once again in 149A. In 149A, he points out that certain people (who can certainly be identified with Eriugenians, including Dionysius and the author of the *Clavis physicae*) would not agree with this distinction: they would argue that diversity arises from the recipients in both governance and creation.<sup>68</sup> This view holds that creation, understood as *participatio unius*, does not require a pre-existing *participans*, whereas all subsequent participation (*informatio* or *determinatio*) does imply a pre-existing *participans*.

If not in quantitative terms, I would say that Aquinas deserves more of our attention as a source of the *Expositio*. In any case, we can confirm, with Dragos Calma, the enduring relevance of Thomas Aquinas, and his *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, with respect to "the medieval understanding of Greek Neoplatonism".<sup>69</sup>

67 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 156A, p. 169, l. 12–p. 170, l. 52. We can also think of 111C. There Berthold cites Aquinas once on the way the different orders of intellects participate in God and he even adopts Aquinas' reading of Dionysius. These are just examples to show that Berthold knew his Aquinas, and especially the *Super Librum de causis Expositio*. In fact, as Evan King pointed out to me, further research would likely reveal that Berthold often made recourse to Aquinas' commentary to glean what he could from the Angelic Doctor's remarks on Proclus' propositions.

68 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis Expositio*, lect. 24, p. 122, l. 13–p. 123, l. 4. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 142B, p. 55, l. 104–p. 56, l. 116, and 149A, p. 112, l. 40–44.

69 D. Calma, "The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism. Considerations on a Recently Discovered Corpus of Texts", in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. Vol. 1 New Commentaries on Liber de causis (ca. 1250–1350)*, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), p. 11–41, at p. 11. Also, on the basis of what has been said, we may think about Aquinas himself, and consider a suggestion recently made by Scarpelli Cory, "*Reditio completa, reditio incompleta*", p. 192: "for Aquinas, the translation of Proclus's *Elements* provided indisputable confirmation of a long-dawning intuition: namely, that the various principles of his (Aquinas's) own unified philosophical system might actually be rooted in different metaphysical traditions that he had originally conceived as fundamentally in tension with each other." Cf. L. Sturlese, "Homo divino (Il commento a Proclo di Bertoldo di Moosburg)", in L. Sturlese, *Eckhart, Tauler, Suso. Filosofi e mistici nella Germania medievale* (Firenze: Le

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## Berthold of Moosburg, Reader of Ulrich of Strassburg. On Natural Providence

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The present article focuses on the concept of “natural providence” in the *Expositio* of Berthold of Moosburg, stressing the role of Ulrich of Strassburg’s *De summo bono* in the theoretical elaboration and textual drafting of Berthold’s work. Indeed, the question of natural providence was discussed by many Dominican masters of Cologne during the 13th and 14th centuries. Berthold was no exception, and he referred not only to Dietrich of Freiberg’s works, as most modern scholars claim, but he also made use of a large portion of Ulrich’s *De summo bono*.

To understand the aim of this article, it is appropriate first to give a preliminary survey of the *status quaestionis* of critical studies. Indeed, a brief history of the historiography of this issue can provide us with some clues as to how and why scholars have traditionally emphasised Berthold’s reception of Dietrich more than Ulrich.<sup>1</sup> As Kurt Flasch stressed in his introduction to the critical edition of Berthold’s *Expositio*,<sup>2</sup> at the beginning of the 20th century Grabmann<sup>3</sup> and Krebs<sup>4</sup> were the first to draw attention to Berthold’s philosophical work. Rightly, they considered the medieval theologian to be one of the most important authors of the “German Dominican School” established by Albert the Great in Cologne during the 13th century.<sup>5</sup> They assumed Berthold

1 This paper will not address the influence of Dietrich of Freiberg’s works on the *Expositio* of Berthold of Moosburg because this subject has already received extensive study from other scholars.

2 K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. xi–xxxix.

3 Cf. M. Grabmann, “Studien über Ulrich von Strassburg”, in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 29(1905), p. 626.

4 Cf. E. Krebs, *Meister Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Wissenschaft* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1906), p. 50, n. 2.

5 The *Studium* of Cologne was founded in 1248 by Albert the Great (cf. *Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, ed. B.M. Reichert, vol. 3 [Roma / Stuttgart: Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica, 1898], I rec., p. 41). For the specific characteristics of this

to be the most important disciple of Dietrich of Freiberg.<sup>6</sup> Grabmann was also the first to understand the particular “philosophical features” of the Cologne authors. In his opinion, Albert’s intellectual heritage divided itself into two different schools: the first one, established in Paris, was characterised by an Aristotelian influence and set the trend for Thomas Aquinas and his followers; the second one, established in Cologne, was characterised by a certain fidelity to Neoplatonic metaphysics and was the trend followed by Ulrich of Strassburg, Dietrich of Freiberg, Meister Eckhart, and Berthold of Moosburg. Klibansky accepted and defended this historical interpretation.<sup>7</sup> The Anglo-German scholar played a particularly important role in the discussion surrounding Berthold’s role in the history of Proclus’ reception during the Middle Ages. Klibansky found that in no other late-medieval school did Proclus have such prominence as he did in Cologne and, moreover, that it was within this tradition that Berthold reached the summit of the medieval reception of Proclus.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, the primacy of the Byzantine philosopher for Berthold is made perfectly clear in the *Expositio tituli*, where Berthold lists the reasons that led him to write a commentary on Proclus. According to Berthold, the virtues of the ancient philosopher are the capacity to reorder Plato’s doctrines and the ability to understand the nature of the First Principle as far as possible for a man, that is, by exclusively using his natural intellect:

Excellentia namque eius et praepollentia ad alios Platonicos evidenter apparet in hoc, quod ipsius Platonis theoremata ordinavit in praesenti libro et ordinata subtilissime declaravit. [...] Item in hoc apparet excellentia eius, quod per triplicem motum, [...] scilicet circularem, rectum et

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Dominican “School of Cologne”, cf. L. Sturlese, “Proclo ed Ermete in Germania da Alberto Magno a Bertoldo di Moosburg. Per una prospettiva di ricerca sulla cultura filosofica tedesca nel secolo delle sue origini (1250–1359)”, in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 22–33.

6 We do not have much biographical information on Berthold of Moosburg: he entered the Dominican Order and studied at Oxford in 1315; he was also a lector at Regensburg in 1327 and, after this period, he worked in Cologne between 1335 and 1361, where he probably wrote his *Expositio* on Proclus’ *Elementatio theologica*. For a general introduction to Berthold of Moosburg’s philosophy and for his personal and intellectual relationship with Dietrich of Freiberg, cf. A. de Libera, *Introduzione alla mistica renana* (Milano: Jaca Book, 1998), p. 239–326.

7 Cf. R. Klibansky, *Ein Proklosfund und seine Bedeutung* (*Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. 1928/29, 5. Abhandlung*) (Heidelberg: Winter, 1929).

8 Berthold’s *Expositio* is one of the few known medieval commentaries on Proclus’ *Elementatio*, and it is certainly the most famous; this fact also stresses its significance for the history of philosophy in general.

obliquum, ascendendo pervenit, quantum fuit possibile homini mortali ductu luminis naturalis intellectus, in notitiam summi boni.<sup>9</sup>

According to Berthold, Proclus' masterpiece should be considered a purely philosophical work in which the author proves his excellence in understanding the Truth through the exclusive use of his natural intellect ("Proclus namque philosophus fuit auctor istius libri, unus de excellentissimis Platonis discipulis. [...] Ipse enim omnes Platonis sectatores procul excellebat et in philosophia sic omnibus praepollebat").<sup>10</sup>

Other important developments of Berthold studies took place in 1974, with Sturlese's edition of the *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli 184–211. De animabus*,<sup>11</sup> and in the 1980s, thanks to the impressive project of the *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi* started by Kurt Flasch and scholars of the "Bochumer Schule". Thanks to this initiative, the editions of the Cologne masters became available to researchers. The edition of Dietrich was already partially available at that time, so it was included as an integral part in the *Corpus* and was completed in 1985.<sup>12</sup> The first work edited in the *Corpus* properly speaking was the volume containing the first 13 *propositiones* of Berthold's commentary in 1984.<sup>13</sup> This work was followed by the edition of *propositiones* 14 to 34 of the *Expositio* in 1986.<sup>14</sup> It was during the 1980s that scholars began to study Berthold's thought more closely and, moreover, it was during this period that Dietrich's philosophical influence began to be recognised in the *Expositio*. Meanwhile, Ulrich of Strassburg still was not published and only a few very specific sections of the *De summo bono* were available to scholars.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, at that time Ulrich was considered an unoriginal

9 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli, Expositio tituli A*, p. 37–38, l. 25–34.

10 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Exp. tit. A*, p. 37, l. 10–15.

11 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super elementationem theologicam Procli 184–211. De animabus*, ed. L. Sturlese (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974).

12 Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie*, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977); Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 2. Schriften zur Metaphysik und Theologie*, eds R. Imbach et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980); Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, eds J.-D. Caviglioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983); Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 4. Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1985).

13 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*.

14 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986).

15 S.J. Seleman, *Procession and Spiration in the Trinitarian Doctrine of the Summa de Bono of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Edited text and Analysis*, MA thesis (University of Saint Joseph, 1973);

author, without real theoretical relevance, whose only merit was his having summarised Albert the Great.<sup>16</sup> I think that these elements help to explain why scholars did not explore the importance of Ulrich's *De summo bono* and particularly, for our purposes, its textual and theoretical influence on Berthold's *Expositio*. Therefore, beginning in the 1980s, it became the established historical and hermeneutical trend to consider Berthold's *Expositio* primarily in relation to Dietrich's works. This is clear in some important volumes of critical literature, such as Alain de Libera's remarkable book *Introduction à la mystique rhénane*:

[...] non è dunque sufficiente dire che la dottrina di Bertoldo è la stessa di quella di Teodorico, è quasi alla lettera che il freibergense è rispettato [...] il *Commento* a Proclo proposto da Bertoldo è anche, per non dire in primo luogo, una valorizzazione delle dottrine più caratteristiche del pensiero di Teodorico di Freiberg [...] È inutile insistere di più, la noetica di Bertoldo è quella di Teodorico di Freiberg.<sup>17</sup>

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S.J. Seleman., *Law and Justice in the Philosophical Doctrine of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Edited text and Philosophical Study*, PhD diss. (Fordham University, 1979); W.J. O'Callaghan, *The Constitution of Created Composite Being in Liber de summo bono (Book IV, Tract. II, 1–8), of Ulrich of Strasbourg, O.P. Philosophical Study and Text*, PhD diss. (Marquette University, 1970); F.J. Lescoe, *God as First Principle in Ulrich of Strasbourg. Critical Text of Summa de Bono, IV, 1, Based on Hitherto Unpublished Mediaeval Manuscripts and philosophical study* (New York: Alba House, 1979); L.B. Geoghegan, *Divine Generation, Its Nature and Limits, in the Summa de Bono of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Philosophical Study and Text*, MA thesis (University of Saint Joseph, 1974); C.J. Fagin, *The Doctrine of Divine Ideas in the Summa de Bono of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Text and Philosophical Study*, PhD diss. (University of Toronto, 1948); J. Daguillon, *Ulrich de Strasbourg, O.P., La Summa de bono, Livre I. Introduction et édition critique* (Paris: Vrin, 1930); J. Daguillon, "Ulrich de Strasbourg, prédicateur. Un sermon inedit du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle", in *La vie spirituelle* 27(1927), p. 84–98; F. Collingwood, *The Theory of Being in Summa de Bono, (Book II) of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Philosophical Study and Text*, PhD diss. (University of Toronto, 1952).

- 16 Cf. B. Hauréau, *Histoire de la philosophie scholastique* (Paris: Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, 1880), part II, vol. 2, p. 42; M. Grabmann, "Studien über Ulrich von Straßburg", in M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik* (München: Hueber, 1926), vol. I, p. 147–221; G. Théry, "Originalité du plan de la *Summa de bono* d'Ulrich de Strasbourg", in *Revue thomiste* 27(1922), p. 376–397.
- 17 A. de Libera, *Introduzione alla mistica renana*, p. 258. Cf. also K. Flasch, "Einleitung", p. xi–xxxix; L. Sturlese, "*Homo divinus*. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds von Moosburg und die Probleme der nacheckhartschen Zeit", in K. Ruh (ed.), *Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposion Kloster Engelberg 1984* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), p. 145–161.

It was at the end of the 1980s that Book I of *De summo bono*, a part of Book II, and a part of Book IV become available in the *Corpus*.<sup>18</sup> The edition of Ulrich's work was interrupted for fifteen years and it began again approximately twenty years ago with the publications of Palazzo, Beccarisi, Retucci, Sannino, and other scholars.<sup>19</sup> The completion of the edition of *De summo bono* and the recent publication of some contributions which rediscovered Ulrich's philosophical relevance are opening up a new approach that stresses his theoretical prominence and his key role in the Dominican School of Cologne.<sup>20</sup> I would like to include my paper in this newer wave of scholarship, taking into account the fundamental question of natural providence in Berthold's *Expositio*.<sup>21</sup>

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- 18 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 1*, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 1–4*, ed. A. de Libera (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 1–2,7*, ed. S. Pieperhoff (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987).
- 19 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 3, Tractatus 1–3*, ed. S. Tuzzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2004); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 3*, ed. A. Palazzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2005); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6*, ed. A. Beccarisi (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 3, Tractatus 4–5*, ed. S. Tuzzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 2,15–24*, eds B. Mojsisch, F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 6, Tractatus 1–3,6*, ed. S. Tuzzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 2,8–14*, ed. A. Palazzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2012); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 6, Tractatus 3,7–29*, ed. S. Cianciosi (Hamburg: Meiner, 2015); Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 6, Tractatus 4,1–15*, eds I. Zavattoni, C. Colomba (Hamburg: Meiner, 2017).
- 20 Cf. A. Beccarisi, "La scientia divina dei filosofi nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Rivista di storia della filosofia* 61(2006), p. 137–63; A. Palazzo, "La sapientia nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Quaestio* 5(2005), p. 495–512; A. Palazzo, "Ulrico di Strasburgo, un maestro nel citare. Nuove evidenze del ricorso alle opere di Alberto il Grande in *De Summo Bono* IV, 2, 8–14", in F. Meroi (ed.), *Le parole del pensiero. Studi offerti a Nestore Pirillo* (Pisa: ETS, 2013), p. 49–75; B. Faes de Mottoni, "La distinzione tra causa agente e causa motrice nella *Summa de summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Studi medievali* 20(1979), p. 313–355; B. Mojsisch, A. de Libera, "Einleitung", in Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 1*, p. ix–xxviii; L. Malovini, "Noetica e teologia dell'immagine nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica* 90(1998), p. 28–50; C. Trottmann, "La théologie des théologiens et celle des philosophes", in *Revue thomiste* 98(1998), p. 531–561; A. de Libera, "Ulrich de Strasbourg, lecteur d'Albert le Grand", in R. Imbach, C. Flüeler (eds.), *Albert der Grosse und die deutsche Dominikanerschule* (Fribourg: Universitätsverlag, 1985), p. 105–136.
- 21 For a general introduction to the main topics of *Expositio* and for Berthold's methodological approach, cf. G.L. Potestà, "Per laboriosam investigationem ascendendo. L'edizione di Bertoldo di Moosburg", in *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 76/4(1984), p. 637–643. For a detailed study of Berthold's work and philosophy, cf. E. King, *Supersapientia. A Study of the Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli of Berthold von Moosburg*, PhD

According to the Dominican theologian, as he writes in the *Prologus*, Proclus' *Elementatio* explicitly deals with the *invisibilia Dei* according to the order of natural providence:

Ista sunt invisibilia Dei transitive accepta, de quibus in ista elementatione theologica subtilissime pertractatur, quantum pertinet ad providentiam naturalem.<sup>22</sup>

The question concerning the *invisibilia Dei* (the divine ideas), can be examined in two different ways according to Berthold: *intransitive* and *transitive*.<sup>23</sup> The first one considers the eternal and immutable reasons (the *exemplaria*) existing in God and in the divine Word in their absoluteness; the second one considers the same reasons as models of all things in the cosmos. According to the *transitive* way, the divine ideas have the necessary function of explaining and making possible the passage from God to the world, that is, from the principle that pre-contains in itself the reasons of all things to the effects and individual entities. In Berthold's *Expositio* these *invisibilia Dei* are considered in their *transitive* way only – in relation to the world and according to their productive and regulative functions. Furthermore, this *transitive* way is considered exclusively *quantum pertinet ad providentiam naturalem*. The point of view of natural providence considers the world according to its causal relations; this kind of knowledge is a philosophical one and it is only attainable by assiduous study (*per laboriosam investigationem*):

Verum, quod per motum obliquum, qui proprius erat philosophorum et erat per laboriosam investigationem primi omnium existentium principii dividendo, definiendo, communibus principiis utendo, a notis ad ignota per ratiocinationem progrediendo, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia ascendendo et inter intelligibilia ab uno in aliud tendendo, quousque ad simpliciter ultimum perveniatur, ascenderit ipse Proclus in summi boni notitiam, apparet in praesenti libro, ubi in excelsum maximum ascendit per operum conditionem, conditorum gubernationem et contrariorum conciliationem.<sup>24</sup>

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diss. (University of Cambridge, 2016); E. King, "Berthold of Moosburg on Intellect and the One of the Soul", in *Dionysius* 36(2018), p. 184–199.

22 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prologus* 5, p. 13, l. 264–266.

23 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 2–7, p. 7, l. 77–p. 14, l. 292. See also Potestà, "Per laboriosam investigationem ascendendo", p. 640.

24 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Exp. tit. D*, p. 40, l. 110–117.



In Berthold's *Expositio* the choice to deal with the *invisibilia Dei* according to the order of natural providence places Proclus among the "philosophers" and not among the "theologians". In fact, according to Berthold, the choice of a particular "point of view", between natural providence or voluntary providence, is what distinguishes theologians from philosophers. It concerns the method, not the object of research nor the goals. Indeed, the theologians deal with the same God as the philosophers and with the same divine ideas, but according to the order of voluntary providence. This is confirmed in a text of the *Expositio* in which the author explains that Dionysius belongs to the ranks of the theologians:

Sed dices, quod Dionysius loquitur ut theologus, qui solum considerat processum rerum a Deo secundum ordinem providentiae voluntariae, et ideo aliter est de processu rerum a Deo secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, ubi proceditur ab uno in multitudinem ordinate, de quo loquuntur philosophi theologizantes sive theologi philosophantes.<sup>25</sup>

Dionysius is a theologian and not a philosopher because he considers the *processum rerum* according to the order of voluntary providence, unlike the *philosophi theologizantes* or *theologi philosophantes* to whom Proclus belongs. A philosopher connects all things to the First Cause and considers the universe according to the causal necessary order. He never goes beyond this rationally determinable order. The theologian, instead, uses the Holy Scriptures and examines all things according to the divine will, which is teleological and eschatological. Ultimately, the philosopher studies the determination of the rational order that rules the cosmos; the theologian, instead, considers everything that exists in accordance with divine revelation.

The question of the two providences has an absolute priority in the *Expositio* and it is so important that it establishes whether an author belongs to the group of philosophers or to the ranks of theologians. The two providences, as well as philosophy and theology, are not to be understood in opposition, but in continuity. This is evident in the *Expositio* not only from a theoretical point of view, but also from the methodological one: Berthold always tries to find the affinities between Proclus' philosophical thought and Dionysius' theological thought.<sup>26</sup> In the study of Proclus' *Expositio*, Berthold normally uses

<sup>25</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, p. 116, 104–108.

<sup>26</sup> For the general agreement between Dionysius and Proclus in Berthold's *Expositio* and for the textual references, cf. I. Zavattero, "La figura e il pensiero di Proclo in Bertoldo di Moosburg", in *ARKETE. Rivista di studi filosofici* 1(2005), p. 51–67.

the Christian authority of Dionysius who certifies philosophy and ensures its veracity.

In terms of historiography, the topic of the difference between the two providences is traced back to Augustine<sup>27</sup> from whom Dietrich took it up. Scholars<sup>28</sup> think that Dietrich was the first to deepen this matter, which was later transmitted to his pupil Berthold. This is traced back to a very well-known passage by Dietrich taken from *De subiecto theologiae*:

Scientia enim divina philosophorum considerat universitatem entium secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, quo videlicet res stant in sui natura et secundum suos modos et proprietates naturales gubernantur per principem universitatis, nec ultra hunc naturae ordinem aliquem ulteriorem finem attendit. Nostra autem divina sanctorum scientia attenditur in entibus, secundum quod stant et disponuntur sub ordine voluntariae providentiae, in quo attenditur ratio meriti et praemii et ea, quae attenduntur circa bonam et sanctam vitam et adeptionem aeternae beatitudinis et perventionem ad finem ulteriorem sive in bono sive in malo etiam post terminum huius mundi, quando scientia divina sapientium huius mundi destruetur, I *Cor.*, 13.<sup>29</sup>

Dietrich divides philosophy from theology in a stronger manner than Berthold. In Dietrich's opinion this division is not only methodological, but also concerns the objectives and areas of pertinence: unlike Berthold, Dietrich does not distinguish between the *philosophi theologizantes* or *theologi philosophantes*. According to this passage, *providentia voluntaria* refers to the *nostra divina sanctorum scientia*: it concerns the goals, the merits and rewards that man can gain through a good and holy life in his search for eternal bliss. On the other hand, *providentia naturalis* belongs to the *divina scientia philosophorum* and takes into account the universe as a result of certain natural principles that can be determined rationally. This natural providence does not consider higher

27 Cf. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim*, ed. J. Zycha (Praha / Wien / Leipzig: Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 1894), VIII.9, p. 243, l. 25–p. 244, l. 20.

28 Cf. L. Sturlese, "Il *De animatione caeli* di Teodorico di Freiberg", in R. Creyten, P. Künzle (eds), *Xenia Medii Aevi Historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppli O.P.* (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1978), p. 183–197; L. Sturlese, *Storia della filosofia tedesca nel Medioevo. Il secolo XIII* (Firenze: Olschki, 1996), p. 208–209. K. Flasch, "Einleitung", p. xxxi–xxxii.

29 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, eds J.-D. Cavigioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 3.9, p. 281, l. 100–p. 282, l. 109.

aims or eschatological values (“nec ultra hunc naturae ordinem aliquem ulteriorem finem attendit”); it guarantees only a stable, coherent, and rationally determinable order of entities and events:

Aliud autem genus entium, scilicet corpora caelestia, procedunt a Deo in ordine naturalis providentiae secundum dispositionem naturae et naturalium proprietatum et motionum entium naturalium, in quibus naturalem connexionem inveniri necesse est.<sup>30</sup>

The philosopher’s point of view is to consider the cosmos as a *conexio naturalis* that links different entities arranged in separate ontological orders, at the top of which there is the First Principle. In the same way, for Berthold the *conexio naturalis* is a philosophical manner of considering the action of the *invisibilia Dei* in their *transitive* aspect, that is, in their efficient causation on the world. Natural providence guarantees the ontological order in the universe, its stability, its harmony, and its intelligibility.

I would now like to reconsider Dietrich’s paternity of the theorem of these two providences in the School of Cologne. I intend to prove that this doctrine is already present in Ulrich’s *De summo bono*. I will also try to stress that Ulrich already conceived natural providence as a *conexio naturalis* before Dietrich. Finally, I aim to show the textual and philosophical debts of the *Expositio* towards the *De summo bono* on the matter of natural providence. This will also give me the opportunity to consider some methodological issues and to analyse the general assessment of philosophy’s cognitive limits in the works of the two thinkers. Indeed, I think that Berthold found in Ulrich’s *De summo bono* an idea more similar to his own proposal about the status of philosophical knowledge and its limits, than in Dietrich of Freiberg; and this could explain why the *Expositio* uses a large part of Ulrich’s work.

Seeking Berthold’s sources is a challenge, since he does not make quotations easy to distinguish or textual references recognizable.<sup>31</sup> The only place where philosophers and the theologians are cited as sources is at the beginning of the *Expositio*, in two lists entitled *philosophi famosi* and *doctores ecclesiae*.<sup>32</sup>

30 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De animatione caeli*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, 20.3, p. 30, l. 92–95.

31 Barbara Faes de Mottoni shares also this opinion. See B. Faes de Mottoni, “Il commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg all’*Elementatio theologica* di Proclo. Edizione delle proposizioni riguardanti il tempo e l’eternità”, in *Studi medievali* 12(1971), p. 417–61.

32 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, p. 3–4. There are actually three explicit mentions of Dietrich of Freiberg in the *Expositio*: two in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam*

Ulrich is counted among the *doctores ecclesiae*, as are Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, and Dietrich of Freiberg. Proclus, instead, is included among the *philosophi famosi*, as are Plato, Aristotle, and Hermes Trismegistus. As far as Ulrich of Strassburg is concerned, in my research I have found at least 32 propositions (out of the 211) of the *Expositio* that are connected to the *De summo bono*.<sup>33</sup> On a purely quantitative level, without taking into account specific theoretical aspects, as much as 15% of the *Expositio's propositiones* is clearly influenced by Ulrich's *De summo bono*. Indeed, in these propositions, Berthold copies extensive parts of Ulrich's work. Moreover, these quotations faithfully follow the text of the *De summo bono* while often keeping the original text unchanged. This suggests that Berthold found in Ulrich's work convincing arguments that can be reused without the need for any change.

Proclus deals with the topic of providence in Proposition 120 ("Omnis deus in sua existentia totis habet providere et primitus providere in diis") and in those immediately following in his *Elementatio*. I will take into consideration all those propositions in which Berthold refers to natural providence and, at the same time, all propositions in which he uses Ulrich's *De summo bono*. I would like to prove how, using only this comparison with Ulrich, we can properly analyse the doctrine of natural providence in Berthold. Therefore, I will refer to Proposition 120, but also to Propositions 114 ("Omnis deus unitas est per se perfecta et omnis per se perfecta unitas est deus"), 121 ("Omne divinum essentiam quidem habet bonitatem, potentiam autem unialem et cognitionem occultam et incomprehensibilem omnibus simul secundis"), 141 ("Omnis providentia deorum haec quidem est exempta ab his, quibus providetur, haec autem coordinatae"), and 144 ("Omnia entia et omnes entium dispositiones intantum processerunt in quantum et deorum ordinationes").<sup>34</sup> Propositions 114, 120, and 141 correspond to two specific chapters of *De summo bono*, Book II, treatise 5: chapters 16 ("De providentia divina et de hoc nomine Deus, quod est nomen providentiae") and 18 ("De fato et de his, quae ad eius notitiam requiruntur, quae sunt casus et fortuna, contingens et occasio et frustra et vanum et

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*Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 107A, p. 246, l. 11 and p. 247, l. 58–59; one in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), 143O, p. 73, l. 455. There is also one explicit mention of Albert the Great in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108–135*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011), 118A, p. 76, l. 55.

33 I refer to Propositions 5, 11, 12, 18, 23, 29, 57, 59, 108, 112, 114, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 134, 140, 141, 144, 145, 149, 155, 164, 184, 185, 188, 200, 201, and 203 of the *Expositio*.

34 The relevant passages from Ulrich's *De summo bono* and Berthold's *Expositio* are included at the end of this paper.

otiosum”). These two chapters deal with divine providence and its definition through an analysis that reports the authoritative opinions of Boethius, John of Damascus, Dionysius, and Augustine. Here Ulrich studies the concept of “fate” and the causal principle that governs the activity of fate in the world. The fifth treatise of Book II of *De summo bono* is devoted to God’s intellectual perfection: *sapientia, mens, ratio, veritas, and fides*. Proposition 121 refers to chapter 17 (“De aliis tribus nominibus pertinentibus ad providentiam, in qua est de legibus aeternis”) of the same treatise, where Ulrich takes into consideration the concepts of *dominus, rex, and sanctus*: three names that proclaim God’s kingship on the world and his ordering power. Finally, Berthold analyses Proposition 144, taking parts of Ulrich’s chapter 15 (“De dispositione, in quo est de vestigio”), again in the fifth treatise of Book II. This chapter refers to the book of Wisdom, chapter 8, *Disponit omnia suaviter*, and concerns the nature of God’s governance of creation. Providence is defined as “cura de omnibus et de illius vestigiis, quae sunt ordines rerum in se et in motibus suis et convenientia et permanentia, per quod scitur mundus regi sapientis providentia et non casu”.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, when Berthold writes about providence in his analysis he has in mind and reports a very specific part of Ulrich’s work, namely chapters 15, 16, 17, and 18 of the fifth treatise of Book II of *De summo bono*.

Proposition 114 presents the general characteristics of providence. The idea that Ulrich and Berthold try to prove is how, in the arrangement of the causes that comprise the ontological structure of the cosmos, all causes share the same perfection that the First Cause has in itself *simpliciter*. This is also the case for the name *Deus* considered in relation to *providentia*. Indeed, the name *Deus* is appropriate only to the First Cause, but it can also be communicated to other beings that participate in divine qualities:

Et per consequens hoc nomen ‘Deus’ convenit prime bono principaliformiter et sic incommunicabiliter, ut dictum est, communicatur autem per se bonitatibus, scilicet rebus divinis ordinem unialem constituentibus essentialiter [...]. Dicitur tamen hoc nomen ‘deus’ esse de participantibus aliquam proprietatem divinam, et hoc sive per naturam sive per gratiam secundum ordinem duplicis providentiae, naturalis videlicet et voluntariae, de quibus inferius disseretur.<sup>36</sup>

Providence is the most appropriate name for God when God is no longer considered in himself, but in relation to something else, namely, according to his

35 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §15, p. 107, l. 346–349.

36 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114A, p. 43, l. 101–p. 44, l. 105 and l. 117–119.

regulatory and causal power on the cosmos. God in his perfection and infinity *est simplex et definiri non potest*<sup>37</sup> but we can know Him, although in an imperfect way, from his effects and from His causal action on the universe. From an ontological point of view, the effects connected to the First Principle through the name “God”, as in the case of providence (“quod hoc nomen ‘Deus’ quantum ad primum significatum, quod est ratio, a qua imponitur nomen, significat providentiam”),<sup>38</sup> are such because they share, although imperfectly, the same essence of the First Principle. We can know something of God through everything that exists, acts, and participates in divine qualities. Therefore, providence can be correctly defined as “God” when we consider the divine power over the cosmos, which is carried out through *prudencia, cura, bonitas, and providentiae circuitus*.<sup>39</sup> Berthold and Ulrich propose that providence should be understood as an *ordo qui cuncta complectitur*.<sup>40</sup> There is nothing outside of this *ordo* that holds everything together. In other words, there is nothing that can be outside of the power of God and subject to *casus*, as Ulrich and Berthold say (*temeritas in regno providentiae non licet*).<sup>41</sup> Every entity exists because it is preserved in being by the power of its cause, but ultimately, every cause depends on the power of the First Universal Cause. Ulrich writes in a passage taken up identically by Berthold:

Quod vero res non conservantur nisi virtute suae causae, solum prime bonum, quod est prima et universalis causa omnium simpliciter, et est ultra omnium conservativa per providentiam propriae virtutis.<sup>42</sup>

Ulrich stresses some of the main elements of providence here and it is important to underline its multiple philosophical implications. First of all, this providential order has an intellectual nature. Citing Boethius,<sup>43</sup> Berthold and Ulrich write: “Providentia est divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta,

37 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 79.

38 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 16, §1, p. 108, l. 1–2; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 41, l. 41–42.

39 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 16, §2, p. 108, l. 19–p. 109, l. 19; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 42, l. 63–67.

40 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 16, §1, p. 108, l. 8–9; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 42, l. 53.

41 Cf. Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 16, §1, p. 108, l. 8–10; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 42, l. 53–55.

42 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 16, §3, p. 109, l. 49–51; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 85–87.

43 Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, ed. C. Moreschini (München / Leipzig: Saur, 2005), lib. IV, pr. 6, §9, p. 122, l. 30–32.

quae cuncta disponit”.<sup>44</sup> The intellectual nature of providence, its *divina ratio*, is recognised by Ulrich at the beginning of the fifth treatise of Book II of *De summo bono* in two fundamental texts:

Intellectum in Deo esse constat ex huius nominis significato, quod est prima omnium causa, et ex nominis ratione, quae secundum Damascenum consistit in universali providentia. Nec enim prima causa potest in causando ab alio regi, nec providentia potest esse sine intellectu, quia confert convenientiam ad consequendum finem [...]. Secundum rem est ipsa essentia divina, quae inter nomina exprimentia perfectionem naturae divinae sumpta a perfectionibus repertis in perfectioribus naturis creatis, propriissime nominatur nomine intellectus, quia haec est altior natura inter omnes.<sup>45</sup>

Mens [...] dicitur de Deo ratione intellectus essentialiter et causaliter. Essentialiter quidem, quia intellectus secundum veram huius nominis rationem solius Dei est, quae vera ratio consistit in puritate lucis intellectualis, quae nihil de obumbratione possibilitatis et potentiae materialis habet admixtum. [...] Causaliter autem dicitur de Deo, inquantum ipse est causa mentis perfectae in angelis bonis et mentis participatae in natura rationali et mentis daemonum, inquantum est mens, et non inquantum est mens rationis depravatae, quia sic magis debet appellari casus a mente.<sup>46</sup>

According to Ulrich, *intellectus* is the real first name of the divine being that is also considered *prima causa omnium* and *universalis providentia*. As Beccarisi points out,<sup>47</sup> Ulrich of Strassburg is really at the beginning of the formulation of the famous Dominican “theory of the intellect” of Cologne, especially because he is the first author to consider *intellectus* as the first of the proper transcendental names of God (“essentia divina [...] propriissime nominatur nomine intellectus”). Firstly, as Ulrich writes, this doctrine has an ontological and etiological implication: “Mens dicitur de Deo ratione intellectus essentialiter et

44 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §4, p. 100, l. 89–90; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120D, p. 98, l. 251–252.

45 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 1, §1, p. 1, l. 5–16. On this topic, see A. Beccarisi, “Einleitung”, in Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6*, p. vii–xxi.

46 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 1, §1–2, p. 8, l. 2–6 and p. 9, l. 32–35.

47 A. Beccarisi, “La *scientia divina* dei filosofi”, p. 137–63. On this topic, see I. Zavattero, “I principi costitutivi delle virtù nel *De Summo Bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo”, in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds.), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der Mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), p. 111–126.

causaliter". The name "intellect" is appropriate to God because intellect alone guarantees the stability, the order, and the rationality that characterise the cosmos, the *causa prima* and *providentia* itself ("Nec enim prima causa potest in causando ab alio regi, nec providentia potest esse sine intellectu, quia confert convenientiam ad consequendum finem"). To these two ontological and etiological aspects of intellect, according to Ulrich and Berthold, there is added also a noetic one. Indeed, providence, which is an expression of God's essence and causality, is also the foundation of our natural knowledge of God: "Nam per opera providentiae primam accipimus Dei cognitionem naturalem".<sup>48</sup> A man through his natural reason can know the regulative reason of God because man's reason has the same intellectual nature that characterises the essence of God. Certainly, Ulrich hastens to affirm, in a passage that is not found in the *Expositio*, that "opera vero creationis et institutionis naturae potius per prophetiam quam per philosophiam cognoscuntur".<sup>49</sup> Ulrich seems to subordinate philosophical knowledge to a prophetic and Scriptural one, but this does not mean that rational knowledge cannot achieve its ultimate goal, which is the supreme Good. Ulrich, like Berthold, strongly believes in the cognitive power of natural reason, even if it analyses theological issues. Sometimes Ulrich seems almost to reserve more power for rational research than for revelation:

Et ex intellectu assimilativo fit intellectus divinus, scilicet cum in lumine intelligentiae recipimus lumen divinum, quia per lumen intelligentiae amplius cognoscentes divina et cognitione uniti Deo ab ipso illuminamur, et in hoc lumine cognoscimus Deum; nec dicimus hoc de lumine gratiae gratum facientis, sed de lumine, quo Deus "illuminat omnem hominem", *Joann.* 1, et quo Deus illis, id est philosophis, revelavit, ut dicitur *Ad Rom.* 1.<sup>50</sup>

And also:

In haec autem concordia philosophiae cum fidei veritate ideo sollicitè laboravimus, ut ipsam fidem rationabilem et acceptabilem faceremus his, qui in philosophia nutriti sciunt insolubilibus rationibus esse demonstratum caelum ab aliquo intellectu sibi intrinseco moveri.<sup>51</sup>

48 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §3, p. 109, l. 42–43; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 109, l. 82–83.

49 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §3, p. 109, l. 43–44.

50 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. I, tr. 1, c. 7, p. 19, l. 16–22.

51 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. IV, tr. 3, c. 1, §21, p. 13, l. 289–p. 14, l. 292.



It is now necessary to reflect on the general consideration of philosophy in the *Expositio* and in the *De summo bono*. These texts reveal the great importance that Ulrich attaches to philosophical inquiry, even in theological matters, and this leads us to reconsider the opinion of Berthold expressed in the *Expositio tituli* in reference to Proclus: a great man able to know God as far as possible for a mortal and only using the light of his natural intellect. The overlap between philosophy and theology typical of the *philosophi theologizantes* or the *theologi philosophantes* such as Proclus, which Berthold endorses and repurposes in his *Expositio*, seems to follow more closely the example of Ulrich than the example of Albert the Great or Dietrich of Freiberg. Indeed, Albert considered philosophy as something separate from theology (“*Theologica autem non conveniunt cum philosophicis in principiis, quia fundantur super revelationem et inspirationem et non super rationem*”)<sup>52</sup> and Dietrich clearly divided the *scientia divina philosophorum* from *nostra divina sanctorum scientia*.<sup>53</sup> Ulrich instead frequently superimposes revealed theology and rational theology. He declares in the *De summo bono* that “the light of truth which is announced in the Gospel of John and which illuminates mankind is the light in which God revealed himself to philosophers,” not to Moses.<sup>54</sup> God reveals himself to philosophers through the light of the natural intellect, not only through the power of divine grace. Furthermore, when the agreement between philosophy and theology is not possible, it must be achieved by adapting the faith to the philosophical doctrine which is based on certain *insolubilibus rationibus*.<sup>55</sup> In Ulrich, philosophy can deal with theological and Scriptural matters and it has the same goals. In the *De summo bono* we find many philosophical questions superimposed or interposed on purely theological issues such as the Trinity, the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, the sacraments, grace, the gifts, virtues, beatitude, and so on.<sup>56</sup> All these questions, the theological as well as the philosophical ones, are pursued by the author using philosophical arguments, Biblical sources, and statements of the Fathers at the same time. This is

52 Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1964), lib. XI, tr. 3, c. 7, p. 542, l. 25–9.

53 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto*, 3.9, p. 281, l. 100–p. 282, l. 109.

54 Indeed, the revelation to Moses is *in caligine*, so it is covered by divine darkness (cf. Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. I, tr. 1, c. 6, p. 17, l. 50–p. 18, l. 60).

55 Cf. Beccarisi, “La *scientia divina* dei filosofi”, p. 137–63.

56 Every book of the *De summo bono* is focused on deepening of one of these topics: the first book focuses on the principles of the “supreme science” named theology; the second on the essence of the supreme Good and its properties; the third on the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit taken in their Unity; the fourth, fifth and sixth books respectively on the Father, the Son and his Incarnation, the Holy Spirit and the virtues; the seventh on the sacraments; the eighth on beatitude.

because Ulrich, unlike Dietrich and Albert, does not consider there to be a real difference in the object or aims of philosophy and theology.

Like Ulrich, there are several elements in Berthold's *Expositio* indicating the harmonic continuity between theological and philosophical discourses, although the author, unlike Ulrich, rarely uses Scriptural references in his work directly. Especially in the *Expositio*, Berthold advocated for the possibility of a philosophical investigation into theological issues. First of all, as mentioned earlier, there is the methodological attempt to harmonise Proclus with Dionysius in the *Expositio*. The juxtaposition of philosophical authorities with theological ones in the two initial lists is an attempt to announce the different authorities used by Berthold, who are in cooperation and not in conflict with each other. Secondly, the second point concerns Berthold's reason for choosing to comment on a Neoplatonic text (the *Elementatio theologica*) instead of an Aristotelian one. Berthold indicates that he found in Proclus the intention philosophically to analyse certain divine and theological themes lacking in Aristotle:

Ex praedictis evidenter apparet scientiam istam in suorum principiorum certitudine ratione principii cognitivi, per quod circa divina versatur, non solum omnibus particularibus scientiis, sed etiam metaphysicae Peripatetici, quae est de ente in eo, quod ens, incomparabiliter eminere.<sup>57</sup>

Proclus deals with divine themes and goes beyond the limits of Aristotelian philosophy.<sup>58</sup> Precisely for this reason, he defines the *Elementatio* as *scientia divinissima* and its author as a philosopher-theologian inspired by God.<sup>59</sup> As Zavattero shows,<sup>60</sup> Proclus is presented by Berthold as a pagan touched by divine grace. Proclus is an enlightened man, a philosopher who studies divine themes, but also a prophet because he describes the divine in the same terms as Dionysius. The questions treated in the *Elementatio* concern the divine properties, the Supreme Good and beatitude:

57 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeambulum C*, p. 65, l. 422–425.

58 Cf. S. Gersh, "Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy", in J. Aersten, K. Emery Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 493–503; L. Sturlese, "Il dibattito sul Proclo latino nel Medioevo fra l'università di Parigi e lo *studium* di Colonia", in G. Boss, G. Seel (eds), *Proclus et son influence. Actes du colloque de Neuchâtel (juin 1985)* (Zürich: Éditions du Grand Midi, 1987), p. 261–285.

59 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb. C*, p. 62, l. 327–328.

60 Zavattero, "La figura e il pensiero di Proclo in Bertoldo di Moosburg", p. 51–67.

Ex praemissis omnibus evidenter apparet, quod non solum per operationem et scientiam sicut per duo elementa, puta practicam et theoreticam, sed magis per elementationis theologicae altissimam philosophiam ascendendo redit homo ad suam perfectionem finalem, propter quam creatus est, scilicet felicitatem, immo, ut apertius dicam, beatitudinem.<sup>61</sup>

In this sense, Proclus' *Elementatio* seeks to bring about the deification of man and his salvation through philosophical reflection. This is also stressed in the *Praeambulum*, in which Berthold says that Proclus' philosophy is a "scientia veridica, certissima et ex hoc altissima".<sup>62</sup> The divine science presented by Proclus, according to Berthold, is superior to Aristotelian metaphysics because it concerns the divine, the entities which participate in goodness and the principles that bring man to the absolute One ("ascenditur in prime unius et prime boni unitatis").<sup>63</sup> Berthold thinks that Proclus in the *Elementatio* ascended to knowledge of the divine in a philosophical way. So, for these reasons, the *Elementatio* can rightly be defined as "theological" because it truly recognises the possibility for philosophy to investigate divine realities.

Like Ulrich, therefore, Berthold strongly believes in the cognitive power of philosophy in divine themes. He constantly searches for the harmony between philosophers and theologians because he wants to deal with theological issues through a philosophical approach, following the example of the philosopher-theologians. In this way, I think the attitude and the intention of Berthold most resembles Ulrich's, who superimposes philosophical discourse with theological discourse and always tries to find a correspondence between philosophy and theology. Berthold certainly follows Dietrich of Freiberg on the division of natural providence and voluntary providence, but he seems to be very close to Ulrich's *De summo bono* on a textual, philosophical, and methodological level. Berthold and Ulrich consider that the difference between *providentia naturalis* and *providentia voluntaria* is only a question of method or different "points of view", but it does not really concern disparate objects of research, areas of competence, or goals. In fact, unlike Dietrich, Berthold and Ulrich think that philosophy and theology have the same purpose: the deification of man and the attainment of ultimate bliss.

After this digression on methodological issues, it is necessary to return to the principal topic of this article: providence, its intellectual nature, and the ontological characteristics of intellect. Natural providence has an intellectual essence and it concerns the causal action of God in the world. According to

61 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Exp. tit. L*, p. 51, l. 475-479.

62 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.*, p. 53, l. 3.

63 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb. C*, p. 68, l. 556.

Berthold and Ulrich, the divine perfections are communicated to the whole universe (*communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates*)<sup>64</sup> and, accordingly, creatures participate to the name of God (even if imperfectly):

Et secundum quod hoc nomen 'Deus' dicitur a providentia secundum perfectionem talis rationis, sic hoc nomen Deo adeo proprium est, quod nec communicari potest creaturae, sicut nec communicari ei potest, quod non sit a prima causa, quia, si aliquod contineret se vel alia propria et non dependente virtute, illud non esset ab aliquo causatum. [...] In quantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet "per fatum" [Ulrich] / "per primordiales causas" [Berthold], sic actus providentiae participantur a creaturis, et per consequens nomen Dei.<sup>65</sup>

This imperfection in the communication of the same name (and of the same nature) is due to the causal relationship between God and creatures, which is a connection by analogy. Indeed, the analogical cause contains in itself the perfections of its effect, not in a formal way (like the univocal cause), but in an eminent way or in a more perfect way:

[...] haec divisio non est univoca, quia nomen commune conveniret dividentibus aequaliter, nec etiam est divisio nominis aequivoci, quia tunc non esset in diversis nominibus respectus ad unam naturam, sed est divisio analogi, quia nomen Dei proprie et primo convenit ei, cui convenit substantialiter, et secundo convenit participantibus divinitatem.<sup>66</sup>

The particular causal relationship, which connects God to creatures, allows the cause to communicate its own essence to the effect, but it also implies that the same nature is shared according to different degrees of perfection: in an excellent way in God (*eminentiori modo*) and in an imperfect way in creatures. The philosophical doctrine justifying this etiological connection is clearly that of essential causality, a central theme for the masters of Cologne. It is central in Dietrich,<sup>67</sup> who probably gave its best and classical formulation, but

64 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 256–262; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 97–98; 120E, p. 100, l. 298.

65 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 16, §4–5, p. 109–110, l. 52–61; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 85–95.

66 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 16, §5, p. 110, l. 67–71; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 45, l. 150–157.

67 Cf. B. Mojsisch, "Causa essentialis bei Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart", in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 106–14; T. Tsopurashvili, "Die causa essentialis-Theorie als Grundlage der Sprachtheorie?"

has a prominent role in Ulrich's *De summo bono*<sup>68</sup> and, of course, in Berthold's *Expositio*.<sup>69</sup> We can say that with Ulrich this etiological principle, which concerns intellectual causality, is expressed in the Cologne School for the first time. Essential causality is introduced here in two different terms. Ulrich uses the concept of *fatum* and Berthold uses the term *causa primordialis*:

Ulrich: In quantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet "per fatum" sic actus providentiae participantur a creaturis, et per consequens nomen Dei.<sup>70</sup>

Berthold: In quantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet "per primordiales causas" sic actus providentiae participantur a creaturis, et per consequens nomen Dei.<sup>71</sup>

What fate is and its close connection to essential causality could be explained comparing Berthold's Propositions 120 and 141 with chapters 16 and 18 of the fifth treatise of Book II of *De summo bono*. In these passages the problem of the subdivision of providence into *providentia voluntaria* and *providentia naturalis* is addressed in priority. After the examination of the definitions given by Boethius and Dionysius, the quotation of Augustine, also used by Dietrich, is reported in both Ulrich and Berthold:

Et illae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae. Dicit enim Augustinus VIII libro *Super Genesim*: Gemina operatio providentiae reperitur: partim naturalis, per quam dat lignis et herbis incrementum, partim voluntaria per operationem angelorum et hominum.<sup>72</sup>

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Sprachmodelle des Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckharts", in *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 18/1(2015), p. 108–129; V. Decaix, "Structure et fonction de la causalité essentielle chez Dietrich de Freiberg", in *Khôra. Revue d'études anciennes et médiévales* 12(2014), p. 171–88.

68 Cf. A. de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand* (Paris: Vrin, 2005), p. 189–206; A. de Libera, *Introduzione alla mistica renana*, p. 79–118.

69 Cf. E. Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg* (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013); E. King, "Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procl'*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes, Volume 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), p. 394–437.

70 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §5, p. 110, l. 60–61.

71 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 94–95.

72 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145–146, l. 256–262; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120E, p. 100, l. 300–302.

This passage is followed by two texts in Berthold and Ulrich, which differ in form, but not in their meaning:

Ulrich: Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, quem philosophi determinant, scilicet quod primo sunt causae universales, scilicet caelestia et motus eorum, et sub illis sunt causae particulares. Cum ergo omnis artifex operans per instrumentum dispositionem artis instrumentis infundat, necessario dispositio divinae providentiae huic conexioni causarum infunditur. Haec ergo dispositio providentiae infusa toti isti conexioni causarum fatum vocatur, ut dicit Boethius, prout philosophi de fato loquuntur.<sup>73</sup>

Berthold: Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum qui in hoc volumine exprimitur, quibus omnibus supereminent ipsae primordiales causae, quas auctor vocat deos.<sup>74</sup>

According to Ulrich, the providence that refers to the *ordo naturalis* as *conexio causarum* is *providentia naturalis* and this providence is also called *fatum*. Fate, *quod est effectum providentiae voluntariae*<sup>75</sup> – meaning it depends on the free will of God – has an intellectual nature and it is the expression of a rational power which orders everything due to a connection of causes and entities governed by a First Principle. Therefore, Ulrich considers *fatum naturale* to be synonymous with *providentia naturalis* and judges that it has a prominent role in the order and movements of the heavens. *Fatum naturale* or *providentia naturalis* is an expression of the necessary order of the universe that appears as an unalterable connection of causes:

Dispositio autem fati naturalis primo habet esse in ordine et motu caelorum. Et ideo substantiae caelorum et ordo et motus non cadunt sub fatali dispositione, sed cadunt sub providentia, quia ab ipsa sunt causata et ab ipsa continentur et gubernantur.<sup>76</sup>

Berthold in the *Expositio* generally does not use the expression *fatum*. He uses the concept of “primordial cause” as synonymous with “essential cause.” The lemma *fatum*, employed by Berthold in the same sense as Ulrich, that is, as

73 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 262–p. 146, l. 266.

74 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120E, p. 100, l. 303–305.

75 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §11, p. 114, l. 186–189.

76 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §14, p. 149, l. 361–364.

synonymous with *providentia naturalis*, can be found in the *Expositio* only in Proposition 141, in a long text copied from prose 6 of Book IV of Boethius' *Consolatio philosophiae* and from Proclus' *De providentia et fato*. Why does Berthold use the expression "fate" less frequently than Ulrich? Could it be that, for some philosophical or theological reason, he normally prefers to use other lemmas to refer to *providentia naturalis*? If so, why? I have not found a definitive answer to these questions. According to Berthold, the *causae primordiales* are the causes of the *invisibilia Dei* and they are organised in perfect orders, at the top of which there is God. They are also called by the Dominican master "infinitates, enter entia, vitae, intellectuales hypostases et animae totales et partiales et his participantia" and their determination is the responsibility of natural providence:

Et hoc de primis invisibilibus praedictis. Sunt praeterea invisibilia effectus primordialium causarum, et hoc sive per se perfecta sive in aliis subsistentiam habentia. Per se perfecta, puta infinitates, enter entia, vitae, intellectuales hypostases et animae totales et partiales et his participantia. De quibus (scilicet primordialibus causis et earum effectibus) sic dicit Dionysius 11 cap. et est supra allegatum: 'Et primo ipsorum (scilicet per se esse, per se virtutis etc.) bonus dicitur substantificator esse, postea totorum ipsorum (id est ordinum, quos causae primordiales instituunt: isti ordines dicuntur tota, quia per se perfecti), postea particularium ipsorum (scilicet singularium ipsorum ordinum), postea particulariter ipsis participantium (in quibus sunt perfectiones superiorum nec primo nec per se, sicut est intellectualitas in nobis hominibus et a nobis particulariter participata).' Ista sunt invisibilia Dei transitive accepta, de quibus in ista elementatione theologica subtilissime pertractatur, quantum pertinet ad providentiam naturalem.<sup>77</sup>

Therefore, Ulrich's *fatum* and Berthold's *causae primordiales* refer to the same order of entities, serve the same purpose, and refer to the same etiological doctrine. I shall conclude my analysis with the mention of Proposition 144, but without going into details because in this proposition Berthold repeats the same issues discussed above. In this proposition, the harmony of creation is underlined once again starting from the Biblical expression, *Disponit omnia suaviter*.<sup>78</sup> Indeed, God orders everything *in mensura, numero, et*

<sup>77</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 5, p. 13, l. 251–266.

<sup>78</sup> Wisdom 8:1.

*ponderare*<sup>79</sup> and this disposition is a rational effect of providence. Once again, in the cosmological order there is no place for *casus*; everything is determined and this order is established by natural providence, which is the *conexio causarum*. Such providence, finally, “est divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae cuncta disponit”.<sup>80</sup>

### Conclusions

In this paper, I have attempted to show how Berthold uses Ulrich’s text and philosophy for the elaboration of the concept of *providentia naturalis*. Starting from the comparison between these two theologians, I have also tried to prove how in Ulrich’s *De summo bono*, before Dietrich, we find a clear distinction between *providentia naturalis* and *providentia voluntaria*. *Providentia naturalis* is interpreted for the first time by Ulrich as the *conexio causarum* that orders the cosmos in a rational way. Both Ulrich and Berthold deepen the question of providential action, using an innovative theory of intellect and especially by employing the etiological doctrine of “essential causality”. In Ulrich we see the attempt to establish the conditions for the natural knowledge of God and of the providential order that rules the world. This attempt is justified by the rationality of the universe itself and by the causal relationship between the essence of God and everything that has the same intellectual nature, including man. The possibility of knowing God depends on the idea that providence is the development, in the world, of the same *invisibilia Dei*. In Ulrich, even before Dietrich, *providentia naturalis* is interpreted as a *conexio causarum* that rules the universe. This connection has its own origin in the First Cause, which analogically communicates its essence. This sharing is imperfect, such that there is an equality *secundum essentia* and a diversity *secundum esse* between the cause and its effect:

Tertio modo consideratur secundum relationem ad effectum, et sic est regula effectuum omnium et operum proveniens ex applicatione causarum ad effectus particulares. Et haec regula, ut est a prima causa et ut consideratur in sua essentia, et ut per esse est in causis vere necessariis,

79 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §1, p. 97, l. 4; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 144B, p. 75, l. 27.

80 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §4, p. 100, l. 89–90; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 144B, p. 76, l. 54–55.



est necessaria et immobilis, licet secundum esse, quod habet in proximis causis, mutetur.<sup>81</sup>

Ulrich is the first thinker in the entire Dominican School of Cologne who clearly identifies natural providence with the rational order of causes that links everything existing in the universe to the First Principle.<sup>82</sup> This philosophical and doctrinal approach is also found in Berthold's *Expositio* and it seems to be very similar to Ulrich's. In this paper, I have tried to show the textual and theoretical dependence of the *Expositio* on the *De summo bono*: the *cura de omnibus* and the *ordo qui cuncta complectitur* constitute for Ulrich and Berthold the causal order that rules in the cosmos. This *ordo* holds everything together and it is the effect of the First Cause, which communicates its nature to creatures imperfectly, according to the doctrine of essential causality. Furthermore, for Berthold and Ulrich, natural providence is part of the rational investigation of philosophers and has an ontological, etiological, and noetic importance. Berthold found in the attitude of Ulrich, who combines philosophical and theological issues and uses philosophy for in the investigation of divine questions, a similar method to that of the *philosophi theologizantes sive theologi philosophantes*, groups that include Proclus and Berthold himself. In my opinion, this method differs both from Albert and Dietrich, who clearly divide the spheres of competence of philosophy and theology. All these aspects enable us to reconsider a continuity of ideas between Ulrich and Berthold, demonstrated by the textual dependence of the *Expositio* on the *De summo bono*. In my view, Berthold's careful and faithful use of the *De summo bono* presupposes a deep and shared approach to theoretical and methodological questions. Ultimately, through this paper, I have tried to show that the impact of Ulrich's *De summo bono* for the *Expositio* was unduly neglected, and that it deserves to be rediscovered for a better understanding not just of both Berthold's and Ulrich's philosophies, but also of the cultural context in which they lived and worked. Reconsidering the influence of the *De summo bono* on the subsequent generations of Dominican authors active in the *studia* beyond the Rhine could truly corroborate and enrich the epithet that Grabmann, at the beginning of the 20th century, prophetically assigned to Ulrich as a true "co-founder" of the Cologne School: a fundamental cornerstone for the entire Dominican tradition.

81 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §12, p. 148, l. 333–337.

82 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §14, p. 149, l. 361–364.

## Appendix

### Ulrich of Strassburg

Hoc nomen Deus quantum ad primum significatum, quod est ratio, a qua imponitur nomen, significat providentiam, quia, sicut dicit Maximus super 12 cap. Dionysii *De divinis nominibus*: “Hoc nomen ‘theos’, quod apud nos est Deus, duas habet derivationes apud Graecos, quia vel derivatur ab hoc verbo ‘theo’, id est ‘video’ sive ‘contemplor’ sive ‘considero’, quia omnia circumspicit, vel ab hoc verbo ‘theo’, quod est ‘curro’, quia omnia providentia circuit” eo circuitu, de quo dicit Boethius in IV libro *De consolatione*: “Ordo”, inquit, “quidam cuncta complectitur, ut, quod assignata ordinis ratione decesserit, hoc licet in alium, tamen ordinem relabatur, ne quid in regno providentiae liceat temeritati”. Damascenus autem libro I cap. 12 dicit: “Post nomen ‘Qui est’, quod idem cum nomine boni est et est primum inter nomina Dei, hoc nomen Deus est nomen secundum, et est nomen operationis. Et dicitur hoc ‘theos’, id est Deus, vel ab ‘ethin’, id est curare vel fovere universa”, secundum illud *Gen.* 14: “Spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas”, id est incubabat et fovebat, ut dicit alia translatio. “Vel ab ethin, id est ardens”. Ut enim dicit *Deut.* 4 et *Hebr.* 13: Deus noster ignis consumens omnium malitiam est. “Vel a ‘theaste’, id est considerando omnia” secundum illud *Hebr.* 4: “Omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius” etc. (*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §1, p. 108, l. 1–18).

### Berthold of Moosburg

De secundo sciendum, quod hoc nomen ‘Deus’ quantum ad primum significatum, quod est ratio, a qua imponitur nomen, significat providentiam, quia, sicut Maximus monachus super 12 cap. *De divinis nominibus* Dionysii tractans descriptionem deitatis, qua dicitur ibi: “Deitas autem, quae omnia videt providentia et bonitate perfecta, omnia circumspiciens et continens et se ipsa implens et excedens omnia providentia ipsa utentia”, hanc, inquam, descriptionem deitatis tractans sic dicit: Hoc nomen ‘theos’, quod apud nos est ‘Deus’, duas habet derivationes apud Graecos, quia vel derivatur ab hoc verbo ‘theo’, id est ‘video’ sive ‘contemplor’ sive ‘considero’, quia omnia circumspicit, vel ab hoc verbo ‘theo’, quod est ‘curro’, quia omnia providentia sua circuit” (haec Maximus) eo circuitu, de quo dicit Boethius in IV libro *De consolatione* prosa 6 circa finem: “Sola est enim divina vis, cui quoque mala bona sint, cum eis competenter utendo alicuius boni elicit effectum. Ordo enim quidam est, qui cuncta complectitur, ut, quod ab assignata ordinis ratione discesserit, hoc licet in alium, tamen ordinem relabatur, ne quid in regno providentiae liceat temeritati”. Damascenus autem libro I cap. 12 dicit: “Sicut autem sanctus Dionysius ait, ‘bonum’ est principalius nomen eius. “Non enim est in Deo dicere primum esse, et ita bonum. Secundum vero nomen ‘theos’, id est ‘Deus’, quod dicitur vel ab eo, quod est ‘thetin’, id est currere vel fovere universa, vel ab ‘ethim’, id est ardens”. Et infra: “vel

a 'theaste', id est a considerando omnia. Nulla enim eum latent, immo omnium est contemplator". Haec Damascenus.

(*Expositio*, 114B, p. 41–42, l. 41–62).

Ex quibus omnibus colligitur, quod hoc nomen quantum ad primum suum significatum est nomen providentiae Dei secundum quattuor eius opera, quae sunt: "prudencia, qua scit, quid unicuique congruit, et cura, qua bona conservat, et tertio bonitas, qua nocumenta repellit, et quarto providentiae circuitus, qua non solum bona, sed etiam mala, quae permittit, ordinat ad bonum. Et sic hoc nomen describit Dionysius 12 cap. *De divinis nominibus* dicens: "Deitas dicitur, quae omnia videt" prospectu regiminis, sicut frequenter dicitur in Scriptura: "Videat Dominus et iudicet", et *Gen.* 22: "Unde usque hodie dicitur: in monte Dominus videbit". Providentia curae, de qua *Sap.* 12: "Nec enim est alius Deus, quam tu, cui cura est de omnibus omnia circumspiciens", scilicet non solum bona, sed etiam mala circumspicione ordinis, quae, ut dictum est, cuncta complectitur. Et "bonitate perfecta", qua non solum placuit omnia fieri, sed etiam facta placent, ut conserventur, *Gen.* 1: "Vidit Deus cuncta, quae fecerat" etc., "omnia bona continens" consumenda mala, ne ipsa mala consumant bona. Sic enim continentur bona in sua natura, quam malum privat et corrumpit, "et se ipsa implens omnia" deducendo singula secundum suas capacitates in proprios fines, in quibus participant proportionaliter summum bonum ut finem ultimum, "et excedens omnia providentia

Ex quibus omnibus colligitur, quod hoc nomen 'Deus' quantum ad primum suum significatum est nomen providentiae ipsius quantum ad quattuor eius opera, quae sunt prudentia, qua scit, quid unicuique congruit, et cura, qua bona conservat, et tertio bonitas, qua nocumenta repellit, et quarto providentiae circuitus, qua non solum bona, sed etiam mala, quae permittit, ordinat ad bonum. Et sic hoc nomen 'deitas' describit Dionysius ubi supra dicens: "Deitas autem dicitur, quae omnia videt" prospectu regiminis; "providentia" curae "et bonitate perfecta", qua non solum diffundit se in omnium creatione, sed et platicorum conservatione "omnia circumspiciens", non solum bona, sed etiam mala circumspicione ordinis, qui, ut dictum est ex Boethio, "cuncta complectitur", omnia "continens" consumenda mala, ne consumant bona. Sic enim continentur bona in sua natura, quam naturam malum privat et corrumpit "et se ipsa implens" omnia deducendo singula secundum suas capacitates in proprios fines, in quibus participant proportionaliter summum bonum et ultimum finem "et excedens omnia providentia ipsa utentia", quia regit res ita, quod non commiscetur cum eis.

(*Expositio*, 114B, p. 42, l. 63–77).

ipsa utentia", quia regit res ita, quod non permiscetur cum eis.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §2, p. 108, l. 19–p. 109, l. 36).

Ex his patet bonitas huius definitionis, quia non est definitio rei significatae, quae simplex est et definiri non potest, sed est expositio nominis. Et ideo ponit quattuor actus, a quibus nomen hoc impositum est. Sed quantum ad id, cui impositum est nomen, quod est secundum eius significatum, significat ipsam naturam divinam prae omnibus aliis Dei nominibus quoad nos. Nam per opera providentiae primam accipimus Dei cognitionem naturalem. Opera vero creationis et institutionis naturae potius per prophetiam quam per philosophiam cognoscuntur. Unde hoc, quod scribitur *Gen.* 1, vocat Gregorius *Super Ezechielem*: "Prophetiam de praeterito". Propter quod potius argumentum, per quod in libro *De natura deorum* probatur, quod Deus sit, sumitur a providentia, a qua nomen Dei dicitur. Et sic vere dicit Ambrosius in libro *De Trinitate*, quod Deus nomen est naturae.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §3, p. 109, l. 37–48).

Quia vero res non conservatur nisi virtute suae causae, sola prima et universalis omnium causa est universaliter omnium conservativa per providentiam propriae virtutis. Et secundum quod hoc nomen 'Deus' dicitur a providentia secundum perfectionem talis rationis, sic hoc nomen Deo adeo proprium est, quod nec communicari potest creaturae, sicut

Ex his patet bonitas huius descriptionis, cum non sit definitio rei significatae, quae est simplex et definiri non potest, sed est expositio nominis. Et ideo ponit quattuor actus, a quibus hoc nomen 'Deus' impositum est. Sed quantum ad id, cui nomen impositum est, quod est secundum eius significatum, significat ipsam naturam, essentiam seu intentionem omnibus eminentissimam, quia per opera providentiae in cognitionem naturae prime devenimus. Unde et Deus dicitur et est nomen naturae. (*Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 78–84).

Quod vero res non conservantur nisi virtute suae causae, solum prime bonum, quod est prima et universalis causa omnium simpliciter, est ultra omnium conservativa per providentiam propriae virtutis. Et secundum quod hoc nomen dicitur a providentia secundum perfectionem talis rationis, sic hoc nomen 'Deus' prime bono adeo proprium est, quod in quantum huiusmodi

nec communicari ei potest, quod non sit a prima causa, quia, si aliquod contineret se vel alia propria et non dependente virtute, illud non esset ab aliquo causatum. Et sic ipse dicit *Deut.* 32: “Videte, quod ego sim solus et non sit alius Deus praeter me”. Et probat hoc per opera providentiae dicens: “Ego occidam” etc. Ideo dicitur *Sap.* 14: “Incommunicabile nomen lapidibus et lignis imposuerunt”. In quantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet per fatum, sic actus providentiae participantur a creaturis, et per consequens nomen Dei.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §4–5, p. 109, l. 49–p. 110, l. 61).

Ad horum ergo intellectum consideremus primo, quid hoc nomine significetur. Deus omnia, quae causat, per providentiam causat eo, quod ipse operatur per intellectum et artem. Et quamvis per se principaliter omnia efficiat, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis non deesset universo, cui communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates naturaliter communicabiles, operatur etiam per secundas causas. Et illae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 256–261).

Et patet, quod haec divisio non est univoca, quia nomen commune conveniret dividendum aequaliter, nec etiam est divisio nominis aequivoci, quia tunc non esset in diversis nominibus respectus ad unam naturam, sed est divisio analogi, quia nomen Dei proprie et primo

nec ipsis per se bonitatibus communicari potest, sicut nec communicari eis potest, quod non sint a prime bono, quia, si aliquid contineret se vel alia propria et non dependente virtute, illud non esset ab alio causatum. In quantum tamen prime bonum explet providentiam suam per primordiales causas, sic actus providentiae primitus est in diis, ut infra videbitur, et per consequens nomen Dei.

(*Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 85–95).

Ad cuius intellectum considerandum, quod prime bonum omnia, quae creat, per providentiam gubernat. Et quamvis per se principaliter omnia efficiat, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis non deesset universo, cui communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates naturaliter sibi communicabiles, ita, quod nullus gradus bonitatis sibi desit, cum prime boni opus sit perfectissimum, operatur etiam per primordiales causas et secundarias.

(*Expositio*, 114B, p. 43, l. 95–100).

Ubi tamen sciendum, quod divisio divini nominis non est divisio nec univoci, quia nomen commune conveniret dividendum aequaliter, nec est divisio nominis aequivoci, si proprie loquamur, quia tunc non esset universis nominibus respectus ad unam naturam, sed est divisio analogi, quia

convenit ei, cui convenit substantialiter, et secundario convenit participantibus divinitatem, sicut sunt sancti, ut dicit *Glossa* ibidem.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §5, p. 110, l. 67–72).

Definitur quoque providentia multipliciter. Damascenus 29 cap. 11 libri ponit duas definitiones. Prima est data per effectum, cum dicit: “Providentia est ea, quae ex Deo ad existentia fit cura”. Haec enim cura est fatum, quod est effectum providentiae. Secunda datur, secundum quod providentia tamquam practica scientia in se concipit voluntatem, cum dicit: “Providentia est voluntas Dei”, id est ratio recta cum voluntate. Unde ipse statim subdit: “Necesse est omnia, quae providentia fiunt, secundum rectam rationem fieri”, propter quam, scilicet voluntatem, omnia, quae sunt, quia effectus providentiae est circa entia, suscipiunt deductionem in suos fines. Boethius autem in IV libro *De consolatione* ponit alias duas definitiones. Prima datur de providentia, prout est scientia operativa. Unde dicit: “Providentia est divina ratio”, id est rationalis modus in divina intelligentia existens, quae multiplicem rebus regendis modum statuit, cum ipsa in se simplex sit “in summo omnium principe constituta”. Quia praedictus modus non refertur extra mentem divinam ad ea, quae movet atque disponit, tunc non providentia, sed fatum appellatur, quae scilicet ratio “cuncta” propter universalitatem providentiae “disponit” ordinando in finem. Secunda

nomen Dei causaliter et principaliformiter convenit ei, cui superessentialiter attribuitur et per consequens prime, primo autem et per se, quibus convenit essentialiter, et deinde participantibus proprietate divina secundum prius et posterius, sicut patet de nuncupative dictis diis, inferius apparebit. (*Expositio*, 114C–D, p. 45, l. 150–157).

Secundum vero quid rei definitur multipliciter. Damascenus enim ubi supra ponit duas definitiones. Prima est data per effectum, cum dicit: “Providentia est ea, quae ex Deo ad existentia fit cura”. Secunda datur, secundum quod providentia tamquam practica scientia in se concipit voluntatem, cum dicit: “Providentia est voluntas Dei, per quam omnia, quae sunt, suscipiunt deductionem” in suos fines. Boethius autem in IV libro *De consolatione* ponit alias duas definitiones. Quarum prima datur, prout est scientia operativa. Unde dicit: “Providentia est divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae cuncta disponit”. Secunda vero est a causa. Unde dicit: Providentia est “simplex et immobilis forma rerum gerendarum”. (*Expositio*, 120D, p. 98, l. 245–254).

vero definitio est huius expositio. Dicit enim: "Providentia est forma simplex et immobilis forma rerum gerendarum".

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §11, p. 114, l. 186–203).

Sicut autem creatio instituit naturam, sic providentia res institutas deducit in congruos sibi fines. Et ideo dicit Dionysius 4 cap. *De divinis nominibus*: "Sicut providentia uniuscuiusque naturae est salvativa, per se mobilia providet ut per se mobilia et tota iuxta proprietatem totius et uniuscuiusque", scilicet est providentia, secundum quod "provisorum natura suscipit provisivas bonitates largissime providentiae proportionaliter attributas unicuique". Et huius exemplum in naturalibus ponit Philosophus in XI *Metaphysicae* in patre familias magnae domus. Ibi enim regimen patris familias perfecte suscipiunt liberi per amorem patris nihil agentes licentiose. Servi autem suscipiunt illud imperfecte, quia ex timore suscipiunt et interdum delinquent. Bestiae vero semper ab eo errant, nisi inquantum violentia aguntur. Sic enim vult Philosophus, quod prima causa omnia ordinat in bonum suum, sed necessaria, quae sunt semper eodem modo sine exorbitatione, illam ordinationem servant ut filii. Ea autem, quae sunt frequenter, sunt sicut servi, et quia permixtas habent sibi malitias, non attingunt bonum universi, nisi inquantum reguntur ab his, quae sunt semper. Ea vero, quae raro fiunt, sunt sicut bestiae, et non diriguntur in bonum universi nisi quodam freno eorum, quae sunt semper et quae fiunt frequenter.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 16, §8, p. 112, l. 119–135).

Dico autem unicuique, quia, ut dicit Dionysius 4 cap. *De divinis nominibus* circa finem, "providentia est uniuscuiusque naturae salvativa, per se mobilia providet ut per se mobilia et tota et particularia iuxta proprietatem totius et uniuscuiusque, inquantum provisorum natura suscipit totius et largissimae providentiae proportionaliter attributas unicuique provisivas bonitates". Haec Dionysius. Et huius exemplum in naturalibus ponit Aristoteles in XII *Metaphysicae* in patre familias magnae domus. Ibi enim regimen patris familias perfecte suscipiunt liberi propter amorem patris nihil agentes licentiose. Servi autem suscipiunt illud imperfecte, quia ex timore suscipiunt et ideo interdum delinquent. Bestiae vero semper ab eo errant, nisi inquantum violentia ab eo aguntur. Sic enim vult Aristoteles, quod prima causa omnia ordinat in bonum suum, sed necessaria, quae sunt semper eodem modo sine exorbitatione, illam ordinationem servant, ut filii. Ea autem, quae sunt frequenter, sicut servi, et permixtas habent sibi malitias et non attingunt bonum universi, nisi inquantum reguntur ab his, quae sunt semper. Ea vero, quae raro fiunt, sunt sicut bestiae, et non diriguntur in bonum universi, nisi quodam freno eorum, quae sunt semper et quae fiunt frequenter.

(*Expositio*, 120D, p. 99, l. 277–292).

Et quamvis per se principaliter omnia efficiat, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis non deesset universo, cui communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates naturaliter communicabiles, operatur etiam per secundas causas. Et illae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae. Dicit enim Augustinus VIII libro *Super Genesim*: “Gemina operatio providentiae reperitur: partim naturalis, per quam dat lignis et herbis incrementum, partim voluntaria per operationem angelorum et hominum”. Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, quem philosophi determinant, scilicet quod primo sunt causae universales, scilicet caelestia et motus eorum, et sub illis sunt causae particulares. Cum ergo omnis artifex operans per instrumentum dispositionem artis instrumentis infundat, necessario dispositio divinae providentiae huic conexioni causarum infunditur. Haec ergo dispositio providentiae infusa toti isti conexioni causarum fatum vocatur, ut dicit Boethius, prout philosophi de fato loquuntur.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 258–p. 146, l. 266).

Ad providentiam divinam tria concurrunt, a quibus Deus nominatur ratione providentiae, propter quod Dionysius 12 cap. *De divinis nominibus* haec tria nomina coniungit cum hoc nomine ‘Deus’. Unum est praesidentia, qua ad ipsum pertinet prospicere subiectis propter amorem, qui “superiora movet ad providentiam minus habentium”. Et sic est hoc nomen ‘dominus’.

Circa tertium sciendum, quod, licet prime bonum super omnia superbenedictus Deus per se principaliter omnia efficiat et per providentiam gubernet, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis, quae est divinissimum operum, non deesset universo, cui communicati sunt omnes gradus divinae bonitatis possibiles existere, operatur etiam per secundas causas a se, scilicet per primordiales. Et istae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae, quae distinguit Augustinus VIII *Hexaemeron* sui dicens, quod “gemina operatio providentiae invenitur, partim naturalis, partim voluntaria”. Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum qui in hoc volumine exprimitur, quibus omnibus supereminet ipsae primordiales causae, quas auctor vocat deos.

(*Expositio*, 120E, p. 100, l. 295–305).

Superius ostensa est deorum providentia. Verum quia ad divinam providentiam tria concurrunt, scilicet praesidentia, qua ad ipsum pertinet prospicere subiectis propter amorem, qui “superiora movet ad providentiam minus habentium”, unde Dionysius sic dicit 4 cap. *De divinis nominibus*: “Ipse omnium causa pulchro et bono omnium amore per abundantiam amativae bonitatis extra se ipsum fit ad omnia



Secundum est ipse actus regiminis, quo Deus cuncta gubernat. Et sic est hoc nomen 'rex'. Tertium est modus regiminis, quo summus rex sic regit omnia quod non commiscetur cum eis. Tertium est modus regiminis, quo summus rex sic regit omnia quod non commiscetur cum eis. Et ideo nihil inquinatum incurrit in eum. Et sic est hoc nomen 'sanctus'. (*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 17, §1, p. 121, l. 1–10).

Ad horum ergo intellectum considerare mus primo, quid hoc nomine significetur Deus omnia, quae causat, per providentiam causat eo, quod ipse operatur per intellectum et artem. Et quamvis per se principaliter omnia efficiat, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis non deesset universo, cui communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates naturaliter communicabiles, operatur etiam per secundas causas. Et illae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae. Dicit enim Augustinus VIII libro *Super Genesim*: "Gemina operatio providentiae reperitur: partim naturalis, per quam dat lignis et herbis incrementum, partim voluntaria per operationem angelorum et hominum". Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, quem philosophi determinant, scilicet quod primo sunt causae universales, scilicet caelestia et motus eorum, et sub illis sunt causae particulares. Cum ergo omnis artifex operans per instrumentum dispositionem artis instrumentis infundat, necessario dispositio divinae providentiae huic connexioni causarum infunditur. Haec ergo

existentia providentiis". Secundum, quod concurrit ad providentiam, est actus regiminis, qui exit a potentia. Tertium est cognitionis eminentia, qua consideret, quid unicuique congruat. Et ideo auctor in praesenti elemento ostendit, qualis sit deorum essentia, potentia et scientia dicens: OMNE etc.

(*Expositio*, 121, p. 105, l. 5–13).

De primo sciendum, sicut aliqualiter dictum est super 120, duplex est providentia, naturalis scilicet et voluntaria. Et habetur ista distinctio ab Augustino VIII *Super Genesim ad litteram*, ubi dicit tractans illud verbum "ut operaretur et custodiret": "Hinc iam in ipsum mundum velut in quandam magnam arborem rerum oculus cogitationis attollitur atque in ipso quoque gemina operatio providentiae reperitur, partim naturalis, partim voluntaria. Naturalis quidem per occultam Dei administrationem, quae et lignis et herbis dat incrementum, voluntaria vero per angelorum opera et hominum. Secundum illam primam caelestia superius ordinari inferiusque terrestria, lumina sideraque fulgere" – et infra – "et quidquid aliud in rebus interiore naturalique motu geritur. In hac autem altera signa dari, doceri et discere, agros coli, societates administrari, artes exerceri, et quaeque alia sive in superna societate aguntur sive in hac terrena atque mortali ita, ut bonis consolatur". Et infra: "Deus itaque super omnia, qui condidit omnia et regit omnia, omnes naturas bonus creat, omnes voluntates iustus ordinat". Haec Augustinus. Verum, quia in naturali providentia est ordo et conexio causarum

dispositio providentiae infusa toti isti conexioni causarum fatum vocatur, ut dicit Boethius, prout philosophi de fato loquuntur.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 256–p. 146, l. 266).

Dispositionem in Deo esse Scriptura testatur, *Sap.* 8: “Disponit omnia suaviter”. Et quod non solum in Deo sit sicut in causa dispositionis rerum, sed sicut in disponente per intellectum, probat Augustinus in libro *Super Genesim* tractans illud *Sap.* 11: “Omnia in mensura, numero et pondere disposuisti”, quia vel haec sunt in creaturis vel in creatore. Non in creaturis, quia sunt facta, et si omnia facta disposita sunt in his, ipsa etiam disposita sunt in se ipsis, quia, si in aliis essent disposita, non omnia Deus in his disposuit. Impossibile autem est rem disponi in se ipsa. Ergo reliquum membrum verum est, scilicet quod haec sunt extra creaturas in creatore et quod disposuisse “omnia in mensura” etc. et omnia disposuisse in se, qui est “mensura omni rei modum praefigens et numerus omni rei speciem praehabens et pondus omnem rem ad quietem trahens”.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §1, p. 97, l. 3–12).

Et licet dispositio divina, inquantum est practica, implicet divinam voluntatem, et inquantum scientia practica Dei est causa scitorum, implicet potentiam, tamen secundum principalem rationem nominis pertinet ad scientiam divinam, in qua secundum rationes exemplares omnia sunt praeordinata. Et quia hoc

essentialium et substantialium, ideo subdividitur in conditivam, contentivam et provisivam.

(*Expositio*, 141A, p. 45, l. 11–26).

De secundo notandum, quod dispositio multa significat. Aliquando enim dicit praedefinitionem simpliciter prime Dei, ut est in ipso praedefiniente secundum illud: “disponit omnia suaviter”. Et quod non solum in Deo sit sicut in causa dispositionis rerum, sed sicut in disponente per intellectum, probat Augustinus *Super Genesim* tractans illud: “omnia in mensura, numero et pondere disposuisti”, quia vel haec sunt in creaturis vel in creatore. Non in creaturis, quia sunt facta, et si omnia facta disposita sunt in his, ipsa etiam disposita sunt in his se ipsis, quia si in aliis essent disposita, non omnia Deus in his disposuisset. Impossibile autem est rem disponi in se ipsa: ergo reliquum membrum verum est, scilicet quod haec sunt extra creaturas in creatore et quod disposuisse “omnia in mensura” etc. est omnia disposuisse in se, qui est “mensura omni rei modum praefigens et numerus omni rei speciem praebens et pondus omnem rem ad quietem trahens”.

(*Expositio*, 144B, p. 75, l. 23–p. 76, l. 34).

Et licet talis dispositio divina implicet divinam voluntatem et, inquantum scientia practica Dei est causa scitorum, implicet potentiam, tamen secundum principalem rationem nominis pertinet ad scientiam divinam, in qua secundum rationes exemplares omnia sunt praeordinata. Et quia hoc attributum appropriatur Verbo divino,

attributum appropriatur Verbo divino, ideo dicit *Glossa* super principium *Genesis*, quod Deus uno modo operatur in Verbo omnia disponendo, “quoniam in ipso condita sunt universa”, *Col.* 1, et parum infra: “Omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt”, scilicet secundum quod conceptus rei res ipsa vocatur.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §3, p. 99, l. 75–82).

Ab hac dispositione efficientia ipsius vocatur dispositio, secundum quod tria distinguuntur opera Dei primo, scilicet creationis, dispositionis, ornatus, et ulterius ipse effectus huius efficientiae vocatur dispositio, *Sap.* 7, “ut sciam dispositionem orbis terrarum”, et tertio huius effectus habitualiter inserti in natura rerum productio ad actum et perfectionem est etiam dispositio, *Sap.* 8: “Disponit omnia suaviter”, et haec dispositio proprie est effectus providentiae. Unde Boethius in IV libro *De consolatione*: “Providentia est divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae cuncta disponit”.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §4, p. 100, l. 83–90).

Ut autem id, quod auctoritate constat, ratione quoque firmetur, praecognoscendum est, quod dicitur per nomen. Natandum ergo, quod, sicut dicit Damascenus in libro II cap. 22, ordo est inter consilium, iudicium, dispositionem, electionem et operationem, quia primo de operandis est “consilium appetitus inquisitivus de his rebus, quae in nobis sunt”. Secundo est

ideo dicit *Glossa* super principium *Genesis*, quod Deus uno modo operatur “in Verbo omnia disponendo”, “quoniam in ipso condita sunt universa”, immo “omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt”, secundum quod conceptus rei vocatur res ipsa. Et ista est prima significatio dispositionis.

(*Expositio*, 144B, p. 76, l. 34–42).

Efficientia ipsius prime Dei, qua omnia in ipsis primordialibus causis et per eas in propriis naturis condidit, dicitur dispositio, secundum quod tria distinguuntur opera Dei prima, scilicet creationis, dispositionis et ornatus. Et sic ulterius quarto ipse effectus huius efficientiae vocatur dispositio *Sap.* 7: “Ut sciam dispositionem orbis terrarum”. Et quinto huius effectus habitualiter inserti in natura rerum. Productio ad actum et perfectionem est etiam dispositio, *Sap.* 8: “Disponit omnia suaviter”. Et haec dispositio proprie est effectus providentiae secundum illud Boethii IV *De consolatione*: “Providentia est divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae cuncta disponit”.

(*Expositio*, 144B, p. 76, l. 46–55).

