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Countering others' insurgencies : understanding U.S. small-footprint interventions in local context / Stephen Watts, Jason H. Campbell, Patrick B. Johnston, Sameer Lalwani, Sarah H. Bana.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Research report (Rand Corporation) ; RR513.Publisher: Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2014Description: 1 online resource (xxiv, 226 pages) : illustrationsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780833085535
  • 0833085530
Report number: RAND RR513Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Countering others' insurgencies.LOC classification:
  • U241 .W38 2014
Online resources:
Contents:
Introduction -- Counterinsurgency in comparative perspective -- Quantitative analysis of counterinsurgency -- Counterinsurgency in the Philippines -- Counterinsurgency in Pakistan -- Managing troubled partnerships -- Appendix: Coding notes.
Summary: This study examines the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by threatened regimes and the conditions under which U.S. "small-footprint" partnerships are likely to help these governments succeed. The report's findings are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold War (72 in all), and more in-depth analyses are provided of two recent cases of U.S. partnerships with counterinsurgent regimes, in the Philippines and Pakistan. The quantitative analysis finds that the cases of small-footprint U.S. operations that are commonly touted as "success stories" all occurred in countries approximating a best-case scenario. Such a verdict is not meant to deny the importance of U.S. assistance; rather, it is meant to highlight that similar U.S. policies with less promising partner nations should not be expected to produce anywhere near the same levels of success. The majority of insurgencies have taken place in worst-case conditions, and in these environments, counterinsurgent regimes are typically unsuccessful in their efforts to end rebellion, and they often employ violence indiscriminately. The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan largely reinforce the findings of the quantitative analysis. They also highlight the challenges the United States faces in attempting to influence partner regimes to fight counterinsurgencies in the manner that the United States would prefer. The study concludes with policy recommendations for managing troubled partnerships.
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 201-226).

This study examines the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by threatened regimes and the conditions under which U.S. "small-footprint" partnerships are likely to help these governments succeed. The report's findings are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold War (72 in all), and more in-depth analyses are provided of two recent cases of U.S. partnerships with counterinsurgent regimes, in the Philippines and Pakistan. The quantitative analysis finds that the cases of small-footprint U.S. operations that are commonly touted as "success stories" all occurred in countries approximating a best-case scenario. Such a verdict is not meant to deny the importance of U.S. assistance; rather, it is meant to highlight that similar U.S. policies with less promising partner nations should not be expected to produce anywhere near the same levels of success. The majority of insurgencies have taken place in worst-case conditions, and in these environments, counterinsurgent regimes are typically unsuccessful in their efforts to end rebellion, and they often employ violence indiscriminately. The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan largely reinforce the findings of the quantitative analysis. They also highlight the challenges the United States faces in attempting to influence partner regimes to fight counterinsurgencies in the manner that the United States would prefer. The study concludes with policy recommendations for managing troubled partnerships.

"The research described in this report was sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation ..."

Introduction -- Counterinsurgency in comparative perspective -- Quantitative analysis of counterinsurgency -- Counterinsurgency in the Philippines -- Counterinsurgency in Pakistan -- Managing troubled partnerships -- Appendix: Coding notes.

Online resource; title from PDF title page (RAND, viewed on October 28, 2014).

English.

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