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008			221201t20212021gw fo d z eng d
020			_a9783110736199
040			_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda
041	0		_aeng
100	1		_aRiedener, Stefan, _eauthor. _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245	1	0	_aUncertain Values : _bAn Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty / _cStefan Riedener.
264		1	_aBerlin ; _aBoston : _bDe Gruyter, _c[2021]
264		4	_c©2021
300			_a1 online resource (XII, 156 p.)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	0		_aIdeen & Argumente , _x1862-1147
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tAcknowledgments -- _tContents -- _t1 The problem of axiological uncertainty -- _t2 The basic argument -- _t3 Evaluating the argument -- _t4 The problem of intertheoretic comparisons -- _t5 The problem of probabilities -- _t6 The problem of incommensurabilities -- _tA Appendix -- _tBibliography -- _tIndex Rerum -- _tIndex Nominum
506	0		_funrestricted online access _2star
520			_aHow ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable? A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)-the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it's true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty.
530			_aIssued also in print.
536			_afunded by Schweizerischer Nationalfonds (SNF)
538			_aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
540			_aThis eBook is made available Open Access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: _uhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/dg/page/open-access-policy
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 01. Dez 2022)
650		4	_aErwartungswert.
650		4	_aRepräsentationstheoreme.
650		4	_aintertheoretische Vergleiche.
650		4	_anormative Unsicherheit.
653			_aNormative uncertainty.
653			_aexpected value.
653			_aintertheoretic comparisons.
653			_arepresentation theorems.
710	2		_aSchweizerischer Nationalfonds (SNF) _efunder. _4fnd _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/fnd
776	0		_cEPUB _z9783110736229
776	0		_cprint _z9783110739572
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9783110736199 _zOpen Access _70
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9783110736199 _zOpen Access _70
856	4	2	_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9783110736199/original
942			_cE-BOOK
999			_c71283 _d71282