Verum, ut istud, quod iam dictum est et etiam quod supra de dispositione adductum est, in primis tribus significationibus dispositionis evidentius appareat, considerandum, quod, sicut dicit Damascenus II libro cap. 22, ordo est inter consilium, iudicium, dispositionem et electionem et operationem, quia primo de operandis est consilium, id est appetitus inquisitivus de his rebus, quae in nobis sunt, secundo est

iudicium, quo iudicamus, quid melius. Tertio est dispositio, qua quis disponit et amat, quod iudicatum est ex consilio, et vocatur sententia. Quarto est electio, cum duobus propositis hoc alteri praeoptamus, deinde fit impetus ad opus. Ex hoc patet, quod dispositio in nobis est sententia de aliquo faciendo, sicut consulte iudicatum est fieri. Cum ergo omnia, quae de Deo dicuntur secundum suam perfectionem sine imperfectione, quam habent in creaturis, sumantur, sic etiam est in proposito. Et ideo remoto omni eo, quod dicit dubitationem vel ignorantiam, dispositio Dei est practica praeconceptio in arte divina de rebus faciendis et de modo productionis, scilicet secundum congruitatem locorum et temporum et similium condicionum, et de modo cuiuslibet rei productae, scilicet ut sit in mensura et numero et pondere et in tali perfectione bonitatis, quod creatura sit vestigium creatoris. Nam secundum Augustinum in iv libro *Super Genesim* haec causaliter dicta sunt in solo creatore, sed formaliter dicta et inhaerenter sunt tantum in creaturis.

(*De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 15, §1, p. 97, l. 13–p. 98, l. 31).

Sententia quoque dispositionis, licet in nobis dicat conclusionem practicam conclusam ex iudicio, quae est cum intentione affectus ad prosequendum id, quod consiliatum est, quia, ut dicit Damascenus, si iudicat et non diligit illud, quod iudicatum est, non dicitur sententia, tamen in Deo non sic sumitur, quia ipse non cognoscit unum ex alio, sed dicit in Deo infallibilem et immutabilem

iudicium, quo iudicamus quid melius, tertio est dispositio, quo quis disponit et amat, quod iudicatum est ex consilio, et vocatur sententia, quarto est electio, cum duobus propositis hoc alteri praeoptamus, deinde fit impetus ad opus. Ex hoc patet, quod dispositio in nobis est sententia de aliquo faciendo, sicut consulte iudicatum est fieri. Cum ergo omnia, quae de diis dicuntur, secundum suam perfectionem sine imperfectione, quam habent in entibus productis, sumantur, sic etiam est in proposito. Et ideo remoto omni eo, quod dicit dubitationem vel ignorantiam, dispositio deorum est practica praeconceptio in eorum arte de rebus faciendis et de modo productionis, scilicet secundum congruitatem ordinum et ordinatorum et similium condicionum, et de modo cuiuslibet rei productae, scilicet ut sit in mensura et numero et pondere, id est in tali perfectione bonitatis, quod cuiuslibet dei causatum sit vestigium suae causae primordialis.

(*Expositio*, 144E, p. 79, l. 132–148).

Ex praemissis apparet tertium, quod sententia dispositionis, licet in nobis dicat conclusionem practicam conclusam ex iudicio, quae est cum intentione affectus ad prosequendum id, quod consiliatum est – ut enim dicit Damascenus, si iudicat et non diligit illud, quod iudicatum est, non dicitur sententia –, tamen in diis non sic sumitur, cum non cognoscant unum ex alio, sed dicit in eis infallibilem

praeordinationem effectus, secundum quod per omnia congruit rationi iudicii divini. Haec est enim sententia mentalis secundum iudicium prudentiae. Unde sicut dicunt Avicenna et Isaac in libro *De definitionibus*: Sententia est conceptio definitiva et certissima alterius partis contradictionis. Alia vero est sententia Dei iudicialis secundum iudicium iustitiae, quam Deus per ora prophetarum promulgavit secundum ordinem causarum inferiorum. Et quia istae mutabiles sunt, ideo dicit Gregorius, quod Deus non mutat consilium, sed sententiam, ut patet *Is.* 38 et *Ezech.* 33 et *Ion.* 3. Electio vero, prout hic sumitur, non dicit praeordinationem comparationis unius ad aliud nec etiam dicit illum specialem modum electionis, quo solo salvandi electi sunt aeternaliter a Deo, sed dicit propositum divinae voluntatis de quocumque faciendo, sicut dispositum est. Cum ergo Deus omnia operetur per artificialem intellectum et ab illo nihil possit fieri nisi cum dispositione praedicto modo sumpta, patet, quod necessaria ratione concluditur dispositionem esse in Deo. (*De summo bono*, lib. 11, tr. 5, c. 15, §2, p. 99, l. 55–63).

et immutabilem praeordinationem effectus, secundum quod per omnia congruit rationi iudicii divini. Haec est enim sententia supermentaliter secundum iudicium prudentiae. Unde, sicut dicunt Avicenna et Isaac in libello *De definitionibus*, “sententia est conceptio definita et certissima” “alterius partis” contradictionis. Cum igitur dii omnia operentur per artificiales intellectus et ab illis nihil possit fieri nisi cum dispositione praedicto modo sumpta, patet, quod necessaria ratione concluditur dispositiones et praeordinationes esse in diis.

(*Expositio*, 144F, p. 79, l. 150–p. 80, l. 161).

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# *Sapiens modernus*: The Reception of Dietrich of Freiberg in Berthold of Moosburg

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## 1 Introduction\*

The importance of the Dominican master Dietrich of Freiberg (d. after 1310) for Berthold of Moosburg's *Exposition on the Elements of Theology* has long been noted, though the extent of this influence has been measured only gradually.<sup>1</sup> Dietrich's influence touches nearly every aspect of the commentary: its doctrines of intellect, causality, time and eternity, cosmology, the theory of soul, the conception of contemplation and beatitude, ontology, natural philosophy, and theology. By my calculation, based on the table below, Berthold cites a text from Dietrich, on average, at least once per Proposition and takes, on average, at least two passages from him each time. The overall situation was succinctly described by Loris Sturlese over 30 years ago: "A catalogue of doctrines inherited by Berthold would equal an index of Dietrich's corpus. We will see that Berthold also cheated, at times. But the agreement with Dietrich goes so far and is thus so emphatic in the *Exposition* that this must be considered as a foundation for every interpretation of Berthold's work".<sup>2</sup> This judgement has proven true for almost every study of particular doctrines in the *Exposition*.<sup>3</sup> My aim here is to bring to light the deeper patterns of this reception.

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- 1 The connection was first noted briefly by M. Grabmann, "Studien über Ulrich von Straßburg", in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 29(1905), p. 626, and E. Krebs, *Meister Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Wissenschaft* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1906), p. 50. On Dietrich of Freiberg, see now K. Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg. Philosophie, Theologie, Naturforschung um 1300* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2007); L. Sturlese, "Dietrich von Freiberg", in A. Brungs, V. Mudroch, P. Schulthess (eds), *Die Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol. 4. 13. Jahrhundert* (Basel: Schwabe, 2017), p. 895–911.
- 2 L. Sturlese, *Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), p. 139.
- 3 See A. de Libera, *La mystique rhénane. D'Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart* (Paris: Seuil, 1994), p. 326–384, with bibliography; T. Iremadze, *Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. Zur Rezeption der Proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter. Dietrich*

The overall pattern can be construed as a dialogue between ancients and moderns in Berthold's commentary. Dietrich is the exemplary figure of the modern master in confrontation with ancient wisdom. The pattern in Berthold's reception of his thought is an act of transposition and sublation. Berthold transplanted Dietrich's metaphysics, whenever possible, back into ancient soil; this is his consistent practice with most of his contemporary sources, e.g., Thomas of York, Albert the Great, and Ulrich of Strassburg. But there is also a striking element of duplicity or "cheating" in his use of Dietrich. This was not because Berthold believed his master's thought was incoherent; I intend to show that Berthold proceeded as if Dietrich's intellectual aims could be realized only by going back to an earlier golden age, and this is why I call it an act of sublation. In this gesture, Berthold profoundly transformed central elements of Dietrich's philosophical project. For Berthold, Dietrich's insights into the order of separate beings and their necessary interconnection were stated inadequately, tarnished by the same forgetting that affected all the "moderns" – one might call it the forgetting of what is beyond being.

As Dragos Calma has shown, Dietrich's copy of the *Elements of Theology*, which he used throughout his career, lacked at least four propositions.<sup>4</sup> By contrast, Dietrich cited Augustine with great care, often supplying alternate systems of enumerating the chapters. But it seems he was not sufficiently concerned with the authority of Proclus to emend his copy of the *Elements*. A comparison with Dietrich's use of the *Liber de causis* has indicated that he preferred it to Proclus.<sup>5</sup> As for Berthold, his sympathy and familiarity with three rare texts made this attitude inconceivable: Proclus' *Three Works on Providence*, the *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York,<sup>6</sup> and the 12th-century paraphrase of Eriugena's *Periphyseon* called the *Clavis physicae*, which Berthold attributed to a "Theodorus, Abbot of Constantinople".<sup>7</sup> Each of these established the fundamental doxographical alliance of Proclus and Dionysius. The

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von Freiberg – Berthold von Moosburg – Joane Petrizi (Amsterdam: Grüner, 2004); M. Führer, S. Gersh, "Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg", in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 299–317; E. King, "Berthold of Moosburg on Intellect and the One of the Soul", in *Dionysius* 36(2018), p. 184–199; P. Hellmeier, "Der Intellekt ist nicht genug. Das proklische *unum in nobis* bei Berthold von Moosburg", in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 126/2(2019), p. 202–226.

4 D. Calma, *Le poids de la citation. Étude sur les sources arabes et grecques dans l'œuvre de Dietrich de Freiberg* (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2010), p. 277–278.

5 Calma, *Le poids de la citation*, p. 341–342, 371–375.

6 See the contributions of Fiorella Retucci and Loris Sturlese in this volume.

7 E. Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela de Colonia* (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013); E. King, "Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procl*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and*

result could not be overlooked. As Loris Sturlese has put it, for Dietrich, Proclus was “a diligent investigator” of the essential natural order of the cosmos, but for Berthold, he became “a divine man” and, in a sense, “a prophet” of “a philosophical revelation”.<sup>8</sup> Thus the very letter of the *Elements of Theology*, each term in each Proposition, carried the weight of a luminous ancient wisdom. It was the commentator’s task to adjust weaker modern eyes to that light.<sup>9</sup>

This paper has three parts: Part 2 presents the quantitative data of Dietrich’s presence in the *Expositio*; Part 3 analyses some case studies of Berthold’s critique and transformation of Dietrich’s works; Part 4 develops a hypothesis about Berthold’s use of a lost theological text from Dietrich.

## 2 The Citations of Dietrich of Freiberg in the *Expositio*: Formal Analysis

The table below presents the number of citations of Dietrich’s works found in the commentary.<sup>10</sup>

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*the Book of Causes, Volume 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), p. 394–437.

8 Sturlese, *Homo divinus*, p. 143, 145.

9 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), *Prologus* 21, p. 34, l. 974–975: *Igitur cum Platone et Boethio bonum esse reor humilem theoricum obnixè lucem divinisimam votis supplicibus invocare [...]*. All citations of the *Expositio* refer to the critical edition published in the *Corpus philosophorum teutonicorum medii aevi*. See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986); Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 35–65*, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001); Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 108–135*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011); Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 160–183*, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 184–211*, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014).

10 The works of Dietrich of Freiberg are cited according to the critical edition (*Corpus philosophorum teutonicorum medii aevi*). See Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie*, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977); Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 2. Schriften zur Metaphysik und Theologie*, eds R. Imbach et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980); Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, eds J.-D. Cavigioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983); Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera*

For the sake of simplicity, Berthold's citations of Dietrich are arranged in each column according to the volume of the critical edition of the *Exposition*, which in most cases (volumes 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8) correspond precisely or closely to natural divisions in the *Elements of Theology*. In each row of the table, the number outside the parentheses refers to the number of subsections in Berthold's commentary (such as: 2A, 2B, 2C, etc.) where a citation of each text is found. The number in parentheses represents the total citations. For example, Proposition 167C has been counted to include six citations for *De intellectu et intelligibili*, which would be represented by 1 (6). The total for that volume indicates that Berthold cited *De int.* in 16 different subsections of his commentary for a total of 40 citations. It is worthwhile keeping these two figures distinct, because the subsections of the *Exposition* correspond to Berthold's explanations of separate terms, doctrines, or arguments. These subsections are the most basic building blocks of the *Exposition*. Therefore, the number outside parentheses gives a sense of how the influence of each of Dietrich's treatises permeates the fundamental structure of the commentary. The number in parentheses reflects the use of a more artificial standard for counting a citation. These numbers are significantly lower than those one would reach by simply counting the entries in the indices of the critical edition, for two reasons. First, I do not count terms or phrases as citations, however characteristic Berthold's thorough appropriation and internalisation of Dietrich's philosophical terminology they may be. Furthermore, it would often be impossible to determine which

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*omnia*, vol. 4. *Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1985). Abbreviations: *De acc.* (*De accidentibus*, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, vol. 3); *De anim.* (*De animatione caeli*, ed. L. Sturlese, vol. 3); *De cog. ent.* (*De cognitione entium separatorum*, ed. H. Steffan, vol. 2); *De cor. cael.* (*De corporibus caelestibus quoad naturam eorum corporalem*, ed. L. Sturlese, vol. 2); *De dot.* (*De dotibus corporum gloriosorum*, ed. L. Sturlese, vol. 2); *De elem.* (*De elementis corporum naturalium*, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, vol. 4); *De ente* (*De ente et essentia*, ed. R. Imbach, vol. 2); *De hab.* (*De habitibus*, ed. H. Steffan, vol. 2); *De int.* (*De intellectu et intelligibili*, ed. B. Mojsisch, vol. 1); *De intellig.* (*De intelligentiis et motoribus caelorum*, ed. L. Sturlese, vol. 2); *De ir.* (*De iride et de radialibus impressionibus*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese, vol. 4); *De luce* (*De luce et eius origine*, ed. R. Rehn, vol. 4); *De magis* (*De magis et minus*, eds R. Imbach, H. Steffan, vol. 2); *De mens.* (*De mensuris*, ed. R. Rehn, vol. 3); *De misc.* (*De miscibilibus in mixto*, ed. W. Wallace, vol. 4); *De nat. contin.* (*De natura et proprietate continuorum*, ed. R. Rehn, vol. 3); *De nat. contr.* (*De natura contrariorum*, ed. R. Imbach, vol. 2); *De orig.* (*De origine rerum praedicalium*, ed. L. Sturlese, vol. 3); *De pot.* (*De ratione potentiae*, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, vol. 3); *De quid.* (*De quiditatibus entium*, eds R. Imbach, J.-D. Cavigioli, vol. 3); *De subiecto* (*De subiecto theologiae*, ed. L. Sturlese, vol. 3); *De sub. spir.* (*De substantiis separatis et corporibus futurae resurrectionis*, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, vol. 2); *De vis. beat.* (*De visione beatifica*, ed. B. Mojsisch, vol. 1); *Quaest. utrum in Deo* (*Quaestio utrum in Deo sit aliqua vis cognitiva inferior intellectu*, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, vol. 3); *Quaest. utrum sub. spir.* (*Quaestio utrum substantia spiritualis sit composita ex materia et forma*, ed. B. Mojsisch, vol. 3).

	<i>Prol.</i> -13	14-34	35-65	66-107	108-135	136-159	160-183	184-211	Total
1. <i>De int.</i>	3 (4)	9 (22)	2 (4)	8 (9)	4 (10)	1 (2)	16 (40)	5 (11)	48 (102)
2. <i>De vis. beat.</i>	3 (3)	4 (7)	6 (11)	1 (2)	3 (4)	4 (5)	14 (24)	3 (3)	37 (58)
3. <i>De orig.</i>	2 (2)	5 (13)	2 (3)	7 (11)	3 (5)	1 (2)	2 (3)	1 (1)	23 (40)
4. <i>De anim.</i>	1 (2)	4 (8)	2 (2)	5 (11)			2 (5)	7 (10)	21 (38)
5. <i>De cog. ent.</i>	1 (6)	3 (3)	2 (2)	2 (6)		1 (1)	5 (9)	1 (2)	15 (29)
6. <i>Quaest.</i>	1 (2)	1 (2)	5 (7)	4 (16)	1 (3)	1 (1)	1 (7)		14 (38)
<i>utrum in Deo</i>									
7. <i>De sub. spir.</i>				5 (9)	1 (6)			5 (10)	11 (25)
8. <i>De mens.</i>			7 (21)	2 (3)					9 (24)
9. <i>De dot.</i>			1 (1)	1 (2)	1 (1)			5 (7)	8 (11)
10. <i>De pot.</i>		2 (6)		3 (8)			1 (3)		6 (17)
11. <i>De nat.</i>	1 (8)			2 (11)		1 (1)			4 (20)
<i>contr.</i>									
12. <i>Quaest.</i>				1 (1)				3 (7)	4 (8)
<i>utrum sub. spir.</i>									
13. <i>De cor. cael.</i>		2 (4)		2 (3)					4 (7)
14. <i>De nat.</i>			4 (6)						4 (6)
<i>contin.</i>									
15. <i>De misc.</i>			1 (1)	1 (1)	2 (3)				4 (5)
16. <i>De acc.</i>		1 (7)	2 (3)						3 (10)
17. <i>De elem.</i>				2 (6)					2 (6)
18. <i>De intellig.</i>								2 (5)	2 (5)
19. <i>De magis</i>			1 (1)	1 (3)					2 (4)
20. <i>De luce</i>			2 (4)						2 (4)
21. <i>De ente</i>	1 (3)								1 (3)
22. <i>De ir.</i>			1 (1)						1 (1)
23. <i>De quid.</i>	1 (1)								1 (1)
24. <i>De subiecto</i>	1 (1)								1 (1)
<b>Total</b>	15 (32)	31 (72)	38 (67)	47 (102)	15 (32)	9 (12)	41 (91)	32 (56)	228 (464)

of Dietrich's works they derive from (e.g., *ens secundum speciem, intellectus in actu per essentiam, ens conceptionale*). Secondly, when Berthold copied many lines from the same treatise in sequence, as he frequently did, I count separate citations only when he omitted two lines of his source or interpolated two lines of his own, since these were evidently deliberate editorial acts on Berthold's part. Finally, in compiling this table I have identified eight overlooked citations of Dietrich.<sup>11</sup>

11 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 17E, p. 40, l. 257-259 = Dietrich of Freiberg, *De int.*, 11.5.1, p. 149, l. 6-10; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 42F, p. 63, l. 280-p. 64, l. 288 ≈ Dietrich of Freiberg, *De vis. beat.*, 1.3.2 (7), p. 55, l. 56-63 and 1.3.2 (10), p. 56, l. 80-86; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 121D, p. 106, l. 50-63 = Dietrich of Freiberg, *De vis. beat.*, 3.2.9.2 (4),

The quantitative data allow us to draw a few conclusions. (a) Works. Berthold's familiarity with Dietrich's corpus was profound. In the *Exposition*, Berthold used every extant treatise by Dietrich except for *De coloribus*, *De corpore Christi mortuo*, *De habitibus*, and the short *Quaestiones* preserved as *reportationes* – so 24 out of 28 works. Of Dietrich's eight other works listed in the 14th-century Stams catalogue, which are no longer extant, we know that Berthold knew at least one, *De entium universitate*.<sup>12</sup> He refers to this treatise in his glosses on Macrobius, which date to before 1323.<sup>13</sup> It seems safe to conclude that, at one time or another, Berthold had all, or almost all, of Dietrich's known corpus available to him, and drew freely from these works as the text of the *Elements* required.

(b) Rank. Berthold made consistent use of *De intellectu et intelligibili* (102), which incidentally contains Dietrich's praise of Proclus as a "diligent investigator" (*diligens indagator*) of the order of nature.<sup>14</sup> In a distant second we find *De visione beatifica* (58), followed by *De origine rerum praedicamentalium* (40), and *De animatione caeli* (38). Next come works that Dietrich explicitly structured according to the four fundamental levels of the cosmos described in Proposition 20 of the *Elements of Theology: De cognitione entium separatorum* and *De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis*. All of the treatises in the top eight places, with the exception of *De origine rerum praedicamentalium*, often proceed by reasoning about the hierarchical structure of the universe and/or the modes of cognition appropriate to these levels or *maneries*, which explains why Berthold would favour them when explaining the cosmology outlined in the *Elements*. Only after the works on intellect and cosmology do we get Dietrich's works on theology (*De dot.*), ontology (*De pot.*,

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p. 88, l. 20–32; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 158E, p. 186, l. 73–78 = Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cog. ent.*, 49.2, p. 214, l. 100–105; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 171A, p. 110, l. 45–49 = Dietrich of Freiberg, *De orig.*, 4.25, p. 175, l. 241–245; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 171A, p. 110, l. 49–50 = Dietrich of Freiberg, *De orig.*, 4.25, p. 175, l. 249–p. 176, l. 251; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 189F, p. 72, l. 138–140 ≈ Dietrich of Freiberg, *De orig.*, 4.6, p. 169, l. 33–p. 170, l. 37.

12 On the catalogues of Dietrich's works, see L. Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen zu Leben und Werk Dietrichs von Freiberg* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 134–136.

13 MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 20r. The gloss corresponds to Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*, I.17.5: QVOD QVIDEM TO PAN, ID EST OMNE, DIXERVNT. *Pan enim non est aliud quam mundus ipse; nota de ratione universitatis ex tractatu magistri Theoderici qui intitulatur De entium universitate.*

14 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De int.*, I.4.1, p. 138, l. 44–46: *Distinguit autem idem Proclus quadruplicem rerum maneriem, in quibus singulis diligens indagator, prout fuerit de proposito suo, necesse habet quaerere proprias uniuscuiusque eorum operationes.*

*De nat. contr.*, *De acc.*, etc.), and natural philosophy (*Quaest. utrum sub. spir.*, *De cor. cael.*, etc.).

(c) Distribution.<sup>15</sup> The highest distribution of citations by proposition is in 160–183, which primarily concern the intellect, followed by Propositions 14–34, on the four genera of the cosmos and essential causality. We also notice a decrease of citations between Propositions 108–159, which concern the primordial causes or gods (*unitates, bonitates*) and their providence. Incidentally perhaps, here one observes an increase in citations from Ulrich of Strassburg and Thomas of York.

(d) Explicit references. Only two of all the citations of Dietrich are explicit references, and both provide the title of Dietrich's treatise: *magister Theodoricus prima parte tractatus De animatione caeli* (107A); *magister Theodoricus tractatu De natura oppositorum cap. 44* (143O). Both attributions are correct. By comparison with other contemporary authors used in the *Exposition*, apart from the appearance of their names in two tables of authorities that accompany the commentary, we find only one explicit reference to Albert the Great (118A), one to Thomas Aquinas (204A), and zero for Thomas of York and Ulrich of Strassburg, which is hardly representative of the degree to which Berthold relied on their work. Nevertheless, in these limited cases there appears to be a pattern. The explicit mentions of Albert and Thomas occur after Berthold cites a lengthy passage that conveys their final determination about a classic topic in philosophical theology: how a plurality of ideas is in God (118A) and whether the rational soul is created *de novo* or is transmitted through the seed (204A). Berthold's decisions to cite Dietrich explicitly coincide with passages in which he presents an argument from Dietrich that he endorses and when this argument makes a valuable correction to an older authority, either Avicenna and Algazel (107A)<sup>16</sup> or Alhazen (143O).

(e) Indirect citations. Most of Berthold's citations of Dietrich are implicit (*quidam* or *alii*)<sup>17</sup> or tacit. Often the implicit citations occur when Dietrich's argument is compared with a different view from another more contemporary

15 The averages per proposition by CPTMA volume, which roughly correspond to the division of the larger themes and subject matter of the *Elements* are: 1–13: 1.15 (2.46); 14–34: 1.55 (3.60); 35–65: 1.27 (2.30); 66–107: 1.15 (2.49); 108–135: 0.55 (1.19); 136–159: 0.35 (0.48); 160–183: 1.70 (3.78); 184–211: 1.15 (2.04). The proportion for ET 1–13 decreases if we include the three prefaces, which contain only three citations.

16 They are unnamed at 107B but are named in the parallel passage at 185B.

17 For example, 3A (*De anim.?*); 7C (*De vis. beat.*) 21I (*De cog. ent.*); 43F (*De int.*); 74B (*De orig.*); 88A (*De mens.*); 104E (*De mens.*); 105B (*De int.*); 106F (*De anim.*); 111B (*De int.*); 129A (*De misc.*); 129A (*De sub. spir.*, twice); 133E (*De anim.?*); 183A (*De vis. beat.?*); 190A (*De int.* and *De vis. beat.*).



author, like Ulrich,<sup>18</sup> or where Berthold disagrees with the view advanced by Dietrich, because it either conflicts with the Platonists or inadequately captures a Platonic doctrine, as we see in the case studies that follow.

### 3 Case Studies

Three instances of Berthold's reception of Dietrich are particularly illustrative: the doctrine of transcendentals, the theory of time and eternity, and the doctrine of causality. The first is foundational for the other two. As is clear to contemporary readers of his commentaries on Propositions 1 and 11, Berthold used texts from Dietrich when he presented a doctrine of "the transcendentals" that he attributes to Aristotle.<sup>19</sup> At other times, Berthold used different texts from Dietrich to present both sides of the Plato-Aristotle divide. A salient example of this is when he contrasts the "Platonic" notion of a "metaphysical" genus as a level of reality defined by its natural place in the cosmic hierarchy (a *maneries*),<sup>20</sup> with the "Aristotelian" sense of a metaphysical genus that is described using the *De origine rerum praedicamentalium*.<sup>21</sup> I believe we should understand this two-sidedness as Berthold's redoubling of Dietrich's own characteristic critique against himself. Dietrich had criticized those who import imaginative and logical abstractions into metaphysics (the *communiter loquentes*), and Berthold subjected the Aristotelian metaphysics of being to the same criticism, which implicated Dietrich. For Berthold, being (*ens*) is prior only from the point of view of logical abstraction, and only the Platonic metaphysics of the Good is adequate to the reality beyond our abstractions.

The second and third cases focus on the only two passages where Berthold discusses the views of his contemporaries (*moderni*). Both cases illustrate how Berthold subordinated Dietrich's "contemporary" views to ancient Platonism. This occurs in two different ways: in the propositions on time and eternity, Berthold takes many essential doctrines from Dietrich's theory of time and eternity in *De mensuris*, but explicitly decides to *restrict* Dietrich's theory

18 For example, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 59C, p. 166, l. 128–p. 168, l. 175; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 185B, p. 19, l. 171–172.

19 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1A, p. 74, l. 109–112: *Et per consequens unum secundum [Aristotelem] et multum proprietates entis in eo, quod ens, erunt transcendentia, quarum esse etiam non est extra animam, quamquam secundum intellectum sint posteriora ente, utpote quorum unum addit super ens indivisionem, aliud vero divisionem sive distinctionem.*

20 On this characteristic theme of Dietrich's thought, see D. Calma, "Maneries", in I. Atucha et al. (eds), *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach* (Porto: FIDEM, 2011), p. 433–444.

21 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 135K–L, p. 227, l. 119–p. 229, l. 289.

because it does not conform to the Platonic truth. In the third case, on causality, we observe the reverse: Berthold *elaborates* Dietrich's theory of three kinds of causes in order to align it with the Platonic theory of the five kinds of causes.

### 3.1 *Case 1: Being and Goodness (Critique)*

Berthold attributed to Aristotle a full-fledged doctrine of the transcendentals.<sup>22</sup> The Aristotelian position, as Berthold presents it by tacitly borrowing the words of Dietrich of Freiberg, is that being (*ens*) is the most formal and primary of all intentions, and *unum*, *verum*, and *bonum* are logically derivative of being because they are resolvable into it.<sup>23</sup> Berthold goes behind this position to address what he takes to be its flawed assumption, namely, that act always determines potency.<sup>24</sup> According to Berthold, Plato acknowledged the validity of this approach relative to physical phenomena, where form always determines matter, but realized that their relation was reversed among the separate substances and the first principles, where potency is a limitation of active causal power.<sup>25</sup> Following Aristotle's reasoning, however, we must maintain that diversity or multitude only arise from the most indeterminate and potential. Starting out from this, the Aristotelian way then posits that the first diversity arises as a form of an opposition in the relationship between privation and possession (*habitus*), which is reducible to the relation of potency and act, which is finally reducible to the logical opposition of negation and affirmation in a subject.<sup>26</sup> On the basis of these assumptions, Berthold then gives a lengthy, if tacit, summary of Dietrich of Freiberg's derivation of the other transcendentals from *ens* by unfolding their notions from the foundational opposition of affirmation and negation.

Berthold's Aristotle, from a historical point of view, is of course a remarkable invention. In some sense his portrait is compatible with those of earlier Neoplatonic commentators who advocate for an ultimate harmony of Plato and Aristotle, provided the Aristotelian philosophy is restricted to the sublunary world. With Berthold, however, the emphasis falls on the discord at the

22 See J. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 545–553.

23 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 11A, p. 185, l. 23–p. 186, l. 40.

24 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1A, p. 72, l. 53–54: *Secundum Aristotelem autem VII Metaphysicae suae actus separat et distinguit [...]*.

25 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1A, p. 73, l. 90–93: *Plato vero alia via incedit circa multitudinis originem, qui, licet concedat distinctionem esse formalem causam multitudinis, tamen actus secundum eum non ubique, hoc est in tota rerum universitate, distinguit nisi in solis materialibus.*

26 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1A, p. 72, l. 58–62.

level of their metaphysics and the need for a total reversal in first principles. It is important to reflect on the underlying motivations for this. For him, it seems a danger lurks in the metaphysics of being that threatens to occlude human nature and its proper relation to the divine. In short, an exclusively physicalist view of the origin of diversity ends up producing a strictly intra-mental or logical metaphysics: we make an imaginative reduction to the primary substratum, prime matter, and from there have recourse to the first principles of logic, the principle of non-contradiction, to account for the principles of diversity and multitude. These principles, however, have lost all bearing on the world outside the mind. Berthold uses a remark from Averroes as verification that the Aristotelians are willing to admit that these transcendental determinations do not have any being outside the soul.<sup>27</sup> Such an outlook must be subject to the verdict of Dionysius: the unlearned are sealed off among beings and believe there is nothing that is supersubstantial beyond.<sup>28</sup> Perhaps Berthold believes that these tendencies were coming to fruition among some of his contemporaries in the late 1310s in Oxford. In any event, he shares the view of Proclus, Dionysius, and Boethius that individuals tend to disperse themselves in the physical world, and that what is beyond being is therefore hidden from our everyday awareness.<sup>29</sup> Platonic theology resists this imaginative impulse and prepares its practitioner to know and be united with the divine realities themselves, which are measured in terms of a causal influence that is independent of the activity of our minds.<sup>30</sup> Platonism, therefore, is the corrective of both a

27 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1D, p. 77, l. 218–219; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 11A, p. 186, l. 43–47.

28 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 71D, p. 35, l. 123–127, directed against the *Liber de causis*, proposition IV.

29 Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 17, p. 27, l. 724–726: *Donec autem circa ea, quae deorsum, volvimur, increduliter habemus circa haec*. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, Prol. 15, p. 23, l. 583–587: [...] *quae sunt corpus, anima, intellectus et unum sive unitas. De quorum ultimo, quia prima tria manifesta sunt, sic dicit Proclus [...]: "Et enim nobis (scilicet hominibus) iniacet aliquod secretum unius vestigium, quod et eo, qui intellectus, est divinius". Cui concordat Dionysius [...]*.

30 Another important source for Berthold was the Byzantine commentator Eustratius, and his arguments against Aristotle's criticism of the Good in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, insofar as Eustratius distinguished between *logical* universals, produced by the mind, and universals of *separation*, which Berthold also calls "theological universals", that are beyond the mind. See F. Retucci, "Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone", in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), p. 79–111. See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1A, p. 74, l. 98–102; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 11A, p. 186, l. 56–59.

contemplative failure and a baleful lack of rational self-criticism at the heart of the metaphysics of being.

Anyone familiar with Dietrich of Freiberg will feel that Berthold is somehow dealing unfairly with his source here. Perhaps no philosopher of his time was more critical of reified, imagistic thinking in metaphysics than Dietrich, as Kurt Flasch in particular has emphasized by pointing precisely to Dietrich's exegesis of Aristotle himself, and especially the Stagirite's doctrines of substance and intellect.<sup>31</sup> Dietrich recognized perfectly well that the move from physics to metaphysics entailed a shift in perspective characterized by the abandonment of extrinsic efficient and final causal explanations. Furthermore, his dynamic view of intellectual substance was founded firmly on the *De anima* and *Metaphysics* XII. Berthold of course was fully aware of this. As we see in his extension of Dietrich's critiques of the *communiter loquentes*, below, he intended, if anything, to go further in this direction. But it was perhaps Dietrich's own endorsement of the metaphysics of being and his characteristic doctrine of the possible intellect, which "effects the universality in things,"<sup>32</sup> that made it necessary for Dietrich's own works to be played off against one another.<sup>33</sup>

In other words, Berthold judged Dietrich's metaphysics to be on the cusp of the truth: it was fundamentally correct in its aspirations but flawed in its expression. Only one further step was needed, which was to restore it to the ancient philosophical soil that would rearticulate those ambitions, and thus give them a form in which they could be realized. He fundamentally endorsed the principle Dietrich took from Aristotle, "each thing exists for the sake of

31 Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 119: "Dietrichs origo-Analyse beansprucht, zugleich Theorie der Wissenschaften zu sein. Sie bestimmt nicht nur die Aufgabe der Metaphysik neu; sie faßt auch das Gebiet der Physik strenger und zieht die Grenze zwischen Logik und Metaphysik schärfer. [...] Wenn Dietrich ein Revolutionär war, dann ein konservativer Revolutionär, denn er wollte nur herausstellen, was er in der Philosophie der Peripatetiker enthalten fand und es gegen waltende Banalisierung verteidigen." And p. 200: "Diese Intellekte sind anders als Dinge. Sie zu begreifen, erfordert eine Reform des dingorientierten Denkens." Also, p. 226: "Befreien wir unseren Selbstbegriff von verdinglichenden Vorstellungen und erneuern wir unser Verständnis des christlichen Glaubens."

32 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 11A, p. 186, l. 41–42: *Ens autem sic acceptum est communissimum in se communitate abstractionis, quam facit intellectus, qui efficit universalitatem in rebus*. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De orig.*, 3.8, 4.1, 5.33; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De ente*, 1.1.2; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De quid.*, 1.3.

33 See, for example, 16D and 177H. Both passages appeal to Dietrich's distinction of abstraction, which is the work of reason, and separation, which is the work of nature. In 16D, Berthold uses *De origine* on intellect to describe abstraction, and *De animatione caeli* to describe the condition of separate substances. In 177H, he uses *De intellectu* on logical universals, followed by *De cognitione* on separate universals.

its own operation".<sup>34</sup> For Berthold, however, this could be best justified if one acknowledged the priority of the Good. In this view, *bonum* and *unum* are the most formal of all intentions if we consider what makes a reality an organized totality, be it a singular thing, an entire series, or the whole cosmos, by ordering it relative to all other things and/or within itself. In other words, placing *bonum* before *ens* compels the mind to seek first the concrete, dynamic, and essential order of the totality. Statements like the following from Dietrich anticipate this point of view:

An isolated essence by itself does not possess the characteristic of the good, nor does it pertain to the real order of the universe insofar as it is a single whole, complete in species and in parts. It is a characteristic of this order of the universe that one thing flows into another by means of some active power.<sup>35</sup>

The best way to make sense of this duplicity is to say that Berthold was in fact thoroughly shaped by Dietrich's way of thinking, but his reading of Proclus, Dionysius, and Eustratius had made him aware of the instability in the metaphysics of being that inherently would indulge the human soul's propensity to turn itself away from the realities above it and insulate itself from the good they bestow. Therefore, he recast the divide between the material and immaterial orders along Platonic and Aristotelian lines.

This critical move inevitably led to distortions of Dietrich's thought, especially relative to his noetics. Burkhard Mojsisch has pointed to an important passage in 168B–D, where Berthold downgrades the constitutive power of the possible intellect. When tacitly citing Dietrich on the way the intellect constitutes its object "conceptionally" (*conceptionaliter*), Berthold explains that this means "conceptually" (*conceptive*) or "intentionally", such that what is thus constituted has being only in the mind.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, Mojsisch observed, nowhere in Berthold do we find Dietrich's strong affirmation that the agent

34 Aristotle, *De caelo* 11.3, 286a8–9.

35 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De int.*, 1.10.3, p. 143, l. 22–25: *Absoluta enim essentia secundum se non habet rationem boni nec est de reali ordine universi, inquantum est unum totum perfectum specie et partibus, de cuius ordinis ratione est, ut una res fluat in aliam aliqua virtute activa.* Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 6B, 44A, and 131D.

36 B. Mojsisch, "Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Berthold von Moosburg: zur Proklosrezeption im Mittelalter", in Th. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, O. Summerell (eds), *Selbst – Singularität – Subjektivität. Vom Neuplatonismus zum Deutschen Idealismus* (Amsterdam: Grüner, 2002), p. 175–184.

intellect knows the first principle in the manner of the principle itself.<sup>37</sup> But we should recognize that both changes follow from a coherent standpoint. For Berthold, it is only the *unum animae*, which places us outside ourselves and beyond the limits of our knowing, that could know in the manner of the principle, and it is only through that principle that the human is placed in any constitutive or providential relation to the world.

### 3.2 Case 2: *The Measures of Time and Eternity (Restriction)*

The next case studies show the two opposed ways Berthold reconciled the rational insights of the modern master with the authority of the Platonists. The first comes from the propositions on time and eternity. Here, Berthold extensively uses Dietrich's *De mensuris*, which contains a complex account of the different measures of temporal and eternal activity. In total, Dietrich posits five kinds of measurement corresponding to five cosmic *maneries*: God (*superaeternitas*); the intelligences, "if such beings exist" (*aeternitas*); angels (*aevum*); celestial bodies (*aeviternitas*); sublunary beings (*tempus*).<sup>38</sup> There are additionally two kinds of measures relating to things whose essence is subject to change and succession: motion, which applies to material things, and "time consisting from indivisibles" (*tempus constans ex indivisibilibus*), which relates to changes in spiritual substances.<sup>39</sup> These distinctions arise when entities are ranked according to four intrinsic criteria: (1) the mode and property of a thing's substantial perfection; (2) whether there is variation of its substance, and what this is; (3) whether it has a beginning and an end, and what these are; (4) the presentness (*praesentialitas*) or mode of presentness belonging to its existence.<sup>40</sup> After citing passages from *De mensuris* 21 times between Propositions 49 and 54, and presenting these principles and conclusions as those of the more subtle contemporary sages (*moderni sapientes et subtiliores*), Berthold concludes with the following:

Although what has just been said seems to have been said reasonably [*rationabiliter dicta*], notwithstanding this, in truth, according to the Platonists, there are in fact only two measures.<sup>41</sup>

37 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De vis. beat.*, 1.2.1.3 (2), p. 44, l. 9–p. 45, l. 20; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De int.*, II.40.3, p. 177, l. 72–77.

38 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De mens.*, 2.7–32, p. 218, l. 106–p. 222, l. 246.

39 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De mens.*, 2.33–48, p. 222, l. 247–p. 225, l. 339.

40 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De mens.*, 2.6, p. 218, l. 98–105.

41 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 54G, p. 131, l. 95 and 54H, p. 133, l. 162–164; *De primo notandum, quod moderni sapientes et subtiliores advertentes ea quattuor, quae ad assignandum rebus proprias mensuras requiruntur, [...] soliti sunt septem mensurarum differentias*

Berthold's procedure here understandably has frustrated some of his modern commentators.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate the tensions navigated by Berthold as he proceeds in accordance with the principles of his project.

Berthold finds himself in a difficult position. His sympathy with Dietrich's arguments is clear throughout Propositions 49–54. He even embellishes his summaries of *De mensuris* with concepts characteristic of Dietrich's thought. For example, he contrasts the use of the four intrinsic criteria, mentioned above, with the approach of the *communiter loquentes*, who reason about the measures of time only according to extrinsic considerations arising in the domain of voluntary providence.<sup>43</sup> The textual basis for interpolating these notions is clear, although he combines two groups mentioned by Dietrich into one. Dietrich had mentioned the *communiter agentes* who assume that the mode of a measure must equal the measure of duration. Thus, they consider only whether a thing's duration has a beginning and/or an end: God, who has no beginning or end, is measured by eternity; created, incorruptible creatures, who have a beginning but no end, are measured by the *aevum*; generable and corruptible creatures are measured by time. There are others, Dietrich added, who adopt only a comparative approach, in which beings are compared either to the whole universe, to God, or to one another. This yields four measures: eternity is the measure of God's duration, because he precedes the existence of the universe; the universe is measured by sempiternity, through a comparison with eternity; particular beings are measured by perpetuity, because they receive their being at a certain time and last as long as the sempiternal universe; finally, things that come before and after one another are said to be in the past or in the future relative to one another, and these are measured by temporality. For Dietrich, both ways of assigning these measures are extrinsic to the properties of the substance of things (*extra proprietatem substantiae rerum*) and are received, as it were, from the outside (*quasi extrinsecus acceptus*).<sup>44</sup> From the perspective of voluntary providence, which Berthold invokes here,

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*assignare. [...] Circa secundum advertendum, quod licet ea, quae iam dicta sunt, rationabiliter dicta videantur, tamen salva gratia eorum, in veritate secundum Platonicos secundum rem non sunt nisi duae mensurae, aeternitas videlicet et tempus.*

- 42 C. Steel, "The Neoplatonic Doctrine of Time and Eternity and its Influence on Medieval Philosophy", in P. Porro (ed.), *The Medieval Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 3–32, at p. 29.
- 43 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 52C, p. 121, l. 165–p. 122, l. 181. Berthold's remarks about the *communiter loquentes* and voluntary providence summarise Dietrich of Freiberg, *De mens.*, 2.1–3.
- 44 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De mens.*, 2.3, p. 217, l. 73–78.

the consideration of the nature of a thing is secondary to extrinsic factors; for example, angels act in the world to serve God's voluntary providence that certain individuals will be saved.<sup>45</sup> What a nature is in itself, essentially and universally, is assumed by voluntary providence, but does not strictly belong to its purview.<sup>46</sup> Problems arise when the extrinsic scruples of voluntary providence encroach upon the intrinsic reasoning about natures. So, for instance, both models here either assume the creation of the world in time or move directly from God to the angels. Accordingly, the entities that populate either picture do not include the separate intelligences – “if they exist”, as Dietrich cautions. As far as theoretical reason is concerned, what must come first is the intrinsic, *per-se* consideration of the realities themselves, their essence and their order, which proceeds according to rational patterns of symmetry and proportion. For Dietrich, Proclus' excellence in this reasoning is what made him the diligent investigator (*diligens indagator*) into the order of nature. It is important to note that Berthold praises the reasoning of the *moderni sapientes* as being “more subtle” (*subtiliores*), which suggests that this intrinsic consideration of natural providence is in fact more difficult to attain; indeed, our reason easily descends back into the imagination that specializes in viewing things extrinsically.<sup>47</sup> Thus we see why Berthold was so sympathetic to these arguments, but also why scruples of another kind forced him to curtail their validity. For Berthold, these subtle arguments agree with the approach followed by the Platonists and yet they must ultimately yield to the dogmatic authority of the best of the ancient philosophers Plato and Proclus.

### 3.3 Case 3: *The Three Levels of Causes (Elaboration)*

Berthold takes the opposite approach to Dietrich's doctrine of the three levels of causes, namely, essential, substantial, and accidental causes.<sup>48</sup> Whereas the previous example demanded a truncation of Dietrich's theory, this required elaboration. Berthold borrowed this doctrine of causes repeatedly, though the most sustained discussion appears in Proposition 7.<sup>49</sup> He identifies this

45 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De anim.*, 20.6, p. 31, l. 109–113.

46 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De sub. spir.*, p. 319, l. 26–p. 320, l. 29; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De vis. beat.*, 4.3.2 (4), p. 114, l. 16–21.

47 One of the two explicit mentions of Dietrich in the *Expositio* praises him with the same terms for an argument about mediation that is faithful to the patterns of symmetrical reasoning. See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 107A, p. 247, l. 60–62: *Ubi considerandum, quod dictis magister subtilissime, realissime concludit caelum esse animatum, sed non dat medium continuativum inter intellectuales hypostases et corpora caelestia, quod hic quaeritur, sicut patet, quae sunt extrema.*

48 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De vis. beat.*, 3.2.9.4, p. 90, l. 2–p. 93, l. 104.

49 See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 25C, 34C, 51A, 72C, 75A, and 104D.



Proposition as one of the two foundations of the entire project. This is because it is the first devoted principally to the Good. Having defended the primacy of the Good with arguments from the *Timaeus*, Dionysius, and Augustine in 7A, Berthold outlines the various kinds of productive causes. In 7B, he gives a five-fold division: the *superbonum* (God), the superessential goods, the essential causes, substantial causes, and accidental causes. After just over 100 lines of explanation, he then adds in 7C:

However, it should be considered that certain moderns [*quidam moderni*] only distinguish three kinds of productive [principles] according to the three kinds of agent cause, namely, essential, substantial and accidental.<sup>50</sup>

He then gives a succinct summary of this “contemporary” position using two texts from Dietrich, *De cognitione entium separatorum* 75.1–76.6 and *De animatione caeli* 7.1–5, which yields this threefold division. Essential causes act spontaneously in virtue of their essence, and therefore their effect is an essence in turn. Each cause is a being existing as a species (*ens secundum speciem*) that is immutable, and so is its effect. For Dietrich, the separate intelligences operate like this. Substantial causes, which act from their own substance, bring their effect into being out of the potency of material principles. Dietrich would identify these with the heavenly souls and the celestial bodies, whose effects are the substances of the sublunary world. Finally, accidental causes act by way of accidental features, like fire that acts by heat. The effect, in turn, is an accidental change, for example, being heated.

If we look back to the fivefold division proposed by Berthold in 7B, there appears to be no significant difference between Berthold’s highest three levels and Dietrich’s essential cause. All of them act spontaneously and presuppose nothing before bestowing their effect. The difference seems to be one of vocabulary and precision: “essential, substantial, and accidental productive principles are less properly called [productive] and truly are less productive than superessential productive principles”, while “superessential productive principles are called [productive] and are productive by analogy to the first productive principle as such”.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, the advantage of Berthold’s

50 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7C, p. 148, l. 365–368: *Et licet haec sufficiant de proposito, tamen considerandum est, quod quidam moderni solum distinguunt triplex genus productivorum secundum triplex genus causae agentis, essentialis videlicet, substantialis et accidentalis.*

51 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7C, p. 147, l. 336–p. 148, l. 338 and p. 148, l. 351–353: *inter iam enumerata productiva tam essentialia quam etiam substantialia et accidentalia minus proprie et vere sunt ut dicuntur productiva superessentialibus productivis. [...] Sola igitur*

more elaborate scheme is simply that it arranges causes according to modalities of goodness, and thus separates the unbounded creative causality of the Good, which calls all things into being, from the more determinate, qualified productive causality of the gods, and the more restricted causality of the many principles beneath the gods.<sup>52</sup>

Comparing his borrowings from Dietrich in 7C to the original texts, it becomes clear that Berthold modifies his source in order to make it seem like this more complex structure was latent in the “contemporary” doctrine of essential causes.<sup>53</sup> Berthold thus gives the impression that the moderns come so far, but their intentions can be fully realized only by returning to the metaphysics of the Good articulated by the best of the ancient Platonists.<sup>54</sup>

Berthold thus interpolates Proclean structures into Dietrich’s doctrine of creation and determination because it is consistent with that metaphysics of the Good and, again, because the authority of the Platonists must prevail. For the same reason, in his citation of *De animatione caeli*, Berthold omits a very significant caveat from Dietrich’s text. After describing God’s creative causality, Dietrich had gone on to add:

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*superessentialia et superbonum productiva stant in vera et propria ratione productivorum, licet ipsa superessentialia dicantur et sint productiva in analogia ad simpliciter primum productivum.*

52 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7B, p. 146, l. 270–p. 147, l. 316.

53 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 7C, p. 150, l. 427–p. 151, l. 445, with the modifications of Dietrich of Freiberg, *De anim.*, 7.1–5 in bold: *Ex praemissis colligitur secundum eos, quod sola causa essentialis dicitur et est causa productiva, a qua entia per suas essentias emanant modo simplici, quia non per motum vel quamcumque transmutationem, sed per simplicem defluxum totalis essentiae rei sic procedentis et hoc vel totaliter vel secundum determinatum modum, ut ex dictis apparet. In talis autem entis constitutione in esse attenditur simplicitas modi productionis non solum ex parte principii productivi – quod est ens ut simpliciter et ex hoc proprium modum principiandi effective habet simplicem et propter hoc sine motu et transmutatione –, verum etiam ex parte causati seu producti huic modo producendi active correspondet passive quidam proprius modus simplicitatis, quia tale productum vel non producitur ex aliquo subiecto – quale est omnis effectus, ut est solum prime productivi simpliciter, cuiusmodi est prime bonum –, vel, si producitur ex aliquo subiecto, hoc tamen subiectum quasi recipiens et intentio ipsum determinans ramanet ut res una, et sic secundum totalitatem sui in esse constituitur, licet non totaliter, cum solum prime productivum, cui etiam summus modus producendi competit, quia agit non solum non praesupponendo aliquod subiectum, ex quo vel in quod agit, sed etiam non praesupponendo actionem cuiuscumque prioris vel altioris virtutis, qua sua actio figatur et fundatur in producendo [...].*

54 For a similar case, this time an extension of Dietrich’s notion of “proceeding as an image” (*procedere ut imago*) to what is above intellect, see Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 29B, 58A, 70C, 83B, 109A, 125D, 131D, 145B, and 185E.

But if there are other substances, which the curiosity of the philosophers asserts and which they call intelligences [...] these, I say, according to these philosophers, would be the principles of beings without presupposing a prior subject from elsewhere, but would presuppose the action and power of the first and higher principle.<sup>55</sup>

Dietrich was not the first to use these caveats when referring to the separate intellects; a passage from Siger of Brabant may be interpreted along these lines.<sup>56</sup> But with Dietrich they became a matter of habit: there are over 40 such expressions in his work.<sup>57</sup> It seems extremely important that Dietrich was always careful to make these cautionary remarks and that Berthold always omitted them and never spoke in these hypothetical terms himself.<sup>58</sup> This reflects his fundamentally different view of pagan philosophical authority. In what follows I will argue that this difference extends down to the very roots of Berthold's conception of theology itself which, I believe, he derived from Dietrich and, following his consistent practice, developed in a new direction: Berthold unifies the orders of natural and voluntary providence, which Dietrich had used to separate philosophical and revealed theology, in Platonism as such.

55 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De anim.*, 7.5, p. 18, l. 67–p. 19, l. 75: *Si autem essent aliae substantiae, quas curiositas philosophorum asserit et intelligentias vocant, quarum quaelibet secundum eos est intellectus in actu per essentiam, huiusmodi, inquam, essent secundum dictos philosophos principia entium non supposito aliunde aliquo subiecto, supposita tamen actione et virtute prioris et altioris principii, in cuius virtute et actione fundarentur et figerentur earum propriae actiones; et ideo non essent creatrices, quamvis entia secundum totas suas essentias ab ipsis procederent, modo tamen inferiore, quam sit ille, quo procedunt a primo omnium principio.*

56 Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, ed. A. Maurer (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1983), lib. III, q. 5, p. 83, l. 15–17: *Nulla autem istarum viarum potest probari quod substantiae separate, si plures sint, habeant causam aliquam, nec etiam quod non habeant ex hoc quod aeternae sunt.*

57 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cog. ent.*, 1.3–4, 2.3, 3.1, 5.2–3, 14.1, 27.2–3, 36.2, 37.1, 37.8, 39.2, 39.4, 44.9, 86.6; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De sub. spir.*, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 2.2, 6.2, 9.1, 16.1, 18.2, 19.3, 23.4, 28.4; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De vis. beat.*, 3.2.9.2.4, 3.2.9.8.1, 4.2.1.14; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De orig.*, 1.14, 3.37; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De int.*, II.34.1, III.25.1, III.30.2; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De anim.*, 7.5, 9.1, 11.4, 15.1; Dietrich of Freiberg, *Quaest. utrum in Deo*, 1.1.4, 1.3.4; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De mens.*, 2.11, 2.43, 8.3; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De dot.*, 24.5; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De acc.*, 8.2.

58 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 44E, p. 77, l. 154–161, citing Dietrich of Freiberg, *De acc.*, 8.2, p. 63, l. 97–p. 64, l. 104; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 69B, p. 21, l. 33–36, citing Dietrich of Freiberg, *De sub. spir.*, 28.4, p. 327, l. 25–28; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 83B, p. 124, l. 38–43, citing Dietrich of Freiberg, *Quaest. utrum in Deo*, 1.1 (4), p. 294, l. 32.

#### 4 Theology and Philosophy: Traces of a Lost Text?

The *Preamble* to the *Exposition* seeks to account for the two principles that, according to Berthold, Proclus assumes as the foundations of his philosophy: Proposition 1 (*Omnis multitudo* etc.) assumes “that there is multitude” (*multitudinem esse*) and moves from the many to the One, while Proposition 7 (*Omne productivum* etc.) presupposes that “the productive exists” (*productivum esse*) and establishes the existence of the Good.

Since Proclus seems to assume these principles, Berthold was compelled, somewhat surprisingly, to address some doubts as to whether the science of the *Elements of Theology* is a true science at all:

These two principles, upon which all of this philosophy is built as upon its own foundations, the author assumes are grasped by the reception of the senses and are in no way intellected, known, or apprehended by another scientific habit, but are only believed, just as the theology that concerns the divine Good according to the order of voluntary providence is founded on believed principles, which are the articles of the Christian faith. For this reason, it is often doubted by many, concerning both sapiential and divinising theology, whether it is a science in the true sense of the term.<sup>59</sup>

The argument of the *Preamble* is then that a science founded on principles that are only believed (*credita*) can still be a science in the genuine sense of the word.

But who are the many (*a plerisque*) who denied the scientific character of Proclus' philosophy? Some, like Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, in an Aristotelian spirit, at times criticised the Platonists for using metaphors instead of precise terminology. But there is no precedent for any such critique directed against Proclus in the Latin world. The criticism seems to presuppose an elaborate debate about the Aristotelian character of a science, the modes of cognition by which the principles of a science are apprehended, as well as an argument that connects the reception of principles through sense-perception

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59 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeambulum* A, p. 53, l. 15–22: *Ista duo principia, quibus totius istius philosophiae structura sicut propriis fundamentis innititur, auctor supponit sicut per sensus acceptionem nota et nullo modo vel intellecta vel scita vel aliquo alio habitu scientiali apprehensa, sed solum credita, sicut et theologia, quae est de bono divino secundum ordinem providentiae voluntariae, fundatur in principiis creditis, quae sunt articuli fidei Christianae. Propter quod a plerisque dubitari solet de utraque theologia et sapientiali et divinali, an sit scientia secundum veram scientiae rationem.*

with belief. In other words, some have challenged the notion that a science based on believed principles could be a science at all. This argument seems naturally suited to debates about the scientific status of revealed theology, but the application of this to the *Elements* is hardly a straightforward one, even within the parallel framework of the two orders of providence, and obliges us to seek out the background debate presupposed by the text.

This task is now much easier now that Berthold's extensive reliance on Thomas of York has been demonstrated. Large portions of the *Preamble* come directly from Thomas.<sup>60</sup> But this is not the case for the core passages of the *Preamble*, namely, its verdict on the status of a science that begins from believed principles. I will suggest that these come from a lost work of Dietrich, whose title we know from the 14th-century Stams catalogue: *De theologia, quod sit scientia secundum perfectam rationem scientiae*. Loris Sturlese was the first to note that the final phrase of the opening passage of the *Preamble*, translated above, echoes the title of this lost treatise, and he intuited that a good deal of what follows in the *Preamble* must depend on Dietrich's lost text, but did not pursue the hypothesis any further.<sup>61</sup> If we now look past Berthold's borrowings from Thomas to the central arguments of the *Preamble*, sections B and C, we begin to see many theoretical and terminological parallels with Dietrich's known works. Indeed, if we transpose these arguments into Dietrich's idiom and context, a picture emerges that is consistent with what we already know about his intellectual project. It equally reflects Berthold's adaptations and adjustments of it that were discussed in the case studies. Furthermore, this hypothesis sheds light on their decisively different approaches to the fundamental question of the relationship between philosophy and theology, and how these disciplines map on to the methodological and ontological separation of the two orders of providence. And so while the reconstruction of the argument of a lost treatise is always a delicate one, especially when one is relying on traces and tacit citations, I believe the result corroborates what

60 See Fiorella Retucci's contribution in this volume.

61 L. Sturlese, "Il *De animatione caeli* di Teodorico di Freiberg", in R. Creyten, P. Künzle (eds), *Xenia Medii Aevi historiam illustrantia, oblata Thomae Kaeppli O.P.*, vol. 1 (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1978), p. 175–247, at p. 194, n. 84: "che Bertoldo dipenda da tale *quaestio*, o comunque da posizioni teodoriciane, è mia netta impressione: ma non posso per ora dimostrarlo". See also L. Sturlese, "Introduction", Berthold de Moosburg, *Commentaire des Éléments de théologie de Proclus, Préambule du livre*, in R. Imbach, M.-H. Méléard (eds), *Philosophes médiévaux. Anthologie de textes philosophiques (XIII<sup>e</sup>–XIV<sup>e</sup> siècles)* (Paris: Union générale d'éditions, 1986), p. 335–346, at p. 342–343: "[...] surtout on peut envisager l'éventualité que derrière le texte du *Préambule* se camoufle un extrait de la *Question* perdue de Thierry de Freiberg *Quaestio utrum theologia sit scientia secundum perfectam rationem scientiae*".

has already been established on solid ground and also opens up new paths for understanding the projects of these two Dominicans within their respective contexts.

While Dietrich was in Paris as a bachelor in theology and lecturing on the *Sentences* sometime between 1282–1292,<sup>62</sup> debates concerning the scientific status of theology reached “a fever pitch”.<sup>63</sup> Followers of Aquinas invoked the deductive model of Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* and argued that theology is a science in the strong sense, in that our theology is subalternated to the higher science possessed by God and the blessed. To give an analogy from the human sciences, an expert geometer knows demonstratively what the practitioner of optics assumes: the geometer knows the reason why (*propter quid*), while the optician knows the fact that (*quia*).<sup>64</sup> Among the most innovative and polarised reactions to this position were Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines. Both went to the *Posterior Analytics* to criticise the subalternation theory on its own grounds. For Henry of Ghent, we must look beyond Aristotle to Christian authorities in order to ground the subalternation theory. Henry proposed his famous doctrine of the middle light (*lumen medium*), which the theologian possesses between the obscure light of faith, which every believer has, and the clear light of glory of God and the blessed. Godfrey of Fontaines also returned to Aristotle but opposed both Henry and the Thomists. Godfrey argued that we simply must give up calling theology a science in the strict sense. In his fourth and eighth *Quodlibets* from 1287 and 1292,<sup>65</sup> which probably overlapped with Dietrich’s baccalaureate,<sup>66</sup> he argued against the subalternation theory,

62 Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen*, p. 4; Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 30.

63 S. Brown, “*Duo Candelabra Parisiensia*. Prosper of Reggio in Emilia’s Portrait of the Enduring Presence of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines regarding the Nature of Theological Study”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 320–356, at p. 323.

64 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I.1.2. On this doctrine and its legacy, see J.-P. Torrell, “Le savoir théologique chez les premiers thomistes”, in *Revue thomiste* 97(1997), p. 9–30, at p. 16–19, 26–29.

65 For the chronology, see J. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), p. xxvii–xxviii. On Godfrey and his criticisms of Henry of Ghent, see C. König-Pralong, *Le bon usage des savoirs. Scolastique, philosophie et politique culturelle* (Paris: Vrin, 2011), p. 111–123.

66 Dietrich’s *De origine* seems to use Godfrey’s *Quodlibet* II (1286) and Henry’s *Quodlibet* XIV (1290/1291). See L. Sturlese, *Storia della filosofia tedesca nel Medioevo. Il secolo XIII* (Firenze: Olschki, 1996), p. 185–188; Flasch, *Dietrich von Freiberg*, p. 162–165; P. Porro, “*Res praedicamenti e ratio praedicamenti*. Una nota su Teodorico di Freiberg e Enrico di Gand”,

contending that any science that receives its principles from a higher science through mere belief cannot be a science in the strict sense of the term:

Therefore, to say that the principles of theology or the knowledge of anything in theology itself [are merely believed], or that in the one who is said to be knowledgeable in theology [these principles] are merely believed and are not known or intellected [*sunt solum credita et non scita vel intellecta*], and thus merely possess the certitude of adhesion, and nevertheless produce the certitude of knowledge in the conclusions reached from them, is to say that the conclusions would be better known than the principles, and so have a twofold certitude, while the principles would have but one [kind of certitude]. This is to say contradictory things and greatly to dishonour sacred theology and its teachers, by propagating such lies about theology to those drawn to it.<sup>67</sup>

Godfrey based his argument on a distinction between the certitude of evidence, which belongs to *scientia*, and the certitude of adhesion, which belongs to faith. The latter comes from adhesion to authority and is weak and imperfect compared to the certitude of scientific evidence.<sup>68</sup> One cannot deduce stronger conclusions from weaker principles.<sup>69</sup> Therefore, because theology relies on principles that are only believed, which are grounded only on certitude of adhesion to authority, Godfrey concluded in 1293/1294, after Dietrich had left Paris, that “theology is less properly a science than natural science”.<sup>70</sup>

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in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), *Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), p. 131–143, at p. 142–143.

- 67 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines*, eds M. de Wulf, A. Pelzer (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l’Université, 1904), *Quodlibet* IV, q. 10, p. 262: *Dicere ergo quod principia theologiae [...] sive apud illum qui dicitur esse sciens theologiam sunt solum credita et non scita vel intellecta et sic solum certitudinem adhaesionis habentia, et tamen efficiunt certitudinem scientiae in conclusionibus ex ipsis elicitis, est dicere quod conclusiones sint notiores principiis, scilicet duplicem certitudinem habentes, cum principia non habeant nisi unam. Et hoc est dicere contradictoria et multum derogare sacrae theologiae et doctoribus ipsius, tales fictiones de ipsa theologia attractantibus ipsam propalare.*
- 68 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Le huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. J. Hoffmans (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l’Université, 1924), *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 7, p. 73: *notitia debilis vel imperfecta ad evidentiam, sed firma quantum ad adhaesionem, quia innititur auctoritati solum et non rei in se vel ostensae per rationem evidentem.*
- 69 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 10, p. 262.
- 70 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Le neuvième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. J. Hoffmans (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l’Université, 1928), *Quodlibet* IX, q. 20, p. 292: *Ergo videtur quod theologia sit minus proprie scientia quam naturalis non tantum propter hoc, quia scilicet habet evidentiam quae requiritur ad scientiam, sed minorem quam*

The ensuing debate lasted well into the 14th century, with prominent responses to Godfrey coming from Duns Scotus, James of Metz, Hervaeus Natalis, and Bernard of Auvergne. What concerns us are not these details but simply the fact that after Godfrey no one held that theology is a science in the strictest demonstrative sense. Those who continued to regard it as such had to admit some flexibility into their notions of what constituted a demonstrative science.<sup>71</sup> As we shall see, the *Preamble*, whether or not it relies on Dietrich's own response to his position, is no exception to this pattern.

By comparing some passages of the *Preamble* with Dietrich's extant works, I will argue that, if these passages are read as traces of Dietrich's lost treatise on the scientific status of theology, we can surmise that Dietrich largely accepted the way in which Godfrey had framed his own position in terms of the certitude of evidence and the certitude of adhesion. But his original manoeuvre in this context would have been to focus on the role that belief plays in every particular science that begins from without (*quasi ab extrinseco*), including metaphysics and theology, and in fact every science except the purely mathematical disciplines. In a sense, this argument amounts to an intensification of Godfrey's focus on subjective certitude, but in so doing redefines what constitutes a true science insofar as the stability of first principles is to be found within the cognitive process by which the subject grasps universal propositions.<sup>72</sup>

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*naturalis, – immo etiam quia nec habet evidentiam quae requiritur ad illam scientiam quae debet dici proprie scientia. Propter quod dicendum esset illis, qui dicunt modo supradicto theologiam esse scientiam proprie dictam, dicentes hoc se credere, quia infinitae auctoritates sanctorum quibus in hoc credendum est videntur hoc dicere, quod non est ita. Immo nec una sola auctoritas viri magnae auctoritatis invenitur per quam possit hoc evidenter persuaderi.*

- 71 J.-P. Torrell, *Recherches thomasiennes. Études revues et augmentées* (Paris: Vrin, 2000), p. 173, n. 4. For the subsequent debate, see J. Leclercq, "La théologie comme science dans la littérature quodlibétique", in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 11(1939), p. 351–374; S. Brown, "Late Thirteenth Century Theology. *Scientia* Pushed to its Limits", in R. Berndt, M. Lutz-Bachmann, R.M.W. Stammberger (eds), "*Scientia*" und "*Disciplina*". *Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), p. 79–90; P. Porro, "Tra l'oscurità della fede e il chiarore della visione. Il dibattito sullo statuto scientifico della teologia agli inizi del XIV secolo", in L. Bianchi, C. Crisciani (eds), *Forme e oggetti della conoscenza nel XIV secolo. Studi in ricordo di Maria Elena Reina* (Firenze: SISMEL – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2014), p. 195–256.
- 72 C. König-Pralong, "Expérience et sciences de la nature chez Dietrich de Freiberg et Berthold de Moosburg", in L. Bianchi, C. Crisciani (eds), *Forme e oggetti della conoscenza nel XIV secolo*, p. 107–133, compares the *Praeambule* with Dietrich of Freiberg's extant treatises, offers some valuable insights on the status of experimental sciences in Dietrich's extant works, and compares him with Roger Bacon. She also rightly underscores an important innovation in the scientific epistemology of the *Preamble*, which autonomises speculative-analytical sciences (the purely mathematical) and the experimental-inductive sciences



Berthold divides the *Preamble* into three sections: (A) on scientific principles in general; (B) on the three kinds of scientific principles, as well as the properties and character peculiar to each kind of principle; (C) on the true and properly scientific procedure of Proclus' theology. All of section A of the *Preamble* (70 lines) comes from Thomas of York's *Sapientiale* III.23 (or v.23 in the Florence manuscript), from which Berthold produces a terminological dossier of the different kinds of principles used in the sciences, such as axioms, hypotheses, and postulates.<sup>73</sup> For the sake of brevity, I pass over the details of this inventory because they do not directly influence Berthold's response to the doubt about the scientific status of the *Elements*.

The aim of the *Preamble* is not only to respond to this doubt, but to show that Platonic philosophy in fact both meets and exceeds the Aristotelian criteria for demonstrative scientific procedure. Section B contains the crucial material that Berthold will then use to elevate Platonic above Aristotelian science in section C. I will focus first on section B which, I believe, comes from or is heavily inspired by Dietrich.<sup>74</sup> I will then consider the ramifications of this reading by pointing to the divergent purposes to which this argument could have been put by Dietrich and by Berthold in section C.

Section B begins with an outline of the three properties, or more specifically, the proper modes that the three kinds of principles presented in section A can assume. Berthold arranges these modes in terms of the various degrees of commonality that principles possess: some principles descend into every science, others only into some sciences, and those in the third group are proper only to one science. After these modes of commonality are explained, this

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which, for the first time, are distinguished not according to their objects but according to the mode of apprehending the truth of the propositions comprising these sciences (p. 125, 128–129). However, the differences König-Pralong notes between the *Preamble* and Dietrich are not substantive and can be reduced to differences of emphasis: the division between analytical and experimental sciences is presented austerely in the *Preamble*, but this does not exclude the possibility of the mixed methods that we see in Dietrich's *De iride*, prol. (5). Moreover, it obscures the purpose of the *Preamble* to say that for Berthold Platonic science has the same certitude as mathematics (p. 129, p. 132–133). The argument of the *Preamble* becomes clearer when it is read as a theological text, and when its sources and interlocutors are sought in that domain.

73 See the list of citations compiled by Fiorella Retucci in this volume. For a study and edition of this section of the *Sapientiale*, see F. Retucci, "Nuovi percorsi del platonismo medievale. I commentari bizantini all'*Etica Nicomachea* nel *Sapientiale* di Tommaso di York", in *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 24(2013), p. 85–120.

74 Only one passage in section B undoubtedly comes from Thomas of York: p. 57, l. 141–157 ( $\approx$  *Sap.* III.23), which explains what Aristotle means by *intellectus* in *Nicomachean Ethics* VI and *Posterior Analytics* using the commentary of Eustratius.

classification is used to discuss the different modes of certitude proper to each kind of principle.

The most-common principles (*communissima*) descend into every science. For example, all sciences use the principle of non-contradiction.<sup>75</sup> The mode or condition of such principles is that they are the most secure of all and cannot deceive; they are true universally, and thus are present by nature and not by instruction. We read that these principles concern “being as being”, since being (*ens*) is “the most universal of all formal intentions” – however, he continues, “according to Plato it is otherwise”. This contrast is incomplete as it stands, and one cannot rule out that Berthold is embellishing another text.<sup>76</sup>

The second group of principles are common (*communia*). These are taken up “proportionately”, or in their own way, only by some sciences. Examples are taken from Euclid’s “common conceptions of the mind”: “the whole is greater than the part” or “if equals are subtracted from equals, then the remainders are equal”.<sup>77</sup>

In the third group are principles proper to particular sciences that have no proportional or analogical commonality across diverse sciences: their meaning is entirely fixed relative to the particular science in question. Examples are the principle in geometry that “all right angles are equal”, in optics the principle that “light and colour move sight”, or in physics that there is movement in nature.

Then we come to the various modes of certitude and truth apprehended in these three kinds of principles. The text argues that “most-common” and “common” principles are known through intellect (*intellectus*), and it is here that Berthold uses Thomas of York to explain how intellect differs from the other habits presented by Aristotle in Book VI of the *Ethics*. But the most

75 For Dietrich’s use of *descendere* to describe the passage from the universal to the particular, see Dietrich of Freiberg, *De vis. beat.*, 3.2.9.6 (4–6); *De quid.*, 4.4; *De int.*, II.14.1; *De luce*, 17.1–2.

76 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 56, l. 116–119: *ens, quod est universalissima omnium intentionum formalium secundum Aristotelem, licet aliter sit secundum Platonem*. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De orig.*, 1.25, p. 144, l. 239–241: *intentio enim entis prima et formalissima est omnium intentionum*; 3.8, p. 159, l. 40–p. 160, l. 48: *ratio entis [...] est prima et formalissima omnium intentionum*; 5.36, p. 191, l. 351–358: *ens, quae est prima et formalissima omnium intentionum*; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De int.*, II.15.1, p. 156, l. 9–10: *quantum ad primam et simplicissimam et universalissimam intentionem, scilicet esse*.

77 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 56, l. 123–126: *quas communes animi conceptions vocant et ponuntur in principio Euclidis, puta, ‘si ab aequalibus aequalia demas’, etc., et ‘omne totum est maius sua parte’*. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De ir.*, I.4.8, p. 128, l. 58–59: *per communem animi conceptionem, scilicet ‘si aequalia ab aequalibus demas’ etc.*; I.4.10, p. 128, l. 80–81; II.24.8, p. 186, l. 93–94.

important point concerns the principles unique to particular sciences. Only in some sciences, the purely mathematical, are the principles apprehended by intellect. All the others, as we shall see, have a different mode of certitude and truth. The notion of a true science must have sufficient latitude to account for these, which comprise the majority, by far, of the disciplines normally regarded as sciences.

Therefore, each science must be considered separately to determine, first, whether it is purely mathematical and, second, how it relates to the physical world. Purely mathematical sciences like geometry and arithmetic have the same certitude as the most-common and common principles because their principles are known through intellect and not sense-experience. In such cases, exemplified by Euclid, the order of nature and the order of our knowledge are parallel: “we apprehend the proper principles of such sciences by intellect in the first steps in the progress in these sciences”.<sup>78</sup>

Sciences relating to the physical world apprehend truth in another way and have a different degree of certitude. Such sciences include physics and ethics, where what is prior by nature is later in the order of knowing because they begin in sense-perception. Here the text cites Aristotle: “every art and intellectual discipline begins from a prior sense-perception”.<sup>79</sup> The principles in these sciences are universals derived from sense, memory, and experience. For example, in physics sense-perception establishes “that there is motion”, and in medicine experience establishes “that scammony purges bile”. In optics and astronomy an instrument is used to capture an *experimentum*. In these particular sciences, there is no necessary relation between experience and the universal proposition or principle derived from it.<sup>80</sup> Therefore, whereas intellect apprehends the principles of purely mathematical sciences as well as most-common and common principles, which have an intrinsic mode of certitude and truth, the principles of every other particular science, as we shall see, “have their cause and reason as it were from the outside” (*quasi ab extrinseco*).<sup>81</sup> It is relative to this domain of exteriority that the text makes the critical manoeuvre that extends the true notion of a science to those founded on believed principles. It is within this category that the text mentions “the principles of metaphysical or divine sciences”.<sup>82</sup>

78 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 58, l. 177–178.

79 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 59, l. 204–209.

80 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 62, l. 331–334.

81 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 60, l. 241.

82 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 60, l. 271–274: *alia est cognitio principiorum communissimorum, communium et propriorum in scientiis pure mathematicis, quia*

Any proposition or principle derived from sense-experience in such sciences is “only believed and in no way known or intellected”, since it lacks the necessity of intellect.<sup>83</sup> These principles, as believed, are “apprehended under the certitude of the ‘true’, [which] cannot possibly be otherwise”. This apprehension has three components: (1) the “apprehended” is what reason objectively deals with in thinking, such as “this, which is moved, exists”;<sup>84</sup> (2) it is “true” by the equality of the thing apprehended and intellect, which occurs through “a combination or composition of speech”;<sup>85</sup> finally, (3) “certitude” is “the firm and unshakeable assent of reason” concerning the thing apprehended as true.

Within this framework, the text compares mathematical and physical sciences. What is known demonstratively (*scitum*) by intellect is also “apprehended by reason under the certitude of truth”, but the principle that is believed (*creditum*) differs from it in two respects: (1) by its mode of certitude and (2) in the order of apprehension. (1) *Scientia* takes its certitude from the intrinsic evidence of the thing, that is, from the intention and rational relations which the terms have to one another in a complex proposition, whether immediately in the case of first principles, or mediately, when a conclusion is deduced from prior principles. By contrast, the certitude of faith derives not from intrinsic evidence, but has its cause and reason from without (*quasi ab*

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*intellectus, alia vero metaphysicorum seu divinorum, physicorum et ad physica relatorum, quia acceptio secundum sensum.*

- 83 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 59, l. 217–229: *Sic igitur procedente indagatione per viam sensus et experientiae in praemissis scientiis sumptum est unum universale pro ipsarum scientiarum principio, quod principium in quacumque huiusmodi scientia solum creditum est et nullo modo scitum nec intellectum, quia nec ex propria ratione terminorum cognitum est, quod esset intelligere, nec ex aliquibus principiis aliis seu causis conclusum et ita nullo modo scitum, sed, ut dictum est, solum est creditum, et sic apprehensum sub certitudine veri, quod impossibile est aliter se habere. Dico autem [1] ‘apprehensum’ id, circa quod obiective negotiatur ratio per cognitionem, ut hoc, quod est motum, esse; [2] ‘verum’ autem hic intelligo ipsam aequalitatem sive consonantiam rei apprehensae et intellectus, quae quantum ad rationem et modum attenditur circa complexionem sive compositionem locutionis; [3] ‘certitudo’ autem de ipsa veritate rei apprehensae est firmus et indeclinabilis assensus rationis in rem sic apprehensam.*
- 84 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 60, l. 249–250 clarifies that these are first intentions. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De orig.*, 5.47, p. 194, l. 463–468: *Circa quaedam enim entia sic negotiatur intellectus [...];* 5.54, p. 197, l. 566–568: *Unde huiusmodi entia proprie dicuntur res rationis, non autem ea, quae sunt primae intentionis, quae important aliquam rem naturae et circa quae negotiatur intellectus tamquam circa res naturae.*
- 85 Presumably this occurs through affirmation and negation, and second intentions. This rare expression, *complexio locutionis*, appears also in Dietrich of Freiberg, *De orig.*, 5.54, p. 197, l. 559–562: *Possunt enim non entia, sicut et entia, in complexionem locutionis et in praedicationem affirmativam vel negativam venire [...];* Dietrich of Freiberg, *De nat. contr.*, 13.1, p. 93, l. 44–55.

*extrinseco*), such as “from the clear authority of an expert, from whose truth the intellect cannot reasonably dissent”.<sup>86</sup> At this stage, one should note that *scientia* and *fides* align closely with what Godfrey called the certitude of evidence, where knowledge begins with *per se* principles that lead to clear conclusions, and the certitude of adhesion, which begins from authority.

(2) The second difference between *scientia* and *fides* concerns the order of apprehension. In *scientia*, the evidence of the thing arises from the intention and rational relation of the terms which are, so to speak, “the intrinsic principle of cognition found in the thing”.<sup>87</sup> The thing itself is by nature apprehended first, prior to truth or falsehood, which both arise from the combining activity of intellect. By contrast, in belief, the authority of an expert comes first, “in whose truth reason declares our trust must absolutely be placed and the will inclines to it”.<sup>88</sup> In belief, the order of apprehension begins with truth as such and not with the intrinsic evidence of the thing. Any necessity lacking in the evidence of the terms is supplied by the authority of an expert, which provides the secure foundation of truth.

What remains to be determined is whether there can be a true science (*vera scientia*) which begins from belief. Section C of the *Preamble* is based on establishing an analogy between theology and natural science. Godfrey did not accept this analogy. But the argument in the *Preamble* will make room for it insofar as it has found a role for belief in the physical sciences. In a moment we shall pause to consider the implications of the possibility that, if Berthold is indeed using Dietrich’s *De theologia*, substantial modifications follow from his repurposing of its argument: he would have placed Platonic philosophy where Dietrich would have put revealed theology, for section C argues that Platonic wisdom (*divinalis sapientia*) has the same scientific structure, proportionately speaking (*proportionaliter loquendo*), as the other genuine sciences,

86 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 60, l. 241–242: *puta ex evidenti auctoritate alicuius experti, a cuius veritate intellectus rationabiliter dissentire non potest.*

87 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 60, l. 248–250: *quae sunt quasi intrinsecum cognitionis principium repertum apud rem ipsam, prout est ens et res primae intentionis.* Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, *De acc.*, 8.4, p. 64, l. 110–113: *universitas entium, quae sunt res primae intentionis et vere res naturae, in duplicem maneriem rerum distinguitur secundum duas differentias entis in eo, quod ens, quae est prima et simplicissima omnium formalium intentionum repertarum in rebus;* Dietrich of Freiberg, *De vis. beat.*, 3.2.9.1 (3), p. 86, l. 26–33.

88 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 60, l. 254–256: *Quia enim causam et rationem suae certitudinis non habet a re ipsa, sed ab auctoritate alicuius experti, cuius veritati omnino standum esse dicit ratio et inclinatur voluntas [...].*

except the purely mathematical.<sup>89</sup> That is, it uses most-common principles (e.g., non-contradiction) and common principles (e.g., “the whole is greater than the part”), which are apprehended by intellect. As for the two principles unique to this science, “there is multitude” and “there is producer and produced”, Berthold states that Proclus assumes them and “proceeds perfectly following the scientific mode”. In this most divine science (*divinissima scientia*), these two principles are known in a way analogous (*proportionaliter*) to the sciences concerning things conjoined to motion or change. While Berthold does not explicitly say so, this requires that we understand both the elements of similarity and difference in the analogy.

In terms of similarity, this theology resembles those sciences in which there is no necessary connection between sense-experience and the universal proposition: their principles must be believed. The text explains this with an important account of the cognitive structure of belief which, however, is subtly different from the grounding of authority in section B:

Therefore, in taking this universal principle from sense-experiences there is nothing but a conjectural inference under the aspect of the true and not under the aspect of being, as has been said. Accordingly, it is received as believed, not as intellected or known [*ut creditum, non ut intellectum vel scitum*]. As has been said, it is taken by a certain conjecture, but still with the firm and unwavering assent of reason. This firmness and unwavering assent arises from a certain natural instinct founded in the power that at once distinguishes, collects, and gathers, which we call the cogitative. In and through this power the simple and pure intentions of things, separated from their images, to use the phrase of Averroes, are apprehended, distinguished, collected, and gathered.<sup>90</sup>

89 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 61, l. 307–309: *omnino eodem modo proportionaliter loquendo secundum proprium modum scientiae procedit haec divinalis sapientia sicut praedictae scientiae solis pure mathematicis exclusis.*

90 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 62, l. 340–349: *Igitur in sumptione talis universalis principii ex sensibilibus experimentis non est nisi quaedam coniecturalis illatio sub ratione veri et non sub ratione talis entis secundum praemissa, et ideo solum accipitur ut creditum, non ut intellectum vel scitum, et, ut dictum est, sumitur secundum quandam coniecturam, cum firmo tamen et indeclinabili assensu rationis. Quae firmitas et indeclinabilis assensus surgit ex naturali quodam instinctu fundato in virtute distinctiva et collectiva simul et collativa, quam cogitativam dicimus, in qua seu per quam apprehenduntur, distinguuntur, colliguntur, conferuntur simplices et purae rerum intentiones separatae a suis idolis, ut verbo Averrois utar.*

The universal principle is thus a conjectural inference that is believed with the assent of reason, all of which occurs in the cogitative power; the “true” as such, rather than the thing itself, is still primary. However, its solidity comes not from authority but from the cogitative power itself, which separates the intentions stored in memory and acquired by sense-perception. Its activity is rational and automatic. There are passages from Dietrich of Freiberg that closely resemble this description of the cogitative power and its close association with the estimative faculty,<sup>91</sup> its phrasing,<sup>92</sup> and its terminology of conjecture.<sup>93</sup> An argument like this would serve as a strong reply to Godfrey of Fontaines, in that it has effectively extended the certitude of adhesion beyond the domain of revealed theology to all physical sciences; there is an act of belief in all such scientific habits.

The fundamental assumption here requires that we accept the analogy between what we might call, importing Godfrey’s language, the certitude of adhesion to authority and the certitude of adhesion to a conjectural inference. The text emphasizes how, in the order of apprehension, both in some sense come from without (*quasi ab extrinseco*), and both are grasped primarily as true with enough firmness to serve as a basis for scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, we should recall that there must also be an element of difference in the analogy between theology and natural philosophy or, in other words, between authority and inference: one, for example, proceeds automatically (the conjecture) and one is voluntary (assenting to authority). This difference in the analogy is, however, not resolved or even acknowledged in the *Preamble*.

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- 91 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De int.*, 111.27.2, p. 200, l. 26–32: *Ratio particularis, quam etiam aestimativam seu cogitativam vocant, est vis distinctiva, quae componit et dividit et versatur circa intentiones rerum, etiamsi sint res universales, universales, inquam, secundum considerationem, in quantum videlicet considerat rem aliquam absque principiis secundum considerationem individuantiis seu particulantibus eam. Et hoc est, quod ille commentator Averroes dicit, scilicet quod denudate rem a suo idolo, id est ab accidentibus, sub quibus imaginativa rem considerat.* See also Dietrich of Freiberg, *De orig.*, 5.26, p. 187, l. 224–p. 188, l. 228; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De int.*, 111.7.5, p. 182, l. 112–p. 183, l. 120; 111.17.1, p. 190, l. 3–9; 111.33.1–2, p. 204, l. 28–53; Dietrich of Freiberg, *Quaestio utrum in Deo*, 1.4.2.2 (11), p. 302, l. 78–88; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De vis. beat.*, 3.2.9.7 (4), p. 98, l. 21–33; 4.3.2 (9), p. 115, l. 40–54; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De sub. spir.*, 4.6, p. 306, l. 96–101.
- 92 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De vis. beat.*, *Prooemium* (4), p. 14, l. 40 and 1.2.2.1 (8), p. 47, l. 51: *ut verbo eius [Augustini] utar*; 3.2.4 (10), p. 75, l. 48: *ut verbis eius [Aristotelis] utar*; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De int.*, 111.2.1, p. 179, l. 21; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De magis*, 11.4, p. 55, l. 68; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De anim.*, 10.4, p. 22, l. 96–97 and Dietrich of Freiberg, *De ir.*, IV.23.5, p. 265, l. 112: *ut verbis Philosophi utar*; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellig.*, 5.10, p. 360, l. 94–95: *ut verbis philosophorum utar*; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De anim.*, 9.1, p. 20, l. 48–49: *ut philosophorum verbis utar*.
- 93 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De int.*, 11.37.1, p. 175, l. 2: *coniciendum*; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De nat. contr.*, 56.2, p. 123, l. 35: *conicimus*. See also note 98, below.

But if we entertain the hypothesis about the *De theologia* and the origin of this argument in Dietrich, we find in his works the resources to resolve this tension. Of the greatest importance here is the *De subiecto theologiae*, which is transmitted in Berthold's own hand (MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31, f. 69v).<sup>94</sup> In this fragment, we find a similar approach to that of the *Preamble*: Dietrich reasons about the subject of theology by analogy with natural philosophy, relying mainly on Aristotle and Averroes.<sup>95</sup> This fragment also, of course, contains the programmatic distinction of natural and voluntary providence used by Berthold in the *Exposition of the Title* that precedes the *Preamble*. It is this distinction that could address the tension between authority and conjecture, insofar as the natural, automatic assent of the cogitative power would pertain to what the fragment calls "the divine science of the philosophers", while the free assent to the authority of Scripture would relate to what Dietrich variously calls our science (*nostra scientia*), theology as such (*theologia simpliciter*), and our divine science of the saints (*nostra divina sanctorum scientia*).<sup>96</sup> Dietrich frames the difference between the two theologies eschatologically: the divine science of the saints looks beyond the limits of this world and will outlast those limits, when the mundane wisdom of the philosophers will be destroyed. The arguments about authority and conjectural inference in the *Preamble* could be used toward a similar end. That is, while metaphysics or the divine science of the philosophers begins from believed principles, and

94 See Loris Sturlese's introduction to the critical edition of the text in Dietrich von Freiberg, *Opera omnia*, vol. 3. *Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, p. 277.

95 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto*, 2.2, p. 279, l. 10–20 and 3.2–3, p. 280, l. 35–58. Presumably the *De subiecto* would have followed the *De theologia*; we ask about the subject of theology after determining whether it is a science.

96 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto*, 3.8–10, p. 281, l. 92–p. 282, l. 112: *Quamvis autem quantum ad considerationem primi philosophi talis etiam, quae dicta est, attributio entium ad primum principium attendatur, et propter hoc etiam potius dicitur apud philosophos scientia divina seu theologia, quam dicatur metaphysica – considerat enim primo et principaliter de ente divino, quod est divinum per essentiam, consequenter autem de aliis, unde in XII talia ostendit ordinari in ipsum tamquam in universitatis principem – nihilominus tamen nostra scientia, quam vere et simpliciter theologiam dicimus, distinguitur a scientia divina philosophorum. Scientia enim divina philosophorum considerat universitatem entium secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, quo videlicet res stant in sui natura et secundum suos modos et proprietates naturales gubernantur per principem universitatis, nec ultra hunc naturae ordinem aliquem ulteriorem finem attendit. Nostra autem divina sanctorum scientia attenditur in entibus, secundum quod stant et disponuntur sub ordine voluntariae providentiae, in quo attenditur ratio meriti et praemii et ea, quae attenduntur circa bonam et sanctam vitam et adeptionem aeternae beatitudinis et perventionem ad finem ulteriorem sive in bono sive in malo etiam post terminum huius mundi, quando scientia divina sapientium huius mundi destruetur, I Cor., 13. Secundum praedicta igitur convenienter accipitur subiectum huius nostrae scientiae divinae, videlicet ut dicatur ens divinum secundum ordinem voluntariae providentiae.*



nevertheless is a legitimate science, the free assent to the infinite authority of Scripture surpasses it in its certitude. For metaphysics begins with principles deriving from sense, memory, and experience, and as Dietrich writes elsewhere, even though the cogitative power gives spontaneous, firm assent, it is not infallible.<sup>97</sup>

Assumptions like these help us understand why Dietrich habitually qualified his assent to the positions of the philosophers regarding the existence of separate intelligences. As was noted above, he uses caveats like these at least 40 times. And yet, at the same time, Dietrich maintains that the philosophers' arguments are the most rationally compelling option and upholds them against those who haphazardly mingle revealed and natural principles. He sums it up in a phrase: "we rationally conjecture" (*rationabiliter conicimus*) about such things as the order of the universe, the movers of the heavens, the separate intelligences, the nature of spiritual places and their inhabitants, and the character of the beatific vision.<sup>98</sup> Our theoretical knowledge of these realities remains tentative; only in ethics and the order of voluntary providence do we reach the things themselves.

But we must return to Berthold, whose *Preamble* importantly does not resolve the tensions between conjecture and authority, between natural and voluntary providence, between the divine science of Proclus and Christian theology. Berthold leaves all of these questions open. Where Dietrich underscores the disproportion between revealed theology and the divine science of the philosophers, Berthold instead spends the remainder of the *Preamble* underscoring the supremacy of Platonic *supersapientia* over Aristotelian *sapientia*. From this point until the end of the *Preamble* we are on surer footing

97 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De hab.*, 9.1–2, p. 14, l. 62–72: *veniemus ad aliquid magis intimum, et hoc eo intimius, ut ita loquamur, quo spiritualius, et est phantasticum nostrum exspoliatum idolis et corporalibus rerum similitudinibus retinens apud se rei intentionem. Et istud vocamus cogitativum nostrum. Et hic oritur aestimativa et per consequens ratio particularis. Et operatio boni vel mali hinc surgit; consequenter autem ratio et proprietas virtutis operativae. Sine hac vi spirituali daemon numquam fuisset lapsus. Ruina enim sua fuit eo, quod inclinavit se in aestimatum bonum, quod non fuit verum. Intellectus autem semper verorum est.*

98 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De anim.*, 5.3, p. 16, l. 20: *rationabiliter conicimus*; 20.1, p. 30, l. 78: *rationi, qua conicimus*; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De cog. ent.*, 44.9, p. 210, l. 101: *rationabiliter conicitur*; 81.4, p. 243, l. 97: *rationabiliter conicitur*; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De dot.*, 13.3, p. 279, l. 30: *rationabiliter conicitur*; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De magis*, 14.3, p. 58, l. 75: *rationabiliter conicitur*; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De sub. spir.*, 11.1, p. 311, l. 76–77: *possumus et de eis conicere tamquam a simili ex tertia manerie entium conceptionalium*; 14.1, p. 313, l. 13–14: *aliquaqualiter conicere possumus de locis dictorum entium realium*; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De vis. beat.*, 4.1 (6), p. 106, l. 33–34: *tamen circa hoc probabiliter ex ratione conicere.*

about his sources: Berthold uses his characteristic synthesis of Dionysius and Proclus concerning what is beyond intellect, and returns to Thomas of York for materials relating to Aristotle. This coincides with a shift in terminology. In the passage reminiscent of Dietrich, translated above, it was “we” who call the cogitative the *virtus distinctiva et collectiva simul et collativa*. Now, as Berthold turns to Proclus, it is “they” who call the *ratio particularis* the *cogitativa (rationem particularem, quam quidam cogitativam vocant)*.<sup>99</sup> But much more tellingly, whereas Dietrich in the *De subiecto theologiae* was careful to distinguish between “our theology of the saints” and “the divine science of the philosophers”, with Berthold the mark of ownership passes to the speculative habit of the Platonists: *habitus nostrae divinalis supersapientiae* and *nostra supersapientialis et divinalis sapientia*.<sup>100</sup> Berthold can make this transposition because of what he understands the fundamental achievement of Platonism to be and what the consequences are of realizing that the best of the pagans had achieved a divine cognition beyond intellect. Proclus in the *Elements of Theology* followed the oblique motion of the soul, ascending to God by reasoning, and he must have begun with the certainty of conjectural inference. Eventually, through intellectual practice and virtue, silencing all motions external and internal, he was elevated to the direct and ecstatic knowledge through ignorance that is the *unum animae* or divine madness. For Berthold, what Dionysius says about the cognition beyond the mind describes the habit of Platonic theology:

According to this [unity], therefore, it is necessary to think divine things, not according to ourselves, but ourselves wholly placed wholly outside ourselves and wholly deified. For it is better to be God’s and not our own.<sup>101</sup>

For Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on the same text, Dionysius is referring to the gift of faith.<sup>102</sup> But the undeniable parallels between Dionysius and

99 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 63, l. 378–379.

100 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 65, l. 454–p. 66, l. 455 and p. 67, l. 514.

101 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 64, l. 410–415: *Secundum hanc igitur divina oportet intelligere, non secundum nos, sed totos nos ipsos extra totos nos ipsos statutos et totos deifactos. Melius est enim esse Dei et non nostri ipsorum.* Cf. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* 7.1, 865C–868A.

102 Thomas Aquinas, *In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio*, ed. C. Pera (Torino: Marietti, 1950), lib. VII, lect. 1, n. 705, p. 262: *secundo vero, habet quamdam unionem ad res divinas per gratiam, quae excedit naturam mentis nostrae, per quam unionem, coniunguntur homines per fidem aut quamcumque cognitionem, ad ea quae sunt super naturalem mentis virtutem.* Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, ed. P.-M.J. Gils (Roma / Paris: Commissio Leonina / Cerf, 1992), q. 2, a. 2, p. 95, l. 65–77: *Et*

the *Tria opuscula* have changed the parameters. Berthold would be well-aware of the similar formulations in Dionysius, where faith is described as the locating of the soul in the highest truth,<sup>103</sup> and in Proclus, for whom the *unum animae* locates the soul in the divine, whence it lives by the divine life.<sup>104</sup> If he has indeed made use of Dietrich's *De theologia* in the *Preamble*, then we see that the only words Berthold could find to express the supremacy of Platonism over Aristotelian metaphysics were those that his most esteemed modern master had used to elevate Christian theology over the divine science of the philosophers.

In the first words of the commentary, we read that St. Paul was aware of the hidden things of God because he was taken up into the third heaven in rapture. Berthold's emphasis on this putative detail from his biography suggests that, from the commentator's point of view, this rapturous knowledge was the basis for Paul's recognition that the philosophers, by reasoning from the creatures of the world, knew the invisible things of God, including the Trinity, and the ideas, primordial causes, or gods in the divine Word.<sup>105</sup> As Augustine says, the vision of these ideas makes the soul blessed.<sup>106</sup> Paul's transitory rapture therefore has the same content as the revelation granted to Proclus, Plato, and the pre-Platonic theologians. So, we are left to ask, what is the difference between the habit of faith and the habit of *supersapientia*? The end appears to be the same: to live by the divine life and to be moved by the providential Good in the silence beyond the mind. The best of the pagan Platonists saw the homeland and they reached it. Whatever differences remain, then, must concern the means to that end. Perhaps faith and the sacraments are a more immediate

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*secundum hoc de divinis duplex scientia habetur: una secundum modum nostrum, qui sensibilibus principia accipit ad notificandum divina, et sic de divinis philosophi scientiam traderunt, philosophiam primam scientiam divinam dicentes; alia secundum modum ipsorum divinorum, ut ipsa divina secundum se ipsa capiantur, quae quidem perfecte in statu viae nobis est impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu viae quaedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam inheremus ipsi primae veritati propter se ipsam.*

- 103 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* 7.4, 872C (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 1, p. 409–410): *divina fides est, quae est manens credentium collocatio, quae istos collocat in veritate.*
- 104 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 16, p. 25, l. 650–652: *per unum, quod est intellectu divinius, 'in quod consummans anima et locans se ad ipsam divina est et vivit divina vita, secundum quod huic est licitum'.* Cf. Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, 10.64, p. 106, l. 11–12.
- 105 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 1, p. 31, l. 5–8: *Summus divinalis sapientiae theologus Paulus secretorum Dei conscius utpote in tertium caelum raptus loquens de mundanae philosophiae sapientibus, postquam dixerat: 'Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis: Deus enim illis revelavit' [Rom. 1:19], subiungit: 'Invisibilia Dei' [Rom. 1:20] etc.*
- 106 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 20, p. 33, l. 935: [...] *quarum visione fit beatissima.*

and broadly accessible perfection of the mind and soul than that attained through the intellectual labours of philosophical science. Berthold, however, was more interested in recalling his contemporaries to the ultimate origin and goal that was in danger of being forgotten than underlining any differences in the means.

## 5 Conclusions

Reading the *Exposition* with an eye to its tacit sources, it seems that, for Berthold, Dietrich of Freiberg was the exemplary contemporary master or sage. Berthold's first gesture towards Dietrich in the commentary is to turn the master's criticism of imaginative metaphysics against himself. In so doing, he separates the Aristotelians, who reason "according to ourselves", from the Platonists, who reason according to what is beyond ourselves. This critique provides the philosophical foundation for the dogmatic authority of Proclus and Dionysius. In relation to this authority, Dietrich's metaphysics must either be simplified (case 2) or elaborated (case 3). Moreover, since the measure of truth was historically actual in the consensus of the greatest sages of antiquity, Berthold could not accommodate Dietrich's hypothetical attitude toward the cosmology of the divine science of the philosophers. The critical *sapiens modernus* gave way to authoritative ancient wisdom. In Part 4, I suggested that this corresponded to a profoundly different understanding of philosophy and revelation in our two authors, which emerged once we situated the core argument of the *Preamble* in the context of late 13th-century Paris.

If we accept this hypothesis, then it becomes clear that all three prefaces to Berthold's commentary follow the same intertextual pattern: to express the ancient accord of Dionysius and Proclus that confronts him, Berthold took arguments that his contemporaries used to describe the nobility of revealed theology. For Dietrich, the difference of natural and voluntary providence corresponded to that of pagan and Christian theologies; the divide between theoretical and practical reason would only be overcome in the end times, and until then the natural arguments of the philosophers, used self-critically, are usually the best tool we have to understand the order of reality. For Berthold, the paths of natural and voluntary providence, theoretical and practical reason, knowledge and action, are only methodologically separate; in the discipline of Platonic science, the realisation of the *unum animae*, and active union with the divine providence, they must be one. Thus, for Berthold of Moosburg, the difference of pagan and Christian philosophical theology is overcome in "the philosophical revelation" of Platonism as such.

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**PART 2**

*Doctrines*





# Berthold of Moosburg, the *unum animae*, and Deification

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## 1 Introduction. Berthold of Moosburg's Commentary on Proclus

In the first chapter of the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, Dionysius defines deification as follows: “Deification is assimilation and union with God, as far as possible”.<sup>1</sup> In the Middle Ages, the theme of deification provoked orthodoxy to issue numerous condemnations of doctrines that were believed not to safeguard the transcendence of God. In the 14th century, which is the period on which we will focus, the debate concerning the heresy of the so-called “free spirit” was particularly lively in the Flemish Rhineland religious and cultural environment, and took place both in Latin and in the vernacular. An authoritative participant in this debate was the Dominican Berthold of Moosburg. We know little about his biography, but enough to recognise him as a pivotal figure in this discussion: he was active in the intellectual leadership of the Dominican order in this period, he succeeded Eckhart at the Dominican *studium generale* of Cologne, he had the task of “collecting the pieces”, so to speak, after the condemnation of Eckhart, he was involved in the spiritual direction of the Beguines of Cologne, and he was well-known in the mystical circles of Bavaria.<sup>2</sup>

He has written only one work, a gigantic *Exposition* of the *Elements of Theology* of Proclus.<sup>3</sup> The *Elements of Theology* is a metaphysical work par

1 Dionysius, *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*, ed. G. Heil (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1991), 1.3, p. 66, l. 12–13; Lat. trans. in *Dionysiaca, recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l'Aréopage*, ed. Ph. Chevallier (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937), p. 1090.

2 For a biographical account of Berthold, see L. Sturlese, *Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), p. 137–138; E. King, *Supersapientia. A Study of the Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli of Berthold von Moosburg*, PhD diss. (University of Cambridge, 2016), p. 5–14.

3 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984); Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986); Berthold of

excellence, and Berthold's mission is to detect the immutable structures that found the world of experience. The discovery, piece by piece, of this transempirical and foundational metaphysical complex has the same effect, in the end, of being able to contemplate, behind the curtain of a theatre, the enormous quantity of interconnected mechanisms and artifices that with their immutable presence make possible the story that from time to time takes place in the manifold appearances of becoming. The aspect of immutability prevails in this fundamental and foundational presence – the immutability of an order that begins with the One, which by its causal transcendence establishes a One-Good, from which derives a more determined Unity and so on as far as the institution of a finite series of henads (seven), which constitute the primordial causes from which further series of unparticipated and participated principles derive. The look behind the scenes of the universe allows Berthold to identify, between the transcendent One and Matter, a numerical detail of something like 126 metaphysical principles dependent on each other and made up of orders (monarchies) dependent on the primordial causes (unity, infinity, entity, vitality, intellectuality, animality, and physicality). But beyond these complicated details – for which we can well refer to Ezequiel Ludueña's dissertation<sup>4</sup> – it is important to note, as I said, the aspect of immutability, because even as we descend from eternity to time and from motionlessness to movement (soul), we have yet to consider the eternal and immutable motion of the celestial spheres.

What, then, does this discovery mean, what is the sense of the contemplation of these dusty and complicated mechanisms of the intelligible universe? Is it one of the many contributions – to use the words of E.R. Dodds<sup>5</sup> – “to that most extensive of all sciences, the *Wissenschaft des Nichtwissenswerthen*”?

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Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 35–65*, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001); Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108–135*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011); Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160–183*, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 184–211*, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014).

4 See E. Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertholdo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela de Colonia*, (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013), p. 122–224.

5 E.R. Dodds, “Introduction” to Proclus, *The Elements of Theology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963<sup>2</sup>), p. ix.

What is its relevance to understanding man, to understanding the human condition?

The question seems legitimate, if we think that in the historical moment in which Berthold lives, the way of understanding the human being and his relationship to God is changing. The “free spirit” proposes a path of individual deification; the Council of Vienne condemns the thesis that “Any intellectual creature in itself is blessed by nature, and the soul does not need a light of glory to raise it to see God”.<sup>6</sup> Dietrich of Freiberg wonders if there is a personal principle with which we unite ourselves to God in the beatific vision and answers that it is the individual agent intellect, which contemplates God by nature;<sup>7</sup> Eckhart proposes to overcome the false autonomy of individuality by recognising the absolute relational dependence of man on God.<sup>8</sup>

In his *Exposition*, Berthold speaks of deification, *theosis*, according to a broad spectrum of understanding: as a possibility of the subject in the twofold aspect of union with God in the present and in the future life, and this under the twofold perspective of the subject’s belonging to the pagan and to the Christian tradition, that is to say to the state of (corrupted) nature and to the state of (reintegrated) grace. He deals with all these themes of contemplation in this life and in the afterlife, he reflects on important mystical passages from Dionysius and Richard of Saint Victor, he quotes Bernard’s metaphor of mixed liquids, he knows Eriugena’s doctrine of deification: in short, the whole mystical tradition is known to him.

## 2 The Doctrine of Dionysius the Areopagite on the Three Movements

Berthold’s intention may be better clarified by considering his doctrine of the “three movements” of the soul. The doctrine was sketched by Dionysius and was interpreted by his commentators in different ways. Dionysius’ relevant text is reported in three different places of the *Exposition*: the first in the *Expositio tituli*, the second in Proposition 131, the third in Proposition 185 (literal quotation).<sup>9</sup> The text quoted in the *Expositio tituli* is the following:

6 *Enchiridion Symbolorum. Definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, eds H. Denzinger, A. Schönmetzer, 36th ed. (Barcelona / Freiburg im Breisgau / Roma: Herder, 1976), p. 282, §895.

7 King, *Supersapientia*, p. 21, 37–42.

8 King, *Supersapientia*, p. 21, 140.

9 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131A, p. 190, l. 10–p. 191, l. 39; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 185K, p. 26, l. 393–408; for the *Expositio tituli*, see the following note.

Sunt autem istorum motuum, inquantum sunt animae, definitiones tales, secundum quod pertractat Dionysius ubi supra: “**Circularis** quidem est animae ad se ipsam introitus ab exterioribus et intellectualium ipsius virtutum uniformis convolutio sicut in quodam circulo non errare ipsi largiens, in multis exterioribus ipsam etiam congregans primum ad se ipsam, deinde sicut informem factam uniens unitive unitis virtutibus et ita ad pulchrum et bonum manuducens, quod est super omnia existentia et unum et idem et sine principio et interminabile. **Oblique** autem anima movetur, inquantum secundum proprietatem suam divinis illuminatur cognitionibus, non intellectualiter et singulariter, sed rationabiliter et diffuse et sicut commixtis et transitoriis operationibus *et ab exterioribus sicut a quibusdam signis variatis et multiplicatis ad simplices et unitas sursum agitur contemplationes*. **In directum** autem, quando non ad se ipsam ingressa et singulari intellectualitate mota – hoc est enim, sicut dixi, secundum circulum –, sed ad ea, quae sunt circa ipsam, progreditur”.<sup>10</sup>

According to Dionysius *De divinis nominibus* c. 4, angels and human souls have a threefold mental movement:<sup>11</sup> the movement of human souls is what interests Berthold particularly, because souls are part of the order of nature (natural providence) and angels are not.

The first movement, the circular one, is a concentration on interiority (*animae ad se ipsam introitus*) that leads to the contemplation of the Good that transcends the whole of being (*super omnia existentia*).

The second movement, the oblique or helical one, is the speculative movement of rational and deductive reflection (*non intellectualiter et singulariter, sed rationabiliter et diffuse*), which – Berthold points out – by the signs offered by the external world is enlightened and raised to simple and unitive contemplations (*ad [...] unitas sursum agitur contemplationes*).

The third direct movement takes place “when it progresses to the things that are around it” (*In directum autem, quando [...] ad ea, quae sunt circa ipsam, progreditur [sic!]*).

As we have already said, Berthold literally quotes the text of Dionysius twice. The first quotation occurs in the *Expositio tituli* (the text reported above), and refers to Proclus himself, who would have experienced the three movements in person (his writings being proof of this); the second occurrence refers more generally to the possibilities of the soul according to the state of the present

10 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expositio tituli* A, p. 38, l. 35–48.

11 Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, ed. B.R. Suchla (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1990), 4.8–9, p. 153, l. 4–p. 154, l. 6; *Dionysiaca*, p. 189–190.

life (*de anima secundum statum praesentis vitae*). The long quotation (134 words) appears to be taken directly from the *Corpus Dionysiacum* (translation by John Saracen), but the comparison with the original reveals a significant discrepancy: the phrase “et ab exterioribus sicut a quibusdam signis variatis et multiplicatis ad simplices et unitas sursum agitur contemplationes”, which in the original text of Dionysius refers to the straight movement, is placed in Berthold’s text at the conclusion of the oblique movement (italics in the text reported above). The fact seems to me to be very important. In this way the direct mystical intuition (characteristic of the straight movement) is attributed as a prerogative of the oblique movement, which is that of philosophical reason.

It is difficult to think that this is a random coincidence. Berthold certainly had a complete text “in order”: this is demonstrated by the fact that in a similar place<sup>12</sup> he clearly states that the rectilinear movement is proper to direct mystical intuition. Therefore we must conclude that the displacement is intentional – and this displacement changes the cards on the table with respect to Dionysius! Evidently Berthold is keen to communicate that the movement of philosophical reason can land (or rather: in fact lands) at the mystical vision. So far, so good. For now we can continue to deepen the doctrine of the three movements and its application to the historical Proclus.

### 3 The Three Movements of the Soul According to Thomas of York

Those who are familiar with Dionysius and the tradition of his commentators might be amazed to find me writing that the straight movement leads to the mystical vision of God. I confirm, for Berthold it is just like that. It is an interpretation that finds no confirmation either in the Commentaries of Albert the Great or of Thomas Aquinas, but that Berthold derives from the *Sapientiale* of Thomas of York, which has recently been discovered to be one of his most important doctrinal sources. At the time when the first volumes of the *Expositio* edition were produced, the influence of Thomas of York on Berthold was not yet known. The research of Retucci, Porreca, and King has highlighted the many places where the *Sapientiale* is used, and this is also the case regarding the three movements of the soul.<sup>13</sup>

12 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 131A, p. 191, l. 35–44.

13 See F. Retucci, “*Magister Thomas Anglicus minor*”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, p. xxiii–xxxix; D. Porreca, “Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York. A 13th-Century Witness to the Prominence



Thomas of York addresses the question of the threefold movement in chapter 6 of the first book of the *Sapientiale*.<sup>14</sup> His aim is to show the breadth of the natural knowledge of God achieved by the philosophers of antiquity (*divinitatis agnitionem*) and his argument is based on the perception of non-self-sufficiency that the subject feels both by practicing introspection (circular) and reflection upon the world of the senses: the oblique with the effort of discursive rational procedure, the straight with an ascent that leads to direct vision. In all three cases, the subject feels a failure that is the engine of a search that leads to the recognition of the existence of the first principle, God. Thomas' passages have been carefully examined by Evan King,<sup>15</sup> to whom I can refer hoping that his beautiful dissertation will soon be published. I will limit myself to pointing out a couple of elements characteristic of Thomas of York's interpretation. The three movements refer to the knowledge of the existence (*anitas*) of God, and have been practiced by the philosophers of antiquity to a large extent, particularly the first (introspection) and the second (philosophical reason). The straight movement, on the other hand, in the case of those who did not have the faith, was granted only to a few, and in its excellence, only to very few, by special grace, that is, as a consequence of the completeness and perfection of the oblique movement. Note that Dionysius, in *De divinis nominibus*, makes no mention of the philosophers of antiquity. It is true indeed that Dionysius had been, before conversion, a pagan philosopher. But the functionalisation of this doctrine to formulate the notion of a sort of philosophical revelation of pagan wisdom is the original work of Thomas of York and does not seem to me to be reflected in the exegesis of the *Corpus Dionysiacum* at all. At the center of Thomas' reflection is the universal consensus of the people on the *anitas* of God, and that this "ascent in the knowledge of divinity" can lead to a mystical vision is a theme present, but not developed in the *Sapientiale*. Thomas is especially interested, I think, in the oblique movement.

#### 4 The Three Movements of the Soul and the Testimony of Proclus

Berthold was fascinated by Thomas' reading of Dionysius. But it was the study of Proclus' *Opuscula* (as we know, the manuscript he owned and glossed is still preserved in the library at Basel)<sup>16</sup> that opened his eyes, so to speak. In

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of an Ancient Sage", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 72(2005), p. 147–275; King, *Supersapientia*, p. 28–43.

14 See Thomas of York, *Sapientiale*, ed. F. Retucci, lib. I, c. 6 (Firenze, in press).

15 King, *Supersapientia*, p. 31–34.

16 MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.31. See King, *Supersapientia*, p. 3–9.

*De fato et providentia* in particular, Berthold thought he had found the key to understanding the doctrine of Dionysius, in particular to further develop the interpretation of the straight movement sketched by Thomas.

In the *Expositio tituli*, Berthold carefully relates the three movements of the soul with what Proclus wrote, highlighting the similarities with the text of Dionysius. In the case of the circular movement, Berthold emphasises the almost literal correspondence between *De fato* and *De divinis nominibus*:

Quod autem Proclus per primum motum, scilicet circularem, [...] ascenderit, patet in libro suo *De fato et providentia* 6 cap., [...] *dicens: [...]* conversa est ad se ipsam, [...] *ad ipsam iam summam recurrens ipsius intelligentiam, [...] videt autem supra omnes animas intellectuales substantias et ordines [...] videt autem rursus et ante haec eas, quae supra intellectum, deorum ipsorum monades.*<sup>17</sup>

This is the movement of intellect that leads to the contemplation of the primordial causes of Eriugena. The oblique movement is formulated in the exact terms of Thomas' philosophical reasoning, and is identified par excellence with the theorems of the *Elements of Theology*:

*per motum obliquum, qui proprius erat philosophorum et erat per laboriosam investigationem primi omnium existentium principii dividendo, definiendo, communibus principiis utendo, a notis ad ignota per ratiocinationem progrediendo, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia ascendendo et inter intelligibilia ab uno in aliud tendendo, quousque ad simpliciter ultimum perveniatur.*<sup>18</sup>

This arrival to the extreme limit leads to a mystical vision. The rectilinear movement is interpreted as a mystical vision and as the exercise of an individual transintellectual principle:<sup>19</sup>

*Sed quod per directum motum ascenderit in Dei cognitionem [...] non digressive, sed unitive, hoc est [...] directa ipsius visione, apparet libro quo supra cap. 8, ubi [...] prosequitur de cognitione, quae est supra intellectum, quam theologi etiam ante Platonem divulgant vocantes eam ut veri*

17 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. B*, p. 38, l. 49–p. 39, l. 67 (italics added for emphasis), citing Proclus, *De providentia*, ed. H. Boese, *Tria opuscula (De providentia, libertate, fato)* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960), c. 6, §18, p. 124, l. 2–p. 126, l. 8, and c. 6, §19, p. 126, l. 8–9.

18 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. D*, p. 40, l. 110–115.

19 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. C*, p. 39, l. 73–p. 40, 108.

*divinam maniam: "Ipsam enim aiunt unum animae, non adhuc intellectualem excitantem", sed coaptantem ipsum unum uni summo, cui "adiacens le unum quietem amat, clausa cognitionibus, muta facta et silens intrinseco silentio".*<sup>20</sup> *His concordat Dionysius 7 cap. De divinis nominibus B et 4 N.*<sup>21</sup>

As we can see, according to Berthold, Proclus experienced the direct vision of God (*directa ipsius visione*).

A very significant shift here should be noted: Dionysius spoke of the mystical experiences of himself and his friends, Timothy, Dorotheus, Gaius. Thomas of York applied this in a generic way to the philosophers of antiquity. Berthold focuses it on Proclus, and does so on the basis of a philological textual comparison. The description of Dionysius fits perfectly with Proclus, who becomes the prototype of the "divine man", *homo divinus* (of which Dionysius speaks). At least on a couple of occasions Berthold points out that in Proclus' texts there is the key to fully understand Dionysius' position: "Sed auctor expressius hoc deducit [...]."<sup>22</sup> *Istam intentionem clarius ponit Proclus*"<sup>23</sup>

This shift has the appreciable advantage of allowing Berthold to bring some clarity to the group of ancient authors (Seneca, Cicero, Apuleius, Macrobius, etc.), which Thomas of York offers in a way that is as inclusive as it is undifferentiated. The reading of Proclus (one should recall that he was still unknown to Thomas) offers Berthold the possibility of resolving the question of ancient wisdom and the Platonic tradition in a selective way, with a surgical operation that identifies and isolates the three movements in the historical instantiation of the Platonic Proclus Diadochus. Thomas of York attributed the vision of God to "a few", or better to "a very few" pagans, and above all put the accent on the *consensus philosophorum*. In Berthold, this consensus is transformed into the historical-factual proof of the personal deification carried out by a pagan philosopher, and by a long and ancient pre-Platonic and Platonic tradition.

To ask how Proclus managed to do what (as Tauler will say) many Christians are unable to do (and which, according to Tauler again, should be a shame for them),<sup>24</sup> is tantamount to asking – beyond the obvious need for the grace of God – the metaphysical reasons and the psychological foundations of deification. This is what we will try to deepen by studying the third, direct movement.

20 Proclus, *De prov.*, c. 8, §31, p. 139, l. 1–p. 140, l. 12.

21 Dionysius, *De div. nom.*, 7.1, p. 194, *Dionysiaca*, p. 385–386; *De div. nom.*, 4.11, p. 156–157, *Dionysiaca*, p. 206.

22 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 20H, p. 71, l. 245–p. 72, 246.

23 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129B, p. 178, l. 167.

24 See Sturlese, *Homo divinus*, p. 169–197.

We can anticipate that, according to Berthold, Proclus so to speak “activated” and exercised a cognitive principle that is inherent to every human being, the exercise of which was already known to the ancient pre-Platonic philosophers and to Plato, and which the subsequent victory of the Aristotelian vision of the world has condemned to oblivion: this principle is the *unum*. The *unum* is the foundation of both the straight and the oblique movement. We understand now the reason why Berthold unites the two moments under a single denominator of the “beatific vision”, intentionally modifying Dionysius’ text, as we have seen.

It is therefore certainly true that, as Stephen Gersh pointed out,<sup>25</sup> Berthold reads Proclus through Dionysius, but from these considerations it appears equally true that at least in this case he reads Dionysius through Proclus.

## 5 The Straight Movement and the *unum animae*

We have seen that, in the text of Dionysius used by Berthold, the straight movement is formulated in an obscure and even mutilated way, and that its interpretation is also open to debate; but it is nevertheless beyond doubt that Berthold understands this movement as that of a unitive (*unitive*) and direct vision (*directa ipsius [Dei] visione*). In fact, he tells us that the straight movement is rooted in a particular cognitive principle, of which Dionysius speaks in *De divinis nominibus* c. 7, and which is called “unity” transcending the nature of the mind (*unitas superexaltata*, a Proclean term). This is a “unity” that abandons intellectual knowledge (*intellectuales virtutes sunt superfluae*) and is capable of bringing multiplicity back to the one (*multorum ad unum convolutio*), becoming deiform and launching itself into the inaccessible light (*deiformis facta [...] luci se immittit*)<sup>26</sup> – note that, according to the commentators, this idea is rather the characteristic of the circular movement. On the basis of his reading of

25 S. Gersh, “Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 493–503, at p. 502.

26 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 20H, p. 71, l. 238–245: *Corpus autem, animam et intellectum esse in homine non est, qui ambigat. Sed quod sit ibi unum, testatur Dionysius 7 cap. De divinis nominibus B vocans ipsum «unionem excedentem mentis naturam (vel «unitatem superexaltatam», ut dicit alia translatio), per quam mens coniungitur ad ea, quae sunt supra ipsam»; et hoc «multorum ad unum convolutione», ut dicit infra C; unde et intellectuales virtutes sunt superfluae, «quando anima deiformis facta per unionem ignote inaccessiblei lucis lumini se immittit», ut dicit 4 cap. N. For the Dionysian source see above, note 21.*

Proclus' *Opuscula*,<sup>27</sup> Berthold adds that this is the same cognitive principle of which Proclus treats in chapter 8 of *De fato*, namely a movement of the mind that abandons and transcends intellectual knowledge (*non adhuc intellectuale excitantem*) and joins the One (*coaptantem uni*) in stillness and inner silence, thus becoming God as far as possible and living by divine life (*deus factus, ut animae possibile*). The closeness to the text of Dionysius is indeed impressive. Berthold notes that this cognitive principle bears the same name in both authors: Dionysius speaks of a "unity", Proclus of an *unum* in the soul, evoking the name that the tradition of pre-Platonic theologians and Plato himself gave it.

Proclus also converges with Dionysius in pointing out that the "one of the soul" is hidden from common sense, and indicates the reason why: people live only within the horizon of the (Aristotelian) world of being (Dionysius: *in existentibus sunt firmati*)<sup>28</sup> here below (Proclus: *circa ea, quae deorsum, volvuntur*), and therefore are incredulous (Proclus: *increduliter habemus nos*)<sup>29</sup> and ignorant (Dionysius: *indoctos*). Nevertheless, Berthold states, Proclus offers a clearer formulation (*expressius*) than that of Dionysius. In what sense?

It is enough to reread the refined analysis of the *unum animae* offered by Werner Beierwaltes<sup>30</sup> in his fundamental contribution of 1961 to understand what Berthold might think of. The German scholar based his interpretation on texts by Proclus that were not all known in the Middle Ages. But if we want to limit ourselves to the *Opuscula*, and in particular to *De fato*, we note that chapters 6–8, cited in full in the Proposition 185 of the *Expositio*,<sup>31</sup> outline a

27 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 20H, p. 71, l. 245–p. 72, l. 250: *Sed auctor expressius hoc deducit 10 quaest. De providentia in haec verba: «Et enim in nobis iniacet aliquod secretum unius vestigium, quod et eo, qui in nobis est intellectus, est divinius, in quem et consummans anima et locans se ad ipsum divina est et vivit divina vita». Idem habetur De fato et providentia cap. 8, ubi loquitur de mania divina, quam aiunt theologi «unum animae».* For the Proclean source see above, note 20.

28 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 71D, p. 35, l. 123–127: *Quem quidam firmati in existentibus et non opinantibus aliquid esse super entia dicunt fore esse, sicut dicit auctor De causis: 'Prima rerum creaturarum est esse'. Esse autem est actus entis. Sed tales vocat Dionysius indoctos, in 1 cap. De mystica theologia, ubi dicit sic: 'Istos autem dico (subaudi: indoctos), qui in existentibus sunt firmati nihil super existentia supersubstantialiter esse opinantes'.*

29 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 121M, p. 111, l. 212–215: [...] *deus factus, ut animae possibile, cognoscet solummodo, qualiter dii omnia indicibiliter cognoscunt singuli secundum li unum, quod sui ipsorum. Donec autem circa ea, quae deorsum volvimur, increduliter habemus nos circa haec, scilicet omnia divino cognoscente.*

30 W. Beierwaltes, "Der Begriff des *unum in nobis* bei Proklos", in P. Wilpert (ed.), *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1963), p. 255–266.

31 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 185L, p. 26, l. 410–p. 28, l. 455.

rigorous philosophical itinerary of the rational soul's self-reflection which, on the basis of the principle that "what is united presupposes a cause of union, and what has an intellectual nature presupposes an intellectual power, and everything that is a participant presupposes a non-participable hypostasis",<sup>32</sup> ascends from sensitive to discursive knowledge and from that to intellectual *noesis*, to reach the ground, the foundation, the One: "become therefore one, to see the one, or rather not to see the one: in fact, he who sees will see something of intellectual nature and not above the intellect, and will include a certain one and not the absolute One".<sup>33</sup> The one of the soul is therefore revealed to be a condition of the very possibility of sensitive and rational experience, and as the point of arrival of a process of self-reflection that also represents a profound diagnosis of the human condition.

This is also the conclusion reached by the oblique movement expressed in the *Exposition on the Elements of Theology*: in fact, from the metaphysical point of view, the one in us is a "shining" instituted by the self-determination of the First Principle (the One-Good) in the series of primordial causes and in particular in the Primary Soul, which institutes the Soul for itself and a double series of souls, a finite series and a series of "shinings" in human souls.<sup>34</sup>

In sum, according to Berthold, the one of the soul (Proclus), the unity transcending the nature of the mind (Dionysius) is inherent to the nature of man. The human condition is no less and no more than that of living in the unawareness of bearing within oneself a secret vestige of the One. The task of philosophical theology is to bring the One to awareness. This does not mean "seeing it" or even "thinking about it", because the One is the condition of the possibility of "seeing" and "thinking", and awareness of this is nothing more than identity with the One in stillness and silence. At this point I will be careful not to violate the threshold of the unsayable and of silence, but I think it is at least appropriate to make an explanatory observation. This concerns the providential dimension of the *unum animae* as a "shining" of the One itself, and it appears important to clarify the trans-Aristotelian sense of the Proclean doctrine also in relation to the discussions of Berthold's German contemporaries.

We have seen that the most striking character of the presentation of *unum animae* is its logical-ontological primacy with respect to the Aristotelian

32 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 185L, p. 27, l. 444–446: *Oportet enim supra unita locari unificas causas et supra intellectuales factas intellectualificas, et supra omnia simpliciter participantia imparticipabiles hypostases.*

33 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 197G, p. 137, l. 170–172: *Fiat igitur unum, ut videat le unum, magis autem, ut non videat le unum: videns enim intellectuale videbit et non supra intellectum, et quoddam unum intelliget et non le antounum.*

34 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 64F, p. 197, l. 155–p. 198, l. 183.

intellect. On this point, which appears to be very characteristic if we consider the role that Dietrich and Eckhart assign to the intellect, it should be noted that Berthold distinguishes, on the basis of Proclus, an “intellectual” cognition from a “providential” cognition. The first is proper to the intellect, and Berthold here fully accepts the doctrine of Dietrich’s so-called “paradoxes of consciousness” (*Paradoxien des Bewußtseins*):<sup>35</sup> 1) the intellect always constitutes itself in thinking itself in act; 2) in this intellection the intellect thinks itself by essence; 3) the intellect is an actual image of the totality; 4) and the intellect by thinking itself thinks the totality by a simple intellection.

The “providential” cognition is “the knowledge of providence that transcends the intellect and is proper to the One only, according to which each god is and is said to provide for things, and that places itself in an operation prior to the intellect”.<sup>36</sup> It is always a matter of the knowledge of totality, like that of the intellect, but not in terms of just knowing, but in terms of *providere* (to provide), which is “the act or operation of Good” (*providere est actus sive operatio boni*),<sup>37</sup> “an operation of Good that gives each entity what is appropriate to it” (*providentia [...] ‘operatio boni unicuique congrua largientis’*).<sup>38</sup> The providence of the *unum animae* is therefore an imitation and participation in the divine power that establishes and preserves totality as goodness and order, and this is deification.<sup>39</sup>

35 See K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Dietrich of Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie*, ed. B. Mojsisich (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), p. xiii. See Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, ed. B. Mojsisich, in *Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie*, 1.1.1.3.6, p. 22, l. 100–120.

36 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 134D, p. 216, l. 70–73: *providentiae cognitio super intellectum existens et uno solo, secundum quod et est unusquisque deus et providere omnium dicitur in ea, quae ante intelligere operatione sistens se ipsum. Hoc itaque uno, secundum quod et consistit, cognoscit omnia*. Cf. Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, ed. H. Boese, q. 1, §4, p. 6, l. 1–5.

37 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120F, p. 101, l. 348–349.

38 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120D, p. 98, l. 259–260.

39 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 188E, p. 65, l. 203–215: *anima [...] non solum vivit animaliter, sed etiam intellectualiter, et per consequens habet in se principium sui motus, scilicet «unum ipsius animae», quod quidam vocant «deiformem unitatem», alii vero «abditum mentis» sive «faciem», quidam autem «intellectum agentem», hoc, inquam, principium manens in se stabile et invariabile et existens intrinsecum substantiae animae, utpote portio eius intranea et eminentior principiat omnem motum vitalem ipsius animae, sive sit intellectualis sive sensualis sive germinalis. [...] Ista enim intraneitas, cum importet mutuum respectum eorum, quorum unum est in alio, non est nisi identitas substantialis*.

## 6 Berthold and the Mystics

With the doctrine of the *unum animae*, Berthold offered an original solution to the question raised by Dietrich at the end of the 13th century: what is the individual principle through which we unite ourselves to God in the beatific vision? Is the human being naturally “capable of God”? Dietrich’s answer is well known: Aristotle (the agent intellect), Augustine (the *abditum mentis*), and Scripture (the image of God) converge in establishing the principle of the beatific vision as an individual and natural one. In the beatific vision, the individual agent intellect becomes the form of the possible intellect; this condition is, however, denied to the subject during “this life”, because “in this life [...] it unites itself to the subject only through the intelligible species that are its action”.<sup>40</sup> In other words, Dietrich says, the human being lives in a condition of alienation from his intellectual and vital principle, which can only be healed in the afterlife when the order of nature is absorbed by that of grace or, in other words, when natural providence is absorbed by voluntary providence. By choosing to keep to the natural order, Dietrich is indeed dealing with the foundation of a possible mystical experience, but he places mysticism outside the horizon of his problematic. And in fact, although he was certainly aware of transitory “mystical” phenomena in his time, he does not mention them, except for a nod to the experience of Saint Benedict, who was reported to have seen the universe at a glance (*in ictu oculi*).<sup>41</sup> Dietrich probably considered mystical experiences to be outside the horizon of philosophical theology, that is, belonging to the order of so-called voluntary providence, of ethics and of the intervention of God in the world. Not very different was the position of Eckhart, his great contemporary, who agreed with him in considering the problem of mystical experience to be a marginal one.

Berthold raises with greater force the question of the relationship between the *unum*, intellect and mystical experience. This can be seen from his interpretation of Dionysius, who teaches how the threefold movement of the soul leads to a direct contemplation of God that happens (*fit*), “through a strong contrition, through the abandonment of the senses and intellectual operations, of all the sensible and intelligible, and of all being and non-being, in such a way that the divine man rises in a hidden way, according to his possibility,

40 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 4.3.3, p. 122, l. 80–84: *nobis quoque, qui degimus in hac vita, non unitur ut forma, secundum quod actio eius est essentia eius, ut dicit Commentator Super III De anima, sed solum unitur nobis per intellecta in actu seu species intelligibiles, quae sunt actio eius, secundum quod actio eius differt ab essentia eius.*

41 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, 1.1.4 (5), p. 29, l. 27–32.



to the union with the one who transcends all substance and knowledge”, and “for this the going-out from himself and from everything is necessary”.<sup>42</sup> Here Dionysius is speaking in the first person of himself and his friends, and therefore of an experience in the present life. In this way, Dietrich’s problem regarding the “principle by which we unite ourselves to God in the beatific vision”<sup>43</sup> in the future life moves to the “principle of union in the present life”. The problem is made even more acute because, according to Berthold, a philological reading of Dionysius shows that the term *unitio* (union as an abstract deverbal noun, *Ein-ung*, the action of uniting) used by John Saracen is, in the older translation of Eriugena, *unitas* (unity as an abstract deadjectival name, *Ein-heit*) that transcends the intellect. The *lectio* of Eriugena corresponds exactly to that of Proclus (*unum animae*). And this *unum*, as we know from Dietrich’s analysis, is a principle and essential cause of the intellect of the soul; it cannot be an accident, but it is a substance.<sup>44</sup>

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- 42 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202A, p. 181, l. 27–p. 182, l. 35: *Istam condicionem tangit ipse Dionysius in Mystica theologia I cap. in principio post orationem dicens: ‘Tu autem, amice Thimotee, circa mysticas visiones’ (alia translatio: ‘circa mysticos intellectus’) ‘forti contritione’ (sive: ‘corroborato itinere’, secundum aliam translationem) ‘et sensus derelinque et intellectuales operationes, et omnia sensibilia et intelligibilia et omnia existentia et non existentia, et sicut est possibile, ignote consurge ad eius unionem, qui est super omnem substantiam et cognitionem. Et enim excessu tui ipsius et omnium irretentibili absolute, et munde ad supersubstantialem divinarum tenebrarum radium, cuncta auferens et a cunctis absolutus sursum’ agens. See Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, ed. A.M. Ritter (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1991), 1.1, p. 142, l. 5–11; *Dionysiaca*, p. 567–569.*
- 43 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De tribus difficilibus quaestionibus*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3. *Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, eds J.-D. Caviglioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), p. 9, l. 16–18: *de principio ex parte nostri, quo immediate uniuntur beati Deo in illa gloriosa et beatifica visione, utrum videlicet hoc sit intellectus possibilis vel intellectus agens.*
- 44 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 21C, p. 83, l. 263–273, with emphasis added: *Unitas vero agens et patiens est duplex, quia vel subsistit se ipsa formaliter per essentiam, licet efficienter sit a primo dicta unitate producta, vel subsistit in alio non potens subsistere per se ipsam. Primo hic dicto modo unitas dicitur de omnibus primordialibus causis, quarum quaelibet est unitas per se perfecta. Secundo modo adhuc dicitur dupliciter, quia vel est principium causale formale eius, in quo subsistit, sicut se habet omnis unitas sive in virtutibus sive in entibus sive in vitis sive in intellectualibus hypostasibus sive in animabus – quaelibet enim istarum unitatum, licet sit quodammodo patiens, ut procedit a sua prime causa, tamen est agens, inquantum est causa totius residuae subsistentiae rei, cuius est principale principium intrinsecum formale et causale sub ordine principalis agentis; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 64B, p. 193, l. 34–p. 194, l. 36: *Si [unitas] est res extra animam, tunc habet rationem principii omnia sua principiata in se virtualiter continentis ita, quod est potentia omnia sua principiata, actu vero et operatione nullum.**

Berthold therefore believes, on the basis of Proclus, that the principle of individual deification is a substance whose very action is its substance, and in this sense he interprets Dionysius.

There are many declarations in this sense, in which Dionysius and Proclus are both quoted, even if Berthold underlines the transience and the difficulty of this mystical experience.

In the prologue he declares,<sup>45</sup> in the words of Hermes Trismegistus (through Albert), that the human being (*homo*) “is” conjoined (*subnexus, id est coniunctus, copulatus*) with God. There is a certain paradox in this statement, since this conjunction is presented as a factuality but immediately afterward it is said that this conjunction “happens” (*fit*), according to Dionysius,<sup>46</sup> “through the abandonment of the senses and intellectual operations, of all the sensible and intelligible, and of all being and non-being, and in such a way that the divine man rises in a hidden way, according to his possibility”, “to the union with him who transcends all substance and knowledge”. But shortly afterwards Berthold returns to factuality:<sup>47</sup> “thus man is united with God, the true and ineffable One, through his one, that is, through the divine likeness – in fact through his one, which is the image of God by which man is capable of God himself and is united with God [...] it is the likeness of God and is God through participation”, which is deification.

A similar metaphysical objectivity characterises the commentary to Proposition 129, if I understand the text correctly, in which the notion of deification is explicitly analysed:<sup>48</sup> “All divine bodies are such through the mediation of a divinised soul, all divine souls through a divine intelligence, and all divine intelligences by participation in a divine henad: the henad is immediate deity,

45 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prologus* 18, p. 27, l. 729–732: *Sic ergo homo subnexus Deo vero et indicibili uni per suum unum, hoc est per divinam similitudinem – uno enim suo, quod est imago Dei, qua homo est capax ipsius Dei et conexus Deo, habet similitudinem Dei, immo est similitudo Dei et deus participatione.*

46 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 17, p. 26, l. 677–682: *Quod secundum Dionysium in principio Mysticae theologiae forti contritione fit per sensuum derelictionem et intelligibilium operationum et omnium sensibilem et intelligibilem et omnium existentium et non existentium et ut divinus homo ignote consurgat, sicut est possibile, ‘ad eius unionem, qui est super omnem substantiam et cognitionem’. Et subiungit ad hoc necessarium esse excessum sui et omnium.* See Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, text quoted in note 42.

47 See note 46.

48 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129, p. 174, l. 2–7: *Omne corpus divinum per animam est divinum exdeatam, omnis autem anima divina propter divinum intellectum, omnis autem intellectus divinus secundum participationem divinae unitatis. et si quidem unum antotheon, id est ex se deus, intellectus autem divinissimus, anima autem divina, corpus autem deiforme.*

the intelligence most divine, the soul divine, the body deisimilar". Here Proclus is dealing with the vertical series, in which the distinctive property of each henad is reflected at different levels of reality (*taxeis*), and illustrates the relationships of dependence and participation at the metaphysical level. Berthold, applying a principle of symmetry already formulated by Dietrich,<sup>49</sup> finds these levels in the microcosm that is the deified man:<sup>50</sup> "in Proposition 129 [...] it has been demonstrated that in the deified man there are four [levels], that is, the divine body, the divine soul, the most divine intellect and the one or the unity that transcends the nature of the mind [Dionysius]"; "let us take the deified man as an example: [...] the absolute One, that is, God himself, participated in a separable way, is present in the intellect through an inseparable power, that is, the one, and in this way makes the intellect itself divine; and furthermore is present to the rational soul through the one and the intellect, deifying it [i.e. the rational soul] through the divine intellect itself".

The perspective is decidedly metaphysical. For Proclus the structure of the *taxeis* is objective, and the description of the deified man also appears to be objective. Deification is the result of the presence of the One in the soul through the determinations of power, being, life and intellect, and is a gift (*datio*) that "is the fundamental substratum" and therefore is constitutive of human nature. Should we therefore conclude that man is deified by the presence of God, and is not aware of this?

With regard to this awareness, Berthold affirms that it is the result of a greater or lesser separation from corporeal things (*prout minus vel plus se ab his corporalibus separaverit*),<sup>51</sup> and that it is possible in this life, even if in a transitory way, "sometimes" (*aliquando*): "contemplating the gods [or rather the primordial causes] it is *sometimes* possible for the human soul, indeed for

49 See L. Sturlese, "Dietrich von Freiberg", in A. Brungs, V. Mudroch, P. Schulthess (eds), *Die Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol. IV. 13. Jahrhundert* (Basel: Schwabe, 2017), p. 895–911, at p. 910.

50 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 181D, p. 223, l. 83–88: [...] *per 129, ubi etiam ostensum est, quod in homine deificato sunt quattuor, scilicet corpus divinum, anima divina, intellectus divinissimus et unum sive unitas, quae etiam 'excedit mentis naturam'*; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129B, p. 178, l. 155–181: *ponamus hominem deificatum pro exemplo [...]. Et sic prime unum, scilicet ex se Deus, separabiliter participatus adest intellectui per inseparabilem potentiam, scilicet per tale unum, et sic facit ipsum intellectum divinissimum; et item adest animae rationali mediante et uno et intellectu, deificans eam per ipsum intellectum divinum.*

51 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 197I, p. 139, l. 220–221: *In statu enim generationis potest enumeratas quinque cognitionum species exercere, prout minus vel plus se ab his corporalibus separaverit.*

us through this";<sup>52</sup> "it *sometimes* contemplates the gods, which is nevertheless granted to a few souls";<sup>53</sup> "as Dionysius affirms when speaking of himself and other men of exemplary holiness" and "of the holy minds of human souls" (*de mentibus sanctis humanarum animarum*) in this life (*de contemplatione viae*).<sup>54</sup> Nevertheless, "those who study divine things become gods" (*divina tractantes efficiuntur di et cognoscunt divina*)<sup>55</sup> and exercise perfect wisdom: "The perfect wisdom of the soul is to recognize where it was born and from what source it comes".<sup>56</sup>

All of these statements show, in my opinion, a certain difficulty in reconciling the metaphysical perspective with an eschatological perspective, that is, the different perspectives of natural providence and voluntary providence. On the one side there is the ordered, eternal cosmic theatre of the world described by Proclus, on the other there is the single actor of creation, the *homo nexus Dei et mundi*, who by the instrument of his own reason moves towards the discovery of his true being, transcends his rationality, and ascends to the One by acquiring divine intellect, and at the same time acts virtuously and acquires merits of eschatological relevance. In the *unum animae* the orders of the two providences are unified, and it is therefore no wonder that Proclus, a pagan philosopher, reached unitive deification as it was understood Dionysius and Berthold: "deification is *unitas* with God, simplicity that rejects any diversity of multiplicity".<sup>57</sup>

52 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 185I, p. 25, l. 376–379: *necessarium est animas, quae semper sunt statutae extra se ipsas et supra se ipsas et sic totae deifactae, incessanter unitate supermentalī contemplari ipsos deos, cum hoc sit animae partiali, prout est in generatione, immo nobis per eam possibile aliquando.*

53 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 185M, p. 28, l. 457–471: [...] *ideo non semper contemplatur deos, licet aliquando. Quod tamen paucis conceditur animabus [...].*

54 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 202C, p. 185, l. 138–144: [...] *de contemplatione viae subiungit [...];* 185G, p. 24, l. 329–331: *Et licet praedicta verba Dionysii sint dicta de mentibus sanctis humanarum animarum, tamen proportionaliter eminentiori modo applicari possunt ad animas semper intelligentes.*

55 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Praeambulum C*, p. 65, l. 419–420.

56 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 206F, p. 223, l. 237–238: *animae enim, dum corpore utitur, haec est perfecta sapientia, ut, unde orta sit, de quo fonte venerit, recognoscat.*

57 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129B, p. 177, l. 133–137: *'Deificatio autem' secundum Dionysium 1 cap. Ecclesiasticae hierarchiae 'est ad Deum, sicut est possibile, et assimilatio et unio' (alia translatio: 'et similitudo et unitas'). 'Similitudo vero est rerum differentium eadem qualitas' vel proprietas. Unitas autem est simplicitas omnem diversitatem multitudinis seu diversam multitudinem refutans.*

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# Metaphysical Freedom. From Albert the Great to Berthold of Moosburg

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1. When Albert the Great sets out to define “freedom” in the first book of his commentary on the *De causis*, he fishes in murky water by engaging with philosophical traditions that are only partly transparent to him.

“Freedom”, the first concept in the series *libertas – voluntas – omnipotentia* discussed here, is assigned to the first principle in five steps. First, Albert discusses Aristotle’s explanation of “what is free” as a *causa sui* in the *Metaphysics* (A1–4 in the appendix). Second, he claims that, since freedom is said in four modes – namely, as negating necessity by obligation, coercion, inevitability, and position – the first principle is free according to all of these modes (A5–12). Third, he relates the opposed view, which denies freedom to the first principle, in order to safeguard it from imperfection (A13–17). Fourth, while answering to these objections, Albert shows that the first principle acts freely, not by necessity (A18–22). Finally, he interprets the freedom of the first principle according to the “richness” with which the Platonic tradition invests it (A23–24).

Surely, Albert was not only aware of, but also familiar with, the philosophical traditions that are mobilized by the opposed view. But it is no less certain that Albert could not fully appreciate or see through the complex process of transmission that connects Aristotle’s definition of freedom in the *Metaphysics* with the *Liber de causis*, which Albert regards as the complement to Aristotle’s philosophical theology.

In fact, Aristotle’s definition of “the free” as *causa sui* was the model for Plotinus’ *Enneads* VI.8, which describes the freedom of the absolute as “what wills its own being”. Proclus, however, who objected that Aristotle’s definition of “the free” as *causa sui* applies primarily to *nous*, denied it to the absolute One-Good. The concept of freedom is absent in the *Elements of Theology*, with the concepts of the self-sufficient (*autarkes*) and especially the self-constituted (*authupostatōn*) coming as close to freedom as it gets. If, therefore, the author of the *Liber de causis* reproduces the notion of a *causa sui ipsius*, he seems to

remain loyal to the Aristotelian tradition at the point at which he, in fact, deviates from his direct source, the *Elements of Theology*.<sup>1</sup>

This constellation is of interest when we compare Albert's discussion of the freedom of the first principle in his *De causis*-commentary to its literal reception, mediated by the *De summo bono* of Ulrich of Strassburg, in the commentary on the *Elements of Theology* by Berthold of Moosburg.

In these three authors, two opposite hermeneutical strategies clash: Albert's synthesis of the Aristotelian and the Neoplatonic traditions, in continuity with the Porphyrian tradition of "the harmony of Plato and Aristotle", on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Berthold's antithesis of these traditions, which follows the path first opened by Aquinas and his exposure of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Liber de causis* as, in fact, adapting and abridging the *Elements of Theology*.

Several questions of a heuristic nature arise here. How does Berthold compensate for Albert's reliance on Aristotle, in the light of his antithetical approach? And how does he account for the freedom of the first principle at all in his commentary, given the absence of the concept in the *Elements of Theology*?

2. Before engaging with the texts in a more direct way, I would first like to emphasise Albert's contribution to an articulation of a Platonic concept of absolute freedom – for that is what he does here, *malgré soi* – by invoking Albert's simultaneous endorsement of the Aristotelian conception of freedom as "freedom of choice". (Clearly, the use of historiographical categories like "Platonic" and "Aristotelian" reaches its true limits when we oppose the "freedom of choice" in the *Nicomachean Ethics* to the conception of freedom in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which we would label "Platonic". Perhaps it is more appropriate, therefore, to speak of metaphysical and ethical freedom instead. What is important is the difference between the two.)

Metaphysical freedom, the freedom of the Absolute, can be distinguished from ethical freedom, the freedom of choice associated with human agency. *In fact, the freedom of the Absolute dialectically sublates the very necessity that*

1 See W. Beierwaltes, "Pronoia und Freiheit in der Philosophie des Proklos", in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 24(1977), p. 88–111; W. Beierwaltes, "Proklos' Theorie des *Authypostatou* und seine Kritik an Plotins Konzept einer *causa sui*", in *Das wahre Selbst* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2001), p. 160–181; Th. Kobusch, "Bedingte Selbstverursachung. Zu einem Grundmotiv der neuplatonischen Tradition", in Th. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, O.F. Summerell (eds), *Selbst – Singularität – Subjektivität. Vom Neuplatonismus zum Deutschen Idealismus* (Amsterdam / Philadelphia: Grüner, 2002), p. 155–173.



is excluded by the notion of freedom of choice as indifference. Their opposition shapes the history of philosophy, where the Neoplatonic affirmation of the absolute freedom of the Good is metaphysical at the expense of any ethics conceived as an independent discipline based on practical reason, and where, inversely, Aristotle is understood as an advocate of an ethical conception of freedom and the human good, at the expense of a metaphysical conception of the Good, which, if it existed, would be irrelevant for human agency.<sup>2</sup>

This opposition, which can only be sketched here, must be addressed in order to appreciate Albert's strategy in defending the freedom of the first principle.<sup>3</sup> For when Albert takes issue with the position that declares the first principle to act by necessity, his discourse actually enacts the dialectical mediation between freedom and necessity, which we have just mentioned.

Indeed, Albert concedes that the freedom that is opposed to necessity is an imperfection from which the first principle must be preserved, while insisting that this is not the only conceivable kind of freedom. What results is a conception of absolute freedom that is no longer opposed to necessity and that is acknowledged to be incompatible with the conception of ethical freedom that Albert endorses elsewhere in his works, but is denied here, due to its imperfection, to the first principle. The real issue, it seems, then, is the unity of the concept of freedom in Albert.

3. Turning to the text of Albert, I postpone for now the discussion of the four modes according to which freedom is applied to the first principle. Albert introduces Aristotle's explanation of "the free" as *causa sui* in the *Metaphysics*, in order to prove the general claim that the first principle is in every way free to

2 See W. Goris, "Metaphysik der Freiheit", in J. Müller, Ch. Rode (eds), *Freiheit und Geschichte. Festschrift für Theo Kobusch zum 70. Geburtstag* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2018), p. 229–250; W. Goris, "Die Freiheit und das Gute", in C. Böhr (ed.), *Metaphysik. Von einem unabweislichen Bedürfnis der menschlichen Vernunft. Rémi Brague zu Ehren* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2020), p. 373–390; J. Halfwassen, "Freiheit als Transzendenz. Zur Freiheit des Absoluten bei Schelling und Plotin", in J.-M. Narbonne, A. Reckermann (eds), *Pensées de l'Un dans l'histoire de la philosophie. Études en hommage au Professeur Werner Beierwaltes* (Paris: Vrin, 2004), p. 459–481. For the later tradition, see the excellent essay by Ch. Krijnen, "Die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit begreifen. Hegels Begriff von Sittlichkeit als Voraussetzung der Sittlichkeitskonzeption Kants", in *Folia Philosophica* 39(2018), p. 37–144.

3 For prior publications on the concept of freedom in Albert the Great, I refer the reader to H. Anzulewicz, "Das Phänomen des Schicksals und die Freiheit des Menschen nach Albertus Magnus", in J. Aertsen, K. Emery Jr., A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 507–534; E. Miteva, "I Want to Break Free. Albert the Great's Naturalistic Account of Freedom of Choice and its Limitations", in *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 21(2018), p. 11–28.

act. Before assessing the different modes according to which the first principle is free to act, this freedom itself first needs to be established.

The first principle is in every way free to act. For Aristotle says in the first book of the *Metaphysics* that “we call ‘free’ the one who acts on his own behalf” [*causa sui*: cause of itself]. Since, therefore, the first principle is in the highest sense on its own behalf (*causa sui*) in acting, it is the most free in action, and not just free, but even placed above freedom. For it has its “own power” (*dominium*) in its action. For the first is lord of all its acts. If now man is lord of his acts, since the cause of his acts is in him, all the more so the first of all is lord, who is for himself cause in every action. (A1–4)

The meaning of the text is clear from a comparison with Albert’s commentary on the *Metaphysics*.<sup>4</sup> Our point of reference is not the commentary on the first book of the *Metaphysics*, from which the quotation of Aristotle is taken, and in which Albert discusses freedom in relation to science and the liberal arts.<sup>5</sup> Rather, in the commentary on *Metaphysics* Lambda, where Albert comments on the notion of *prote ousia* as pure act, he reproduces the whole discussion on the first principle as *nesesse esse* that acts by its own essence, without thereby losing its freedom, since it is free in the sense of what is *causa sui*. The connection with the *De causis*-commentary is manifest in the digression that Albert adds to explain that the first substance is “above every name” (*super omne nomen*).

We may notice, moreover, that Albert introduces a slight twist in his explanation of Aristotle’s conception of freedom. The first principle is “the freest” and not just free, but “placed above freedom”, which designates the transcendence proper to the first principle. The conclusion of the text discusses freedom as the *largitas* of magnificence, as the expression of self-sufficiency or autarky (see *Liber de causis*, prop. XIX[XX]).

4. Referring to previous deliberations, Albert introduces the position that contradicts his conclusion that the first principle is “the freest” both in itself and in its actions since it does not depend on any other cause and thus is free from all necessity.

4 Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, ed. B. Geyer, Editio Coloniensis 16/1–2 (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1960–1964), lib. XI, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 484, l. 48–p. 485, l. 31.

5 Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, lib. I, tr. 2, c. 7, p. 24, l. 13–92.

In the five arguments *contra*, it is argued that it is proper to the first principle to act by necessity, and not freely. The first two arguments rely on the concept of the *necesse esse*, which acts *per essentiam*, both of which seem to exclude freedom. The first argument is as follows:

Against this, however, some try to counter by what was said before. It was said, namely, that the first is necessary being totally and in every way. And what is necessary in every way, in no way seems to be free. (A13)

To these objections, however, and others like it one can easily respond, namely, that the first is in every way necessary being. But for this reason freedom is not removed from it. For necessity, which is by dependence on another cause, is removed from the first. But for that reason freedom is not removed, such that in it is the cause of its action. (A18)

The reference to “what was said before” indicates chapters 9–11 of the first treatise in this first book, where the first principle is established as *necesse esse*; the Cologne edition has shown in detail how this passage in Albert’s text is elaborated upon the abridgement of Avicennian doctrine in the *Metaphysica Algazelis*. The arguments contesting the freedom of the first principle here are based, therefore, on Avicenna.<sup>6</sup>

In his answer, Albert concedes that the first principle is *necesse esse*, but denies that such necessity annuls freedom. It is perfectly reasonable, he affirms here with the entire Platonic tradition, to deny necessity to the first principle, so as to remove any dependence upon other causes, while affirming its freedom in the sense of what necessitates itself.

The last three arguments (A15–16) articulate a conception of freedom as the disposition “to act or not to act”, which, if posited in the first principle, would introduce change into what is immutable, withhold the perfection of everlasting action from it, and falsely attribute something to the higher realm which implies an imperfection in the lower realms.<sup>7</sup> The key to solving these objections is provided by the answer to the third argument:

6 See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, ed. W. Fauser, Editio Coloniensis 17/2 (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 9, p. 17, l. 33–p. 18, l. 40.

7 In the *Summa theologiae*, Albert attributes this conception of freedom to Avicenna: *in potestate suae libertatis habet agere et non agere et agere hoc et contrarium huius*. See Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei. Libri I, pars I. Quaestiones 1–50A*, ed. D. Siedler, Editio Coloniensis 34/1 (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), pars I, tr. 2, q. 3, c. 2, p. 30.

Furthermore, what is free is that in which there is “to act and not to act”. If it is said, however, that in the first there is “to act and not to act”, one must concede that the first is subject to variation. This, however, is impossible, since it is totally unchangeable, as was proved before. Therefore, there is not “to act and not to act” in it. It is necessary, therefore, that it acts. And thus it is subject to necessity and not to freedom. (A15)

Furthermore, by that which is said, that there is not “to act and not to act” in it, nothing is proved. For this is said in a twofold way. The absence of “to act and not to act” in something can be the result of compulsion to the one and the impossibility of the other. In the other way, it can be the result of freedom to the one and the other. But because it is better to be the one than the other, therefore it does not turn from the one to the other – just as in the chaste there is acting chastely and not chastely, and in the generous to give and not to give. But because it is better to act chastely and to give generously than to act unchastely and to hold back greedily, therefore the chaste and the generous does not turn to the opposite of its action. And thus “to act and not to act” is in the first indeed, but it cannot not act, since it is better to send out goodness than to hold it back, and “it is impossible to attribute anything in the least unbecoming to it”.<sup>8</sup> (A20)

The freedom “to act and not to act” is denied incorrectly to the first principle by the objection, if its denial is taken in the sense of being forced to do something *because* it is impossible to do the opposite. Clearly, the first principle is free in this sense, for the contrary would conflict with its omnipotence. But necessity can also be taken in the sense of having the ability “to act and not to act”, while preferring the one over the other because of its perceived goodness. In this sense, Albert says, the first principle is free not to act, while acting necessarily in conformity to its own goodness.

More urgent at present than a consideration of Albert’s replies to the fourth and fifth objections, which also follow this strategy, is the clarification of the

1. 11–15. One notes the differentiation here between *executio actus* (*agere et non agere*) and *specificatio actus* (*agere hoc et contrarium huius*).

8 The quotation is from Anselm, *Cur Deus homo*, lib. I, c. 10.

type of necessity that the freedom of the first principle negates (see A4–12). The necessity to act that is attributed to the first principle is not the necessity which determines nature to one action; this type of necessity, in the form of an *obligatio ad unum*, is clearly opposed to the freedom of the first principle. But the necessity attributed to the first principle differs less evidently from the fourth type of necessity, that of position (in the sense of “presupposition”), which corresponds to the final cause.<sup>9</sup> Albert refers to a passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* on the unity of the virtues, where Aristotle (cf. *NE* VI.13, 1145a4–6) explains that choice requires both virtue and practical wisdom, which can be distinguished in terms of what determines the end and what makes us do the things that lead to the end:

For a goal being posited, if one has to attain this goal, it is necessary to attend to what is necessary to attain the goal. As Aristotle says, “in order to have moral virtue it is necessary to have prudence, because prudence inquires and chooses that which leads to the moral goal of virtue, since moral virtue tends only as nature to the goal, without considering that which leads to the execution of its goal”. (A10)

It seems to me that this relation is very akin to the necessity to act, if acting is perceived as to do what is good, which is granted to the first principle in the response to the third objection.

My point, however, is not to challenge the consistency of Albert’s remarks, but to check the definition of freedom as what can both act and not act. Freedom is defined here exclusively in relation to the *executio actus*, and not to the *specificatio actus*. That the first principle is free not to act, yet is bound to act by its goodness, might be interpreted as an evasive strategy. But is not the

<sup>9</sup> See Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, lib. 1, tr. 7, q. 30, c. 3, p. 237, l. 33–42, where Albert negates the first three types of necessity to God, while accepting the fourth: *Dicitur quarto modo necessitas secundum causam finalem, quam Boethius vocat necessitatem suppositio-nis, secundum quam dicimus: si femina honesta esse debeat, necesse est castam esse [...]. Et hoc modo dicimus, quod pater necessitate genuit filium, quia si summum bonum esse debeat, necesse est, quod summa et perfecta diffusionem seipsum diffundat et communicet*. See also the questions on *liberum arbitrium*: Albert the Great, *In II Sententiarum*, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. 27 (Paris: Vivès, 1894), d. 3, A, a. 7, p. 72b; Albert the Great, *De homine*, eds H. Anzulewicz, J. Söder, Editio Coloniensis 27/2 (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 2008), a. 3.4.1, p. 519–p. 521. In the latter text, Albert follows Anselm in distinguishing freedom from the *flexibilitas in bonum et malum*, which is based here on an objection from Aristotle: *Praeterea, in primo Metaphysicae habetur quod dicimus hominem liberum, quia causa sui est tantum; ergo videtur quod libertas sic deberet determinari secundum rationem illam, scilicet quod libertas arbitrii in hoc est quod ipsum causa sui est in actibus* (p. 520).

real problem the question that Albert dodges successfully, that is, whether the first principle is free to do something or its very opposite?

5. We may conclude that Albert introduces necessity into the concept of freedom that he attributes to the first principle, and thus subscribes to the Platonic tradition of absolute freedom that originates in *Enneads* VI.8. Albert subsequently builds on this tradition when he derives from the freedom of the first principle that it has will and is omnipotent, since its freedom requires neither deliberation, as we have seen, nor an explicit appetite for things absent.<sup>10</sup>

Against this, however, some object subtly by saying that everything that has in itself the principle of its action and that is totally free, is willing. But the first has in the highest sense in itself the principle of its action and is totally free. Therefore, the first is willing in the highest sense.<sup>11</sup>

The association of these *quidam* with the position of Plato, as well as the identification of the will as a free cause of its actions with *Boethius sequens Platonem*,<sup>12</sup> makes clear that Albert has identified a Platonic conception of absolute freedom. This freedom is compatible with the freedom of choice that he relates to Aristotle only on the condition of removing the imperfection that is inherent to the freedom of choice.

6. Albert's careful, and perhaps even cautious, discussion on the freedom of the first principle is rearranged by his pupil Ulrich of Strassburg in *De summo bono* IV.1.4, which reproduces the same series of attributes: *De primi principii libertate, voluntate et omnipotentia*. Ulrich interprets Albert's approach as attributing three different concepts of freedom to the first principle. In his reconstruction, Ulrich imposes a hierarchy among these concepts.

The first concept is the freedom of dependency from a cause, which is proved by literal quotations from the second section in Albert's discussion. Ulrich recognizes the complexity in Albert, and even smooths out the text, when he characterizes the freedom of the first principle.

10 Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, lib. 1, tr. 3, c. 2, p. 37, l. 50–55.

11 Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, lib. 1, tr. 3, c. 2, p. 37, l. 26–30: *Contra hoc autem quidam subtilissime obiciunt dicentes, quod omne quod in seipso habet suae actionis principium et omnino liberum est, volens est. Primum autem maxime in seipso habet suae actionis principium et omnino liberum est. Ergo primum maxime volens est.*

12 Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, lib. 1, tr. 3, c. 2, p. 37, l. 69–70.

And this first principle is free both in itself and in its action. (B1)

That the first principle is free in itself follows from the compatibility of this freedom with the necessity of immutability, which Ulrich had already affirmed of the first principle. Hence, what was dialectically mediated in Albert, is in Ulrich transformed into a straightforward assertion.

The freedom of the first principle (*haec libertas*) is compatible with the necessity proper to it alone (*haec necessitas*), since it is *causa sui*. This freedom is compatible with the necessity of immutability, but not with the necessity of dependence on another cause, which is ruled out by the necessity of immutability.

Since Ulrich proceeds to show that there exists no genus of cause according to which the first principle is dependent and necessitated in its action, we can register two interesting deviations from Albert's text: Ulrich extends the discussion of "freedom from inevitability" with a reflection on the essences of things, and he omits the dimension of ethical freedom which fueled Albert's analysis of "the necessity of position" (B8 and 10).

A second type of freedom can be discerned in the freedom to act and not to act, which was the core of Albert's answer to objections 3–5 and which Ulrich associates, silently quoting the *Liber de causis*, with the magnificence and self-sufficient generosity ascribed to the first principle by the Peripatetics (B24).

From this freedom Ulrich distinguishes a third type, which is the freedom of what is *causa sui*, and which he ascribes explicitly to Aristotle, to which a short summary of Albert's explanation is added (B25–26). Only the ascription of *liberum* and *liberissimum* remains; the *libertati superpositum* is removed.

We may conclude, therefore, that Ulrich does more than simply rearrange Albert's argument about the freedom of the first principle. Albert's argument is transformed into a hierarchy of three concepts of freedom. In this way, Ulrich stresses the compatibility of freedom and necessity. He also emphasizes their compatibility with the freedom to act and not to act. Finally, the Aristotelian concept of freedom, which was at the basis of Albert's approach and which still tacitly informs Ulrich's description of the first type of freedom, is reduced to a mere afterthought.

The conception of freedom that slowly starts to emerge in Ulrich, becomes fully manifest in Berthold of Moosburg's commentary on the *Elements of Theology*.

7. Berthold employs Ulrich's discussion of the freedom of the first principle in the commentary on Proposition 23 of the *Elements of Theology*:

All that is unparticipated produces out of itself the participated; and all participated substances are linked by upward tension to existences not participated.<sup>13</sup>

It is interesting to observe which passage Berthold selected to insert the discussion on freedom in his commentary. In Proposition 23, Proclus introduces the notion of the unparticipated as part of the triad ἀμέθεκτον – μετεχόμενον – μετέχον (*imparticipatum, participatum, participans*) – a central triad in Proclus' philosophy. In establishing the hierarchy of the unparticipated, the participated, and the participating, Proclus first differentiates between the unparticipated and the participated, before projecting the hierarchy of the participated (superior) and the participating (inferior) upon the unparticipated (superior) and the participated (inferior) in Proposition 24. The differentiation between the unparticipated and the participated in Proclus responds to Plato's self-criticism regarding the doctrine of participation in the *Parmenides*. Its mediation of immanence and transcendence is codified in Proposition 23. Since it would be derogatory to the perfection of the unparticipated if it were to remain ungenerative, the unparticipated must give something of itself; but since it is both common to all that can participate and identical for all, it must be prior to all and must be unparticipated.

Proclus here elaborates a structure that applies to the entire hierarchy that links the One, Intellect, Soul, and Nature. Following this reasoning, Berthold infers that "the unparticipated" applies to the One-Good as well. In his commentary, Berthold first identifies the possible referents of the term "the unparticipated" before specifying the meaning of the term in the proposition. It is at this stage that he deals with the very modes of freedom which Albert and Ulrich ascribed to the first principle. Berthold distinguishes three modes according to which *imparticipatum* is said: *communiter, proprie, and magis proprie*. The commonly accepted meaning applies to every intellectual nature, the proper meaning to every first and principal being of an order, and the most proper meaning to the One-Good alone, which has neither superiors nor inferiors to which it would be related by participation.

Proposition 23, Berthold observes, is concerned with *imparticipatum* taken in the second sense (*proprie*):

13 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 23: Πάν τὸ ἀμέθεκτον ὑφίστησιν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὰ μετεχόμενα, καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ μετεχόμεναι ὑποστάσεις εἰς ἀμεθέκτους ὑπάρξεις ἀνατείνονται. In its Latin translation: *Omne imparticipatum instituit a se ipso participata, et omnes participatae hypostases ad imparticipatas essentias eriguntur.*



In the other way, namely in a proper sense, “unparticipated” refers to everything that is first and principally a being according to each order, total or partial, viz. that either is simply and absolutely first (the good and the one) or with respect to some determinate and partial order only (for example, the first virtue, the first being, and so on). What is such, is not partially taken [i.e., *participatum* as *quasi partialiter captum*, WG] from inferiors, since it is the most absolute and superperfect in its kind, which as such is “by itself” (*sui gratia*) and thus “being by itself” (*sui ipsius ens*), and this free from every mode of contraction, by which its kind is limited, as will be said immediately below. And thus it is before everything whatsoever that is contracted in its intention, as the truly separate and exempt, for the absolute is always prior and more eminent than the contracted; and thus it is called “unparticipated”, that is not partially taken, either from the whole of its order simultaneously or from something of its order, since it is common to all and before all of which it is exempt. In this sense “unparticipated” is understood in the present proposition.<sup>14</sup>

The “unparticipated” applies to every *maneries entium*, and denotes the most absolute and perfect mode of being within each order, which is *sui gratia* and *sui ipsius ens* – that is, the unparticipated is free from all contraction and is transcendent, although it does not necessarily refer only the One-Good itself, which is unparticipated in the sense that “it has its own essence only from itself, since it does not depend from anything else” (“*proprium essentiam non habeat nisi ex se, cum non pendeat ex alio*”).

8. Having established the referent of the term *imparticipatum*, Berthold proceeds to detail its meaning and defines the unparticipated in the following way:

<sup>14</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), 23A, p. 112, l. 24–p. 113, l. 37: *Alio modo, scilicet proprie, dicitur imparticipatum omne, quod est prime et principaliter ens secundum unumquemque ordinem, et hoc sive totalem sive partialem, hoc est sive sit simpliciter et absolute prime, puta bonum et unum, sive respectu alicuius determinati et partialis ordinis solum, puta prime virtus, prime ens et huiusmodi. Omne enim tale non est partialiter captum ab inferioribus, cum sit absolutissimum et superperfectissimum in sua manerie, quod in quantum huiusmodi est sui gratia et sic sui ipsius ens, et hoc liberum ab omni modo contractionis, quibus habet sua maneries limitari, ut statim infra dicitur. Et sic est ante omnia qualitercumque in sua intentione contracta sicut vere separatum et exemptum, cum semper absolutum prius et eminentius sit contracto; et sic dicitur imparticipatum, id est non partialiter captum, et hoc sive a toto suo ordine simul sive ab aliquo ipsius ordinis, cum sit commune omnium et ante omnia, a quibus est exemptum. Et sic accipitur in proposito elemento.*

Indeed, the unparticipated, such as it is taken here, according to its essential description, is (i.) a thing, (ii.) existing by itself, (iii.) having from itself and in itself a superplenitude of its own goodness or (iv.) of an intention by itself in whatsoever way originally instituted.<sup>15</sup>

Before we focus on the second condition, “existing by itself”, I want to make two remarks on the other aspects of this description, which aims to give a real definition (*secundum quid rei*) instead of a merely nominal one (*secundum quid nominis*).

First, Berthold comments on the concept of *res* with the remark:

In this description, “thing” is taken generically, not insofar as it derives grammatically from “I think, you think”, but from “solidity”, since the unparticipated is something solid in nature.<sup>16</sup>

Although this distinction between *res a reor, reris* and *res a ratitudine* is related in a privileged way to the first *Quodlibet* (1276) of Henry of Ghent, it is also found in Bonaventure and Aquinas.<sup>17</sup> If I highlight this term, it is because it is indicative of the central place accorded to the idea of an essential order, both here and in the Avicennian tradition leading up to Scotus.

Secondly, the further elements – which entail a subdivision between the *simpliciter imparticipabile*, which is the first One and Good, and the *imparticipabile* in a determinate intention<sup>18</sup> – refer back, as Berthold notes (*sicut expositum est super 9*), to the exposition on Proposition 9, about what is self-sufficient (*autarkes*) according to substance or operation – I will come back to this shortly.

As for the second condition of the *imparticipatum* mentioned already (*sui ipsius existens*), Berthold interprets this in terms of what is free both in itself and in its action, as he explains in agreement with Ulrich:

15 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 23B, p. 113, l. 59–61: *Sane imparticipatum, prout hic sumitur, secundum quid rei est res sui ipsius existens habens a se ipsa et in se ipsa superplenitudinem propriae bonitatis seu intentionis a se qualitercumque originaliter institutae.*

16 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 23B, p. 113, l. 62–64: *In ista descriptione res accipitur pro genere, non prout grammaticae descendit a reor, reris, sed a ratitudine, cum imparticipatum sit quid ratum in natura.*

17 See P. Porro, “*Res a reor, reris / res a ratitudine. Autour d’Henri de Gand*”, in I. Atucha, D. Calma, C. König-Pralong, I. Zavattero (eds), *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach* (Porto / Turnhout: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2011), p. 617–628.

18 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160–183*, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 163A, p. 24, l. 12–22.

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**Ulrich****Berthold**

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And this first principle is free both in itself and in its action. (B<sub>1</sub>)

I say, however, “existent by itself”, in order that it is understood to be free both in itself and in its action. (C<sub>1</sub>)

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What is free in itself is described by Berthold in accordance with Ulrich along the four modes of freedom, in which the necessary dependence from other causes is excluded (C<sub>6–11</sub>).

But whereas Ulrich related freedom in action to Albert’s discussion of *agere et non agere* (B<sub>20</sub>), Berthold insists on the notion of what acts *per esse* (C<sub>12</sub>) which was part of the formal or essential characteristic of freedom in Ulrich and Berthold alike.

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**Ulrich****Berthold**

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And this freedom is according to the simplicity by which something has a form, not as a part of itself – rather it is its essence and is its freedom and is whatever it has. For, indeed, it acts whatever it acts by its essence, and yet it acts freely, for its essence is its freedom and free will, and this freedom is in the first principle. And therefore the case of what acts by its essence, and the case of what acts naturally by the essence of its form, like fire necessarily burns and the like, are not the same (B<sub>9</sub>)

Just like every unparticipated has freedom in itself, insofar as it is “being by itself” and “for its own sake”, in the same way it has freedom in action, since it acts by its being, and thus the action that remains in it is one with their essence. (C<sub>12</sub>)

And this is rooted in simplicity, either in all ways and absolutely or respectively. For thus each simple principle is its freedom, by which it is completely what it is, and completely acts what it acts, and yet it acts freely, since its essence is its freedom. (C<sub>9</sub>)

I take this to be the essence of what I call here a Platonic concept of freedom.

9. Now what about Aristotle? What happened to the Aristotelian definition of freedom, which was central for Albert and became a sort of appendix for Ulrich? It is eliminated by Berthold. And not only the reference to Aristotle

has disappeared, the vocabulary itself is replaced: where Ulrich has *causa sui*, Berthold has *gratia sui* or *sui ipsius existens*. This is no mere coincidence. In fact, Berthold considers the concept of a *causa sui* to be self-refuting, as is clear from assertions like “illud esset causa sui ipsius, quod est impossibile” and the recurring reference in the *Expositio* to the eighth proposition of Nicholas of Amiens’ *De arte fidei*, which asserts that *nihil est causa sui*. Here, we return to the commentary on Proposition 9 of Proclus, where Berthold explains the “sufficiens bonum as quod habet a se ipso et in se ipso plenitudinem propriae bonitatis”. Berthold argues that *a se ipso* must be understood in respect to formal causality and not efficient causality:

But I say “by itself” formally, not efficiently, since by way of an efficient cause nothing begets itself in order to exist, according to Augustine. The author of *De arte fidei* alludes to this in prop. 3: “Nothing composed itself or brought itself into being,” and prop. 8: “Nothing is cause of itself,” although formally it both proceeds from itself and converts to itself.<sup>19</sup>

For Berthold, from the perspective of efficient causality, the notion of *causa sui* is self-contradictory. It can, however, be given an acceptable interpretation in terms of formal and essential causality: freedom is essential self-constitution.

## Appendix

A = Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, ed. W. Fauser, Editio Coloniensis 17/2 (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), lib. I, tr. 3, c. 1, p. 35, l. 10–p. 36, l. 60.

B = Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 1–2,7*, ed. S. Pieperhoff (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), lib. IV, tr. 1, c. 4, p. 23, l. 2–p. 24, l. 39.

19 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), 9B, p. 170, l. 108–112: *Dico autem a se ipso formaliter, non efficienter, quia causaliter effective nihil gignit se ipsum, ut sit, secundum Augustinum De Trinitate I cap. 1, cui alludit auctor De articulis fidei libro I prop. 3: “Nihil se ipsum composuit aut ad esse perduxit” et 8: “Nihil est causa sui”, licet formaliter et procedat a se ipso et convertatur ad se ipsum*. For further objections to the expression *causa sui* see *Expositio*, 7E, p. 152, l. 502–508; *Expositio*, 18D, p. 53, l. 335–341; *Expositio*, 21B, p. 82, l. 212–219; *Expositio*, 35B, p. 4, l. 50–59; 38A, p. 27, l. 16–22; *Expositio* 150D, p. 121, l. 76–78. Significantly, at *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 35–65*, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001), 52A, p. 119, l. 80, where Berthold for once uses the expression non-critically, it is in the midst of a quotation from Albert the Great.

C = Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), 23B, p. 113, l. 65–p. 115, l. 107.

A	B	C
1 Primum etiam principium ad agendum omnimodo liberum est.	Liberum etiam est hic primum principium tam in se quam in actione.	Dico autem sui ipsius existens, ut intelligatur esse liberum tam in se quam in actione sua.
2	In se quidem liberum est, quia haec libertas non tollit necessitatem immutabilitatis, qualiter primum principium solum esse necessarium supra probavimus, cum haec necessitas maxime faciat ipsum esse sui causa in causando eo, quod non convenit nisi primae causae,	In se quidem omne imparticipatum liberum est, quia haec libertas non tollit necessitatem immutabilitatis, qualiter omnis per se perfecta vel superperfecta monas est immutabilis, cum haec necessitas maxime faciat ipsum esse sui gratia eo, quod non conveniat nisi prime et principaliter enti, et hoc vel quod tale est simpliciter et absolute vel in respectu determinati ordinis per praemissam.
3 Dicit enim Aristoteles in 1 <i>Philosophiae Primae</i> quod 'liberum dicimus, qui causa sui est'.		
4 Cum ergo primum principium maxime sui causa sit in agendo, liberrimum in actione est nec tantum liberum, sed etiam libertati superpositum. Dominium enim habet in actione sua.		

*(cont.)*

A	B	C
<p>Dominus enim est primus omnium suorum actuum. Si enim homo dominus est suorum actuum, cum causa suorum actuum in ipso est, multo magis primus omnium dominus est, qui sibi ipsi in omni actione causa est.</p>		
<p>5 Adhuc autem, cum libertas quattuor modis dicitur, scilicet ab obligatione, a coactione, ab inevitabilitate et a necessitate positionis, primum principium omni modo liberum est.</p>	<p>sed tollit necessitatem dependentiae ad aliquam causam, quae quattuor modis dicitur secundum quattuor genera causarum.</p>	<p>Tollit autem haec libertas necessitatem dependentiae ad aliquam causam, quae necessitas quattuor modis dicitur secundum quattuor genera causarum.</p>
<p>6 Libertas enim ab obligatione est ad effectum causae materialis. Obligatio enim per materiam est. Sicut homo obligatur ad necessitatem comedendi, bibendi, dormiendi. A quibus omnibus esset liber, si immaterialis esset.</p>	<p>Est enim libertas ab obligatione, quae obligatio est per materiam, sicut homo obligatur per hoc, quod materialis est, ad necessitatem comedendi, dormiendi et huiusmodi. Libertas ergo haec est per immaterialitatem.</p>	<p>Est enim necessitas obligationis, quae est vel per materiam proprie dictam, sicut generatum obligatur per materiam ad corruptionem, vel per materiam communiter dictam, qualis est corpus subiectum in caelo, ad quod obligatur anima totalis, cum inter ea secundum quosdam sit mutua dependentia ita, quod, si unum eorum non esset, nec reliquum, vel communissime dictam quasi extenso nomine materiae, sicut</p>

*(cont.)*

A	B	C
<p>7 Necessitas autem coactionis per causam efficientem est. Sicut necessitatem habet homo, quod comburatur, si in igne ponatur; vel ut non moveatur, si vinculetur.</p>	<p>Alia est libertas a coactione, quae coactio est per causam efficientem, sicut vinculus necesse habet non ire, et libertas haec est per virtutis perfectionem, quae nihil extrinsecum potest recipere.</p>	<p>subiecta intentionum in aliis existentium, ad quae obligantur in existentia propter essentialem eorum ad invicem dependentiam, qua unum sine alio subsistere non valeret. Et sic solum illud, quod in se ipso est sine dependentia ad quodcumque materiale, liberum est quoad iam dictam libertatem, quae est immunitas ab obligatione. Et sic est quadruplex libertas ab obligatione, scilicet per immaterialitatem et independentiam ad corpus subiectum et in se ipso esse et non in alio secundum intentionem differente et sic esse illimitatum.</p> <p>Est secundo libertas a coactione, quae est per causam efficientem seu producentem. Et hoc vel per causam simpliciter omnium productivam, quae est prime bonum, vel per eam, quae efficit aliquam multitudinem determinatam, ut sunt unitates, non ut sunt intra ordinem unialem conclusae – sic enim cadunt a dicta libertate –, sed ut sunt prime et principaliter entia ordinum suorum.</p>

(cont.)

	A	B	C
8	Necessitas inevitabilitatis a causa formali est. Sicut necesse habet homo non volare, quia pennas naturaliter non habet insitas; et necesse habet hominem esse et humana facere propter formam humanitatis.	Tertia libertas est ab inevitabilitate, quae inevitabilitas est per formalem causam, sicut homo necessario facit humana propter formam humanitatis,	Est et tertio libertas ab inevitabilitate, quae est per causam formalem.
9		et haec libertas est per simplicitatem, quae aliquid formam non habet partem sui, sed est ipsa sua quiditas et est, quidquid habet. Illud enim operatur quidem per essentiam suam, quidquid agit, et tamen agit libere, quia sua essentia est sua libertas et libera voluntas, et hoc est in primo principio. Et ideo non est simile de hoc agente per essentiam et de naturalibus agentibus per essentiam suae formae, sicut ignis necessario comburit et similia.	Et haec radicitur in simplicitate, et hoc vel omnimoda et absoluta vel in respectiva. Sic enim quodlibet simplicium est sua libertas, quae se toto est, quod est, et se toto agit, quod agit, et tamen agit libere, quia essentia sua est sua libertas.
10	Necessitas autem positionis secundum causam finalem est. Sicut necesse habet quis lucrari, si velit ditari; vel secari, si velit	Quarta libertas est a necessitate positionis, quae necessitas est per causam finalem, sicut necesse est hunc secari, si debet curari.	Est quarto libertas a necessitate positionis, quae est per causam finalem, et quia imparticipata, sicut nec habent principium in quantum imparticipata, cum ipsa



(cont.)

A	B	C
<p>sanari. Posito enim fine aliquo si debeat aliquis consequi finem, necesse est studere ad ea quae sunt ad finem consequendum. Sicut Aristoteles dicit, quod 'ad habendum virtutem moralem necesse est habere prudentiam eo quod prudentia inquit et eligit ea quae faciunt ad finem moralem virtutis, cum ipsa moralis virtus non nisi ut natura tendat in finem nihil eorum considerans quae faciunt ad sui finis consecutionem'.</p>	<p>Cum ergo primum ad nullam penitus causam habeat dependentiam, constat, quod ab omni necessitate liber est.</p> <p>Cum ergo primum principium ad nullam causam habeat dependentiam, patet, quod ipsum in se omnino liberum est.</p>	<p>sint principia, sic etiam non habent finem, cum quodlibet sit finis, et hoc iterum vel simpliciter et absolute vel respectu determinatae maneriei.</p>
<p>11 Cum igitur primus ad nullam penitus causam habeat dependentiam, constat, quod ab omni necessitate liber est.</p> <p>12 Liberrimus ergo est primus tam in se quam in actione.</p>		<p>Sicut autem omne imparticipatum habet libertatem in se, prout est sui ipsius ens et sui gratia, ita consimiliter habet libertatem in actione, cum agat per esse, et sic actio intra manens est unum cum essentia eorum.</p>

*(cont.)*

- | A  | B  | C |
|----|--|---|
| 13 | (1) Contra hoc tamen quidam nituntur opponere per ea quae antehabita sunt. Habitum est enim, quod primum necesse est esse omnino et omnimode. Et quod est omnimode necesse, nullo modo videtur esse liberum.   |   |
| 14 | (2) Adhuc autem, habitum est quod primum non nisi per essentiam agit, quia aliter non esset primum, si ageret vel per accidens vel per aliquid essentiae additum vel etiam per aliud. Quod autem per essentiam agit, de necessitate agit, sicut lux lucet per necessitatem essentiae.    |   |
| 15 | (3) Adhuc autem, liberum est, in qua est agere et non agere. Si autem dicatur in primo esse agere et non agere, necesse est, ut concedatur primum aliter et aliter se habere. Hoc autem impossibile est, cum omnino sit immutabile, ut in antehabitis probatum est. Ergo non est in ipso |   |

*(cont.)*

A	B	C
<p>agere et non agere. Necesse est ergo ipsum agere. Et sic necessi- tati subiacet et non libertati.</p>		
16	<p>(4) Adhuc, nobilius est semper agere quam aliquando agere et aliquando non agere. Primo autem convenit semper agere, quia omne nobilius convenit ei. Cui autem convenit semper agere, de necessitate agit. Necessitati ergo subia- cet et non libertati, ut videtur.</p>	
17	<p>(5) Adhuc, in secundis quaecumque semper agunt et necessita- tem habent in agendo, meliora sunt quam ea quae quandoque agunt et quandoque non agunt. Sicut caelestia meliora dicimus quam naturalia generabilia et corruptibilia et natura- lia meliora fortuitis eo quod caelestia semper et de necessitate agunt, naturalia frequenter, fortuita autem raro. Videtur ergo, quod primi sit de necessi- tate agere et non de libertate.</p>	

*(cont.)*


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A	B	C
18	(1)	Ad haec autem et similia facile responderi potest, scilicet quod primum omni modo necesse est esse. Sed non propter hoc tollitur ab eo libertas. Necessitas enim, quae est per dependentiam ad aliquam causam, tollitur a primo. Sed propter hoc non aufertur libertas, quin in ipso sit causa suae actionis.
19	(2)	Similiter, per hoc quod dicitur, quod per essentiam agit, non potest probari, quod per necessitatem agat, nisi illa essentia subiaceat necessitati. Et similiter per sequens, quamvis sit simplicissimum, non concluditur, quod aliquam in agendo patiatur necessitatem. Simplicissimum enim liberrimum est inter omnia eo quod ipsum sibi ipsi causa est in omnibus.

(cont.)

A	B	C
<p>20 (3) Adhuc autem, per hoc quod dicitur, quod non sit in ipso agere et non agere, nihil probatur. Hoc enim dupliciter dicitur. Non esse enim in aliquo agere et non agere potest esse per obligationem ad unum et impossibilitatem ad alterum. Alio modo potest esse per libertatem ad unum et ad alterum. Sed quia melius est esse unum quam alterum, propter hoc non transponitur de uno in alterum. Sicut in casto est caste agere et non caste, et in liberali dare et non dare. Sed quia melius est caste agere et liberaliter dare quam non caste agere et avaro retinere, ideo non transponitur castus et liberalis in oppositum suae actionis. Et sic agere et non agere quidem est in primo, sed non potest non agere, quia melius est emitte-          re bonitates quam retinere, et minimum inconueniens in primo impossibile est.</p>	<p>Est etiam liberum ad agendum et non agendum ita, quod ad neutrum habet obligationem nec impossibilitatem ad alterum, sed habens libertatem ad utrumque non transponitur de uno in alterum, quia melius est esse unum quam alterum, sicut "homo sanctus in sapientia manet sicut sol", <i>Eccli.</i> 27. Cum tamen liber sit ad hoc et ad oppositum, sic enim in primo est agere et non agere, sed non potest non agere, quia melius est emitte-          re bonitates quam inuidiose retinere</p>	

*(cont.)*

A	B	C
21	<p>(4) Ex hoc etiam patet responsio ad sequens: Tali enim modo semper agere nobilissimum est et multo nobilius quam aliquando agere et aliquando non agere. Sicut dicit Messahalla, quod motus caeli motus sapientis est eo quod sapientis uno modo est agere et semper et non per inconstantiam aliquando agere et aliquando non agere vel sic et aliter agere. Tali enim modo agit, quod per diversa disponitur. Quod non convenit primo.</p>	
22	<p>(5) Hoc etiam modo quaecumque secundorum semper agunt, ad intelligentiae actionem referuntur, quae uno et eodem se habet modo et uno et eodem modo desideratur a mobili. Et propter hoc illa nobiliora sunt quam ea quae frequenter vel raro agunt et a diversis ad diversa disponuntur. Non tamen propter hoc intelligentia alicui subiacet necessitati.</p>	

(cont.)

A	B	C
<p>23 Ex omnibus his colligitur, quod primum liberrimum est in omnibus suis tam in agendo quam in aliis eo quod ad nihil penitus habet dependentiam et sibi ipsi sufficiens causa est ad omnia et in omnibus.</p>		
<p>24 Propter quod etiam meliores Peripateticorum primum dixerunt esse largissimum secundum illam largitatis speciem, quae magnificentia vocatur. Hoc enim est, quando aliquis fluit optimis et non deficit propter hoc quod in optimis in seipso sufficientiam habet, per quam sibi et omnibus aliis sufficit abundanter.</p>	<p>propter quod etiam Avicenna et alii meliores Peripateticorum dicunt primum esse largissimum secundum illam speciem largitatis, quae est magnificentia, quia semper fluit optimis et non deficit eo, quod sibi sufficit et omnibus aliis.</p>	<p>Dico autem ipsum imparticipatum habere a se ipso, scilicet formaliter, et in se ipso essentialiter superplenitudinem.</p>
	<p>Primum ergo in hoc agere liberrimum est tam propter libertatem iam dictam quam etiam propter hoc, quod, ut dicit Philosophus in 1 <i>Metaphysicae</i>, liberum dicimus, quod causa sui est.</p>	

(cont.)

A	B	C
26	<p>Cum ergo primum principium maxime sui causa sit in agendo, liberrimum est in actione et per consequens dominium habet in actione sua, quia quilibet est dominus suorum actuum, cum causa ipsorum in ipso est.</p>	

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# Doppelte Providenz. Die Rezeption einer neuplatonischen Tradition bei Berthold von Moosburg

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In seiner Schrift *Zum ewigen Frieden* (1795) unterscheidet I. Kant zwischen der „gründenden Vorsehung“ (*providentia conditrix*) des Welturhebers, „sofern sie in den Anfang der Welt gelegt wird“, und der „waltenden Vorsehung“ (*providentia gubernatrix*), die diesen Anfang nach „allgemeinen Gesetzen der Zweckmäßigkeit“ erhalten soll.

Diese Unterscheidung einer doppelten Providenz hat eine lange Geschichte, der hier im Sinne einer Genealogie nachgegangen werden soll. In ihr spielt das Mittelalter eine herausragende Rolle, auf der Seite der Franziskaner – wie hier nur erwähnt werden kann – vor allem Alexander von Hales und die *Summa Halensis*, auf der Dominikanerseite vor allem Berthold von Moosburg und seine philosophischen Mitstreiter. Die folgenden Ausführungen haben zum Ziel, den mittelalterlichen Diskurs über das Thema der doppelten Providenz unserem Verständnis näher zu bringen und den neuplatonischen Ursprung dieser Idee offenzulegen.

## 1 Natürliche und willensmäßige Providenz

### 1.1 *Berthold von Moosburg*

Berthold von Moosburg hat seinen monumentalen Kommentar zur *Elementatio theologica* des Proklos von vorneherein unter die Differenz der doppelten Providenz, d.h. der *providentia naturalis* und der *providentia voluntaria* gestellt. Die natürliche und die willensmäßige Providenz sind zwei Gesichtspunkte, unter denen das göttliche Gute je verschieden betrachtet wird. Nach der Sichtweise der natürlichen Providenz werden so die „theologischen Elemente“, d.h. vor allem die metaphysischen Prinzipien und primordialen Ursachen sichtbar. Deswegen ist die Koordinierung dieser „Elemente“ der eigentlich thematische Stoff dieses proklischen Werkes, so daß sich auch der Name des

Werkes von selbst ergibt.<sup>1</sup> Genauer gesagt handelt es sich bei den „theologischen Elementen“ um die Sätze über Gott.<sup>2</sup> Diejenige Disziplin, die diese theologischen Sätze zum Gegenstand hat, heißt traditionell „Metaphysik“. Berthold lehnt diese aristotelische Bezeichnung (wie auch die „Erste Philosophie“) aufgrund ihrer engen naturphilosophischen Implikationen ab für das theologische Prinzipienwissen und damit auch für das Wissen von der natürlichen Providenz, von dem bei Proklos die Rede ist. Er zieht dafür die Begriffe des „supersapientialen Wissens“ oder der „divinalen Philosophie“ im Sinne Platons vor, die beide das „unvergleichbare Überragen“ über die aristotelische Metaphysik ausdrücken, die nur das *Ens in quantum ens* zum Gegenstand hat.<sup>3</sup>

Demgegenüber umfaßt die „Ordnung der willentlichen Providenz“ nicht das Wesen- und Naturhafte, sondern – mit den Worten Alberts des Großen – das Gnadenhafte bzw. das, was die göttlichen Gnadengaben partizipiert, das Hierarchische, Engel und Menschen, das mit freiem Willen Ausgestattete, Lohn und Strafe. Deswegen wird Dionysius der „Theologe“ der willensmäßigen Providenz genannt.<sup>4</sup> Es ist das Reich des Willens, um das es hier geht, daher der Name der Ordnung. Auch es ist ein *ordo divinus*, auch hier geht es um das göttliche Gute, nämlich in partizipierter Form.<sup>5</sup> Berthold kann deswegen beide Formen der Providenz auch als zwei Arten des „Hervorgangs“ (*processus*) begreifen, die natürliche als einen wesenhaften, die willentliche als einen partizipativen.<sup>6</sup> Das Wissen von dieser Ordnung der willentlichen Providenz ist und heißt bei Berthold genau wie das Wissen um die natürliche Providenz: „Theologie“, aber jetzt ist die Offenbarungstheologie gemeint. Beide Theologien, die philosophische Theologie Platons und die Offenbarungstheologie – deren Wissenschaftscharakter Berthold im *Praeambulum* seines Kommentars darzustellen sich bemüht – haben eine ganz ähnliche Struktur: Wie die

1 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 1–13*, hg.v. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), *Expositio tituli 1*, S.45, L.278–283; *Ex praedictis apparet, quod bonum divinum secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis est subiectum huius libri, quod exprimitur per li: ELEMENTATIO THEOLOGICA. [...] Materialis quidem subiectiva, quia in ipso tractatur per elementorum coordinationem de bono divino secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis; unde dicitur elementatio non qualiscumque, sed theologica, ad differentiam elementationis physicae, quam etiam iste auctor dicitur edidisse.*

2 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio tituli K*, S.47, L.365–366: *Auctor tamen vocat eas elementa theologica, id est propositiones, in quibus est sermo de divinis sive de Deo.*

3 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeambulum C*, S.65, L.422ff.; L, S.48, L.401ff.

4 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5B, S.116, L.104.

5 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 10A, S.179, L.88–180, L.112.

6 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, hg.v. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), 146B, S.90, L.19.

philosophische Theologie auf allgemeinsten Prinzipien beruht, die nicht bewiesen und nicht gewußt sind, sondern nur „glaubend“ hingenommen werden können – Berthold zählt zu ihnen neben dem Widerspruchsprinzip auch die Prinzipien der Vielheit und des Produktiven, die für die Stabilisierung der Existenz des Einen und des Guten notwendig sind –, so ist auch die Offenbarungstheologie auf nur geglaubte Prinzipien gegründet, eben auf die *articuli fidei Christianae*.<sup>7</sup>

Wie sich die beiden Theologien zueinander verhalten, ist nicht ganz einfach zu sagen, weil Berthold ihre Funktion nicht direkt gegenüber stellt. Wenn wir aber wissen könnten, wie sich die natürliche Providenz und die willensmäßige Providenz zueinander verhalten, dann würde auch das Verhältnis der beiden Theologien klar werden. Nun hat Berthold, wie weiter unten ausgeführt werden wird, die willensmäßige Providenz als eine „Ergänzung“, also als eine Vervollständigung eines Ganzen bezeichnet (s.u. S.340–342). Er hat damit einen Begriff ins Spiel gebracht, der als *terminus technicus* in den Erkenntnislehren seiner Zeit, besonders aber bei Heinrich von Gent und Dietrich von Freiberg, eine überragende Rolle spielt. Wird seine Bedeutung nicht erkannt, dann kann man dem Anspruch dieser Erkenntnislehren nicht gerecht werden. Das gilt nun auch hier: Wenn die willensmäßige Providenz eine „Ergänzung“ der natürlichen ist und wenn jener die Offenbarungstheologie, dieser aber die philosophische Theologie zugeordnet sein soll, dann muß die Offenbarungstheologie nach Berthold, aber auch nach Dietrich als eine „Ergänzung“ der philosophischen Theologie und damit der natürlichen Vernunft angesehen werden.<sup>8</sup>

7 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeambulum*, S.53, L.13–20: *Circa stabilitatem anitatis seu existentiae unius utitur quodam principio complexo, isto videlicet, multitudinem esse, sicut et stabiliendo anitatem boni utitur alio principio, scilicet productivum esse. Ista duo principia, quibus totius istius philosophiae structura sicut propriis fundamentis innititur, auctor supponit [...] nullo modo vel intellecta vel scita [...] sed solum credita, sicut et theologia, quae est de bono divino secundum ordinem providentiae voluntariae, fundatur in principiis creditis, quae sunt articuli fidei Christianae.* Den Begriff der *anitas*, d.h. der „Obheit“, also der Existenz, den Berthold auch der *quiditas*, also der Essenz gegenüberstellt (*Praeambulum C*, S.68, L.556), dürfte Berthold von Avicenna oder Meister Eckhart kennengelernt haben.

8 Man kann F. Retucci nur zustimmen, wenn sie Bertholds Verdienste um die Stärkung der natürlichen Vernunft gegenüber Thomas und der übrigen Scholastik herausstellt. Allerdings darf das nicht zu der falschen Meinung führen, als komme die Offenbarungstheologie im Werk Bertholds gar nicht vor oder habe gar keine Funktion. Cf. „*Magister Thomas Anglicus Minor*. Eine neue Quelle der *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli* Bertholds von Moosburg – das ungedruckte *Sapientiale* des Franziskaners Thomas von York“, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio – Prop. 136–159*, s.XXIII–XXXIX. Ähnliches gilt auch im Hinblick auf Dietrichs Werk, wie schon *De subiecto theologiae* zeigt. Wenn L. Sturlese in *Homo divinus* (S.152) sagt, daß an keiner Stelle des Bertholdschen Werkes „von Sakramenten, Kirche, Offenbarung, guten Werken und Glaube die Rede“ sei, so ist man auf den ersten Blick geneigt,

Und um es ganz klar auszudrücken: „Complementum“ und alle Ableitungen dieses Wortstammes bezeichnen nicht etwa, wie die in meinen beiden genannten Aufsätzen angeführten Belege zeigen (s.u. Anm.33), ein gegenseitiges Ergänzen, sondern eindeutig ein einseitiges: Die Offenbarungstheologie ist nach Dietrich und Berthold die Ergänzung der natürlichen Vernunft, nicht umgekehrt. Das bedeutet, daß die Offenbarungstheologie eine Hilfestellung innehat, nicht den Primat, aber auch nicht gleichrangig ist mit der supersapientalen Metaphysik, sondern ihr untergeordnet. Bei allem Respekt vor den Intellekttheorien der beiden Denker (Dietrich und Berthold) ist diese Umkehrung des Ancilla-Verhältnisses, diese intellektuelle Revolution, die eigentliche Errungenschaft ihrer Philosophie, das einmalig Große innerhalb der mittelalterlichen Philosophie. Die heutige Theologie, besonders die katholische kirchlich verfaßte, die im Sinne der *providentia specialis* sich auf partikuläre Prinzipien stützt, täte gut daran, sich (im Sinne Dietrichs und Bertholds) ihrer dienenden Funktion gegenüber der natürlichen, allgemeinen Vernunft, die auf universalen Prinzipien beruht, zu besinnen und auf den Primatsanspruch in Leben und Wissenschaft zu verzichten.

Beide Ordnungen, die der natürlichen und der willensmäßigen Providenz, sind göttliche Ordnungen, sie sind auch beide kausale Ordnungen,<sup>9</sup> wenn gleich die willensmäßige nur im übertragenen Sinne. Beide Ordnungen unterscheiden sich dadurch, daß – wie schon Albert der Große gesagt hatte – erstere eine Wesensordnung ist, die zweite aber eine durch Partizipation an den göttlichen Gnadengaben begründete. Die natürliche Providenz ist das Reich des Autarken, die willensmäßige dagegen das Reich des Hierarchischen.<sup>10</sup>

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ihm unumwunden zuzustimmen, auf den zweiten nur noch zögerlich: Von „Offenbarung“ ist tatsächlich nicht die Rede, wohl aber von *articuli fidei*, von „guten Werken“ auch nicht, wohl aber von Lohn und Strafe (bes. im Zusammenhang mit der *providentia voluntaria*), vom Glauben auch nicht, aber immerhin weiß Berthold, von der „Wissenschaft“ (*scientia*) den „Glauben“ (*fides*) abzuheben und zeigt darüber hinaus, daß er mit allen Wassern der zeitgenössischen Terminologie um „Gewißheit“ und „Evidenz“ gewaschen ist (cf. Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeambulum* B, S.60, L.247–264). Zur Unterscheidung von philosophischer Theologie und Offenbarungstheologie bei Berthold s. W. Goris, „Das Gute als Ersterkanntes bei Berthold von Moosburg“, in W. Goris (Hg.), *Die Metaphysik und das Gute. Aufsätze zu ihrem Verhältnis in Antike und Mittelalter. Jan A. Aertsen zu Ehren* (Leuven: Peeters, 1999), S.143–145.

9 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, hg.v. L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), 21A, S.77, L.47–49: *Ordo etiam causalis, qui est secundum originem extra manantem, est duplex, quia aut secundum providentiam naturalem aut voluntariam secundum distinctionem Augustini VIII Super Genesisim ad litteram.*

10 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 10A, S.179, L.88–180, L.112, bes. S. 179, L.99–102: *Ex praedictis apparet differentia inter antarkiam et hierarchiam, quia antarkia est ordo divinus*

Beide Ordnungen stellen auch Ganzheiten dar, die eine je verschiedene Formbestimmtheit haben. Die Ordnung der natürlichen Providenz ist ein Ganzes durch eine „wesensmäßige Verknüpfung oder Verbindung (...), der notwendig eine Formbestimmtheit durch den wesentlichen Einfluß eines auf ein anderes folgt“.<sup>11</sup> Es liegt in der natürlichen Providenz als einer Ordnung und Verbindung von wesentlichen Ursachen begründet, daß sie in eine dreifache Kraft oder Macht unterteilt wird: In die schöpferische, die später bei Kant als *providentia conditrix* wieder auftaucht, in die zusammenhaltende und in die (um das Heil) sorgende bzw. bewahrende. Berthold beruft sich für diese Unterteilung auf Johannes Damascenus.<sup>12</sup> Auch Alexander von Hales hat sie in dieser Weise aufgenommen.<sup>13</sup>

Auch die Ordnung der willensmäßigen Providenz ist ein Ganzes, allerdings gemäß der Partizipation an einem höheren Licht. In dieser Ordnung gibt es die Weitergabe des Lichtes von Höherstehenden an die Niedrigeren, denn hier gibt es keine *causa essentialis*. Und mögen hier auch intellektuelle

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*secundum condiciones supra positas in descriptione emanans a Deo iuxta dispositionem providentiae naturalis; hierarchia vero est ordo divinus emanans a Deo iuxta dispositionem providentiae voluntariae.*

11 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 145B, S.83, L.47.

12 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141A, S.45, L.25–27: *Verum, quia in naturali providentia est ordo et connexio causarum essentialium et substantialium, ideo subdividitur in conditivam, contentivam et provisivam.* Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141A, S.46, L.35–37: *Etenim generatio nostra conditricis eius virtutis est, et permanentia contentivae eius est virtutis, et gubernatio et salus provisivae eius est virtutis.* Cf. Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108–135*, hg.v. F. Retucci (Hamburg, Meiner, 2011) 121H, S.108, L.110–112: *Verum, quia omne, quod est ratio producendi, qua aliquid potest se ipsum exserere sua causalitate et fecunditate secundum triplicem providentiam, scilicet conditivam, contentivam et conservativam, est et dicitur virtus sive potentia, qua ipsum providens praehabet, praecomprehendit et praeobinet omnia, quibus providet, necessarium est in omni divino per essentialiam esse potentiam sive virtutem [...].* Die Dreiteilung scheint schon bei Proklos vorweggenommen zu sein. Cf. Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, hg.v. H.-D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1968) I, S.123: τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὴν πατριαν ἀφομοιοῦνται καὶ ἔστι ποιητικά <καὶ> φρουρητικά καὶ συνεκτικά τὰ τοιαῦτα γένη τῶν θεῶν καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ συνέχειν καὶ τὸ φρουρεῖν τῇ τοῦ πέρατος αἰτία προσήκει. Cf. auch Proclus, *Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon*, I, hg.v. A.-Ph. Segonds (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2003), S.45–46: οὐχ ὅτι προνοητικός ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔρως καὶ σωστικός τῶν ἐρωμένων καὶ τελειωτικός αὐτῶν καὶ συνεκτικός.

13 Alexander von Hales, *Summa universis theologiae*, ed. Quaracchi (Roma: Coll. S. Bonaventurae, 1924–1948), I, p. 1, inq. 1, tr. 5, s. 2, q. 3, tit. 1, c. 7, a. 1, n. 208, S.301: *Providentia aliquando accipitur communiter, et sic pertinet ad virtutem conditivam et contentivam et provisivam: secundum hoc res ab ipsa sunt, permanent et gubernantur; et sic accipitur a Boethio, in libro Consolationis, cum determinat de providentia per comparationem ad fatum.*

Substanzen ihren Platz haben, so ist „dennoch keine von ihnen ein *intellectus per essentiam*“.<sup>14</sup>

Gegenstand der natürlichen Providenz Gottes ist die natürliche Ordnung der Ursachen, d.h. – im Sinne Eriugenas ausgedrückt – der primordialen Ursachen, also derer, die die Sorge Gottes „unmittelbar“ erfahren, während in der willensmäßigen Providenz die Sorge Gottes „auf eigene Weise“ sich vollzieht, nämlich durch Partizipation an der Güte Gottes.<sup>15</sup> Die providentielle göttliche Sorge gilt also zuerst den „Göttern“, d.i. den übersubstantiellen Engeln. Berthold beruft sich in diesem Zusammenhang auf die Etymologie, sowohl auf die griechische wie die lateinische: Denn *pronoia* ist das vor dem Nous, und *providentia* meint die Tätigkeit des Provisors.<sup>16</sup> Was die Etymologie des griechischen Ausdrucks angeht, so übernimmt er offenbar eine weitverbreitete neuplatonische Ansicht.<sup>17</sup> Sie gibt der neuplatonischen Überzeugung Ausdruck, daß die Providenz die Sache Gottes ist, nicht des Geistes.<sup>18</sup>

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- 14 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 145B, S.83, L.47–58: [...] *cum quidam sit totalis per essentialem colligationem seu connexionem, ordinationem ratione providentiae naturalis, quam necessario sequitur formalitas per essentialem influentiam unius in aliud [...] Est et alius ordo totalis in providentia voluntaria secundum participationem altioris luminis, [...] quam etiam exsequuntur taliter ordinata, inquantum superiora inferioribus communicant indita sibi lumina copiose. [...] cum nullum eorum sit causa essentialis. Licet enim sint intellectuales substantiae, nulla tamen earum est intellectus per essentiam [...]*.
- 15 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120E, S.100, L.303–305: *Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, qui in hoc volumine exprimitur, quibus omnibus supereminet ipsae primordiales causae, quas auctor vocat deos.* Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120E, S.100, L.321–323: *Sicut ergo in providentia naturali Deus providet omnibus primordialibus causis immediate et per eas et in eis omnibus simpliciter, sic etiam in providentia voluntaria est suo modo.*
- 16 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120 -prob., S.104, L.438–440: *Igitur in diis est providentia prime. Ubi enim est pronoy, id est intellectus provisoris nisi in supersubstantialibus? Providentia vero est operatio provisoris, ut nomen insinuat.*
- 17 Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, hg.v. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963<sup>2</sup>), 120, S.106, L.6–7: ἡ δὲ πρόνοια, ὡς τοῦνομα ἐμφαίνει, ἐνέργειά ἐστι πρὸ νοῦ. s.134: ἡ οὖν προνοεῖ, θεός, ἐν τῇ πρὸ νοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ τῆς προνοίας ἰσταμένης. Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, hg.v. E. Diehl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903, repr. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1965), I, S.415: καὶ δεῖ μνησθῆναι καὶ ὧν ὁ Χαίρωνεύς εἶπε περὶ τοῦ τῆς προνοίας ὀνόματος, ὡς Πλάτωνος οὕτως τὴν θείαν αἰτίαν καλέσαντος. εἰ δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ πρόνοια, καθόσον ἔχει τι καὶ τοῦ νοῦ κρείττον, εἰκότως καὶ τοῦτο ἔσχε τὸ ὄνομα διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἐνέργειαν. Johannes Philoponos, *In Aristotelis De anima libros*, hg.v. M. Hayduck (Berlin: Reimer, 1897), S.527: ὁ γὰρ θεός καὶ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἐστὶν, ὅθεν καὶ πρόνοια ὀνομάσται, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ ὧν. Olympiodor, *In Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria*, hg.v. L.G. Westerink (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976), 13,2,15, S.167.
- 18 Proclus, *In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria*, hg.v. C. Steel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), II, S.173 [967,16–20]: οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν Νόμοις (αὐτοῖς) αὐτὸς οὐκ ἄλλως εἶπε τὰς ὅλας ψυχὰς προνοεῖν ἢ τοῦς αὐταῖς νοῦν θεῖον, ὡς τῷ θεῷ τῆς προνοίας προσηκούσης, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ νῷ· νοῦ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις μέτεστι, θείου δὲ νοῦ ταῖς θεαῖς ψυχαῖς.

Mit Berufung auf Boethius versucht Berthold darüber hinaus den Unterschied beider Providenzarten auch als den zwischen der Providenz und dem Fatum deutlich zu machen. Die Providenz ist nach dem alles überragenden und bestimmenden neuplatonischen Schema jene Ordnung, die alles in eingefalteter Form enthält, was das Fatum als der Zeit unterworfenen Ordnung entfaltet.<sup>19</sup> Ob das Fatum durch gewisse göttliche dienende Geister oder die menschliche Seele oder die ganze Natur oder die Bewegung der Gestirne ausgeführt und die „fatale Reihe“ des Geschehens gewebt wird, das will Berthold offenlassen, fest steht nur: Die Providenz ist die Ordnung des Einfachen, des Unbeweglichen, die Disposition des singulär und stabil zu Machenden, das Fatum dagegen die zeitliche und vielfältige Verwaltung desselben, die Ordnung des Beweglichen und des Raumzeitlichen. Deswegen kann man sagen: „Die Ordnung des Fatums geht aus der Einfachheit der Providenz hervor“,<sup>20</sup> d.h. das Fatum steht in den Diensten der göttlichen Providenz. Es bedeutet freilich auch: Alles, was dem Fatum unterworfen ist, ist auch der Providenz unterworfen, während der Kausalzusammenhang der wesentlichen Ursachen dem Fatum entzogen ist.

Ähnlichkeit und Differenz zwischen den beiden Providenzarten werden hier sichtbar: Die Providenz, gemeint ist die *providentia naturalis*, ist Gott „an sich“ (*per se*), das Fatum aber, das „Abbild“ von jener, ist nicht Gott, sondern nur „eine göttliche Sache“.<sup>21</sup> Wir könnten das uns so übersetzen: Die „natürliche Providenz“ ist das unmittelbare Handeln Gottes, das Fatum aber, die „willentliche Providenz“, ist das vermittelte göttliche Handeln. Die göttliche Providenz ist „gewissermaßen“ ein „praktisches Wissen“, weil es der Wille Gottes ist, der sich auf alles erstreckt.<sup>22</sup> Berthold hat in diesem Sinne das intellektuelle und das providentielle Erkennen als zwei Tätigkeiten eines substantiellen Intellekts unterschieden und so, wie das Mittelalter überhaupt, es vermieden, den göttlichen Intellekt „praktisch“ zu nennen.<sup>23</sup>

19 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141B, S.46, L.52-56: *Providentia namque cuncta pariter, quamvis diversa, quamvis infinita complectitur, fatum vero singula dirigit in motu locis, formis ac temporibus distributa, ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio in divinae mentis adunata prospectum providentia sit, eadem vero adunatio digesta atque explicata temporibus fatum vocetur.* Zum *complicatio-explicatio*-Prinzip vgl. Th. Kobusch, „*Complicatio und explicatio.* Das ontologische Modell des Neuplatonismus“, in hg.v. G. Kapriev, *The Dionysian Traditions*, Turnhout, Brepols, 2021.

20 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141B, S.46, L.56–S.47, L.76.

21 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141B, S.48, L.103.

22 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120D, S.98, L.247: *providentia tamquam practica scientia.*

23 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 134D–E, S.215, L.61–S.217, L.103 wird die Unterscheidung zwischen der Erkenntnis des Intellekts und der „Erkenntnis der Providenz“ erwähnt. – Daß der göttliche Intellekt „schlechthin spekulativ“ und nur *per accidens* praktisch ist,



## 1.2 *Dietrich von Freiberg*

Neben Augustinus ist Dietrich von Freiberg der wichtigste Gewährsmann für die Lehre von der doppelten Providenz. Er hat sie zum Thema des Kapitels 20 seiner Schrift *De animatione caeli* gemacht. Dort kritisiert er die Position des Thomas von Aquin, der nicht genügend unterschieden habe die Ordnungen der geistigen Substanzen einerseits und der himmlischen Körper, d.h. der Gestirne andererseits. Nach Dietrich haben sie aber von ihrer Natur gar keine Beziehung zueinander außer derjenigen, durch die sie beide aus dem ersten Prinzip, Gott, hervorgegangen sind, aber in je verschiedener Weise. Die geistigen Substanzen nämlich gehen in der Ordnung der willentlichen Providenz aus Gott hervor und sind hierarchisch und stufenmäßig unterschieden, und zwar nicht nur in ihrer Natur, sondern auch ihrem Willen und ihren hierarchischen Akten nach. Ihre Providenz gelangt bis zu uns. Die himmlischen Körper dagegen gehen in der Ordnung der natürlichen Providenz aus Gott hervor je unterschieden nach ihrer natürlichen Disposition und ihren natürlichen Eigentümlichkeiten und Bewegungen. Da aber beide Ordnungen, die der natürlichen Providenz und der willentlichen Providenz, „völlig disparat“ sind und das Eine mit dem Anderen nichts zu tun hat, können auch nicht die geistigen Substanzen, die zur Ordnung der willentlichen Providenz gehören, als Prinzipien der Himmelsbewegung, die selbst zur Ordnung der natürlichen Providenz gehört, gedacht werden.<sup>24</sup>

Doch nicht nur dieser Gedanke von der aus der willentlichen Providenz hervorgehenden hierarchischen Ordnung der geistigen Substanzen ist das historische Vorbild für Berthold. Was bei Berthold außerdem eindeutig auf Dietrich von Freiberg zurückzuführen ist, ist die Zuteilung der beiden Ordnungen zu den je verschiedenen Gegenstandsbereichen der philosophischen Theologie und der Offenbarungstheologie. Ihrer beider gemeinsamer Gegenstand ist zwar das „göttliche Seiende“ (*ens divinum*), aber ihre Betrachtungsweise ist je verschieden. Denn die philosophische Theologie, d.i. die Metaphysik oder Erste Philosophie betrachtet das, was wesenhaft göttlich ist und alles andere,

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hat Heinrich von Gent in zwei Quaestiones ausführlich begründet: Heinrich von Gent, *Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae)*, hg.v. G.A. Wilson, art. xxxvi, qq. 4–5 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1994), S.105–130.

<sup>24</sup> Dietrich von Freiberg, *De animatione caeli*, hg.v. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 20, S.30, L.82–93: *Huiusmodi autem substantiae spirituales omnino disparatae sunt in suis naturis et essentis a substantiis corporum caelestium et nullum respectum et habitudinem secundum naturam habent ad ipsa nisi eam, qua ambo ista entium genera procedunt ab uno principio, Deo, sed tamen ordine diverso. Unum enim istorum, id est spirituum, [...] procedit in ordine voluntariae providentiae [...]. Aliud enim genus entium, scilicet corpora caelestia, procedunt a Deo in ordine naturalis providentiae [...].*

insofern es auf dieses erste Prinzip hingeordnet ist. Die Metaphysik (*scientia divina*) betrachtet die Gesamtheit des Seienden, insofern sie aus Gott hervorgegangen ist, d.h. gemäß der Ordnung der natürlichen Providenz, in der die Dinge in ihrer Natur stehen und vom Ersten des Weltalls gemäß ihrer Modi und natürlichen Eigentümlichkeiten gelenkt werden, und über diese Ordnung der Natur hinaus achtet sie auf kein weiteres Ziel.<sup>25</sup>

„Unsere göttliche Wissenschaft der Heiligen aber“, d.h. die Offenbarungstheologie, betrachtet das „göttliche Seiende“ nach der Ordnung der willentlichen Providenz, d.h. die Dinge, insofern sie in die Ordnung der willentlichen Providenz gehören, wo es um Verdienst und Lohn und Strafe für ein gutes oder schlechtes Leben geht und die Möglichkeit, die ewige Glückseligkeit zu erlangen und überhaupt zu einem fernerem Ziel zu gelangen nach dem Ende dieser Welt – wenn die „göttliche Wissenschaft der Weisen dieser Welt vernichtet werden wird“.<sup>26</sup>

Vielleicht wurde Dietrich zu dieser Zuordnung der beiden Providenzarten zu den beiden Arten der Theologie von Heinrich von Gent angeregt, von dem er auch sonst beeinflusst ist. Dietrich hat ja in den siebziger Jahren in Paris studiert, und es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, daß er auch Heinrich von Gent gehört und kennen gelernt hat. Jedenfalls erinnert sich Dietrich rund zwanzig Jahre später, nämlich im 2. Buch von *De intellectu et intelligibili*, einer Disputation

25 Dietrich von Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae*, 3 (5), hg.v. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), S.281, L.69-75: *Quia igitur in hac scientia tractatur de tota universitate entium – et secundum processum eorum a Deo [...] et haec sive secundum ordinem naturalis providentiae seu secundum ordinem voluntariae providentiae, secundum distinctionem Augustini VIII Super (69 vb) Genesisim – necesse est omnia convenire in una ratione subiecti, quod vocetur, sicut et vere est, ens divinum [...].* Dietrich of Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae* 3 (8)-(9), S.281, L. 92 – S.282, L.104: *Quamvis autem quantum ad considerationem primi philosophi talis etiam, quae dicta est, attributio entium ad primum principium attendatur, et propter hoc etiam potius dicitur apud philosophos scientia divina seu theologia, quam dicatur metaphysica – considerat enim primo et principaliter de ente divino, quod est divinum per essentiam [...] – nihilominus tamen nostra scientia, quam vere et simpliciter theologiam dicimus, distinguitur a scientia divina philosophorum. Scientia enim divina philosophorum considerat universitatem entium secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, quo res stant in sui natura et secundum suos modos et proprietates naturales gubernantur per principem universitatis, nec ultra hunc naturae ordinem aliquem ulteriorem finem attendit.*

26 Dietrich von Freiberg, *De subiecto theologiae* 3 (9)–(10), S.282, L.104-112: *Nostra autem divina sanctorum scientia attenditur in entibus, secundum quod stant et disponuntur sub ordine voluntariae providentiae, in quo attenditur ratio meriti et praemii et ea, quae attenduntur circa bonam et sanctam vitam et adeptionem aeternae beatitudinis et perventionem ad finem ulteriorem sive in bono sive in malo etiam post terminum huius mundi, quando scientia divina sapientium huius mundi destruetur, I Cor. 13. Secundum praedicta igitur convenienter accipitur subiectum huius nostrae scientiae divinae, videlicet ut dicatur ens divinum secundum ordinem voluntariae providentiae.*

eines *solemnis magister*, und es spricht einiges dafür, daß Heinrich von Gent gemeint ist.<sup>27</sup> Auf diese Weise zeigt sich ein weiteres Mal, daß Heinrich von Gent, dessen Einfluß in der Dietrich- und Eckhart-Forschung notorisch unterschätzt wird,<sup>28</sup> die zentrale Figur in der zweiten Hälfte des 13. Jh. ist, die das Denken der Dominikaner wie auch und besonders der Franziskaner bestimmt hat.<sup>29</sup>

Was das hier verhandelte Problem angeht, so unterscheidet Heinrich im Anschluß an Augustinus die „allgemeine Providenz“ im Sinne der natürlichen und die „besondere Providenz“ im Sinne der willentlichen. Die allgemeine Providenz bewegt zu jenen Erkenntnissen, die im Licht der natürlichen Vernunft gemacht werden können oder auch zu Handlungen, die aufgrund natürlicher Vernunft vollzogen werden. Die „spezielle“ Providenz dagegen bewegt zu solchen Erkenntnissen, die die Fähigkeit der natürlichen theoretischen Vernunft übersteigen und nur durch ein „übernatürlich“ eingeflößtes Licht möglich werden bzw. zu durch die göttliche Gnade ermöglichten Handlungen.<sup>30</sup>

27 Vgl. M. Führer, „Dietrich of Freiberg“, in E.N. Zalta (Hg.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition)*, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/dietrich-freiberg/> (29.11.2020).

28 In den sich als programmatisch gebenden „Einleitungen“ zu den kritischen Editionen Dietrichs und Bertholds von K. Flasch wird nicht einmal der Name Heinrichs einer Erwähnung für würdig gehalten. K. Flasch, „Einleitung“, in Dietrich von Freiberg, *Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie*, S. IX–XXVI. K. Flasch, „Einleitung“, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1–13*, S. xi–xxxviii.

29 Vgl. Th. Kobusch, *Die Philosophie des Hoch- und Spätmittelalters* (München: Beck, 2011), S. 308–321.

30 Heinrich von Gent, *Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae)*, hg.v. G.A. Wilson (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005), art. III, q. 5, S. 263–264; *Nunc autem sicut Deus agit et movet ut primus motor in movendo creaturas corporales motu corporali, sic agit et movet ut primus motor in movendo creaturas spirituales motu spirituali, et ideo sicut dupliciter movet, ut dictum est, creaturas corporales, una scilicet providentia generali et naturali, et altera providentia speciali et voluntaria, similiter congruit ut dupliciter moveat creaturam spirituales. Motus autem eius est in intelligendo et volendo, et hoc scilicet providentia generali movendo eam lumine naturaliter sibi indito ad cognoscendum ea quae subsunt cognitioni naturali, et similiter ad ea agendum quae sibi ex naturalibus agere competit; providentia autem speciali movendo eam lumine supernaturaliter infuso ad cognoscendum quae sunt super facultatem rationis naturalis, et similiter voluntarie ad agendum quae sibi per gratiam agere competit, ut sic homo ordinetur, tam ex parte intellectus quam affectus [...]*. Auch Thomas bestimmt die *providentia specialis* ganz im Sinne der *providentia voluntaria* als die besondere Sorge um die vernunftbegabten Wesen, cf. *Summa contra Gentiles*, III.111, hg.v. P. Marc, C. Pera, P. Caramello (Torino / Roma: Marietti, 1961); *Summa Theologiae*, I, 22,2, hg. Leonina (Roma: Ex Typ. Polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1888–1889).

Zuletzt ist dies bemerkenswert, daß Dietrich die Willensordnung, also die Ordnung der Willensprovidenz, als die „Vervollständigung“ oder „Ergänzung“ der natürlichen Providenz versteht<sup>31</sup>. Berthold hat diese These Dietrichs zitiert.<sup>32</sup> Sie ist insofern bemerkenswert, als dadurch ein Prinzip des Dietrichschen Denkens bestätigt wird. Dieses Prinzip besagt, daß die Tätigkeit des Intellekts, und das gilt sowohl für den theoretischen Intellekt bei der Konstituierung der ersten Intentionen wie auch für den praktischen Intellekt bei der Konstituierung z.B. des „Geldes“ oder des „Preises“ oder der positiven Gesetze, als eine „Ergänzung“ der Tätigkeit der Naturdinge anzusehen ist.<sup>33</sup> Berthold hat dementsprechend auch die ersten und zweiten Intentionen unterschieden: Die ersten Intentionen sind das, was der Intellekt von der Sache als das washeitliche Sein aufgrund der formalen, d.h. in der Sache selbst liegenden Prinzipien konstituiert. Die ersten Intentionen heißen also so, weil sie zuerst von dem extramentalen Naturding angeregt und als solche vom Intellekt aufgenommen und quiditativ konstituiert werden. Die zweiten Intentionen dagegen, also so etwas wie Subjekt, Prädikat, Maior, Minor, Gattung, Species und andere Prädikabilien haben ihre Entität alleine durch den Intellekt.<sup>34</sup> Berthold hat aber auch Dietrichs Lehre von der parallelen Struktur und Funktion des spekulativen und praktischen Intellekts aufgenommen, nach der z.B. der

31 Dietrich von Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, hg.v. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), 4.3.2.(4), S.114, L.16-21: *Et dico rationabile esse hoc et non dico necessarium esse, quia huiusmodi non fit ex necessitate ordinis, qui attenditur in providentia naturali, sed contingit ex sola Dei gratia et bonis meritis, quod pertinet ad ordinem voluntariae providentiae, qui est complementum et consummatio ordinis providentiae naturalis, quem duplicem ordinem in universo distinguit Augustinus VIII Super Genesisim.*

32 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 129, S.182, L.299ff.

33 Cf. Th. Kobusch, „Begriff und Sache. Die Funktion des menschlichen Intellekts in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie“, in *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 13/2(2004), 140–157; Th. Kobusch, „Die Vernunftordnung als Vollendung der Naturordnung. Zur Funktion der menschlichen Vernunft in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie“, in T. Iremadze (mit H. Schneider, K.J. Schmidt) (Hgg.), *Philosophy in Global Change: Jubilee volume dedicated to the 65th anniversary of Burkhard Mojsisch*, Tbilisi: Nekeri, 2011, S.140–154.

34 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160–183*, hg.v. U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 177G, S.181, L.270–280: *Prima enim intentio est id, quod capit suam entitatem opere intellectus possibilis facti actu constituentis ipsum in esse quiditativo ex principiis formalibus, quae sunt partes definitionis; et dicitur res primae intentionis, quia est primo intentum a natura et sic respectum ab intellectu. Res vero secundae intentionis non sic capit suam entitatem, ut secundum se et primo sit aliquid extra intellectum, quo secundum se et primo sit respectum ab intellectu, sicut res primae intentionis, sed est forma quaedam habens se ex parte intellectus vel rationis, sub qua fit res rationalis; et ideo quasi per accidens respicit ipsum intellectum, in quantum sub eo et per ipsum ratiocinatur de rebus, quas per se respicit. Est autem secunda intentio subiectum, praedicatum, maior vel minor extremitas, genus species et alia praedicabilia.*

„Preis“ als eine solche vom praktischen Intellekt dem Geld verliehene „komplementäre“ Bestimmtheit anzusehen ist.<sup>35</sup>

Das Letztere zusammengefaßt: Wie der spekulative und praktische Intellekt durch seine jeweilige Tätigkeit die Tätigkeit des Naturdings „komplementär“ unterstützt und vollendet, so ist nach Dietrich und Berthold auch die „willentliche Providenz“ eine komplementäre Ergänzung der „natürlichen Providenz“.

### 1.3 *Augustinus*

Für die Unterscheidung der natürlichen und der willensmäßigen Providenz beruft sich Berthold sehr oft auf Augustinus, nämlich die klassische Stelle in *De Genesi ad litteram*, wo Augustinus die natürliche Providenz Gottes als die unvermittelte Erschaffung und verborgene Verwaltung der Naturwelt beschreibt, durch die er den Bäumen und Gräsern das Wachstum verleiht, aber auch das kosmische Geschehen regelt, die Elemente ins rechte Verhältnis zueinander bringt, und Geburt, Wachsen, Altern und Sterben der Lebewesen lenkt. Die willentliche Providenz Gottes aber ist die durch Menschen und Engel vermittelte Sorge um den Bestand der Zivilisation und Kultur. Sie ist daran zu erkennen, daß, gelehrt und gelernt wird (*doceri et disci*), daß Felder bestellt, Staaten verwaltet, Künste geübt werden, und manch anderes, sei es in der himmlischen oder in der irdischen Gesellschaft getan wird und zwar so sehr, daß sogar die Schlechten, ohne daß sie es wüßten, zum Guten beitragen können.<sup>36</sup> Die bedeutsame anthropologische Aussage Augustins an dieser

35 Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 32B, S.207, L.44–57. Im Hintergrund steht Heinrich von Gent, *Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae) art. XLVII–LII*, hg.v. M. Führer (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2008), art. LI, q. 3, S.240. Vgl. Kobusch, „Die Vernunftordnung als Vollendung“. Auch Nikolaus von Straßburg, *Summa*, liber II, tract. 8–14, hg.v. T. Suarez-Nani (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990), tr. 9, q. 5, S.35–55 hat sich mit der Dietrichschen Lehre von den *res primae intentionis* und ihrer Verursachung durch den spekulativen und praktischen Intellekt kritisch auseinander gesetzt sowie auch mit Hervaeus Natalis' Kritik an Dietrich. Im Verlauf dieser Auseinandersetzung wird auch der Begriff des *completum* bzw. des *complementum* diskutiert (cf. Nikolaus von Straßburg, *Summa*, liber II, tr. 9, q. 5, S. 46, L.239–47, L.254).

36 Augustinus, *De Genesi ad litteram*, hg.v. J. Zycha (Prag / Leipzig / Wien: Tempsky / Freytag, 1894), VIII 9,17: *atque in ipso quoque gemina operatio prouidentiae reperitur, partim naturalis, partim uoluntaria et naturalis quidem per occultam dei administrationem, qua etiam lignis et herbis dat incrementum, uoluntaria uero per angelorum opera et hominum; secundum illam primam caelestia superius ordinari inferius que terrestria, luminaria sidera que fulgere, diei noctis que uices agitari, aquis terram fundatam interlui atque circumlui, aerem altius superfundit, arbusta et animalia concipi et nasci, crescere, senescere, occidere et quidquid aliud in rebus interiore naturali que motu geritur; in hac autem altera signa dari, doceri et disci, agros coli, societates administrari, artes exerceri et quaeque alia siue in suprema societate aguntur siue in hac terrena atque mortali, ita ut bonis consulatur et*

Stelle aber ist, daß diese doppelte Macht der Providenz – die Augustinus auch schon in früheren Schriften andeutet<sup>37</sup> – auch im Menschen vorhanden ist, fast ganz parallel und bezogen sowohl auf den Leib als auch auf die Seele: die natürliche, d.h. dem Leib von innen gegebene Sorge äußert sich in den Bewegungen, durch die er entsteht, wächst und altert, die willentliche aber, indem er für den Lebensunterhalt, Kleidung und Pflege sorgen kann.

Die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Natürlichen und Willentlichen im Sinne einer Disjunktion ist eine Neuerung der christlichen Philosophie, eingeleitet durch Origenes und seine Anhänger. Diese Unterscheidung ist von eminenter Wichtigkeit für die weitere Geschichte der Philosophie.<sup>38</sup> Denn sie bringt zu Bewußtsein, daß es hier um zwei irreduzible Welten geht, die jeweils eigene Gesetze haben: Die Welt der Natur mit ihren Naturgesetzen und die Welt des Moralischen, die den moralischen Gesetzen gehorcht. Später werden in diesem Sinne auch Natur und Freiheit unterschieden. Wenn Augustinus nun diese Unterscheidung auf die menschliche Form der Providenz, d.h. der Sorge anwendet, dann will er auf ein zweifaches Vermögen in unserer körperlichen und geistigen Existenz aufmerksam machen: Das natürliche Vermögen in der körperlichen Existenz ist die Bewegung des Entstehens, Wachsens und Alterns. Das moralische, d.h. in unsere Verantwortung gegebene, also unsere Freiheit betreffende dagegen ist die Ernährung, Kleidung und Körperpflege. Was die geistige Existenz angeht, so besteht das natürliche Element darin, daß die Seele als Lebensprinzip „lebt“ und Wahrnehmungen bzw. Empfindungen haben kann, während das „moralische“, von unserer Freiheit abhängige, im Lernen bzw. Erkennen und in der „Zustimmung“ besteht. Obwohl die Konzeption der doppelten göttlichen und der doppelten menschlichen Providenz ganz parallel strukturiert zu sein scheint, gibt es einen wichtigen Unterschied, den Augustinus wenig später auch ausdrücklich benennt: Die natürliche Providenz

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*per nescientes malos; in que ipso homine eandem geminam prouidentiae uigere potentiam: primo erga corpus naturale, scilicet eo motu, quo fit, quo crescit, quo senescit; uoluntariam uero, quo illa ad uictum, tegumentum curationem que consulitur. similiter erga animam naturaliter agitur, ut uiuat, ut sentiat, uoluntarie uero, ut discat, ut consentiat. Cf. z.B. Berthold von Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141A, S.45, L.11ff.*

37 Cf. Augustinus, *De vera religione* hg.v. J. Clémence, J. Pegon (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1951), 22: [...] *conditricem uero ac moderatricem temporum diuinam prouidentiam* [...].

38 S. Th. Kobusch, „Der Begriff des Willens in der christlichen Philosophie vor Augustinus“, in J. Müller, R. Hofmeister Pich (Hgg.), *Wille und Handlung in der Philosophie der Kaiserzeit und Spätantike. Will and Action in Late Antique Philosophy* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2010), S.277–300.

geschaffener Wesen kann keine Schöpfungsprovidenz im strengen Sinne der Schöpfung aus Nichts sein<sup>39</sup>.

Durch den Begriff der Zustimmung ist Augustinus zutiefst mit der stoischen Philosophie verbunden, in der die Zustimmung der eigentliche Hort der Freiheit darstellt, da sie im eigentlichen Sinne in unserer Macht steht (*ephe hemin*)<sup>40</sup>. Auch für Augustinus steht die Zustimmung im Zentrum der Freiheitslehre. Das ist schon daraus zu erkennen, daß nach Augustins durchgehender Lehre die Sündhaftigkeit der Sünde in der Zustimmung zum Bösen besteht<sup>41</sup>. Sie ist Sache des Willens<sup>42</sup>. Deswegen ist sie in *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII 9,17 der willentlichen Providenz zugeordnet.

Augustinus kommt in derselben Schrift – manchmal auch in anderen Schriften – noch mehrere Male auf die Lehre von der doppelten Providenz zurück und damit auch auf die Zweiteilung der gesamten Schöpfung in natürliche und willentliche Bewegungen. Daraus geht hervor, daß die göttliche Providenz eine zweifache Funktion hat: eine natürliche, durch die „Naturen“, d.h. die Wesenheiten zur Existenz gebracht werden, und eine „willentliche“, d.h. eine lenkende, durch die die verschiedenen Willen auf den richtigen moralischen Weg gelenkt und entsprechend ihrem Leben auch belohnt oder bestraft werden<sup>43</sup>. Damit sind wir bei der Vorstellung von der göttlichen Schöpfungs-

39 Augustinus, *De Genesi ad litteram* IX 15, S.288: *quapropter cum deus uniuersam creaturam suam bipertito quodam modo opere prouidentiae, de quo in superiore libro locuti sumus, et in naturalibus et in uoluntariis motibus administret, creare naturam tam nullus angelus potest quam nec se ipsum.*

40 Cf. Th. Kobusch, „Zustimmung I. Antike; Mittelalter“, in J. Ritter, K. Gründer, G. Gabriel (Hgg.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Basel / Stuttgart: Schwabe AG, 2005), S.1457–1465.

41 Cf. die berühmte Lehre von der Dreistufung der Sünde: *suggestio, delectatio, consensio* in *De sermone Domini in monte* I c.34.

42 Augustinus, *De catechizandis rudibus*, hg.v. I.B. Bauer (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), 18: *propria uoluntate consensit*. Augustinus, *Contra Secundinum*, §14, hg.v. R. Jolivet, M. Jourjon (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961): *dicis enim tunc animam uoluntate sua peccare, dum consentit malo*. Augustinus, *Epistulae*, hg.v. K.D. Daur (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), CVIII,7, S.71: *Qui tetigerit pollutum, pollutus est, sed consensione uoluntatis*.

43 Augustinus, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII 12,25: *neque enim tale aliquid est homo, ut factus deserente eo, qui fecit, possit aliquid agere bene tamquam ex se ipso; sed tota eius actio bona est ad eum conuerti, a quo factus est, et ab eo iustus, pius, sapiens beatus que semper fieri, non fieri et recedere, sicut a corporis medico sanari et abire, quia medicus corporis operarius fuit extrinsecus seruiens naturae intrinsecus operanti sub deo, qui operatur omnem salutem gemino illo opere prouidentiae, de quo supra locuti sumus*. Augustinus, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII 19,38: *locus itaque magnus neque praetereundus proponitur, ut intueamur, quantum possumus, quantum ipse adiuuare et donare dignatur, opus diuinae prouidentiae bipertitum, quod superius, cum de agricultura loqueremur, transitoria quadam occasione perstrinximus, ut inde iam inciperet legentis animus hoc adsuescere contueri, quod adiuuat*

und Vergeltungsprovidenz angekommen, deren Ursprung in der Philosophie des Neuplatonismus liegt – wie Augustinus selbst zu wissen scheint (*De civitate Dei*, x 17).

## 2 Neuplatonismus: Schöpfungs- und Vergeltungsprovidenz

### 2.1 *Porphyrrios und Jamblich*

Doch mögen Berthold und Dietrich und auch Augustinus noch so sehr der Lehre von der doppelten Providenz das Mäntelchen des Christlichen, d.h. der „christlichen Philosophie“ umgehängt haben, indem sie die Konzeption des Willens damit verbunden haben, so ist der neuplatonische Ursprung dieser Lehre doch nicht zu übersehen.

Die göttliche Providenz war ein überragend wichtiges Thema für die antike, besonders auch die spätantike Philosophie und zwar sowohl für die pagane wie auch die christliche Philosophie. Das bezeugen allein schon die zahlreichen Titel *Peri pronoias*, die wir kennen, so etwa von Chrysipp, Claudius Aelian, Philo von Alexandrien, Antiphon, Alexander von Aphrodisias, Clemens Alexandrinus, Johannes Chrysostomos, Theodoret, Proklos, Synesios, Hierokles, daneben

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*plurimum, ne quid indignum de ipsa dei substantia sentiamus. Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram VII 23,44: ergo dei prouidentia regens atque administrans uniuersam creaturam, et naturas et uoluntates, naturas, ut sint, uoluntates autem, ut nec infructuosae bonae nec impunitae malae sint [...]. Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram VIII 24,45: et ideo deus bipertito prouidentiae suae opere praeest uniuersae creaturae suae, naturis, ut fiant, uoluntatibus autem, ut sine suo iussu uel permissu nihil faciant. Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram VIII 26,48: sed in opere diuinae prouidentiae ista cognoscere non in illo opere, quo naturas creat, sed in illo, quo intrinsecus creatas etiam extrinsecus administrat [...]. Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram IX 14,24: uomodo haec adduxerit deus ad adam, ne carnaliter sapiamus, adiuuare nos debet, quod de bipertito opere diuinae prouidentiae in libro superiore tractauimus. Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram IX 15,28: quapropter cum deus uniuersam creaturam suam bipertito quodam modo opere prouidentiae, de quo in superiore libro locuti sumus, et in naturalibus et in uoluntariis motibus administret, creare naturam tam nullus angelus potest quam nec se ipsum. Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram IX 18,33: habet ergo deus in se ipso absconditas quorundam factorum causas, quas rebus conditis non inseruit, eas que inplet non illo opere prouidentiae, quo naturas substituit, ut sint, sed illo, quo eas administrat, ut uoluerit, quas, ut uoluit, condidit. Cf. Augustinus, Enarrationes in Psalmos, hg.v. E. Deckers, I. Fraipont (Turnhout: Brepols, 1956), 145, 13: ad prouidentiam uniuersitatis, qua creauit omnia et mundum regit: homines et iumenta saluos facies, domine. Augustinus, De opere monachorum, hg.v. J. Zycha (Wien: Tempsky, 1900), 26,34, S.583: cum eius sapientissima prouidentia usque ad ista creanda et gubernanda perueniat. Augustinus, De civitate Dei, hg.v. B. Dombart, A. Kalb, G. Bardy, G. Combès (Paris: Institut d'études augustiniennes, 2014), I, 36: et quod Deus uerus mundum condiderit et de prouidentia eius, qua uniuersum quod condidit regit.*



wichtige Kapitel mit diesem Titel in Schriften wie z.B. in Epiktet I 6, Nemesius *De natura hominis* c.42, das Carmen *Peri pronoias* von Gregor von Nazianz oder Kap. 17 in *De deis et mundo* von Sallust oder schließlich das entsprechende Kapitel in der *Expositio fidei* des Johannes Damascenus. Dem entsprechen ebenso viele Titel auf der lateinischen Seite von Philo von Alexandrien, Seneca, Augustins q. 27 von *De div. quaest.*, sein *Sermo De providentia Dei* u.a.m.

Die Lehre von der doppelten göttlichen Providenz, d.h. der Schöpfungs- und der Vergeltungsprovidenz, hat im Rahmen dieses allgemeinen Interesses an der Providenzthematik einen besonderen Stellenwert. Ihre eigentliche Heimat ist der Neuplatonismus. Doch von welchem Autor könnte sie stammen? Bei Plotin z.B., von dem wir ja zwei Providenzschriften haben, finden wir sie nicht, wohl aber bei fast allen späteren Neuplatonikern. W. Theiler hat in einem großartigen Aufsatz erstmals das Bewußtsein der modernen Forschung für dieses Thema geweckt<sup>44</sup>. Mit der Aufdeckung dieses spezifisch neuplatonischen Grundsatzes hat Theiler jedoch eine These verbunden, die gewagt zu sein scheint. Die These besagt, daß aus der auffälligen Übereinstimmung zwischen dem Christen Origenes und dem Neuplatoniker Hierokles das „System des Ammonios Sakkas“ ablesbar sei. Die These ist gewagt, weil sie in der Hauptsache nicht greift – wie Theiler auch selbst weiß (p. 30). Denn nach Origenes ist die geschaffene geistige Welt ontologisch differenz- und grenzenlos – erst der geschaffene Wille macht die Wesensgrenzen –, nach Hierokles aber gibt es „demiurgische“, d.h. von Gott gesetzte ontologische Grenzen<sup>45</sup>. Doch auch wenn man so gegenüber diesem Versuch der Konstruktion des ammonischen Systems skeptisch sein muß, bleibt das unvergeßliche Verdienst dieses Aufsatzes, in der Forschung wegweisend auf die Bedeutung der neuplatonischen Lehre von der Schöpfungs- und Vergeltungsprovidenz hingewiesen zu haben.

Wir können diese Lehre erstmals deutlich bei Porphyrios finden. Der Christengegner ist in manchem der christlichen Lehre verblüffend nah. Das gilt nicht nur etwa für die Lehre von der Schöpfung, sondern auch für die hier ins Auge gefaßte Providenzlehre. In seiner christentumsnahen Schrift *Ad Marcellam* ist der Providenzglaube von entscheidender Bedeutung. Die einen, so sagt Porphyrios, haben sich „durch Erkenntnis und festen Glauben“ die Überzeugung erworben, daß Gott ist und alles verwaltet, d.h. daß er die Welt erschaffen hat und alles providentiell regelt, indem mit Hilfe göttlicher Engel

44 W. Theiler, „Ammonios der Lehrer des Origenes“, in Id., *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1966), S.1–45. Zur Schöpfungs- und Vergeltungsprovidenz: S.9. 13. 15f. 42. 44.

45 S. Th. Kobusch, „Origenes und Pico. Picos *Oratio* im Licht der spätantiken Philosophie“, in A. Fürst, Chr. Hengstermann (Hgg.), *Origenes Humanista. Pico della Mirandola's Traktat De salute Originis disputatio* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2015), S.141–159.

bzw. guter Dämonen, denen nichts entgeht, die Handlungen der Menschen beobachtet werden. Auf diese Weise lernen solche Gottgläubigen einerseits durch ihr sittliches Leben die Götter kennen, andererseits werden sie auch durch die erkannten Götter erkannt<sup>46</sup>. Die anderen dagegen – sagt Porphyrios –, die weder an Gottes Existenz glauben noch an die providentielle Verwaltung des Universums durch Gott, haben die „Strafe des Rechts“ erhalten, indem sie weder sich selbst noch anderen darin vertrauten, daß Götter existieren und daß das Universum nicht durch irrationalen Zufall verwaltet wird. Diese Ungläubigen haben sich selbst in die größte Gefahr begeben und sich ihrerseits einem irrationalen Impuls ergeben und alles getan, was nicht recht ist, indem sie versuchten, den Glauben an die Götter zu zerstören. Im Gegensatz zu den ersteren haben sie ein schlechtes Leben gewählt, wissen nichts von den Göttern, werden aber von den Göttern und dem göttlichen Recht erkannt. Selbst wenn sie glauben sollten, die Götter zu verehren und von der Existenz der Götter überzeugt zu sein, dabei aber das Moralische vernachlässigen, dann handelt es sich in Wirklichkeit um eine Leugnung der Götter<sup>47</sup>. Denn weder ein irrationaler Glaube noch eine blinde Verehrung würden ohne ein sittliches Leben eine Annäherung an Gott sein. Mit dem „irrationalen Glauben“ zielt Porphyrios kritisch auf eine fideistische Gruppe der frühen Christen<sup>48</sup>. Da die Ausgangspunkte für alle so unterschiedlich sind, ist es am gerechtesten anzunehmen, daß für Gott die Reinheit der Gesinnung zählt, da diese jeder aufgrund seines freien Willens erreichen kann<sup>49</sup>.

Auch sonst spielt die Doppelung von Gottes Existenz und Providenz, die später als natürliche und willensmäßige Providenz üblich wird, bei Porphyrios eine wichtige Rolle. Ihre Leugnung nennt er die „erste“ und „zweite Gottlosigkeit“<sup>50</sup>. Bei Jamblich stehen die Schöpfung und Providenz der Götter

46 Porphyrios, *Ad Marcellam*, 21/22: εὐγνώμονα δὲ βίον κτησάμενοι μανθάνουσι θεοὺς γινώσκονταί τε γινωσκομένοις θεοῖς.

47 Porphyrios, *Ad Marcellam*, hg.v. A. Nauck und übers. von W. Pötscher (Leiden: Brill, 1969), 23: βίον δὲ κακοδαίμονα καὶ πλανήτην ἐλόμενοι ἀγνοοῦντες θεοὺς γινώσκονται θεοῖς καὶ τῇ δίκῃ τῇ παρὰ θεῶν. κἂν θεοὺς τιμᾶν οἴωνται καὶ πεπεισθαι εἶναι θεοὺς, ἀρετῆς δὲ ἀμελῶσι καὶ σοφίας, ἤρηνται θεοὺς καὶ ἀτιμάζουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄλογόπιστις δίχα τοῦ ὀρθῶς ζῆν ἐπιτυχεῖ θεοῦ, οὔτε μὴν τὸ τιμᾶν θεοσεβὲς ἄνευ τοῦ μεταθιγέμεναι ὅτῳ τρόπῳ χαίρει τὸ θεῖον τιμῶμενον.

48 Cf. Th. Kobusch, *Christliche Philosophie. Die Entdeckung der Subjektivität* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaft Buchgesellschaft 2006), S.98.

49 Porphyrios, *Ad Marcellam* 23: εἰ δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ἤττον, μόνῳ δὲ ἤδεται τῷ καθαρεύειν τὴν διάνοιαν, ὃ δὴ δυνατόν ἐκ προαιρέσεως παντὶ τῷ προσεῖναι, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἶη δίκαιον.

50 Porphyrios, *In Platonis Timaeum Commentariorum Fragmenta*, hg.v. A.R. Sodano (Neapel: Istituto della Stampa, 1964), II fr.28: ὡς οὔτε οἱ τὴν πρώτην ἀθεότητα νοσήσαντες (...), οἱ γὰρ μὴδὲ εἶναι λέγοντες θεοὺς, οὔτε οἱ τὴν δευτέραν, ὅσοι τὴν πρόνοιαν ἄρδην ἀνατρέπουσι θεοὺς εἶναι διδόντες, οὔθ' οἱ καὶ εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτοὺς συγχωροῦντες, ἅπαντα δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι·

ganz nah beieinander<sup>51</sup>. Die Atheisten verraten eine einfache Denkweise: Weil sie die Art und Weise der Schöpfung und providentiellen Sorge Gottes nicht durchschauen, leugnen sie beides strikt ab<sup>52</sup>. Die Providenz wird dabei als Vergeltungsprovidenz verstanden. In diesem Sinne ist auch das Schlechte providenzgemäß<sup>53</sup>.

## 2.2 Die späteren Neuplatoniker

Die Lehre von der doppelten Providenz wird im Neuplatonismus auf vielfache Art und Weise zum Ausdruck gebracht. Proklos hat das Verhältnis der Schöpfungsprovidenz und der Vergeltungsprovidenz, (d.h. in bezug auf das Letztere: was bei Berthold von Moosburg „Fatum“ genannt wird), in klassischer Weise bestimmt: Die Heimarmene und damit das Recht hängt von der göttlichen Schöpfungsprovidenz ab und folgt den Bestimmungen des Schöpfers, indem es das göttliche Gesetz durchsetzt<sup>54</sup>. Götter, Dämonen und Seelen helfen bei diesem Werk der Gerechtigkeit<sup>55</sup>. Wie Philoponos und Johannes Damascenus übereinstimmend überliefern, ist es das Verdienst der proklischen Providenzschrift, gezeigt zu haben, daß die schöpferische und providentielle Macht Gottes bis zu den äußersten und feinsten Enden der Schöpfung reicht<sup>56</sup>.

Proklos hat diese Zweiheit auch als zwei kosmische Umdrehungen beschrieben, die an die oben erwähnte augustinische Zweiteilung der Providenz erinnert: Die eine ist rein intellektuell und hat eine für die Seelen anagogische

51 Jamblich, *De mysteriis*, III 16: "Ἦκει δὴ οὖν εἰς ταὐτὸ τῷ τῆς δημιουργίας καὶ προνοίας τῶν θεῶν λόγῳ καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς μαντικῆς ἀπολογισμός.

52 Jamblich, *De mysteriis*, III 19: μὴ δυνάμενοι γὰρ μαθεῖν ὅστις ὁ τρόπος αὐτῶν, τὰς τε ἀνθρώπων φροντίδας καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν ἀποκρίνοντες, καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀναιροῦσιν ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὴν πρόνοιάν τε καὶ δημιουργίαν.

53 Jamblich, *Theologumena arithmeticae*, hg.v. V. de Falco (Leipzig: Teubner, 1922), S.45: τὰ κακὰ ἄρα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνεται.

54 Proclus, *In Platonis Rempublicam Commentaria*, hg.v. W. Kroll (Leipzig: Teubner, 1901, repr. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1965), I S.98: καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῆς εἰμαρμένης ποίησις τῆς δημιουργικῆς ἐξέχεται προνοίας, καὶ ἡ τῆς δίκης σειρά περὶ ἐκείνην ὑφέστηκεν καὶ ἔπεται τοῖς ἐκείνου ὄροις, τοῦ θεοῦ νόμου τιμωρὸς οὖσα, φησὶν ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ξένος. Cf. auch Olympiodor, *In Platonis Gorgiam*, hg.v. L.G. Westerink (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970), 39,1, S.198: καὶ γὰρ ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἐκ τῆς προνοίας ἦρτηται.

55 Proclus, *In Platonis Rempublicam Commentaria*, II S.135.

56 Johannes Philoponos, *De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum*, hg.v. H. Rabe (Leipzig: Teubner, 1899, repr. 1963), S.91: καὶ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ δὲ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πρόκλου χρήσεις παρεθέμεθα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ περὶ τῶν δέκα πρὸς τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀπορημάτων, ἐν αἷς σαφῶς τὴν δημιουργικὴν τε καὶ προνοητικὴν. τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμιν μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων καὶ λεπτοτάτων διήκειν ὁ Πρόκλος ἀποφαίνεται. Cf. Johannes Damascenus, *Expositio fidei*, ed P.B. Kotter (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1973), S.42.

Funktion, die andere führt im Gegensatz dazu in die Welt der Natur hinein, die eine ist unsichtbar und durch die göttliche Providenz gelenkt, die andere ist sichtbar und stellt die Entfaltung der natürlichen Providenz in der Ordnung der Heimarmene dar<sup>57</sup>.

Die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Sichtbaren und dem Unsichtbaren gilt auch im Hinblick auf den Menschen selbst: Die physischen Eigenschaften wie Schönheit oder Größe der Gestalt sind Geschenke der Heimarmene oder der Natur, die das Seelenheil und eine höhere Lebensart bewirkenden Kräfte dagegen sind die Keimkräfte der göttlichen Providenz<sup>58</sup>. So ergibt sich ganz allgemein: Die Heimarmene ist die für die Welt des sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren zuständige Providenz, die von der unsichtbaren der Götter abhängig ist<sup>59</sup>. Die Heimarmene ist dabei auch der Inbegriff für die in der göttlichen Schöpfungsprovidenz präexistierenden notwendigen Gesetze der Natur und des Sittlichen, die als Naturgesetze und Sittengesetze den einzelnen Seelen a priori eingepflanzt werden<sup>60</sup>.

Wiederum anders und sehr aufschlußreich auch im Hinblick auf die Lehre vom Einen ist die Bemerkung Proklos', daß die eine Providenz des Göttlichen ganz transzendent gegenüber dem von ihr Umsorgten ist, während die andere den Charakter des „Koordinierten“ hat<sup>61</sup>. Diese Lehre hat ihre Entsprechung, oder sollten wir sagen: ihren Grund in der Ontologie: Im Parmenideskommentar hat Proklos in Auseinandersetzung mit der Theorie des historischen Parmenides das absolute Eine als das „Transzendente“ (*exhairemenon*), d.h als das Zusammenhanglose definiert, dem das „Hen on“

57 Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, hg.v. H.D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1987), v, S.92: Διττάς τοίνυν ὁ Ἑλεάτης ξένος τῷ παντί τούτῳ κόσμῳ διδούς ἀνακυκλήσεις, ὡς καί πρότερον ἐλέγομεν, τὴν μὲν νοεράν καὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἀναγωγόν, τὴν δὲ εἰς φύσιν πορευομένην καὶ τὰναντία τῇ πρόσθεν ἀποδιδούσαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀφανῆ καὶ προνοία θεία κυβερνωμένην, τὴν δὲ ἐμφανῆ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἰμαρμένης τάξιν ἀνελισσομένην.

58 Proclus, *Sur le Premier Alcibiade*, 134,1–14, 1, S.111.

59 Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum*, III, S.274: ὁ Πλάτων [...] μονοουχὶ διαρρήδην λέγων, ὅτι ταύτην εἰμαρμένην <ε>νόμιζε, τὴν προσεχῶς κινούσαν τὸ αἰσθητόν, ἐξηρητημένην τῆς ἀφανοῦς προνοίας τῶν θεῶν· Cf. Olympiodor, *In Platonis Gorgiam*, c.39,1.

60 Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum*, III S.274–275: εἰ οὖν κατὰ νόμους εἰμαρμένους ἄγουσι τὰς ψυχὰς, εἰσὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς οἱ εἰμαρμένοι νόμοι, προὑπάρχοντες μὲν ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ νοερώς (παρ' αὐτῷ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἴδρυται νόμος), ὑπάρχοντες δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς θεαῖς ψυχαῖς (κατὰ γὰρ τούτους ποδηγετοῦσι τὸ πᾶν), μετεχόμενοι δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν μερικῶν ψυχῶν.

61 Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 141: Πᾶσα πρόνοια θεῶν ἢ μὲν ἐξηρημένη τῶν προνοουμένων ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ συντεταγμένη. Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, hg.v. H.D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1997), VI, S.77: Διττὴν γὰρ κἀν τοῖς θεοῖς αὐτοῖς ὁρώμεν τὴν ἐνέργειαν, τὴν μὲν συντεταγμένην τοῖς προνοουμένοις, τὴν δὲ ἐξηρημένην καὶ χωριστήν.

als das „Koordinierte“, d.h. als das mit dem Vielen irgendwie Verbundene gegenübersteht<sup>62</sup>.

Nach Hermias, dem Zeitgenossen des Proklos, sind die Schöpfungsprovidenz und die Vergeltungsprovidenz zwei unterschiedliche Aspekte desselben: Die Schöpfungsprovidenz hat den Charakter des Existenzstiftenden (*hypostatike*), die Vergeltungsprovidenz dagegen stiftet das „Heil“ (*sostike*). Mit dem Letzteren knüpft Hermias an Porphyrios' Vorstellung vom universalen Weg zum Heil der Seele an<sup>63</sup>.

Am deutlichsten hat Hierokles von Alexandrien die These von der doppelten Providenz Gottes vertreten. In seiner Schrift *Über die Providenz*, von der wir Teile bei Photius überliefert haben, knüpft er an Platons Lehre von Gott als dem Schöpfer und Vater aller Dinge an. Seine Königsherrschaft besteht in seiner Providenz, die jeder Gattung das ihr Zukommende zuteilt. Das dieser Verfügung aber folgende Recht wird Heimarmene genannt. Sie ist die Providenz im Sinne der Vergeltung, die auf die freien und selbstmächtigen Handlungen der Menschen reagiert, d.h. sie korrigiert<sup>64</sup>. Die Vergeltung aber wird göttlicherseits in die Hände ätherischer Wesen, also der Engel gelegt, die von Gott als Richter eingesetzt werden und die Sorge um uns naturgemäß übernehmen<sup>65</sup>. Da, wie Hierokles bemerkenswerterweise sagt, die providentielle Beurteilung, die mit Recht und Gesetz die menschlichen Dinge ordnet, unserer Freiheit bedarf, die Heimarmene aber die Antwort auf unsere freien Handlungen ist, muß die Heimarmene, d.h. das rechtsprechende Verhältnis zu den menschlichen Seelen als ein Teil der göttlichen Providenz angesehen werden<sup>66</sup>.

62 Proclus, *In Platonis Parmenidem*, 714,5 [711,21].

63 Hermias, *In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, hg.v. C.M. Lucarini, C. Moreschini (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 2, S.146: Καὶ ἡ πρόνοια μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ δημιουργεῖ καὶ ἡ δημιουργία προνοεῖ· ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς διενήνοχεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ὑποστατικὴ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἡ δὲ σωστικὴ. Cf. auch S.238: διττὴ οὖν ἡ πρόνοια· ἡ αὐτὴ ἢ ἰδικῶς ἢ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ἡ διὰ τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἐντοπίων θεῶν. Cf. Augustinus, *De civitate Dei*, x 32.

64 Hierokles, *Peri Pronoias* (bei Photius, *Bibliotheka*, hg.v. R. Henry (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1959–1991), cod. 251, 461b): πάντων δὲ βασιλεύειν τὸν ποιητὴν αὐτῶν θεὸν καὶ πατέρα, καὶ ταύτην τὴν πατρονομικὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ πρόνοιαν εἶναι τὴν ἐκάστῳ γένει τὰ προσήκοντα νομοθετοῦσαν, τὴν δὲ αὐτῆ ἐπομένην δίκην εἰμαρμένην καλεῖσθαι: [...] οἴονται τινες, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἐκβαινόντων κατὰ τὸν τῆς προνοίας θεσμὸν δικαστικὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργειαν, τάξει καὶ εἰρμῶ πρὸς τὰς προαιρετικὰς ὑποθέσεις τῶν αὐτεξουσίων ἔργων ἐπανορθουμένην τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς.

65 Hierokles, *Peri Pronoias* (bei Photius, *Bibliotheka*, cod. 251, 462b): Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸ λειπόμενον, τὰς μὲν προαιρέσεις ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι, τὰς δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς προαιρέσεσι δικαίας ἀμοιβὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰθερίοις κείσθαι ὡς ὑπὸ θεοῦ τεταγμένοις δικασταῖς καὶ πεφυκόσιν ἡμῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

66 Hierokles, *Peri Pronoias* (bei Photius, *Bibliotheka*, cod. 251, 462b): καὶ ἡ προνοητικὴ κρίσις, δίκη καὶ νόμῳ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τάττουσα, τῆς αὐτεξουσίᾳ ἡμῶν καὶ προαιρετικῆς ἀρχῆς δεῖται.

Was – wenn man so sagen kann – den Zuständigkeitsbereich der göttlichen Providenz angeht, so ergibt sich ein auffälliger Unterschied zur Lehre des Proklos, mit dem Hierokles sonst Vieles gemeinsam hat: „Die Tiere und Pflanzen sind der göttlichen Vorsehung entzogen“, hier herrscht der Zufall (*hōstychē*), sagt Hierokles<sup>67</sup>, während nach Proklos die Kompetenz der göttlichen Providenz bis zu den äußersten Enden des Universums und das bedeutet: bis zur Pflanzenwelt und toten Körperwelt reicht<sup>68</sup>.

Die göttliche Providenz im Sinne der *providentia gubernatrix* ist ihrem weitesten Begriff nach die Lenkung des Universums. Sie ist in diesem Sinne Gegenstand der Ersten Philosophie, d.h. der Metaphysik<sup>69</sup>. Es ist der „Theologe“, d.h. der Metaphysiker, der die Frage erörtert, ob alles aus Notwendigkeit geschieht oder auch aus Zufall, und wenn alles notwendigerweise geschieht, ob dann die Gründe für unsere Fehler in der Heimarmene, d.h. der *providentia gubernatrix* liegen oder, wenn doch Einiges in unserer Macht liegt im Sinne des *eph' hemin*, ob wir dann nicht als autonome Wesen Sorge zu tragen haben für unsere Ausbildung und Moralität<sup>70</sup>. Nur unter dieser Voraussetzung der Freiheit des Menschen kann die lenkende Providenz auch als Straf- oder Vergeltungsprovidenz gedacht werden, die die Taten der Menschen nach ihrer

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“Ὡστε μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς ὅλης προνοίας ἡ εἰμαρμένη τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχὰς δικαστικῶς ἀρμοζόμενον.

67 W. Theiler, „Ammonios der Lehrer des Origenes“, in: Cf. Hierokles, *In Aureum Pythagoreorum Carmen Commentarius*, hg.v. F.W. Koehler (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1974), XI 28, S.51. Cf. Hierokles, *Peri Pronoias* (bei Photius, *Bibliotheka*, cod. 251, 466 a).

68 Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, hg.v. H. Boese (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960), 45: πάντως δήπου καὶ ὁ τῆς προνοίας λόγος ἔσται ἐν τούτοις ὁμοίος καὶ κοινὸς ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν [...]. cf. auch Anm. 42! Tatsächlich heißt es in Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, V 102: δύνανται καὶ πρόνοιαν, ἄνωθεν ἄχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων τοῦ παντὸς διήκουσαν· Cf. Proclus, *Sur le Premier Alcibiade*, I 53,21, S.44.

69 Cf. Ammonios, *In Aristotelis librum De interpretatione commentarius*, hg.v. A. Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1897), S.131: ζητήσει γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεολόγος κατὰ τὴν τρόπον ὑπὸ τῆς προνοίας διακυβερνᾶται τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πράγματα.

70 Ammonios, *In Aristotelis De interpretatione*, S.130–131: ζητήσει γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεολόγος κατὰ τὴν τρόπον ὑπὸ τῆς προνοίας διακυβερνᾶται τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πράγματα, καὶ εἴτε πάντα ὠρισμένως καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα, καθάπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰδίων ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ ἔστι τινὰ καὶ ἐνδεχομένως ἐκβαίνοντα, ὧν τὴν γένεσιν ἐπὶ μερικὰς δηλονότι καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐχούσας αἰτίας ἀνάγειν ἀνάγκη. καὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς πάντοτε ἰδιωτικῶς διακειμένους τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐρήσεις ἀμελοῦντας τῆς περὶ τούτου τοῦ θεωρήματος ἐνοίας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ὡς πάντων ἐξ ἀνάγκης γινομένων τὰς αἰτίας ὧν ἀμαρτάνουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν εἰμαρμένην ἢ τὴν πρόνοιαν τὴν τε θεῖαν καὶ τὴν δαιμονίαν ἀναφέρειν πειρωμένους, καθάπερ ὁ ἀπαιδεύτως παρ' Ὀμήρῳ λέγων ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἰτίος εἰμι, ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἡεροφοῖτις Ἐρινύς, ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἡεροφοῖτις Ἐρινύς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ὄντων τινῶν καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀπομαχομένους μὲν τοῖς πάντα ἀναγκάζουσιν ἀξιούντας δὲ ἡμᾶς ὡς αὐτοκινήτους παιδείας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι.

Würdigkeit vergilt<sup>71</sup>. Von dieser Vergeltungsprovidenz scheint der gesamte spätere Neuplatonismus zu sprechen<sup>72</sup>.

Nach Philoponos kümmert sich die göttliche Providenz nicht nur um unser Sein, d.h. um unsere Existenz im Sinne der *providentia conditrix* oder *naturalis*, sondern auch um unser Gutsein im Sinne der *providentia voluntaria*, die auch die ins Widernatürliche abgeglittene Seele nicht vernachlässigt, sondern ihrer Sorge teilhaftig werden läßt, indem sie ihr die Gelegenheit zur Selbstreinigung gibt<sup>73</sup>.

Die Schöpfungsprovidenz (*demiurgike pronoia*) definiert Simplikios in diesem Zusammenhang als die mit der göttlichen Güte koexistierende schöpferische Tätigkeit, durch die der Demiurg dem Universum die Ordnung verschafft hat<sup>74</sup>.

Wie Simplikios berichtet, ist der Gedanke einer lenkenden Providenz auf die alten Mythenerzähler zurückzuführen, nach denen das Meer ein Symbol der Entstehung der Seelen war. Das Schiff, das die Seelen zur Entstehung brachte, steht dabei für das zugeteilte Los (Moirā) oder das unentrinnbare Schicksal (Heimarmene) oder wie man es sonst nennen soll. Der Lenker des Schiffes aber ist Gott, der das All lenkt und durch seine Providenz die Entstehung der Seelen und die entsprechende Vergeltung regelt<sup>75</sup>.

71 Cf. Ammonios, *In Aristotelis Categorias commentarius*, hg.v. A. Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1895), S.78: ἴσμεν ὅτι ἔστι πρόνοια ἀπονέμουσα ἐκάστη ψυχῇ ἀμοιβὴν τῶν πράξεων.

72 Cf. Ammonios, *In Aristotelis Categorias*, S.78: ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθές ἄπαντες ἴσμεν ὅτι ἔστι πρόνοια ἀπονέμουσα ἐκάστη ψυχῇ ἀμοιβὴν τῶν πράξεων [...]. Cf. Johannes Philoponos, *In Aristotelis Categorias commentarius*, hg.v. A. Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1898), S.127: καὶ εἰ οὐδεὶς τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπολύφεται, οὐκ ἔσται πρόνοια. Johannes Philoponos, *In Aristotelis Analytica priora commentaria*, hg.v. M. Wallies (Berlin: Reimer, 1905), S.38: εἰ δὲ οὐ τυγχάνει τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀνήρηται πρόνοια. Cf. Hierokles, *Peri Pronoias* (bei Photius, *Bibliotheka*, cod. 251, 465b): ἦν ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἐπιτελεῖν λέγεται, κρίσις θεία οὐσα ἐν τοῖς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν ἀμοιβὴν τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Olympiodor, *In Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria* 2,7: ἐτέρου δὲ τοῦ εἶναι πρόνοιαν τὰ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονέμουσαν ἐκάστῳ, Cf. später auch z.B. Albert der Große, *In IV Sententiarum*, hg.v. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1894), d. 43, a.1, S.498: *Primum est de iustitia et providentia, quae ordinat quamlibet naturam secundum gradum suae dignitatis*.

73 Johannes Philoponos, *In Aristotelis libros de anima*, S.17: οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἡμῶν φροντίζει ἡ πρόνοια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι. διὸ οὐκ ἀμελεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐξολισθήσασα, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει τῆς προσηκούσης ἐπιμελείας, καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτῇ διὰ γλυκυθυμίας ἐγένετο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ καθαρθῆναι δι' ἀλγύνσεως αὐτῇ γενήσεται.

74 Simplikios, *In Aristotelis Physicorum libros commentaria*, hg.v. H. Diels (Berlin: Reimer, 1882), S.704: εἰ γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἀγαθότητα δημιουργεῖ, ἡ δὲ ἀγαθότης αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ τελεία καὶ ἐνεργὸς ἐστὶ καὶ τῷ εἶναι πάντα ἀγαθώνει, δῆλον ὅτι τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγαθότητι συνυφέστηκεν ἡ δημιουργικὴ πρόνοια. ἐνδείκνυται δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον, ὅτι κόσμου καὶ τάξεως ὁ δημιουργὸς αἰτιὸς ἐστὶ τῷ παντί.

75 Simplikios, *Commentarius in Epicteti enchiridion*, hg.v. I. Hadot (Leiden / New York: Brill, 1996), S.13: Τὴν μὲν γὰρ θάλασσαν διὰ τὸ ἐμβριθές καὶ κλυδαινόμενον καὶ παντοίως μεταβαλλόμενον καὶ πνίγον τούς καταδύοντας εἰς αὐτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως ἀνα{λογία} καὶ οἱ

Wie Johannes von Damaskus später sicher ganz in neuplatonischem Sinne sagt, ist die Providenz im allgemeinen Sinne nichts Anderes als die Sorge Gottes um das Seiende<sup>76</sup>. Doch gerade bei diesem Begriff der Sorge kann der Unterschied zwischen der christlichen und nichtchristlichen Konzeption der göttlichen Providenz deutlich werden. Bei Simplikios nämlich treffen beide Konzeptionen aufeinander.

Auch wenn die Providenz als Sorge Gottes um den Menschen bezeichnet wird, darf man sie nach dem letzten Vertreter der platonischen Akademie nicht so vorstellen, als wendete sich Gott den Menschen zu, wie er sich auch nicht abwendet. Das geht aus einer Auseinandersetzung des Simplikios mit der christlichen Verzeihenslehre hervor, die an anderer Stelle entfaltet ist<sup>77</sup>. Für den Providenzbegriff ergibt sich aus dieser Auseinandersetzung, daß die göttliche Sorge-Providenz nicht eine Annäherung an die menschlichen Dinge beinhaltet. Wenn der Mensch sittliche Verfehlungen begeht, „ziehen wir uns selbst von dort weg“, ohne doch der alles durchdringenden göttlichen Providenz entrinnen zu können. Vielmehr verschaffen wir uns, wenn wir an der Krankheit der Schlechtigkeit leiden, am ehesten Zugang zur Heilung, die im Recht besteht, wenn wir uns der göttlichen Providenz und Sorge würdig machen, und genau das meint Platons berühmte Rede von der *Homoiosis Theo*. Wer dagegen diese unsere Hinwendung zu Gott als seine Hinwendung zu uns versteht – wie die Christen es tun – dem ergeht es so wie gewissen Schiffbrüchigen, die ein Seil um einen Felsen werfen, um sich und das Boot dem Felsen zu nähern und dabei der irrigen Meinung verfallen, daß nicht sie sich dem Felsen näherten, sondern der Felsen zu ihnen käme. In diesem Bild entsprechen die Reue, das Gebet und das Bittflehen dem Seil, denn durch sie vollzieht sich die „Hinwendung“<sup>78</sup>. Hinwendung im Sinne der *epistrophé*

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παλαιοὶ μυθοπλαστοὶ τῆς γενέσεως ἔλεγον σύμβολον. Τὸ δὲ πλοῖον εἶη ἂν τὸ διακομίζον εἰς τὴν γένεσιν τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ εἶτε μοῖραν, εἶτε εἰμαρμένην, εἶτε ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ καλεῖν χρή. Ὁ δὲ κυβερνήτης τοῦ πλοίου εἶη ἂν ὁ θεός, ὁ καὶ τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὴν εἰς γένεσιν κάθοδον τῶν ψυχῶν ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ προνοίαις πρὸς τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπευθύνων τε καὶ κυβερνῶν.

76 Johannes Damascenus, *Expositio fidei*, S.43: Πρόνοια τοῖνον ἐστὶν ἐκ θεοῦ εἰς τὰ ὄντα γινόμενη ἐπιμέλεια.

77 Cf. Th. Kobusch, *Selbstwerdung und Personalität. Spätantike Philosophie und ihr Einfluß auf die Moderne* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018), Kap. xvii.

78 Simplikios, *Commentarius in Epicteti enchiridion*, 360,683–392,703. Das schöne Bild ist aufgenommen worden von Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, *Von den göttlichen Dingen*, hg.v. W. Jaeschke (Hamburg: Meiner, 2000), 41,28–42,02: „So macht Simplicius, in seiner Auslegung des Epictet, wider gewisse Leute, die sich über die Zukehrung des Menschen zu Gott so ausdrückten, als wenn Gott, vom Menschen abgewendet, sich erst zu ihm wenden müßte, die Anmerkung: es ginge ihnen hiebey wie denen, die ein Schiffseil um einen Felsen am Ufer würfen, und da sie sich und ihr Boot an demselben Ufer hinan zögen,



ist so – nach Simplikios – die Sache allein des Menschen bzw. des „Geistes“. Die göttliche Straf- oder Vergeltungsprovidenz ist nach dem nichtchristlichen Neuplatonismus keine Hinwendung zu den Menschen. Vielmehr ist für den paganen Philosophen der Gedanke einer Hinwendung Gottes zum Niedrigen skandalös. Die göttliche Hinwendung zum Menschen ist für den christlichen Philosophen ein Zeichen der Vollkommenheit Gottes, für den paganen Neuplatoniker ein Zeichen der Unvollkommenheit. Vor fast sechzig Jahren schrieb schon P. Aubin in diesem Sinne: „On sent très bien que la pensée philosophique de cette époque répugne à répudier systématiquement toute ‚conversion‘ *ad inferiora* (...) mais nous n’avons pas trouvé d’auteur païen qui ose parler explicitement d’E- [i.e. ἐπιστροφή] de Dieu vers l’homme. (...) Tout E- [i.e. ἐπιστροφή] vers l’inférieur marque finalement une imperfection“<sup>79</sup>.

### 3 Konklusion

Die Lehre von der doppelten göttlichen Providenz, der *providentia naturalis* und der *providentia voluntaria*, die bei Berthold von Moosburg unter der Voraussetzung der Differenz von Philosophie und Theologie entwickelt wird, ist auf Dietrich von Freiberg zurückführbar. Die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Natürlichen und dem Willensmäßigen, die in den lateinischen Ausdrücken mit enthalten ist, stammt von Augustinus. Was bei diesen christlichen Denkern als Gründungsprovidenz und Erhaltungs- oder Rettungsprovidenz erscheint, das war im Neuplatonismus als demiurgische Providenz und Vergeltungsprovidenz (Dike, Heimarmene) vorgebildet worden.

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einfältig genug wären zu meinen, daß sie nicht sich dem Felsen näherten, sondern der Felsen allmählig zu ihnen käme“.

79 Cf. P. Aubin, *Le problème de la conversion. Étude sur un terme commun à l'hellénisme et au christianisme des trois premiers siècles* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1963), S.192–193.

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## *Regna duo duorum.* Berthold of Moosburg's Theory of Providence and Fate

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Berthold's reflections on providence were part of a lively debate which took place in Germany between the mid-13th century and the third quarter of the 14th century, involving the chief German theologians of the Dominican Order: Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strassburg, Dietrich of Freiberg, and Meister Eckhart.

The centrality of natural providence in the philosophy of Berthold of Moosburg is unquestionable. In a well-known and oft-cited locus of the *Expositio tituli*, Berthold states that the subject of the *Elementatio theologica* is the universe (*universitas*) of divine things considered in their procession from, and their return to, the Highest Good within the order of natural providence. The *ratio subiecti* of this theological science is the Divine Good, which belongs in a simple, causal, and primary way to the First Principle of all things, whereas it resides relatively (*in attributione ad ipsum*) in divine things *per essentiam* and *per participationem*. Therefore, it can be affirmed that the subject of the *Elementatio theologica* is the Divine Good according to natural providence.<sup>1</sup>

1 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, eds. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), *Expositio tituli* I, p. 46, l. 319–p. 47, l. 342: *Et quia totus iste liber tractat de rerum divinarum universitate secundum processum eius a summo bono et regressum in ipsum, et hoc secundum dispositionem et proprios modos earum inditos ipsis rebus divinis ab eo, quod est divinum principaliformiter sive secundum causam, et hoc secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, non iam proprie voluntariae, iuxta distinctionem Augustini VIII Super Genesim ad litteram, necesse est omnia convenire, de quibus hic tractatur, in una ratione subiecti, propter quam etiam ista philosophia est una scientia. Quod subiectum vocetur, sicut et vere est, bonum divinum, quod simpliciter et absolute causaliter seu principaliformiter convenit omnium primo principio, reliquis autem bonis, puta divinis per essentiam et per participationem, in attributione ad ipsum, et hoc quantum ad modos attributionis, quos distinguit Averroes super principium IV Metaphysicae, scilicet ut ad efficiens primum et finem ultimum nec non ut accidentia ad subiectum. [...] Ex praedictis apparet, quod bonum divinum secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis est subiectum huius libri, quod exprimitur per li: ELEMENTATIO THEOLOGICA. See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Exp. tit. I*, p. 45, l. 280–281: *Materialis quidem subiectiva, quia in ipso tractatur per elementorum coordinationem de bono divino secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis.* The*

Elsewhere, Berthold maintains more straightforwardly that the act of natural providence is the subject of this book.<sup>2</sup> By contrast, voluntary providence is said to be the subject of dogmatic theology<sup>3</sup> and is usually exemplified by the Dionysian hierarchy, the angels, and their hierarchical mutual operations.<sup>4</sup>

Unsurprisingly, therefore, when it comes to providence, modern scholars have mainly devoted their attention to the concept of twofold providence (*gemina providentia*), first theorized by Augustine in Book VIII of *De Genesi ad litteram*,<sup>5</sup> and originally reformulated by Ulrich of Strassburg (*De summo bono*

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source of the longer quotation is a locus of Dietrich's *De subiecto theologiae*, the only difference being the fact that, unlike Berthold, Dietrich is concerned with defining the subject of theology, not philosophy: see *De subiecto theologiae*, ed. L. Sturlese, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3. *Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, eds J.-D. Cavigioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 3-9, p. 281, l. 100–p. 282, l. 109. On the locus of the *De subiecto theologiae* and Dietrich's notion of twofold providence, see L. Sturlese, "Introduzione" to Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 184–211. De animabus*, ed. L. Sturlese (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), p. xv–xcii, at p. xxvi–xxxiv; L. Sturlese, "Il *De animatione caeli* di Teodorico di Freiberg", in R. Creytens, P. Künzle (eds), *Xenia Medii Aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppli O. P.*, 2 vols (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1978), vol. 1, p. 175–247, at p. 183–201; A. de Libera, *Introduzione alla mistica renana* (Milano: Jaca Book, 1998), ch. 7, p. 244–246; L. Sturlese, *Storia delle filosofia tedesca nel Medioevo. Il secolo XIII* (Firenze: Olschki, 1996), p. 204–213.

2 See below, n. 31.

3 Berthold, *Expositio, Praeambulum*, p. 53, l. 19–20: *theologia, quae est de bono divino secundum ordinem providentiae voluntariae, fundatur in principiis creditis, quae sunt articuli fidei Christianae.*

4 Interestingly, Berthold inverts the usual scheme when he first refers to twofold providence, for he quotes a passage from Dionysius' *De divinis nominibus* to illustrate the *invisibilia Dei transitive accepta* according to natural providence – these are the primordial causes and their effects, which are both the subject of the *Elementatio theologiae* – whereas he cites a text from Proclus' *De malorum subsistentia* to clarify the *invisibilia Dei* belonging to voluntary providence: see *Expositio, Prologus* 5–6, p. 13, l. 251–278. The latter text is also used to illustrate voluntary providence elsewhere: see Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), 161C, p. 12, l. 46–53.

5 Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim*, ed. J. Zycha (Praha / Wien / Leipzig: Tempsky, 1894), VIII.9, p. 243, l. 25–p. 244, l. 18: *hinc iam in ipsum mundum uelut in quandam magnam arborem rerum oculus cogitationis adtollitur atque in ipso quoque gemina operatio prouidentiae reperitur, partim naturalis, partim uoluntaria. Et naturalis quidem per occultam dei administrationem, qua etiam lignis et herbis dat incrementum, uoluntaria uero per angelorum opera et hominum; secundum illam primam caelestia superius ordinari inferius que terrestria, luminaria sidera que fulgere, diei noctis que uices agitari, aquis terram fundatam interlui atque circumlui, aere altius superfundi, arbusta et animalia concipi et nasci, crescere, senescere, occidere et quidquid aliud in rebus interiore naturali que motu geritur; in hac autem altera signa dari, doceri et disci, agros coli, societates administrari, artes exerceri et quaeque alia siue in superna societate aguntur siue in hac terrena atque mortali, ita ut bonis consulatur et per*

11.5.18) and Dietrich of Freiberg (in several works). It has therefore been argued that Berthold aligned himself with his Dominican predecessors who made recourse to twofold providence as an epistemological tool aimed at separating the fields of philosophy and theology.<sup>6</sup> This line of interpretation is defective, however, because it ends up neglecting other important aspects of Berthold's theory of providence.

Furthermore, by exclusively focusing its attention on twofold providence, modern scholarship is inclined to read Berthold's conceptions through the filter of the views of his predecessors, who attached fundamental importance to Augustine's distinction between natural and voluntary providence. Even though it cannot be denied that Berthold was indebted to both Ulrich and Dietrich,<sup>7</sup> it must nevertheless be pointed out that his analysis advances

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*nescientes malos; in que ipso homine eandem geminam prouidentiae uigere potentiam: primo erga corpus naturalem, scilicet eo motu, quo fit, quo crescit, quo senescit; uoluntariam uero, quo illa ad uictum, tegumentum curationem que consulitur.*

- 6 Sturlese, "Il *De animatione cael*", p. 193–196; K. Flasch, "Einleitung", in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologica. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13*, p. xi–xxxvii, at p. xxxi–xxxii; G.L. Potestà, "Per laboriosam investigationem ascendendo. L'edizione di Bertoldo di Moosburg", in *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 76(1984), p. 637–643, at p. 642; R. Imbach, "Au-delà de la métaphysique. Notule sur l'importance du *Commentaire* de Berthold de Moosburg O.P sur les *Éléments de théologie*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2019), p. 376–393, at p. 380–381; A. Beccarisi, "Einleitung", in Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6*, ed. A. Beccarisi (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), p. vii–xx, at p. xix–xx. By contrast, W. Eckert, "Berthold von Moosburg O.P. Ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik im Spätmittelalter", in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 65(1957), p. 120–133, at p. 133, argues that the distinction between the two providences is aimed at using theological principles to explain Proclean thought, since philosophy and theology – which are identified by the two providential orders – deal with the same subject, the Highest One considered from two different points of view. According to de Libera, *Introduzione alla mistica renana*, p. 246–247, n. 24, even though twofold providence serves to provide the distinction between philosophy and theology with a systematic foundation, Proclus is both a philosopher and a theologian and brings together the methods of both disciplines.
- 7 I draw attention to a hitherto overlooked passage from Albert's *Summa theologiae*: Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae. Pars prima*, ed. A. Borgnet, *Opera omnia*, vol. 31 (Paris: Vivès, 1894), Ia, tr. 17, q. 68, m. 3, p. 703b–704a: *Sunt alia per duos ordines causarum a prouidentia descendentia, scilicet per ordinem causarum naturalium [...]. Est iterum ordo causarum in his quae descendunt a prouidentia per liberum arbitrium*. See also Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, Ia, tr. 17, q. 68, m. 1, p. 695a. Even though a textual dependence seems improbable, it cannot be excluded that the text was known by and influenced Berthold. As is well known, the *Summa theologiae* was one of the most prominent sources in Berthold's *Exposition on the Elements of Theology*. See L. Sturlese, "Rec. a Alberti Magni *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei, Libri I pars 1, Quaestiones 1–50A*", ed. D. Siedler, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1978", in *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* 10(1980), p. 1691–1698, at p. 1693–1697. The complex ways in which the *Summa theologiae* was used by Berthold have been carefully



original concepts, deals with hitherto unexplored issues, and put forward innovative solutions. In a word, Berthold faced the intellectual challenge posed by Proclus' *Opuscula*, from which he derived key elements, such as the threefold One or Good (*secundum causam, per essentiam, secundum participationem*), the theory of the two *regna* (providence and fate), providential knowledge (*cognitio providentialis*), etc. The *Elements of Theology* also offers a complex and articulate theory of providence, giving Berthold the opportunity to discuss crucial questions, such as how providence differently resides in the One-Good and in the rest of reality and how it transcends the things for which it provides. Even though he was familiar with Proclus' masterpiece, Dietrich of Freiberg did not deal with these topics.



In what follows, I intend to explore some of the issues which Berthold discusses with regard to providence. In particular, I will devote my attention to the dialectical relationship between the domains of providence and fate. As we will see, the delineation of the two realms is made possible by the adoption of two different approaches to providence, one top-down and the other bottom-up. It is within this specific doctrinal context that I will *also* refer to the concept of twofold providence.

My analysis will focus on Berthold's commentary on a few particularly relevant Propositions (141, 120, 122, and 34) in an attempt to reconstruct the main steps in Berthold's reflections on providence. Attention will be given to several sources (Proclus' *Opuscula*, Boethius' *De consolatione philosophiae*, Ulrich's *De summo bono*, Cicero's *De natura deorum*) that Berthold quotes from, in addition to the *Elements of Theology*.

## 1 The Complexity of Providence: The *Tabula contentorum*

The starting point of my analysis is the *Tabula contentorum* at the end of the *Expositio*, a document usually neglected by Berthold scholars. The *Tabula* is a list of the main topics discussed by Berthold and includes references to the

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studied by M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, "À propos du néoplatonisme d'Albert le Grand. Aventures et mésaventures de quelques textes d'Albert dans le Commentaire sur Proclus de Berthold de Moosburg", in *Archives de Philosophie* 43(1980), p. 635–654; E. King, "Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus. Vol. 1*, p. 395–437, at p. 401–410.

numbers of the propositions where these topics are discussed. Whether compiled by Berthold himself or by someone else, at his request, this is a valuable hermeneutical tool, as it provides specific access to the text *ad mentem auctoris*.<sup>8</sup>

#### PROVIDENTIA, PROVIDERE

Quod quidam negaverunt providentiam esse 120 (D). Ostenditur multipliciter providentiam esse. Quod omnis deus in sua existentia habet totum providere (F). Quod providentia primitus est in diis (I). Quid sit providentia (D). Quod providentia est duplex, scilicet naturalis et voluntaria (L). Quid sit ratio providendi (G). Quomodo providere conveniat pluribus (H).

De duplici providentia 121 (L).

Quod est prime providens 122 (A). Quod omne divinum est primum providens in sua universitate. Quod est inpausabiliter providens et universaliter. Que sit condicio provisorum.

Quod omne divinum providet essentialiter, universaliter et inpausabiliter seu incessabiliter. Provisorum diversificatio (D). Actus providendi difformis participatio (E). Actus providendi ad omnia eternalis extensio (F). Actus providendi primitus providentium condicio (G). Quod pervenit ad omnia intentioni providentis subiecta (H). Quod prime providens est exemptum a providentibus (I). Quid sit inmiscibilitas et inhabitualitas divinorum (K). Quod providentia et unialis excellentia conpatiuntur se (L). Quod excellentia non submittitur nec providentia exterminatur (M). Cognitionis intellectualis et providentialis differentia 134 (D). Item distinctio intelligendi et providendi (E). Quod omnis intellectus divinus providet ut deus (F).

Distinctio providentie in naturalem et voluntariam secundum Augustinum 141 (A). Providentie et fati distinctio (B). Omnis providentie causa et ratio et eius bipartita divisio (D). Providentie exempte modus et condicio (E). Providentie coordinate propria intentio (F). Quod in ordine providentie naturalis est duplex processus 146 B.<sup>9</sup>

The section entitled *Providentia, providere* is one of the longest in the *Tabula*, taking up almost a page and a half. The reader is struck by the number of

8 L. Sturlese, "Presentazione", in Berthold of Moosburg, *Tabula contentorum in Expositione super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, ed. A. Beccarisi (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2000), p. vii–xi, at p. x: "accesso puntuale al testo, per così dire, ad mentem auctoris".

9 Berthold of Moosburg, *Tabula contentorum*, p. 132–133.

topics related to providence: the existence of providence (“Quod quidam negaverunt providentiam esse”) and its definition (“Quid sit providentia”); how providence resides in the divine (e.g. “Omnis deus in sua existentia habet totum providere”, “Quod providentia primitus est in diis”, “Quod omne divinum est primum providens in sua universitate”, etc.); how inferior beings are subject to providence (“Que sit condicio provisorum”); the difference between knowledge according to providence and intellectual knowledge (“Cognitionis intellectualis et providentialis differentia”; “Item distinctio intelligendi et providendi”); the transcendence and universality of providence (“Actus providendi ad omnia eternalis extensio”; “Quod pervenit ad omnia intentioni providentis subiecta”; “Quod prime providens est exemptum a providentibus”; etc.), and so on. Considered within this large cluster of theologico-metaphysical themes, the concept of a twofold providence, which is referred to three times, it is only one important issue among several others.<sup>10</sup>

Moreover, the distinction Berthold draws between providence and fate (“Providentia et fati distinctio”, 141B) reveals a link to topics related to both the realm of celestial causality – evoked by such headings as “Peryodus, Peryodicum, Annus: De magno anno” (198 [F]) and *Astra*<sup>11</sup> – and the world of nature – referred to as *Natura*.<sup>12</sup> In other words, the providence-fate distinction allows us to identify a bottom-up perspective on providence and also conduct the analysis at the level of the philosophy of nature.

## 2 The Realm of Providence and the Realm of Fate

Proposition 141 (“Omnis providentia deorum haec quidem est exempta ab his, quibus providetur, haec autem coordinata”) is one of the most cited under the heading *Providentia, providere* in the *Tabula contentorum*. In the commentary on this proposition, Berthold addresses some of the most salient motifs in his theory of providence.

10 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Tabula contentorum*, p. 133, l. 584–585: *Quod providentia est duplex, scilicet naturalis et voluntaria (L)* [the correct reference would be to 120E]; l. 587: *De duplici providentia 121 (L)* [however, the reference is not to twofold providence, but to *cognitio providentiae*]; l. 603: *Distinctio providentiae in naturalem et voluntariam secundum Augustinum 141 (A)*.

11 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Tabula contentorum*, p. 119, l. 246–256; p. 17, l. 378–379; p. 22, l. 502–504.

12 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Tabula contentorum*, p. 98, l. 26–p. 99, l. 58. One should note that Berthold lists *Naturalis providentia* as the first item after *Natura*: p. 99, l. 59–61.

In the *suppositum*, he deals with the issue of twofold providence. It must be noted that in this case, in contrast with comments he makes elsewhere, Berthold does not evoke this concept for methodological reasons, that is, with a view to distinguishing *divinissima philosophia*, subject of the *Elementatio theologiae*, from Christian philosophy.

De primo sciendum, sicut aliquo modo dictum est super 120, duplex est providentia, naturalis scilicet et voluntaria. Et habetur ista distinctio ab Augustino VIII *Super Genesim ad litteram*, ubi dicit tractans illud verbum “ut operaretur et custodiret”: “Hinc iam in ipsum mundum velut in quandam magnam arborem rerum oculus cogitationis attollitur atque in ipso quoque gemina operatio providentiae reperitur, partim naturalis, partim voluntaria. Naturalis quidem per occultam Dei administrationem, quae et lignis et herbis dat incrementum, voluntaria vero per angelorum opera et hominum. Secundum illam primam caelestia superius ordinari inferii usque terrestria, lumina sideraque fulgere” – et infra – “et quidquid aliud in rebus interiore naturalique motu geritur. In hac autem altera signa dari, doceri et discere, agros coli, societates administrari, artes exerceri, et quaeque alia sive in superna societate aguntur sive in hac terrena atque mortali ita, ut bonis consolatur”. Et infra: “Deus itaque super omnia, qui condidit omnia et regit omnia, omnes naturas bonus creat, omnes voluntates iustus ordinat”. Haec Augustinus.<sup>13</sup>

Among the mentions of twofold providence scattered throughout Berthold's *Expositio*, this passage has two peculiarities. First, Berthold *directly* and *explicitly* quotes from the Book VIII of the *De Genesi ad litteram* – a rare occurrence in the *Expositio*. Secondly, this is the *only time* Augustine's text is cited extensively. As the consequence, natural providence is exemplified as the growing of trees and herbs, the order of celestial and terrestrial phenomena, the shining of lights and lightning, and whatever else takes place in things due to their intrinsic and natural movements. From all these examples, the physical character of natural providence clearly emerges. Whereas in the *Expositio tituli*, for instance, the order of natural providence coincides with the all-encompassing metaphysical movement of the procession from, and return to, the One, here natural providence is interpreted as the orderly structure of physical phenomena and in fact is the same as the realm of fate described in the passage from

13 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141A, p. 45, l. 11–24. As for the quotation of Augustine, see above, n. 5.

Proclus' *On Providence and Fate* (*De providentia et fato*) cited only a few pages later. This physical understanding of natural providence is made easier by a seemingly minimal, but in fact highly significant, divergence from *De Genesi ad litteram*; whereas Augustine refers to the twofold operation of a single providence (*gemina operatio providentiae*), Berthold mentions a twofold providence (*duplex est providentia*), thus paving the way for the identification of natural providence with what he would later define as "the realm of fate".

In all likelihood, Ulrich of Strassburg's *De summo bono* is the origin for the interpretation of natural providence as fate.

Dicit enim Augustinus VIII libro *Super Genesim*: "Gemina operatio providentiae reperitur: partim naturalis, per quam dat lignis et herbis incrementum, partim voluntaria per operationem angelorum et hominum". Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, quem philosophi determinant, scilicet quod primo sunt causae universales, scilicet caelestia et motus eorum, et sub illis sunt causae particulares. Cum ergo omnis artifex operans per instrumentum dispositionem artis instrumentis infundat, necessario dispositio divinae providentiae huic conexioni causarum infunditur. Haec ergo dispositio providentiae infusa toti isti conexioni causarum fatum vocatur, ut dicit Boethius, prout philosophi de fato loquuntur.<sup>14</sup>

In this text, Ulrich transforms what was originally an operation of providence into a natural order of causes which descend from the universal (i.e., the celestial bodies and their motions) to the particular. Even though this does not reach the explicit idea of a realm of fate, it comes a step closer by suggesting the existence of a structure that underpins the natural universe.

Ulrich's mention of Boethius' conception of fate is telling. Unsurprisingly, Berthold takes this clue and develops it further. In the *suppositum*, when it comes to clarifying the relationship between providence and fate, he quotes the classical *locus* from *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, Book IV, prose 6 dealing

14 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 263–p. 146, l. 272. The fact that Berthold quotes a larger part of the Augustinian source than Ulrich does confirms that he had direct access to Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram*. On Ulrich's conception of fate, see A. Beccarisi, "La *scientia divina* dei filosofi nel *De summo bono* di Ulrico di Strasburgo", in *Rivista di Storia della filosofia* 61(2006), p. 137–163, at p. 147–152; A. Palazzo, "Ulrich of Strasbourg's Philosophical Theology. Textual and Doctrinal Remarks on *De summo bono*" in A. Speer, Th. Jeschke (eds), *Schüler und Meister* (Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2016), p. 205–242, at p. 219–241. Twofold providence is discussed at pages p. 222–228.

with providence and fate.<sup>15</sup> There, Boethius considers fate to be the chain of causes by which the simple and eternal decree of divine providence unfolds in space and time. This is the core concept from which Boethius draws several important consequences, such as the conclusion that everything subject to fate is also subordinate to providence, but not vice versa; that fate is a disposition inhering in mutable things; that the beings close to the First Divinity are beyond the mutable order of fate, etc. This text allows Berthold to conceptualize the crucial issue of the temporalization of the disposition of the divine mind. As already seen in Ulrich, providence and fate are clearly distinguished: one coincides with the intuition of all reality in the divine mind, the other with the temporal series or connection of causes. Yet, they are interrelated: the latter is the unfolding of the former. Nowhere, however, does Boethius refer to two realms.

It is on the basis of a long passage quoted from Proclus' *On Providence and Fate* that Berthold explicitly theorizes the existence of two hierarchically ordained realms: that of providence and that of fate. *On Providence and Fate* is one of Proclus' *Tria opuscula* which deal with providence, fate, freedom and evil. Translated from Greek into Latin by William of Moerbeke in 1280, they did not enjoy wide circulation.<sup>16</sup> Berthold, however, made extensive recourse to these treatises with specific regard to the theory of *unum animae*.<sup>17</sup> They are also crucial sources for Berthold's theory of providence, as is clear from this and other passages throughout his *Expositio*, some of which we will discuss below.<sup>18</sup>

15 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141B, p. 46, l. 42–p. 47, l. 66. See Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, ed. C. Moreschini (München / Leipzig: Saur, 2000), lib. IV, prosa 6, §7–17, p. 122, l. 20–p. 124, l. 77.

16 C. Steel, "William of Moerbeke, Translator of Proclus", in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 247–263, at p. 251–253.

17 L. Sturlese, *Eckhart, Tauler, Suso. Filosofi e mistici nella Germania medievale* (Firenze: Le Lettere, 2010), ch. VII ("Tauler e Bertoldo di Moosburg. I presupposti filosofici della dottrina del 'fondo dell'anima'"), p. 157–194, at p. 184–191; ch. IX ("*Homo divinus*. Il commento a Proclo di Bertoldo di Moosburg"), p. 237–257, at p. 244–246 (the texts are translated with few changes from the originals in L. Sturlese, *Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Henrich Seuse* [Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007]); ch. XII ("Tauler im Kontext. Die philosophischen Voraussetzungen des 'Seelengrundes' in der Lehre des deutschen Neuplatonikers Berthold von Moosburg"), p. 169–197; ch. X ("Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds von Moosburg und die philosophischen Probleme der nacheckhartschen Zeit"), p. 137–154.

18 For the theory of providence in *On Ten Doubts Concerning Providence*, see for example the commentary and the doctrinal analysis in F. Brunner, W. Spoerri, "*De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*", q. 3, 11–14. Commentaire philosophique par F. Brunner. Kritische

Ex praemissis colligitur differentia providentiae et fati: tum quia [A] “providentia praeexistit fato et omnia quidem, quaecumque fiunt secundum fatum, multo prius a providentia fiunt” secundum auctorem *De fato et providentia* cap. 2. [B] Tum quia providentia est simpliciter omnium, fatum vere quorundam: “multa enim diffugiunt fatum, providentiam vero nihil” secundum auctorem ibidem. [C] Tum quia “providentia est fatum desuper gubernans, quod ipsa produxit et separavit ipsius epystasiam, id est superstitionem, usque ad altero mobilia aut sortita in altero mobilibus subsistentiam”, idem ubi supra. [D] Tum etiam quia proxima deo sunt exempta a fato, distantia vero subsunt. [E] Unde auctor ibidem 5 cap.: “Providentiam itaque non est tibi difficile videre, quam dicimus. Si enim fontem bonorum primum divinam ipsam causam determinans recte dicens, unde enim aliunde bona quam divinitus? Ita ut bonorum quidem, ait Plato, nullum alium causandum quam Deum. [F] Deinde omnibus superstantem intelligentialibusque et sensibilibus superiorem esse fato, et quae quidem sub fato entia et sub providentia perseverare, le conecti quidem a fato habentia, bonificari autem a providentia, ut conexio finem habeat bonum et providentia sic reductiva fati in se ipsam, quae autem rursus sub providentia non adhuc omnia indigere et fato, sed intelligentialia ab hoc (scilicet fato) exempta esse”. Et bene infra: “Et propter haec omne quidem intellectualiter ens sub providentia perseverari solum, omne autem, quod corporaliter, sub necessitate. [G] Duo itaque regna rei intelligantur: haec quidem intellectualia, haec autem sensibilia, et regna duo duorum, providentiae quidem sursum intellectualiumque et sensibilibium, fati autem deorsum sensibilibium. [H] Et providentia differat a fato, qua differt Deus a divino quidem, sed participatione divino et non prime, quoniam et in aliis, ut vides, aliud quod prime, aliud quod secundum participationem velut lumen solis et quod in aere lumen, sed hic quidem prime, hoc autem propter illum (scilicet solem) lumen; et vita prime quidem in anima, secundario autem in corpore propter illam. Sic igitur providentia quidem Deus per se, fatum autem divina aliqua res et non Deus: dependet enim a providentia et velut imago est illius. Sicut enim providentia ad intellectualia entium, sic fatum ad sensibilia. [I] Regnat quidem haec (scilicet providentia) super intellectualia, hoc autem super sensibilia, et permutatim aiunt geometrae, et ut providentia ad fatum, sic

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Exegetische-Bemerkungen von W. Spoerri”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 24(1977), p. 112–164; for an overview of Proclus’ theory of providence, see W. Beierwaltes, “*Pronoia* und Freiheit in der Philosophie des Proklos”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 24(1977), p. 88–111.

intellectualia ad sensibilia. Intellectualia autem prime sunt entia et ab his altera: et providentia ergo prime est, quod est, et ab hac dependet et fati ordo". Haec auctor.<sup>19</sup>

This text, which is quoted immediately after the citation from *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, Book IV, prose 6, provides Berthold with the conceptual tools he needs to rethink the relationship between providence and fate in more elaborate terms. Whereas Boethius considers fate to be the chain of causes by which the simple and eternal providence unfolds in space and time, this text sheds light on the existence of the two distinct, but interrelated, realms of providence and fate, analyzing their main characteristics.<sup>20</sup>

Berthold first points out that *On Providence and Fate* is in agreement with Boethius on several points: e.g., (A) providence preexists fate but (B) whereas nothing escapes providence, many things are not subject to fate. (C) Accordingly, "providence governs from above over fate" and "entrusts to it the authority as far as the bodies that are externally moved (or those things that first come to be in externally moved things)". (D) Finally, things close to God are exempt from fate. All of this confirms the preeminence that providence enjoys over fate, a point which was already clear in *On the Consolation of Philosophy*. Proclus' distinctive influence on Berthold's conception must be looked for in the rest of the quotation from *On Providence and Fate*.

19 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141B, p. 47, l. 78–p. 48, l. 109. The capital letters between square brackets have been introduced into the text to simplify references to the sections examined. For the texts in Proclus, see Proclus, *De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis ad Theodorum Mechanicum*, in *Tria opuscula (De providentia, libertate, malo)*, ed. H. Boese (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960), c. 2, §3, p. 110, l. 6–p. 111, l. 8; c. 2, §4, p. 111, l. 4–7; c. 5, §13, p. 118, l. 1–p. 120, l. 11 and l. 29–30; c. 5, §14, p. 120, l. 31–p. 122, l. 16. For literal quotations of *On Providence*, I have relied on Proclus, *On Providence*, trans. C. Steel (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2007).

20 In spite of the undeniable analogies between lib. IV, prosa 6 of *On the Consolation of Philosophy* and Proclus' *On Providence and Fate*, the *regna duo* thesis constitutes a major difference between the two texts, which is peculiar to the Proclean treatise. On Boethius' relationship with Proclus and other Neoplatonists on the topic of fate, see H.R. Patch, "Fate in Boethius and the Neoplatonists", in *Speculum* 4(1929), p. 62–72; P. Courcelle, *Les lettres grecques en Occident. De Macrobe à Cassiodore* (Paris: De Boccard, 1948), p. 287–289, and J.C. Magee, "The Boethian Wheels of Fortune and Fate", in *Mediaeval Studies* 49(1987), p. 524–533. Courcelle and Magee offer criticisms of Patch's arguments. See also S. Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition*, 2 vols (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), vol. 2, p. 647–718; M. Belli, "Il centro e la circonferenza. Proclo, Boezio e Tommaso d'Aquino", in P. Totato, L. Valente (eds), *Sphaera. Foma e immagine e metafora tra medioevo ed età moderna* (Firenze: Olschki, 2012), p. 51–80, at p. 51–62, and the literature quoted therein.



As is clear from the previous paragraphs in Proclus' treatise, providence and fate act at two different levels: the former is the cause of the goods for those for whom it provides ("causam esse bonorum hiis quibus providetur"), whereas fate is "the cause of some connection between and sequence of the things that occur" ("causam [...] connexionis cuiusdam et consequentie hiis que generantur").<sup>21</sup> (F) As a consequence, things that depend on fate also fall under providence: "they have their interconnection from fate, but their orientation to the good comes from providence. Thus, the connection will have the good as its end and providence will order fate". (G) There are two realms (*regna*) of things intelligible and sensible. Providence rules over things intelligible and sensible, while fate only governs sensible things. Even though the two realms are hierarchically ordered, each of them is nonetheless autonomous, retaining its own laws. This means that the realm of fate, which is the world of nature, can be explained by its own laws without reference to any superior ontological level of reality. In this light, Berthold's keen interest in the issues related to celestial causality and, more generally, to the philosophy of nature, becomes clear. The realm of fate provides the theoretical framework for scientific research, at the same time granting a bottom-up perspective on the providence of God and the gods.

Finally, it should be noted that Berthold also adopts the typical Proclean distinction *secundum causam* and *per participationem* to clarify the difference between providence and fate. (E) Providence is said to be, as the divine cause, the first source of all goods. (H) More precisely, providence stands in the same relationship to fate as the primary God does to what is divine by participation. (I) Moreover, since providence rules over intelligible beings whereas fate only rules over sensible beings, and since intelligible beings are primary beings (*prime entia*), providence is what it is primarily (*prime est, quod est*).

### 3 The Theologico-Metaphysical Approach: Providence and the Divine

Berthold's concept of providence is also indebted to another of Proclus' opuscles, *Ten Doubts Concerning Providence* (*De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*). Indeed, in the *propositum* of Proposition 141, Berthold clarifies how providence is found in the divine, namely in the primary God and the

<sup>21</sup> Proclus, *De providentia*, c. 3, §7, p. 113, l. 2–4.

gods. The gods are the henads (*unitates* or *bonitates*), also defined as *causae primordiales*.<sup>22</sup>

According to Berthold, the absolutely Good is absolutely First and thus is not coordinated with the things that it causes. It exercises providence absolutely over all beings (*providet omnibus simpliciter*), and its providence transcends them. This is the condition of God in whom providence resides *secundum causam*. The gods, who are first in their own given genus, but not absolutely first, exercise providence over the subsequent members in their series. As in the case of God, their providence does not enter into relation with the things that they cause. Every god stands in relation to its own universe – its series – just as the absolutely Good does to the entire Universe.<sup>23</sup> The gods have providence *per essentiam*.

A long quotation from Proclus' *Ten Doubts Concerning Providence* confirms the difference between the providence *secundum causam* of the First

22 On the role and significance of the henads in Berthold, see L. Sturlese, "Einleitung", to Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), p. ix–xv, at p. xi–xiii; A. Sannino, "Il Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum nella metafisica di Bertoldo di Moosburg", in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), p. 252–272, at p. 252–267; E. Ludueña, "El politeísmo de Proclo en la *Expositio* de Bertoldo de Moosburg", in S. Filippi, M. Coria (eds.), *La Identidad propia del Pensamiento Patrístico y Medieval. ¿Unidad y Pluralidad?* (Rosario: Paideia Publicaciones, 2014), p. 393–403. On the function of the henads in Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, see E. Massa, "La deificazione nel commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg a Proclo, *Elementatio theologica*, 129. Edizione del testo e prime analisi", in R. Lievens, E. Van Mingroot, W. Verbeke (eds), *Pascua Mediaevalia. Studies voor Prof. Dr. J.M. De Smet* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983), p. 545–604, at p. 580–582; S. Gersh, "Proclus as theologian", in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 80–107, at p. 92–97, with literature quoted at p. 93, n. 88.

23 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141E, p. 49, l. 153–p. 50, l. 181: *Primo modo simpliciter bonum, et hoc solum est prime simpliciter et per consequens non concluditur cum suis causatis nec intra ordinem partialem nec etiam totalem, sed est simpliciter exemptum ab omnibus simpliciter et per consequens non habet providentiam nisi exemptam, et sic providet omnibus simpliciter. Secundo modo prime, scilicet in genere, respectu videlicet determinati ordinis, sunt ipsi dii, quorum quilibet est monarcha respectu suae antarkiae, immo totius seyrae suae, id est omnium sub suae causalitatis ambitu contentorum, et per consequens est exemptus ab omnibus suis causatis, cum omne, quod prime causa, exaltatum sit ab effectu per 75. Et sic "omne divinum" et per essentiam et secundum causam "et providet secundis et ereptum est ab his, quibus providetur, neque providentia submitte suam immixtam et unialem excellentiam neque unione providentiam exterminante" per 122. [...] Sicut autem se habet simpliciter bonum ad totum universum simpliciter, sic se habet quilibet deus, qui est quaedam bonitas, ad suum universum. Et hoc de secundo.*

Principle, i.e. the primary Good, and the providence *secundum essentiam* of the gods. Berthold introduces a few slight changes to this text which involve a significant reinterpretation of Proclus' original intention. Whereas Proclus maintains that providence is the cause that makes everything that exists in the universe good ("propter providentiae causam bonum habet"), Berthold affirms that it is the primary Good that makes things good ("propter prime bonum bonificantur"), implying that the primary Good is the first and originary source of providence. Moreover, Berthold specifies that those beings that receive by themselves (*per se*) their good from providence, without any other intermediary, are the gods and, especially, the primary God ("sicut dii et praecipue primo Deus").<sup>24</sup> In other words, God and the gods are the first agents, each in his own order, for the distribution of the good, which unfolds through the subordinate series and the lower members of each series. After this quotation, Berthold adds that providence is in the gods not only *per essentiam*, but also *secundum participationem*. Since they all exist within the order of God and receive his influence, the gods *partake in his providence*.<sup>25</sup>

In Proposition 141, Berthold refers twice to Proposition 120, another of the most cited propositions in the *Tabula contentorum*. Therefore, in order to better understand Berthold's views on the three modalities of providence – *secundum causam*, *per essentiam*, and *per participationem* – it is appropriate to turn to his discussion of Proposition 120 ("Omnis deus in sua existentia totis habet providere et primitus providere in diis"). In the *propositum* Berthold conceptualizes the three modes of providence:<sup>26</sup>

24 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141E, p. 50, l. 165–178. See Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, q. 3, §17, p. 30, l. 8–22.

25 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 141F, p. 50, l. 182–192: *Sane, quia dii intra ordinem unialem et sint monarchae, ut dictum est, et antarkes et pro tanto, licet exempti sint a suis causatis sicut prime ens ab omnibus entibus, tamen omnes insimul accepti praeter prime Deum, cum concludantur intra ordinem, ut dictum est, qui ordo etiam sicut et omnis universitas est quoddam totum formale finitum specie et partibus. Et sic superior deus influit alteri submisso et bonitatem, in quantum gradatim bonitas in eis contrahitur, et etiam propriam intentionem, in qua est prime, cuius vestigium aliquale in sequentibus derelinquit. Et talis bonificatio sive proviso boni vel providentia, cum omnes sint coordinati, dicitur coordinata. Sicut autem dictum est de diis per essentiam, quod primorum est providentia respectu subsequentium coordinata, ita etiam se habet in omnibus diis secundum participationem [...].*

26 Before conceptualizing the three ontological levels of the good in the *propositum*, Berthold had already distinguished the twofold status of the henads – *per essentiam* and *secundum participationem* – in the *suppositum*: Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam. Propositiones 108–135*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011), 120B, p. 93, l. 92–95: *Deorum vero naturalium quidam sunt per essentiam tales, ut sunt superessentiales bonitates unialem ordinem integrantes, alii vero per participationem sunt huiusmodi, sicut prima inferiorum ordinum, puta infinitatum, substantiarum, vitarum, intellectuum et huiusmodi, sicut inferius apparebit.*

li 'bonum' dicitur tripliciter, quia "aut secundum causam, puta primum: etenim bonum illud et existentiae omnis causa et bonorum omnium ut unitatum" et sic etiam est universaliter omnium conservativum per providentiam propriae virtutis, "aut secundum existentiam, puta unusquisque deus unum et bonum existens" per 119 in commento, et istis convenit providentia per existentiam, sicut et bonitas, "aut secundum participationem, puta, quod in substantiis bonum, propter quod et unita est omnis substantia".<sup>27</sup>

By starting from the definition of providence as "the operation of the good bestowing what is appropriate upon each thing" ("operatio boni unicuique congrua largientis"),<sup>28</sup> Berthold claims that the good is stated in three different ways. The Good *secundum causam* is the first Good, which is the cause of every being (*existentiae omnis*) and of all goods-unities. As such, the Good is the principle of the preservation of all things thanks to the providence of its power. The good *per existentiam* is predicated of the gods, as each god is good and one. Providence *per existentiam* resides in the gods. Finally, the good *secundum participationem* is predicated of substances in the sense that every substance is unified by its participation in the good.

The abovementioned text is indeed a literal quotation from Proclus' *Ten Doubts Concerning Providence*, punctuated by a few of Berthold's remarks, which make explicit the reference to providence which is merely implicit in the Proclean passage. A few lines below, after demonstrating that "one", being shared by all things, is the *ratio providendi* in general, Berthold again distinguishes three modes of "one" – *secundum causam*, *per existentiam*, and *secundum participationem* – on the basis of the same Proclean source.<sup>29</sup>

27 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120D, p. 99, l. 269–276. See Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus*, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 7–p. 104, l. 12. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120I, p. 103, l. 398–404: [...] *prime providens est Deus, quia et prime bonum, quod non solum est verum simpliciter de prime Deo, sed etiam de diis, qui sunt prime bonum suorum ordinum. Alia autem post hos, quando secundum unum illocantur et divinae operantur. Cum igitur unum et bonum supersubstantialiter sit in ipsis diis et sic ipsorum essentia, necessario etiam ipsum providere primitus erit in eis et per eos in omnibus, quibus participative convenit providere, sicut et bonum est in eis per participationem.*

28 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120D, p. 98, l. 260.

29 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120H, p. 102, l. 374–381. See Flasch, "Einleitung", p. xiii–xvii, xxi–xxiii, concerning the priority of the Good over the One. For this reason, Imbach considers it not inappropriate to refer to Berthold's theological philosophy (*scientia divina*) as agatho-theology. See Imbach, "Au-delà de la métaphysique", p. 388, n. 63. J.A. Aertsen, "Ontology and Henology in Medieval Philosophy (Thomas Aquinas, Master Eckhart and Berthold of Moosburg)", in E.P. Bos, P.A. Meijer (eds), *On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy* (Leiden / New York / Köln: Brill, 1992), p. 120–140, at p. 125, n. 24, disagrees with Flasch on this point.

Once it has been made clear that there are three levels of providence, but that the providential order ultimately must be reduced to the primary God, in whom providence *secundum causam* resides, the question arises as to why God, who can govern the universe on his own without any help, delegates his providence to the secondary gods. In this case, Berthold has recourse to the same quotation from Ulrich of Strassburg's *De summo bono* 11.5.18 which he also cites in Proposition 141.<sup>30</sup> Adopting what we can call a principle of plenitude, Berthold argues that God accomplishes through secondary causes – which are the primordial causes – all that he could have done by himself and could have governed through his providence, so that the universe, which has received from him all the possible degrees of divine goodness, may not be deprived of the dignity of causality and the opportunity to cooperate in his divine operation. The secondary causes are arranged according to the twofold mode of providence theorized by Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram*.

Circa tertium sciendum, quod, licet prime bonum super omnia superbenedictus Deus per se principaliter omnia efficiat et per providentiam gubernet, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis, quae est divinissimum operum, non deesset universo, cui communicati sunt omnes gradus divinae bonitatis posibles existere, operatur etiam per secundas causas a se, scilicet **per primordiales**. Et istae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae, quae distinguit Augustinus VIII *Hexaemeron* sui dicens, quod “gemina operatio providentiae invenitur, partim naturalis, partim voluntaria”. Secundum primum actum providentiae est **ordo naturalis causarum, qui in hoc volumine exprimitur, quibus omnibus supereminet ipsae primordiales causae, quas auctor vocat deos.**<sup>31</sup>

The meaning of natural providence changes between Proposition 141 and Proposition 120. We see in this passage from 120E that Berthold does not understand the notion in a physicalist sense. This is all the more surprising given that, as we already know, Ulrich's *De summo bono* 11.5.18 is the seminal source for Berthold's physical interpretation of natural providence. Yet, if we compare the abovementioned passage with its source in the *De summo bono*, we will notice a few interesting differences:

<sup>30</sup> See above, footnote 14.

<sup>31</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120E, p. 100, l. 295–305.

Ad horum ergo intellectum consideremus primo, quid hoc nomine significetur. Deus omnia, quae causat, per providentiam causat eo, quod ipse operatur per intellectum et artem. Et quamvis per se principaliter omnia efficiat, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis non deeset universo, cui communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates naturaliter communicabiles, operatur etiam per **secundas causas**. Et illae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae. Dicit enim Augustinus VIII libro *Super Genesim*: “Gemina operatio providentiae reperitur: partim naturalis, per quam dat lignis et herbis incrementum, partim voluntaria per operationem angelorum et hominum”. Secundum primum actum providentiae est **ordo naturalis causarum**, quem philosophi determinant, **scilicet quod primo sunt causae universales, scilicet caelestia et motus eorum, et sub illis sunt causae particulares**.<sup>32</sup>

What are only secondary causes in the *De summo bono*, become the primordial causes, i.e. the gods, in the commentary on the *Elementatio theologica*. Whereas according to Ulrich the chain of physical causes, from the celestial spheres down to the particular causes, constitutes the order of causes of natural providence determined by philosophers – the foremost among whom is Boethius – Berthold refers to the natural order of causes which is expressed in this volume (*in hoc volumine exprimitur*), namely in the *Elements of Theology*. Therefore, Berthold is clearly reinterpreting Ulrich’s notion of the connection of physical causes in terms of the order of theologico-metaphysical causes, the most perfect and highest of which are the primordial causes, namely the gods-henads. Significantly, while Ulrich also cites the first examples of natural providence mentioned by Augustine – examples based on the natural world (the growing of trees and herbs), here Berthold leaves them out.

Overall, then, the metaphysical reinterpretation of Ulrich’s text runs counter to Proposition 141, where Berthold regards natural providence as fate and theorizes the existence of the realm of fate. Far from excluding each other, Berthold’s two different conceptions of natural providence indicate the existence of two different approaches to providence in the *Expositio*.

In Proposition 122 (“Omne divinum et providet secundis et ereptum est ab his, quibus providetur, neque providentia submittente suam immixtam et univalem excellentiam neque unione providentiam exterminante”), which is also widely quoted in the *Tabula*, Berthold shifts his focus to the transcendence of both the general providence of the primary Good and the special providence of the gods. He argues that since it pre-contains the lower members in a nobler

32 See Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 256–p. 146, l. 268.

way that they exist in themselves, all that is first in every essentially ordered universe is the universal cause exercising providence over all those that are posterior.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, that which is essentially divine (*divinum per essentiam*) is said to be the essence of the things for which it provides, while these things participate in it according to their capacity. However, that which is essentially divine is exempt from them (*exemptum a provisivis*), for were it not transcendent, its causality would no longer be universal.<sup>34</sup>

The transcendence of all that is divine – both *secundum causam* and *secundum essentiam* – relative to its own effects is due to its absolute and excellent unity.<sup>35</sup> From Dionysius the ps.-Aeropagite Berthold derives the analogy between goodness and the sun, which nicely fits his attempt to describe the transcendence of providence. He maintains that just as the sunlight shines everywhere, yet the sun keeps unchanged the purity and perpetuity of its substance, remaining what it is, so the operation of providence reaches everything, while at the same time transcending everything.

Talis autem extensionis actus providendi generalitate sua ad omnia et nihilominus ereptionis eius ab omnibus exemplum satis aptum invenimus in nostro sole magno, qui est “totus splendens et superlucens” [...] sed per ipsum esse “illuminat omnia, quaecumque participare ipso possunt, et superextentum habet lumen ad omnem extendens visibilem mundum splendores priorum radiorum et sursum et deorsum”. “Et nihil est visibilium, ad quod non pertingat secundum magnitudinem excedentem splendorem proprii luminis”. Et licet ipse sol sic sit in inferioribus istis generabilibus et corruptibilibus, quae “et movet ad vitam et nutrit et auget et perficit et mundat et renovat”, tamen nihilominus non recedit a puritate et perpetuitate suae substantiae manens hoc, quod est.<sup>36</sup>

33 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 122A, p. 116, l. 67–69: *Omne autem primum omnis universalitatis essentialiter ordinatae prae habet omnia submissa nobiliori modo, quam sint in se ipsis, et sic est causa universaliter providens omnibus, quae sunt post ipsum.*

34 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 122B, p. 117, l. 88–91: [...] *sequitur ipsum esse essentiam omnium provisorum, quae tamen essentia est in unoquoque provisorum, secundum quod potest ea participare ex propria analogia. Item, quod sit exemptum a provisivis, quia, si esset inter provisiva, non provideret omnibus universaliter [...].*

35 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 122L, p. 121, l. 266–p. 122, l. 268: *sed ratione unitatis est ereptum ab omnibus, quibus providetur, et in se ipso mansivum in sua unionali excellentia.*

36 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 122I, p. 120, l. 220–p. 121, l. 232. See Dionysius ps.-Aeropagita, *De divinis nominibus*, ed. B.R. Suchla (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1990), 4.4, p. 147, l. 11–p. 148, l. 5.

#### 4 Nature as a Way of Accessing Providence

The realm of fate is the domain of corporeal and sensible things, of physical phenomena, of knowledge based on sense-perception: simply put, it is the world of nature.

In order to understand what exactly Berthold means by the realm of fate and what he considers to be the relationship between fate and providence, I turn to Proposition 34 (“Omne, quod secundum naturam convertitur, ad id facit conversionem, a quo et processum propriae subsistentiae habet”), which does not explicitly deal with providence, but rather with nature. In the *suppositum*, while illustrating the several meanings of the word *natura*, Berthold quotes a long text from the Hermetic *De VI rerum principiis*. From this text he derives the idea of nature as a universal and special power (*vigor*) which first resides in the celestial sphere and operates in inferior realities by stimulating their qualities to develop.<sup>37</sup> Nature originates from *ratio*, the law of the stars (*lex astrorum*), which is the uniform and perpetual disposition of the celestial motions. With this disposition originates the machine of the world (*mundi machinam*), by which the world and its components are harmoniously ruled (*benigna amicitiae pace*).<sup>38</sup>

37 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), 34A, p. 222, l. 67–89: *natura est vigor quidam universalis et specialis ex causa et ratione nascens, primum caelo innascens, in univ[er]s[is] et singulis quadrupartitus, qualificatus non qualificans et quantificatus non quantificans, differentes qualitates successive diffundens. [...] Natura vero nata qualitates in singulis differentes non qualificando, sed operando diffundit, id est qualitates excitando exerit. Simile potest dici de quantitate, quod eam successive dicitur diffundere, ut unaquaeque res ab alia in suo genere nascatur*. See Hermes Latinus, *Liber Hermetis Mercurii Triplicis de VI rerum principiis*, ed. T. Silverstein, in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 22(1955), p. 217–302, at p. 248–249. For an analysis of Berthold's Hermetic conception of nature, see A. Sannino, “Il concetto ermetico di natura in Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), *Hermetism from Late Antiquity to Humanism. La tradizione ermetica dal mondo tardo-antico all'Umanesimo = Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi, Napoli 20–24 novembre 2001* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), p. 203–221. For inspiring remarks on the theory of nature by Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold, see M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, “Filosofia della natura e filosofia dell'intelletto in Teodorico di Freiberg e Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 115–127.

38 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 34A, p. 221, l. 50–54: *Ratio est vis quaedam a causa procedens, cuncta a principio ordinans. Haec lex astrorum dicitur, quae est aequa et perpetua motuum eorum dispositio, quae mundi machinam efficit et moderatur, per quam mundus et mundana nulla coactione, sed benigna amicitiae pace reguntur*. See Hermes Latinus, *Liber de VI rerum principiis*, p. 248.



In light of this Hermetic text and the other sources quoted by Berthold (Avicbron and Isaac Israeli), it can be argued that nature is bipartite, being subdivided into a superior operating nature (*natura superior operativa*), which consists in the quality of the celestial bodies, and an inferior nature (*natura inferior*), which consists in the elemental qualities acted upon by the motions of the celestial spheres.<sup>39</sup>

This perspective is in accord with the special attention Berthold devotes to issues related to celestial causality and their investigation, which may at first appear out of place in a commentary on the theologico-metaphysical summa of the Neoplatonic tradition. By way of example, I refer only to a long quotation from a certain “diligens motuum astrorum investigator et calculator, frater Arnoldus dictus Luscus” (the one-eyed brother Arnoldus).<sup>40</sup> According to Berthold, Arnoldus is the author of a work entitled *De periodis motuum et mobilium caelestium*, which was dedicated to calculating the periods of the celestial bodies. From this work, Berthold quotes the scientist as saying that the calculation of the Great Year (the famous and feared *Magnus Annus*) is incomprehensible to the human intellect, being known only to God and to

39 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 34A, p. 222, l. 90–p. 223, l. 112. On Hermes’ presence in Berthold, see L. Sturlese, “Proclo ed Ermente in Germania da Alberto Magno a Bertoldo di Moosburg. Per una prospettiva di ricerca sulla cultura filosofica tedesca nel secolo delle sue origini (1250–1350)”, in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart*, p. 22–33, at p. 28–30; A. Sannino, “Berthold of Moosburg’s Hermetic Sources”, in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 63(2000), p. 243–258; A. Palazzo, “La ricezione di un passo ermetico (*Asclepius* 8) nel tardo medioevo. Ulrico di Strasburgo, Pietro di Tarantasia, Riccardo di Mediavilla, Bertoldo di Moosburg e Dionigi il Certosino”, in T. Iremadze, T. Tskhadadze, G. Kheoshvili (eds), *Philosophy, Theology, Culture. Problems and Perspectives. Jubilee Volume Dedicated to the 75th Anniversary of Guram Tevzadze* (Tbilisi: Publishing House “Nekeri” / Publishing House “Arche”, 2007), p. 104–125, at p. 113–121.

40 Th. Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, 4 vols (Roma: Istituto Storico Domenicano, 1970–1993), vol. 1, p. 133, only includes Arnoldus in his catalogue without being able to provide any biographical detail. I. Draelants, “La transmission du *De animalibus* d’Aristote dans le *De floribus rerum naturalium* d’Arnoldus Saxo”, in C. Steel, G. Guldentops, P. Beullens (eds), *Aristotle’s Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), p. 126–158, at p. 132, n. 21, conjectures that Arnoldus is in fact the same person as Arnold of Saxony, a German Dominican active in the 13th century, and the author of the encyclopaedia entitled *De floribus rerum naturalium*. According to Draelants, the hypothesis could be supported provided that Arnold is demonstrated to be the author of the astronomical and astrological content of ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, O.VI.4, which bears evident resemblances to Arnold’s authentic works.

whomever he will disclose it; moreover, Berthold copies the table calculating the positions of the celestial bodies over the Great Year.<sup>41</sup>

The importance of astronomy and astrology also lies in their practical usefulness. Berthold claims in the prologue that these sciences enable man to govern the sensible world, which is the realm of fate. This is due to the fact that among all philosophers, only astrologers were divinely given by celestial decrees the ability to investigate and grasp future events by observing the first natural, essential, and eternal causes.<sup>42</sup>

Since it is ruled by celestial causality, inferior nature is intrinsically ordered. Based on this assumption, Berthold cannot doubt the purposefulness of the work of nature or its finalism (“secundo de ipsius naturae, prout hic sumitur, in operando finis praeconceptione et totius operis sui in finem directione”). Indeed, he contends that the thesis that nature is a force (*vis*) moving without any rational design leads to a series of doctrinal mistakes, such as necessitarianism, the absence of a maker of nature, chance, the denial of natural finalism. Against these erroneous positions, Berthold argues that nature is ruled by a superior rational principle, adducing a number of authorities in support of this view.

From Book XII of Averroes’ *Commentary on the Metaphysics* Berthold quotes the renowned dictum stating that “even nature does not know, nonetheless it works in a perfect and orderly way, somehow recalled by nobler active virtues, which are called intelligences”.<sup>43</sup> The rationality of the natural mechanism is

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- 41 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam. Propositiones 184–211*, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014), 198E, p. 147, l. 151–p. 148, l. 196. On the theory of the *Magnus Annus*, see G. De Callataj, *Annus Platonicus. A Study of World Cycles in Greek, Latin and Arabic Sources* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain / Institut Orientaliste, 1996). One should note that Proclus also displays a keen interest in physical investigation and astronomy, as attested by his several works in both these fields. However, the Platonic astronomy pursued by Proclus searches for the hidden causes of celestial phenomena and is different from “scientific” investigation based on observation of celestial phenomena and the formulation of artificial hypotheses. See A.-Ph. Segonds, “Philosophie et astronomie chez Proclus”, in G. Boss, G. Seel (eds), *Proclus et son influence. Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel, juin 1985* (Zürich: Éditions du Grand Midi, 1987), p. 159–177.
- 42 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prologus* 16, p. 24, l. 636–641: *Quod autem per eas et specialiter astronomiam et astrologiam homo mundi sensibilis vocetur proprie gubernator, apparet. Tum quia astrologis solis inter omnes philosophantes divino munere communicatum est decretorum caelestium ex consideratione causarum naturalium primarum per se et essentialium ac sempiternarum in futurorum eventibus scrutatores esse et conscios [...]*.
- 43 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 34B, p. 224, l. 148–151: *Nam secundum Averroem super XI Metaphysicae cap. 6 “natura”, “quamvis non intelligat” nec rationem habeat, “facit” tamen “perfecte et ordinate, quasi esset rememorata ex virtutibus agentibus nobilioribus ea, quae dicuntur intelligentiae”.* See Averroes, *Metaphysica*, in *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois*

evident in the balance (*mensura*) between the heat of stars and that of generated things, a balance that depends on the divine intellectual art.

Divine providence (*divina sollicitudo*) is the cause of the rational government of nature:<sup>44</sup> all beings and natural processes exhibit regularities because they originate from the divine mind, as is made clear in *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, Book IV, prose 6. Significantly, in this case Berthold only quotes the beginning of Boethius' passage, the part that relates to physical processes, while omitting the rest of prose 6: "omnium generatio rerum cunctusque mutabilium naturarum progressus et, quidquid aliquo movetur modo, causas, ordinem, formas ex divinae mentis stabilitate sortitur".<sup>45</sup>

Cicero's *De natura deorum* confirms that the orderliness of natural processes indicates that nature is governed rationally by the divine art.

Istud nihilominus **regimen rationis inesse naturae ab arte prima, videlicet divina**, per artes, quae sub illa sunt, manifestum est per operationes ipsius naturae in naturalibus, secundum quod eleganter declarat Cicero ubi supra libro II capitulis 10, 11, 12 **tam in animalibus quam in terrae nascentibus, tam in caelestibus quam terrestribus, ut breviter recolligam, quae "natura mentis et rationis experts" efficere non potuit**, utpote mundi stabilitio, apertissima eiusdem cohaesio, partium libratio, circularis colligatio, stellarum ordinatio, motuum proportio, alimenti a terrae nascentibus attractio, arborum erectio, mutua invicem complexio, animantium in suo genere distinctio, ciborum variorum electio, medicinarum quaesitio, sollertiarum et artium ostensio, marium et feminarum ad perpetuam generis conservationem distinctio, partium corporis ad procreandum concipiendumque aptatio, ad generandum mutua desideriorum excitatio, sine magistro duce mammaram appetitio, appetitarum inventio, ad custodiendum procreata dilectio. His et consimilibus manifestum est "mente consilioque divino omnia in hoc mundo ad salutem hominum conservationemque administrari mirabiliter" secundum eundem. Ex quibus etiam concluditur nihil eorum esse fortuitum, immo

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*Commentariis*, 8 vols (Venezia: Junta, 1562–1574), vol. 8, lib. XII, comm. 52, f. 305rD–E. Interestingly, the same dictum is quoted several times by Eckhart indirectly through Thomas Aquinas' works. See A. Palazzo, "Eckhart's Islamic and Jewish Sources. Avicenna, Avicbron, and Averroes", in J. Hackett (ed.), *A Companion to Meister Eckhart* (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2013), p. 253–298, at p. 286–288.

44 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 34B, p. 224, l. 154.

45 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 34B, p. 224, l. 161–p. 225, l. 164. See Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, lib. IV, prosa 6, §7, p. 122, l. 20–23.

**haec omnia esse opera providae sollertisque naturae, secundum quod dicit in eodem.**<sup>46</sup>

Above all, one is persuaded that the world is ruled by intelligent reason by considering the uniformity of celestial motions, as these are the origin for the regularity of physical events, experienced in the inferior region.

[...] unde, sicut dicit idem ubi iam supra, **ex certis caeli motibus, ex ratis astrorum ordinibus, ex sphaerarum revolutionibus**, quae non nisi vera ratione fieri possunt, **convincitur mundum regi non casu, sed ratione**, sicut ipse idem manifestat in eodem per pulchram contemplationem visibilium usque ad 11 capitulum.<sup>47</sup>

Aristotle's *Physica* argues that even creatures such as monsters, usually considered to be mistakes of nature, demonstrate the teleologism of nature: they do not occur because natural events lack direction, but as a result of a material contrariety, which prevents the natural agent from introducing the intended form into matter.<sup>48</sup>

In other words, Berthold is persuaded that contemplation of the order and beauty of nature, as well as the scientific study of physical and astronomical processes, offers access to providence, access based on the effects of providence on the inferior world.<sup>49</sup> This *a posteriori* demonstration, which leads to

46 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 34B, p. 225, l. 170–188. As for Cicero's *De natura deorum*, see the passages registered *ad lin.* by Berthold's editors.

47 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 34B, p. 226, l. 205–209.

48 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 34B, p. 227, l. 237–245: *Ceterum id ipsum ostendit peccatum et error, quod accidit tam in natura quam in arte, quia omne agens, circa cuius actum contingit peccatum et error, agit propter finem, sed non invenit suam intentionem propter impedimentum; in quibus enim peccatur, alterius gratia agitur; natura autem est ratio agendi, in qua accidit error et peccatum, sicut apparet in monstis propter indispositionem ex parte materiae, ob quam efficiens non inducit formam intentam in materiam, sicut in semine, quando corrumpitur, agens non inducit formam intentam, quia prius necesse est esse semen, quam sit animal, et multas in eo praecedere alterationes.*

49 He uses the same lines of reasoning when it comes to the issue of the providence exercised by each god, for he maintains that it is possible to intuit the existence of a superior rationality from the order (Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 120E, p. 96, l. 195: *ad ordinem*; p. 96, l. 197–198: *per contrariorum in unitatem concordantiam*; p. 97, l. 223–224: *in ordine secundum gradum sibi debitum*), the beauty (p. 97, l. 212–222: *ex specie*), and the effects it has created. In this context, a preeminent role must be credited to Cicero's *De natura deorum*, often cited indirectly through Thomas of York's *Sapientiale*. On this, see F. Retucci, "Magister Thomas Anglicus Minor. Tommaso di York fonte dell'*Expositio* di Bertoldo di Moosburg", in *Quaderni di Noctua. La tradizione filosofica dall'antico al moderno* 5(2019), p. 1–41, as well as Retucci's contribution in this volume. One finds an intriguing hint

knowing the existence of the divine intelligence and his providential activity, does not conflict with but rather complements the metaphysical approach, which focuses on providence as the distribution of the good from the primary God *secundum causam* through the divine *per essentiam* and *per participationem* and down to the whole of reality.

It has been argued that, in Berthold's view, philosophical enquiry consists in both knowledge of God and the study of nature.<sup>50</sup> It must, however, be emphasized that these are not two separated fields of research, but two levels of one and the same "oblique" motion, the type of philosophical investigation adopted by Proclus in the *Elements of Theology*. By progressing *per ratiocinationem* from known to unknown things, from sensible to intelligible beings, the philosopher eventually comes to know the highest Good. He ascends to "the theological" contemplation of the One by considering the works of creation, the government of creatures, and the harmony of contrasting things.

[...] per motum obliquum, qui proprius erat philosophorum et erat per laboriosam investigationem primi omnium existentium principii dividendo, definiendo, communibus principiis utendo, a notis ad ignota per ratiocinationem progrediendo, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia ascendendo et inter intelligibilia ab uno in aliud tendendo, quousque ad simpliciter ultimum perveniatur, ascenderit ipse Proclus in summi boni notitiam, apparet in praesenti libro, ubi in excelsum maximum ascendit per operum conditionem, conditorum gubernationem et contrariorum conciliationem.<sup>51</sup>

In sum, by perceiving the effects of divine providence on the order of physical events and the regularity of celestial phenomena, a human being can start a process of cognitive improvement that will culminate in a unifying grasp of everything (*secundum unum omnium*), as he attains the *cognitio providentialis* proper to the primary One.<sup>52</sup>

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at Thomas of York's conception of the beauty of the cosmos in U. Eco, *Arte e bellezza nell'estetica medievale* (Milano: La nave di Teseo, 2016), p. 44, n. 1.

50 U.R. Jeck, "Die hermetische Theorie des Mikrokosmos in der Metaphysik Alberts des Grossen und im Prokloskommentar des Berthold von Moosburg", in *Patristica et Mediaevalia* 20(1999), p. 3–18, at p. 7.

51 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expositio tituli D*, p. 40, l. 110–117.

52 On *cognitio providentialis*, see Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 134D–E, p. 215, l. 61–p. 217, l. 104.

## 5 Conclusion

Berthold's belief in the rational governance of nature, emphasis on the order of the *machina mundi*, and admiration for the harmony of nature, and so on, were not merely traditional and stereotypical motifs derived from his sources that he wearily repeated. On the contrary, Berthold was truly fascinated by the world of nature. From the scanty information at our disposal, we know that he owned and annotated manuscripts containing works of scientific content (Ptolemy's *Almagest* and Macrobius' *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio*) and Albert the Great's autographs (*De animalibus*, a part of *Physica*, *De caelo*, *De generatione et corruptione*, *De natura loci* and *De causis proprietatum elementorum*);<sup>53</sup> that he added comments to Dietrich of Freiberg's *De iride* and Aristotle's *Meteora*; and that he wrote a now lost treatise *De polo iridis*.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, his *Exposition on the Elements of Theology* discusses several issues in natural philosophy (light,<sup>55</sup> time, movement, celestial periods, etc.<sup>56</sup>) and quotes large extracts from several scientific sources (e.g. Ptolemy, Thebit ben Chorat, Alhazen, Alfred the Englishman, etc.). All of this contributes to the picture of a scholar with prominent scientific interests, a thinker dominated by *Wissenschaftspathos*.<sup>57</sup>

By delineating a two-layered structure of reality, the *regna duo* theory provides the philosophical background for Berthold's scientific interest and research. Fate is the principle behind the connection of cause and effect; it is what binds the dispersed multiplicity of sensible phenomena together, giving rise to an orderly and knowable world, to nature itself. Behind – and above – the regularity of natural processes and the uniform periodicities of celestial bodies moved by celestial souls, human reason recognizes a superior and

53 On the Berthold's "library", see Sturlese, "Introduzione", p. xix–lix.

54 L. Sturlese, "Note di Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P., scienziato e filosofo", in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32(1985), p. 249–259; According to early-modern sources, he also wrote several works on astronomy: Albert de Castello, *Brevis et compendiosa Cronica ordinis Praedicatorum*, in R. Creytens, "Les écrivains dominicains dans la chronique d'Albert de Castello", in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 30(1960), p. 227–313, at p. 283 (the *Chronica* is found at p. 260–291); B. Faes de Mottoni, "Il commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg all'*Elementatio theologica* di Proclo. Edizione delle proposizioni riguardanti il tempo e l'eternità", in *Studi medievali* 12(1971), p. 417–461, at p. 419–420.

55 See e.g. B. Faes de Mottoni, "Il problema della luce nel commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg all'*Elementatio theologica* di Proclo", in *Studi medievali* 16(1975), p. 325–352.

56 Due to space limitations I could not examine Propositions 198–200, dedicated to movement, animation and cosmology and largely based on natural-philosophical sources (e.g., Proclus' *Elementatio physica*, Aristotle's physical writings, the *Timaeus*, etc.).

57 Flasch, "Einleitung", p. xix.

divine intelligence. At the physical level, the causal operation of divine providence brings forth the arrangement of natural events according to regular laws of development.

Despite its importance, the role of fate – and the world of nature more generally – has largely been underestimated by scholarship, leaving the Augustinian doctrine of twofold providence as the main focus for scholarship on Berthold's theory of providence. Yet it is precisely this relationship between the *regna duo*, between providence and fate, that deserves more attention if Berthold's theory is to be fully understood in itself and in the context of the debate on providence that took place among German Dominicans between the mid-13th century and the third quarter of the 14th century.

This new interpretive approach, which emphasizes the astronomical-physical processes within Berthold's metaphysical project, also unveils a tension that seems inherent in the concept of natural providence and that has until now remained undetected. In the *Exposition on the Elements of Theology*, we find two different understandings of natural providence. Often, as in the *Expositio tituli*, Berthold interprets natural providence in a theologico-metaphysical way as the procession of goodness which, originating with the primary God *secundum causam*, is *per essentiam* and *per participationem* in the divine realities. Sometimes, however, Berthold adopts a physical approach, consonant with Augustine's passage in the *De Genesi ad litteram*, and considers natural providence to be the order of natural phenomena, seeing in this order the proof of the existence of a superior ruler.

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# Founding a Metaphysics of Light in Proclus' Universe: Berthold of Moosburg's Theory of Forms

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## 1 Introduction

Like many of his philosophical standpoints, the theory of formal causality that Berthold of Moosburg developed in his *Exposition on the Elements of Theology* results from an original combination of the doctrines inherited from Albert the Great and the so-called German Dominican school. Since it is intimately connected to the notion of flux and the concept of essential cause, Berthold's theory of formal causation is an essential aspect of his intellectual project that sets it apart from the dominating Aristotelian framework of his time. His account of formal causation brings together his positions on universals, his account of cognition and the structure of the soul and, most of all, the production of the physical universe in its physical and cosmological dimensions. It is known that, on these topics, Berthold builds on his Dominican predecessors' developments on the theory of emanation. But his conception of formal causality cannot be entirely superimposed upon these earlier doctrines, for two main reasons.

On the one hand, Berthold intends to harmonize many sources that, as we will see, are sometimes divergent regarding the nature of forms and were partly rejected by his main influences. On the other hand, his exposition on the *Elements of Theology* forces him to adjust his theory of forms to its precise content. The *Elements* describe Form as something posterior to Being.<sup>1</sup> Defining the first cause as superintellectual and superessential (Proposition 115), Proclus does not seem to allow the description of God as the first form or the form of forms, a phrase often used in the Latin tradition to describe God, which Berthold takes up.<sup>2</sup> But while the *Elementatio* seems on the face of it incompatible with

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1 Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), Prop. 74, p. 70–71.

2 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 108–135*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011), 112D, p. 27, l. 79–84.

a pure metaphysics of form, Berthold's hermeneutical tools for interpreting it – rooted in the Latin theological and philosophical tradition – are strongly dependent from the vocabulary of forms and hylomorphism. How, then, did the *Exposition on the Elements of Theology* lead Berthold to a specific account of formal causation? And to what extent did he have to take some distance from ideas defended on the subject by Albert the Great and his followers?

A first answer to these questions is that Berthold aims at the same time to adapt the *Elements* to a Christian perspective, to the specific theory of causation built by his Dominican predecessors and, first of all, to the philosophical terminology of the period. Indeed, Berthold cannot fully explain Proclus's text without using – and modifying to a certain extent – the vocabulary of Aristotelian hylomorphism.<sup>3</sup> This answer, while correct in outline, is still too general to be satisfying, and needs to be refined regarding the precise points where Berthold's status as a commentator of Proclus led him to original views. Several studies have already highlighted the way Berthold grounds his doctrine of causality on a wide range of philosophical material leading him to a highly systematized theory of emanation.<sup>4</sup> However, Berthold's theory of forms is intended to encompass a general account of the various levels of reality – of which the formal flux is only one side – that has not yet been studied in detail.

This paper aims to fill this gap by analyzing Berthold's most distinctive ideas on this topic. His most original views on forms can be divided into three categories: first, the way Berthold's conception of forms supports his theory of light; second, the way he defines form as a universal principle capable of

3 As is known, even if the use of hylomorphic discourse in Proclus is common and betrays the influence of Aristotle, Proclus refuses hylomorphism as a general ontological theory and a coherent theory of the soul. See H.S. Lang, "The Status of Body in Proclus," in D.D. Butorac, D.A. Layne (eds), *Proclus and his Legacy* (Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2017), p. 69–82; C. Russi, "Causality and Sensible Objects: A Comparison between Plotinus and Proclus," in R. Chiaradonna, F. Trabattoni (eds), *Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism. Proceedings of the European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop (Il Ciocco, Castelvecchio Pascoli, June 22–24, 2006)* (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2009), p. 145–171; G. Van Riel, "Proclus on Matter and Physical Necessity," in Chiaradonna, Trabattoni (eds), *Physics and Philosophy of Nature*, p. 231–255.

4 E. Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg: Un aporte sobre la Escuela de Colonia* (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013); K. Flasch, "Procedere ut imago. Das Hervorgehen des Intellekts aus seinem göttlichen Grund bei Meister Dietrich, Meister Eckhart und Berthold von Moosburg," in K. Ruh (ed.), *Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), p. 125–134; M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, "Filosofia della natura e filosofia dell'intelletto in Teodorico di Freiberg e Bertoldo di Moosburg," in K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 115–127; E. Paschetto, "L'Elementatio theologica di Proclo e il Commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg. Alcuni aspetti della nozione de causa," *Filosofia* 27(1976), p. 353–378.

distinct modes of existence; and finally, the way Berthold justifies the gradation of beings described in the *Elements* using hylomorphic terminology. It will become clear that, far from being disconnected, these themes represent three sides of a unified and original theory of forms through which, besides his first ambition to explain the eternal realities and the beyond-wisdom contained in the *Elements*, Berthold also takes positions on important debates of his time.

## 2 The Identification of Light and Form

### 2.1 *Berthold's Sources*

One of the fundamental principles lying at the core of Berthold's conception of form is its identification with light, which underlies the constant comparison between the process of emanation and the diffusion of light. The image of light is arguably central to every Neoplatonic doctrine, but it acquired a particular importance in the school of Cologne and especially in Berthold's system.<sup>5</sup> More than a simple metaphor of creation, light diffusion came to represent a theoretical model for the mechanism of emanation. Translated into more technical concepts, the thesis of a diffusion of essences from the divine unity to created beings is captured by the expression *forma fluens* describing this essential dynamism, which Berthold analyzes in Proposition 18. The association between the notions of form and flux echoes one of the most important debates in 14th-century natural philosophy about the definition of motion.<sup>6</sup> Quite unrelated to this debate in Berthold's work, the expression rather takes us back to Albert the Great.

Albert mainly presented this concept in his *De causis et processu universitatis*. In this work, Albert called *forma fluens* the process by which divine perfections flow from higher realities to the sensible world.<sup>7</sup> This phrase enabled

5 B. Faës de Mottoni, "Il problema della luce nel commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg all'*Elementatio theologica* di Proclo," in *Studi medievali* 16(1975), p. 325–352.

6 A. Maier, "Die Wesensbestimmung der Bewegung," in *Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jh.* (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1949), p. 9–25; A. Maier, "Forma fluens oder fluxus formae," in *Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik* (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1958), p. 61–143; J.M.M.H. Thijssen, "The Debate over the Nature of Motion: John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony. With an Edition of John Buridan's *Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, secundum ultimam lecturam*, Book III, Q. 7," in *Early Science and Medicine* 14/1(2009), p. 186–210.

7 S. Milazzo, *La théorie du fluxus chez Albert le Grand. Principes philosophiques et applications théologiques*, PhD diss. (Université de Metz, 2007) <URL:https://hal.univ-lorraine.fr/tel-01749027/document>; A. de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand* (Paris: Vrin, 2005), p. 143–209; T.M. Bonin, *Creation as Emanation. The Origin of Diversity in*

Albert to reconcile the vertical dimension of formal causation with the idea of participation suggested by the image of flux, while insisting on the difference between the notion of flux and the usual four Aristotelian causes.<sup>8</sup> In his works, Albert already suggested a link between his theory of universals and the nature of light. He explained how universals, in other words, forms or essences, could be related at the same time to distinct individuals and have distinct modes of existence (*ante rem, in re, post rem*). Albert's conception of universals allowed forms to exist as intelligible models, in concrete beings, or in the intellect while remaining self-identical as essences.<sup>9</sup> To this extent, the properties of light correspond to Albert's views on essences: the nature of light is such that it remains the same in its source and in the medium in which it is propagated. For this reason, the flux of forms can be conceived in terms of light. This identification of light and form therefore enables Albert to ground the thesis according to which forms remain essentially the same in their source and in their medium of diffusion, so to speak.<sup>10</sup>

On this point, however, Albert's influence on Berthold is only one among others. One of his most important sources is the *Liber de intelligentiis* of Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, which draws on the notion of light as well as optical

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*Albert the Great's On the Causes and Procession of the Universe* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2001).

- 8 Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, ed. W. Fauser (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), lib. 1, tr. 4, c. 1, p. 42-43, l. 38-3; *Non enim fluit nisi id quod unius formae in fluente et in eo in quo fluit fluxus. Sicut rivus eiusdem formae est cum fonte, a quo fit fluxus, et aqua in utroque est eiusdem speciei et formae. Quod non semper est in causato et causa. Est enim quaedam causa aequivoce causa. Similiter non idem est fluere quod univoce causare. Causa enim et causatum univoca in alio causant aliquando. A fonte autem a quo fit fluxus non fluit nisi forma simplex absque eo quod aliquid transmutet in subiecto per motum alterationis vel aliquem alium. [...] Fluxus est simpliciter emanatio formae a primo fonte, qui omnium formarum est fons et origo.*
- 9 Albert the Great, *Physica*, ed. P. Hossfeld (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1987), lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 6, p. 10; Albert the Great, *Super Porphyrium de V Universalibus*, ed. M. Santos Noya (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 2004), 2, 3, p. 24; Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1960), lib. v, tr. 6, c. 5, p. 285. On Albert the Great's theory of universals, see T. Noone, "Albert and the *Triplex universale*", in I.M. Resnick (ed.), *A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy and the Sciences* (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2013), p. 619-626; de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique*, p. 211-264; A. de Libera, *La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris: Seuil, 1996), p. 177-206; A. Bertolacci, "Le citazioni implicite testuali della *Philosophia prima* di Avicenna nel Commento alla *Metafisica* di Alberto Magno: analisi tipologica", in *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 12(2001), p. 179-274; G. Wieland, *Untersuchungen zum Seinsbegriff im Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Grossen* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1972), p. 41-46.
- 10 Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, lib. v, tr. 6, c. 5, p. 285, l. 73-77.

concepts, such as diffusion and reflection, to explain the process of creation.<sup>11</sup> From the *Liber de intelligentiis*, Berthold borrows the idea of treating notions such as light refraction, multiplication or radiation not only in their physical meaning but also in a metaphysical sense. The diffusion of light and its reflection, in particular, can serve to model the processive and converse movements of the emanative flux.<sup>12</sup> But Berthold's closest source for the identification of light diffusion and formal causality is Ulrich of Strassburg. More than in Albert's works, the comparison of form and light in Ulrich's thought not only represents a figure of speech, but expresses a relation of identity between the two terms, including when the meaning of light is broadened from its physical sense to the analysis of creation. In this respect, the divine activity of producing all existing forms is an intellectual light.<sup>13</sup> Ulrich's work ties together Albert's theory of universals and the identification of light and form.<sup>14</sup> Because Ulrich does not integrate these views to a radical henology – like Berthold will do – the notions of light and form remain associated with the concept of being. As a consequence, the equivalence of light, form and being is an essential aspect of the *De summo bono*.<sup>15</sup>

Berthold takes up these convergent influences. Like Ulrich, frequently cited when he tackles the topic, Berthold takes light from a metaphysical point of view as more than a mere metaphor. In the *Exposition*, light is also defined as

11 Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, *De intelligentiis*, in C. Baeumker (ed.), *Witelo, ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII. Jahrhunderts* (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1908), p. 1–71. The influence of this work on Berthold has been analyzed in detail by de Libera; see A. de Libera, *La mystique rhénane, d'Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart* (Paris: Seuil, 1994), p. 410–423.

12 A. de Libera, *La mystique rhénane*, p. 419sq.

13 Ulrich de Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 1*, ed. B. Mojsisich (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989), lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 2, p. 9, l. 71–72: [...] *lumen divini intellectus, quod est hypostasis omnium formarum*.

14 Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 3, Tractatus 4–5*, ed. S. Tuzzo, lib. III, tr. 4, c. 7, §2, p. 32, l. 22–32; *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 3*, ed. A. Palazzo, lib. IV, tr. 3, c. 2, §30, p. 37, l. 503–505; on the reception of Albert's doctrine in Ulrich, see A. de Libera, "Ulrich de Strasbourg, lecteur d'Albert le Grand," in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32(1985), p. 105–136.

15 See for instance Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 1–4*, ed. A. de Libera, lib. II, tr. 3, c. 4, §3, p. 55, l. 35–39; lib. II, tr. 3, c. 5, §3, p. 65, l. 52–53; Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6*, ed. A. Beccarisi, lib. II, tr. 5, c. 10, §2, p. 60, l. 30–31; Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 3, Tractatus 4–5*, ed. S. Tuzzo, lib. III, tr. 5, c. 6, §5, p. 80, l. 131–133; Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 1–2,7*, ed. S. Pieperhoff, lib. IV, tr. 2, c. 5, §18, p. 104, l. 328–329; Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 2,8–14*, lib. IV, tr. 3, c. 1, §14, p. 11, l. 219–220. See F.J. Lescoe, *God as First Principle in Ulrich of Strasbourg: Critical text of Summa de bono, IV, 1* (Alba House: New York, 1979), p. 113sq; C. Putnam, "Ulrich of Strasbourg and the Aristotelian Causes," in J.K. Ryan (ed.), *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1961), p. 139–159.



the first form, and this identification results in a systematic analogy between the causal activity of forms and the mode of action proper to light:

De primo notandum, quod 'forma probatur per hoc esse, quod prima causa est pura lux formalis, et quia causat per essentiam suam, sequitur necessario, quod eius effectus sit diffusio formalitatis: hoc enim est causalitas essentialis, sicut lux essentiali causalitate et formali nihil causat nisi lumen, talis autem diffusio est formale esse omnium'.<sup>16</sup>

## 2.2 *Berthold's Metaphysics of Light*

Insofar as Berthold grants to light an eminent role, he is willing to define it as a special type of form. Light enjoys a particular status, for its features are different from the process of information typical of other forms. Like an essential cause, the diffusion of light entails the presence in another subject of the same form having a different being (*secundum aliud esse*).<sup>17</sup> According to Berthold, this property is not exemplified only by physical light. In Proposition 36, he distinguishes three types of light: natural, intellectual and supersubstantial. Whereas intellectual light pertains to the level of intelligence, supersubstantial light refers to the divine activity of emanation. On the basis on this distinction, Berthold can establish a series of analogies between these different types of light through a principle of proportionality, e.g. between physical and intellectual light: "omnino eodem modo proportionaliter se habet in luce intellectuali, sicut dictum est de luce corporali".<sup>18</sup> By virtue of its immaterial character, intellectual activity is analogous to the transparency of an illuminated medium. Because of its simplicity, intellectual light is analogous to the com-penetration of physical light on the sensible plane. The multiplication of light reflects on the sensible plane the diffusing process of intellectual perfection that Berthold

16 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 112D, p. 27, l. 73–77, cited from Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, lib. IV, tr. 2, c. 5, §2, p. 94, l. 18–23.

17 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones* 35–65, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001), 36A, p. 15, l. 14–20: [...] *lux et color, ratione suae originis, quae est lumen in perspicuo, et hoc sive terminato quoad colorem sive conculcato quoad lucem, ex proprietate naturae suae non sic absolute informant sua subiecta sicut aliae formae physicae, puta calor et huiusmodi, sed informant ea in quodam ordine ad extra sua subiecta, quo scilicet se ipsas diffundant et multiplicent et faciant extra sua subiecta in alia, et hoc secundum aliud esse, quam habeant in suo proprio subiecto*. See also 36D, p. 16, l. 44–50.

18 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 36E, p. 19, l. 165–166; see also 36B, p. 17, l. 105; 37B, p. 24, l. 81–82; p. 25, l. 111.

defines as a *forma radians*<sup>19</sup> in order to express its communicability.<sup>20</sup> Just like a polished surface does not retain physical light but transmits it without modifying its nature, one being reflects intellectual light toward another one without altering its essence.<sup>21</sup> Thus, the reflection of physical light provides a theoretical model for explaining the conversive movement of created intellects toward their cause.

But this analogy can also be extended to analyze the activity of the divine (supersubstantial) light. More precisely, Berthold intends to conceptualize in terms of light diffusion the Neoplatonic thesis according to which created beings continuously depend on the causal flux of the first cause. To do so, Berthold needs to translate the purity and immediateness of this vertical causality into the vocabulary of hylomorphism. To this end, he relies on an interesting aspect of Dietrich of Freiberg's own theory of formal causation, namely his theory of *forma perfectionalis*. In several works, Dietrich had defined particular entities that he called perfectional forms.<sup>22</sup> Perfectional forms have four properties: their inherence in substances depends on prior dispositions; they are not composed of genus and species; they do not appear through continuous motion, but through direct transmutation; they do not have proper contraries.<sup>23</sup> This concept is an original construction of Dietrich's that does not fully correspond to the usual meaning of the scholastic term *perfectio*: the soul of an animate being, for instance, cannot be counted as a perfectional form. According to Dietrich, perfectional forms belong to the class of secondary acts, even though a secondary act is not necessarily such a form (for instance, the act of speaking in comparison with the ability to speak is not such a form). Since they do not meet any resistance from contraries, perfectional forms are not progressively educed from the potency of matter but immediately appear when actualized. Furthermore, these forms are not composed of genus and species. Since being in potency requires the existence of a genus, perfectional

19 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 36A, p. 15, l. 13–14; p. 16, l. 43; 36D, p. 19, l. 156; 37A, p. 22, l. 14, p. 23, l. 49–60.

20 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 36D, p. 19, l. 167–170.

21 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 37A, p. 23–24, l. 68–70: *Quoniam igitur impossibile est superficiem politam in eo, quod polita, recipere aliquam formam naturalem absolute informantem et quiescentem in ea et denominantem ipsam, sed solum secundum transmissionem et fluxum in aliud [...]*.

22 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De natura contrariorum*, ed. R. Imbach (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980), p. 109–114; Dietrich of Freiberg, *Utrum in Deo sit aliqua vis cognitiva inferior intellectu*, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), p. 313–314; Dietrich of Freiberg, *De luce et eius origine*, ed. R. Rehn (Hamburg: Meiner, 1985), p. 20.

23 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De natura contrariorum*, ed. R. Imbach (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980), c. 39–45, p. 109–114.

forms do not exist in potency within a subject, which explains that the external agent communicates its own essence to it. From these properties, Dietrich deduced that perfectional forms imply a relation of constant and immediate ontological dependence to another agent. He considered them as particular kinds of forms different from substantial and accidental forms. Dietrich first used this notion in the *Quaestio utrum in Deo* to explain the status of human intellectual understanding and took as examples the acts of sensation and those of the possible intellect. But the most frequent example and the main application of this notion is light, which Dietrich describes as a perfectional form not only in the *De luce et eius origine*, but also in his treatise on the nature of contraries.

Berthold borrows this concept from Dietrich to explain several theorems of the *Elements*. Commenting on Proposition 79, he quotes large passages of Dietrich's *Tractatus de natura contrariorum* to explain how in certain cases a perfection can be instantaneously actualized and not continuously educed from potency to act.<sup>24</sup> But most of all, Berthold merges Ulrich's identification of light and form together with Dietrich's theory of perfections when commenting on Proposition 143, which contains an explicit reference to light. Berthold takes advantage of Dietrich's concept of perfectional form which allows him to explain the modalities of divine illumination described in the proposition: "Omne quidem, quod alienum a divino lumine fit, illustratur autem omne subito a diis". Berthold needs to justify the immediate character of illumination cast upon creatures expressed by the adverb *subito* in the proposition. For doing so, Berthold relies on a comparison between light in its physical, intellectual, and supersubstantial aspects, which is justified by the fact that every type of light comes from the divine form as its ultimate cause.<sup>25</sup>

However, Berthold mentions several arguments designed to show that cognitive processes cannot be instantaneous. Quoting Alhazen's *De aspectibus*, Berthold notes that complex understanding such as the intellection of a syllogism made of several propositions seem to require some time, just like vision in the sensible order.<sup>26</sup> Nonetheless, Berthold shows that understanding must

24 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 79 E–F, p. 95, l. 147–157; p. 96, l. 191–202; p. 97, l. 212–217. See also 72C, p. 39, l. 41.

25 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159*, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), 143L, p. 69, l. 321–324: *Unde etiam quaelibet forma, quanto minus habet huius luminis per obumbrationem materiae, tanto deformior est et alienior a divino lumine, et quanto plus habet huius luminis per elevationem supra naturam, tanto pulchrior est.*

26 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 143O, p. 72–73, l. 435–450.

be instantaneous, since intellectual light – just like physical light – implies an immediate relation to an actualizing cause. To do so, he quotes paragraph 44 of the *Tractatus de natura contrariorum* where Dietrich concluded that perfections only exist by an immediate actualization from an external agent.<sup>27</sup> Berthold then applies this description to the divine light by an *a fortiori* argument. Given that physical illumination is an instantaneous actualization, and not a continuous process, it will necessarily be true of divine light, which is more perfect than physical light.<sup>28</sup> Thus, in order to justify the immediate relation of created beings to the divine, Berthold ties together his metaphysical interpretation of light and Dietrich's theory of perfectional forms. Moreover, unlike Dietrich, Berthold extends the concept of perfectional forms to any operation in the natural and supernatural world,<sup>29</sup> allowing him to emphasize the hierarchical dependence of the created universe from the higher levels of reality within the framework of an emanative cosmology.

This point is indicative of Berthold's general attitude toward his sources for constructing his theory of forms, and more particularly toward Dietrich. Here, we can see him extending a notion that was not designed to serve this purpose in Dietrich's thought. Dietrich considered as an important principle the Aristotelian axiom that everything tends towards its own perfection. According to him, this end is immediately achieved only in intellects *per essentiam semper in actu*, whereas other beings need additional operations to realize their nature. But even in his later writings (the *De luce* and the *De natura contrariorum*), Dietrich used the concept of "perfectional forms" to explain the physical properties of light and never directly exploited this notion to conceptualize the cosmological order, i.e. to describe the separate intelligences and their operations. Berthold's metaphysical expansion of this concept is notable

27 Dietrich of Freiberg, *Tractatus de natura contrariorum*, c. 43–44, p. 113: *Quamvis autem hoc genus formarum, quas perfectiones voco, sint naturae extraneae a subiecto sicut et hae formae, quae sunt entium principia, quia tamen in natura perfectionum non distinguitur inter actum et potentiam, per consequens non reperietur in eis distinctio inter formam generis et speciei. [...] Unde per consequens huiusmodi formae, quod saepe dixi perfectiones, non habent fieri per motum, sed per simplicem transmutationem eo, quod motus non est nisi de forma in formam, quae sunt eiusdem generis secundum Philosophum in X Metaphysicae.*

28 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 143O–P, p. 73, l. 455–470: *Sed magister Theodoricus tractatu De natura oppositorum 44 cap. oppositum sentit, ostendendo formas perfectionales 'fieri non per motum, sed simplicem transmutationem' et per consequens 'unaquaeque earum secundum se et absolute respicit suum perfectibile, et ideo adest et abest modo simplici et indivisibiliter suo perfectibili secundum simplicem et instantaneam dependentiam a sua causa'. Et sic visio et illuminatio medii secundum eum fit in instanti.* See also 78E, p. 89, l. 125.

29 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 44B, p. 74, l. 61–64.

from the way he describes the actualization of such forms. Dietrich described it as a “simple transmutation” to emphasize its immediate character by contrast with continuous motion.<sup>30</sup> Berthold takes a further step and refers to the actualization of these indivisible perfections as a “simple emanation” (“non per motum et transmutationem, sed per simplicem emanationem”).<sup>31</sup> From this perspective, it appears clearly that Berthold aims to provide a rigorous account of emanation by enriching the terminology of hylomorphism. The concept of perfectional forms allows him to give the notion of intellectual light a literal meaning, and to provide a rigorous justification for referring to God as the first light.<sup>32</sup>

### 3 Forms and Universality

#### 3.1 *Berthold's Sources*

The temporal modalities of illumination are not the only properties that Berthold needs to prove in order to ground his metaphysics of light. Following his main sources on this theme – i.e. Albert, Ulrich, and Adam Pulchrae Mulieris – he also needs to explain how the essence of perfections remains the same despite the division and multiplication following their diffusion from the first cause. The emanative process of creation, understood as the descending movement of a formal flux, requires the elaboration of a theory of essence as a principle capable of different modes of being. In other words, Berthold's doctrine of emanation requires a theory of universal essence. Interestingly, whereas his realism of universals is in line with his Dominican predecessors, Berthold has his own distinctive strategy for presenting the universal forms. His theory of universals gives a new direction to Albert the Great's views on the reality of forms *ante rem* that are separate from concrete individuals. Berthold's distinction between two types of universals – *praedicationis* (logical) and *separationis* (theological) – not only serves to attribute the theory of transcendent universals to the “true” *Platonici* and to defend them against Aristotle; it also lays the foundation for a dynamic conception of forms. Berthold's realism about universals is much more than a mere semantical standpoint: building on Dietrich's identification of form and essence,<sup>33</sup> Berthold's theory of universal

30 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De natura contrariorum*, c. 44, p. 113, l. 11–14.

31 Correction of the CPTMA edition, which gives *enumerationem* (143P, p. 73, l. 468) instead of *emanationem* (cf. MS Oxford, Balliol College Library, 224B, f. 212va; MS Vat. lat. 2192, f. 222rb).

32 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 143K–L, p. 68–70, l. 290–358.

33 Dietrich of Freiberg, *Tractatus de quidditatibus entium*, eds R. Imbach, J.-D. Caviglioli (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983). It must be noted that despite his proximity with Dietrich on the

essence allows him to conceive “forms” as dynamic principles contributing to the ontological production of the universe from the higher spheres of reality to the sensible plane.

In fact, the singularity of Berthold's theory of *forma universalis* lies in the different authorities summoned to justify his realist position on the subject. The most distinctive feature of his theory of universal forms is his frequent and at times surprising use of Ibn Gabirol's *Fons Vitae*, which Albert the Great had strongly criticized.<sup>34</sup> Considering only his exposition on Proposition 177, Berthold quotes this work no less than twenty-six times.<sup>35</sup> Several of these quotations are significant passages meant to justify Berthold's own ideas. However, this use is surprising because among the Neoplatonic materials available to him, something could hardly be more distant from the system Berthold intends to build than Ibn Gabirol's ontology. It cannot be excluded that Berthold's reliance on authors – like Thomas of York<sup>36</sup> – more open to Ibn Gabirol's ideas than his Dominican sources explains to a certain extent the numerous citations from the Jewish philosopher. In any case, the ideas exposed in the *Fons Vitae* do not fit at first sight with his doctrine.<sup>37</sup> Following the Dominican tradition – and not only the Albertist school – Berthold rejects

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analysis of substantial forms, Berthold describes the hylomorphic compound as being made up from two essences – something that Dietrich would strictly deny (*Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 184–211*, ed. L. Sturlese [Hamburg: Meiner, 2014], 193E, p. 104, l. 139–141: [...] *ut composita ex materia et forma: est enim ibi unum esse, sed duae essentiae sibi mutuo unitae essentialiter*). The coexistence of the two essential parts in the hylomorphic compound represents the converse relation of an essential cause, since it implies identity *in esse* but difference *secundum essentiam* (193E, p. 104, l. 139); see also 1B, p. 75, l. 138–139.

- 34 B. McGinn, “Ibn Gabirol, The Sage among the Schoolmen,” in L.E. Goodman (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 77–110, esp. p. 96–98. On the influence of the *Fons Vitae* on Albert's theory of the formal flux, see Bonin, *Creation as Emanation*, p. 15, p. 96–98, n. 1–3.
- 35 Berthold's quotations from Avicbron are numerous, especially on the on the theme of form and matter: in Proposition 3 (11 citations); Prop. 4 (14); Prop. 24 (14); Prop. 34 (9); Prop. 36 (3); Prop. 80 (3); Prop. 83 (4); Prop. 98 (5); Prop. 135 (6); Prop. 145 (5); Prop. 159 (6); Prop. 170 (20); Prop. 172 (7); Prop. 173 (4); Prop. 177 (26); Prop. 187 (9). On Avicbron's influence on Berthold, see A. Beccarisi's contribution in this volume.
- 36 On Thomas of York's influence on Berthold and the transmission of Neoplatonic materials through his *Sapientiale*, see F. Retucci's contribution in this volume; see also E. King, “Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli*,” in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1. Westerly Scholarly Debates and Networks* (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2019), p. 394–437.
- 37 For an introduction to Avicbron's metaphysics, see S. Pessin, *Ibn Gabirol's Theology of Desire: Matter and Method in Jewish Medieval Neoplatonism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); J. Schlanger, *La philosophie de Salomon Ibn Gabirol* (Leiden: Brill, 1968).

the *binarium famosissimum*, i.e. the two famous ideas constituting the doctrinal core of the *Fons Vitae*.

On the one hand, Berthold does not subscribe to the plurality of substantial forms in concrete substances.<sup>38</sup> He clearly aligns himself with Dietrich's way of defending the position that only one substantial form can be present in a compound substance. The faculties of a being do not indicate different substantial forms, but only different parts of the soul that are virtually included in the unique form inhering in matter. As such, a soul is a single form that is ontologically simple, even though it can be analyzed in several *formales intentiones* or *principia formalia*.<sup>39</sup> The phrases "formal intentions" and "formal principles" are taken up from Dietrich and, as we will see below, play a central role in Berthold's theory of forms.<sup>40</sup> Just like Dietrich, Berthold employs them to refer to intelligible features representing the parts of a thing's definition, the *partes ante totum* constituting the nature of a form.<sup>41</sup> Thus, there is only one substantial form present in a given compound, even if this form can be decomposed, so to speak, into different formal intentions.

On the other hand, Berthold rejects universal hylomorphism, the view according to which every substance without exception is composed from matter and form. Nonetheless, his relation to Ibn Gabirol's doctrine is more

38 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 187E, p. 51, l. 310–313: *Dico autem istas tres partes unam rationalis animae substantiam essentiali et non esse diversas in corpore, cum nulla forma substantialis uniatur corpori subiecto mediante alia forma substantiali, sed forma perfectior dat corpori subiecto, quidquid dabat inferior, et adhuc amplius. Unde anima rationalis dat corpori humano, quidquid dat anima vegetabilis plantis, quidquid sensibilis brutis, et aliquid ulterius, et propter hoc ipsa una anima secundum substantiam est in homine vegetabilis, sensibilis et rationabilis. Cuius signum est, quod, cum operatio unius partis intenditur, alterius partis operatio impeditur, et quia redundantia fit unius in aliam.* See also 47B, p. 90, l. 60–63; 205B, p. 211, l. 87–93.

39 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli Propositiones* 160–183, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 171A, p. 110, l. 45–61.

40 Dietrich's use of the simple term *intentiones* is by far the most common in his works, but he also employs the phrase *formales intentiones* in several occasions, see for instance *Tractatus de origine rerum praedicamentarium*, 4.21, p. 174, l. 210; 4.33, p. 178, l. 332; *De intellectu et intelligibili*, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), lib. 11, c. 16, §1, p. 157, l. 34; *Tractatus de accidentibus*, 8.4, p. 64, l. 113. For some occurrences of the phrase *principia formalia*, see *Tractatus de origine rerum praedicamentarium*, 4.33, p. 178, l. 341–342; 5.44, p. 194, l. 445; *Quaestio utrum substantia spiritualis sit composita ex materia et forma*, 11.25, p. 335, l. 267; *Tractatus de accidentibus*, 3.3, p. 56, l. 62. On Dietrich's concept of intentions, see A. de Libera, "La problématique des *intentiones primae et secundae* chez Dietrich de Freiberg," in Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart*, p. 68–94.

41 For the characterization of *partes ante totum* as *principia formalia*, see 16A, p. 25, l. 34–35; 19B, p. 60, l. 87; 32E, p. 211, l. 177–178; 74B, p. 51, l. 49–50; 170H, p. 102, l. 255; 171F, p. 117, l. 261–262.

ambiguous on this point. Berthold acknowledges the authorities of Boethius and pseudo-Dionysius stating that spiritual substances are immaterial.<sup>42</sup> But, in accordance with Proposition 196, he admits the existence of a spiritual body or vehicle perpetually associated with the soul. Although this incorruptible vehicle is different from the material body, Berthold seems to be committed to the view that separate forms are always linked to a potential principle, not unlike the universal matter posited by Ibn Gabirol. Commenting on Proposition 187, Berthold rejects the idea that forms contain matter as part of their essence. Aiming to justify that no soul can be destroyed, Berthold unsurprisingly denies that the human souls and intellects contain matter as an essential part. He gets to this conclusion by an argument from lesser to greater, showing that since vegetative and sensitive souls themselves do not possess an essential relation to matter, it will be impossible to attribute such a relation to higher forms.<sup>43</sup> Even the form of a stone *as a form* is immaterial. Indeed, the hylomorphic composition of the form itself would lead to an infinite regress, insofar as the formal part of this composition will also have its own matter, like any element of the compound will have its co-principle, and so on.

### 3.2 *Universal Hylomorphism and the Problem of the First Principles*

Nonetheless, Berthold finds a useful resource in Ibn Gabirol's idea of a universal form whose progressive multiplication generates the created world. Therefore, he sets up an original strategy to legitimize the meaning of universal matter, existing at every level of creation according to Ibn Gabirol.<sup>44</sup> Having extensively quoted the *Fons Vitae* in Proposition 159, Berthold eventually rejects universal hylomorphism as a literal interpretation of Proclus's statement that

42 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159C, p. 193–194, l. 139–149; 187C, p. 48–49, l. 214–219. According to Berthold, these theological authorities are in line with Aristotle's opinion on the subject.

43 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 187A, p. 43, l. 39–53: *Si igitur aliquam inveniamus formam minus nobilem anima rationali vel totali, quae non habet materiam, omnis anima, de qua agitur, erit omnino immaterialis. Medium istius rationis apparet, quia lapideitas, quae est forma lapidis, in quantum forma non habet materiam, alias enim procederetur in infinitum. Ergo nec forma vegetabilis nec sensibilis nec rationalis nec intellectualis nec divina habebunt in sui essentia materiam. Et ipse Averroes videtur hoc probare specialiter de forma seu anima vegetabili, quia nulla forma, quae non est aliquid praeter hoc, quod est forma, habet materiam aliam quam subiectum, cuius est forma, alias enim secundum totale esse suum non esset in ratione formae. Quod vero anima vegetabilis in plantis et sensibilis in animalibus sint tales formae, manifestum est, quia, si essent aliquid praeter hoc, quod sunt formae et actus corporum, iam non essent virtutes in corpore, nec penderet earum esse ex corpore, cum essent aliquid in se praeter corpora. Si igitur formae ignobiliores sunt simplices et immateriales, multo fortius animae nobiles erunt formae omnino immateriales.*

44 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159B, p. 191, l. 75–77.



Limit and Infinity are the first principles of every composite being.<sup>45</sup> Matter cannot be regarded as an universal principle, because it represents a part of physical substances and as such does not exist in angels and supernatural beings. However, Berthold offers more acceptable interpretations of this idea:

Proprie enim materia dicitur, ubi est admixta privationi, propter quam ipsa est principium transmutationis.

Minus autem proprie seu communiter dicitur de materia, ubi non est admixta privationi, sicut est in caelo, et tamen est ibi sub situ et dimensione, unde et nominatur subiectum potius quam materia ab Averroee super VIII *Metaphysicae*.

Communius dicitur materia, ubi nec subicitur privationi nec situ, sed tantum dicitur potentiale, quod subicitur actui, et sic est in anima partiali et creatura spirituali, scilicet in angelis. Et hoc vult dicere Rabbi Moses in libro, quem vocat *Matrem philosophiae* cap. 75: 'Omne, inquit, quod est in potentia ad aliquid, attinet materiae, quia possibilitas semper invenitur in materia', actus vero attribuitur formae.

Communissime dicitur materia, ubi etiam excluso tali potentiali solum dicitur potentiam determinativam actualis, ubi determinans, scilicet minus actuale, et determinatum, scilicet magis actuale, coincidunt in eandem essentiam et naturam re, licet differant intentione, et talis materia est in animabus nobilibus, intellectualibus hypostasibus et omnibus entibus citra deos.<sup>46</sup>

Thus, in a broader sense, matter can also refer to the principle devoid of privation existing in heavenly bodies, and even to the sort of potentiality that can be found in the partial souls or spiritual creatures like angels. But in the largest sense (*communissime*) matter refers to an actual potency of determination in which the more actual is not essentially distinct from the less actual, but only intentionally, and in this sense the most noble souls and the intelligences possess some matter.<sup>47</sup>

Having detailed the different meanings of the term "matter", Berthold still has to make sense of the idea of a universal form. But the idea of a form present in every being does not seem fully compatible with Proclus's system. In Propositions 73 and 74 of the *Elements*, Proclus establishes a hierarchy between

45 Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, p. 138–139.

46 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159C, p. 194, l. 152–166.

47 On the distinction between three types of matter (with a reference to Thomas of York), see also 187C, p. 47–48.

wholes, forms, and being. In Proposition 73, Proclus demonstrates that Being is superior to Wholeness, since every whole participates Being, while the converse is false.<sup>48</sup> Similarly, according to Proposition 74 of the *Elements*, *eidos*, which is rendered in the Latin version by *species*, is posterior to Being, since every form is a being, while the converse is false (for instance, privation is still a sort of being, but not a form). Wholes are prior to Forms, because the latter are already cut (ἡδὴ τεμνόμενον) – i.e. divided – into distinct individuals.<sup>49</sup> Thus, Forms are posterior to Wholes, which are less universal than Being but more universal than Forms.<sup>50</sup> In this perspective, forms, strictly speaking, only belong to the intellectual level, and not to the divine realm, so that the phrase *forma universalis* should be restricted to the Intellect. The Intellect, full of forms, can be properly said to be a universal form in the sense that it contains all intelligible models of species, as stated by Proposition 177 and as Ibn Gabirol showed in his *Fons Vitae*.<sup>51</sup>

At this point, Berthold seems to be caught between the conflicting sources he is willing to harmonize. On the one hand, the definition of God as the highest or first form represents a classic theme of the Latin theological tradition, to which Albert and his followers were not opposed. Berthold himself often describes the first cause as *formalius*, and sometimes refers to it as the *prima forma*.<sup>52</sup> But on the other hand, owing to a distinction taken up from the *De causis*,<sup>53</sup> Berthold sharply differentiates the causal activity of the One, operating *per modum creationis*, and the secondary causes that operate *per modum formae*. This latter mode of operation can be called information, determination, or composition.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, according to Ibn Gabirol, the *forma formarum* refers to a created principle. In the *Fons Vitae*, the concept of

48 Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, Prop. 73, p. 68–69: Πάν μὲν ὅλον ἅμα ὄν τί ἐστι, καὶ μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος· οὐ πᾶν δὲ ὄν ὅλον τυγχάνει ὄν. [Every whole is at the same time an existent thing, and participates Being but not every existent is a whole – trans. Dodds].

49 Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, Prop. 74, p. 70–71: Πάν μὲν εἶδος ὅλον τί ἐστίν (ἐκ γὰρ πλειόνων ὑφέστηκεν, ὡν ἕκαστον συμπληροῖ τὸ εἶδος)· οὐ πᾶν δὲ ὅλον εἶδος. [Every specific Form is a whole, as being composed of a number of individuals each of which goes to make up the Form; but not every whole is a specific Form – trans. Dodds].

50 On Proclus's theory of wholes and universals, see L. Siorvanes, *Proclus. Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), p. 67–71.

51 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 177A, p. 173, l. 16–20. See also 173A, p. 127–129.

52 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 112D, p. 27, l. 82, l. 85.

53 *Liber de causis*, Prop. xvii (xviii), p. 86. On the *per creationem/per modum formae* distinction in Berthold, see Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg*, p. 30–31, p. 178, p. 403; E. Ludueña, “Creatio y determinatio en la Escuela Renana: de Alberto Magno a Bertoldo de Moosburg”, in *Principios: Revista de Filosofía* 22/37(2015), p. 77–97.

54 In this context, the phrases “information” and “determination” are taken up from Albert the Great and Dietrich of Freiberg (3A, p. 93, l. 37, n. 6), whereas the term “composition”

universal form refers to the highest created principle of the universe that generates every subsequent being by its conjunction with universal matter. In this system, form and matter represent universal principles in a double sense: first, because they are present in every being;<sup>55</sup> second, and most of all, because they are the first created principles, whose union generates a series of derived creatures. The First Intelligence,<sup>56</sup> distinct souls (rational, sensitive, vegetative),<sup>57</sup> Nature, and finally the physical substance bearing the nine accidents<sup>58</sup> represent the stages of this descending process. The ultimate cause of everything is independent from the realm of universal form and matter to which God relates only through his will.

Berthold manages to solve this difficulty by reinterpreting in his own way the two first principles that Ibn Gabirol called “universal matter” and “universal form”. Berthold replaces those universal principles with the first One (*prime unum*) and the first infinity (*prime infinitas*), that is to say the first of the six *unitates* immediately following the first cause.<sup>59</sup> Everything comes from these two principles, like Proclus demonstrated using the terms Limit and Infinity just like, in his own way, Ibn Gabirol with the terms form and matter.<sup>60</sup> But Berthold’s solution retains something of Ibn Gabirol’s doctrine of a co-production of the whole universe from two principles. Indeed, the *prime infinitas* that replaces universal matter accounts for the presence of the *incohatio formarum* in matter and, in this respect, represents the proper cause of multiplicity in the created universe including in the material world.

We can see how, despite many *prima facie* incompatibilities, Berthold manages to make sense of philosophical material that was not held in high esteem by his Dominican predecessors. Berthold does not follow Ibn Gabirol’s scheme of universal emanation, in the sense that the series of emanated beings in the *Fons Vitae* is quite different from the more complex Proclean universe. Nonetheless, Berthold agrees with Ibn Gabirol on the equivalence of form and universality in a precise sense: what is more universal *contains* more forms, and the first universal cause virtually contains all perfections as well as specific models informing the created universe, as Proclus had emphasized. However, Berthold cannot have it both ways. His attempt to reconcile Ibn Gabirol with

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(denoting the relation between form and matter) stems from Gundissalinus’s *De processione mundi* (4A, p. 104, l. 100).

55 Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, ed. C. Baeumker (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1995), lib. I, c. 5, p. 7–8.

56 Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, lib. V, c. 10, p. 274; lib. V, c. 11, p. 277.

57 Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, lib. III, c. 46–49, p. 183–188.

58 Avicbron, *Fons vitae*, lib. III, c. 1, p. 73–74.

59 On this point, see Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg*, p. 165–219.

60 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 159G, p. 197, l. 265–269.

Proclus's henology not only modifies the meaning of the adjective "universal" central to Ibn Gabirol's cosmology, his interpretation also leads him to deviate from Proclus's original text, which did not identify the One with the principle of Limit and located it, so to speak, beyond Limit and Infinity.<sup>61</sup>

### 3.3 *Conceptual Distinctions*

The reality of universal essences has a direct implication on the internal structure of the universe as Berthold conceives it. Berthold defines an intrinsic relation between the universal character of essences and the ontological properties Proclus attributed to self-constituted realities (*antipostata*). This relation is characterized owing to Dietrich of Freiberg's guiding reflections on the nature of spiritual substances.<sup>62</sup> Drawing on Dietrich's analysis, Berthold considers that pure forms – i.e. purely spiritual entities – are species before being individuals, since they are not individuated by quantity nor possess *partes post totum*. In other words, some beings (like hypostatic intellects) that Berthold calls *entia secundum speciem* are such that they are, in a sense, "more species than individuals", insofar as they are alien to the individualizing conditions of material existence. Since these beings are higher principles than material entities, their spiritual influence is not limited by matter as in the case of concrete individuals. The fact that they are constituted by pure intelligible perfections, themselves undivided but participated by lower individuals, explains why Berthold refers to these entities as "species before individuals". This priority must not be understood in a chronological sense, but as a type of ontological priority. Concrete individuals, in contrast, are individuals before being a species, since the full actualization of their essential properties implies the development of material dispositions.<sup>63</sup> Matter and the dimensional quantity attached to it give essences a concrete mode of being, which necessarily entails a certain partibility characterizing the realm of individuals. The *partes post totum* of a substance (i.e. the integral parts that come along with concrete existence) explain that the operations of corporeal souls do not immediately coincide with their essence and are subject to the division entailed by quantified matter. However, even in the case of partial souls, whose powers are

61 Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, p. 138–141.

62 Dietrich of Freiberg, *Quaestio utrum substantia spiritualis sit composita ex materia et forma*, II, p. 335, l. 252–255; *Substantiae enim ingenerabiles et incorruptibiles quantum ad id, quod sunt, prius natura sunt entia ut simpliciter et secundum speciem quam entia individualia; secundo autem et secundo ordine sunt entia individualia.*

63 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 187D, p. 50, l. 260–263, l. 272–274; for similar analyses, see 20A, p. 67, l. 81–84; 121D, p. 106, l. 52–60. On this point, see K. Flasch, "Einleitung", in Dietrich of Freiberg, *Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik*, p. XXXIII–XXXIV.

divided into distinct parts, the different faculties are different aspects of one single form.

One will note, at this point, that Berthold employs a single concept of form to describe quite different realities. As a matter of fact, regarding the different status of forms and their equivocal meanings, Berthold makes two important distinctions that must be noted. The first is to be found in Proposition 28. Here, Berthold makes a distinction between “substantial form”, which refers to a part of the compound substance, and what should more properly be called “essential form”. Whereas the former syntagm should be restricted to designate the part of the hylomorphic compound, the latter refers to a form that does not inhere in a subject, but whose perfection is nevertheless participated by it. The essential form designates an intention that more truly informs a subject without becoming one with it:

Voco autem formam substantialem communi nomine pro forma, quae est altera pars compositi, et pro forma essentiali, quae est intentio realis, quae etiam realius et essentialius omni forma substantiali qualitative informat, cum ipsa non faciat compositionem realem cum subiecto suo, forma autem substantialis et subiectum suum ponant in numerum, quamvis unum per essentiam suam penetret aliud.<sup>64</sup>

This distinction echoes the difference Berthold establishes in Proposition 25 between the term *essentia*, which should be restricted to the *entia secundum speciem*, and the term *substantia* that refers to the level of concrete beings beginning with celestial bodies.<sup>65</sup>

A second important distinction can be found in Berthold’s exposition on Proposition 194. There, Berthold underlines the difference between the closely related terms *species* and *forma* or *idea*, which are very often confused according to him. Berthold does not quote the famous remarks made by Augustine on this problem,<sup>66</sup> but he recalls that the term *species* refers to the specific reasons

64 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 28E, p. 177, l. 210–215.

65 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 25C, p. 142, l. 166–172: *Dico autem substantiam, secundum quod dividitur contra essentiam, quae est ens ut simpliciter, ut iam dictum est, et secundum speciem. Substantia vero est ens hoc cum proprietate individuali. Et sic ratio substantiae proprie loquendo in separatis incipit in anima totali, quae unita corpori caelesti constituit cum eo unum, cuius potentia sive ratio agendi est substantia caeli, prout est composita ex anima totali et corpori caelesti.* See also 178D–E, p. 196, l. 236–253, where Berthold tries to establish the compatibility of Plato’s theory of Ideas with Aristotle’s identification of formal, final, and efficient causes.

66 Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, ed. A. Mutzenbecher (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975), p. 70–71.

making up the essence of things. These specific reasons express intelligible features possessing a universal mode of being devoid of individual character. By contrast, *forma* or *idea* refer rather to the model from which an individual entity comes to being. Once again, Berthold follows a distinction that Dietrich previously articulated in the *De visione beatifica*. In this work, Dietrich underlined the difference between the *rationes rerum* present in the divine mind and the *ideas*. Whereas the former only constitute the pure intelligible features of a given species that do not determine its individual aspects (therefore constituting *res secundum speciem*), the latter phrase refers to the exemplar form from which individual things derive.<sup>67</sup> In Proposition 194, Berthold employs his collage technique to make his point: making Dietrich's distinction more precise, Berthold adds that ideas exist in mobile causes, whereas *species* belong to the level of hypostatic intellects. The distinction between universal and individual form is therefore emphasized and complements the theory of "beings according to species":

Tales autem species differunt ab ideis sive formis; respiciunt enim solum res, immo respiciendo constituunt secundum esse specificum simpliciter vel prout determinatur ad individuum modo, quo iam dictum est; solius autem esse specifici est ratio sive definitio. Ideae autem sunt formae exemplares, secundum quas ad quarum imitationem procedunt res secundum esse individuale.

Est et alia differentia specierum et idearum. Species enim, prout sunt idem, quod rationes essentielles causales, inexistunt causas simpliciter immobili et intransmutabili, qualis est intellectualis hypostasis – sic namque species derivatae, utpote intransmutabilis substantiae, procedunt ab immobili causa, per 76 –; ideae autem inexistunt causae vel per se mobili vel ex se mobili ratione eius, quod est per se mobile.

Et haec sufficiant de specierum et idearum differentia, si accipiantur secundum proprias rationes, licet frequenter unum pro alio accipiat. <sup>68</sup>

From this perspective, we can see that the reality of universal essences according to Berthold participates to the very structure of the universe. The causal dynamism of beings *secundum speciem* marks the border between these self-subsistent realities and the sensible world derived from them.

67 Dietrich of Freiberg, *De visione beatifica*, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977) 1.2.1.1.3, p. 38–39, l. 65–72.

68 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 194D, p. 110–111, l. 100–113.

## 4 Describing the Cosmological Order in Terms of Forms

### 4.1 *Forms, Intentions, and Formal Principles: An Extended Hylomorphic Vocabulary*

By themselves, however, those distinctions appear insufficient to fully characterize the complexity of Proclus's universe and its numerous ontological layers. Above the level of the hypostatic Intellect, the six divine beings (*prime infinitas*, *prime entitas*, *prime vitas*, *prime intellectualitas*, *prime animealitas*, *prime naturalitas*) represent the most formal level of the universe immediately following the first One. These entities cannot be adequately described by the Aristotelian idea of form understood as an essence composed of genus and specific difference. Rather, Berthold describes these entities with the concepts of “formal intention” or “formal principle”. The first One is one single intention (*intentio unius*). Since a “formal intention” represents a perfection that can be participated by the effects flowing from the first cause, Berthold alternatively uses the expression “formal principle” to designate it: “Unum est primum et universalissimum principium inter omnia principia formalia”.<sup>69</sup> Each god or divine unity following the first One (Proclus's henads) is also constituted by a unique intention. However, whereas the first One is *unum secundum causam principaliformiter*,<sup>70</sup> the divine unities (to which Berthold also refers to as *bonitates*) are one *per essentiam*. This difference entails that the gods represent different “contractions” of this first One's unique intention.<sup>71</sup> The first divine unity (the *prime infinitas*) is constituted by the *intentio infinitatis* (or *intentio virtutis*), the second one (the *prime entitas*) is constituted by the *intentio entitatis*, which is a further contraction of the *intentio unius*, and so on.

69 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 3E, p. 97, l. 214–215. Berthold favours the phrase *intentio* for describing the nature of the *unitates* and the *prime unum*, and tends to reserve *principia formalia* – that connotes a causal character – for the lower beings composed from several of these intelligible features. Nonetheless, he also uses the latter phrase in the singular form to designate the first One and the unities; see for instance 190D, p. 83, l. 248.

70 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 5D, p. 120, l. 248–250.

71 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43E, p. 71, l. 177–181: [...] *rerum sic separatarum quaedam stant in una intentione tantum. Et hoc dupliciter, sive simpliciter, ut prime unum, sive contracte, ut bonitates. Et istae cum prime uno proprie et principaliter dicuntur antipostaton sicut stantes se ipsis totis et totaliter sub absoluta formali independentia ad omnem aliam intentionem*. On Berthold's definition of unities or gods, see E. Ludueña, “Dioses, inteligencias y ángeles de Alberto Magno a Bertoldo de Moosburg”, in *Cuadernos de filosofía* 66(2016), p. 47–59.

Berthold justifies whenever he can his terminology by showing how it fits with Proclus's text, even when his reading does not fully correspond to the intended meaning of the *Elementatio*. For instance, his reading of the term *uniformis* given by William of Moerbeke's translation of Proposition 160 ("Omnis divinus intellectus uniformis est" [...]) reverses the original meaning of the term ἐνοειδής, which only indicates in Proclus's text that every divine intellect, insofar as it is divine, has the character of unity.<sup>72</sup> Berthold reads this passage as intended to mean that divine intellects share the same formal intention and, to this extent, are essentially identical.<sup>73</sup> The divine unities sharing the same intention can be called *uniform* in this sense, which allows Berthold to describe in his own terms the relation between God and the unities. This terminology also supports Berthold's claims on the equivalence of light and form. The gods are constituted by a single formal intention, just like light in the physical realm is the purest form:

Sicut enim lux est maxime formalis et nobilis inter omnes formas sensibiles et habet in se unite et simpliciter et excellenter perfectiones omnium qualitatum visibilium adeo, quod etiam sit hypostasis, id est formalis subsistentia, omnium colorum, ita bonitas deorum consistit in hoc, quod ipsa sola ratione suae supersubstantialitatis est pura et immixta et sic omnino formalis nihil habens vel de materia vel materiae conditionibus sibi permixtum, immo nec de aliis intentionibus formalibus essentialiter.<sup>74</sup>

The single intention defining the unities explains their self-subsistent character. The unities are self-subsistent because they can totally revert upon themselves insofar as they are devoid of any internal complexity and represent different contractions of a unique intention. Berthold's description of the divine beings as formal principles or formal intentions makes the most of

72 Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, Prop. 160, p. 140–141: Πᾶς ὁ θεῖος νοῦς ἐνοειδής ἐστὶ καὶ τέλειος καὶ πρῶτως νοῦς, ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νόας παράγων. [All divine intelligence is perfect and has the character of unity; it is the primal Intelligence, and produces the others from its own being – trans. Dodds]. William translates the proposition as follows: *Omnis divinus intellectus uniformis est et perfectus et prime intellectus a se ipso alios intellectus producens*. See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 160D, esp. p. 5–6, l. 65–99.

73 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 160D, p. 5, l. 75–77: *Prime autem et principaliformiter unum, quod est forma superdea, non dicitur proprie 'uniforme', sed 'bonificum' et unificum per commentum 112. Si autem ascribitur sibi nomen 'uniformis', hoc est, inquantum dicitur 'idem' [...]*.

74 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 143L, p. 68, l. 301–308.



the vocabulary he borrows from Dietrich. Dietrich already used the notions of “intention” and “contractions” in his own account of the emanative process of creation. More precisely, Dietrich employed these notions to conceptualize the emanation of the distinct Intellects from God, each of which instantiates a more or less universal intention (*ens, vivum, rationale*).<sup>75</sup> Dietrich described the series of Intelligences flowing from God as a series of contractions of the most formal intention that Dietrich identified with the concept of *esse*. The term “contraction” meant in this context that the subsequent determinations of this first formal intention are less universal than it. Berthold takes up this terminology, but he adjusts it to the henology of Proclus with its various gods, identifying the more universal and formal intention with the notion of oneness.<sup>76</sup> As a result, Berthold manages to equate the notions of universality and unity together with the concept of form: whatever is *universalius* is also *actualius* and *formalius*.

#### 4.2 *Composition and Structures of the Formal Intentions*

Berthold’s theory of formal principles or formal intentions enables him to offer a mereological account of the way the various ontological layers following the first One are derived from it. According to Berthold’s reading of the *Elementatio*, the realm of specific forms is made up from a combination of the formal intentions constituting the level in between the One and the Intellect.<sup>77</sup> Below the level of the *unitates* is the series of the *infinitates* that are composed of two intentions, namely the *intentio infinitatis* and the *intentio unius* (which Berthold also designates as the *intentio finitatis* due to his identification of the first One and Limit). The subsequent series of the *enter entia* results from the combination of three formal principles, i.e. the *intentio unius*, the *intentio infinitatis*, and the *intentio entitatis*, and so on.

75 See Dietrich of Freiberg, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, lib. II, c. 16, §1, p. 157, l. 28–35: *Sicut autem accepimus rationem generis in supremis intellectibus secundum primam et simplicissimam omnium intentionum entis, scilicet secundum esse, sic sumendum est rationem speciei secundum quandam intentionem magis contractam et minus simplicem in his, quae sequuntur inferius, scilicet in intellectibus moventibus caelos, et haec intentio est vivum in quantum vivum. In ipsis enim primo invenitur ratio vitae quantum ad moventia et mota, et ideo haec intentio formalis secundo loco ponitur et immediate post primam omnium intentionum, scilicet ipsum ens, cui mox coordinatur vivum.*

76 On the conceptual shifts entailed by Berthold’s henology, see E. King, “Berthold of Moosburg on Intellect and the One of the Soul”, in *Dionysius* 36(2018), p. 184–199.

77 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 43E, p. 71, l. 182–183: *Quaedam vero stant in pluribus intentionibus. Et hoc dupliciter, quia vel habent respectu ad corpus vel non.*

It must be noted that Berthold attempts a mathematico-metaphysical deduction of the numbers of divine beings and highest spiritual entities in general. In doing so, Berthold demonstrates a certain familiarity with Boethius's *De institutione arithmetica*, which conveyed the Platonist and Pythagorean theories of Nicomachus of Gerasa whose reincarnation, as the story goes, Proclus was believed to be. Berthold establishes that the first multiplicity must be such that it can be divided into three parts, since every essentially ordered series includes a beginning, a medium, and an end. The first multiplicity – the divine unities – must be composed of six elements, since it is the least number than can be decomposed in three equal parts (given that the number 3 can only be divided in three elements than are not quantities but three unities).<sup>78</sup> The number six – the first perfect number<sup>79</sup> – allows the first multiplicity to be divided into equal parts following an arithmetical proportion. This arithmetic proportion, unlike other types of proportion (geometric, harmonic), preserves the same difference between the terms of the series and, therefore, expresses in spite of this difference their essential identity (*identitas unius intentionis*).<sup>80</sup> On the basis on such principles, Berthold deduces the number of the subsequent series of principles (*infinitates, enter entia, vitae*, and so on) that result from the first series of unities and the different combinations of formal principles received from them.<sup>81</sup>

We can see now how specific forms constituting the intelligible models of concrete individuals result from a composition of *principia formalia* that ultimately stem from the first contractions of the *intentio unius*. Although it is unique, the substantial form inhering in a compound substance is made up of different formal principles that can be analyzed through its essential definition. Berthold's characterization of the *formalia principia* as *partes ante totum* (parts of the specific definition) complexifies the Proclean notion of a "whole prior to the parts" (ὅλον ἐκείνο πρὸ τῶν μερῶν) that designates in the *Elements* the first cause of a series of beings depending on it. But this theory of formal intentions allows Berthold to conceptualize the internal complexity of specific forms and to relate it to their ultimate intelligible causes. To this extent, the formal intentions or formal principles are the fundamental elements of the various degrees of composition present in the cosmological order. This expansion of the hylomorphic terminology enables Berthold to analyze the

78 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 62B, p. 182, l. 61–64.

79 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 62B, p. 182, l. 40.

80 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 62B, p. 183, l. 82.

81 See the table in the CPTMA edition, *Expositio*, 62B, p. 184.

whole hierarchy of beings in terms of formal composition – something alien to Proclus's *Elementatio* in which forms are described as mutually intricated at the intellectual level.<sup>82</sup> As recent studies have shown, Berthold makes the most of this mereological account of formal principles through which he bridges theological sources quite distant from a terminological point of view (most notably Eriugena's doctrine of the primordial causes).<sup>83</sup>

One of the most interesting aspects of Berthold's theory of formal principles lies in the fact that he intends not only to use it to explain the constitution of specific essences but also the emergence of material reality. Indeed, Berthold deduces from the different ways the formal principles can be connected the three main classes of beings composing the whole universe. The first class comprises formal principles that can be associated with one another at a formal level to constitute specific essences. For the second class, due to a certain degree of complexity, the composition of formal principles does not generate unified essences but results in different natures, producing the sphere of bodies (*corpora*). The process by which the composition of formal principles comes to produce material beings is described as a "distraction" (in contrast with contraction) from their own nature of principles. Whereas the formal principles can combine in a unified and stable manner to produce purely intelligible beings (the *entia secundum speciem*), the increasing complexity of their composition generates natures that become separate from their intelligible models and are affected by the multiplicity characterizing the sensible world. In accordance with the principle of continuity, a third class must exist where the formal intentions produce realities affected by division but still participating to the intellectual level, that is to say souls.<sup>84</sup> In some cases, Berthold further details this scale of being. He explains how the celestial souls are located in between the celestial bodies and the incorporeal beings which, inasmuch as they are defined by a plurality of formal principles, still remain under the divine unities consisting in one unique intention:

'Hoc autem medium necessario triplex, unum quidem per aequidistantiam et duo per approximationem extremorum'. Illud autem medium, quod est superiori extremo proximum, est omnis res per se perfecta, in qua principia formalia remanent in ratione et natura principiorum

82 Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, Prop. 176, p. 154–155.

83 Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg*. On Eriugena's influence on Berthold, see also King, "Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg".

84 See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 34D, p. 229–230, l. 325–329; 76I, p. 69–70, l. 178–192; 80C, p. 100–101, l. 64–73; 91B, p. 159, l. 41–46; 108E, p. 4–5, l. 59–71; 171A, p. 109, l. 14–121; 187E, p. 51, l. 264–267; 197B, p. 134, l. 50–54.

simpliciter, et per consequens sunt res ut simpliciter et secundum speciem. Medium vero, quod est inferiori extremo proximum, est substantia corporis caelestis, in quo, licet sit incorruptibile, tamen principia formalia sunt in ea simpliciter distracta in ulteriores naturas, scilicet in naturam corporeitatis, et sic est res ut haec et particularis, hoc, inquam, medium est immediatum generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Est et medium per aequidistantiam, in quo principia formalia nec remanent simpliciter in ratione et natura principiorum nec etiam simpliciter distrahuntur in alias naturas, puta anima totalis, quae est separata, et sic communicat superioribus, et coniuncta corpori, et sic communicat cum inferioribus propter respectum ad corpus, a quo superiora sunt penitus absoluta. 'Et sic omnia sunt conexas in virtute, quam connexionem Pythagoras vocavit catenam auream'.<sup>85</sup>

Thus, Berthold maintains the key standpoints of Dietrich's ontology, and manages to take into account with the same conceptual architecture the level of divine beings that Dietrich did not take into account. To this extent, Berthold intimately links the core intuition of his emanative model with precise stances on contemporary issues, like the status of quantified matter in the process of individuation and the thesis of the unicity of form in human beings. These positions are articulated through a dynamic conception of essences, which flow from the ideal sphere to the physical realm in multiple modes of being.

#### 4.3 *The Status of Forms in Matter*

The resemblance or dissemblance between the terms of the chain of being can now be explained within this extended hylomorphic framework. Although a formal cause usually accounts for the resemblance between the cause and its effect, since it consists in the transmission of the same essence from one subject to another, this transmission can happen more or less perfectly. According to Berthold, perfect resemblance exists when two things share the same form according to the same reason and mode, like the Father and the Son. A less perfect resemblance exists when two things share the same form according to the same reason but not the same mode, and a still less perfect when they share the same form but neither according to the same reason nor the same mode.<sup>86</sup> To explain these different modalities in the transmission of a same form, Berthold uses again the notion of formal intentions along with the couple contraction/distractio. Every agent brings about something similar to itself.

85 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 108E, p. 4–5, l. 59–73.

86 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 28D, p. 177, l. 171–177.

However, insofar as it does so by transmitting a certain formal intention, this intention sometimes remains the same, whereas it is sometimes contracted or even “distracted” into other natures, accounting for the various degrees of multiplicity that reaches its highest point in the material world.<sup>87</sup>

However, since they derive from a combination of *principia formalia*, forms possess an intrinsic relation to their intelligible models even at the lowest level of matter. On this point, Berthold’s theory of material forms is indebted to Albert the Great’s views on the subject, which he follows closely. In Albert’s system, the theory of natural generation was based on a certain conception of matter, according to which forms somehow already exist in it, even if under a potential mode of being called *inchoatio formae*. Interestingly, Albert analyzed the structure of matter with the same concepts serving to define emanative causality in general, namely the idea of identity *secundum essentiam* and difference *secundum esse*.<sup>88</sup> According to Albert, forms as such are essentially identical with their privation in matter. They remain essentially unchanged when actualized in it, and only change according to their being. In his *Metaphysica*, this theory was intended to solve the problem of the emergence of natural beings. It explains how new forms can arise in nature without having to admit their preexistence in matter and without postulating their induction *ab extra* by God.<sup>89</sup> The idea of an active potency of matter is in line with the principle according to which nothing comes from nothing. It also entails that matter already contains the disposition for future actualizations. Albert called this potency *aptitudo formalis* and equated it with the concept of *rationes seminales*.<sup>90</sup>

Dietrich of Freiberg also subscribed to the thesis that potential forms in matter are identical *secundum essentiam* with actual forms, although distinct from them *secundum esse*. In his treatise *De miscibilibus in mixto*, Dietrich took

87 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 28E, p. 177, l. 231–235.

88 Albert’s theory of matter, along with its associated concepts of active potency and the *inchoatio formae*, is disseminated among different works (for instance *Physica*, lib. 1, tr. 3, c. 10; *De anima*, lib. 1, tr. 2, c. 7; *De caelo*, lib. 1, tr. 3, c. 4) has been studied in detail, beginning with Nardi’s works (see esp. B. Nardi, “La dottrina d’Alberto Magno sull’ *inchoatio formae*”, in *Studi di filosofia medievale* (1960), p. 69–101). For a recent synthesis on the topic, see A. Rodolfi, *Il concetto di materia nell’opera di Alberto Magno* (Firenze: Galluzzo, 2004).

89 Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, lib. XI, tr. 1, c. 8, p. 468–471.

90 See P.M. Wengel, *Die Lehre von den rationes seminales bei Albert dem Grossen: Eine terminologische und problemgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (Würzburg: Mayr, 1937); Nardi, “La dottrina d’Alberto Magno sull’ *inchoatio formae*”.

care to specify that this idea does not entail the plurality of forms in matter, an apparent consequence of this thesis.<sup>91</sup>

Differentiating the equivocal meanings of the phrase “active potency”,<sup>92</sup> Berthold equally conceives the *essentia formae* as something permanent receiving different modes of being, and takes up the notion of *incohatio formae*.<sup>93</sup> Like Dietrich, Berthold refuses the separability of matter from form as much as the plurality of forms and, like Albert, he does not make use of the literal interpretation of the *Dator formarum* attributed by Albert to the *Platonici*.<sup>94</sup> The most notable aspect of his position lies in his insistence on the intimate connection between the potential being of forms in matter and their intelligible model. The form understood as the ideal model eternally existing at the intellectual level is the constitutive principle of a thing's essence (*principium constitutum esse specifici*), even for something like a house that is brought to being artificially.<sup>95</sup> In this respect, specific essences enjoy an eternal mode of being in the divine intellect that is independent of their contingent actualization in the material world.<sup>96</sup> Commenting on Proposition 48, Berthold states more precisely in which sense forms are eternal. He demonstrates that the

91 Dietrich of Freiberg, *Tractatus de miscibilibus in mixto*, ed. W. Wallace (Hamburg: Meiner, 1985), 21, p. 46–47.

92 On the notion of *potentia activa*, see 25C, p. 141–142, where Berthold distinguishes three types of active potency, which enables him to deduce three *maneries perfectorum*. See also Berthold, *Expositio*, 78A–E, p. 86, l. 21–25; p. 89, l. 109–122; 27E, p. 165, l. 144–154. Let us note that in Proposition 1B, Berthold defines the potential plurality of forms in matter as a “passive potential multitude” (Berthold, *Expositio*, 1B, p. 74–75, l. 129–135).

93 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 77G, p. 78, l. 158–164: *Forma etiam dicitur esse in potentia in materia, in quantum essentia sua stans sub esse imperfecto seu potenciali, quod quidam vocant esse confusi habitus, perficitur in actum existentem eiusdem essentiae cum forma in potentia. Potentia enim et actus non diversificant essentiam formae, hoc est forma in potentia et in actu non diversificant eandem numero essentiam, cum processus de potentia ad actum non largiatur procedenti multitudinem essentiarum, sed perfectionem in esse et in toto*. See also Berthold, *Expositio*, 24A, p. 126, l. 45–47; 59C, p. 167, l. 153–154, l. 162–163; 205A–C, p. 209, l. 23–30. On the implications of this position in Berthold's emanationist metaphysics, see M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, “À propos du néoplatonisme d'Albert le Grand. Aventures et mésaventures de quelques textes d'Albert dans le Commentaire sur Proclus de Berthold de Moosburg”, in *Archives de philosophie* 43(1980), p. 635–654, esp. p. 635–638.

94 Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, lib. I, tr. 4, c. 1, p. 43–44.

95 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 178F, p. 197, l. 285–292.

96 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 118B, p. 77, l. 63–66: *Sed res ab aeterno fuerunt in Dei omnipotentia et voluntate tantum secundum esse potentiale potentiae activae, in scientia fuerunt ab aeterno non solum ut in potentia causae secundum illam speciem scientiae Dei, quae vocatur dispositio, sed etiam quia, ut dictum est supra, rerum rationes ab aeterno sunt in ipsa*.

corruption of an individual form – even a corporeal one – does not annihilate its entire being. The true form as such – the ideal model from which an individual is brought to actual existence – never ceases to subsist as an essence, even if it can lose existence (“*nulla forma substantialis cadit ab essentia in purum non ens, licet quaedam cadant ab esse*”).<sup>97</sup> To this extent, Berthold’s theory of generation of natural forms at the lowest level of matter is intrinsically dependent on his doctrine of universals since it implies the thesis of a variation of the same essence only *secundum esse*.

#### 4.4 *Berthold’s Classifications of Forms*


From all of these concepts, Berthold is able to describe the structure of the Proclean universe in his own terms – that is to say, without abandoning the vocabulary of forms inherited from the Latin theological tradition. Thus, the structure of the multiple modes of being is not simply repeated from the descriptions given by the *Elements*, but it is thoroughly analyzed and justified through Berthold’s conceptual framework. Berthold offers several classifications of forms that all underline the principle of continuity<sup>98</sup> according to which between any two opposite orders of beings, something must always exist.<sup>99</sup> While the divine unities only contain a unique formal intention, the realm of specific forms begins at the intellectual level and, from there, covers the entirety of the created universe. Commenting on Proposition 41, Berthold defines a purely spiritual being as a forming form (*forma formans*), whereas a form having a relation to matter is a *forma informans*. Forming forms are *per subsistens*, whereas informing forms subsist *per aliud*, due to their relation to matter. The class of informing forms is subdivided in corporeal and non-corporeal. It covers the entire range of forms that are not entirely intellectual, from souls – be they total or partial – to purely corporeal forms. Forming forms, on their side, can be divided due to the fact that some of them function like subjects for others, even if not in a material sense, since they are composed from different formal intentions. Indeed, some forming forms are

97 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 48B, p. 97, l. 121–133.

98 On this point, see also Berthold, *Expositio*, 205A, p. 209, l. 20–22 where Berthold distinguishes three modes of information following a similar reasoning.

99 These classifications are often redundant but nonetheless present the interest of being based on different approaches that encompass Berthold’s theory of formal principles and *maneries entium*. The main examples can be found in Proposition 25 (following the modalities of constitution, p. 142–143); Proposition 41 (types of informing relations, p. 49–51); Proposition 48 (relation to privation, p. 94–96); Proposition 82 (criterion of divisibility, p. 118–119); Proposition 112 (separability, p. 28–29); Proposition 173 (participation, p. 129–130); Proposition 190 (operations, p. 83–84); Proposition 205 (relation to matter, p. 209–210).

more universal than another because they are composed of fewer intentions (as stated in Proposition 72). This distinction, therefore, supposes Berthold's theory of the composition from formal intentions that defines the dependence relations among the highest realities.<sup>100</sup>



100 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 41C, p. 49–51, l. 73–148: *Ex praemissis evidenter apparet, quod subsistere per se et non fulciri aliquo alio, et esse in alio sive fulciri et sustentari aliquo alio sunt modi substantiae ita, quod omnis forma formans habet subsistentiam per se, informans autem habet esse in alio, quae etiam, ut sit in genere dicere, est duplicis manerie: quaedam enim est corporalis, quaedam non, seu incorporealis. Dico autem 'corporales', quae educuntur de potentia materiae per agens physicum. Et haec adhuc sunt in duplici differentia, quia vel sunt formae animatorum vel inanimatorum, et haec sunt generum diversorum, quia vel elementorum vel mixtorum [...]. Formae autem animatorum corporales etiam sunt in duplici differentia, quia vel vegetabilium vel sensibilium. [...] Super quam sunt formae simpliciter incorporeales, et hae iterum sunt in duplici manerie, quia vel partiales vel totales. Partialis autem est anima rationalis, quae in quantum huiusmodi non est actus alicuius corporis neque forma corporalis nec operans in corpore, sed solum in quantum est vegetativa [...]. Totalis autem, quae etiam nobilis anima dicitur, secundum se totam est elevata super corpus subiectum, licet etiam secundum se totam sit in corpore, quamvis autem secundum aliam et aliam rationem. Et ista tenet ultimum seu supremum gradum formarum informantium. Ex praemissis apparet, qualiter formae informantes habeant esse in. Verum, quia in formis formantibus quibusdam, non in quantum sunt formantes, sed formatae, compositis videlicet ex diversis intentionibus pluribus vel paucioribus, quales sunt omnes res supra animas totales et citra bonitates existentes, quaedam habent rationem subiectorum, quaedam autem formarum, ideo etiam tales quasi formae insunt suis subiectis, cum quibus tamen non ponunt in numerum essentialium sicut informantes praedictae, sed compositum ex eis est ut res una, quae est ens ut simpliciter et secundum speciem.*



Some differences in these classifications must be noted, however. For instance, the principle of continuity is sometimes intended to define the status of human souls, which are partly informing matter, and partly detached from it by their intellectual character. This is the case in Proposition 82, where Berthold analyzes the multiplication of forms in matter and classifies them according to division or partibility. Forms can be grouped into two general classes: those that can be divided according to their subject, and those that are fully separate from matter. In the former group, there exists a distinction between *entia secundum speciem* like hypostatic intelligences and particular beings like angels.<sup>101</sup> Among the forms that can be divided according to their subject, some are fully immersed in matter, whereas others are totally undivided by their subject and remain separate from it, like celestial forms (total souls).<sup>102</sup> According to the principle of continuity, human souls are then defined in between incorporeal forms not divided by their subject and forms entirely divided by it.<sup>103</sup>

At other places, like in Proposition 112, the principle of continuity is rather meant to clarify the status of total or celestial souls. Here, Berthold presents the gradation of forms following the criterion of separability.<sup>104</sup> Total souls are presented as *formae mediae*, i.e. located between the realm of incarnate forms and purely separate entities. Berthold explains that total souls are only causes and not principles since they are not educed from potency to act, unlike material forms that are both principles and causes. Natural forms present different degrees of separability from matter, from the most humble souls entirely immersed in it to the rational souls whose intellectual activity does not depend on matter. Fully separate forms can be divided due to the fact that some self-subsistent entities are still inferior to the level of gods which, unlike the first One, include a first type of multiplicity. Berthold complements this classification with the Boethian distinction between the true forms, entirely separated from matter, and the *imagines formarum*.<sup>105</sup>


101 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 82A, p. 118, l. 17–18.

102 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 82A, p. 119–120, l. 69–71: *Non enim existunt ex eo neque in parte et universaliter neque in divisibili neque in indivisibili, et istae sunt formae, quae sunt quasi extremae ad formas corporales.*

103 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 82A, p. 120, l. 77–78.

104 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 112D, p. 28, l. 114–119: *Inter veras vero formas et non veras, quia sunt extremae, necessario dantur formae mediae, scilicet animae caelorum, quae conectunt causaliter infimas cum supremis. Ex praemissis apparet formae diversa significatio, quia dicitur et de forma thearchica et principaliformi per se et secundum se subsistente, quae sunt verae formae, et de non veris secundum suos gradus et mediis inter extremas.*

105 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 112D, p. 28, l. 105, l. 122.




In Proposition 48, Berthold offers another description of the hierarchy of forms based on the way they relate to privation and potency.<sup>106</sup> Here, this approach enables him to provide a classification that takes into account the way different kinds of forms exist or come to being. Purely corporeal forms such as the elements or material bodies are subject to privation *secundum subiectum et formam*, because these forms are entirely educed from the potency of matter and, like the composite substance in which they inhere, did not exist before this actualization.<sup>107</sup> The operations of such entities are entirely dependent on their bodies. Other forms, like partial souls, are partly separable from their subject since some of their activities (intellectual operations) are independent of matter. These forms, therefore, cannot be not educed from the potency of matter and, because of that, do not cease to exist when separated from their subject.<sup>108</sup> A third kind of forms, the total souls, is neither separable nor subject to annihilation.<sup>109</sup>

<sup>106</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 48A, p. 94–96, l. 17–98.

<sup>107</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 48A, p. 94, l. 21–24: *Omnes enim tales formae habent privationem oppositam secundum subiectum et formam, quia totum, quod fit actu, fuit prius in potentia; compositum autem fit actu; ergo et quantum ad materiam et formam prius fuit in potentia.*

<sup>108</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 48A, p. 94, l. 25–28: *Alia est forma habens privationem secundum subiectum et non secundum se ipsum, qualis est anima partialis: non enim educitur de potentia materiae, sed corpore organizato secundum Aristotelem infunditur, propter quod etiam non tota immergitur, sed partim est separata.*

<sup>109</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 48A, p. 96, l. 93–98.



It appears that these classifications use different criteria to demarcate the dynamic, modal, and relational aspects of a same graduated structure. Despite slight differences owing to the criteria taken into account, the classifications are convergent. They show how Berthold manages to conceptualize the complex organization of the Proclean universe in his own terms, obtaining a sort of combinatory deduction of the main ontological levels exposed in the *Elementatio*.

## 5 Conclusion

In view of these elements, Berthold's main innovations on the theme of forms appear as complementary aspects of a same project, i.e. to found his doctrine of emanation within the philosophical vocabulary of his time despite the dominance of Aristotelian hylomorphism. His efforts to provide a rigorous definition of light in its spiritual dimension, to justify its status as a universal principle and to explain its different modalities of manifestation all work toward the same goal, that we could sum up in the expression "metaphysics of light". The concept of light and its generative dynamism enables Berthold to sharpen Albert's distinction between the Aristotelian conception of formal causation and the specific action of the formal flux. The diffusing action of the first cause in different modes of manifestation is conceptualized as the multiplication and diffraction of a primordial formal principle, which virtually contains the different intentions composing the created universe, just as natural light – invisible in itself – contains all possible colors.

To explain the mix of identity and otherness entailed by this diffusion, Berthold draws on the key idea that something can produce an effect essentially identical to the cause but different *secundum esse*. Even though Berthold does not depart on this point from the main positions of his Dominican predecessors, his own contribution extends these ideas to a more complex universe that, in addition, was not theorized in the same concepts in the *Elements*. This conceptual adaptation relies on a twofold strategy. On the one hand, Berthold selects and extends several technical notions inherited from the German Dominican School to make sense of different aspects of Proclus's text. This is true of Dietrich's theory of perfectional forms that helps to describe the dynamic aspect of the flux, whose action is simple and instantaneous like the operations of agents acting *per essentiam*. This same goes for the concepts of *intentio formalis* or *principium formale*, that Berthold employs to study a level of reality (i.e. gods or divine unities) that his predecessors did not recognize. On the other hand, Berthold applies the conceptual framework of hylomorphism already available to him (*idea, species, forma*) to organize the layers of reality owing to a small set of additional terms (*forma formans, formans informans, forma subsistens, forma per se/per aliud subsistens*, and so on). In his innovations, Berthold remains faithful to the fundamental ideas defended by his Dominican masters about the unity of the hylomorphic compound, the status of matter and the nature of causality.

Alain de Libera has considered one of the central ideas of the School of Cologne to be the model of causation based on the idea of a formal flux that, through different modes of being, remains essentially the same.<sup>110</sup> To a certain extent, some may wonder if this model would apply to Berthold's theory of forms itself when compared to the foundations laid by his predecessors. The originality of his construction lies in the unique way he combines multiple sources, even when his main authorities were openly hostile to them, like Albert the Great was hostile to Ibn Gabirol. On the theme of forms and formal causation, Berthold departs on several points from his main influences, notably Albert and his Dominican followers. But it would be a mistake to see his innovations as a betrayal of them, when Berthold is first driven by the unparalleled will to explain the full complexity of Proclus's work in the philosophical vocabulary of his time.

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110 De Libera, *La mystique rhénane*, p. 361.

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**PART 3**

*Comparisons*





# Peter of Ireland and Berthold of Moosburg on First Being, First Life, and First Mind

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## 1 Premises

In his “Introduction” to the first volume of the edition of Berthold of Moosburg’s *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli*, Kurt Flasch refers to the fact that, already at the beginning of the 20th century, writers such as Martin Grabmann and Engelbert Krebs had noted that Berthold’s work was within the tradition of the German Dominican School, ultimately leading back to Albert the Great, which gave rise to a strong Neoplatonic tradition with Ulrich of Strassburg, Dietrich of Freiberg, Meister Eckhart and then the high point of the reception of Proclus with Berthold.<sup>1</sup> Grabmann, Flasch points out, had noted the contrast between this Neoplatonic tendency and the more thoroughgoing Aristotelian approach stemming from Albert’s other pupil, Thomas Aquinas. In an article by Grabmann, one was led to the conclusion that this divergence between Thomas and Ulrich of Strassburg was perhaps also due to the influence of Aquinas’ other teacher, Master Peter of Ireland.<sup>2</sup>

1 See K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli*, Prologus, Propositiones 1–13, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. xi: “Gleich zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts lenkten Martin Grabmann und Engelbert Krebs die Aufmerksamkeit auf Berthold; sie stellten ihn vor als einen charakteristischen Autor der deutschen Dominikanerschule, insbesondere als einen Erben Dietrichs von Freiberg. Grabmann sah, daß man in der deutschen Albertschule eine mehr aristotelisierende, eher an Thomas anknüpfende Richtung von einer stärker neuplatonischen Strömung unterscheiden müsse, für die er Ulrich von Straßburg, Dietrich von Freiberg, Meister Eckhart und eben Berthold als charakteristisch ansah.”

2 See M. Grabmann, “Thomas von Aquin und Petrus von Hibernia”, in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 33(1920), p. 347–362. Grabmann, while referring to the research Clemens Baeumker had already carried out on Peter of Ireland, states (p. 360): “Für diese Prägung des Thomistischen Aristotelismus war es, wie Baeumker weiterhin ausführt, vielleicht doch von Bedeutung, daß Thomas, ehe er zu dem Deutschen Albert kam, schon bei Petrus von Hibernia die entscheidende Richtung auf Aristoteles bereits vorgefunden und auf sich hatte wirken lassen. Jedenfalls hat Ulrich Engelberti, der ureigenste Schüler Alberts des Großen, von seinem großen Lehrer eine ganz andere Art der Scholastik ererbt als Thomas von Aquin. Zwischen

Keeping these two distinct but related traditions in mind, what I wish to do here is to make a comparison by concentrating on Proposition 102 of the *Elements* of Proclus and the version known to Peter from Proposition XVII (XVIII) of the *Liber de causis* in order to compare the approaches of Peter of Ireland and Berthold of Moosburg, while at the same time using Aquinas's *Lectio XVIII* of his *Commentary on the Book of Causes* as a bridge between the two traditions.

On the surface, our topic here centres on the classic triad of Being-Life-Intellect which for Plotinus were conceptual distinctions that defined the one hypostasis of *Nous*; Proclus then sees each as hypostases and in precisely that order. This is clarified and the order established already by Proclus in Proposition 101:

All things which participate intelligence are preceded by the unparticipated Intelligence, those which participate life by Life, and those which participate being by Being; and of these three unparticipated principles Being is prior to Life and Life to Intelligence.

For in the first place, because in each order of existence unparticipated terms precede the participated (Prop. 100), there must be Intelligence prior to things being intelligent, Life prior to living things, and Being prior to things which are. And secondly, since the cause of more numerous effects precedes the cause of fewer (Prop. 60), among these principles Being will stand foremost; for it is present to all things which have life and intelligence (since whatever lives and has intellection necessarily exists), but the converse is not true (since not all that exists lives and exercises intelligence). Life has the second place; for what shares in intelligence shares in life, but not conversely, since many things are alive but remain devoid of knowledge. The third principle is Intelligence; for whatever is in any measure capable of knowledge both lives and exists. If, then, Being gives rise to a number of effects, Life to fewer, and Intelligence to yet fewer, Being stands foremost, next to it Life, and then Intelligence.<sup>3</sup>

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der neuplatonisch gerichteten *Summa* Ulrichs und der *Summa theologiae* des Aquinaten bestehen so durchgreifende Unterschiede, daß man für beide nicht den gleichen Lehrer und die gleiche Schule vermuten möchte." See also C. Baeumker, "Petrus de Hibernia. Der Jugendlehrer des Thomas von Aquino und seine Disputation vor König Manfred", *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos.-philolog. und hist. Klasse*, Heft 8(1920), p. 41–49. For a different point of view, see A.A. Robiglio, "Neapolitan Gold: A Note on William of Tocco and Peter of Ireland", in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 44(2002), p. 107–111.

3 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66–107*, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 101, p. 211–216, Latin text at p. 215; English translation by E.R. Dodds in Proclus, *The Elements of Theology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963<sup>2</sup>), p. 91.

In fact the triad Being-Life-Intelligence are developed in Propositions 101, 102, and 103 but for the reasons which will become clear below, here we will focus on Proposition 102.

## 2 Peter of Ireland

Peter of Ireland (Petrus de Hibernia, de Ybernia) was active as a teacher and writer at the University of Naples from perhaps as early as the 1240s until at least the mid-1260s. Born in Ireland sometime towards the beginning of the 13th century, the fact of his career taking place in the South of Italy, with its Norman links with Ireland and England, would make his being of Gaelic origin less probable than his being of an Anglo-Irish family. The lack of a University in Ireland meant that, like Richard FitzRalph a century later, he probably left Ireland at around fifteen years of age to pursue his studies abroad. We do not know at which university he studied but the most likely candidate is Oxford. The historical records we do have place him at the world's first state university at Naples as Professor of Logic and Natural Philosophy in the middle part of the 13th century.

The initial interest of scholars in Peter of Ireland was mainly due to the fact that he was held to be a teacher of the young Thomas Aquinas at Naples University from 1239–44, introducing Thomas to the study of Aristotle and perhaps also to the commentaries of Avicenna and Averroes. However, based upon internal evidence, the surviving works of Peter would seem to date from at least a decade later, and to relate to lectures given in the 1250s and 1260s.<sup>4</sup>

Peter was one of those authors towards the mid-thirteenth century who explored and taught the new learning which had arrived with the translations of Aristotle's works and his Arabic commentators (at a time when these works were forbidden to be taught at the University of Paris). Again, we know from Rabbi Moses ben Solomon of Salerno that he met with Peter of Ireland, whom he called "that wise Christian," and some others in the 1250s to discuss the leading doctrines of Maimonides.<sup>5</sup> An Aristotelian influence is clear in the way in which Peter did philosophy, where, like his student Thomas Aquinas,

4 Peter of Ireland, *Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, ed. M. Dunne (Louvain-la-Neuve / Paris: Peeters / Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1993); Peter of Ireland, *Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis*, ed. M. Dunne (Louvain-la-Neuve / Paris: Peeters / Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1996).

5 See G. Sermoneta, *Un glossario filosofico ebraico italiano del XIII secolo* (Firenze: Olschki, 1969), p. 45.

a clear distinction between philosophy and theology is maintained. In terms of his philosophical approach he seems to consciously eschew the Christian Neoplatonic tradition.<sup>6</sup> However, the influence of Arabic Neoplatonism is present in his work especially through his use of Avicenna. The only reference to Plato I have found is in his *Determinatio magistralis*:

Et propter hoc dicit Phylosophus: sumus et nos finis omnium, non finis propter quem omnia sunt, sed ut illud cuius dicunt esse omnia propter aliquam utilitatem; sed omnia sunt propter unum motorem omnium, primum scilicet. Et dicitur bonum distinctum, propter quod sunt omnia. Et propter hoc, si sustinentur indiuidua unius speciei per indiuidua alterius speciei uel generis, hoc non est contra naturam ordinantem, sed totum est de bonitate ordinis et de sollicitudine ordinantis datum. Et non est inconueniens quod magis appareat beniuolencia nature in una specie quam in alia, quamuis ex se natura habet equaliter ad influendum, tamen non est equaliter res sunt preparate ad recipiendum influenciam; unde relegata est inuidia ex toto a primo, sicut ait Plato.<sup>7</sup> Bonum ergo quod dicitur bonum ordinis non inuenitur nisi secundum magis et minus, secundum prius et posterius, et secundum nobilius et uilius; et semper posterius est propter prius, et uilius propter nobilius, et imperfectius propter perfectius, et materia propter formam et motus propter motorem.<sup>8</sup>

The Commentary on the *De longitudine et breuitate vitae* contains extensive quotations from writings by Aristotle, *Physics*, *De caelo*, *De generatione et corruptione*, the fourth book of the *Meteorologia*, *De anima*, *Parua Naturalia*, *De animalibus* and also from the available medical authors, Constantine the

6 The exception being the opening of the *De longitudine* commentary, beginning as it does with the *Liber de causis*, or the *Liber de pura bonitate* as Peter terms it, the original title as translated from the Arabic *Kalām fi maḥd al-khair*. The text is based on the *Elementatio theologica* of Proclus with commentaries by an unknown Arabic author. Peter like many of his contemporaries presumably thought that it was a work of Aristotle although some held it to be by al-Fārābī.

7 Plato, *Timaeus*, ed. J.H. Waszink, *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus* (London / Leiden: The Warburg Institute / Brill, 1962), 29e, p. 22, l. 18: *Optimus erat, ab optimo porro inuidia longe relegata est*.

8 The text of the *Determinatio magistralis* was republished from the 1920 edition of Baeumker in Peter of Ireland, *Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis*, p. 245–250, here p. 248.

African, Galen, Haly Abbas, Isaac Israeli, Nicolaus Damacenus, and al-Rāzī. Peter is aiming at making a conscious attempt to reconstruct Aristotle's philosophy of life by looking at and exploring all of the pertinent sources and not just the text of the *De longitudine*. There are the conventional references to *Physics* v, *Meteorologica* iv, the *De generatione*; but Peter is unusual in giving many references to the *De plantis*, and especially in his extended references to the *De animalibus*. In fact, in style and content Peter is quite close to the more extended treatment of Peter of Spain in his *Questiones super libro De animalibus*.<sup>9</sup> However, one thing that Peter did not find in his sources listed above was a philosophical discussion of the origin of life and for this he turned in his Prologue to the *Liber de causis*.

The Prologue to the commentary on the *De longitudine* does not deal with Aristotle's text but is, instead, an extended version of a *divisio scientiae* which as a literary form serves to give an idea of the nature and subject of the science which studies the problem in question – life and death – and the reasons why life is short or long. The prologue opens with a long quotation from Proposition xvii (xviii) of *De causis* (inspired by Proposition 102 of the *Elementatio theologica*). In fact, in this short prologue Peter gives two titles for the work, the *Liber de pura bonitate* and the *Liber de causis*. As the subject matter of the commentary will refer to life, its length or shortness, and its contrary death, it is only natural to examine the ultimate origin of life first.

According to Aquinas the purpose of Proposition xvii (xviii) of the *De causis* is to show the universal dependence of all things upon the First Being which is God:

Postquam ostensum est quod res omnes dependent a primo secundum suam virtutem, hic ostendit quod dependent omnia a primo secundum suam naturam. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit universalem dependentiam rerum a primo secundum omnia quae pertinent ad naturam vel substantiam earum, secundo ostendit diversum gradum appropinquationis ad primum a quo dependent, sicut et de dependentia virtutis dixerat, et hoc 19<sup>a</sup> propositione, ibi: *Ex intelligentiis est* etc.<sup>10</sup>

9 Peter of Spain, *Questiones super libro De animalibus*, ed. F. Navarro Sanchez (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015).

10 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002), Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 1–8.



Now let us compare Peter's quotation with that of St Thomas:

Peter of Ireland

*Sicut habetur in libro De pura bonitate: res omnes habent essenciam propter ens primum et res uiue sunt mote per essenciam suam propter uitam primam.*<sup>11</sup>

Thomas Aquinas

*Primo ergo ponit talem propositionem: res omnes habent essenciam per ens primum, et res vivae omnes sunt motae per essenciam suam propter vitam primam, et res intelligibiles omnes habent scientiam propter intelligentiam primam.*<sup>12</sup>

From the above, it is immediately clear that Peter is selective in his use of the quotation; he is interested in the dependence of beings upon the First Being and of life upon the First Life and excludes those passages in the commentary which refer to knowledge and understanding (*scientia/intelligentia*).

Of course, Peter did not know of the text of Proclus and was not able to make the comparison which Aquinas makes between the two texts.<sup>13</sup> Aquinas is clear, as distinct from Peter, that in order to understand Proposition XVII (XVIII) we must grasp that all grades of things can be led back to three: being, living and understanding:

*Ad huius autem propositionis intellectum primo quidem considerandum est quod omnes rerum gradus ad tria videtur reducere quae sunt esse, vivere et intelligere. Et hoc ideo quia unaquaeque res tripliciter potest considerari: primo quidem secundum se, et sic convenit ei esse, secundo prout tendit in aliquid aliud, et sic convenit ei moveri, tertio secundum quod alia in se habet, et sic convenit ei cognoscere quia secundum hoc cognitio perficitur quod cognitum est in cognoscente non quidem materialiter sed formaliter.*<sup>14</sup>

The question is, why does Peter not refer to the First Intelligence? We cannot be sure but there are a number of reasons, of course, which one might consider. The text of Aristotle which he is commenting on concerns length and shortness

11 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, Prologue, p. 67.

12 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 8–12.

13 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 12–101, l. 3.

14 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 101, l. 8–16.

of life and, as he will show, it is the task of natural philosophy (*physica*) to consider this. It is not, however the task of natural philosophy to consider how the known is in the knower, not materially, but formally, as Aquinas puts it: “cognitum est in cognoscente non quidem materialiter sed formaliter”.<sup>15</sup> Perhaps another reason might have been to avoid certain contemporary debates on the relationship between *intelligentia* and *intellectus*. He condemns the Averroistic doctrine of a single intellect in his commentary on the *Peryermenias*.<sup>16</sup>

The *De causis* introduces a distinction with regard to being, life and intelligence, namely, that being is by way of causation, life, and intellect by way of information. St Thomas, following Aristotle and the Ps. Dionysius understands all three to be one and the same as God.<sup>17</sup> Peter, however, in beginning his

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- 15 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 101, l. 15–16. See also, Aquinas, *De sensu et sensato*, p. 5, l. 68–79, where he says that Aristotle never wrote a treatise on intellect *per se*, and that if he had it would have belonged to metaphysics and not the science of nature (referred to in S. Donati, “Albert the Great’s Treatise *De intellectu et intelligibili*. A Study of the Manuscript and Printed Tradition”, in *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 30[2019], p. 162, n. 15). I am grateful to Evan King for drawing my attention to this.
- 16 Peter of Ireland, *Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis*, I, lect. 1, q. 5, p. 24: *Per distinctionem huius “anime” [16a 6–7] communiter loquentes solvunt hic istud, quod intellectus sunt idem apud omnes, id est quod intellectus conceptus de re apud unum consentiens sit intellectui concepto de re apud alterum et non interimit conceptio unius conceptionem alterius. Set illud est vulgare, primum est sophisticum.*
- 17 Aquinas quotes this proposition in *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 1 c: *Et propter hoc ex nihilo aliquid facere potest; et haec eius actio vocatur creatio. Et inde est quod in Libro de causis, dicitur, quod esse eius est per creationem, vivere vero, et caetera huiusmodi, per informationem. Causalitates enim entis absolute reducuntur in primam causam universalem; causalitas vero aliorum quae ad esse superadduntur; vel quibus esse specificatur, pertinet ad causas secundas, quae agunt per informationem, quasi supposito effectu causae universalis: et inde etiam est quod nulla res dat esse, nisi in quantum est in ea participatio divinae virtutis. Propter quod etiam dicitur in Libro de causis, quod anima nobilis habet operationem divinam in quantum dat esse.* Aquinas also presupposes it in *Quodlibet* III, q. 3, a. 1 c: *Respondeo. Dicendum, quod impossibile est, id quod per creationem producitur, ab alio causari quam a prima omnium causa; cuius ratio est, secundum Platonicos, quia quanto aliqua causa est superior, tanto eius causalitas ad plura se extendit. Unde oportet ut in effectibus id quod ad plura se habet, ad superiorem causam referatur. Manifestum est autem quod in ordine principiorum essentialium quanto aliqua forma est posterior, tanto est magis contracta, et ad pauciora se extendit. Quanto autem forma est prior, et propinquior subiecto primo, tanto oportet quod ad plura se extendat. Sequitur ergo quod formae posteriores sunt ab inferioribus agentibus; priores vero et communiore a superioribus. Et sic relinquuntur quod id quod est primum subsistens in unoquoque, sit a prima omnium causa. Quaelibet ergo alia causa praeter primam, oportet quod agat praesupposito subiecto, quod est effectus causae primae. Nulla ergo causa alia potest creare nisi prima causa quae est Deus; nam creare est producere aliquid non praesupposito subiecto. Quaecumque ergo non possunt produci in esse nisi per creationem, a solo Deo creantur. Haec autem sunt illa quae, cum sint subsistentia, vel*

Prologue on life as such has to turn to the *Liber de causis* to explain how the plurality of things requires a first. Although Peter does not justify this in the text, Aquinas does so in his commentary:

Secundo considerandum est quod in unoquoque genere est causa illud quod est primum in genere illo, a quo omnia quae sunt illius generis in illo genere constituuntur, sicut inter elementaria corpora ignis est primum calidum a quo omnia caliditatem sortiuntur; non est autem in aliquo rerum ordine in infinitum procedere. Oportet igitur in ordine entium esse aliquod primum quod dat omnibus esse, et hoc est quod dicit quod *res omnes habent essentiam per ens primum*.<sup>18</sup>

Similarly, not only being, but life derives from a first:

Similiter oportet in genere viventium esse aliquod primum, et ab hoc omnia viventia habent quod vivant; et quia viventis proprium est quod sit suiipsius motivum, ideo dicit quod *res vivae omnes sunt motae per essentiam suam*, id est sunt moventes seipsas, *propter vitam primam*; unde et in libro Procli dicitur: *omnia viventia suiipsorum motiva sunt propter vitam primam*. Et quod movere seipsum procedit a prima vita, probat subdens: *quoniam vita est processio procedens ex ente primo quieto sempiterno*.<sup>19</sup>

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*non sunt composita ex materia et forma, sed sunt formae in suo esse subsistentes, sicut sunt angeli; vel sunt ea quae si sint composita ex materia et forma, tamen materia eorum non est in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut est in corporibus caelestibus; utraque enim haec producuntur absque productione primi subsistentis in eis. Possunt autem produci in actum absque productione primi subiecti tam composita ex materia et forma, quorum materia est in potentia ad diversas formas, et sic in eadem materia possunt sibi diversae formae succedere; tam etiam formae quae non sunt subsistentes in suo esse, quae quidem non dicuntur esse quia ipsae habeant esse, sed quia subiecta habent aliquid esse secundum eas; unde nec ipsae secundum se dicuntur fieri vel corrumpi, sed in quantum subiecta fiunt entia in actu vel non entia secundum ipsas. Anima autem rationalis est subsistens in suo esse, alioquin non posset habere operationem absque communiione suae materiae. Unde relinquitur quod anima rationalis non possit produci in esse nisi per creationem. Et ita patet quod angelus nullo modo sit causa eius, sed solum Deus.*

18 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 102, l. 4–11.

19 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 102, l. 11–19.

This first according to Aquinas is as follows:

Sicut autem supra dictum est,<sup>20</sup> secundum Platonicos primum ens, quod est idea entis, est aliquid supra primam vitam, id est supra ideam vitae, et prima vita est aliquid supra primum intellectum idealem; sed secundum Dionysium primum ens et prima vita et primus intellectus sunt unum et idem quod est Deus; unde et Aristoteles in *XII<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae* primo principio attribuit quod sit intellectus et quod suum intelligere sit vita, et secundum hoc ab eo omnia habent esse et vivere et intelligere.<sup>21</sup>

Peter, of course, is not aware of the *Elements*, nor does he ever make reference to the Ps. Dionysius. The only slightly parallel notion which I can find in his writings comes from the *Peryermenias* commentary (1, lect. 16, q. 1) when he is making a quite unusual (for him) theological point<sup>22</sup> against the Stoics and Epicureans:

Set contra istos [Stoics and Epicureans] sunt ratiocinationes manifeste, quia non est possibile causam primam intelligere aliquid eorum que sunt hic secundum quod hic; nec est dubium quin intelligat et uiuat, cum sit intellectus purus, sicut probatur in naturalibus; intellectus autem purus, qui nullo modo est in potencia semper intelligit; intelligere autem uiuere est [...] si intelligeret res que sunt hic sicut homo intelligit sua scientia, esset per receptionem et esset in potencia intelligens quandoque; set nulla potencia cadit in eo, sicut probatur in naturalibus. Et quia intelligibile est perfectio intelligentis, quia ducit ipsum in actum, patet quoniam nichil intelligit extra se: quod enim esset ducens ipsum in actum, esset

20 Aquinas refers here to his remarks on Prop. 12 of the *De causis* which is actually Prop. 103 of the *Elements*, where Proclus speaks of the first triad of hypotheses, being, life, and intelligence and the three basic relations to which they give rise: causal, essential, and participative.

21 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 103, l. 16–23.

22 According to James McEvoy the entire Christian Neoplatonic tradition is absent from his writings; Boethius is mentioned but only insofar as he is a commentator on Aristotle's logic and remarkably Augustine is entirely absent. Peter maintains a thorough going Aristotelianism and apart from a few comments, there is nothing which would identify him as a Christian. See J.J. McEvoy, "Maître Pierre d'Irlande, professeur in *naturalibus* à l'université de Naples", in J. Follon, J.J. McEvoy (eds), *Actualité de la pensée médiévale* (Louvain-la-Neuve / Paris: Peeters / Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1994), p. 146–158.

enim tunc aliquid nobilius Deo, et esset ille Deus magis quam primus, et quis esset ille Deus? Patet ergo demonstratiue quoniam nichil intelligit extra se; intelligit ergo se solum per se et primo; sua autem essentia semper sibi est presens; ergo semper intelligit, et sunt in eo quod intelligit et quo intelligit et intelligens idem. Et hec est Trinitas personarum, ad cuius cognitionem omnes aspirabant; sua ergo essentia est sua actio, et actio sua est sua uoluntas [...].<sup>23</sup>

### 3 Berthold of Moosburg

When we turn to Berthold, we see immediately that his concerns at the beginning of the commentary on Prop. 102 are quite different from those of Peter of Ireland. His focus is on the unparticipated (the *amethecta*), the participants, and what is participated. He writes: “having shown the priority of the *amethecta* in respect both of all participants and also in respect of each other, now Proclus indicates the property of some participants, as having its origin in its causes [...]”<sup>24</sup> If we compare Proposition XVII(XVIII) of the *De causis* with Proposition 102 of the *Elements* (the text which Berthold had *prae oculis*) we can note some differences, of course:

Res omnes habent essentiam per ens primum, et res vivae sunt motae per essentiam suam propter vitam primam, et res intelligibiles omnes habent scientiam propter intelligentiam primam. [*Liber de causis*, Prop. XVII(XVIII)]<sup>25</sup>

Omnia quidem qualitercumque entia ex fine sunt et infinito propter prime ens; omnia autem viventia sui ipsorum motiva sunt propter vitam primam; omnia autem cognitiva cognitione participant propter intellectum primum. [*Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 102].<sup>26</sup>

Two notions stand out in the text of the *Elementatio* which are not in the *De causis*, namely, “limit and infinite” and “participates” and which will be much of the focus of Berthold’s *Expositio*. In the first part of his commentary (of three parts) he begins with an argument based on intensive and extensive infinity:

23 Peter of Ireland, *Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis*, I, lect. 16, q. 16, p. 123.

24 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102, p. 217, l. 7–9: *Postquam ostensa est prioritas amethectorum et ad omnia participantia et inter se, nunc auctor ostendit participantium quorundam proprietatem ex origine suarum causarum dicens*: Omnia.

25 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 9–12.

26 Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, p. 93; Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102, p. 217, l. 1–5.

De primo sciendum, quod, sicut apparet prima facie, quod non omnia qualitercumque entia sunt ex fine et infinito. Sive finis accipiatur intensive et infinitas extensive, licet enim omne productum sive principiatum in quantum huiusmodi [...] sit limitatum et finitum in essentia sua saltem respectu superioris, scilicet producentis sive principiantis per 93, non tamen omne tale est infinitum sive participans infinitate extensiva, quia aliquando ens non est nullatenus ens, et sic est qualitercumque ente participans, sed non est infinitae potentiae durationis [...].<sup>27</sup>

In the second part of the first part, Berthold offers his solution:

Et ideo secundum hoc videtur ipsum elementum quoad primam partem sic debere distingui, quod omnia qualitercumque entia sive existentia ex fine et infinito, cuiusmodi sunt enter entia per 89, sunt talem proprietatem participantia propter prime ens. Quod sic videtur intelligendum, quia, cum omnis causa et ante causatum operetur et cum ipso et post ipsum plurimum est institutiva per 57, ideo, licet prime ens in quantum amethectum non sit ab alia causa, sed ingenitum per 99, tamen, in quantum est unitas quaedam intra ordinem unialem conclusa, procedit a duabus causis, scilicet principali et concausa. Principali, quod est prime unum, quod etiam directe est causa et totalis ipsius prime entis. Concausa, scilicet prima unitate intra ordinem, scilicet prime infinitate, quae est intermedia prime unius et prime entis per 92 in commento. Et per consequens, cum prime unum sit finitas et primo unum infinitas, quae quidem infinitas, licet directe sub ratione infinitatis non agat in ipsum prime ens, in quantum est unitas, cum producat effectus suos secundum gradum determinatae distantiae ad prime unum per declarationem 57 et 59, tamen relinquit in eo vestigium infinitatis.

Et sic prime ens, licet sit unitas, tamen quasi compositum est ex finitate ratione prime unius et infinitate ratione secundo unius, scilicet prime infinitatis, quae in ipso prime ente et cum ipso agunt, derivat enter entibus non solum entitatem ratione propriae intentionis, in qua est prime, sed etiam finitatem et infinitatem, in quantum agit in ratione superiorum. Et sic omnia qualitercumque existentia ex fine et infinito sunt propter prime ens.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102A, p. 217, l. 14–21.

<sup>28</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102B, p. 217, l. 28–p. 218, l. 48.

Aquinas on this point is more succinct:

Et hoc idem dicitur in libro Procli cII propositione, sub his verbis: *omnia quidem qualitercumque entia ex fine sunt et infinito, propter prime ens. Omnia autem viventia suiipsorum motiva sunt propter vitam primam. Omnia autem cognitiva cognitione participant propter intellectum primum. Dicit autem quod omnia sunt ex fine et infinito propter prime ens quia, ut supra habitum est in 4 propositione, ens creatum compositum est ex finito et infinito.*<sup>29</sup>

In fact, Aquinas had clarified this before in his exposition of Proposition 4:

Quam quidem compositionem etiam Proclus ponit LXXXIX<sup>a</sup> propositione, dicens: *Omne enter ens ex fine est et infinito.* Quod quidem secundum ipsum sic exponitur: Omne enim immobiliter ens infinitum est secundum potentiam essendi; si enim quod potest magis durare in esse est maioris potentiae, quod potest in infinitum durare in esse est, quantum ad hoc, infinitae potentiae. Unde ipse praemisit in LXXXVI<sup>a</sup> propositione: *omne enter ens infinitum est, non secundum multitudinem, neque secundum magnitudinem, sed secundum potentiam solam, scilicet existendi,* ut ipse exponit. Si autem aliquid sic haberet infinitam virtutem essendi quod non participaret esse ab alio, tunc esset solum infinitum; et tale est Deus, ut dicitur infra in 16<sup>a</sup> propositione. Sed, si sit aliquid quod habeat infinitam virtutem ad essendum secundum esse participatum ab alio, secundum hoc quod esse participat est finitum, quia quod participatur non recipitur in participante secundum totam suam infinitatem sed particulariter. In tantum igitur intelligentia est composita in suo esse ex finito et infinito, in quantum natura intelligentiae infinita dicitur secundum potentiam essendi; et ipsum esse quod recipit, est finitum. Et ex hoc sequitur quod esse intelligentiae multiplicari possit in quantum est esse participatum: hoc enim significat compositio ex finito et infinito.<sup>30</sup>

In the second part, Berthold concludes:

Cum ergo prime ens sit quodammodo et finitum et infinitum, necessarium est omnia qualitercumque entia participare eadem proprietate per 97, fine scilicet et infinitate. Cum ergo diversus sit modus participandi, et omnia entia participant finitate, et quaedam participant infinitate

29 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 12–101, l. 7.

30 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 4, p. 30, l. 8–30.

et intensiva et extensiva semper et connaturaliter, necessarium videtur omnia entia esse ex fine et participare saltem aliqualem illustrationem infinitatis, cum infinitas in plus se habeat entitate. Et sic omne ens est aliquialiter infinitum, sed non e converso.<sup>31</sup>

#### 4 First Being and First Life

Now let us return to Peter of Ireland and to the opening text of his Prologue where Peter gives a suitably magisterial overview of the ultimate origin of all being and life from the First Being and First Life:

*Sicut habetur in libro De Pura Bonitate: res omnes habent essenciam propter ens primum et res uiue sunt mote per essenciam suam propter uitam primam, et hoc est sicut dicit ibi commentator, quia omnis causa dat aliquid suo causato, unde ens primum dat causatis suis esse et uita prima dat causatis suis motum. Vnde dicit quod uita est processio procedens ab ente primo, quieto et sempiterno. Et quamuis ens primum det causatis suis esse et uita prima dat hiis que sub ipsa sunt uitam, non tamen eodem modo, quia ens primum dat esse per modum creacionis, set uita prima non dat uitam per modum creacionis, set per modum forme.*<sup>32</sup>

Now life consists in some kind of capacity to initiate movement or change, but not everything has such a capacity; not all things which are have the perfection of living, yet it is being which is common to all existing things, living or otherwise. What is meant, then, by the statement that being is given *per modum creationis* and life *per modum formae*? Aquinas distinguishes between two modes of causality: the first is when something comes to be *praesupposito altero* and this is called *feri aliquid per informationem* (Peter uses the term *infusio*) because that which comes afterwards *se habet ad id quod presupponitur per modum formae*; the second type of causality is when something comes to be *nullo praesupposito*, and this is what is called creation.

Aquinas explains it this way:

*Tertio considerandum quod ista tria diversimode causantur in rebus, sive a diversis principiis secundum Platonicos, sive ab eodem principio secundum fidei doctrinam et Aristotelis. Est enim duplex modus causandi: unus quidem quo aliquid fit praesupposito altero, et hoc modo*

<sup>31</sup> See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102C, p. 218, l. 55–61.

<sup>32</sup> Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et breuitate vitae*, Prologus, p. 67.



dicitur fieri aliquid per informationem, quia illud quod posterius advenit se habet ad illud quod praesupponebatur per modum formae; alio modo causatur aliquid nullo praesupposito, et hoc modo dicitur aliquid fieri per creationem. Quia ergo intelligere praesupponit vivere et vivere praesupponit esse, esse autem non praesupponit aliquid aliud prius; inde est quod *primum ens dat esse omnibus per modum creationis. Prima autem vita*, quaecumque sit illa, *non dat vivere per modum creationis, sed per modum formae*, id est informationis; et similiter dicendum est de *intelligentia*. Ex quo patet quod, cum supra dixit intelligentiam esse causam animae, non intellexit quod esset causa eius per modum creationis, sed solum per modum informationis, ut supra expositum est.<sup>33</sup>

One term which Aquinas does not address here is the concept of *processio / procedere*, found of course in the text of the *De causis* and *Elementatio*. Peter uses the term only once apart from quoting the *De causis* and in quite a different context:

Vnde, credendo quod uita celi non sit processio sui motus a primo motore separato, <s>et a motore coniuncto, necesse est ponere duplicem motorem primi mobilis, coniunctum et separatum.

Avicenna and Algazel assigned two movers to each heaven, a conjoined mover or soul, and a separated mover or Intelligence. The Intelligences impart motion to the heavens whereas the soul is the substantial form of the heavens. Thinkers such as Aquinas identify the Intelligences with Angels but there is no sign of such an identification here. Peter seems to reject the emanationist theory that life is a procession from the First Separate Mover (God) but instead assigns two movers to the *primum mobile*.<sup>34</sup>

One can interpret *processio* to mean that the One, like any other reality which produces something else, does so because of its perfection and abundance of power. The activity of procession does not diminish the One or lessen its perfection. Nor is procession a transition such that what is produced is something completely different from that which produces it. Procession, rather, is a process by which the One produces a multiplication of itself through its power – what proceeds is, therefore, similar to what produces it, with the producer remaining more perfect than the produced. The produced has the same nature as the producer but not in the same way. Thus, the *vita prima* contains the

33 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 104, l. 1–17.

34 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, Prologus, p. 69.

forms in itself in an infinitely perfect way whereas the forms in the produced are such in a similar but, in relation to the One, imperfect way.

The terminology which Peter uses in the Prologue is, as I have mentioned, quite unique compared with the rest of his texts, which is to be expected. *Processio* I have already mentioned, but the same is true of *creo/-are* and *creatus, -a -um* – all the occurrences with one exception are to be found in the Prologue. The occurrences of the word *forma* are also heavily concentrated here, with 19 out of a total of 33 occurrences found in the few opening pages.

Peter's conclusion from the *De causis* is that life is to be found in living things in the way of a form and not in the way of a created thing and, secondly, that life does not become actual, does not go out into being (*exire in esse*), by means of creation but only in the way that form does, that is, by infusion. A living thing exists as a result of both activities / modes of procession.<sup>35</sup>

The next two paragraphs of Peter's text consist of a series of syllogisms which reduce being (contingent), life, and substance to their formal cause and brings both Boethius and Aristotle into line with the *Liber de causis*. As can be seen, Peter's central focus is upon the notion of form as the source of life. In the first paragraph, Peter makes use of two phrases, the first from Boethius and the second from Aristotle, almost as if they were sayings (confirmed by their use also by Albert the Great).<sup>36</sup> The first is drawn from the *De Trinitate* of Boethius<sup>37</sup> and states that every being derives from form. All being then is dependent on

35 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, Prologus, p. 67: *Quod potest intelligi dupliciter: quod uita sit in uiuentibus per modum forme et non per modum rei create; non enim forma est creata, sicut iam ostendetur. Vnde potest sic intelligi quod uita non exit in esse per uiam creacionis, set per uiam per quam exit forma, scilicet per infusionem et utroque modo uiuum.*

36 See also Albert the Great, *De Morte et vita*, ed. A. Borgnet, *Opera omnia*, vol. 9 (Paris: Vivès, 1890), p. 346–347: *His ergo sic praelibatis, accipiamus ex probatis a nobis in physicis libris, quod vita est actus primus et essentialis et continuus animae in corpus, non per modum somni, sed per modum uigiliae existens ab anima in ipsum. Dico autem actum perfectionem quam endelechiam Graeci uocant. Sicut enim cuiuslibet essentiae formalis quae dat esse et rationem ei in quo est, proprius et primus actus est esse quod dat ei cuius est forma: ita formae determinatae et specificatae quae ultima est et convertibilis, est dare determinatum et specificatum esse quod est ab ea essentialiter, sicut actus lucere essentialiter conuenit luci. Cum ergo anima sit quaedam formarum specificantium, sibi essentialiter conuenit dare animato corpori specificatum et determinatum esse. Et hoc esse uocatur uita in uidentibus: et ideo egregie dictum est, quod uivere uidentibus est esse.*

37 Boethius, *De Trinitate*, ed. C. Moreschini, *De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica* (München / Leipzig: Saur, 2005<sup>2</sup>), c. 2, p. 169, l. 79–83: [...] *in diuinis intellectualiter uersari oportebit neque ducere ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam quae uere forma neque imago est et quae ipsum esse est ex qua esse est. Omne namque esse ex forma est [...].*

that form which is being itself and from which being derives. Now, Peter continues, the being of living things is being, therefore the being of living things is from form.<sup>38</sup> The second argument comes from Aristotle (*De anima*, II iv): life in living things is “to be” (*esse*); therefore to live is from form; but to live is life; therefore, life is from form.

In the next paragraph, the same argument of Aristotle is taken up again:

Item, argumentum Aristotilis est: *uiuere uiuentibus est esse; set nichil est causa esse nisi substancia; ergo substancia est causa uiuere; set uita est causa uiuere; ergo uita est substancia; set non materia, non compositum; ergo forma.*<sup>39</sup>

Life in living things is existence, but the cause of existence in all things is substance; therefore, substance is the cause of living. However, life comes from the life which is the cause of living; therefore, life is from substance; but not matter or the composite, therefore from form. However, what kind of form? Peter now suggests that forms are not created and provides the reasons why:

Quod autem forma non sit creata, patet: quia omne quod est creatum est hoc aliquid; forma non est hoc aliquid; ergo non est creata. Quod autem forma non sit hoc aliquid, patet, quia omne quod est hoc aliquid est id quod est; forma non est id quod est; ergo non est hoc aliquid.

Probatio assumptionis: id quo est unumquodque quod est, non est id quod est; forma autem est quo est unumquodque quod est; ergo forma non est id quod est. Immo uidetur quod ita debeat formari: id quo est unumquodque quod est, non est id quod est; forma est quo est unumquodque quod est, ergo non est id quod est.

Item, quod forma non sit hoc aliquid patet per Aristotilem in principio secundi *De Anima*: ibi enim dicit quod *forma est secundum quam unumquodque est hoc aliquid*, nam forma non est creata set infusa, uita uero infusa et non creata.<sup>40</sup>

38 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et breuitate uitae*, Prologus, p. 67: *Quod patet hoc modo: omne enim esse est a forma; esse uiuentium est esse; ergo esse uiuentium est a forma. Set uiuere uiuentibus est esse; ergo uiuere est a forma; set uiuere est uita; ergo uita est a forma.*

39 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et breuitate uitae*, Prologus, p. 67.

40 Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et breuitate uitae*, Prologus, p. 67–68.

Since everything which is created is a certain determined thing (*hoc aliquid*), form cannot be said to belong to this category because it is not a certain thing. Thus, together with the reasons which we have already seen, it can be affirmed that form is not something which has been created. In order to explain this, Peter introduces the real distinction, found in Boethius (but ultimately drawn from Aristotle), between *id quod est* and *id quo est*. The form is the *id quo est* of the *id quod est* since it causes the *id quod est* to be; it is the reason for its being. The argument is reinforced by the quotation drawn from Aristotle where he says that form is that according to which something is a certain individual thing. Thus, Peter brings the introductory part of the Prologue to an end, concluding that the forms or perfections of things are not created but are infused, and since life is a form, it is not created but infused, it seems, by procession. Peter affirms this by quoting the text of the “commentary” of the *De causis*: “the first life gives life to those who are under it, not by way of creation, but by way of form”. Aquinas, as we have seen, concludes in a similar way.<sup>41</sup>

The rest of Peter’s text deals with some *dubia* such as whether the life of the heavens is the same as life in the sublunary world; whether the soul is a mover; and whether natural philosophy is the right part of philosophy to deal with length and shortness of life. It is interesting to note that Peter dwells on the different kinds of motion but also the differing kinds of life as Berthold will also do as we shall see below.

Whereas Berthold’s classification will be quite original, Peter’s overview of the world of living things is strictly Aristotelian:

Viuere ergo quod est ab anima dicitur multipliciter: quod testatur Aristotiles in libro *De Anima* dicens: uiuere dicto multipliciter, et〈si〉 secundum unumquodque alicui inest ipsum uiuere dicimus, ut intellectum, 〈sensum〉, motum secundum locum uoluntarie, secundum alimentum, crementum, detrimentum. Ex quo patet quod non solum animalia uiuunt, set eciam plante: habent enim potenciam et principium motus in se, secundum quem per alimentum sussiunt crementum et detrimentum. Sic ergo concludit Aristotiles quod plante uiuunt. Vnumquodque enim uiuit in fine quousque accipiat alimentum, et cum non possit sucipere alimentum, non amplius natum est uiuere. Et ita potencia uegetatiua in mortalibus est causa uite. Vnde alibi dicit Aristotiles quod uegetatiua est communissima potencia anime,

41 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 104, l. 12–17. See note 33, above.

secundum quam inest uiuere omnibus uiuentibus. Ista enim potencia potest separari ab omnibus aliis in mortalibus, alie uero nullo modo ab ista: quedam enim animalia uiuunt uegetacione et sensu et non habent motum uoluntarium secundum locum, sicut sunt animalia que uiuunt per adherenciam, et hec non sunt perfecta animalia, immo sunt medium inter animalia perfecta et plantas. Viuunt enim per adherenciam sicut plante, set addunt aliquid super uitam plante: uita enim plante non est nisi uita occulta, set sensus est illustracio uite, sicut habetur ab Aristotile in principio primi *De Vegetabilibus*. Primus autem sensus, scilicet tactus, separabilis est ab omnibus aliis, set alii omnes nequaquam separantur ab ipso. Maxime autem dicitur uiuere quod habet in se omnem causam uite, scilicet intellectum, sensum, motum secundum locum et cetera. Vnde dicitur in *6 Principiis* quod rationale animancius est bruto.<sup>42</sup>

## 5 First Life and First Mind

In the second part of his commentary, Berthold looks firstly at the different kinds of movement and secondly, at the different motions of those living things which move themselves.

He begins with a long quotation from Dionysius, *De diuinis nominibus* 9.9:

Moveri ipsum religiose aestimandum est non secundum portationem aut mutationem aut alterationem aut modalem aut localem motum, non directum, non circularem, non est ambobus, non intelligibilem, non animale, non naturalem, sed eo, quod ad substantiam agat Deus, et contineat omnia et totaliter omnia provideat et eo, quod assit omnibus, omnium circuitu et ad existens omnia provisio processibus et operationibus. Set et motus Dei immobilis, si decet Deum laudari sermone, permittitur, et rectum quidem intelligere conuenit neque declinabilem et inflexibilem processum operationum et ex ipsa totorum generationem, obliquum autem stabilem processum et generativum statum, secundum circulum autem identitatem et media et extrema circumdantia et circumdata continere et conversionem ad ipsum eorum, quae ab ipso processerunt.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Peter of Ireland, *In librum De longitudine et breuitate uitae*, Prologus, p. 69–70.

<sup>43</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102D, p. 219, l. 68–79.

This allows Berthold to distinguish between different kinds of motion:<sup>44</sup>

*Motus portationis qui est motus per accidens, sicut anima movetur motu corporis, et, cum sint quattuor species motus violenti – pulsio, tractio, vectio, vertigo – positus unus fuit pro omnibus.*

*Motus scilicet mutatio substantialis per quam res substantialiter mutatur.*

*Motus alterationis: secundum quamcumque formam accidentalem.*

*Motus modalis quo res se habet aliter quam prius.*

*Motus modalis qui est ad ubi, licet causaliter sit ad formam.*

*Motus intelligibilis: de potentia habituali ad habitum et imperfectum et perfectum et de habitu ad actum.*

*Motus animalis, qui est secundum passiones animalium, quae dicuntur animales motus et sunt coniuncti.*

*Motus naturalis: perficit per principia naturalia et modo naturali sui quoad motum naturae, qui est ad unum. Item est motus rectus, circularis et obliquus.*

*Motus vitalis qui tamen est in intelligibili, animali et naturali comprehenditur.*

In 102E,<sup>45</sup> Berthold begins by stating that a living thing is said to share in life, and so it differs from a non-living thing by having within itself the principle of its own motion, and consequently that everything which has in itself the principle of its own motion is said to be alive, whether such a principle is distinguished either in reality and intention because there is a part of living – as in animals, or by reason only as in partial and complete souls, of which some is life and living, and in intellects which although they live, yet are not properly life. And thus living is said to differ from life, which is “the way and movement from the steadfast substance of being” (Prop. 102 comm.) or from the unmoving being.

Berthold now lists different levels of life:<sup>46</sup>

*Vita essentialis: quaedam incessabilis ebullitio sive scaturrigo manens in propria identitate inegressibiliter.*<sup>47</sup>

44 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102D, p. 219, l. 80–94.

45 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102E, p. 219, l. 96–p. 220, l. 116.

46 See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102E, p. 220, l. 104–116.

47 See also Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 100D, p. 206, l. 108: *fontana scaturrigo*; Prop. 131E, p. 196, l. 176–186: *In intellectibus etiam invenitur transfusio, quo aliud fluat in aliud [...]. Similiter se habet in aliis substantiis separatis, quae sunt entia ut simpliciter et*

*Vita intellectualis: esse intellectuale seu entitas intellectualis, converitur in se ipsam, et sic se tota se totam penetrat.*

*Vita animae totalis: etiam est esse ipsius, est motus intellectus practici, qui est esse mobilis, inquantum est mobile [see Prop. 102 D]*

*Vita immortalitas: est fortis et indeclinabilis et sempiterni motus [cf. De div. nom. 6.1]*

*Vita intellectus: coniuncta potentiis organicis est motiva per inclinationem suam, quae vocatur voluntas.*

*Vita materialis et organica: movet per appetitum sensibilem, animalis secundum locum et secundum affectiones.*

*Vita imperfectam cognitionem sensitivam habens: movet secundum constrictionem et dilationem in eodem loco.*

*Ultima vita: secundum ultimam resonantiam habet vivere, est motus consequens naturam nutritibilis generis.*

Berthold concludes this second part by stating that every living thing moves itself by means of a vital movement. And since every property existing in living things, inasmuch as they participate in life, are necessarily led back to something first as such, the conclusion is that all living things are self-moving on account of the first life.

The third part allows Berthold to distinguish between the different kinds of knowers in general.<sup>48</sup>

*Sensitivum: sensitivum exterior quod etiam est quintuplex in perfectis animalis non orbatis; sensitivum communis quod sequitur imaginativum et hoc cogitativum.*

*Ratiocinativum: opinativum, creditivum and scientificum.*

*Intellectivum: infimum, medium, and supremum.*

*Superintellectivum: super quae omnia secundum suos gradus.*

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*secundum speciem. Et in hoc consistit quaedam ebullitio sive fontana scaturrigo talis substantiae in causando aliquid extra et ita est redundans in aliquid aliud extra se; cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ed. B. Mojsisch, Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), 1.8.1–2, p. 141, l. 46–p. 142, l. 71. See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160–183, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 167B, p. 59, l. 40–41: Verum primus intellectus, scilicet secundum causam, principaliformiter est fontana scaturrigo omnis intellectualitatis [...].*

48 See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102G, p. 220, l. 129–135.

Next, a long quotation from the *De providentia* allows Berthold to distinguish between the various ways in which the various knowers participate in knowing:<sup>49</sup>

*Cognitivum per essentiam, scilicet intellectuales hypostases, in quibus idem est cognitivum, cognitio, cognitum et ratio essendi.*

*Cognitivum quod semper et connaturaliter cognitione participat sicut sunt animae totales et huiusmodi.*

*Quod quandoque cognitione participat, sicut sunt animae, et hoc sive intellectuali sive rationali sive sensitiva.*

This allows Berthold to reach his conclusion in 102I, that all things which share in knowing are such because of the first intellect, which is the summit of all cognition.<sup>50</sup>

This is something Aquinas himself had confirmed:

[...] unde et in libro Procli dicitur quod *omnia cognitiva cognitionem participant propter intellectum primum*. Et ratio huius assignatur quia *omnis scientia radicaliter non est nisi intelligentia*; intelligentia enim est summitas quaedam, ut Proclus dicit, *omnis cognitionis*; unde *intelligentia est primum cognoscens et influens cognitionem supra omnia cognoscentia*.<sup>51</sup>

## 6 Conclusion

This brief examination of how three medieval authors in chronological order dealt with a text, originally written by Proclus, reworked and made known as a ps.-Aristotelian work before being 'returned' to its original author, is revealing of and revealed by how our three authors were challenged and rose to that interpretative challenge in different and innovative ways. The focus shifts between the 'Aristotelian' interpretation of Peter of Ireland, the mediation of Thomas Aquinas who Janus-like looks back and then forward to the thoroughgoing Platonic approach of Berthold of Moosburg.

49 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102H, p. 221, l. 155–162.

50 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 102I, p. 221, l. 164–166: *Ex praemissis satis habetur tertium, scilicet quod omnia, quae cognitione participant, sunt huiusmodi propter prime intellectum, qui est summitas omnis cognitionis*.

51 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 103, l. 10–15.



Peter of Ireland does, however, make one final reference to Proposition 102/18 at the end of his *Prologue* as he concludes his *divisio scientiae* as a justification of why he, as a teacher of natural philosophy, is dealing with the topic of life. Here is what he has to say:

Vnde quamuis uita non sit corpus neque a corpore proprie loquendo, saluatur tamen per ea que sunt in corpore, ut per calidum et humidum et cetera; et quia physice per se est considerare causam saluacionis uite in uiuente, propter hoc sciencia de uita et de eius opposito ad ipsam pertinet. Alio tamen modo considerando uitam secundum eius causam efficientem primam, non pertinet ad physicam considerare secundum quod sic diffinitur in libro *De Causis*: uita est processio procedens ab ente primo, quieto et sempiterno. Sic ergo patet de quo sit ista sciencia, quia de passione concomitante ipsam animam uegetabilem in corpore, de qua demonstrat aliam passionem, scilicet longitudinem et breuitatem. Vnde proprie intendit in hac sciencia inquirere causam longitudinis et breuitatis uite. Omnia autem mensurantur periodo, non tamen eodem, sicut habetur in physicis, quia quedam mensurantur reuolucione que fit una die, quedam autem reuolucione que attenditur secundum reuolucionem lune, quedam autem secundum reuolucionem solis; et ita quedam uiuunt per unam diem, quedam per plures, quedam per mensem, et sic deinceps. Etsi causa huius diuersitatis longitudinis et breuitatis uite sit diuersitas reuolucionum corporum supercelestium, tamen hanc diuersitatem non attendit hic primo et per se, set diuersitatem que attenditur secundum principia materialia uiuentis, secundum tamen quod regulatur a superioribus.<sup>52</sup>

By way of conclusion, Peter as a natural philosopher, will walk a different path than that of Proclus' triad of Being-Life-Intellect but maybe while accepting that the way of Proclus is perhaps a higher path.

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# Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino as Historians of Philosophy

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## 1 Introduction

Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino are undoubtedly the three pre-eminent Platonists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries ranked in chronological order. However, it is a rather surprising that none of the three acknowledges the influence of his predecessor within the group and indeed they scarcely mention one another. Nicholas of Cusa discusses the erroneous assumptions concerning God's presence in all things when this notion is not approached with "learned ignorance" and the consequent justification with which certain saints argue that the intellectual light should be withdrawn from those with weak mental eyes. This intellectual light is then illustrated with a list of authors and books including the *commentaria Iohannis de Mossbach in propositiones Procli*.<sup>1</sup> Marsilio Ficino responds in a letter dated 12 June 1489 to an inquiry by his friend Martin Prenninger regarding the availability of books in Latin setting out the essentials of Platonic philosophy. He supplies a list of books including both scholastic and more modern authors that ends with *quaedam speculationes Nicolai Cusii Cardinalis*.<sup>2</sup> These references of Nicholas to Berthold and of Ficino to Nicholas together with the absence of any reference in Ficino to Berthold do not take us beyond the level of basic bibliography. Indeed, the bibliography is rather defective given that

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1 Nicholas of Cusa, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, h II, p. 30, l. 1–3 in Nicholas of Cusa, *Opera omnia*, iussu et auctoritate Academiae Heidelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita (Hamburg: Meiner, 1932–2006) [= h]. This Latin edition together with English and German translations can be accessed at [www.cusanus-portal.de](http://www.cusanus-portal.de).

2 Marsilio Ficino, *Epistulae*, in *Marsilii Ficini [...] opera et quae hactenus extitere et quae in lucem nunc primum prodire omnia [...]* (Basel: Heinrich Petri, 1576 [photographic reprint Torino: Bottega d'Erasmus, 1959]), lib. IX, 12, p. 899. Henceforth cited as *Opera omnia*.

the names of Berthold and Nicholas are both misspelled by the authors who cite them, or at least by their copyists and editors.<sup>3</sup>

The present essay will leave to those who consider the general psychology of authorship the question why writers who clearly have some knowledge of each other's works and share a philosophical agenda do not explicitly make common cause. Instead, we will attempt to make a comparative study of the three authors that elucidates both their similarity of philosophical method and doctrine and also their numerous subtle deviations in approach. The main points of similarity are first, that for them writing the history of philosophy is part of doing philosophy itself, this being obvious in the case of Berthold and Ficino and also arguable in that of Nicholas; second, that for them Platonism is the closest philosophy to Christianity according to the authority of Augustine and according to the example of Dionysius the Areopagite. The subtle deviations are numerous and include: first, Berthold and Ficino are both explicit commentators – lemmatic in the former case and discursive in the latter –, whereas Nicholas is not primarily an exegete. Second, Nicholas and Ficino emphasise the concordance of Plato and Aristotle whereas Berthold stresses their disagreement. Third, Nicholas and Ficino are anti-Scholastic in underlying intent, Nicholas being openly subversive – especially via his doctrines of the coincidence of opposites and his methodology based on conjecture – and Ficino being more subtly evasive, whereas Berthold remains more embedded in the scholastic context. Fourth, Nicholas and Ficino avoid the axiomatic method of philosophical expression, whereas Berthold assigns it prominence. Finally, both Berthold and Nicholas depend on the medieval “Platonic” corpus – especially Augustine, Dionysius the Areopagite and Proclus –, whereas Ficino also introduces works newly translated from the Greek.

Against the background of these writers' common assumptions regarding the importance of the history of philosophy and of their particular commitment to a belief in the inherent sympathy of Platonism and Christianity, this essay will examine how Berthold, Nicholas, and Ficino collectively – albeit with the variety of subtle deviations mentioned above – approach the *Hermetica*, Plato, and Proclus, making briefer reference to their readings of the Pythagoreans, the Latin Platonists, and the Greek Neoplatonists for reasons of space. With an appropriate *caveat* about simplification, we will conclude that with respect to their exploitation of these intertextual foundations of Platonic philosophy, Nicholas and Ficino are closer to one another than is Berthold to either Nicholas or Ficino.

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3 It is “John of Mossbach” rather than Berthold of Moosburg, while “Cusa” appears in a strange variety of spellings in the early Ficino printings.

2 *Hermetica*

The writings originating in late antiquity and the Middle Ages and attributed to the mythical figure of Hermes Trismegistus play a major role in establishing the notion of “Platonism” for our three philosophers. The importance of these writings stems from the venerable authority attributed to their assumed ancient author, although there was always a certain measure of controversy surrounding their value.<sup>4</sup> A favourable presentation of Hermes and his works can be found primarily in Lactantius who in his *Divinae institutiones* reports that Trismegistus often described the excellence and majesty of the one God, called him by the names that Christians use: namely, “God” and “Father,” and also declared that the one God actually has no name.<sup>5</sup> In addition, the same church father quotes a work by Trismegistus called the *Logos Teleios* in which the first God is said to have made a second God who was his Son<sup>6</sup> and to have foretold the restoration of the world: a point on which he was in agreement with the Sibyl.<sup>7</sup> A more ambivalent presentation of Hermes and his writings occurs in Augustine. On the negative side, the bishop of Hippo quotes the opinion of the Egyptian Hermes called “Trismegistus” concerning demons from a Latin translation of his work entitled *Asclepius*.<sup>8</sup> Hermes here maintains that there are two classes of gods: created by the supreme God and created by men respectively, the latter being idols dedicated to gods and animated by them.<sup>9</sup> Augustine clearly finds this author to be rather problematic for, although the latter rightly prophesies the time when the pagan religion will be conquered by a new belief, he does not explicitly name the latter as Christianity and seems to deplore the forthcoming events. This would indicate that the prophecy was

4 For biographical information about Hermes see Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones*, lib. 1, c. 6, reporting Cicero’s reference to five Mercuries, the fifth being the one who slew Argus and therefore fled to Egypt and gave laws and letters to the Egyptians. He was called Thoth by Egyptians, was of great antiquity, and was imbued with so much learning that he acquired the name “Trismegistus”; *De ira Dei*, c. 11, Trismegistus more ancient than Plato and Pythagoras; Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, lib. XVIII, c. 39, reporting that Trismegistus lived long before the sages and philosophers of Greece but after Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, and even Moses. At the time when Moses was born there lived Atlas, Prometheus’ brother, a great astronomer. He was grandfather by the mother’s side to the elder Mercury who begat the father of this Trismegistus.

5 Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones*, lib. 1, c. 6.

6 Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones*, lib. IV, c. 6.

7 Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones*, lib. VII, c. 18.

8 Augustine’s reference here is to Hermes Latinus, *Asclepius*, eds A.D. Nock, A.-J. Festugière, *Corpus Hermeticum*, vol. 2 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1973), c. 23–24, p. 325, l. 4–p. 326, l. 20.

9 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, lib. VIII, c. 23.

revealed to him not by the Holy Spirit but by demons.<sup>10</sup> On the positive side, the church father cites Hermes Trismegistus' statements to the effect that there is one true God who is the artificer of the universe as being close approximations to the truth. In the light of such statements, Augustine finds it very surprising that the same author allows men to be subjected to man-made gods and bewails the destruction of this idolatrous religion.

During the period under review in the present study, we can distinguish two phases in the interpretation of Hermes Trismegistus based on the range of texts available:<sup>11</sup> a medieval phase and a Renaissance phase.<sup>12</sup> In the medieval phase, the main texts are the *Asclepius* already mentioned – a genuinely ancient text whose Latin translator was often thought to be Apuleius<sup>13</sup> – and two pseudo-antique medieval works: the *Liber XXIV philosophorum* and the *De VI rerum principiis*, the former being often cited without specific mention of Hermes as author.<sup>14</sup> These texts are all used by Berthold of Moosburg who cites them often through intermediate sources such as Alan of Lille, Albert the Great, and Thomas of York.<sup>15</sup> They are also used by Nicholas of Cusa who generally cites them directly, as his extant MS glosses on the *Asclepius* would seem to indicate.<sup>16</sup> In the Renaissance phase, the main texts are the *Asclepius* and the medieval treatises once again, although these are now supplemented by the *Pimander*, i.e. Ficino's translation of the Greek *Corpus Hermeticum*.

10 The discussion continues down to *De civitate Dei*, lib. VIII, c. 26 quoting *Asclepius*, cc. 24–25, p. 326, l. 15–329, l. 23.

11 On the MS tradition see P. Lucentini, V. Perrone Compagni, "I manoscritti dei testi ermetici latini", in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), *Hermetism from Late Antiquity to Humanism. La tradizione ermetica dal mondo tardo-antico all'Umanesimo = Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi, Napoli 20–24 novembre 2001* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), p. 715–745.

12 The phases are mainly distinguished by the range of texts available.

13 For a survey see C. Gilly, "Die Überlieferung des *Asclepius* im Mittelalter", in R. van den Broek, C. van Heertum (eds), *From Poimandres to Jacob Böhme. Gnosis, Hermetism and the Christian Tradition* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 336–367.

14 For a survey see Hermes Latinus, *Il Libro dei ventiquattro filosofi*, ed. P. Lucentini (Milano: Adelphi, 1999), containing the study: "La fortuna del 'Libro dei ventiquattro filosofi' nel Medioevo", p. 103–150.

15 For citation of these three Hermetic texts by Thomas of York see D. Porreca, "Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York. A 13th-Century Witness to the Prominence of an Ancient Sage", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 72(2005), p. 147–275. See also L. Sturlese, "Saints et magiciens. Albert le Grand en face d'Hermès Trismégiste", in *Archives de philosophie* 43(1980), p. 615–634.

16 See note 34.

### 2.1 *Berthold of Moosburg*

Berthold of Moosburg cites the *Asclepius* with bibliographical precision as *Trismegistus ad Asclepium De Hedera, id est, De Deo deorum*.<sup>17</sup> The importance of this work for him is indicated by his use of two passages as the basis of an informal lemmatic commentary setting out his doctrine of the macrocosm and microcosm in the *Prologue* to his *Expositio*. The passage dealing with the macrocosm reads: “Mundus est opus Dei immutabile, gloriosa constructio, bonum multiformi imaginum varietate compositum, machina voluntatis Dei suo operi absque invidia suffragantis” (“the world is an immutable work of God, a glorious construction, a good composed of a multiform variety of images, a mechanism of the will of God who ungrudgingly supports his work”).<sup>18</sup> The first lemma extracted from this, *opus*, is initially glossed by noting that the Hermetic author refers to a “work” rather than to a “creature” because of the peculiar status of the primordial causes: a notion derived by the commentator from the *Clavis physicae* of “Theodorus”.<sup>19</sup> The gloss is next expanded intertextually by Berthold who observes that this same work is *perfectissimum* according to Plato’s *Timaeus*, *pulcherrimum* according to Boethius’ *De consolatione philosophiae*, and *ordinatissimum* according to Augustine and the *Asclepius* itself.<sup>20</sup> There follows a series of lemmatic comments of a similar kind based on the terms *immutabile*, *gloriosa constructio*, *bonum multiformi imaginum varietate compositum*, and *machina voluntatis dei*<sup>21</sup> after which the commentator returns to his base text using a different methodology. The complementary passage dealing with the microcosm reads: “Homo est nexus Dei et mundi super mundum per duplicem indagationem existens [...] et hoc modo mundi gubernator proprie vocatur. Subnexus autem Deo, pulchritudines eius non immersas mundo [...] accipiens per similitudinem divinam” (“man is the bond between God and the world, existing above the world in terms of a

17 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1–13*, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), *Expositio tituli K*, p. 47, l. 368–369, using the reading *De Hedera* of codex v. On the titles see Porreca, “Hermes Trismegistus and Thomas of York”, p. 150–151.

18 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prologus* 8, p. 14, l. 296–299. The passage summarized by Berthold is *Asclepius*, c. 25, p. 328. l. 20–23.

19 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 9, p. 14, l. 300–302. Several other texts influenced by Eriugena are also cited.

20 The passages cited are Calcidius, *Commentarius in Timaeum*, ed. J.H. Waszink, *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus* (London / Leiden: Warburg Institute / Brill, 1962), p. 23, l. 16–20 (= Plato, *Timaeus*, 30d–31a); Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae*, ed. C. Moreschini (München / Leipzig: Saur, 2005), lib. III, m. 9, p. 80, l. 7; and Augustine, *De ordine*, passim.

21 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 10–13, p. 16, l. 363–p. 23, l. 569.



twofold investigation [...] and in this way he is properly called the governor of the world. Bound in subordination to God, he receives the latter's beauties that are not immersed in the world through his similarity to the divine"). This passage is actually not a direct quotation from the *Asclepius* but a summary of the latter in Albert the Great's *Metaphysica*.<sup>22</sup> The first lemma extracted from it, *nexus dei et mundi*,<sup>23</sup> is initially glossed by noting that the Hermetic writer is alluding to the four principal parts of the totality: namely, body, soul, intellect, and unity – a division derived from Proclus rather than the *Asclepius* itself. After suggesting that the first three terms require little comment, Berthold expands the gloss intertextually by citing for an explanation of unity Proclus' *De providentia et fato* and noting that Dionysius' *De divinis nominibus* agrees with this teaching,<sup>24</sup> the discussion continuing with the statement that there is an assimilation of the microcosm to God through unity and intellect and to the world through soul and body. There follows a series of lemmatic comments of a similar kind based on the terms *duplicem indagacionem, gubernator, sub-nexus Deo*, and *pulchritudines non immerses mundo*.<sup>25</sup>

In addition to the *Asclepius*, Berthold makes a number of references to the medieval Hermetic texts.<sup>26</sup> From the *Liber XXIV philosophorum* he quotes the *VII regula Trismegisti* stating that God is "a beginning without beginning, a process without variation, an end without end" ("principium sine principio, processus sine variatione, finis sine fine"), and *per VI ibidem* the statement that he is that "in comparison with which substance is accident and accident is nothing" ("cuius comparatione substantia est accidens, accidens vero nihil").<sup>27</sup>

22 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 14, p. 23, l. 570–577. The passage summarised by Berthold is Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1960), lib. I, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 2, l. 5–15, which itself follows *Asclep.*, c. 6–10, p. 301, l. 18–309, l. 4.

23 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 15, p. 23, l. 578–579.

24 The passages cited are Proclus, *De X dubitationibus circa providentiam*, ed. D. Isaac (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1977), c. 10, §64, p. 134, l. 12–14; and Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 7, §1, 865C.

25 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 16–18, p. 23, l. 604–p. 27, l. 734.

26 On Berthold's use of the medieval *Hermetica* see the series of studies by A. Sannino, "Berthold of Moosburg's Hermetic Sources", in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 63(2000), p. 243–258; A. Sannino, "Il concetto ermetico di natura in Bertoldo di Moosburg", in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), *Hermetism from Late Antiquity to Humanism*, p. 203–221; A. Sannino, "Il *Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum* nella metafisica di Bertoldo di Moosburg", in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet* (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), p. 252–272.

27 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.*, 1, p. 46, l. 332–335. The passages cited are *Liber XXIV philosophorum*, in Hermes Latinus, *Le Livre des XXIV philosophes*, ed. F. Hudry (Grenoble: Millon, 1989), maxim 6, p. 108 and maxim 7, p. 111.

Without attribution he also quotes the statement in the same work that God is “an infinite sphere whose centre is everywhere but whose circumference is nowhere” (“sphaera infinita, cuius centrum est ubique, circumferentia vero nusquam”).<sup>28</sup> From the *De vi rerum principiis* he quotes a variety of teachings including the notions that intellect is transformed from on high into divine knowledge, that intellect so transformed investigates what the Good’s causality and effectivity is,<sup>29</sup> that the Good is the creator of all things and the plenitude of knowledge, and that the Good is the mind that discharges its function without any fatigue.<sup>30</sup>

## 2.2 *Nicholas of Cusa*

Nicholas of Cusa’s interest in the tradition of philosophical *Hermetica* can be documented throughout his career, starting from some of the earliest sermons to the *De ludo globi* of 1462–3.<sup>31</sup> A passage in his *Apologia doctae ignorantiae* shows decisively albeit indirectly the importance that he attaches to this literature by comparing the dialogic and didactic relation between Hermes and “Aesculapius” to that between Dionysius the Areopagite and Timothy and even to that between Christ and St. Paul.<sup>32</sup> The earlier work of which the *Apologia* is a defence – *De docta ignorantia* – had already contained some striking references to the *Asclepius*. In support of his argument for the lack of distinction in the Absolute Maximum, Nicholas notes that “for this reason, Hermes Trismegistus rightly says that ‘since God is all things, he has no proper name, for it would be necessary either to give God every name or call all things by his name’” (“quoniam Deus est universitas rerum, tunc nullum nomen proprium est eius, quoniam aut necesse esset omni nomine Deum aut omnia eius nomine

28 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 11, p. 18, l. 419–420. The passage cited is *Lib. XXIV Philos.*, maxim 2, p. 208.

29 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 11F, p. 192, l. 261–265; *sicut dicit Trismegistus De sex principiis cap. 1*. The passage cited is Hermes Latinus, *Liber de VI rerum principiis*, eds P. Lucentini, M.D. Delp (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), part I, c. 2, l. 48–50.

30 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 11F, p. 193, l. 296–305. The passages cited are *Lib. De VI rerum princ.*, part I, c. 2, l. 4–10; part I, c. 2, l. 44–48; part I, c. 3, l. 1–8; part I, c. 3, l. 21–24.

31 For Nicholas’ reading of the testimonies of Lactantius and Augustine concerning Hermes Trismegistus see *Sermo* 1, §2 [December 1430], eds R. Haubst, M. Bodewig (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977). However, he adopts a more circumspect view of some doctrines in the Hermetic books in *Sermo* 11, §2 [January 1431]. The influence of Hermetic texts on Nicholas has been studied by A. Minazzoli, “L’héritage du *Corpus Hermeticum* dans la philosophie de Nicolas de Cues”, in *La Ciudad de Dios* 205(1992), p. 101–122; P. Arfé, “Ermete Trismegisto e Nicola Cusano”, in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), *Hermetism from Late Antiquity to Humanism*, p. 223–243; and G. Federici Vescovini, *Nicolas de Cues* (Paris: Vrin, 2016), p. 53–64.

32 Nicholas of Cusa, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, h 11, p. 5, l. 21–23.

nuncupari”).<sup>33</sup> Whereas this quotation is obviously drawn directly from the *Asclepius* – a work on which Nicholas’ manuscript glosses survive –,<sup>34</sup> another passage is probably taken indirectly through Thierry of Chartres. In developing his account of the fourfold structure of the Contracted Maximum, Nicholas quotes the view of unnamed authorities that the movement characteristic of the created world “is a certain spirit that is as though intermediate between matter and form [...] a spirit of connection which proceeds from both: namely, possibility and the world-soul” (“spiritus quidam esse, quasi inter formam et materiam medius [...] spiritus connexionis procedere ab utroque: scilicet, possibilitate et anima mundi”).<sup>35</sup>

Nicholas is not deterred from citing some of the most controversial and the most enigmatic parts of the *Asclepius*. In *De beryllo* he includes among a set of premises to be employed in the explanation of the hermeneutical device called the “intellectual beryl” the statement of Hermes Trismegistus that “man is a second god” (*hominem esse secundum deum*) and then glosses this by arguing that, just as God is the creator of “real beings” (*entia realia*) and natural forms, so is man the creator of “conceptual beings” (*rationalia entia*) and artificial forms: an analogy that underlies his methodology of conjecture.<sup>36</sup> In *De ludo globi* he destabilizes the notion of the world’s physically precise sphericity by endorsing Mercury’s view that it is not the world’s roundness “of itself” (*ex se*) but only the forms of things contained in it that are actually visible.<sup>37</sup>

It is consistent with his all-pervasive epistemology exploiting the “coincidence of opposites” that Nicholas should especially gravitate towards the paradoxical utterances forming the *quasi*-definitions of God in the *Liber XXIV philosophorum*. In the second book of *De docta ignorantia* he attributes to an anonymous sage the fourteenth proposition of that work stating that “God is the opposite of nothing with being as the intermediary” (*Deus est oppositio*

33 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, h I, lib. I, c. 24, p. 48, l. 13–15. The reference is to *Asclepius*, c. 20, p. 321, l. 5–9. See also Nicholas of Cusa, *De beryllo*, h XI/1, §13, l. 10–12.

34 See P. Arfé (ed.), *Cusanus-Texte III. Marginalien. 5. Apuleius. Hermes Trismegistus. Aus Codex Bruxellensis 10054–56* (Heidelberg: Winter, 2004).

35 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, h I, lib. II, c. 10, p. 96, l. 14–p. 97, l. 17. The reference is to *Asclep.*, c. 14, p. 313, l. 3–7 and l. 20–22; c. 16, p. 315, l. 13–16; c. 17, p. 315, l. 22–24 and p. 316, l. 3–4. Cf. Thierry of Chartres, *Commentum super librum Boethii De Trinitate*, ed. N.M. Häring, *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1971), c. 4, p. 91–96.

36 Nicholas of Cusa, *De beryllo*, h XI/1, §7, l. 1–2. The reference is to *Asclepius*, c. 6, p. 301, l. 18–p. 302, l. 2.

37 Nicholas of Cusa, *De ludo globi*, h IX, lib. I, §13, l. 15–17. The reference is to *Asclepius*, c. 17, p. 316, l. 5–10.

*nihil mediatione entis*).<sup>38</sup> In the same book he applies without attribution – exactly as Berthold had done earlier in his *Expositio* – the second proposition: “God is an infinite sphere whose centre is everywhere but whose circumference is nowhere” by analogy to both the Absolute and the Contracted Maximum.<sup>39</sup>

### 2.3 *Marsilio Ficino*

The status of the *Hermetica* as a literary source was changed radically by Marsilio Ficino.<sup>40</sup> In the proem to his translation and commentary on Plotinus’ *Enneads* published in 1492, he describes the circumstances surrounding his commission almost thirty years earlier to translate the Greek Hermetic corpus, a manuscript of which had come into the possession of Cosimo de’ Medici.<sup>41</sup> The resulting Latin translation of the Greek text<sup>42</sup> – to which he assigned the title of *Pimander* – is prefaced with a short *argumentum* summarising all the biographical and genealogical information about the mythical author that could be derived from Cicero, Lactantius, and Augustine.<sup>43</sup> This short preface is the Florentine writer’s only extended critical reflection on the *Hermetica*, since the annotations on the separate treatises that accompanied his translation in some of the early printings are in fact by Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples.

It is the fact that Ficino here introduces some of his own most important ideas that makes this preface a document of real interest. He explains that the ancient author was called “thrice-greatest” (*ter maximus*) because he was considered to be the greatest philosopher, the greatest priest, and the greatest king – a detail important with respect to Ficino’s view of the fusion of philosophy and religion.<sup>44</sup> Regarding the character of Hermes, the commentator informs us that he was the first philosopher to transfer himself from physics

38 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, h 1, lib. 11, c. 2, p. 66, l. 11. The reference is to *Liber XXIV philosophorum*, maxim 14, p. 133.

39 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, h 1, lib. 11, c. 12, p. 103, l. 20–p. 104, l. 3. The reference is to *Liber XXIV philosophorum*, maxim 2, p. 95.

40 On the influence of *Hermetica* on Ficino see M.J.B. Allen, “Marsilio Ficino, Hermes Trismegistus and the *Corpus Hermeticum*”, in J. Henry, S. Hutton (eds), *New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought. Essays in the History of Science, Education and Philosophy in Memory of Charles B. Schmitt* (London: Duckworth, 1990), p. 38–47; S. Gentile, C. Gilly (eds), *Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Ermete Trismegisto. Marsilio Ficino and the Return of Hermes Trismegistus* (Firenze: Centro Di, 1999).

41 Marsilio Ficino, *In Enneadem I*, ed. S. Gersh (forthcoming), proem §1.

42 Apparently because of a lacuna in his Greek manuscript, Ficino in his *Pimander* omits one treatise included in the modern edition.

43 Marsilio Ficino, *Opera omnia*, p. 1836.

44 However, the notion of Mercury’s triple profession itself may have been derived from a similar suggestion at *De VI rerum principiis*, prol., l. 6–7.

and mathematics to divine matters and the first to dispute widely regarding the majesty of God, the order of daemons, and the vicissitudes of souls. He adds that Hermes also speaks as a prophet in predicting the end of the old religion and rise of a new faith, the advent of Christ, the future judgment, and the resurrection. From these comments, it becomes apparent that Ficino is following the favourable view of Lactantius – *i.e.* that Hermes has definite *pro-Christian* tendencies – rather than the sceptical view of Augustine. Regarding the organization of the Hermetic corpus, the *argumentum* informs us that of their author's many books two are most important: one concerning the divine will and entitled *Asclepius* and another concerning the power and wisdom of God and entitled *Pimander*. It further notes that the former was translated into Latin by Apuleius, whereas the latter remained in Greek until it was brought to Italy by Leonardo of Pistoia and translated by Ficino on the orders of Cosimo de' Medici. Finally, we learn that Hermes is the founder of a tradition of "ancient theology" (*antiqua theologia*) which continued with Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, Philolaus, and Plato in a sixfold order – an idea crucial for Ficino's interpretation of the history of philosophy.

Despite completing a translation of the Greek Hermetic corpus, Ficino uses this material only to a limited extent in his own commentaries and treatises.<sup>45</sup> It is not absolutely clear why this is the case, although possible reasons might include a desire to distance himself from medieval philosophical material that had by this time become a cliché – as he perhaps does also with Proclus' *Elements of Theology* –, and a feeling that he now also has better Greek writings – *e.g.* those of Plato and Plotinus – covering the relevant metaphysical topics. In fact, the one Hermetic passage that he exploits in a significant way is the controversial one in the *Asclepius* dealing with statue-making.<sup>46</sup> In book three of his *De Vita*, Ficino presents this text from a novel intertextual perspective in arguing that Plotinus, in the *Fourth Ennead*,<sup>47</sup> "imitates Mercury"

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45 The main importance of Hermes for Ficino seems to be as the founder of the tradition of "ancient theology" that is integral within the Florentine's view of the history of philosophy. However, from the time of the first version of Ficino's *Philebus* commentary and the *Platonic Theology* onwards, Hermes' position in that tradition is usurped – under the influence of Proclus and Plethon – by the equally mythical figure of "Zoroaster", the putative author of the *Chaldaean Oracles*.

46 See above.

47 The third book of Ficino's treatise was originally conceived as a commentary on Plotinus, *Ennead* IV.3.26 and appears as such in the dedication MS of his Plotinus translation and commentary but not in the *editio princeps*.

(*Mercurium imitatus*)<sup>48</sup> in illustrating the soul's acquisition of celestial gifts with the *magi's* capturing of something divine and wonderful in their statues.<sup>49</sup> To some extent, this perfectly justifiable interpretation in relation to the original Plotinian discussion can be viewed as sanitising the Hermetic text by treating the animation of statues as a metaphor for a natural process rather than as literal account of an occult contrivance.<sup>50</sup>

### 3 Pythagoreans

The importance of Pythagoras and his followers for the development of philosophy before Plato was well established for later generations by the doxographies in writers such as Augustine and Macrobius and by the role of "Timaeus" in the Platonic dialogue. We must distinguish two phases of reception in the period under review. During the medieval phase, the main texts transmitting Pythagorean<sup>51</sup> doctrine in technical detail are Boethius' *De institutione arithmetica* and *De institutione musica*, both of which are partially translations of the Greek theorist Nicomachus of Gerasa.

#### 3.1 *Medieval Phase*

##### 3.1.1 Berthold of Moosburg

Berthold of Moosburg knows his Pythagoreanism, in the first instance, through Boethius. In one passage he quotes from this source "Archytas the Pythagorean" (*Archytas Pythagoricus*) on the organization of the categories into a decadic

48 A little later, he says: "that same Mercury, whom Plotinus follows [...]" (*Mercurius ipse quem Plotinus sequitur [...]*), "Mercury [...] following him Plotinus [...]" (*Mercurius [...] secutus hunc Plotinus [...]*), etc.

49 Marsilio Ficino, *Three Books on Life*, eds C.V. Kaske, J.R. Clark (Tempe, Arizona: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2002), lib. III, c. 26, p. 388, l. 77–p. 392, l. 139.

50 For more detail on this question, see S. Gersh, "Marsilio Ficino as Commentator on Plotinus. Some Case-Studies", in S. Gersh (ed.), *Plotinus' Legacy. The Transformation of Platonism from the Renaissance to the Modern Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 19–43, at p. 36–41.

51 Many modern scholars distinguish between "Pythagorean" (=pre-Platonic) and "Neo-Pythagorean" (post-Platonic) doctrine – a distinction that we can ignore here as being meaningless for the authors presently under consideration. There are useful recent surveys in A. Hicks, "Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages", in C.A. Huffman (ed.), *A History of Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 416–434; and M.J.B. Allen, "Pythagoras in the Early Renaissance", in Huffman (ed.), *A History of Pythagoreanism*, p. 435–453.

structure,<sup>52</sup> and in another the doctrine that all things derived from the primaeval nature are formed according to the principle of number.<sup>53</sup> Secondly, Berthold's Pythagoreanism comes via Calcidius' *Commentary on the Timaeus*: for example, in a passage where he explicitly quotes this text as justification of the analogy between the division of multitude by the number 3 in arithmetic and the division of substance into indivisible, divided, and mixture in the Platonic account of the soul's generation.<sup>54</sup>

### 3.1.2 Nicholas of Cusa

The importance of Pythagoreanism for Nicholas of Cusa cannot better be documented than by citing the passage in the first book of *De docta ignorantia* which introduces a threefold arithmetical analogy comprising Unity, Equality, and Connection in order to express the trinitarian nature of the Absolute Maximum discussed earlier in the text.<sup>55</sup> Although Nicholas refers to ancient Pythagoreanism, he is here clearly using one of his favourite medieval sources as an intermediary or at least as an inspiration, namely, the Boethian commentaries of Thierry of Chartres:

No nation has ever existed which did not worship God and believe that he was absolutely the Maximum. We find Marcus Varro in his books of *Antiquities* to have remarked that the *Sisennii* revered Unity as the Maximum, while Pythagoras – a man celebrated in his era for an irrefutable authority – further asserted that this Unity was a Trinity. In investigating its Truth and elevating our mind higher, let us argue according to the following premises: Nobody doubts that that which precedes all otherness is eternal, for otherness is the same as mutability. But everything that naturally precedes mutability is immutable and therefore eternal. Indeed, otherness consists of one thing and another, and so otherness

52 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli. Propositiones 14–34*, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), 24A, p. 126, l. 52–54, via Boethius, *De institutione arithmetica*, ed. G. Friedlein (Leipzig: Teubner, 1867 [photographic reprint Frankfurt a. M.: Minerva, 1966]), lib. II, c. 41, p. 139, l. 13–19.

53 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 19A, p. 59, l. 40–45, via Boethius, *De institutione arithmetica*, lib. I, c. 2, p. 12, l. 14–15. The passage in Berthold includes an intertextual cross-reference to Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*, ed. D. Isaac (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982), c. 1, §4, p. 33, l. 37–38.

54 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 6E, p. 131, l. 162–170. The reference is to Calcidius, *In Timaeum*, p. 27, l. 6–14.

55 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, h I, lib. I, c. 7–9, p. 14, l. 22–p. 19, l. 14. Chapter 7 bears the heading: "On the trine and unitary Eternity" (*De trina et una aeternitate*).

like number is posterior to Unity. Consequently, Unity is prior in nature to otherness and, since it precedes it naturally, is Eternal Unity.<sup>56</sup>

This passage is by no means alone in testifying to the importance of Pythagoreanism in Nicholas' thought. The precise metaphysical status of number is determined in his *Idiota de mente*<sup>57</sup> where the character of the "Layman" praises the Pythagoreans for treating number not just mathematically as proceeding from our mind but "symbolically and rationally" (*symbolice ac ratiōnabilit̄er*) as proceeding from the divine mind, the former number being the image of the latter.<sup>58</sup> He adds that Pythagorean doctrine was followed by the Platonists who in their turn were followed by Boethius.

During the Renaissance phase, the aforementioned Latin texts transmitting Pythagorean doctrine in a technical sense were supplemented by numerous works becoming available for the first time in Greek. These included Plato's *Timaeus* and *Parmenides* together with their Greek commentaries by Proclus, Porphyry's *De vita pythagorica*, Iamblichus' *De vita pythagorica* and *De comuni mathematica scientia*, Timaeus of Locri's *De natura mundi et animae*, and Hierocles' *Commentaria in Aureum carmen*.

### 3.2 Renaissance Phase

#### 3.2.1 Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino has an ambivalent view of Pythagoreanism. On the one hand, he emphasises the importance of Pythagoreanism within the tradition of "ancient theology" which always includes Pythagoras and sometimes also Philolaus as representatives of the Graeco-Italian school in the list of authorities.<sup>59</sup> On the other hand, Ficino is highly critical of the doctrine

56 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, h 1, lib. 1, c. 7, p. 14, l. 24–p. 15, l. 10: *Nulla umquam natio fuit quae Deum non coleret et quem maximum absolute non crederet. Reperimus M. Varronem in libris Antiquitatum annotasse Sissennios unitatem pro maximo adorasse. Pythagoras autem, vir suo aevo auctoritate irrefragabili clarissimus, unitatem illam trinam astruebat. Huius veritatem investigantes, altius ingenium elevantes dicamus iuxta praemissa: Id quod omnem alteritatem praecedit aeternum esse nemo dubitat. Alteritas namque idem est quod mutabilitas. Sed omne quod mutabilitatem naturaliter praecedit immutabile est, quare aeternum. Alteritas vero constat ex uno et altero; quare alteritas sicut numerus posterior est unitate. Unitas ergo prior natura est alteritate et, quoniam eam naturaliter praecedit, est unitas aeterna.*

57 Nicholas of Cusa, *Idiota de mente*, h v, c. 6, §88, l. 11–22 and §95, l. 1–21.

58 See S. Toussaint, "Mystische Geometrie und Hermetismus in der Renaissance. Ficinus und Cusanus", in *Perspektiven der Philosophie* 26(2000), p. 339–356.

59 See the *argumentum* of the *Pimander*, cited above. Among later illustrations of this historical thesis see Ficino, *In Ennead.* 1, proem 2.



of transmigration of the soul into animals which he believes Plato to have endorsed only in a metaphorical sense, although some of the late ancient *Platonici* including Plotinus mistook it for a literal truth.<sup>60</sup>

#### 4 Plato

During the period here under review, we must distinguish three phases in the interpretation of Plato based on the range of texts available: a medieval phase, a transitional phase, and a Renaissance phase. In the medieval phase, the main texts are Calcidius' translation and commentary on the *Timaeus* (as well as Cicero's translation), William of Moerbeke's translation of the *Parmenides* as lemmata within his translation of Proclus' commentary,<sup>61</sup> Aristippus' translations of the *Meno* and *Phaedo*,<sup>62</sup> and the doxographies in Augustine's *Contra Academicos*, *De civitate Dei* VIII, and *De diversis quaestionibus*, q. 46. The transitional phase utilizes the same texts together with certain newer humanist translations from the Greek. Among the latter are the *Parmenides* as a separate text translated by George of Trebizond in the fifteenth century,<sup>63</sup> the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedrus* in the translation of Leonardo Bruni,<sup>64</sup> and the *Republic*

60 See Marsilio Ficino, *Commentary on Plotinus. Volume 4. Ennead III, Part 1*, ed. S. Gersh (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2017), *In Ennead.* III.4, §9–14. Cf. *In Enneadem* III.2, §30. In the *Theologia platonica*, Ficino proposes a classification of six Academies according to their tendency to read Plato's accounts of the vicissitudes of souls literally or metaphorically. See Marsilio Ficino, *Platonic Theology. Volume 6. Books XVII–XVIII*, eds M.J.B. Allen, J. Hankins (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), lib. xvii, c. 1, §1–2, p. 6–8. See also Ficino, *Theologia Platonica*, lib. xvii, c. 3, §5, p. 32–34; *Theologia Platonica*, lib. xvii, c. 3, §10, p. 40–42; *Theol. Plat.*, lib. xvii, c. 4, §1, p. 44–46.

61 See Proclus, *Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. C. Steel, 2 vols (Leuven / Leiden: Leuven University Press / Brill, 1982–1985), which includes Moerbeke's translation of extracts from Proclus' Commentary on the *Timaeus* (vol. 2, p. 559–587). Moerbeke's translation of the *Parmenides* is based on Proclus' lemmata and extends only as far as the "first hypothesis".

62 See Plato, *Meno interprete Henrico Aristippo*, eds V. Kordeuter, C. Labowsky (London: Warburg Institute, 1940) and *Phaedo interprete Henrico Aristippo*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (London: Warburg Institute, 1950).

63 See J. Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance*, 2 vols (Leiden / New York: Brill, 1990), p. 180–186, 429–435; I. Ruocco (ed.), *Il Platone latino. Il Parmenide. Giorgio di Trebisonda e il cardinale Cusano* (Firenze: Olschki, 2003). George of Trebizond's translation – being independent of Proclus' commentary – covers the entire text of the *Parmenides*.

64 For notes on the provenance of the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedrus* translations and the preface to the *Phaedrus* see H. Baron (ed.), *Leonardo Bruni Aretino. Humanistisch-philosophische Schriften, mit einer Chronologie seiner Werke und Briefe* (Leipzig / Berlin: Teubner, 1928), p. 3–4, 172, and Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance*, p. 388–400. For the *Crito* text

in the translation of Pier Candido Decembrio.<sup>65</sup> In the Renaissance phase, the main texts are the complete Latin translation of Plato by Ficino together with *argumenta* for all dialogues and longer commentaries on the *Symposium* (also called *De amore*), *Phaedrus*, *Parmenides*, *Timaeus*, and *Philebus*, and of course the Greek texts of Plato themselves. Among the many doctrinal aspects of this Plato reception, we will concentrate here on two that are particularly important for understanding the Platonists' own historical viewpoint: the notion of concealment and the relation between Plato and Aristotle.

#### 4.1 *The Notion of Concealment*

The notion that the ancient Academy had pursued a deliberate strategy of concealing their metaphysical doctrine behind a display of sceptical methodology was very influential among later Platonists. The main authority for this teaching was Augustine, who in *Contra Academicos* lists the important teachings of Plato – the immortality of the human soul, the distinction between the intelligible and sensible worlds, and so forth – and reports that such doctrines were as much as possible “preserved and guarded as mysteries” (*servata et pro mysteriis custodita*) by his successors. According to Augustine, many students of philosophy were erroneously starting to believe that everything is corporeal, in response to which Arcesilaus “thoroughly concealed the doctrine of the Academy and buried it as a golden hoard to be discovered some day by posterity” (“occultasse penitus Academiae sententiam et quasi aurum inveniendum quandoque posteris obruisse”), preferring to disabuse those whom he considered badly taught rather than teach those whom he considered unteachable.<sup>66</sup> The notion that Arcesilaus' adoption of sceptical methodology was a stratagem aimed at concealing dogmatic metaphysics seems to have been derived by Augustine from a rather oblique reading of a passage in Cicero's *Academica* in which the New Academic practice of arguing against all things and for all things “for the purpose of finding the truth” (*veri inveniendi causa*) is discussed. Here, Lucullus asks what these thinkers have discovered. The Academic replies that “their custom is not to show this” (*non solemus [...] ostendere*). Lucullus then asks what these “mysteries” (*mysteria*) are and why the school “conceals”

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see Plato, *Il Critone latino di Leonardo Bruni e di Rinuccio Aretino*, eds E. Berti, A. Carosini (Firenze: Olschki, 1983).

65 See Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance*, vol. 1, p. 117–154.

66 Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, lib. III, c. 17, §37–c. 20, §45 [at c. 17, §38]. It seems likely that Augustine understood the philosophical strategy of Arcesilaus as being broadly equivalent to Socrates', and therefore perhaps something that Socrates' follower Plato would himself have sanctioned. See Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, lib. VIII, c. 4.

(*celare*) these things as something base. The Academic replies that it is in order to guide our hearers by reason rather than by authority.<sup>67</sup>

In the opinion of certain medieval Platonists, this report by Augustine needed to be read in conjunction with a statement by Dionysius the Areopagite. In his ninth *Letter*, the latter explains that the theological tradition has a double aspect: on the one hand “the ineffable and the mysterious” (*aporrhētos kai mustikē*) which is symbolic and employs initiation, and on the other hand “the manifest and more known” (*emphanēs kai gnōrimōtera*) which is philosophical and employs demonstration. Dionysius continues by explaining that symbolism has been utilized by the sacred writers both to protect the understanding of the highest truths from the multitude of the irreligious and to accommodate those understandings to the varying capacities of the hierarchy.<sup>68</sup> It is worth noting immediately that Augustine and Dionysius have somewhat different ideas about what concealed and what was concealed within the philosophical thinking of their predecessors. With Augustine it was an autonomous dialectical methodology that concealed and Platonic metaphysics in general that was concealed, whereas with Dionysius it was symbolism and ritual that concealed and mystical unification that was concealed. The tension between the two approaches resulting from the intertextual use of these historical accounts will be the source of much that is both puzzling and productive in the later tradition.

#### 4.1.1 Berthold of Moosburg

Berthold of Moosburg provides a good illustration of the reception and exploitation of the Augustinian thesis regarding Platonic concealment. In the *Expositio tituli* of his commentary, he attempts to contextualize Proclus’ philosophical project by emphasising the crucial role of this philosopher in unwrapping the “coverings” (*integumenta*) with which the first Platonists,<sup>69</sup> and especially the Academics, enwrapped their wisdom. He further explains that according to Cicero’s account as relayed through Augustine, the custom of these thinkers was to “conceal” (*occultare*) their doctrine and not to “reveal” (*aperire*) it to anyone who had not spent an entire lifetime within their sect.<sup>70</sup> According to Berthold, the Platonic wisdom that was kept concealed was a complete axiomatic system setting out the relation between the first cause and its many effects.

67 Cicero, *Academica*, lib. 11, c. 18, §60.

68 Dionysius, *Epistula IX*, §1, 1105D–1108B. Cf. Dionysius, *De caelesti hierarchia*, c. 2, §2, 140A–B and c. 2, §5, 145A–B; Dionysius, *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*, c. 1, §5, 377A.

69 Augustine had suggested, albeit rather tentatively, that it was Plotinus who accomplished this. See our discussion below.

70 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. A*, p. 37, l. 18–21.

#### 4.1.2 Nicholas of Cusa

Nicholas of Cusa supplies a striking example of the reception and exploitation of the corresponding Dionysian teaching together with a further refinement making it explicit that the Dionysian teaching is also a *Platonic* one. In one paragraph of *De beryllo*, he notes that both Plato “in his letters” (*in epistulis*) and great Dionysius forbade “these mysteries to be divulged” (*haec mysteria [...] propalari*) to those who do not know “the intellectual elevations” (*elevationes intellectuales*),<sup>71</sup> and in another that Plato in his letters says that all things exist with the king of all things and for his sake and that he wrote wisely that this teaching should be held as a “secret” (*secretum*).<sup>72</sup> The mystery to which Nicholas refers in both these passages is his own *praxis* of conjecture by which one is guided towards an experience of the first principle.

#### 4.1.3 Marsilio Ficino

The notion of Platonic concealment has its most far-reaching implications in connection with Marsilio Ficino’s doctrine of the “ancient theology” (*prisca theologia*). The fullest explanation of this can be found in the proem to his *Commentary on Plotinus’ Enneads* where he makes the following main points. First, it was the custom of the ancient theological tradition from Hermes Trismegistus to Plato “to veil the divine mysteries both with mathematical numbers and figures and with poetic fictions” (“*divina mysteria cum mathematicis numeris et figuris tum poeticis figmentis obtegere*”). This was in order to prevent them from being rashly communicated to all and sundry. Second, Plotinus was the first and only thinker who stripped away these mathematical and poetic coverings from theology and “divinely penetrated into the secrets of the ancients” (*arcana veterum divinitus penetravit*). This statement is corroborated with the testimony of Porphyry and Proclus.<sup>73</sup>

In addition to making an extensive application to the historiography of philosophy, Ficino’s rethinking of the notion of Platonic concealment – on which both the Augustinian and Dionysian formulations as well as scattered remarks in Proclus’ writings were probably influential – is associated with several

71 Nicholas of Cusa, *De beryllo*, h XI/1, §2, l. 1–4. The references are to Plato, *Epistula II*, 312d–e (probably cited through Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne. Livre II*, eds H.-D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1974], lib. II, c. 8, p. 54, l. 24–25) and to Dionysius, *Epistula IX*, §1, 1105D – as cited above – and perhaps Dionysius, *De mystica theologia*, c. 1, §2, 1000A–B.

72 Nicholas of Cusa, *De beryllo*, h XI/1, §15, l. 1–§16, l. 19. The reference is to Plato, *Epistula II*, 312e–313a (probably cited through Proclus, *Theologia platonica*, lib. II, c. 8–9, p. 51, l. 21–p. 61, l. 9).

73 Marsilio Ficino, *In Enneadem I*, pr. §2, ed. S. Gersh.

striking new developments resulting from the availability of the complete Platonic corpus. These include a hermeneutical distinction that seems to have been conceived specifically in order to maintain that the ancient Athenian did not himself believe *literally* in transmigration, although the distinction itself also has more general philosophical implications. In *Platonic Theology* xvii, Ficino argues that Plato affirms as literally true regarding divine matters only what is stated in those of his writings where he speaks in his own person, whereas the statements regarding similar topics contained in his other dialogues where he is reporting the views of the ancients should be understood in a non-literal manner.<sup>74</sup> In the course of this same discussion, the Florentine also shows how this thesis is useful in explaining the seemingly enigmatic statements of Plato in his *Second* and *Seventh Letters* that no written work of his has existed or ever will exist on divine matters and therefore that nobody has existed or will exist who will understand his views on such questions.<sup>75</sup> According to Ficino, the teachings of Plato regarding the existence of divine providence and the immortality of the soul are disclosed in such texts as the *Letters* and the *Laws* where the author speaks in his own person, whereas his views on other matters are mysteries veiled in the manner of the ancient theologians and presented as the utterances of such literary characters as Timaeus, Parmenides, and Melissus.

Ficino's rethinking of the notion of Platonic concealment also includes a further hermeneutical distinction that is useful for maintaining that the ancient Athenian did not advocate the doctrine of transmigration in a literal sense. Also in *Platonic Theology* xvii, the Florentine argues that the concealment of doctrine by the earliest Academy led to a variety of interpretations of the ancient theology on the part of later thinkers that can be associated with six "academies" following one another in a sequence of which the first three were Greek and the second three foreign.<sup>76</sup> These schools were: the "old" academy headed by Xenocrates, the "middle" academy under the headship of Arcesilaus, and the "new" academy headed by Carneades, followed by the

74 Marsilio Ficino, *Theologia Platonica*, lib. xvii, c. 4, §6, p. 52 and lib. xvii, c. 4, §14, p. 60–62.

75 Marsilio Ficino, *Theologia Platonica*, lib. xvii, c. 4, §5–6, p. 50–52 – the references are to Plato, *Epistola II*, 314c and *Epistola VII*, 341c. Cf. Ficino's *Argumentum in Epistulam II*, *Opera omnia*, p. 1530–1532 and *Argumentum in Epistulam VII*, *Opera omnia*, p. 1534–1535.

76 Marsilio Ficino, *Theologia Platonica*, lib. xvii, c. 1, §2, p. 6–8. The symmetry with the set of six ancient theologians is obvious and deliberate on Ficino's part. For him, the entire history of philosophy is governed by divine providence which proceeds in an orderly – and hence, numerical – manner. On Ficino's history of the six academies see Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance*, vol. 1, p. 283, notes 41–42, and M.J.B. Allen, *Synoptic Art. Marsilio Ficino on the History of Platonic Interpretation* (Firenze: Olschki, 1998), p. 56–79.

“Egyptian” academy headed by Ammonius,<sup>77</sup> the “Roman” academy under the headship of Plotinus, and the “Lycian” academy headed by Proclus. Ficino is highly critical of the last two Academies with respect to their interpretation of the circulation of souls in a literal sense,<sup>78</sup> whereas he endorses the view of the first four Academies and especially the first and fourth which take a more metaphorical approach to the same doctrine.<sup>79</sup> It is not clear to what extent the Florentine would maintain precisely this classification when considering the history of Platonic tenets other than that of transmigration, especially given the rather artificial distinction between the school of Ammonius and that of Plotinus and the placing of the normally “divine” Plotinus in the less favoured camp.

#### 4.2 *The Relation between Plato and Aristotle*

In *Contra Academicos*, Augustine speaks of a certain doctrine of the truest philosophy as having been consolidated through many centuries by industrious and discerning men who continued to teach that “Aristotle and Plato are so concordant with one another that it is to the unskilled and inattentive that they seem to disagree” (“Aristotelem et Platonem ita sibi concinere ut imperitis minusque attentis dissentire videantur”).<sup>80</sup> This statement is clearly based on Cicero who reports in his *Academica* – in his turn, explicitly quoting Varro – that originating with Plato there was established a philosophy that was “single and harmonious” (*una et consentiens*), despite having the two names of “Academic” and “Peripatetic”. Both schools in dependence on Plato produced “a certain science of philosophy, an ordering of subject-matter, and a system of teaching” (“ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae”): something inconsistent with the Socratic manner of discussing everything in a doubting manner. Although there was originally “no difference between the Peripatetics and that Old Academy” (“nihil [...] inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differe”) and both drew from the same source,<sup>81</sup> Aristotle excelled in a certain abundance of ingenuity.<sup>82</sup> Now, Augustine’s statement somewhat transforms the original account on which it depends for, whereas Cicero views the concordance between Plato and Aristotle as vested in the systematization of thinking and accords a certain primacy to Aristotle,

77 *I.e.* Ammonius Saccas.

78 Marsilio Ficino, *Theologia Platonica*, lib. xvii, c. 3, p. 28–44.

79 Marsilio Ficino, *Theologia Platonica*, lib. xvii, c. 4, p. 44–62.

80 Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, lib. iii, c. 19, §42.

81 *I.e.* Plato.

82 Cicero, *Academica*, lib. i, c. 4, §17. Cf. Cicero, *Academica*, lib. ii, c. 5, §15 for a briefer statement.

the continuation of Augustine's text associates the concordance with the doctrine of the intelligible and sensible worlds and implicitly prioritises Plato.

These reports concerning the original concordance between Platonic and Aristotelian thought were well known to the medieval and Renaissance Platonists who understood them in connection with the synthesising approach to the two traditional doctrines that they observed in the Latin Platonic writings of late antiquity in general. For them, there were clearly many possible answers to the question of precisely how a doctrinal concordance that is obviously not intended to be a purely nominal distinction must be understood, and the type of solutions envisaged clearly varied in accordance with information regarding the content of Plato's and Aristotle's writings gradually emerging between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries. However, the concordance between Platonic and Aristotelian thought as understood by the authors studied in this essay undoubtedly took the form of a complex network of identities and differences between various philosophical tenets in which the balance was in effect always tilted towards the Platonic side of the equation.

#### 4.2.1 Berthold of Moosburg

The radically Platonic character of the *Elementatio theologica* of Proclus, the sole work on which Berthold of Moosburg is commenting, would seem to militate against any commitment on his part to the traditional doctrine of concordance. Nevertheless, much of the *Elementatio's* philosophical procedure had already integrated Aristotelian notions and – to take the most immediately obvious example – Berthold furthers this approach by expressing the propositional method itself in the technical terminology of the four causes.<sup>83</sup> Thus, the Platonic author corresponds to the efficient cause of the *Elementatio*,<sup>84</sup> the prior definitions represent its material cause,<sup>85</sup> the network of implications and exclusions of propositions, the application of common notions, and the necessity inherent in the whole system correspond to its formal cause,<sup>86</sup> and the arrangement of propositions in a sequence representing scalar ascent to the first principle represent its final cause.<sup>87</sup> Although the introduction of the four causes in this manner illustrates a common procedure with the *accessus* (“introductions”) to philosophical works adopted by scholastic writers, and although the establishment of analogies between literary and metaphysical

83 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.*, p. 37, l. 5–9.

84 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.*, p. 37, l. 7 and l. 10–14.

85 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.* I, p. 45, l. 296–p. 46, l. 313.

86 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.* K, p. 47, l. 343–p. 49, l. 407.

87 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit.* L, p. 49, l. 408–414 and 420ff.

structures is not foreign to ancient Neoplatonism, there is absolutely nothing in the original Greek text of Proclus or its Latin translation that suggests precisely this organisation.

But when turning from methodology to content, we do find Berthold more inclined to argue that Plato and Aristotle “are divergent and not in harmony” (*diversantur [...] non concordant*).<sup>88</sup> Maintenance of the distinction between the two thinkers is especially marked in the section called *Praeambulum* in the course of which the commentator explains the nature of Proclus’ philosophy by setting up a series of metaphysical contrasts between the two more ancient authorities. Here, he notes with respect to the object of highest intellectual activity, that this is “being *qua* being” (*ens in eo quod ens*) for Aristotle but the One or Good for Plato;<sup>89</sup> with respect to the psychic faculty to be employed in this activity, that this is the “intellect” (*intellectus*) for Aristotle but “a knowing above intellect” (*cognitio supra intellectum*) for Plato;<sup>90</sup> and with respect to the name of the process, that this is “metaphysics or first philosophy” (*metaphysica / prima philosophia*) for Aristotle but “divine super-wisdom” (*divinalis supersapientia*) for Plato.<sup>91</sup> It is perhaps obvious from this summary that the “Plato” to which Berthold here refers has much more in common with Dionysius the Areopagite than with the founder of the Academy.

#### 4.2.2 Nicholas of Cusa

Nicholas of Cusa follows the Augustinian tradition in according Platonism a privileged status on the grounds of its unique affinity with Christianity, at the same time reflecting a pattern widespread among earlier medieval thinkers of seeing “Platonism” as broadly identifiable with the theology of Dionysius the Areopagite.<sup>92</sup> On occasion, we do find him explicitly contrasting Plato favourably with Aristotle: for instance, when considering the question of the world’s eternity or createdness in *De venatione sapientiae*, he notes that Aristotle denies

88 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeambulum* C, p. 65, l. 430–432.

89 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* B, p. 56, l. 116–119, and *Praeamb.* C, p. 65, l. 422–429. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, 1A, p. 74, l. 113–123.

90 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 65, l. 433–p. 66, l. 458, and p. 67, l. 504–p. 68, l. 528.

91 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Praeamb.* C, p. 65, l. 422–p. 66, l. 458, and p. 68, l. 539–540.

92 For evidence regarding Nicholas’ understanding of Plato and the Platonic Tradition see M.L. Führer, “Cusanus Platonicus. References to the Term *Platonici* in Nicholas of Cusa”, in S. Gersh, M.J.F.M. Hoenen (eds), *The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages. A Doxographic Approach* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2002), p. 345–370; and S. Gersh, “The Virtue of Absence. Nicholas of Cusa and the Historical Plato”, in A. Balansard, I. Koch (eds), *Lire les dialogues, mais lesquels et dans quel ordre? Définitions du corpus et interprétations de Platon* (Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2013), p. 117–131.



that the “possibility of coming-to-be” (*posse fieri*) has a beginning, whereas Plato “with superior vision” (*melius videns*) said that time is the image of the eternal.<sup>93</sup> However, these passages are surprisingly rare for such a committed Platonist as Nicholas, and he more frequently endeavours to read Aristotle in the most charitable way, often by reporting his doctrine in an already platonised form via Albert the Great or various Arabic commentators. His ultimate position is that stated in the formal debate between a Peripatetic “philosopher” and a Platonic-Dionysian “layman” entitled *Idiota de mente*: namely, that the relation between the viewpoints characterised here as Aristotelian and Platonic must itself be understood in terms of the coincidence of opposites.<sup>94</sup>

Notable examples of his obliquely affirmative characterisations of Aristotle and the Peripatetics can be found in works from Nicholas’ middle to late periods. In *De non-aliud*, he remarks that although the Stagirite “fell short” (*defecerit*) in first or mental philosophy, he nevertheless wrote many completely praiseworthy things in the rational and moral spheres.<sup>95</sup> In *De apice theoriae*, Nicholas states rather cryptically that the “mental power” (*posse mentis*) of Aristotle is displayed only partially in his books, and that this fact is something that the ignorant “do not see” (*non vident*).<sup>96</sup> What Nicholas is saying here is that the real *posse* of Aristotelian thought – this technical term signifying both its “power” and its “possibilities” – is only disclosed by skilful interpretation – the “seeing” also mentioned and equated with the interpreter’s intellectual elevation. Presumably, an instance of reading Aristotle in the right manner would be Nicholas’ own explanation in *De beryllo*<sup>97</sup> and *De venatione sapientiae*<sup>98</sup> of the Stagirite’s notion of intellect as being both a triunity and a multiplicity of forms. A further example would be his refashioning in *De non-aliud* of Aristotle’s question whether or not one and being are other than the

93 Nicholas of Cusa, *De venatione sapientiae*, h XII, c. 9, §25, l. 1–§26, l. 4. There is one other major issue concerning which Nicholas prefers Platonism to Aristotelianism: namely, the status of the law of contradiction. This point will be discussed below in connection with axiomatics.

94 Nicholas of Cusa, *Idiota de mente*, h v, c. 2, §66, l. 19–§67, l. 3; c. 3, §71, l. 1–2; and c. 4, §77, l. 15–26. On Nicholas’ Aristotelianism see S. Gersh, “Medieval Platonic Theology. Nicholas of Cusa as Summation and Singularity”, in J. Hankins, F. Meri (eds), *The Rebirth of Platonic Theology. Proceedings of a Conference held at The Harvard University Centre for Italian Renaissance Studies (Villa I Tatti) and the Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento (Firenze, 26–27 April, 2007)* (Firenze: Olschki, 2013), p. 15–45, at p. 30–35.

95 Nicholas of Cusa, *De non-aliud*, h XIII, c. 19, p. 47, l. 10–12.

96 Nicholas of Cusa, *De apice theoriae*, h XII, §21, l. 1–§22, l. 6.

97 Nicholas of Cusa, *De beryllo*, h XI/1, §36, l. 8–15; §39, l. 5–8.

98 Nicholas of Cusa, *De venatione sapientiae*, h XII, c. 8, §22, l. 1–§24, l. 22. Cf. *De non-aliud*, h XIII, c. 10, p. 22, l. 23–p. 23, l. 9.

substance of beings as an answer to the effect that they are the “not-other” (*non aliud*).<sup>99</sup>

In actual fact, it is because of his rather ingenious reading of Aristotle that Nicholas is able ultimately to subscribe to the traditional ancient and medieval notion of the concordance of Platonism and Aristotelianism. It is likewise because of a particular reading of “Plato” that avoids the caricature of “Platonism” as amounting to the identification of logical genera and species with separate substances: a view that is explicitly rejected in *De beryllo*.<sup>100</sup> The Platonism that Nicholas espouses is always rather the version implicit in Dionysius the Areopagite’s writings on which various teachings of non-Christian Platonists such as Proclus can sometimes be treated as commentary. This can be seen in *Idiota de mente* where the Layman explains that according to the Aristotelian doctrine, the contents of sensation form the basis of the contents of reason and the contents of reason form the basis of the contents of intellect. But according to the Platonic doctrine, the contents of sensation form the basis of the contents of reason whereas the contents of reason *do not* form the basis of the contents of intellect. The Layman finally concludes that according to the combined Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine, the contents of sensation form the basis of the contents of reason, while reason by turning first towards sensation and then towards intellect cognitively multiplies the first principle’s single infinite Form.<sup>101</sup>

#### 4.2.3 Marsilio Ficino

A commitment to the traditional doctrine of concordance was relatively easy for Marsilio Ficino to make.<sup>102</sup> When Ficino’s attention had shifted from Proclus to Plotinus,<sup>103</sup> he could rely on the testimony of the latter’s biographer Porphyry that concealed Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines were blended into his teacher’s writings, that Aristotle’s metaphysical doctrines were concentrated in them, and that Peripatetic commentaries were read in Plotinus’

99 Nicholas of Cusa, *De non-aliud*, h XIII, c. 18–19, p. 44, l. 1–p. 47, l. 14. Cf. *De venatione sapientiae*, h XII, c. 21, §60, l. 1–12.

100 Nicholas of Cusa, *De beryllo*, h XI/1, §49, l. 9–17.

101 Nicholas of Cusa, *Idiota de mente*, h V, c. 2, §65, l. 1–§66, l. 20; and c. 4, §77, l. 1–§79, l. 10. For the first point see especially *Idiota de mente*, h V, c. 2, §63, l. 1–§66, l. 20. For the second point see *Idiota de mente*, h V, c. 2, §67, l. 1–§68, l. 16; c. 3, §71, l. 1–9; c. 4, §74, l. 1–§79, l. 10; and c. 7, §99, l. 1–§107, l. 14. For the first point see also *De docta ignorantia*, h I, lib. II, c. 6, p. 80, l. 1–p. 81, l. 15.

102 On the possibility of an evolution in Ficino’s thinking on this point see J. Monfasani, “Marsilio Ficino and the Plato-Aristotle Controversy”, in M.J.B. Allen, V. Rees (eds), *Marsilio Ficino. His Theology, his Philosophy, his Legacy* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 179–202.

103 See below.

seminars including those of Aspasius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Adrastus.<sup>104</sup> Indeed, Porphyry was himself one of the earliest proponents of the doctrine of concordance and perhaps one of the influences behind Augustine's endorsement of the thesis. When the Florentine comes to write a formal commentary on Plotinus, he declares that his own aims as an exegete are to explain here not only how Plotinus reveals the hidden meaning of Plato's utterances but also how Plotinus provides us with a correct interpretation of *Aristotle*.<sup>105</sup> This same commentary is indeed very informative concerning certain major points at which Ficino finds the two ancient thinkers in agreement,<sup>106</sup> other points at which he considers them to be divergent,<sup>107</sup> and still other points at which he finds their relation to be ambivalent.<sup>108</sup>

For Ficino, the real dispute was not between Plato and Aristotle but between the better commentators of Aristotle – those including Plotinus who emphasise Aristotle's "Platonism" – and worse commentators – those who concentrate on the differences between the two ancient thinkers. In one important passage, the Florentine goes as far as to argue that Plotinus himself can be seen as resolving the conflict between those Peripatetics who follow Alexander in thinking that the human intellect is individual but mortal and those who follow Averroes in maintaining that it is immortal but not individual. According to Ficino, if the reader accepts, on the one hand, the multiplicity of individual human intellects with Alexander and, on the other, the immortal gift of total intelligence with Averroes, he will come into possession of "the complete doctrine of our Plotinus" (*integra Plotini nostri sententia*).<sup>109</sup> Ficino has touched

104 Porphyry, *Vita Plotini*, §14. Cf. Ficino's translation, *Opera omnia*, p. 1542.

105 Marsilio Ficino, *In Enneadem* 1, pr., §2–3.

106 See Marsilio Ficino, *In Enneadem* 1.1, §19. With respect to a discussion of the relation between discursive reason and intellect, Ficino concludes that Plotinus "in employing here the terminology of Aristotle, indicates that Aristotle in this context differs hardly at all from Plato" (*dum vero hic verbis Aristotelis utitur, significat Aristotelem in his a Platone minime dissidere*).

107 See Marsilio Ficino, *In Enneadem* 1.3, §15. Concerning the subject of metaphysics, Ficino notes that Plato deals with being endowed with a self-sufficient condition of relatedness to that which is superior and that which is inferior to being – *i.e.* in the *Parmenides* –, whereas Aristotle is concerned with being *qua* being subsumed under the notion of being which is common to all things – *i.e.* in the *Metaphysics*.

108 See Marsilio Ficino, *In Enneadem* 1.4, §35. With respect to the doctrine of mind, Ficino concludes that Aristotle in *De anima* 111 maintains that intellect truly exists as immortal but in other places denies that there is remembrance – and therefore a rational power – after death.

109 Marsilio Ficino, *In Enneadem* 1.1, §15–16.

upon this question earlier in the commentary while reformulating it as a conflict between those who think with Alexander that intellect can be the proper life of the body and those who think with Averroes that intellect cannot properly give life to the body.<sup>110</sup>

## 5 Latin Platonists

Any attempt to situate the three subjects of the present study in terms of their consciousness of themselves within a historical tradition must also take account of an influential group of late ancient Latin writers of philosophical or semi-philosophical character. These writers continued to be studied by all the medieval Platonists primarily because they preserved important remnants of the precious ancient Greek philosophy lost to readers in the Latin-speaking west since the fifth century. We must distinguish two phases of their reception in the period under review. During the medieval phase, Calcidius' *Commentarius in Timaeum*, Macrobius' *Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis*, Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, and Boethius' *De consolatione philosophiae* were the most important texts.<sup>111</sup>

### 5.1 Medieval Phase

#### 5.1.1 Berthold of Moosburg

Berthold of Moosburg provides an elegant example of intertextual reading when he explains that the *theta* and *pi* and the steps placed between these letters embroidered on Philosophia's robe according to Boethius' *De consolatione philosophiae* represent stages in the ascent to the first principle through the propositional method set out in Proclus' *Elementatio theologica*.<sup>112</sup> Not less striking is Berthold's application of Proverbs 9:1 on Wisdom as having built her house by cutting out seven columns to the seven primordial causes of Eriugena and the *Clavis physicae* and their various participations through the

110 Marsilio Ficino, *In Enneadem* 1.1, §8.

111 For discussion of these authors and works in general see S. Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition*, 2 vols (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986); and for specific examples of their medieval transmission, S. Gersh, "The First Principles of Latin Neoplatonism. Augustine, Macrobius, Boethius", in *Vivarium* 50(2012), p. 113–138.

112 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. L*, p. 49, l. 415–p. 51, l. 491. The reference is to Boethius, *De cons. philos.*, lib. 1, pr. 1, §3–4.

interpretation of the number 7 and its factors (1 + 6, 2 + 5, 3 + 4) in Macrobius' *Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis*.<sup>113</sup>

### 5.1.2 Nicholas of Cusa

That these Latin Platonists of antiquity continue to have an impact on Nicholas of Cusa is shown by a passage in his *De docta ignorantia*,<sup>114</sup> which forms a link between the earlier discussion of the Absolute Maximum as Unity, Equality, and Connection,<sup>115</sup> and the later one of the process through which we receive "guidance" (*manuductio*) towards that Absolute through a series of geometrical examples.<sup>116</sup> Here, Nicholas is referring directly to a passage in Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis Philologiae Mercurii* describing the ritual of purgation in which the allegorical figure of Philology prepares for deification.<sup>117</sup>

Let us now inquire what Martianus means when he says that Philosophia, desiring to ascend to the knowledge of this Trinity, vomited circles and spheres. It has previously been shown that there is only a single and most simple Maximum, and that neither the most perfect solid figure – the sphere – nor the most perfect plane figure – the circle – nor the most perfect rectilinear figure – the triangle – nor the figure of the simplest rectilinearity – the straight line – is such a Maximum. This Maximum is above all these things to such an extent that we must necessarily expel everything that is attained through sense, imagination, or reason together with their material associations in order to reach that most simple and most abstract understanding where all things are one, and where the line is a triangle, a circle, and a sphere.<sup>118</sup>

113 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 11, p. 19, l. 451–471. The reference is to Macrobius, *Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis*, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970), lib. 1, c. 6, p. 19, l. 16ff. On Berthold's study of Macrobius see I. Caiazza, "Mains célèbres dans les marges des *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* de Macrobe", in D. Jacquart, C. Burnett (eds), *Scientia in margine. Études sur les marginalia dans les manuscrits scientifiques du Moyen Âge à la Renaissance* (Genève: Librairie Droz, 2005), p. 171–189.

114 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, h 1, lib. 1, c. 10, p. 19, l. 18–20.

115 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, h 1, lib. 1, c. 5–9, p. 11, l. 23–p. 19, l. 14.

116 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, h 1, lib. 1, c. 10, p. 19, l. 15ff.

117 Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1983), lib. 11, §135–138, p. 42, l. 5–p. 43, l. 6.

118 Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, h 1, lib. 1, c. 10, p. 19, l. 18–p. 20, l. 9: *Nunc inquiramus quid sibi velit Martianus quando ait Philosophiam ad huius trinitatis notitiam ascendere volentem circulos et sphaeras evomuisse. Ostensum est in prioribus unicum simplicissimum maximum, et quod ipsum tale non sit nec perfectissima figura corporalis, ut est sphaera, aut superficialis, ut est circulus, aut rectilinealis, ut est triangulus, aut simplicis rectitudinis, ut est linea. Sed ipsum super omnia illa est, ita quod illa quae aut per sensum aut*

According to the well-known earlier medieval exegesis of this text by Remigius of Auxerre, the cognitive ascent of the human soul signified by Philologia's purgation involves the setting aside of the contents of the medieval quadrivium in order to reach a transcendent unknown.<sup>119</sup> Nicholas has considerably enriched the metaphysical significance of the original. For him, this ascent especially includes the transition from an understanding of finite geometrical figures in their discreteness to the comprehension of infinite ones coinciding in the Absolute Maximum.

During the Renaissance phase, the aforementioned Latin texts were gradually superseded as sources of ancient philosophical doctrine by the original Greek writings, even if they continued to be admired for their imaginative qualities. However, Calcidius' *Commentarius in Timaeum* and Boethius' mathematical writings at least were of sufficiently technical character to retain their position in the curriculum alongside the newly acquired treatises.

## 5.2 Renaissance Phase

### 5.2.1 Marsilio Ficino

Ficino's earliest studies on Platonism were based on the Latin sources mentioned and as late as 1489 he continues to recommend as sources of Platonic study: *Boethii Consolatio* [...], *Calcidii commentarium in Timaeum*, *Macrobbii expositio in Somnium Scipionis* and other Latin writings.<sup>120</sup> His own practice is to refer quite often to Boethius' *De consolazione philosophiae*: notably, in emphasizing the predominance of the subjective aspect in epistemology<sup>121</sup> and in establishing doctrinal equivalence between Boethius and Proclus,<sup>122</sup> and also less often to quote Calcidius' *In Timaeum*: for instance, in connection

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*imaginationem aut rationem cum materialibus appendiciis attinguntur necessario evomere oporteat ut ad simplicissimam et abstractissimam intelligentiam perveniamus ubi omnia sunt unum, ubi linea sit triangulus circulus et sphaera.*

119 Cf. Remigius of Auxerre, *Commentum in Martianum Capellam*, ed. C.E. Lutz, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1962–1965), vol. 1, lib. 11, lemma 59, l. 6, p. 173–174. This commentary was widely used throughout the Middle Ages.

120 Marsilio Ficino, *Epistulae*, lib. IX, 12, *Opera omnia*, p. 899.

121 Marsilio Ficino, *Commentary on Plotinus. Volume 5. Ennead III, Part 2, and Ennead IV*, ed. S. Gersh (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018), IV.6, §1 – reference to Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, lib. v, m. 4, §1–9.

122 Marsilio Ficino, *Commentaries on Plato. Volume 2. Parmenides, Part 1*, ed. M. Vanhaelen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012), c. 32, p. 128 – reference to Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, lib. v, pr. 4, l. 70–116 –; Marsilio Ficino, *Commentaries on Plato. Volume 2. Parmenides, Part 2*, ed. M. Vanhaelen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012), c. 97, p. 266 – reference to *De consolazione philosophiae*, lib. III, m. 9, l. 15–17.

with the structure of means<sup>123</sup> and the mechanism of sight.<sup>124</sup> Ficino's continued use of Boethius was no doubt influenced by Boethius' status as a *Christian* Platonic authority and Calcidius' as a writer of mathematical sophistication.<sup>125</sup>

## 6 Proclus

During the period here under review, we can distinguish three phases in the interpretation of Proclus based on the range of texts available: a Medieval phase, a transitional phase, and a Renaissance phase.<sup>126</sup> In the medieval phase, the main texts are the *Elementatio theologica*, *Elementatio physica*, *Tria opuscula*, and *Commentarius in Parmenidem*, in translations by William of Moerbeke.<sup>127</sup> These texts are all used by Berthold who as a pioneer – and obviously in contrast to his usage of the *Hermetica* where scholastic doxographies sometimes intervene – always cites them directly through their Latin translations.

### 6.1 Berthold of Moosburg

We will confine ourselves to making just a few illustrations of Berthold's extensive intertextual handling of the Athenian scholar. In the course of his exposition, the first explicit citation of Proclus' *Elementatio physica* occurs when Berthold explains the key term *elementatio* itself with reference to a work on physics "which this same author is also said to have published" ("quam etiam iste auctor dicitur edidisse").<sup>128</sup> Turning to the *Tria opuscula*, we find very extensive use in connection with numerous central theological doctrines, especially

123 Marsilio Ficino, *Compendium in Timaeum, Opera omnia*, c. 19, p. 1446 – reference to Calcidius, *In Timaeum*, §8–22, p. 61, l. 10–p. 73, l. 4.

124 Marsilio Ficino, *Compendium in Timaeum, Opera omnia*, c. 41 (= c. 42 [correcting defective pagination]), p. 1446 – reference to Calcidius, *In Timaeum*, §236–48, p. 248, l. 15–p. 259, l. 17.

125 Ficino also continues to use Macrobius' *Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis* – mostly without explicit citation – as a source of the "Platonists'" doctrines regarding cosmic harmony and the souls' celestial journeys. Cf. Marsilio Ficino, *Theol. plat.*, lib. xviii, *passim*. On Ficino and Macrobius see Caiazzo, "Mains célèbres".

126 For a survey of Proclus' influence during the Middle Ages see S. Gersh, "One Thousand Years of Proclus. An Introduction to his Reception", in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 1–29.

127 See Proclus, *Elementatio theologica, translata a Guillelmo de Moerbeke*, ed. H. Boese (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987) and Proclus, *Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*.

128 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. 1*, p. 45, l. 280–284.

in such a manner as to facilitate the establishment of doctrinal connections between Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagite. In fact, the editors of vol. 1 (Propositions 1–13) of the *Expositio* list four passages of *De X dubitationibus circa providentiam*, nine passages from *De malorum subsistentia*, and eight passages from *De providentia et fato* that are cited often repeatedly within that part of the *Expositio* alone. Finally, there is a rare citation of Proclus' *Commentarius in Parmenidem* in the course of Berthold's exposition when he quotes "according to Proclus *On the Parmenides*" (*secundum Proclum Super Parmenidem*) a statement to the effect that the world is the plenitude of all kinds of forms.<sup>129</sup>

In the transitional phase, the main texts are the four translations by William of Moerbeke mentioned above together with an important new translation that appears in the intellectual milieu surrounding Nicholas of Cusa.<sup>130</sup>

## 6.2 *Nicholas of Cusa*

It is from the time of his *De beryllo* (1458) onwards that Nicholas of Cusa, having earlier relied on Platonic material derived through the Latin tradition as supplemented by Moerbeke's work, began to turn to Greek works in newer humanistic translations.<sup>131</sup> Most important among the latter was the *Theologia Platonis* of Proclus as translated by Pietro Balbi of which important manuscripts survive containing Nicholas' own marginalia.<sup>132</sup> Nicholas' enthusiastic

129 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Prol.* 11, p. 17, l. 401–402.

130 Nicholas of Cusa's encounter with Proclus and especially his glossing of the Moerbeke translations is discussed by S. Gersh, "Nicholas of Cusa", in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance*, p. 318–349. On more specific philosophical questions see W. Beierwaltes, "Cusanus und Proklos. Zum neuplatonischen Ursprung des non-aliud", in *Nicolò Cusano agli inizi del mondo moderno. Atti del Congresso internazionale in occasione del V centenario della morte di Nicolò Cusano, Bressanone 6–10 settembre 1964* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1970), p. 137–140; W. Beierwaltes, "Das seiende Eine. Zur neuplatonischen Interpretation der zweiten Hypothese des platonischen Parmenides. Das Beispiel Cusanus", in G. Boss, G. Seel (eds), *Proclus et son influence. Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel, juin 1985* (Zürich: Éditions du Grand Midi, 1987), p. 287–297; W. Beierwaltes, "Centrum totius vite. Zur Bedeutung von Proklos' *Theologia Platonis* im Denken des Cusanus", in A.-Ph. Segonds, C. Steel (eds), *Proclus et la Théologie platonicienne. Actes du Colloque international de Louvain, 13–16 mai 1998, en l'honneur de H.-D. Saffrey et L.G. Westerink* (Leuven / Paris: Leuven University Press / Brill, 2000), p. 629–651; and Gersh, "Medieval Platonic Theology", p. 15–45.

131 There are also some traces of influence from this material in earlier works – especially *De coniecturis* – although the main development is after *De docta ignorantia* and mostly late. See R. Haubst, "Die Thomas- und Proklos-Exzerpte des 'Nicolaus Treverensis' in Codicillus Strassburg 84", in *Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft* 1 (1961), p. 17–51.

132 Marginalia on Proclus' *Elementatio theologica* also survive although, for reasons that we cannot pursue here, these are much less detailed. For the texts of the marginalia see



use of his new sources is indicated in dramatic form at the beginning of *De non-aliud* where the character of the Abbot is said to have been busy in the study of Proclus' *In Parmenidem* and that of Peter to be currently in the process of translating Proclus' *Theologia Platonis*.<sup>133</sup> Further evidence is provided by *De venatione sapientiae* where Nicholas refers to Proclus' *Theologia Platonis* by its Latin title and states that it contains six books,<sup>134</sup> and where there are numerous verifiable citations both of the *In Parmenidem* and of the *Theologia Platonis*.<sup>135</sup>

In the Renaissance phase, the main texts are the four translations by William of Moerbeke once again, Balbi's translation of the *Theologia Platonis*, together with the Greek texts of Proclus' writings that were brought into prominence by Ficino's translations and commentaries.<sup>136</sup>

### 6.3 Marsilio Ficino

It can be assumed that Ficino consulted the medieval Latin versions wherever these were available,<sup>137</sup> although his superior expertise in Greek philology and wider knowledge of Greek philosophy meant that he worked primarily on the original sources. Regarding the *Elementatio theologica*, there is some evidence that he may himself have made a new translation of this work: namely, glosses in the manuscript on which he based his translation of Plotinus – MS Paris, BnF, gr. 1816 – that are possibly fragments of his version of the *Elementatio*.<sup>138</sup> However, Ficino seems to have soon lost interest in any such a project as may have existed, for the glosses referring to Proclus' treatise in the Plotinus

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H.-G. Senger (ed.), *Cusanus-Texte III. Marginalien. 2. Proclus Latinus. Die Exzerpte und Randnoten des Nikolaus von Kues zu den lateinischen Übersetzungen der Proclus-Schriften. 2.1. Theologia Platonis – Elementatio theologica* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1986); and K. Bormann (ed.), *Cusanus-Texte III. Marginalien. 2. Proclus Latinus. Die Exzerpte und Randnoten des Nikolaus von Kues zu den lateinischen Übersetzungen des Proclus-Schriften. 2.2. Expositio in Parmenidem Platonis* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1986).

133 Nicholas of Cusa, *De non-aliud*, h XIII, c. 1, p. 3, l. 2–7.

134 Nicholas of Cusa, *De venatione sapientiae*, h XII, c. 8, §21, l. 7–9.

135 Nicholas of Cusa, *De venatione sapientiae*, h XII, c. 17, §49, l. 3–8; and c. 22, §64, l. 7–12.

136 For a survey of Ficino's reading of Proclus see M.J.B. Allen, "Marsilio Ficino", in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 353–379.

137 See C. Steel, "Ficino and Proclus. Arguments for the Platonic Doctrine of the Ideas", in J. Hankins, F. Meri (eds), *The Rebirth of Platonic Theology*, p. 63–118, especially at p. 93–94.

138 There is also an apparent reference to a translation in a letter dated 1474. On the testimony and "fragments" see D. Robichaud, "Fragments of Marsilio Ficino's Translations and Use of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* and *Elements of Physics*. Evidence and Study", in *Vivarium* 54(2016), p. 46–107, at p. 49–50.

manuscript are not repeated in the corresponding passages within the Plotinus commentary that was composed later on.<sup>139</sup> Regarding the *Theologia Platonis*, there is evidence in his letter to Martin Prenninger of 17 June 1489 referring to a Latin translation of the work that Ficino knew Balbi's translation or at least knew of it.<sup>140</sup> However, his notes on the Greek text in the MS Firenze, Bibl. Riccard. 70 show clearly that he studied also the larger theological treatise primarily in the original language.<sup>141</sup> In addition, Ficino undoubtedly used the original texts of Proclus' commentaries on the *Timaeus* and *Parmenides* in connection with his own commentaries on those dialogues, also producing his own translations of extracts from Proclus' commentaries on the *Republic*<sup>142</sup> and *First Alcibiades*.<sup>143</sup>

#### 6.4 *Proclus as Preeminent Platonist*

The high valuation placed on Proclus by medieval Platonists was based on the philosophical richness of his writings buttressed by his presumed dependence on the authority of Dionysius the Areopagite. This doctrinal dependence – the order of which is now known to be reversed – was assumed by our three central figures. Doubts about the genuine apostolic authenticity of the Dionysian corpus had existed since it first appeared on the scene and in both the eastern and western sectors of medieval Christendom. However, it was not until the rise of humanism in the fifteenth century and especially after the work of Lorenzo Valla and Desiderius Erasmus that decisive proof of the Dionysian pseudepigraphy was obtained.

Nicholas of Cusa's contribution to the fifteenth-century debate is strangely detached or ambivalent. An annotation in one of this writer's MSS of Dionysius states his amazement that neither Augustine nor Jerome cites Dionysius who is mentioned as an authority only many years later by John Damascene and

139 However, Ficino refers to the work in a letter of 1492: namely, *Epistulae*, lib. XI, 28, *Opera omnia*, p. 937.

140 Ficino, *Epistulae*, lib. IX, 12, *Opera omnia*, p. 899. The same letter also refers to the Latin version of the *Tria opuscula*.

141 See H.-D. Saffrey, "Notes platoniciennes de Marsile Ficin dans un manuscrit de Proclus (Cod. Riccardianus 70)", in *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et de Renaissance* 21(1959), p. 161–184.

142 At *Epistulae*, lib. XI, 28, *Opera omnia*, p. 937, he speaks of having in 1492 obtained six books and the beginning of the seventh of this work and of having translated some extracts. However, Ficino never obtained access to a complete MS.

143 Ficino also translated a short work of Proclus about theurgy to which he gave the Latin title *De sacrificio et magia*.

Gregory the Great.<sup>144</sup> There is also a letter from Nicholas to Valla dated 1450 in which he requests permission from the latter to have copied his *In Novum Testamentum Annotationes* which Nicholas has already read in a borrowed copy.<sup>145</sup> The Cardinal must therefore have been familiar with Valla's critique of the apostolic status of Dionysius. However, there is no evidence in Nicholas' published writings – even after 1450 – that he questioned the authority of a source which remained equally canonical for Berthold and Ficino.

#### 6.4.1 Berthold of Moosburg

There is plenty of circumstantial evidence suggesting that Berthold of Moosburg adopts the standard medieval viewpoint regarding the priority of Dionysius to Proclus. In a position of strategic significance near the beginning of his *Expositio tituli*, he argues that the Lycian thinker's theological excellence resides in his ascending to knowledge of the supreme Good "through the triplicity of motions that Dionysius in chapter 4 of *On Divine Names* [section K] ascribes both to angels and souls: that is, the circular, the rectilinear, and the oblique" ("per triplicem motum quos ascribit Dionysius 4 cap. *De Divinis Nominibus K* et angelis et animabus: scilicet circularem, rectum et obliquum»).<sup>146</sup> This statement seems to confirm that Berthold believes Proclus to have lived subsequently to Dionysius and to have been influenced by him. After this passage, when the German commentator goes on to connect the three Dionysian motions with different psychic faculties and their uses by drawing upon a discussion not in Proclus' *Elementatio* but in his *De providentia et fato*, we can assume that he sees this Proclus text and others like it as extended glosses on the Areopagite.<sup>147</sup>

#### 6.4.2 Nicholas of Cusa

Nicholas of Cusa provides a fairly detailed analysis of what he takes to be the historical relation between Proclus and Dionysius in a chapter of *De venatione*

144 MS Bernkastel-Kues, Cod. Cus. 44, fol. 1v published by L. Baur (ed.), *Cusanus-Texte III. 1. Marginalien. 1 Nicolaus Cusanus und Ps.-Dionysius im Lichte der Zitate und Randbemerkungen des Cusanus* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1941), p. 19. On the Cusanus-Valla connection see E.N. Tigerstedt, *The Decline and Fall of the Neoplatonic Interpretation of Plato. An Outline and Some Observations* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1974), p. 22–24.

145 The letter is only extant as included in Valla's *Antidotum in Poggium* 111. It is discussed in detail by L. Barozzi, R. Sabbadini, *Studi sul Panormita e sul Valla* (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1891), p. 127ff.

146 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. A*, p. 37, l. 30–p. 38, l. 34.

147 Proclus, *De providentia et fato*, ed. D. Isaac (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1979), c. 4, §17–19, p. 41, l. 1–p. 44 l. 32.

*sapientiae*.<sup>148</sup> In the course of discussing how philosophers have surveyed the conjectural “field of Unity” (*campus unitatis*), Nicholas notes the practice of denying all attributes of the One as a means of establishing its transcendence. He then explains that the book *Parmenides* shows how Plato made the pursuit of the One by means of logic, that Proclus “sums up” (*epilogat*) this teaching in the second book of his *Platonic Theology*, and that Dionysius “imitates” (*imitatur*) Plato in a similar pursuit of the One.<sup>149</sup> Although Nicholas’ argument establishes that both Proclus and Dionysius follow Plato, he has not been explicit concerning the relative priorities of the two later writers. This omission is rectified in a passage in *De non-aliud* where the Cardinal notes that Proclus “came after Dionysius” (*post Dionysium venit*) because he cites Origen<sup>150</sup> who himself came after Dionysius,<sup>151</sup> and that Proclus “follows Dionysius” (*Dionysium sequendo*) in denying both unity and goodness of the First whereas Plato called the First both one and good.<sup>152</sup>

#### 6.4.3 Marsilio Ficino

There are explicit statements by Marsilio Ficino indicating that he also endorses the prevailing view concerning the priority of Dionysius to Proclus. One example can be found in a passage where Ficino is commenting on the Plotinian notion that evil consists of a falling short of the law contained in the divine mind and in nature, and then connects this with the doctrine that evil is not existent but only *quasi*-existent in Proclus who “in my opinion, follows in the wake of Dionysius the Areopagite” (“Dionysium, ut arbitrator, secutus Areopagitam”).<sup>153</sup> That Ficino was conscious of the problem concerning the absence of references in the early Church Fathers to the Dionysian Corpus is indicated in a letter noting his “frequent suspicion” (*saepe [...] suspicari*) that the Platonists who preceded Plotinus such as Ammonius, Numenius and maybe some of their predecessors had read the works of Dionysius “before they were hidden away” (*antequam [...] delitescerent*) as a result of some unknown calamity to the Church.<sup>154</sup>

148 The argument of the following paragraph expands some earlier comments at Nicholas of Cusa, *De beryllo*, h XI/1, §12, l. 11–12.

149 Nicholas of Cusa, *De venatione sapientiae*, c. 22, §64, p. 62, l. 3–20.

150 The reference is to Proclus, *Theologia platonica*, lib. II, c. 4, p. 31, l. 1–9.

151 We have supplied what seems to be Nicholas’ missing premiss.

152 At *De non-aliud*, h XIII, c. 20, p. 47, l. 23–26, Nicholas says that it is unclear whether Proclus had actually read Dionysius.

153 Marsilio Ficino, *In Enneadem* III. 2, §23. The references are to Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*, c. 2, §11–39 and c. 3, §49, and Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 4, §18–35, 713D–736B.

154 Marsilio Ficino, *Epistulae*, lib. XI, 3, *Opera omnia*, p. 925.

## 6.5 *Changing Attitudes to Proclus' Doctrine*

In turning from the consideration of the later Platonists' view of Proclus' historical position in relation to philosophy and Christianity to their view of his actual doctrine, we will attempt to pursue the analysis in two directions. On the one hand, a conceptual trajectory in the case of our selected authors will be traced consisting of their increasing awareness of – or willingness to acknowledge – the inherent paganism of Proclus' doctrine indicated by its emphatic polytheism. On the other hand, we will discern a double or inverted trajectory in the same authors' thinking comprising a decline of their apparent interest in Proclus' axiomatic theory and – in a complementary relation to that – a noticeably heightened interest in his doxographical content.

### 6.5.1 Increasing Recognition of Proclus' Inconsistency with Christianity

#### 6.5.1.1 *Berthold of Moosburg*

Berthold's *Expositio* obviously has to take account of a prominent feature of Proclus' original text – reinforced by the *Tria Opuscula* and the *Commentarius in Parmenidem* [only its first part] –: namely, its contention that reality includes a hierarchical chain of causality subsequent to the First Cause – the One or Good – that begins from a series of “gods” (*dei*) or “unities” (*henades / monades*). Given that Dionysius explicitly rejects the notion that there are “many causes and divinities causing one another in a hierarchy of higher and lower” (“polla ta aitia kai allōn allas paraktikas theotētas huperechousas kai hupheimenas”)<sup>155</sup> – which is precisely the doctrine advocated by Proclus in the *Elementatio* –, it was obviously necessary for Berthold to start from the earlier scholastic practice when dealing with Proclus of assimilating the latter's gods or unities somehow to transcendent Forms, and then to insert these principles into the framework provided by the Dionysian doctrine of the single God's *names*. Presenting in summary form<sup>156</sup> the information contained in three passages in the early part of his *Expositio*,<sup>157</sup> we can say that Berthold establishes the following hierarchical plan of the divine world consisting of four distinct levels: *Level 1* – The First One and Good <A>;<sup>158</sup> *Level 2* – the gods of

<sup>155</sup> Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 5.2, 816C.

<sup>156</sup> In order to simplify things, we here omit much of the intertextual component which includes references to Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, lib. III. pr. 10, §85–6; Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis*, lib. 1, c. 6, §5–6, and an abundance of biblical citations.

<sup>157</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio*, *Prol.* 4, p. 12, l. 227–p. 13, l. 250 [= passage A]; *Prol.* 5, p. 13, l. 254–263 [= passage B]; *Prol.* 11, p. 19, l. 451–471 [= passage C]; *Prol.* 12, p. 21, l. 524–535 [= passage D].

<sup>158</sup> For the reader's greater convenience, the different passages in Berthold's text are indicated with letters A–D. See the previous note.

Proclus' *Elementatio* – equivalent to unities or goodnesses in themselves, “self-sufficient” (*autoteleis* = *per se perfecta*) terms <A>, that are seven in number <C>, equivalent to the “primordial causes” (*primordiales causae*) of Augustine, Eriugena, and the *Clavis physicae* <B>, “unparticipated” (*amethecta*) terms <D>, and comprising goodness, infinity,<sup>159</sup> being, life <BC>, intellectuality, animality, and naturality <C>; *Level 3* – Numerous unities in participants <A>, terms having substances in themselves, being [a primary group of]<sup>160</sup> effects of the primordial causes <B>, participated terms <A>, and comprising infinities,<sup>161</sup> beings, lives <B>, intellectualities, animalities, and naturalities <BD>; *Level 4* – Divine and intellectual souls <BD>, terms having substances in other things, being [a secondary group of] effects of primordial causes <B>, and participating terms <B>. As a result of the idealistic turn of his thought prompted by his studies of Augustine, Eriugena and the *Clavis physicae*,<sup>162</sup> Berthold manages to effect a rather successful reconciliation between Proclus and Dionysius by aligning the former's elaborate stratification of real principles with (partially mind-dependent) *modalities* of the single participatory relation associated with each of the Dionysian *divine names*.

In his *Theologia platonica*, Proclus had arranged his gods less as the highest of a number of superimposed series of metaphysical principles than as the unitary initial moments of triadic structures discerned between and within the primary hypostases of being, life, and intellect. The second book of Proclus' work also includes an explanation of how this theological doctrine had been elaborated in the second part of his commentary on the *Parmenides*: a useful feature for medieval readers in that the relevant material was missing from the manuscript used by Moerbeke for his Latin version and has still not been recovered. In addition, the gods of Proclus' *Theologia platonica* were less the abstract causes of hierarchies of metaphysical principles than the concrete allegorical personifications of such causes in the imagery of Orphic and “Chaldaean” religious cult. In turning from Berthold to Nicholas and Ficino, we find the two later thinkers grappling in ways that are both similar and divergent with the

159 “Infinity” and the other terms are here naturally *singular*.

160 We here distinguish a primary and secondary group by name, since both the structuring of his system and Proclus' original doctrine clearly requires it. In fact, Berthold's own explanation was not written with the utmost clarity at this point, for he on occasion conflates levels  $3+4$  <AB>, whereas at other times he separates them <CD>.

161 “Infinities” and the other terms are here naturally *plural*.

162 On the important aspect of Berthold's use of Eriugena and the *Clavis physicae* for the formation of his general viewpoint see E. Ludueña, *La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela de Colonia* (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013) and E. King, *Supersapientia. A Study of the Expositio super Elementationem Theologicam Procli of Berthold von Moosburg*, PhD diss. (University of Cambridge, 2016).

more intractable polytheism of Proclus' most substantial and definitive treatment of Greek theology.

### 6.5.1.2 *Nicholas of Cusa*

We will never know exactly what Nicholas of Cusa thought of Berthold of Moosburg's ingenious explanation of Proclus' gods – other than the fact that he included the commentary of “John of Mossbach” in his list of forbidden books.<sup>163</sup> However, the Cardinal reports in considerable detail his critical encounter with this more overtly cultic version of polytheism in Proclus' *Theologia platonica* in numerous passages of his *De beryllo*,<sup>164</sup> *De principio*,<sup>165</sup> *De non-aliud*,<sup>166</sup> and *De venatione sapientiae*<sup>167</sup> in most of which he sets out from a discussion of the metaphysical doctrine of the One and the One-Being in Plato's *Parmenides* as explained by Proclus. The sermon-treatise *De principio*<sup>168</sup> displays with particular clarity Nicholas' twofold strategy of maintaining the theological reading of the dialogue while driving a wedge between the acceptable negative and affirmative theology of Proclus and his unacceptable polytheism.<sup>169</sup>

Nicholas begins here by stating the positive aspects of Proclus' doctrine. This is correct in distinguishing as two modes of being: the One that is the absolute and un-participated cause of the multiplicity of things and the One-Being that is the contracted and participated cause of the multiplicity and the being of things.<sup>170</sup> The phraseology here aligns the Platonist's distinction with his own standard dichotomy of absolute and contracted *Maximum*.<sup>171</sup> However, Nicholas immediately follows this statement with a negative remark. Proclus is incorrect in arguing that the One-Being is participated in a primary way by “other gods” (*alii dei*),<sup>172</sup> and is a “multiplicity co-eternal” (*plura [...]*)

163 There is a deep affinity between Berthold and Nicholas in that both thinkers similarly developed an idealistic standpoint on the basis of reading Eriugena and the *Clavis physicae*. See above.

164 Nicholas of Cusa, *De beryllo*, h x1/1, §12, l. 11–§13, l. 12.

165 Nicholas of Cusa, *De principio*, h x/2b, p. 8, l. 11–18 and p. 39, l. 1–33.

166 Nicholas of Cusa, *De non-aliud*, h XIII, c. 20–22, p. 47, l. 29–p. 53, l. 30

167 Nicholas of Cusa, *De venatione sapientiae*, h XII, c. 21–22, §59, l. 1–§64, l. 20.

168 Here, Nicholas treats Plato and Proclus in tandem, his assumption being that the latter's commentary approximates to the original teaching of the former.

169 We know from other statements in Nicholas' writings that he approves the theological reading of the *Parmenides* as long as that is maintained on Dionysius' terms.

170 Nicholas of Cusa, *De principio*, h x/2b, p. 39, l. 1–34.

171 As stated in *De docta ignorantia* and elsewhere.

172 Nicholas of Cusa, *De principio*, h x/2b, p. 40, l. 1–12.

*coaeterna*) with the One.<sup>173</sup> The critique is now amplified in two stages. In the first stage, he states the theological doctrine elaborated by Proclus after the first two hypotheses of the *Parmenides* and summarised in his *Theologia Platonis* as follows: *a.* there is a distinction between the One and the One-Being; *b.* there is a division of the One-Being – or the participated being or the contracted being – into three modes of being called being, life, and intellect; a further division of life – the second mode of being – into a simple unity, the unitary life, and the multitude of lives; and a further division of intellect – the third mode of being – into a simple unity, the unitary intellect, and the multitude of intellects;<sup>174</sup> *c.* the One is identified with the First God who exercises a universal providence; *d.* the multiple divisions of the One-Being are identified with secondary gods who exercise partial providence, these secondary gods – who participate in the First God in a primal manner – including a division into intellectual gods, celestial gods, and cosmic gods; *e.* the First God is identified with Jupiter and one of the secondary gods who preside over mechanical arts with Vulcan.<sup>175</sup> In the second stage, Nicholas attacks the obvious polytheism of this doctrine by turning the arguments of Parmenides and Zeno in the first part of the *Parmenides* against the doctrine of a multiplicity of self-subsistent principles such as Forms co-eternal with the One extracted by Proclus from the second part of the dialogue.<sup>176</sup>

### 6.5.1.3 *Marsilio Ficino*

Ficino's main contribution to this debate can be found in two texts: a short *argumentum* ("analytical study") forming the preface to his translation of the *Parmenides* in his *Platonis Opera omnia* volume of 1484<sup>177</sup> and a lengthy

173 Nicholas of Cusa, *De principio*, h x/2b, p. 25, l. 1–18. At *De venatione sapientiae*, h XII, c. 21, §62, l. 1–12, he notes that Proclus is incorrect in treating the One-Being as a divine species participating in the One.

174 Nicholas of Cusa, *De principio*, h x/2b, p. 39, l. 1–34.

175 Nicholas of Cusa, *De principio*, h x/2b, p. 40, l. 1–14. There is perhaps a briefer reference to the doctrine of Proclus' *Theologia Platonis* concerning God and the opposition of motion and rest at *De possest*, h XI/2, p. 21, l. 1–13.

176 Nicholas of Cusa, *De principio*, h x/2b, p. 25, l. 1–p. 30, l. 22.

177 Marsilio Ficino, *Argumentum in Parmenidem*, *Opera omnia*, p. 1136–1137. The short *argumentum* explains that the aim of the dialogue is to study how the One is above all things and how all things are derived from it. In order to accomplish this, it ascends through levels of unity starting from the sensible sphere, passing through that of intelligibles and Ideas, and culminating in the reason-principle of the Ideas. Ficino lists the *quaestiones* concerning the Ideas in the first part of the dialogue and notes the arrangement of the hypotheses in the second part. By adopting all these typically Proclean positions, it is clear that Ficino was familiar with the later Neoplatonic exegesis of the dialogue by 1484 at the latest.



commentary published in the collected edition of his Plato commentaries in 1496. It is in the latter that his critical encounter with the more overtly cultic version of polytheism in Proclus' *Theologia platonica* is worked out in detail. As in the case of Nicholas of Cusa, there is a twofold strategy of maintaining the theological reading of the dialogue while driving a wedge between the acceptable negative and affirmative theology of Proclus and his unacceptable polytheism. In so doing, he at the same time adopts a relatively polite yet firm critical stance against an interpretation of the same dialogue recently publicised by his former student and "fellow Platonist" Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.

We need to consider three extracts from the *Parmenides Commentary*. In the first passage, Ficino summarises the view of Syrianus and Proclus regarding the threefold ordering of the super-mundane gods into the intelligible, the intelligible-and-intellectual, and the intellectual gods; and of the mundane gods into the souls of the greater spheres, the souls of the stars, and the invisible divinities within the spheres. This is described as part of the Platonists' attempt to demonstrate that Parmenides "introduces precisely as many orders of gods as he posits propositions in the first and second hypotheses" ("totidem ad unguem deorum ordines introducere quot propositiones in prima secundaque suppositione ponit").<sup>178</sup> A second passage adopts a critical stance with respect to this obvious polytheism by warning against the method of "calculating the number of individual gods in accordance with that of individual phrases" ("cum clausulis singulis deos singulos computare").<sup>179</sup> In the third passage, Ficino concludes that Parmenides conducts the entire disputation in the second half of the dialogue not as the dogmatic unfolding of a complete metaphysical system but as a logical exercise designed to test the hearers' intelligence. He argues that "underneath this dialectical form Parmenides also frequently blends in mystical teachings" ("sub hac vero dialectica forma mystica quoque dogmata frequenter admiscet") not everywhere and continuously in his discourse but scattered at whatever points the logical exercise might permit.<sup>180</sup> Thus, Ficino pursues the same strategy as did Nicholas in undermining the polytheism of Proclus' text, although he does so in this case not by setting the first part of the *Parmenides* against the second but by distinguishing the latter's surface and deeper meanings.

178 Marsilio Ficino, *Commentum in Parmenidem*, part II, c. 94, §2–3, p. 238–240.

179 Marsilio Ficino, *Commentum in Parmenidem*, part II, c. 94, §3–4, p. 240–242.

180 Marsilio Ficino, *Commentum in Parmenidem*, part II, c. 90, §2, p. 220–222.

## 6.5.2 Declining Interest in Proclus' Axiomatics and Increasing Interest in his Doxography

### 6.5.2.1 *Berthold of Moosburg*

Berthold of Moosburg had understood, and rightly so, that the most important feature of the *Elementatio* was its axiomatics.<sup>181</sup> At the beginning of his *Expositio tituli*, he explains that Proclus was one of the most eminent of Plato's disciples – something reflected in the etymology of his name: “famed far and wide” (*procul cluens*)<sup>182</sup> – and then makes two fundamental exegetical moves.<sup>183</sup> Berthold's first exegetical move is to combine two doxographical passages in Augustine's *Contra Academicos*:<sup>184</sup> a passage referring to the Platonists' deliberate concealment of their doctrine examined earlier,<sup>185</sup> and a passage identifying *Plotinus* as the thinker who dispersed the clouds of error surrounding Plato's work.<sup>186</sup> With respect to the latter passage, Berthold alters the gist of the Augustinian original on the one hand, by associating Proclus very closely with Plotinus in relation to the definitive disclosure of Platonic truth, since he notes that “the countenance of Plato blazed forth especially in him” – *i.e.* Proclus – “just as it had done also in Plotinus” (“*emicare maxime in eo sicut et in Plotino os illud Platonis*”). On the other hand, he shifts the sense of Augustine's statement by interpreting the definitive disclosure as the discovery of literal truth concealed behind allegory, for he glosses the “clouds of error” [*nubes* = non-technical term] as “the coverings with which the first Platonists and especially the Academics had enwrapped their wisdom” (“*integumenta [...] quibus Platonici primi et maxime Academici suam sapientiam obvolvebant*”) [*integumenta* = technical term for allegory]. Berthold's second exegetical move is to interpret the doctrine of Plato, now identified with that of Proclus, as an axiomatic system.<sup>187</sup> He writes that Proclus “arranged the theorems of Plato himself in the present book and most subtly elucidated them once arranged” (“*ipsius Platonis theoremata ordinavit in praesenti libro et ordinata subtilissime declaravit*”). The evidence for this is provided by an

181 On Berthold's axiomatics see S. Gersh, “Berthold von Moosburg on the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 493–503.

182 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. A*, p. 37, l. 10–13. The etymology is derived from Papias.

183 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. A*, p. 37, l. 14–29.

184 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. A*, p. 37, l. 14–24.

185 Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, lib. III, c. 20, §43.

186 Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, lib. III, c. 18, §41.

187 Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio, Expos. tit. A*, p. 37, l. 25–29.

intertextual citation of Eustratius' *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*. Berthold notes that "Plato handed down *theorems* regarding the primal Good that should be thought not as insignificant but as important and leading souls towards the greatest heights" ("Plato de primo bono tradidit non contemptibilia *theoremata*, sed magna et in excelsum maximum animas referentia").<sup>188</sup>

The axiomatic aspect of Proclus' theology has in reality a certain ambivalent status, on the one hand having discursive thinking as its defining characteristic, but on the other being a vector towards its own transcendence in the non-discursive or mystical sphere. That Berthold understood this well enough is shown by his intertextual explanation of the propositional method in the *Elementatio* in terms of the ladder linking the *theta* and *pi* on Philosophia's robe in Boethius' *Consolatio*.<sup>189</sup> However, the ambiguity of Proclus' methodology was perhaps too much for the next generations of medieval Platonists who, if they were familiar with Berthold's *Expositio* at all, decided to assimilate the Greek philosopher in a different way. In fact, the subsequent course of the latter's influence can be charted by studying the double or inverse conceptual trajectory mentioned earlier: namely, a reduction of interest in Proclus' axiomatic system – taken at its face-value – complemented by an increase of interest in his doxographical content.

#### 6.5.2.2 *Nicholas of Cusa*

Many of the extant philosophical and theological books in Nicholas of Cusa's library have abundant glosses in the master's hand. This is particularly true with respect to his copies of the Moerbeke translations of Proclus although, while the annotations on the *Theologia platonica* are fairly extensive, those on the *Elementatio theologica* are brief and perfunctory.<sup>190</sup> Of course, it may be that the Cardinal's earlier study of the latter was illustrated in manuscripts of his that are no longer extant. However, it is more likely that these insignificant notes reveal how much his thought had moved away from a form of Platonism that compromised so readily with the axiomatic taste of the schoolmen.<sup>191</sup> In

188 Eustratius, *In Ethicam nicomacheam Commentarius*, ed. G. Heylbut (Berlin: Reimer, 1892), lib. 1, c. 4, p. 39, l. 32–34. Of course, Berthold read this work in the Latin translation: *In Ethicam nicomacheam Commentarius, translatio Roberti Grosseteste*, ed. H.P.F. Mercken, *The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln. Volume 1. Eustratius on Book I and the Anonymous Scholia on Books II, III, and IV* (Leiden: Brill, 1973).

189 See above.

190 See Senger, *Cusanus-Texte III*.

191 This propensity is indicated by the enormous influence among the Schoolmen of another very axiomatic work: the Arabic-Latin *De causis*. It is perhaps no accident that Nicholas of Cusa also makes very little use of this text.

Nicholas' case, the axiomatic approach can be seen as replaced by his doctrine of "conjectures". He explains this notion in the first book of *De coniecturis*<sup>192</sup> where he contrasts on the one hand, "unity of truth" (*veritatis unitas*) and on the other hand, "conjectural otherness" (*alteritas coniecturalis*). He notes that, since precision of truth is unattainable by human beings because of the lack of proportion between truth and the intellect, any "positive assertion" (*positiva assertio*) about truth must be conjectural.<sup>193</sup> In Nicholas' case also, the axiomatic approach can be seen as replaced by his doctrine of "coincidence of opposites". Having devoted a major work to this notion in the specific form of "learned ignorance" (*docta ignorantia*), he found himself having to defend it against the attacks of the neo-scholastic Johannes Wenck. He replies by arguing that the law of contradiction is something established by prolonged acceptance among the currently dominant Aristotelian faction rather than a universal law.<sup>194</sup> But then, a student of Proclus' axiomatics would realise that acceptance of the law of contradiction was indispensable for such a project.

### 6.5.2.3 Marsilio Ficino

For Berthold, the axiomatics is equivalent to the mystery *concealed* in the Platonic tradition and revealed by Proclus in the *Elementatio theologica*, whereas for Ficino, the axiomatics would be equivalent to what *conceals* the mystery.<sup>195</sup> But the Florentine's position on this question is somewhat hypothetical, since he never addresses this question directly, being interested less in Proclus the logician than in Proclus the doxographer.<sup>196</sup> This change of focus with respect to the earlier tradition runs parallel with a shift in interest from Proclus' *Elementatio theologica* to his Plato commentaries and especially to those on the *Timaeus* and *Republic* now available in Greek.<sup>197</sup> Two

192 J. Koch, *Die Ars coniecturalis des Nikolaus von Kues* (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956), discusses the nature of this doctrine and suggests various possible historical sources.

193 Nicholas of Cusa, *De coniecturis*, h III, *prol.*, p. 2, l. 1–12. Cf. *De docta ignorantia*, h I, lib. I, c. 1, p. 5, l. 1–p. 6, l. 24.

194 Nicholas of Cusa, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae*, h II, p. 6, l. 3–12. We cannot go into detail here concerning the many ways in which Nicholas "recommends" – obviously he cannot "prove" – the coincidence of opposites.

195 As does similarly the demonstration by the chief protagonist in Plato's *Parmenides*. See above.

196 On the possible traces of a commentary on the *Elementatio theologica* by Ficino, see above.

197 On this material see P. Megna, "Marsilio Ficino e il Commento al *Timeo* di Proclo", in *Studi medievali e umanistici* 1(2003), p. 93–135; and P. Megna, "Per Ficino e Proclo", in F. Bausi, V. Fera (eds), *Laurentia Laurus. Per Mario Martelli* (Messina: Centro interdipartimentale di studi umanistici, 2004), p. 313–362.

examples of Ficino's doxographical use of Proclus may perhaps suffice here. In the *Compendium in Timaeum*, Ficino considers the possible doubts of a reader as to whether Plato really thought the world to be everlasting, and then replies explicitly on the authority of Proclus<sup>198</sup> that some commentators such as Severus, Atticus, and Plutarch did not consider the world to be everlasting, whereas others such as Crantor, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus understood it to be perpetually flowing forth from God.<sup>199</sup> In the *Argumentum in Critiam*, Ficino discusses the causes of human intelligence and reports once again according to Proclus<sup>200</sup> that, whereas Panaetius believes this to be the moderate warmth of the air, Longinus rather the blended quality of the region, and Origen rather the celestial aspects and emanations, Porphyry and Proclus himself seek the causality higher up in the world-soul and in the demiurgic intellect.<sup>201</sup> Passages such as these in which Ficino explicitly cites the source of his doxography can be supplemented by many others clearly identifiable as borrowed from Proclus through the presence of absolutely identical clusters of the more ancient authorities in both writers' texts.

## 7 Plotinus and the Greek Neoplatonists

Marsilio Ficino's translations of the complete works of Plato and Plotinus, to which he added a range of shorter and longer commentaries, obviously marks a decisive turning-point in the history of philosophy. During the western medieval period when Plato's works were largely unavailable, Proclus had gradually risen to prominence as the definitive source of ancient Platonism. But from 1484 onwards when the Latin translation of Plato's writings appeared, it is Plotinus who largely replaces Proclus, thereby recapturing the preeminent position within the Platonic tradition assigned to him by Augustine.<sup>202</sup>

Various of his letters and prefaces indicate that Ficino began the work of translating Plotinus in 1463 on the basis of the MS supplied by Cosimo de' Medici (Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., Plut. 87. 3) and another one (Paris, BnF,

198 "as Proclus recounts" (*ut Proclus narrat*).

199 Marsilio Ficino, *Compendium in Timaeum, Opera omnia*, c. 13, p. 1443. The reference is to Proclus, *In Timaeum Commentaria*, ed. E. Diehl, 3 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–1906), vol. 1, lib. I, p. 277, l. 8–16.

200 "Proclus says that ..." (*Proclus ait ...*).

201 Marsilio Ficino, *Argumentum in Critiam, Opera omnia*, p. 1486–1487. The reference is to Proclus, *In Timaeum*, lib. I, p. 162, l. 11–30.

202 For an introduction to the Plotinus commentary see S. Gersh, "Analytical Study", in S. Gersh (ed.), *Marsilio Ficino: Commentary on Plotinus, Ennead I*.

gr. 1816) copied from it, both these extant MSS containing annotations in his hand.<sup>203</sup> The commentaries prefixed to the translation reached their final form by 1490. It was in the spring of that year that the entire work was presented in a luxurious manuscript to its dedicatee, Lorenzo de' Medici, this manuscript being now catalogued as MS Bibl. Med. Laur., Plut. 82. 10. and 82. 11. The printed edition appeared from the press of Antonio Miscomini in May 1492. This chronology shows that Ficino spent roughly thirty years working on Plotinus, while the content of his other writings shows that he had thoroughly mastered Plotinian thought by the early 1470s.<sup>204</sup> Among the latter are the commentary on the *Symposium* (= *De amore*), the first redaction of the commentary on the *Philebus*, and especially the *Platonic Theology* (eighteen books). Given the assumption that Plotinus was the philosopher who had resolved the enigmas in Plato's dialogues,<sup>205</sup> it is fair to conclude that for Ficino the philosophies of Plato and Plotinus were only distinct from one another on the rhetorical surface.

It is possible to reconstruct the process of composing the *Commentary on the Enneads* in some detail.<sup>206</sup> We know that Ficino worked in the order of the Porphyrian edition and had completed the commentary up to the first two treatises of the *Third Ennead* by 1487 after which a two-year gap intervened in which he worked instead on translations of various works by other Neoplatonists such as Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, and Synesius. He then returned to Plotinus but soon after decided to write only shorter commentaries in order to prevent the whole project from becoming out of hand.<sup>207</sup>

Ficino's work on these other Neoplatonists made a significant contribution to the development of his own personal philosophy and to the dissemination of late ancient philosophy in general. In addition to his introduction of certain writings by Proclus that had not been known in western Europe during the Middle Ages,<sup>208</sup> his translations of Porphyry's *De abstinence* and *De occasionibus* (= the *Aphormai pros ta noēta*), of Iamblichus' *De mysteriis*, and of Synesius' *De insomniis* helped to propagate a radically new interpretation of

203 On these MSS see C. Förstel, "Marsilio Ficino e il Parigino Greco di Plotino", in S. Gentile, S. Toussaint (eds), *Marsilio Ficino, fonti, testi, fortuna. Atti del convegno internazionale, Firenze 1-3 ottobre 1999* (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2006), p. 65-88.

204 This judgment is based on the dates of *composition* – which are mostly known – rather than those of *publication*.

205 See above.

206 The narrative was constructed on the basis of references in Ficino's letters by P.O. Kristeller, *Supplementum Ficinianum*, 2 vols (Firenze: Olschki, 1937), vol. 1, p. cxxvi-cxxviii.

207 See Marsilio Ficino, *In Enneadem* IV.3, §33.

208 See above.

Platonism in western Europe. Combining as he did the talents of philosopher, philologist, physician, and priest, Ficino not only further extended the general understanding of Neoplatonic theology and metaphysics but also brought into focus Plotinus' doctrines of contemplative nature and cosmic sympathy. In particular, he drew upon the theurgic tradition so prominently displayed in the post-Plotinian writings that he translated in order to develop a theory of natural magic which, especially in combination with the cabalistic magic of Giovanni Pico, established a tradition of "occult philosophy" extending from Cornelius Agrippa in the early sixteenth century down to the German Romantics.

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